1. People versus George Bongalon, G.R. No. 169533, March 20, 2013.

FACTS:

George Bongalon (petitioner) was charged with the crime of child abuse under
Section 10 (a) of RA No. 7610 for striking with his palm and slapping a twelve
year old, Jayson Dela Cruz (Jayson). The Information alleges that as Jayson
and his brother Roldan was passing through the petitioner's house during a
procession, Mary Ann Rose, a minor daughter of the petitioner, threw stones at
Jayson and called him "sissy." The petitioner then confronted Jayson and
Roldan, calling both names like "strangers" and "animals." The petitioner then
struck Jayson at the back with his hand and slapped the same on the face.
The petitioner then went to their house and challenged Rolando dela Cruz, the
father of Jayson but the former did not come out of the house. Afterwards,
Rolando later brough Jayson to the police station and reported the incident.
The medical certificate attests that Jayson suffered the following injuriest: (1)
contusion .5 x 2.5 scapular area, left; and (2) +1x1 cm. contusion left
zygomatic area and contusion .5 x 2.33 cm. scapular area, left.

The petitioner denied maltreating Jayson and said that he confronted the latter
after her minor daughter told him that Jayson and his brother were throwing
stones at her daughter and that they burned the hair of Cherryln, other minor
daughter of the petitioner.

The RTC found the petitioner guilty of child abuse and the decision was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of the crime of child abuse under Section
10 (a) of RA No. 7610.

HELD:
No. The Court set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals and convicted the
petitioner of the crime of slight physical injuries.

Section 10 (a), Article VI of Republic Act No. 7610, states that:

Section 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and other
Conditions Prejudicial to the Child’s Development. –
(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or
exploitation or be responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child’s
development including those covered by Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603,
as amended, but not covered by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall
suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period.
xxxx
Child abuse, the crime charged, is defined by Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No.
7610, as follows:
Section 3. Definition of terms. –
xxxx
(b) "Child Abuse" refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child
which includes any of the following:
(1) Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and
emotional maltreatment;
(2) Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or demeans the
intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being;
(3) Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for survival, such as food
and shelter; or
(4) Failure to immediately give medical treatment to an injured child
resulting in serious impairment of his growth and development or in his
permanent incapacity or death.
The Court ruled that the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the petitioner
beyond reasonable doubt with the crime charged since the evidence did not
show that the laying hands on Jayson by the petitioner was intended to debase
the "intrinsic worth and dignity" of the latter as a human being nor to
humiliate or embarrass the same. Instead, the Court held that the act of the
petitioner have been done at the spur of the moment and anger as a result of
his fatherly concern on the safety of his minor daughters, thereby losing his
self control. With absence of self-control, the specific intent, which is essential
to the crime of child abuse, to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth
and dignity of a child as a human being cannot be established.
Lastly, the Court held that petitioner should be convicted with the crime of
physical injuries since the wound of Jayson required five to seven days of
medical attention. Specifically, Art 266 of the Revised Penal Code states:
Article 266. Slight physical injuries and maltreatment. — The crime of slight
physical injuries shall be punished:
1. By arresto menor when the offender has inflicted physical injuries which shall
incapacitate the offended party for labor from one to nine days, or shall require
medical attendance during the same period.
The Court also applied the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation
due to the loss in reason and self-control on the part of the accused.

2. People versus Claudio Teehankee, Jr., G.R. Nos. 111206-08, October 6,

1995.

FACTS:

Claudio Teehankee Jr. (accused) was charged with (1) Murder for the killing of
Ronald Chapman (Ronald); (2) Frustrated Murder for the shooting of Jussi
Leino (Leino) and (3) Frustrated Murder for the shooting of Maureen Hultman
(Maureen), who died during the course of trial, thereby amending the charge
from frustrated murder to murder.

On July 12, 1991, Maureen requested Leino to take her home at Campanilla
Street, Dasmarinas Village, Makati City with Ronald tagging along. They
stopped at a few blocks away from Maureen's house as per request of the
latter. Leino offered to walk Maureen home while Chapman stayed at the car.
The accused, who was then driving his car, stopped at the corner of Caballero
and Mahogany streets where Maureen and Leino are walking. The accused
went out of his vehicle, approached the two and demanded for their Ids.
Instead of checking it, he grabbed the wallet from Leino's hands. Chapman,
witnessing the incident, approached the three and confronted the accused. The
accused then pulled out his gun and shot Chapman. Leino and Maureen
witnessed Chapman being shot and then Maureen started panicking and
shouting for help. The accused ordered the two to sit down on the sidewalk,
and eventually shot Leino first. The bullet hit her upper jaw, stumbled
backwards but did not lose consciousness. Leino heard another shot and saw
Maureen fall beside him. He then saw the accused return to his car and drive
away. Three eye witness heard the first gunshot-- (1)DOMINGO FLORECE, a
private security guard hired by Stephen Roxas to secure his residence at #1357
Caballero Street, Dasmariñas Village, Makati; (2) VICENTE MANGUBAT, a
stay-in driver of Margarita Canto, residing at #1352 Caballero Street, corner
Mahogany Street, Dasmariñas Village; (3) and AGRIPINO CADENAS, a private
security guard assigned at the house of Rey Dempsey, located at #1351
Caballero Street, corner Mahogany Street, Dasmariñas Village.

All three witnesses saw the incident. Both Cadenas and Mangubat saw the
gunman's face. Cadenas identified the plate number of the car of the accused
and gave it as PDW 566.

ISSUE(s):
I. Whether or not the trial court erred in finding that the accused had
been positively identified by Leino, Cadenas, and Magubat as the
perpetrator
 II. Whether or not the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt

HELD:

FIRST ISSUE: No. The positive identification, though done out of court, by
Leino, Cadenas and Mangubat is with credit. Identification testimony has at
least three components. First, witnessing a crime, whether as a victim or a
bystander, involves perception of an event actually occurring. Second, the
witness must memorize details of the event. Third, the witness must be able to
recall and communicate accurately. Out-of-court identification is thru show-
ups where the suspect alone is brought face to face with the witness for
identification; thru mug shots where photographs are shown to the witness to
identify the suspect; or thru line-ups where a witness identifies the suspect
from a group of persons lined up for the purpose. To ensure the integrity of the
identification, the totality of circumstances test was adopted by the Courts. In
this case, the Court is convinced that the irregularities cited by the accused did
not affect nor resulted to his misidentification.

SECOND ISSUE: Yes. The Court concurs with the decision of the trial court
convicting the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt. The trial court may
have committed error in citing his involvement in the previous shootings, but
the Court considered such error as slight and insignificant compared to the
positive identification of him by the witnesses as the perpetrator. The Court
was also not convinced with the petitioner's argument that he cannot be guilty
for the paraffin test turned out negative. This was because paraffin tests, as
ruled in previous cases, was not a reliable method in establishing that the
source of nitrates was the discharge of a firearm; it can only establish the
absence or presence of the same. Add to that is the interval of the time when
the test was conducted as to the time when the shooting occurred which is 72
hrs. According to the NBI Forensic Chemist, because of the time interval, the
test may be unreliable.

3. People versus Manuel Macal y Bolasco, G.R. No. 211062, January 13,
2016.

FACTS:

Manual Macal y Bolasco (accused) was charged with the crime of parricide for
killing his wife Auria Ytac Macal (Auria). The accused pleaded not guilty to the
crime.

The prosecution presented Angeles Ytac (Angeles), the mother of Auria, as a

witness who testified that around 1:20 in the morning of February 12, 2003,
after they have played bingo at a local peryahan, she and her children,
including Auria, with some friends who tagged along, were walking towards
their house when they spotted the accused. The accused joined them in
walking back to their house. Upon arriving at their house, they proceeded to
the living room, while the accused and his wife Auria went inside their room
which is about four meters away from the living room. After a short while,
Angeles heard the scream of her daughter asking for her help and shouting
"mother help me I am going to be killed." Angeles and the rest rushed towards
the locked door, then Arvin kicked open the door then they saw Auria covered
in blood on the other side of the door. They then saw the accused trying to stab
himself with an improvised bladed weapon in a form of a belt buckle. Then the
accused fled the scene even before the policemen came. Erwin, also a witness
to the prosecution, who was part of the group who tagged along with Auria
corroborated the testimony of Angeles and testified that once the door to teh
bedroom was forcibly opened, he became aware that the accused stabbed Auria
on the upper left portion of her chest with a kitchen knife and that the accused
stabbed himself on the chest with a belt buckle; and then the accused
hurriedly fled.

On the other hand, the accused, in his version of the facts, states that on
February 12, 2003, when he arrived at their house and before coming up to
their bedroom, Arvin, his borther-in-law, warned him not to go to their
bedroom for there was a man inside with Auria. The accused went to their
bedroom, despite the warning of Arvin. He then found his wife sitting and
conversing with a man. Furious to what he seen, he went out of the room to
grab a knife and delivered a stab blow towards the man but it was shielded by
Auria, thereby hitting her instead. The man then ran outside the house. Out of
frustration that he failed to kill the man, the accused wounded himself on the
chest. He then left the house and went to a hospital for medical treatment. One
of the witnesses of the defense, Benito attested that he was with the accused
when he came home to their house. They met when they were seated next to
each other on board a bus to Tacloban City. Since it was already midnight and
there was no bus available going to Benito's final destination, he agreed to stay
the night at the house of the accused. Benito testified that once they reached
the house, he stayed at the main door while the accused went inside the house.
The accused then asked someone about the whereabouts of his wife and a
woman answered that Auria was inside the bedroom but advised him not to go
inside for there is a man inside. After a while, he heard a thudding sound from
the bedroom and then saw a man running out of the house.

The RTC found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
parricide. This decision was then affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
parricide
HELD:
Yes. The Court affirms the decision of the Court of Appeals.

Under the Revised Penal Code, Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is
killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the accused; (3) the deceased is the father,
mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other
ascendants or other descendants, or the legitimate spouse of the accused.

The relationship between the offender and the victim should be established in
distinguishing the crime of parricide from homicide. In this case, the spousal
relationship between the accused and the victim has been properly established
based from the marriage certificate presented by the prosecution and also from
the oral evidence coming from the accused confirming and admitting their
spousal relationship.

The death of the victim cannot be contested evidenced by the Death Certificate
presented. As to the second element, the Court held that there was no doubt
that Auria was killed by the accused since it was the accused himself who
admitted to the stabbing.

As to the argument of the defense invoking Article 12 par. 4 of the Revised

Penal Code, the Court held that in this case, affirmative defense of accident as
an exempting circumstance must fail. Pursuant to said provision, the essential
requisites of accident as an exempting circumstance are: (1) a person is
performing a lawful act; (2) with due care; (3) he causes an injury to another by
mere accident; and (4) without fault or intention of causing it. This defense
presupposes absence of intention to kill. In addition, the burden of proof by
clear and convincing evidence of accidental infliction of injuries on the victim
lies with the accused. In this case, the Court held that the defense failed to
discharge the burden of proving the exempting circumstance of accident since
based from the testimonies of the accused, in his act of delivering the stab
blow, he has the intent to kill the man he found in their bedroom. Thus, the
accused is not actually performing a lawful act when he accidentally stabbed
his wife instead of the man. Also, the Court held that if it was indeed an
accident, the accused, upon learning that he instead injured his wife, should
have taken his wife to the hospital. Instead, his priority was to produce an
improvised bladed weapon in a form of a belt buckle in order to hurt himself
then fled the scene.

Lastly, the Court ruled that the accused cannot also invoke the absolutory
cause provided for under Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code which has the
following elements: (1) that a legally married person surprises his spouse in the
act of committing sexual intercourse with another person; (2) that he kills any
of them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter; and (3) that he
has not promoted or facilitated the prostitution of his wife (or daughter) or that
he or she has not consented to the infidelity of the other spouse. Since, as
testified by the accused, when he entered their bedroom, he saw his wife
talking with a man seated beside her and not in the act of committing sexual
intercourse, Art. 247 cannot be applied.