Working With Mental Health Experts On Workplace Claims: Some Practical Advice
Working With Mental Health Experts On Workplace Claims: Some Practical Advice
Education
and
Georgetown University Law Center Continuing Legal Education
by
"Emotions are intangible, but they are none the less perceptible.
The hurt done to feelings and to reputation by an invasion of
constitutional rights is no less real and no less compensable than
the cost of repairing a broken window pane or a damaged lock.
Wounded psyche and soul are to be salved by damages as much as
the property that can be replaced at the local hardware store."
Baskin v. Parker, 602 F.2d 1205, 1209 (5th Cir. 1979).
*
Robert B. Fitzpatrick of the Washington, D.C. law firm of Robert B. Fitzpatrick, PLLC, represents clients
in employment law and employee benefits matters. Mr. Fitzpatrick has concentrated his practice in employment law
disputes for more than thirty-five years and has been described by the National Law Journal as being among the top
employment lawyers in the country. He serves on numerous bar association committees related to employment law.
In addition to an active employment practice, he offers his services as a mediator of employment disputes. He also
testifies as an expert witness in employment cases. A nationally known lecturer, Mr. Fitzpatrick chairs a number of
ALI-ABA and Georgetown Law School employment law courses.
ii
8Copyright, 2006, Robert B. Fitzpatrick, Esq., Robert B. Fitzpatrick, PLLC, Washington, D.C.
DISCLAIMER OF ALL LIABILITY AND RESPONSIBILITY
THIS PAPER IS PRESENTED WITH THE UNDERSTANDING THAT THE AUTHOR DOES NOT RENDER
ANY LEGAL, ACCOUNTING OR OTHER PROFESSIONAL SERVICE. DUE TO THE RAPIDLY
CHANGING NATURE OF THE LAW, INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS PAPER MAY BECOME
OUTDATED. AS A RESULT, AN ATTORNEY USING THIS MATERIAL MUST ALWAYS RESEARCH
ORIGINAL SOURCES OF AUTHORITY AND UPDATE INFORMATION TO ENSURE ACCURACY
WHEN DEALING WITH A SPECIFIC CLIENT'S LEGAL MATTERS. IN NO EVENT WILL THE AUTHOR
BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES RESULTING FROM THE
USE OF THIS MATERIAL.
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 1
Civil Rules.................................................................................................................................. 4
Checklist................................................................................................................................. 178
Medical Release........................................................................................................................ 23
iv
Records to Gather ................................................................................................................... 245
Conclusion................................................................................................................................ 50
v
ATTACHMENT B ................................................................................................................. 565
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Abdulwali v. Washington Metro Area Transit Authority, 193 F.R.D. 10 (D.D.C. 2000)............ 38
Acosta v. Tenneco Oil Co., 913 F.2d 205, 208 (5th Cir. 1990) .................................................. 35
Ali v. Wang Laboratories, Inc., 162 F.R.D. 165 (M.D. Fla. 1995) ............................................. 37
Alston v. Greater Southeast Community Hosp., 107 F.R.D. 35 (D.D.C. 1985) .......................... 24
Barnes v. American Tobacco, Co., 1997 US Dist Lexis 10550 (E.D. Pa. 1997)......................... 41
Beasley v. National Rifle Assoc. of America, et al., Civ. Action No. 89-11277 (D.C. Superior
Bethel v. Dixie Homecrafters, Inc., 192 F.R.D. 320 (N.D. Ga. 2000) ........................................ 38
Biggs v. Village of Dupo, 892 F.2d 1298 (7th Cir. 1990) .......................................................... 11
Bigoni v. Pay 'N Pak Stores, 48 FEP Cases (BNA) 732, 733 (D.Or. 1988) ................................ 17
Bohrer v. Merrill-Dow Pharmaceutical, Inc., 122 F.R.D. 217 (D.N.D. 1987) ............................ 24
Bolden v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transp. Authority, 21 F.3rd 29 (3rd Cir. 1994) ............... 17
Bottomly v. Leucadia National, 163 F.R.D. 617 (D. Ut. 1995) .................................................. 32
vi
Bridges v. Eastman Kodak Co., 850 F.Supp. 216, 221 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).................................... 35
Bultmeyer v. Ft. Wayne Cmty. Schools, 100 F.3d 1281 (7th Cir. 1996) ...................................... 2
Burrel v. Crown Central Petroleum, Inc., 177 F.R.D. 376 (E.D. Tex. 1997) .............................. 32
C.I.R. v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323, 67 FEP Cases (BNA) 1745 (1995) .......................................... 3
Chalmers v. City of Los Angeles, 762 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1985) ................................................ 11
Chaparro v. IBP, Inc., 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18438 (D.Kan. 1994)......................................... 38
Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Puerto Rico v. Negron Torres, 255 F.2d 149 (1st Cir. 1958) ............ 35
Cohen v. Bd. of Ed., Smithtown Central Sch. Dist., 728 F.2d 160 (2nd Cir. 1984) .................... 11
Cote v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., Civ. #93-0184-B (D.Me. April 11, 1994) .................................. 24
Criado v. IBM Corp., 145 F.3d 437 (1st Cir. 1998) ..................................................................... 2
Cross v. General Motors Corp., 40 FEP Cases (BNA) 415 (E.D. Mo. 1982) ............................. 29
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., U.S. , 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d
Delaney v. City of Hampton, 999 F.Supp. 794 (4th Cir. 1998) .................................................. 18
Dominquez v. Syntex Laboratories, Inc., 149 F.R.D. 158 (D. Ind., February 12, 1993) ............. 42
Duprey v. Wagner, 451 A.2d 416, 419 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1982) ................................................... 36
Duquette v. Superior Court, 778 P.2d 634 (Ct. App. Ariz. 1989)............................................... 24
Durst v. Superior Court, 222 Cal. App. 2d 447, 35 Cal. Rptr. 143, 7 A.L.R. 3d 9874, 877-78
(1963)....................................................................................................................................... 39
Eberle v. Savon Food Stores, Inc., 30 Mich. App. 496, 500, 186 N.W.2d 837, 839 (1971) ........ 42
EEOC v. Old Western Furniture Corp., 173 F.R.D. 444 (D.C. Tex 1996)............................ 32, 35
Fields v. State, 221 Ga. 307, 308-09, 144 S.E.2d 339, 342 (1965) ............................................. 42
Fischer v. Coastal Towing Incorporated, 168 F.R.D. 199 (E.D.Tex. 1996) ................................ 40
Ford v. Contra Costa County, 179 F.R.D. 579 (N.D. Cal. 1998)................................................ 32
Fritsch v. City of Chula Vista, 187 F.R.D. 614 (C.D. Cal. 1999) ............................................... 32
Frye v. United States, 54 U.S. App. D.C. 46, 293 F.2d. 1013, 1014 (1923) ............................. 5, 7
Gatewood v. Stone Container Corp., 170 F.R.D. 455 (S.D. Iowa 1996)..................................... 32
Gier By and Through Gier v. Educ. Serv. Unit No. 16, 66 F.3d 940 (8th Cir. 1995) .................... 9
Gladfelter v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 162 F.R.D. 589 (D.Neb. 1995) .......................................... 17
Government of Virgin Islands v. Penn, 838 F.Supp. 1054, 1056-57 (D.Virgin Islands 1993)....... 7
viii
Greenhorn v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 216 F.R.D. 649 (D. Kan. 2003).............................................. 41
Hardy v. ESSROC Materials, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2390 (E.D.Pa. 1998) .............................. 35
Henry v. City of Tallahassee, 2000 U.S. Dist. Lexis 20469 (N.D. Fla. 2000)............................. 41
Hertenstein v. Kimberly Home Health Care Inc., 189 F.R.D. 620 (D. Kan. 1999) ............... 38, 41
Hirschheimer v. Associated Metals & Minerals Corp., 1995 U.S. Dist. Lexis 18378 (S.D.N.Y.
Horner v. Rowan Companies, Inc., 153 F.R.D. 597 (S.D. Tex. 1994)........................................ 24
Hunter v. Sullivan, 993 F.2d 31, 35, n.3 (4th Cir. 1992) ............................................................ 14
Jackson v. Entergy Operations, 1998 U.S. Dist. Lexis 752 (E.D. La. 1998)......................... 35, 41
Jansen v. Packaging Corp. of America, 158 F.R.D. 409 (N.D. Ill. 1994) ................................... 39
Jefferys v. LRP Publicaions, Inc., 184 F.R.D. 262 (E.D. Pa. 1999)............................................ 41
Jenkins v. American Red Cross, 369 N.W.2d 223, 230, 43 FEP Cases (BNA) 1145 (1985)......... 2
Kelley v. Smith & Oby Co., 70 Ohio L. Abs. 202, 129 N.E. 2d 106 (1954)............................... 38
Keplinger v. Virginia Electric & Power Co., 208 W. Va. 11 (2000) .......................................... 32
Large v. Our Lady of Mercy Medical Ctr., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1702 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) ........ 36
Lemon v. Klibert, 1998 U.S. Dist. Lexis 18174 (E.D. La 1998) ................................................ 41
Lilley v. BTM Corp., 58 FEP Cases (BNA) 498, 505 (6th Cir. 1992)...................................... 1, 2
Looney v. National R.R. Corp., 142 F.R.D. 264 (D.Mass. 1992) ............................................... 41
MacDonald v. United States, 767 F.Supp. 1295 (M.D.Pa. 1991), aff'd., 983 F.2d 1051 (3d Cir.
1992) ........................................................................................................................................ 24
Marable v. Walker, 704 F.2d 1219 (11th Cir. 1983); Williams v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 660
McAlindin v. County of San Diego, 192 F.3d 1226 (9th Cir. 1999)............................................. 2
1993) ........................................................................................................................................ 17
McCleland v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 1995 WL 571324 (N.D. Ill. 1995) ............................. 18
McQuillen v. City of Sioux City, 306 N.W.2d 789, 791 (Iowa 1981) ........................................ 36
Milam v. Mitchell, 274 N.Y.S.2d. 326 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1966) ................................................. 38
Mohamed v. Marriott International, Inc., 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2788 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)........... 15
Moody v. Pepsi-Cola Metro. Bottling Co., 915 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1990)..................................... 2
Mulholland v. Dietz Co., 896 F.Supp. 179 (E.D. Pa. 1994) ....................................................... 17
Murray v. Specialty Chemicals Co., 100 Misc. 2d 658, 418 N.Y.S.2d 748 (1979) ..................... 38
O'Quinn v. New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 163 F.R.D. 226 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) ................................. 35
Pazer v. New York State Bd. of Law Examiners, 849 F.Supp. 284 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) ................... 2
Reese v. Batesville Casket Co., Civil Action No. 79-1645 (D.D.C., May 13, 1980) .................. 38
Robin v. Assoc. Indemnity Co., 297 So.2d 427, 430 (La. 1973) .......................................... 38, 39
Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 118 F.R.D. 525 (N.D. Fla. 1988) .............................. 37
Ruhlmann v. Ulster County Dep’t of Social Servs., 194 F.R.D. 445 (N.D.N.Y. 2000)............... 37
Sabree v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America, 126 F.R.D. 422 (D.Mass
1989) ........................................................................................................................................ 37
Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 118-119, 85 S.Ct. 234, 13 L.Ed.2d 152 (1964) ....... 34, 35
Schumacher v. Souderton Area School Dist., 2000 WL 72047 (E.D. Pa. 2000)........................... 2
Shepard v. American Broadcasting Corp., Inc., 862 F. Supp. 486 (D.D.C. 1994) ...................... 13
Shirsat v. Mutual Pharmaceutical Co., Inc., 169 F.R.D. 68 (E.D. Pa. 1996)............................... 38
Sklagen v. Greater Southeast Community Hospital, 625 F.Supp. 991 (D.D.C. 1984)................. 24
Smedley v. Capps, Staples, Ward, Hastings & Dodson, 820 F.Supp. 1227 (N.D. Cal. 1993) ..... 37
Smith v. J.I. Case Corp., 163 F.R.D. 229 (E.D. Pa. 1995).......................................................... 37
Soybel v. Gruber, 132 Misc. 2d 343, 345-46, 504 N.Y.S.2d 354, 356 (1986) ............................ 42
Spence v. Board of Educ. of Christina Sch. Dist., 806 F.2d 1198 (3rd Cir. 1986) ...................... 11
Stasiak v. Illinois Valley Cmty Hosp., 590 N.E.2d 974 (Ill. Ct. App. 1992)............................... 36
xi
State v. Szatmari, 163 N.J. Super. 418, 394 A.2d 1254 (1978) .................................................. 38
Storms v. Lowe=s Home Centers, Inc., 211 F.R.D. 296 (W.D. Va. 2002) ................................. 40
Tietjern v. Department of Labor, 13 Wash. App. 86, 534 P.2d 151 (1975) ................................ 38
Tomlin v. Holecek, 150 F.R.D. 628, 630 (D.Minn. 1993) ................................................... 15, 38
Turick by Turick v. Yamaha Motor Corp. U.S.A., 121 F.R.D. 32, 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) ............. 29
United States v. Smith, 869 F.2d 348, 353-354 (7th Cir.1989) .................................................... 7
United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194, 1198 (2d Cir. 1978)................................................... 7
Urseth v. City of Dayton, Ohio, 653 F. Supp. 1057, 1066 (S.D. Ohio 1986).............................. 29
Usher v. Lakewood Eng. & Mfg. Co., 158 F.R.D. 411 (N.D.Ill. 1994) ................................ 22, 42
Vansconcellos v. Cybex Int’l, Inc., 962 F.Supp. 701 (D. My. 1997).......................................... 32
Whitfield v. Superior Court, 246 Cal. App. 2d 81, 54 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1966).............................. 38
Williams v. Trader Publ’g Co., 218 F.3d 481 (5th Cir. 2000) .................................................... 11
Wilson v. GMC, 454 N.W.2d 405, 415, 54 FEP Cases (BNA) 680 (1990) .................................. 2
Zabkowicz v. West Bend Co., 585 F.Supp. 635 (E.D. Wis. 1984) ............................................. 38
Statutes
xii
Americans with Disabilities Act.................................................................................................. 2
Other Authorities
A United States District Judge's View of the Impartial Medical Expert System, 32 F.R.D. 498,
American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law Ethical Guidelines for the Practice of Forensic
Psychiatry. Adopted May 1987 - Revised October, 1989 and 1991, Baltimore, MD................. 11
Between Psychiatrist or Psychologist and Patient, 44 A.L.R.3d 24, 50-52 (1972 & Supp. 1987)42
Bales, Richard A. and Ray, Priscilla, “The Availability of Rule 35 Mental Examinations in
"Challenging the Plaintiff's Diagnosis of Psychological Injury," The Personal Injury Law
Hallahan, Tim, “Everything you Need to Know about Expert Witnesses,” 8 The Practical
Joyce, Thomas F. and Fay, Thomas F., AThe Aftermath and Implications of the Schleier
Decision: Are Civil Rights Settlements and Verdicts Totally Taxable?,@ presented at a luncheon
co-sponsored by the D.C. Bar and the Metropolitan Washington Employment Lawyers
xiii
Association (1995)...................................................................................................................... 3
Kutchins & Kirk, “Making Us Crazy: DSM: The Psychiatric Bible and the Creation of Mental
Levin, “Workplace Violence: Navigating through the Minefield of Legal Liability,” The Labor
McDonald, James J. Jr. and Lees-Haley, Paul R., “Avoiding ‘Junk Science’ in Sexual
McDonald & Kulick, “Mental and Emotional Injuries in Employment Litigation (Bureau of
McElhaney, James W., "Fixing the Expert Mess," Vol. 20, No. 1, p. 53 (Litigation, Fall 1993)... 2
Milite, G., "Workplace Violence: You're Not Alone," Supervisory Management (September
1993) .......................................................................................................................................... 2
Payton, “Psychiatric Disabilities in the Workplace,” Employment Law Counselor (January 2004)
................................................................................................................................................... 2
Pope, Kenneth S., Butcher, James N., and Seelen, Joyce, "MMPI, MMPI-2, and MMPI-A In
Court: Assessment, Testimony, and Cross-Examination for Expert Witnesses and Attorneys"
Silvain, Peter B., The Defense Deposition Atlas (The Med/Psych Press Inc.)............................ 43
Smith, “Understanding How to Apply the DSM-IV to a Case under the ADA,” 17 The Labor
Spiegel, Alix, “The Dictionary of Disorder”, The New Yorker (January 3, 2005)...................... 13
Tancredi, "Malingering: A Psychiatric Dilemma," (Insurance/ Defense Review, Fall 1992) ..... 46
Thomas, “Right of Party to have Attorney or Physician Present During Physical or Mental
Udovitch, Mim “I’m O.K., You’re 300.02” (New York Times Book Review) .......................... 13
Related Inquiries and Medical Examinations under the ADA, July 26, 2000, FEPM 405: 7701,
"Violence in the Workplace Survey Results," Society for Human Resource Management,
December, 1993.......................................................................................................................... 2
Rules
xv
WORKING WITH MENTAL HEALTH EXPERTS
ON WORKPLACE CLAIMS: SOME PRACTICAL ADVICE
by
Introduction
Prior to the passage of the latest wave of employment discrimination laws, plaintiffs were
obtaining substantial judgments awarding emotional distress1 damages in employment cases.2
*
Robert B. Fitzpatrick of the Washington, D.C. law firm of Robert B. Fitzpatrick, PLLC, represents clients
in employment law and employee benefits matters. Mr. Fitzpatrick has concentrated his practice in employment law
disputes for more than thirty-five years and has been described by the National Law Journal as being among the top
employment lawyers in the country. He serves on numerous bar association committees related to employment law.
In addition to an active employment practice, he offers his services as a mediator of employment disputes. He also
testifies as an expert witness in employment cases. A nationally known lecturer, Mr. Fitzpatrick chairs a number of
ALI-ABA and Georgetown Law School employment law courses.
1
The Restatement (Second) of Torts defines “emotional distress” as encompassing “all unpleasant mental reactions,
such as fright, horror, grief, shame, humiliation, embarrassment, chagrin, disappointment, worry, and nausea.”
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46.
2
The court in Lilley v. BTM Corp., 58 FEP Cases (BNA) 498, 505 (6th Cir. 1992), upheld a $350,000 award for
mental anguish damages wherein the plaintiff’s proof consisted of the following:
• plaintiff’s testimony regarding feelings of anguish and embarrassment following his discharge;
1
With the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 which broadens the relief available
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII") and the Americans with Disabilities
Act ("ADA") to include compensatory and punitive damages, the prevalence of claims of mental
anguish has been expected to rise dramatically in workplace disputes. A substantial number of
the claims being filed under the Americans With Disabilities Act are predicated on alleged
mental disabilities ranging from learning disability (LD) cases3 to emotional disturbances4 that
claimants assert are covered disabilities.5 And, if the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
("ADEA") is amended to track the Civil Rights Act of 1991's remedial scheme, mental anguish
claims will increase even more. Workplace violence is on the rise and sometimes counsel will
be working with mental health practitioners (MHPs) in prevention, assessment, and/or litigation
arising out of an incidence of violence.6 Employers have been permitted to terminate employees
with an emotional order when that disorder causes the employee to engage in violent conduct.7
See, e.g., Kientzy v. McDonnell Douglas, 990 F.2d 1051 (8th Cir. 1993) ($125,000 award for mental anguish,
$25,000 for future mental anguish); Lilley, 58 FEP Cases (BNA) at 505 ($350,000 award); Moody v. Pepsi-Cola
Metro. Bottling Co., 915 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1990) ($150,000 award); Wilson v. GMC, 454 N.W.2d 405, 415, 54
FEP Cases (BNA) 680 (1990) ($375,000 award); Jenkins v. American Red Cross, 369 N.W.2d 223, 230, 43 FEP
Cases (BNA) 1145 (1985) ($500,000 award).
3
See, e.g., Pazer v. New York State Bd. of Law Examiners, 849 F.Supp. 284 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (bar examination
applicant failed to show that he suffered from a learning disability (dysgraphia) under ADA).
4
See, Schumacher v. Souderton Area School Dist., 2000 WL 72047 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (Attention Deficit
Hyperactivity Disorder is “unquestionably” a mental impairment); McAlindin v. County of San Diego, 192 F.3d
1226 (9th Cir. 1999) (panic disorders may be mental illnesses under the ADA); Criado v. IBM Corp., 145 F.3d 437
(1st Cir. 1998) (depression sometimes constitutes a disability under the ADA); Bultmeyer v. Ft. Wayne Cmty.
Schools, 100 F.3d 1281 (7th Cir. 1996) (bipolar and paranoid schizophrenia may be mental illnesses under the
ADA).
5
Great uncertainty surrounds the definition of a mental impairment under the ADA. See, e.g., Edwards, "The ADA
and the Employment of Individuals with Mental Disabilities," 18 Employee Rel.L.J. No. 3, 347 (Winter 1992-93);
Payton, “Psychiatric Disabilities in the Workplace,” Employment Law Counselor (January 2004); Wolkinson,
“Mental Fitness for Duty Examinations Under the ADA,” Employee Rel.L.J. No. 29, 1 (Summer 2003); McDonald
& Kulick, “Mental and Emotional Injuries in Employment Litigation (Bureau of National Affairs, Washington, D.C.
2001).
6
S.L. Smith, "Violence in the Workplace: A Cry for Help," Occupational Hazards (October 1993); O.M. Kurland,
"Workplace Violence," Risk Management (June 1993); "Violence in the Workplace Survey Results," Society for
Human Resource Management, December, 1993; G. Milite, "Workplace Violence: You're Not Alone," Supervisory
Management (September 1993);
7
Levin, “Workplace Violence: Navigating through the Minefield of Legal Liability,” 11 The Labor Lawyer 171
(Summer 1995).
2
Many employers have enhanced their employee assistance programs (EAPs) in recent years, and
some have MHPs on staff or refer employees to MHPs. Counsel for employers sometimes in
such circumstances have to advise clients regarding the use of a MHP by an EAP and counsel for
employees have to advise on privacy concerns among others. The federal, state and local family
and medical leave acts sometimes involve MHPs as, for example, in determining whether an
emotional problems is a Aserious health condition@ under the federal statute. Stress-related
workers compensation claims continue to increase dramatically as the courts expand the scope of
workers compensation to cover stress-related claims. Finally, a colorable claim of emotional
distress may be important for tax reasons. After the Court's 1995 decision in C.I.R. v. Schleier,8
all other damage claims under the civil rights laws may give rise to taxable income, leaving
emotional distress damages as the only possible source of non-taxable recovery. There is
considerable doubt whether emotional distress will be found under the Code as non-taxable as
well as legislative efforts to make it explicitly taxable.9
Over the past 37 years, the author has worked with experts in various mental health
disciplines, including psychiatrists, clinical psychologists, psychiatric social workers, and
holistic counselors in workplace disputes. The emphasis of this article is on options potentially
available to counsel in working with mental health records, reports and testimony of mental
health practitioners. Every effort has been made to suggest cost effective options.
8
515 U.S. 323, 67 FEP Cases (BNA) 1745 (1995).
9
See Thomas F. Joyce and Raymond C. Fay, AThe Aftermath and Implications of the Schleier Decision: Are Civil
Rights Settlements and Verdicts Totally Taxable?,@ presented at a luncheon co-sponsored by the D.C. Bar and the
Metropolitan Washington Employment Lawyers Association (1995).
3
Civil Rules
Prior to December 1, 1993, testimonial experts in some jurisdictions did not have to
submit a written report. One advantage of no report is obvious: the absence of a written report
denied a fixed target for the other side to shoot at. In addition, the old Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure Rule 26(b)(4) many times allowed counsel to be less specific than the reports have to
be under the amended rule. No written reports also arguably lowered litigation costs. The
absence of a written report to use in settlement negotiations, however, could be a significant
detriment to settling the case.
The current federal rule, Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 26(a)(2)(B), dramatically changed the
inconsistency in this area of practice by requiring that:
Thus, under the current version of Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 26(a)(2)(B), the testimonial expert
(sometimes referred to as "the forensic") is required to prepare a written report which sets forth
all opinions and an identifies everything considered in forming those opinions, not just that upon
which the expert actually relied. Counsel is also cautioned to be sensitive to the time limits
under the current rule within which to identify testimonial experts.10 Additionally, the current
rule requires the proponent of a putative expert to identify all cases in which the so-called expert
has testified in the last four years and all articles authored by the individual in the last ten years.
See Rule 26(a)(2)(B) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
10
Rule 26(a)(2)(C) states that disclosure shall be made in the sequence directed by the court. In the absence of
other directions from the court, the disclosures shall be made at least 90 days before the trial date.
4
Under the current rule, the defense forensic, unless otherwise stipulated or ordered, will
have to prepare a written report just like the claimant's forensic. As stated, there are specific
time limits in the rule and a substantial amount of detailed information that must be provided by
the expert to the other side. Accordingly, there is an increasing need for counsel to work with
mental health testimony, reports, and the so-called experts.
Daubert Decision
13
See Edward J. Imwinkelried, "The Daubert Decision: Frye is Dead, Long Live the Federal Rules of Evidence,"
Vol. 29, No. 9, p. 60 (Trial, September 1993); James W. McElhaney, "Fixing the Expert Mess," Vol. 20, No. 1, p. 53
5
Also, in Daubert, the Supreme Court emphasized that Fed. R. Evid. 702 governs the
admission of expert scientific testimony. That rule provides:
The District Court of the Virgin Islands succinctly summarized the holding in Daubert as
follows:
(Litigation, Fall 1993). See also Edward J. Imwinkelried, "The `Bases' of Expert Testimony: The Syllogistic
Structure of Scientific Testimony," 67 N.C.L.Rev. passim (1988).
6
"the court should consider the known or potential rate of error, (Id.) citing United
States v. Smith, 869 F.2d 348, 353-354 (7th Cir.1989), [as well as] the existence
and maintenance of standards controlling the technique's operation," (Id. 509 U.S.
at 594, 113 S.Ct. at 2797 (citing United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194, 1198
(2d Cir. 1978), and lastly (4) the degree to which the theory or technique is
accepted by a "`relevant scientific community,'" (Id. (quoting United States v.
Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1238 (3d Cir.1985)).
The second requirement, that the evidence must assist the trier of fact,
"goes primarily to relevance." (Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591, 113 S.Ct. at 2795.)
Here, the court must determine "`whether expert testimony proffered in the case is
sufficiently tied to the facts of the case that it will aid the jury in resolving a
factual dispute.'" (Id. (quoting United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1242
(3d Cir.1985))).
After overturning the Frye rule, the Daubert Court, by a strong 7-2 vote, set forth the
Court's "general observations" on some criteria that the trial courts can consider in evaluating the
qualifications and reliability of an expert and his/her opinions. Among the criteria mentioned by
the Court are the following:
14
Government of Virgin Islands v. Penn, 838 F.Supp. 1054, 1056-57 (D.VI 1993).
7
see if they can be falsified; indeed, this methodology is what distinguishes science
from other fields of human inquiry.
• Another pertinent consideration is whether the theory or technique has been subjected
to peer review and publication.
• The fact of publication (or lack thereof) in a peer reviewed journal will be a relevant,
though not dispositive, consideration in assessing the scientific validity of a particular
technique or methodology on which an opinion is premised.
The Court emphasized that its list of criteria was not exhaustive, but rather illustrative.
Two Justices dissented from the portion of the opinion setting forth the Court's "general
observations" and in doing so said:
After Daubert's invitation to the trial courts to be "gatekeepers" on expert testimony, the
trial courts began to receive motions in limine designed to exclude expert testimony essentially
on the ground that it does not adhere to industry standard and some summary judgments began to
hinge on the "reliability" of the expert's written report.
8
Six years after Daubert was decided, the Supreme Court again revisited the issue of
expert witness testimony in Kumho Tire Company, LTD v. Carmichael15. In that case, the Court
extended Daubert=s Agatekeeping@ obligation, not only to scientific testimony, but to all expert
testimony.
After Daubert and Kumho Tire, the defense will more carefully review the qualifications
of the putative expert and the reliability of the opinions of the so-called expert the proponent
wishes to put into evidence, and trial courts have begun to more clearly scrutinize psychological
experts.16 In addition, given the federal civil rules which require experts to disclose much more
information on their opinions and their background, the defense will have more information at its
disposal to plan an attack.
• A list of references to lawyers with whom the expert has worked in the recent past.
• Employment law experience -- for example, we have found that we had to recycle the
economists that we use in employment cases because their experience was entirely in
personal injury cases and they were not sensitive to some of the peculiar economic
issues that arise in employment cases.
• A listing and copy of all writings authored by the individual during at least the past 10
years, as the new federal civil rule 26(a)(2)(B) requires such information.
• Is the expert's testimony confined to one side that is plaintiff only or defendant only?
• If the expert testifies for both sides, is there a positional conflict that can be found in
past reports and testimony?
15
526 U.S. 137 (1999)
16
See, e.g., Gier By and Through Gier v. Educ. Serv. Unit No. 16, 66 F.3d 940 (8th Cir. 1995).
17
McDonald, James J. Jr. and Lees-Haley, Paul R., “Avoiding ‘Junk Science’ in Sexual Harassment Litigation,” 21
Employee Rel.L.J. 51 (Autumn 1995).
9
• Copies of all depositions transcribed in cases during at least the past four years, as the
new civil rule 26(a)(2)(B) requires that all such depositions be identified.
• A list of all depositions that have not been transcribed with the identity of the attorney
and, if known, the court reporter.
• A listing of all such depositions with the names of the lawyers on both sides -- also
try to get the reports that they have written for other lawyers.
• All trial testimony during the last four years and the names of the lawyers on both
sides.
• Does the expert do forensic work only or, for example, in the case of a mental health
practitioner, does the expert act as a treating doctor also?
• Does the expert have an academic orientation? Does he or she teach? Some
academics can be deadly in front of juries if they are pedantic.
• Can the expert speak in plain English and convey complicated concepts in word
pictures that juries can understand?
• Has the expert been sanctioned by his or her profession for ethical violations?
• Has the expert been sanctioned by a court or seen his or her testimony excluded by a
court?
• What does the expert consider to be the industry standard as the basis for his or her
opinion and what will it cost to get an opinion that adheres to industry standard?
10
• Does the expert have a personality that may cause the jury to react negatively?
Consulting Experts
It can be expected that oftentimes claimants will have at least one treating mental health
practitioner (MHP), and, in a lesser number of cases, an actual forensic expert on mental
anguish. A plaintiff is not required to retain an expert witness to prove emotional distress. 18
Normally, the treating practitioner will limit his/her testimony to facts, leaving it to the trier of
fact (and the forensic expert) to assess causation. The treating practitioner typically does not
want to testify about causation for a variety of reasons. Unlike an orthopedic specialist who
deals with x-rays, for example, the treater relies on soft data provided primarily by the patient.
Also, the treater is concerned with the patient's "perception" of reality rather than the actual
reality that a forensic would be concerned with. Further, the treater is appropriately an ally of
the patient and thus is biased, particularly if he or she stands to benefit financially through a
patient-litigant's continued treatment. Additionally, the ethical guidelines of the American
Academy of Psychiatry and the Law discourage treaters from becoming experts. (American
Academy of Psychiatry and the Law Ethical Guidelines for the Practice of Forensic Psychiatry.
Adopted May 1987 - Revised October, 1989 and 1991, Baltimore, MD.) Finally, there is the
problem of confidentiality. Once on the stand the treater may be asked to divulge all sorts of
information disclosed in sessions that was probably best left unsaid.
The forensic's involvement may be marginal (e.g., a one hour consultation) or it may be
substantial. Obviously, an increase in forensic claims will result in greatly increased
transactional expenses on account of the new civil rules and the Supreme Court's Daubert
decision.
Counsel oftentimes will need to consult with an expert19 to interpret the records, notes,
and reports of the treating practitioner and/or the forensic. Assistance may also be needed from a
consulting expert in discovery.
18
See, e.g., Williams v. Trader Publ’g Co., 218 F.3d 481 (5th Cir. 2000); Biggs v. Village of Dupo, 892 F.2d 1298
(7th Cir. 1990); Rakovich v. Wade, 819 F.2d 1393 (7th Cir. 1987); Spence v. Board of Educ. of Christina Sch. Dist.,
806 F.2d 1198 (3rd Cir. 1986); Chalmers v. City of Los Angeles, 762 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1985); Cohen v. Bd. of Ed.,
Smithtown Central Sch. Dist., 728 F.2d 160 (2nd Cir. 1984); Marable v. Walker, 704 F.2d 1219 (11th Cir. 1983);
Williams v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 660 F.2d 1267 (8th Cir. 1981).
19
For a thorough discussion of expert witnesses, See Hallahan, Tim, “Everything you Need to Know about Expert
Witnesses,” 8 The Practical Litigator 41 (September 1997).
20
See, e.g., Nichols v. American Nat’l Ins. Co., 154 F.3d 875 (8th Cir. 1998), United States v. Scop, 846 F.2d 135
11
the jury may judge the plaintiff’s credibility.
• Adjustment Disorder
• Affective Disorders
• Antisocial
• Borderline
• Clinical Psychologist
• Clinical Social Worker
• Dependent
• DSM III-R and DSM IV
• Histrionic
• Holistic Counselor
• Learning Disability
• Malingering
• Mood Disorders
• Narcissistic
• Neuroses
• Non-Organic or Functional
• Obsessive-Compulsive
• Organic
• Paranoid
• Personality Disorder
(2nd Cir. 1988). See also, Gittes and Harris, “Experts in Sexual Harassment Cases: The Plaintiff’s Perspective,”
The Employee Advocate (Spring/Summer 2005).
12
• Post Traumatic Stress Disorder21
• Primary Gain
• Psychiatrists
• Psychoanalyst
• Psychoses
• Psychotherapy
• Secondary Gain
• Social Worker
• Stressor
• Thought Disorders
Attorneys (both plaintiff and defense) should become familiar with the multi-axial
diagnostic system of DSM-IV23, all the while being aware of the caveats included in the manual
about its use in litigation:
21
Shepard v. American Broadcasting Corp., Inc., 862 F. Supp. 486 (D.D.C. 1994) (discussion of PTSD under DSM-
III-R).
22
For an in-depth discussion on DSM-IV, See Smith, “Understanding How to Apply the DSM-IV to a Case under
the ADA,” 17 The Labor Lawyer 449 (2002).
23
Kutchins & Kirk, “Making Us Crazy: DSM: The Psychiatric Bible and the Creation of Mental Disorders”
(Freepress, 2004); see review by Mim Udovitch, “I’m O.K., You’re 300.02” (New York Times Book Review); see
also Alix Spiegel, “The Dictionary of Disorder”, The New Yorker (January 3, 2005).
13
clinical picture? Antisocial personality present?
Axis III Pertinent Medical Disorders - How do they affect psychiatric diagnosis?
Did they pre-exist? Influence of medications?
The scope of mental problems that amount to a covered disability is extremely unclear.
Some, for example, have posited that the diagnosis of Learning Disability (LD) must come from
a psychiatrist and must be a diagnosis listed in the official diagnostic manual (DSM-III-R, now
DSM-IV). Not surprisingly, it is being argued that a stress diagnosis listed in DSM-IV is a
disability. Counsel will be mining Social Security disability cases, FELA cases, Veterans
Administration disability cases, workers compensation stress cases, and long term disability
(LTD) insurance cases under state contract law and the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act (ERISA) to support their respective viewpoints on stress.24
The newest version of the "Diagnostic and Statistic Manual of Mental Disorders" from
the American Psychiatric Association has arrived. Interestingly, the manual lists bad writing as a
mental disorder. D.S.M.-IV Code 315.2 refers to a "Disorder of Written Expression" which the
manual characterizes as poor use of grammar or punctuation, sloppy paragraph organization,
24
See, e.g., Hogarth v. Thornburgh, 2 AD Cases (BNA) 1777 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (court, in holding that FBI could not
reasonably accommodate a clerk with a bipolar personality disorder, relied on psychiatric testing that lithium
therapy is not a guarantee against recurrence of bipolar disorder); Cass v. Shalala, 8 F.3d 552 (7th Cir. 1993) (court
affirmed ALJ's finding that a Social Security claimant suffering from a Somatoform Pain Disorder, a physiological
malady where a patient complains of numerous pains for which there is no physiological explanation or symptoms
in excess of physiologic findings, was not disabled); Hunter v. Sullivan, 993 F.2d 31, 35, n.3 (4th Cir. 1992) (a
Social Security disability case where court emphasized the following criteria in assessing mental impairment: a)
marked restriction of activities of daily living; marked difficulties in maintaining social functioning; frequent
deficiencies of concentration, persistence or pace resulting in frequent failure to complete tasks in a timely manner
(in work settings or elsewhere); and repeated episodes of deterioration or decompensation in work or work-like
settings which cause the individual to withdraw from that situation or to experience exacerbation of signs and
symptoms (which may include deterioration of adaptive behaviors)).
14
awful spelling and bad handwriting!25
Learning Disability
A learning disability is a disorder in one or more of the basic processes involved in using
spoken or written language in the presence of normal or above average intelligence. In adults,
learning disabilities may be manifested in academic deficits in spelling, written expression,
reading comprehension, mathematics computation, and sometimes in problems in organizational
skills, time management, and social problem solving. A learning disability is not mental
retardation or an emotional disorder. Learning disabled people have difficulty receiving
information through their senses. There are many types of learning disabilities, and they vary
from mild to severe. Types of learning disabilities include visual, auditory, motor, tactile, and
academic.
With respect to job placement, a person's strengths and the work to be performed must be
compatible. Learning disabled individuals should not do tasks in which their disabilities would
play too large a role. Many of them go into positions that require creativity, because their
particular perception of the world provides a different way of looking at the world.
While many individuals with learning disabilities require no accommodations, there are
also many people with learning disabilities who require differing degrees of support, because the
accommodations will vary according to the need.26
Before pleading emotional distress and placing the plaintiff's mental condition in issue27,
counsel for plaintiff should research carefully the plaintiff's background, investigate other
stressors, and confer with any treating mental health practitioner. An intake questionnaire ought
to identify the pertinent information that counsel needs. Any such questionnaire ought to include
25
Cf. Mohamed v. Marriott International, Inc., 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2788 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (finding that language
skills constitute a mental condition and granting plaintiff=s motion to compel language evaluation of person under
the legal control of the defendant employer).
26
See, e.g., University Interscholastic League v. Buchanan, 848 S.W.2d 298 (Texas 1993) (learning disabled high
school athletes sought to permanently enjoin an organization from enforcing a rule precluding participation by
athletes over nineteen years old; court held that athletes were "disabled" under the Rehabilitation Act and that the
organization failed to reasonably accommodate the athletes by not allowing exceptions to the rule).
27
If the plaintiff pleads mental anguish, the courts hold that plaintiff has placed his/her mental condition in
controversy and opened the door to discovery relating to his/her mental condition. See, e.g., Tomlin v. Holeck, 150
F.R.D. 628 (D. Minn. 1993); Cody v. Marriott Corp., 103 F.R.D. 421 (D.Mass. 1984).
15
the following:
• Increased Irritability
• Diminished Interest
• Weight Loss
• Weight Gain
• Insomnia
• Feelings of Agitation
• Fatigue and Loss of Energy
• Difficulty Concentrating
• Headaches
• Body Pain
• Shortness of Breath
• Dizziness
• Palpitations of the Heart
• Trembling or Shakiness
• Sweating
• Choking
• Nausea, Abdominal Distress
• Chest Pain
• Feeling Out of Control
• Did you seek medical attention (including psychologists and/or
psychiatrists)? If so, please explain.28
Repeatedly, counsel should warn the plaintiff of the consequences of pleading emotional
distress and evaluate whether the case is worth it.29 The prospective plaintiff needs to be warned
that pleading emotional distress may very well lead to, inter alia:
28
See Fitzpatrick "A Damages Questionnaire for Wrongful Termination Cases" (Practical Lawyer, March 1993; 40
Employment Law Counselor 2, December 15, 1993; Lane's Goldstein Litigation Forms published by Clark
Boardman Callaghan; and Business Law, Inc.'s Checklists for Corporate Counsel (September, 1994 Supplement).
29
Plaintiff must understand that if treater becomes involved as an expert witness, the therapy is invariably adversely
affected. The treater will be forced to divulge information revealed in the privacy of the clinician's office. Few
therapies survive. Strasburger, "Crudely, Without Any Finesse; The Defendant Hears His Psychiatric Evaluation."
Bulletin, American Academy Psychiatry Law 15:229-233, 1987.
16
• Depositions of her/his treating mental health practitioners30
• Plaintiff's history of counseling in the past and the subjects discussed with counselors
in the past may be fair game for the plaintiff's opponent.
• That the defense will get an instruction that the jury may take into account the fact
that the plaintiff had other problems that might account for the stress in whole or in
part.
Checklist
In assessing whether to proceed with a mental health claim, the practitioner needs to
consider a host of questions. Among them are the following:
• Was the conduct such that major trauma logically follows? Will this make sense to a
jury? Will the jury be able to relate to it? Is the plaintiff trivializing the overall case
30
Although the federal common law psycho-therapist-patient privilege protects confidential communications
between a patient and her psychotherapist made for the purpose of diagnosis, the privilege fails to shield information
relevant to a patient’s mental state where the patient’s mental state is at issue. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena,
710 F.Supp. 999 (D.N.J.) (interpreting privilege under federal law), aff’d sub nom. 879 F.2d 861 (3d Cir. 1989);
Topol v. Trustees of Univ. of Pa., 160 F.R.D. 476 (E.D.Pa. 1995) (plaintiff waived any applicable psychotherapy-
patient privilege by alleging defendant’s conduct caused her to become “depressed, anxious and fearful.
31
See, e.g., McCarthy v. Southeastern Penn. Transportation Auth., 93 WL 409858 (E.D. Pa. October 13, 1993)
(employer entitled to medical records when plaintiff puts mental stress in issue). Contra: Bigoni v. Pay 'N Pak
Stores, 48 FEP Cases (BNA) 732, 733 (D.Or. 1988) (court held that plaintiff had waived privilege relating to
conversations with psychologist even though plaintiff filed an action alleging emotional distress).
32
See, e.g., Mulholland v. Dietz Co., 896 F.Supp. 179 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
33
See, e.g., Bolden v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transp. Authority, 21 F.3rd 29 (3rd Cir. 1994).
34
See, e.g., Gladfelter v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 162 F.R.D. 589 (D.Neb. 1995) (deposition of girlfriend permitted
where expert testified that a significant cause of emotional distress was the deterioration of the plaintiff’s
relationship with his girlfriend).
17
by making mental anguish a major issue?
• Consider community standards - Is there some fact that might prejudice the case and
it cannot be assumed you can keep out of evidence? How will it fly before jury? Be
cautious.
• Do not overblow the value of emotion. Wise people will understand distress without
having to force it down the jury's throat.
• Was plaintiff a solid person and able to function well before the workplace dispute
arose?
• Does the plaintiff have a history of mental, physical, or sexual abuse which could be
argued as an alternative cause of the emotional distress?35
• Will it be necessary to present an "eggshell" plaintiff theory to the jury?36 Will that
sell?
• Does the plaintiff have nightmares or flashbacks? Is the plaintiff afraid to be alone?
Has the claimant's social patterns changed dramatically?
• Does plaintiff suffer from loss of appetite or sleep, etc.? Has the plaintiff resumed
smoking, drinking to excess, etc.?
• Can plaintiff describe the trauma? How will jury react to tears?
• Can the distress be proven collaterally? Are there prior evaluations, prior supervisors,
or a vocational counselor, who can help present the claim?
35
See, e.g., McCleland v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 1995 WL 571324 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (admitting evidence of
plaintiff’s being a victim of childhood sexual abuse); Delaney v. City of Hampton, 999 F.Supp. 794 (4th Cir. 1998)
(same).
36
See, e.g., Cole v. Snow, 586 F.Supp. 655 (D. Mass. 1984) (plaintiff was awarded compensatory damages as a
result of a strip search even though plaintiff suffered from psychological sensitivities as a result of developing early
and being sexually molested by her father).
18
• Plaintiff's household activities? Dress? Neat or sloppy? Family photographs?
• Consequences for the spouse? Is the plaintiff no longer "available" to the spouse?
• Is there a loss of consortium claim? In sexual matters, you ought to approach with
some trepidation. Use words like friendship, romance, affection, availability, etc.
You don't have to use the "f" word.
• Does plaintiff need a forensic expert? Can plaintiff prove mental anguish through the
treating MHP? Oftentimes, a strong argument can be made to go just with treating's
testimony.
Looking before you leap may have application to defense counsel in these cases also.
Increasingly, plaintiff's counsel are suggesting that in certain circumstances the plaintiff can take
discovery on the mental condition of the defendant or even a non-party witness in the case. For
example, can the plaintiff take a Rule 35 examination of the alleged harasser in a sex harassment
case? If the alleged harasser defends in essence by saying "I'm not the sort of man who would do
such a thing," the plaintiff's bar may then argue that the alleged harasser has placed his mental
condition in controversy, and consequently must submit to a Rule 35 mental examination.
Unfortunately, the phraseology of Rule 35 is such that it seems critical that the harasser be
named as a party defendant; thereby increasing the complexity and cost of workplace litigation.
Plaintiff's counsel should make sure that the retainer agreement is:
• A clause which provides that, if the fee arrangement is contingent, you will
receive the value of your services (quantum meruit) if the case collapses on
account of a material misrepresentation.
• In light of the spate of after acquired evidence cases, specifically advising the
19
client that disinformation/ misinformation (or lies) on an intake form is a
material misrepresentation and the basis for automatic withdrawal. This may
help with after acquired evidence, devastating information from the medical
and/or mental health records and interviews that were not revealed by the
plaintiff during the intake process.
• The client is ultimately responsible for litigation expenses. Not only is this
rule based in the ethical codes, it makes sound economic sense. The
proverbial "perfect retainer" ought to state the plaintiff is responsible for
expert fees.
• The client has been advised at the outset of the potential expenses associated
with the mental health issues. You do not want a surprised client when the
bills come in for psycho-babble.
Discuss plaintiff's condition with his/her treating psychiatrist, psychologist, or some other
mental health practitioner. If possible and cost-effective, meet the treating clinician face-to-face.
Make an assessment of the clinician as a witness, both in light of Daubert and at a practical jury-
appeal level. Have a checklist to pursue with the treating.
• Has anything come out in counseling that could be embarrassing and therefore
harmful to the case?
• Are the counseling sessions dominated by discussion of matters other than stress on
the job or stress on account of job loss?
• Will a "holistic counselor" qualify under Evidence Rule 702 after Daubert?
Examine, if there are any, the treating's notes or audio tapes. The treating will want you
to agree not to share her/his notes with the client/patient. A more troubling problem in litigation
is having to share the notes with defense counsel. Copy all notes, "Bates Stamp" all, retain
originals, return a stamped set to the MHP, verifying that the set is a duplicate of his/her original
notes, records, and correspondence.
20
If you intend to use the treater for opinion testimony, you need to obtain the information
that you will have to disclose under new Rule 26. Thus, obtain and read before you plead if time
permits. For a while, requests for this information are going to be a shock to forensic expert
witnesses. Ask questions that defense counsel may be allowed to ask. The limits of inquiry are
not clear. Better to know the good, the bad and the ugly at the outset, than after many hours and
much money have been put into the case. Among the questions to ask are:
• What are the major topics that have been discussed with the clinician?
• What drugs have been prescribed? Learn the reactions and inter-reactions, especially
with alcohol.
As stated, the psychiatrist normally will refer the client to a clinical psychologist for
testing and evaluation.37 A consulting expert's report is considered normally to be confidential
work product, thereby making it non-discoverable under the Federal Civil Rules. 38 If you are
giving serious consideration to pleading a mental health issue in the case, then before you plead,
37
Referral for psychological testing should not be automatic. Psychological testing that is incomplete will raise
questions about credibility. For example, not properly assessing Axis II personality disorder possibilities is a
common plaintiff's expert's error. If an antisocial personality is discovered, the issues of malingering will arise.
38
Crockett v. Virginia Folding Box Co., 61 F.R.D. 312 (E.D. Va. 1974); Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(4).
21
get a report from a consulting that you can cloak in work product privilege.
Psychological Testing
o Intelligence tests
o Personality Tests
• Objective Tests
• Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI)39
• Bernreuter Personality Inventory
• Humm-Wadsworth Temperament Scale
• Guilford-Martin Personnel Inventory
• Myers-Briggs Type Indicator
• PDI Employment Inventory
• Employee Reliability Inventory
• Sixteen Personality Factor Questionnaire
• California Psychological Inventory
• Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory
• Projective Tests40
• Rorschach Inkblot Technique
• Thematic Apperception Test (TAT)
• Sentence Completion Test
• Draw-A-Person (DAP) Test
• Personality Assessment Inventory (PAI)
In Usher v. Lakewood Engineering & Mfg. Co.,41 the plaintiff sought a protective order
to prevent the defendant from conducting a battery of psychological tests on the plaintiff. The
all-day testing would have included the MMPI, the Rorschach test, the Thematic Apperception
Test (TAT), the Shipley Institute for Living Scale, and the Sixteen Personality Factors Inventory.
Judge Shadur held that a protective order was appropriate, barring the administration of these
tests. The court relied on the possibility of an invasion of privacy.
39
See, e.g., Kenneth S. Pope, Ph.D., James N. Butcher, Ph.D., and Joyce Seelen, Esq., The MMPI, MMPI-2, and
MMPI-A In Court: Assessment, Testimony, and Cross-Examination for Expert Witnesses and Attorneys (American
Psychological Association).
40
For a historical discussion of projective tests see Morton Hunt's "The Story of Psychology" (Anchor Books 1993,
p. 323-326).
41
158 F.R.D. 411 (N.D. Ill. 1994).
22
Interviews with Fact Witnesses
The conventional "wisdom" in a case involving a person pleading mental anguish is that a
portion of the case should be proven largely through witnesses other than the person. Therefore,
if you deem it appropriate, determine whether there are good lay witnesses to corroborate stress?
Some of the possibilities are listed below:
o If and when you engage a forensic, consider whether it is appropriate for the
forensic to meet with some of these lay witnesses before giving deposition or trial
testimony.
o If so, the written report now required by the new rules must reference all of those
interviews as having been "considered".
Medical Release
Medical records are expensive; can take an inordinate amount of time to obtain,
especially if you don't know what you are doing; sometime require extensive interpretation; are
written in jargon, codes, shorthand, and in some of the world’s worst chicken scratch. The
quality of the copies received by counsel from the MHP varies. Suffice it to say that obtaining
these records and extracting same is a very labor intensive task, requiring paralegal/paramedical
skills. To assist whomever will obtain the records and extract the records, you need to obtain a
formal written release as early as possible. That release should address specific problems that
recur in these cases.
The release used by plaintiff's counsel with his/her client ought to emphasize that the
MHP is instructed to make herself/himself and staff available to consult with counsel and his/her
staff (or named independent contractor). This will assure hopefully that indecipherable notes can
be interpreted, and there can be a free and open discussion about the plaintiff's treatment. If
appropriate in your jurisdiction, plaintiff's counsel should emphasize with the MHP that he/she is
not authorized to confer with anyone other than plaintiff's counsel and counsel's authorized staff
or other representative, otherwise the MHP may engage in ex parte communications with the
other side. Written authorization is often demanded by the MHP. Some defendants will fight for
a release that allows defense counsel to communicate with the treating on an ex parte basis. The
defendant will request releases to be signed by plaintiff so that it can obtain records ex parte and
communicate ex parte with doctors. Plaintiff should resist this tactic.42
42
See Morris v. Consolidation Coal Co., 446 S.E.2d 648 (W.Va. 1994) (a fiduciary relationship exists between a
treating physician and a claimant in a workers' compensation proceeding such that unauthorized oral ex parte
communications are prohibited and the patient would have a cause of action against the treating physician); Harlan
v. Lewis, 982 F.2d 1255 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, Hall v. Harlan, 114 S.Ct. 94 (8th Cir. 1993) (the court, in a
non-employment case, affirmed the Federal court's sanctions against defendant lawyer for their ex parte
23
So, get releases early on to obtain medical and mental health records so you can
determine if there is disastrous material in these records. Sometimes a plaintiff's attorney may
want to insist that the client pay for the records up front, as they can be expensive. Bates stamp
and extract those records upon receipt. This work can be contracted out on an independent
contractor basis or you can do it in-house with trained paralegals.
Records to Gather
Before filing a case, plaintiff's counsel ought to obtain and review the records of all
MHPs, hospitals and clinics so that, hopefully, there are no surprises. Immediately after the case
is filed, the defense should demand that the plaintiff execute appropriate releases that will
facilitate the defendant's efforts to obtain records relevant to the case, many of which will be
unauthorized communications with plaintiff's treating physicians); Horner v. Rowan Companies, Inc., 153 F.R.D.
597 (S.D. Tex. 1994) (the court held that defense attorneys may not conduct private ex parte interviews with a
plaintiff's treating physician unless, with advance notice thereof, the plaintiff specifically and unconditionally
authorizes same); Duquette v. Superior Court, 778 P.2d 634 (Ct. App. Ariz. 1989) (in medical malpractice context,
defense attorneys are not permitted to communicate ex parte without plaintiff=s consent; without plaintiff=s
consent, defendants limited to formal discovery procedures under Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure); Williams v.
Rene, 886 F.Supp. 1214, 1226-1227 (D.VI 1995) (even though defendants had procured a broadly-worded release
from plaintiff to communicate ex parte with plaintiff=s doctors, the defendant was still required to follow local law
which required (1) reasonable notice of ex parte contact, (2) notification to the doctor of the scope of the ex parte
interview, and (3) communication to the plaintiff=s doctor that participation is on a completely voluntary basis);
Garner v. Ford Motor Co., 61 F.R.D. 22 (D.Alaska 1973) (court condemned ex parte conferences with plaintiff's
treating physicians); Weaver v. Mann, 90 F.R.D. 443 (D.N.D. 1981)(court found Federal Civil Rules prohibit such
ex parte conferences); Bohrer v. Merrill-Dow Pharmaceutical, Inc., 122 F.R.D. 217 (D.N.D. 1987) (motion to
compel plaintiff to authorize defendant to engage in ex parte interviews with plaintiff's treating physician was
denied); Alston v. Greater Southeast Community Hosp., 107 F.R.D. 35 (D.D.C. 1985) (same); Gobuty v. Kananagh,
795 F.Supp. 281 (D.Minn. 1992) (court refused to permit ex parte interviews); Miles v. Farrell, 549 F.Supp. 82
(N.D.Ill. 1982) (court held that Federal Civil Rules do not permit ex parte interviews of plaintiff's treating
physician); Neal v. Boulder, 142 F.R.D. 325 (D.Colo. 1992) (court refused to compel plaintiff to sign releases and
authorizations for ex parte communications with treating physicians); Acosta v. Richter, 671 So.2d 149 (Fla. 1996)
(state statute providing exception to rule of confidentiality in medical negligence action when a health care provider
is or reasonably expects to be named as a defendant creates only a limited exception to the physician-patient
privilege); Contra: Cote v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., Civ. #93-0184-B (D.Me. April 11, 1994) (court approved ex
parte interviews); Filz v. Mayo Foundation, 136 F.R.D. 163 (D.Minn. 1991) (court, despite a state statute to the
contrary, held that ex parte interviews are permissible under federal civil rules); Felder v. Wyman, 139 F.R.D. 85
(D.S.C. 1991) (holding ex parte conferences are permissible); Clark v. Homrighous, 136 F.R.D. 186 (D.Kan. 1991)
(court granted defendant's motion to allow informal private interviews of plaintiff's treating physicians); Bryant v.
Hilst, 136 F.R.D. 487 (D.Kan. 1991) (court denied plaintiff's motion for a protective order to prevent defendant from
communicating ex parte with plaintiff's treating physician); Doe v. Eli Lilly & Co., Inc., 99 F.R.D. 126 (D.D.C.
1983) (plaintiff was ordered to sign an authorization allowing his treating physicians, at their option, to engage in ex
parte interviews); Sklagen v. Greater Southeast Community Hospital, 625 F.Supp. 991 (D.D.C. 1984) (plaintiff
compelled to authorize her physicians, at their discretion, to disclose information about plaintiff in informal ex parte
interviews); MacDonald v. United States, 767 F.Supp. 1295 (M.D.Pa. 1991), aff'd., 983 F.2d 1051 (3d Cir. 1992)
(court denied plaintiff's motion to strike the testimony of a treating physician who had been interviewed ex parte);
King v. Ahrens, 798 F.Supp. 1371 (W.D.Ark. 1992) (court held it had no authority to prohibit such ex parte
interviews).
24
considered and relied upon by experts on both sides.
Among the records that may be helpful in these cases are the following:
o The records of former employers of the plaintiff that may include earning records,
sick leave records, employee assistance records, records from the insurance
department and worker compensation claim records.
o Military records, including medical and psychiatric records -- a lot of times one
can find records of clinical psychological testing.
o The records at the state workers' compensation commission regarding any claim
and the records and depositions and trial testimony in the possession of counsel in
any workers' compensation matter.
o If there was a claim for long term disability benefits with the defendant or a
previous employer, those records can be obtained from the previous employer
and/or the LTD carrier.
o With subpoenas to all prospective employers that the plaintiff identifies as having
been a part of his/her job search.
o Records, including audio tapes of the hearing, from the state unemployment
compensation commission.
o Records reflecting the frequency of doctor visits and the failure of plaintiff to
consistently seek treatment.
o Insurance records that will reflect medications, doctor records that reflect
medications prescribed, pharmacy records that reflect medications purchased.
25
Extracting Records
Extracting will allow you to identify a vast number of matters that may assist in
prosecution and/or defense.
o Whether the plaintiff failed to obey any advice from his/her doctor(s).
o Whether plaintiff has been seeing medical doctors for gastrointestinal disorders or
other medical problems commonly associated with stress.
o If some treatment preceded the onset of the workplace dispute which allegedly
caused the distress, explore in depth whether there is a bright line that can be
shown to the jury between other stressor(s) that led to that counseling and the
counseling regarding workplace disputes, typically termination. Typically, the
plaintiff wants to separate the treatment into two treatments -- one which is either
over or ongoing, and the other which started with (and as a result of) the
workplace dispute and the defense wants to suggest that the bulk (if not all) of the
stress is "caused" by stressors other than the workplace dispute.
Remember to plead emotional distress in the EEOC charge. The failure to do so may
jeopardize the plaintiff's ability to plead it in court proceedings given the long line of scope of
the charge decisions. Certainly, if the courts are going to hold the plaintiff to this standard and
return us to what a judge long ago called "common law pleading niceties," the EEOC must have
a procedure to systematically assist charging parties to properly plead damages, including
emotional distress, in charges.
What are you as counsel looking for in an expert witness? The expert must be qualified
and must not have any bombshells lying in the closet so to speak. In light of Daubert,
26
practitioners can anticipate an increase in motions in limine to exclude experts. Thus, counsel
for the proponent should obtain routinely such information from an expert with whom counsel
has no prior relationship before retaining the expert's services. The expert, not counsel and their
clients, should have to bear the expense of gathering and preparing this information as part of the
price of doing business.
o ll information considered
o Causal Connection
o Damages
o Diagnosis
o Prognosis
o The rationale for conclusions
The forensic should not be surprised at deposition or in trial on cross. In sum, the
forensic should not be hearing facts or being shown documents for the first time at deposition
conducted by defense counsel. You might consider having the forensic attend the deposition of
plaintiff's "tormenter," i.e., the alleged "black hat" of the drama.
The expert must present well to judge and jury. Many people are very biased against the
psychiatric profession. The witness should be friendly and have a ready smile. A sense of
humor and a strain of humanity/compassion helps. It is imperative that a forensic expert be
ready to defend his/her diagnosis, prognosis and other opinions with vigor. The forensic witness
must be unequivocal. In my firm, we have a rule that no wafflers need apply -- the jury normally
wants a credible "fighter," not some academic up in the clouds.
Ensure that your forensic has psychological testing performed, especially so-called
objective tests, as the jury may give greater weight to what they perceive as an objective test as
compared to projective psychological tests, like Rorschach ink blots.
27
Make sure the forensic has all records that you can obtain at a reasonable costs. You
would be surprised at the volume of records that you could obtain if you act with dispatch.
Among the records are:
o treating records
o medical records
o military records
o school records
You want these records in the hands of the forensic before a diagnosis is made. Try to
have the forensic interview family members also. Without interfering with proper methodology
and the reliability of the forensic's opinions, confer with the forensic and advise that a diagnosis
should be withheld until the forensic has been able to review the totality of the information
reasonably available. You need to discuss with the forensic how he/she responds to the
predictable questions from opposing counsel regarding any "working diagnosis" before the "final
diagnosis."
Encourage (require) communication between treating and forensic expert to avoid the
disaster of them working off different sets of "facts" and even worse arriving at seemingly
conflicting diagnoses.
Defendants, especially if they hit the ground running, can gather substantial documentary
and other information on the plaintiff through both formal and informal discovery. This section
reviews the formal mechanisms to obtain discovery from the plaintiff and non-parties bearing on
mental health issues.
Releases
Plaintiff can expect the defense to request formally that plaintiff execute releases,
including releases for medical and psychiatric records. To the extent that documents are not
within the actual possession of a party but are in the possession of a non-party, the courts have
authority to compel the party to execute documents authorizing release from the non-party.43
43
See, e.g., Turick by Turick v. Yamaha Motor Corp. U.S.A., 121 F.R.D. 32, 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (party compelled
to execute release for medical records); Urseth v. City of Dayton, Ohio, 653 F. Supp. 1057, 1066 (S.D. Ohio 1986)
(party compelled to execute release for medical records); Cross v. General Motors Corp., 40 FEP Cases (BNA) 415
28
Indeed, it may be said that records which a party can obtain by executing a release are within the
party's "control" even if not within the party's possession or custody. A subsidiary issue is
whether the party who has obtained a consent to release of medical records can communicate ex
parte with the other party's mental health care provider.44
Interrogatories
Interrogatories to anticipate will focus on identifying all mental health practitioners that
plaintiff has ever seen. Start early to gather this information, especially the more recent
treatment by a MHP as this is more likely to be discoverable by the other side. Train paralegals
on how to obtain, how to control the document flow and follow up on requests for medical
records. Plaintiff's counsel oftentimes will try to control the flow of documents to the defense by
refusing to provide an ex parte release. Plaintiff's counsel may insist that counsel for plaintiff
obtain all records, and insure that they are being produced under a strict privacy-sensitive
protective order. The documents should be numerically coded before production to the defense.
Document Requests
Document requests that plaintiff can anticipate receiving from the defense will focus on:
o Notes
o Audio tapes
o Insurance records (one side or the other may want to show how low or high the
"specials" are)
o Records of dates and times of visits (this can be good evidence to show that the
frequency of visits is keyed to litigation)
(E.D. Mo. 1982) (party compelled to execute release for tax records).
44
See, e.g., Kitzmiller v. Henning, 437 N.E.2d 452 (1993) (consent to release of records does not imply a patient's
consent to have his physician discuss confidential medical information with opposing counsel in informal interviews
without the patient's consent).
29
o All clinical notes of the treating and the forensic
o Court records from previous cases involving the plaintiff (i.e. divorce, child
custody, etc.)
o All patient telephone messages in the possession of the treating and forensic
o The plaintiff's health insurance claim forms and records of health insurance
carrier in the possession of plaintiff
o Plaintiff's current and prior employers and the insurance companies that provided
coverage while the Plaintiff was employed, including any COBRA extension
period
o Lab report
o Insurance Claim Forms - these forms will have the five digit code number,
indicating the DSM-IV diagnosis
o Treating's notes
o Records of medication
o Criminal records
Any requests for medical records unrelated to the case should be challenged, as courts
have held that only the relevant records can be compelled due to privacy interests.45 In addition,
courts have held, on numerous occasions that “garden variety” emotional distress claims do not
establish a waiver of the medical records privilege.46 Quite recently, the Missouri Supreme
Court held that where “garden variety” emotional distress is pleaded and where the plaintiff does
not intend to offer evidence of treatment for emotional distress, the plaintiff’s medical records
regarding prior treatment of emotional problems are not discoverable.47
45
See, e.g., Alcon v. Spicer, 113 P.3d 735 (Colo. 2005); Vansconcellos v. Cybex Int’l, Inc., 962 F.Supp. 701 (D.
My. 1997); Burrel v. Crown Central Petroleum, Inc., 177 F.R.D. 376 (E.D. Tex. 1997); Gatewood v. Stone
Container Corp., 170 F.R.D. 455 (S.D. Iowa 1996); Bottomly v. Leucadia National, 163 F.R.D. 617 (D. Ut. 1995);
Keplinger v. Virginia Electric & Power Co., 208 W. Va. 11 (2000).
46
See, e.g., Fritsch v. City of Chula Vista, 187 F.R.D. 614 (C.D. Cal. 1999); Ford v. Contra Costa County, 179
F.R.D. 579 (N.D. Cal. 1998); EEOC v. Old Western Furniture Corp., 173 F.R.D. 444 (W.D. Tex. 1996); Neal v.
Siegel-Robert, Inc., 171 F.R.D. 264 (E.D. Mo. 1996); Vanderbilt v. Town of Chilmark, 174 F.R.D. 225 (D.Mass.
1997).
47
Dean v. Cunningham, 2006 Mo. LEXIS 8 (Mo. 2006).
31
Discovery to Forensic MHP
o The identification of any texts of articles relied upon by the expert in formulating
any opinion;
It is always important to determine if any attorney in your firm has encountered the
expert before. If the expert has either been retained by your firm or deposed by a member of
your firm on a previous occasion, you should know that fact prior to the expert's deposition. It is
of significant assistance to review prior testimony before deposing an expert. If you intend to
question the credentials of an expert at trial, it can be embarrassing to learn on redirect that this
expert has been retained by your law firm in the past. Once all pertinent information is obtained,
it is then helpful to meet with your expert consultant to prepare a strategy for the taking of the
expert's deposition.
48
In some jurisdictions, it may be necessary to issue a subpoena.
32
Defense Deposition of Plaintiff
Among the topics covered during the deposition of the plaintiff would be the following:
o Education
o Employment history
o Military service
o Alcohol history
o Drug history
o Marital history
o Interpersonal history
o Sexual history
o Recreational/Social
o Developmental history
o Life stressors
33
The Mental Exam49
Defense counsel also may have his/her forensic (normally a psychiatrist) conduct a Rule
35 mental examination (ME) and prepare a written report. Rule 35(a) provides, in pertinent part,
as follows:
In Schlagenhauf, the Court stated that the "in controversy" and "good cause"
requirements cannot be met by "mere conclusory allegations of the pleadings," nor by "mere
relevance to the case."52 Rather, "the movant must show that each condition as to which the
examination is sought is really and genuinely in controversy and that good cause exists for
49
The EEOC defines a medical examination under the ADA as a “procedure or test that seeks information about an
individual's physical or mental impairments or health.” U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,
“Enforcement Guidance on Disability-Related Inquiries and Medical Examinations under the ADA, July 26, 2000,
FEPM 405: 7701, 7705 (Bureau of National Affairs, 2000).
50
379 U.S. 104, 118-119, 85 S.Ct. 234, 242-43, 13 L.Ed.2d 152 (1964) (citations omitted).
51
See also Acosta v. Tenneco Oil Co., 913 F.2d 205, 208 (5th Cir. 1990) (quoting Schlagenhauf); Notes of Advisory
Committee, 1970 Amendment (stating that subsequent amendment had no effect on the stress placed on these
requirements by Schlagenhauf); Brown v. Ringstad, 142 F.R.D. 461, 463 (S.D.Iowa 1992) (good cause
requirement).
52
Schlagenhauf, supra, 379 U.S. at 118-19, 85 S.Ct. at 242-43.
34
ordering each particular examination."53 Courts have also held that Rule 35 invests broad
discretion in the trial judge, thus even upon a showing of “in controversy” and “good cause,” the
judge may still refuse to order the examination. 54 Courts have considered, for example, whether
unnecessary health risks55 or “serious inconvenience”56 would occur to the plaintiff in the event
an examination is ordered,
There are situations where the pleadings alone are sufficient to meet these requirements.
A plaintiff in a negligence action who asserts mental or physical injury places that mental or
physical injury clearly in controversy and provides the defendant with good cause for an
examination to determine the existence and extent of such asserted injury.
Courts have been known to order a Rule 35 examination when the case involves, in
addition to a claim of emotional distress, one or more of the following: “1) a cause of action for
intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress57; 2) an allegation of a specific mental or
psychiatric injury or disorder; 3) a claim of unusually severe emotional distress; 4) plaintiff's
offer of expert testimony to support a claim of emotional distress; and/or 5) plaintiff's concession
53
Id.; Ricks v. Abbott Laboratories, 98 F.R.D. 647 (D.Md. 2001) (stating that the burden on the party moving for
the Rule 35 examination is “substantial”); EEOC v. Old Western Furniture Corp., 173 F.R.D. 444 (D.C. Tex 1996)
(holding the plaintiff did not place her mental condition in controversy by seeking compensation for mental
anguish); Bridges v. Eastman Kodak Co., 850 F.Supp. 216, 221 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (request for order to compel Rule
35 examination denied where plaintiffs did not allege a separate tort for emotional distress, made no allegation of
ongoing severe mental injury, and did not claim that they ever suffered from a psychiatric disorder); O’Quinn v.
New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 163 F.R.D. 226 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (denying a motion for an order to compel a Rule 35
examination where the complaint did not contain an independent claim for emotional distress nor an allegation of
severe emotional distress); Jackson v. Entergy Operations, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 752 (E.D. La. 1998)
(requirements in the rule that the moving party show "good cause" and that the condition to be examined is "in
controversy" . . . are plainly expressed limitations on the use of the rule rather than "a mere formality"); Usher v.
Lakewood Eng=g & Mfg. Co., 158 F.R.D. 411, 412 (E.D.Ill. 1994) (opportunity to conduct a mental examination
and the methodology used during the course of said examination are two distinct issues; citing Daubert plaintiff=s
motion for protective order was granted); Hardy v. ESSROC Materials, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2390 (E.D.Pa. 1998)
(allegations that plaintiff felt anxious and had trouble sleeping as a result of the alleged discrimination were not so
severe as to warrant an order compelling a mental examination); Neal v. Siegel-Robert, Inc., 171 F.R.D. 264 (E.D.
Mo. 1996) (plaintiff's motion for a mental examination denied where plaintiff was not complaining of any definable
psychological symptoms, but rather suffered from basic complaints that were within the understanding of the jury).
See also, Bales, Richard A. and Ray, Priscilla, “The Availability of Rule 35 Mental Examinations in Employment
Discrimination Cases,” 16 Rev. Litig. 1 (Winter 1997).
54
Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Puerto Rico v. Negron Torres, 255 F.2d 149 (1st Cir. 1958); Bucher v. Krause, 200
F.2d 576 (7th Cir. 1952), cert denied, 345 U.S. 997 (1953); Hardy v. Riuser, 309 F.Supp. 1234 (N.D.Miss. 1970);
Neuman v. Neuman, 377 A.2d 393 (1977); Grimm v. Gargis, 303 S.W.2d 43 (Mo. 1957); Martin v. Tindell, 98
So.2d 473 (Fla. 1957).
55
See, e.g., Stasiak v. Illinois Valley Cmty Hosp., 590 N.E.2d 974 (Ill. Ct. App. 1992); McQuillen v. City of Sioux
City, 306 N.W.2d 789, 791 (Iowa 1981).
56
Duprey v. Wagner, 451 A.2d 416, 419 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1982).
57
See, Lahr v. Fulbright & Jaworski, L.L.P., 164 F.R.D. 204 (N.D. Tex. 1996) (stating that a claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress automatically places the plaintiff’s mental condition in controversy).
35
that his or her mental condition is "in controversy" within the meaning of Rule 35(a).” 58 A
plaintiff’s mental condition may also be placed “in controversy” by substantial claims for
compensatory damages for “serious and ongoing” mental distress.59
58
Turner v. Imperial Stores, 161 F.R.D. 89 (S.D. Cal. 1995).
59
See, Large v. Our Lady of Mercy Medical Ctr., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1702 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
36
Preparation for a Rule 35 Exam
60
For a discussion on “initial considerations” in a Rule 35 examination situation, See Platt, “Preparing for Trial:
What do I Need to Know?,” The Employee Advocate (Spring/Summer 2005).
61
See, e.g., Ruhlmann v. Ulster County Dep’t of Social Servs., 194 F.R.D. 445 (N.D.N.Y. 2000) (a “garden variety”
claim of emotional distress does not place a plaintiff’s mental condition “in controversy”) (provides a detailed
discussion of the cases on both sides of this issue); O’Sullivan v. State of Minnesota, 176 F.R.D. 325 (D.Minn.
1997); Smith v. J.I. Case Corp., 163 F.R.D. 229 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (court held that a psychiatric examination in “your
basic garden variety tort quest for damages, to include pain and suffering” should be the exception not the rule);
Turner v. Imperial Stores, 161 F.R.D. 89 (S.D. Cal. 1995); Ali v. Wang Laboratories, Inc., 162 F.R.D. 165 (M.D.
Fla. 1995); Curtis v. Express, Inc., 868 F.Supp. 467 (N.D.N.Y. 1994) (the court held that even if good cause for a
mental examination was shown, the court, exercising its discretion, could preclude the examination as the plaintiff
presented a "garden variety" claim for emotional distress and made no claim of ongoing severe mental injury, and
therefore a mental examination was not needed); Bridges v. Eastman Kodak Co., 850 F.Supp. 216 (S.D.N.Y. 1994);
Sabree v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America, 126 F.R.D. 422 (D.Mass 1989); Robinson v.
Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 118 F.R.D. 525 (N.D. Fla. 1988); Broderick v. Shad, 117 F.R.D. 306 (D.D.C. 1987);
Cody v. Marriott Corp., 103 F.R.D. 421 (D.Mass. 1984). But See, Jansen v. Packaging Corp. of America, 158 F.R.D.
409 (N.D. Ill. 1994); Smedley v. Capps, Staples, Ward, Hastings & Dodson, 820 F.Supp. 1227 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
62
Bass v. Nooney, 646 S.W.2d 765 (Mo. Banc 1983).
63
For a discussion on the presence of third parties at mental examinations, See, e.g., Wyatt and Bales, “The Presence
of Third Parties at Rule 35 Examinations,” 71 Temple L. Rev. 103 (Spring 1998); Fleming, Thomas, “Right of Party
to have Attorney or Physician Present During Physical or Mental Examination at Instance of Opposing Party,” 84
A.L.R. 4th 558 (1991).
64
Generally, the defense will argue that when the litigant's attorney or expert is present during an adversarial
examination, the psychological condition of the litigant is exacerbated by the heightened, adversarial atmosphere. In
37
o Counsel should be present
Baba-Ali v. City of New York, 1995 WL 753904 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), the court noted “Underlying the reasoning of
those courts that have rejected requests for the presence of third parties at examinations are the following
considerations: 1) the special nature of a psychiatric examination requires direct and unimpeded one-on-one
communications, without external interference or intrusion; 2) in contrast to depositions and other forms of
discovery, Rule 35 expert examinations are not intended to be adversarial; 3) fairness dictates that if defense counsel
cannot be present when a plaintiff is interviewed by a psychiatrist who will testify at the trial on his behalf, then
plaintiff’s counsel cannot be present when plaintiff is examined by defendants’ expert psychiatrist; and 4) any
concerns with distortions or inaccuracies by the examining psychiatrist can be addressed through traditional methods
of impeachment and cross-examination.”
65
See, e.g., Zabkowicz v. West Bend Co., 585 F.Supp. 635 (E.D. Wis. 1984) (a third party, including counsel or a
recording device was permitted to be present during examination); Beasley v. National Rifle Assoc. of America, et
al., Civ. Action No. 89-11277 (D.C. Superior Ct., July 19, 1990) (vonKann, J.) (counsel, psychiatrist and tape
recorder may be present during examination); Tietjern v. Department of Labor, 13 Wash. App. 86, 534 P.2d 151
(1975) (counsel present during psychiatric examination); Kelley v. Smith & Oby Co., 70 Ohio L. Abs. 202, 129 N.E.
2d 106 (1954) (same) B.D. v. Carley, 704 A.2d 979 (N.J.Super.A.D. 1998) (plaintiff was permitted to employe
“unobtrusive” audio recording device during examination); Milam v. Mitchell, 274 N.Y.S.2d. 326 (N.Y. Gen. Term
1966) (stenographer could record examination but had to be stationed outside of the examining room, or in such a
position so as not to interfere with conducting the examination). Contra. Tomlin v. Holecek, 150 F.R.D. 628, 630
(D.Minn. 1993) (finding tape recording to be inconsistent with the underlying purposes of Rule 35 examinations;
Apsychological examinations necessitate an unimpeded, one-on-one exchange between the doctor and the
patient@); Tirado v. Erosa, 158 F.R.D. 294 (S.D. N.Y. 1994) (plaintiff not entitled to have attorney and
stenographer present at examination by defendant's psychiatrist); Di Bari v. Incaica Cia Armadora, 126 F.R.D. 12
(E.D.N.Y. 1989) (plaintiff allowed to have court reporter, but not counsel, present during a psychiatric exam);
Hirschheimer v. Associated Minerals & Minerals Corp., 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18378 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 1995)
(outside of special circumstances, plaintiff cannot tape record medical examination with opposing party=s
psychologist or have plaintiff=s attorney attend the exam); Abdulwali v. Washington Metro Area Transit Authority,
193 F.R.D. 10 (D.D.C. 2000) (counsel was not permitted to be present during examination because plaintiff failed to
show a “compelling need.”); Shirsat v. Mutual Pharmaceutical Co., Inc., 169 F.R.D. 68 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (denying
plaintiff’s request to have an observer present because it would constitute a distraction and diminish the accuracy of
the exam); Ragge v. MCA/Universal Studios, 165 F.R.D. 605 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (refusing to require clinical
psychologist to disclose specific tests to be administered and denying request for a third party observer); Murray v.
Specialty Chemicals Co., 100 Misc. 2d 658, 418 N.Y.S.2d 748 (1979); Whitfield v. Superior Court, 246 Cal. App.
2d 81, 54 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1966); State v. Szatmari, 163 N.J. Super. 418, 394 A.2d 1254 (1978) (examinee's
psychiatrist present); Reese v. Batesville Casket Co., Civil Action No. 79-1645 (D.D.C., May 13, 1980) (same).
66
See, e.g., Ferrell v. Shell Oil Co., 1995 WL 688795 (E.D. La. 1995) (refusing to limit the scope of questioning);
Bethel v. Dixie Homecrafters, Inc., 192 F.R.D. 320 (N.D. Ga. 2000) (same); Morton v. Haskell Co., 5 AD Cases 272
(M.D. Fla. 1995) (same); Hertenstein v. Kimberly Home Health Care, Inc., 189 F.R.D. 620 (D. Kan. 1999)
(permitting questioning regarding plaintiff’s sexual history).
67
Cf. Chaparro v. IBP, Inc., 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18438 (D.Kan. 1994) (a party seeking a Rule 35 examination is
not permitted to unilaterally impose unnecessary or avoidable expenses upon the party to be examined).
38
o Plaintiff's expert should be present; if there is no forensic, then argue that the
treating or the spouse (to provide emotional support) be present. Physicians are
more likely to be permitted to be present at the examination as they are less likely
to disrupt the exam. The bottom line goal for plaintiff is to get a deposition-type
record of the Rule 35 exam.
In Robin v. Assoc. Indemnity Co.,71 the Court readily recognized the "partisan nature" of
an examination by a physician selected by an adverse party.72 In Jansen v. Packaging Corp. of
America,73 Judge Shadur dealt with the "great dangers of intrusiveness" and the need to "provide
a level playing field" and appointed an independent expert.74 While many lament this reality, the
Court must premise its decision upon it. AUnder present procedure, where the medical
testimony comes from no objective or necessarily qualified source, and only through the
hirelings of the parties, partisan experts, medical mouthpieces, the jury is more apt to be
confused than enlightened by what it hears. It hears black from one expert, white from the other,
a maximizing or minimizing of injuries in accordance with the interest of the source of payment
for the testimony."75 The Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence has noted the
68
86 A.D. 2d 398, 450 N.Y.S. 2d 612 (1982).
69
614 N.Y.S. 2d at 614.
70
Id.
71
297 So.2d 427, 430 (La. 1973).
72
297 So.2d at 430. See also Di Bari.
73
158 F.R.D. 409 (N.D. Ill. 1994).
74
See also Durst v. Superior Court, 222 Cal. App. 2d 447, 35 Cal. Rptr. 143, 7 A.L.R. 3d 9874, 877-78 (1963),
where the Court recognized that an examination, under the California statute comparable to Rule 35, "might be
considered an adversary proceeding."
75
Hon. D. Peck, Impartial Medical Testimony, 22 F.R.D. 21, 22 (1958). See also Hon. F. VanDusen, A United
States District Judge's View of the Impartial Medical Expert System, 32 F.R.D. 498, 500 (1962) (Experience shows
that opposing parties still search until they find experts whose testimony supports their positions).
39
"practice of shopping for experts."76 "An attorney will use great care in choosing his expert and
in preparing for trial. He will not necessarily seek the expert who is most qualified. Instead, he
will probably choose the expert who will best support his client's cause, and, perhaps, conceal its
weaknesses.”77
o Mental status
o General appearance
It is advantageous for plaintiff to hold the mental examination in the defendant's forensic
office. The theory behind this premise is that plaintiff's counsel is likely to learn something
about the forensic's soft underbelly by getting into his/her lair for a couple of hours. In sum, you
are there to protect your client, but also to size up the other side's forensic and his environment.
In Storms v. Lowe=s Home Centers, Inc.78, the court declined to permit a Rule 35
examination of plaintiff for the purposes of a vocational assessment. Several courts have found
that vocational examinations may be ordered under Rule 35.79 The Storms court declined to do
76
Advisory Committee's Notes on Rule 706, Fed. R. Evid., 28 USCA at 517.
77
Kraft, "Using Experts in Civil Cases" at 57 (PLI 1977).
78
211 F.R.D. 296 (W.D. Va. 2002)
79
See, e.g., Fischer v. Coastal Towing Incorporated, 168 F.R.D. 199 (E.D.Tex. 1996) (finding that a vocational
rehabilitation expert is a Asuitably licensed or certified examiner@ under Rule 35, but failing to address whether a
40
so, on the ground that such an assessment was not connected with any physical or mental
examination. The court also found that Agood cause@ had not been shown as the information
was available by other means.
vocation exam is a Aphysical or mental examination@); Olcott v. LaFiandra, 793 F.Supp. 487 (D.Vt. 1992)(finding
that a vocational rehabilitation expert is a Asuitably licensed or certified examiner@ after evaluating the expert=s
credentials, but also specifically finding that expert qualified to render a Aphysical examination@); Jefferys v. LRP
Publicaions, Inc., 184 F.R.D. 262 (E.D. Pa. 1999)(finding that a vocational rehabilitation counselor is a Asuitably
licensed or certified examiner@ and finding without explanation that a pure vocational evaluation is a Aphysical or
mental examination@ within the spirit and letter of the rule as currently written).
80
See, e.g., Barnes v. American Tobacco, Co., 1997 US Dist Lexis 10550 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (limiting psychiatric
examination to three hours); Jackson v. Entergy Operations, 1998 U.S. Dist. Lexis 752 (E.D. La. 1998) (limiting
psychiatric examination to four hours); Henry v. City of Tallahassee, 2000 U.S. Dist. Lexis 20469 (N.D. Fla. 2000)
(limiting examination to 3 hours absent good cause for a longer interview); Hertenstein v. Kimberly Home Health
Care Inc., 189 F.R.D. 620 (D. Kan. 1999) (examination limited to two hours). But see, Greenhorn v. Marriott Int’l,
Inc., 216 F.R.D. 649 (D. Kan. 2003) (declining to limit examination to two hours).
81
See e.g., Lemon v. Klibert, 1998 U.S. Dist. Lexis 18174 (E.D. La 1998); Duncan v. UpJohn Co., 155 F.R.D. 23
(D. Conn. 1994) (defendant directed to reimburse plaintiff=s necessary expenses and to provide limousine
transportation and to furnish meals); Ewing v. Ayres Corp.,. 129 F.R.D. 137 (N.D. Miss. 1989) (defendant to
reimburse reasonable transportation costs and other incidental expenses).
82
See e.g., Duncan v. UpJohn Co., 155 F.R.D. 23 (D. Conn. 1994); Powell v. U.S., 149 F.R.D. 122 (E.D. Va. 1993).
See also, Looney v. National R.R. Corp., 142 F.R.D. 264 (D.Mass. 1992) (questions of bias regarding defendant=s
expert left for exploration at trial, not in disqualifying expert from Rule 35 exam).
83
See Sullivan v. Helene Curtis, Inc., 135 F.R.D.166 (N.D.Ill. 1991) (limits on employment-related counseling
records, although not confidential; after court in camera review irrelevant portions orders redacted).
84
See e.g., Hirschheimer v. Associated Metals & Minerals Corp., 1995 U.S. Dist. Lexis 18378 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)
(tests to be given must be identified).
41
o
The court may, however, determine whether psychological testing is appropriate
and, if so, may question the choice of tests made by the defense.85
After a mental examination, and if requested by counsel for the examinee, counsel is
entitled to a copy of the report. Also, the defense under rule 26 will have to reveal the qualifying
information about the forensic if he/she is going to serve as an expert in the case, as well as
submit him/her to deposition. In such cases, the report must include all opinions and everything
considered by the expert in arriving at his/her opinion. Presumably, cases like Dominquez v.
Syntex Laboratories, Inc.,88 are a thing of the past.
85
See, e.g., Usher v. Lakewood Eng. & Mfg. Co., 158 F.R.D. 411 (N.D.Ill. 1994) (denying request for psychological
testing). See Mark E. Weinstein, ARights of Plaintiff When an Independent Medical Examination is Ordered,@
Vol. X, Employment Law Strategist 1 (Oct. 2002).
86
Clark v. District Court, 668 P.2d 3, 10 (Colo. 1983); Soybel v. Gruber, 132 Misc. 2d 343, 345-46, 504 N.Y.S.2d
354, 356 (1986); Cal. Evid. Code ' 1016(a) (West 1966); Ill. Ann. Stat. Ch. 912, & 810(1) (Smith-Hurd 1987); Or.
Rev. Stat. Ann. ' 40.230(4)(b) (1985); Tex. R. Civ. Evid. ' 510(d)(5), see Annotation, Privilege, in Judicial or Quasi-
Judicial Proceedings, Arising From Relationship Between Psychiatrist or Psychologist and Patient, 44 A.L.R.3d 24,
50-52 (1972 & Supp. 1987).
87
E.g., Fields v. State, 221 Ga. 307, 308-09, 144 S.E.2d 339, 342 (1965); Eberle v. Savon Food Stores, Inc., 30
Mich. App. 496, 500, 186 N.W.2d 837, 839 (1971).
88
149 F.R.D. 158 (D. Ind., February 12, 1993) (although the testifying expert read the information prepared by the
non-testifying expert, the testifying expert never considered it).
42
Deposition of Forensic
There is an abundance of material available on the subject.89 The tips that pertain to
depositions of experts in general apply in the case of mental health practitioners. In other words,
adhere to the following rules if you are taking the depositions:
o Allow the expert to speak at length; you learn more through his/her words than
yours;
o Do not cross-examine the witness; that educates him/her for trial and may
encourage the selection of another expert;
o Ask the witness to produce all reports and drafts and if they have been destroyed
(to test the witness's preliminary thinking) find out when and on whose
instructions;
o Find out if anyone assisted the expert to test his or her feel for underlying data;
89
See, e.g., The Defense Deposition Atlas by Peter B. Silvain (The Med/Psych Press Inc.).
43
o Ask who the expert regards as expert in the field.90
o The expert deposition is too late to prepare or defend your case; instead the
deposition should be viewed as damage control, designed not to score points, but
to prevent points being scored;
o Try to have your expert work on computer since that is harder to produce than
documents;
o Assume your expert may not receive the benefit of any testimonial privileges;
o Insure your expert's opinions are final before testifying, otherwise they may be
precluded later as unformed, or the deposition might be adjourned until they are
formed;
o If an opinion is not formed before the deposition, then witness preparation may be
discoverable;
o Protect the expert's credibility by giving up honest points even if adverse, in order
to enhance credibility; and
90
Daniel Beller, "On Taking the Expert's Deposition" (unpublished).
44
o Object to questions early on so that points you truly care about are not your first
objection.91
• Qualifications
o Publications authored
91
Gandolfo V. DiLasi, "On Defending the Expert Deposition" (unpublished).
45
o Previous experience as an expert in cases identical to the pending matter (i.e., sex
harassment, breach of contract, etc.)
o Fees
Ask the expert to articulate his "mission" (always obtain a copy of the
expert's entire file, including any correspondence to and from plaintiff's
counsel)
- Depositions;
o Determine if the expert has requested any information which has not been
provided or if additional information would have been desirable in the completion
of his mission.
46
The defense may challenge the diagnosis on the basis of the following:
o malingering.
On malingering, counsel needs to be aware of patterns on the objective tests that one
looks for to detect malingering. Also, counsel should be aware of the clinical criteria for
malingering according to DSM IV. There is excellent defense literature on malingering issues. 92
Clinical psychologists, for example, maintain that a so-called wide scatter on the WAIS-R scores
on the F minus K scales of MMPI indicate malingering.
In anticipation of a "other life stressors" defense, review the Traumatic Event and Social
Stressor Checklists. Be prepared for the Holmes-Rake Social Readjustment Rating Scale which
ranks and gives a numerical value to the 25 most stressful life events (#1 is death of spouse (100
points), and the 8th is being fired from your job (47 points)).
Oftentimes, the defense will argue that plaintiff's anxiety and depression are transient
side-effects of medication. Certain frequently prescribed medications have been reported to
cause anxiety (e.g., Elavil) and/or depression (e.g., Demerol). Counsel for plaintiff should
consider this, if possible, at intake.
Plaintiff and his/her counsel may not have, by any stretch of the imagination, all of the
92
See, e.g., Tancredi, "Malingering: A Psychiatric Dilemma," (Insurance/ Defense Review, Fall 1992); King,
"Malingering: Detection by Clinical Observation and Psychological Tests," (Insurance/Defense Review, Fall 1992);
Smith, "Faking Believable Defects on Neuropsychological Testing," (Insurance/Defense Review, Fall 1992); Price,
"Case Review: Malingering," (Insurance/Defense Review, Fall 1992); Resnick, "The Detection of Malingered
Mental Illness," (1984).
47
records relevant to the issue of mental anguish. The defense should be aware that there are many
other places to get relevant records, including former employers, the military, as well as doctors,
hospitals, and clinics. The defense needs to get appropriate releases from the plaintiff as early as
possible and, where met with resistance, get court orders or a motion to compel directing the
plaintiff to sign an appropriate form of release when the plaintiff has placed his/her mental
condition in controversy.
Trial Presentation
If you use an expert, the individual ought to be on direct for a maximum of 30 minutes.
The principal reasons the expert is there is to validate common sense and to create a record
where court evidentiary rulings dictate that an expert testify. Here are some additional
suggestions:
o The expert must talk in real talk on direct. Save the psycho-babble for academia.
o Deflate the "whiner" defense by putting the evidence on through others, not the
plaintiff.
o Deflate the other stressor defense by testimony on the separateness of the two and
the relative magnitude of the job stress as opposed to the other.
o Consider sending plaintiff out of the courtroom during the testimony of the mental
health practitioner or during the spouse's testimony on mental anguish.
o Never refer to the other side's expert as the Independent Medical Examiner (IME).
Rather, challenge any suggestion he/she is independent by, for example, asking:
Are you independent? Did the Judge appoint you? Did the defense lawyer hire
you? Doesn't that make you the defense medical expert?
After Daubert, the defense will more carefully review the qualifications of the putative
expert and the reliability of the opinions of the so-called expert the proponent wishes to put into
48
evidence. Given the new federal civil rules which require experts to disclose much more
information on their opinions and their background, the defense will have more information at its
disposal to plan an attack.
Substantive Attacks93
Over and above Daubert thrusts and parries, the defense will pursue some of the time-
honored avenues of attack on such testing used in personal injury litigation. Among the lines of
attack are:
o Susceptibility to malingerers
o Attack on credentials
93
"Challenging the Plaintiff's Diagnosis of Psychological Injury," The Personal Injury Law Defense Bulletin (No. 6,
May 1989).
49
o Inadequate symptoms for the diagnosis of a proximately caused mental illness
o Bias in reporting because of: 1) economic considerations [e.g., the plaintiff owes
the doctor money]; 2) the therapist-patient alliance
o Failure to conduct an adequate differential diagnosis and rule out other mental or
physical illnesses that are causing the plaintiff's symptoms.
Everyone is striving to reduce transactional costs. Thus, counsel's interface with the
mental health issues must be focused and cost effective. At the outset establish deadlines to
obtain records. If you are prepared,
o The amount of material that can be obtained within the shortened time periods of
the new civil rules can be awesome.
o Counsel must be able to obtain, extract, and utilize such evidence expeditiously
and on a much more cost effective basis than heretofore clients have tolerated.
o Certainly, familiarizing yourself with the vast literature in the field will help to
reduce your client's transactional costs. See short bibliography of representative
readings in the field attached hereto as Attachment B.
Conclusion
While one needs to approach mental anguish with trepidation, adequate preparation can
be of immense value not only on damages, but also on liability. Jurors' attitudes about damages
can spill over and color their judgment about liability. I hope this article helps the reader to
better prepare to deal with mental health issues in workplace cases.
50
Good luck.
51
ATTACHMENT A
Affective Disorder - a disorder of mood, usually resulting in depression, but sometimes in mania;
three groups of affective disorders appear in DSM-III: major affective disorder, other specific
affective disorders; and atypical affective disorders.
Attention Deficit Disorder - the adult with ADD is a mass of unfinished tasks, broken promises,
and unfulfilled potential, subject to uncontrollable temper outbursts, fidgeting, resistance to
being touched, and a tendency toward drug and alcohol abuse or other compulsive behavior.
Behavior both creates and expresses a deep frustration and confusion, and a fearful sense of not
being in control of his life.
Borderline – a person affected by this disorder may act sexually inappropriate or seductively, and
if rejected may claim harassment.
Clinical Psychologist - individual has a doctoral degree in psychology, the science of mental
processes and behavior.
Clinical Social Worker - individual has a master's or doctoral degree in social work, and special
training to practice psychotherapy.
Dependent – a dependent individual in the workplace will endure abuse and fail to report
harassment and discrimination.
52
ATTACHMENT A – Page 2
Holistic Counselor - practitioner who maintains the view that an organic or integrated whole has
a reality independent of and greater than the sum of its parts
Learning Disability - disorder in one or more of the basic processes involved in using spoken or
written language in the presence of normal or above-average intelligence (Supervising Adults
with Learning Disabilities, p. 1); identifiable and delimited problems with reading, arithmetic,
language, or combinations of these which are usually diagnosed by psychological testing
Malingering - plaintiff is consciously deceptive: the plaintiff lies. This is different from
secondary gain, where the mechanics are unconscious. The malingering soldier would
consciously fabricate an injury or lie about a condition in order to be removed from the front
lines. The malingerer knows that 2 + 2 = 4, but swears that the answer is 5. The malingerer is a
faker.
Mood Disorders - include elevated mood (mania) as well as depressed mood (depression), or a
combination of both (bipolar disorder or cyclothymic disorder, if not as severe).
Narcissistic – self-centered, imperious; may react with rage or violence to career changes.
Obsessive Compulsive – perfectionists; may not interact well with peers or subordinates.
Primary Gain - people achieve primary gain by developing physical symptoms to block
Psychiatrists - an M.D. who specializes in the medical study, diagnosis, treatment and prevention
of mental illness.
Secondary Gain - people achieve secondary gain by developing physical symptoms to control
their environment. Secondary gains are the tangible, but unconscious, benefits that people
realize from being sick. For example, an individual may develop paralysis to avoid returning
from a work injury to a detested job. These are the psychological benefits (fulfilled needs and
rewards) that the plaintiff gains from his or her neurosis. The benefit may be money or other
compensation, peer and familial attention, sympathy, or social allowance for or removal from
stressful situations; an unconscious symptom-fixing mechanism which helps maintain the
primary gain symptoms or condition because of the rewards or "gains" which the symptoms
afford. The plaintiff is not consciously aware of his or her true motivations when secondary gain
mechanisms are present.
Social Worker, Psychiatric - a skilled professional, trained in social work, who works with
psychiatrists, usually in an institutional setting. The social worker evaluates family,
54
ATTACHMENT A - Page 4
environmental, and social factors in the patient's illness, may work in intake and reception with
new patients, and may follow up and counsel after discharge. All of the aforementioned are
incorporated in the technique of case work. Psychiatric social workers also carry out individual,
family, and group psychotherapy as well as participate in community organizations.
Stressor - a stimulus that affects a patient's ability to respond; frequently plays a precipitating
role in a disorder, it may also be a consequence of the person's psychopathology - e.g., alcohol
dependence may lead to marital problems and divorce, which then become stressors contributing
to the development of a Major Depressive Episode.
Thought Process Disorders - a symptom of schizophrenia that involves the intellectual functions.
It is manifested by irrelevance and incoherence of the patient's verbal productions. It ranges
from simple blocking and mild circumstantiality to total loosening of associations, as in word
salad.
55
ATTACHMENT B
BIBLIOGRAPHY
William A. Barton, Recovering for Psychological Injuries ATLA PRESS (2d. ed).
S. Brakel & R. Rock, The Mentally Disabled and the Law (1971).
Diana Clifford Kimber & Carolyn E. Gray, R.N., Textbook of Anatomy and
Physiology (The MacMillan Company).
Coryell, Pfohl, & Stangl, The Reliability of the Family History Method for
Psychiatric Diagnoses 45 ARCH GEN PSYCHIATRY 320, (1988).
Davidson, Smith, & Kudler, Validity and Reliability of the DSM-III Criteria for
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder: Experience with a Structured Interview, 177 J.
NERV. & MENT. DIS. 336 (1989).
Ann Ehrlich, The Medical & Health Sciences Word Book (Houghton Mifflin).
56
ATTACHMENT B - PAGE 2
T. Gutheil & P. Appelbaum, Clinical Handbook of Psychiatry and the Law (1992).
Kahn, Fox, & Rhode, Detecting Faking on the Rorschach: Computer Versus Expert
Clinical Judgment 52 J. PERS. ASSESS. 516 (1988).
Marvin E. Lewis and Robert L. Sadoff, M.D., Courtroom Medicine (Volume 12) -
Psychic Injuries (Matthew Bender).
Malingering and the Law: An Update Symposium 8 BEH. SCI. & L. 1 (1990)
Kenneth S. Pope, Ph.D., James N. Butcher, Ph.D., and Joyce Seelen, Esq., The
MPI, MMPI-2, and MMPI-A In Court: Assessment, Testimony, and Cross-
Examination for Expert Witnesses and Attorneys (American Psychological
Association)
Fredrick C. Redlich & Daniel X. Freedman, The Theory and Practice of Psychiatry
(Basic Books, Inc.)
57
ATTACHMENT B - PAGE 3
Peter B. Silvain, The Defense Deposition Atlas (The Med/Psych Press Inc.)
Robert I. Simon, Clinical Psychiatry and the Law (2d ed. American Psychiatric
Press, Washington, D.C. 1992).
Watson, Juba, Manifold, Kucala, & Anderson, The PTSD Interview: Rationale,
Description, Reliability, and Concurrent Validity of a DSM-III-Based Technique 47
J. CLIN. PSYCHOLOGY 179 (1991).
Dr. Lynn Weiss, Attention Deficit Disorder in Adults (Taylor Publishing Company).
Stanley L. Weinberg, Biology: An Inquiry Into the Nature of Life (Allyn and
Bacon, Inc.)
J. Ziskin, Coping with Psychiatric and Psychological Testimony (3d ed. 1981 &
supp. 1983).
58
ATTACHMENT B - PAGE 4
McDonald, “My Life’s a Mess and It’s All Your Fault!” 29 Emp. Rel.L.J. 68
(Summer 2003)
59