TUTORIAL 5,

ANALYSIS OF CASES ON PROFESSIONAL MISCONDUCT

PROFESSIONAL ETHICS

Under the guidance of:

Dr. Sanu Rani Paul

Submitted By:

G SHASHANK RAO

PRN-17010324019

Division-C (B.B.A, L.L.B.)

Submitted on: 2nd November,2021

1. N.G. DASTANE V. SHRIKANT S. SHINDE AIR 2001 SC 2028

FACTS

“ Two advocates won with respect to tormenting an eyewitness by searching for different
adjournments for addressing him in the Court of a legal magistrate. On all of those days the
onlooker should be accessible perforce and at tremendous cost for him. It transformed into an
issue of profound concern when we saw that the legal magistrate had, on each and every such
occasion, obliged the advocates by yielding such adjournments on the straightforward asking
to the vast weight and sufferings of the onlooker. Exactly when he was convinced that those
two advocates were assuming the tactics of duplicity by progressing bogus reasons each an
ideal chance for postponing addressing he tested. However, the magistrate didn't help him. In
the end when crushed against the divider he moved the State Bar Council for taking
disciplinary procedures against the advocates concerned. However, the State Bar Council just
shut its entrances exhorting him that he didn't have even a from the start contention against
the delinquent advocates .””

ISSUES

• WHETHER THE ACTIONS OF THE DILINQUINT ADVOCATES FELL INTO

PROFESSIONAL MISCONDUCT

• WHETHER THE DECISION TAKE BY THE BAR COUNSEL WAS FAIR IN

DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT OF THE APPALENT ONE BASIS OF NOT HAVING A
PRIMA FACIE CASE?

ANALYSIS

Advocate misusing the course of court is to blame for misconduct. Right when witnesses are
free in Court so that evaluation the advocate concerned has a commitment might see that their
appraisal is coordinated. We remind that sees who go to the Court, on being called by the
Court, do as, for example, they have no other option, and such onlookers are moreover
trustworthy inhabitants who have other work to go to for crushing out work.

The State Bar Council has surrendered its commitments when it was found that there was no
right away case for the Disciplinary Committee to take up. The Bar Council of India also
ended up being terrible in holding that there was no case for adjustment in any way shape or
form. In our considered view the appealing party complainant has made out an outstandingly
strong from the get go case for the Disciplinary Committee of the State Bar Council to
proceed with. We, in this way, set aside the request for the State Bar Council similarly as that
of the Bar Council of India and we hold that the dissent of the appealing party would stand
insinuated the Disciplinary Committee of the State Bar Council.

The decision taken by the court was urgent as it not simply gave light on what professional
misconduct relates to while using the powers of the court and gave it a moral compass to
follow yet furthermore helped in raising the blunders of the Bar Council Itself as to set a
model for the moral Compass the actual Council needs to follow to get the freedoms and
interests of an inhabitant.

DECISION

It was held by the Supreme Court that searching for adjournments for conceding the
evaluation of witnesses who were accessible without making diverse game arrangements for
investigating such eyewitnesses is a relinquishment of the commitment that an advocate owed
to the Court, amounting to misconduct.

2. BAR COUNCIL OF MAHARASHTRA V. M.V. DAHBOLKAR. AIR 1976

SC242

FACTS

The facts suitable included advocates organizing themselves at the section to the Magistrate's
courts and hurrying towards possible respondents, reliably inciting a horrendous scrimmage
to get briefs and attacking of expenses. The Disciplinary Committee of the state Bar Council
found such lead to add up to professional misconduct, yet on appeal to the Bar Council of
India, it was the Bar Council of India justified them of all charges of professional misconduct
on the ground that the direct didn't renounce Rule 36 of the Standards of Professional
Conduct and Etiquette as the standard required arrangements of work from a specific person
concerning a specific case, and this case didn't meet the fundamental measures as a whole,
and such framework for bargains couldn't add up to misconduct. This methodology of the Bar
council of India was predominantly condemned by the Supreme Court. It was held that
prohibitive cognizance of the huge norm by secluding the text doesn't suggest that the direct
of the advocates was upheld or legitimized.

ISSUES

• WHETHER THE ACTIONS OF THE ADVOCATES AMOUNTED TO

PROFESSIONAL MISCONDUCT?

• WHETHER PROFESSIONAL MISCONDUCT RESTED SOLELY ON RULE 36

OF THE RULES FRAMED UNDER SECTION 49C OF THE ADVOCATES ACT, 1961?

ANALYSIS

The high upstanding tone and the huge public help the bar is connected with and its basic
occupation in the developmental and discussion taking care of activities and, in particular, in
the construction up of a reasonable society and set up request has procured for it an
impressive plan of action to practice law and an autonomy to control its own internal
discipline. This significant public trust should not be surrendered by legalizing or approving
fights for briefs affrays in the flood towards clients, subverting and battling among people.
Subsequently what the advocates did was grave unfairness to the profession of an advocate
and amounted to misconduct.

Rule 36 was contained three sections, shows how a heading course in guidelines of lead and
conduct in the socio-moral setting of the legal advisor, everyone and professional
commitment may be an educative asset for disciplinary courts and Bar Councils which select
councils and oversee professional direct by rules. Cicero called the law 'a good profession',
yet Frederick the Great depicted legal advisors as 'leeches'. Rule 36, sensibly comprehended,
sets out sound standards of professional direct yet the guidelines of morals existed in any
event, going before r. 36 and the examination of the said rule; the way wherein it has been
done by the disciplinary Committee.

DECISION

It was held that "professional morals can't be held back in a Bar Council rule nor in ordinary
cant in the books anyway in new guidelines of soul which will arrange the person from the
calling of value to submit to rules or profound quality and utility." Misconduct of advocates
ought to in this way be seen in a setting unequivocal, interesting sense, which gets the work
of the advocate in the overall population running free.

3. D.P. CHADHA VS. TRIYUGI NARAYAN MISHRA AIR 2001 SC 457

FACTS

While the past in a civil suit were happening in the civil suit at Jaipur, the complainant
Mr.Mishra was busy with the political race in U.P. additionally, was not open in Jaipur for a
critical stretch. Sri D.P.Chadha, litigant had a reasonable vakalatnama and a paper both
supported by the respondent given to him as his advocate I initial multi day stretch of October
1993. The vakalatnama was used for associating with Shri.Anil Sharma arrange of to serve
the respondent. On 17 November, 1993 Shri Chadha was accessible in the court anyway the
litigant was missing when adjournment was taken from the court communicating that there
was conceivable of a pleasant settlement between the gatherings, where upon the consultation
was conceded to fourteenth December1994 for repaying compromise or illustrating issue.

On 20, November1993, Shri Rajesh Jain, and Anil Sharma displayed to serve the offended
party and respondent recorded a compromise request close by a receipt by the complainant
communicating that he has gotten Rupees 5, 000, 00 as a compensation for the damages to
the school building. The primer Court directed the gatherings to stay eventually introduce
under the careful attention of the court on 17 December 1993, to confirm the exchange.
Maybe than consenting to the request, Sri Rajesh Jain advocate record a Misc. civil
application raising a petition that the primer court was not legitimized in organizing
individual appearance of the gatherings. The Appeal was pardoned. The primary official of
the primer court was moved and his substitution got an application by Shri Suresh Jain.
Advocate communicating to record the compromise and their bye pass a declaration. On 23
August 1994, the judge announced the suit similarly as the compromise. Shri Mishra moved
to state bar council protesting of the professional misconduct of the three advocates who had
plotted to bring sham compromise. The disciplinary panel observed that it was advocated
D.P.Chadha who gave the going with papers to Anil Sharma, and mentioned that he get
degree. The board held Chadha Guilty of professional misconduct and in this manner
suspended him for a long time. Advocate Chadha Appealed to the bar council of India which
without giving the charm litigant hearing worked on the discipline to a period of a long time
from this request the appealing party jumped at the chance to seek after the supreme court.

ISSUES
• WHETHER THE APALENT COMITTED PROFESSIONAL MISCONDUCT?

• WAS THE BAR COUNCIL OF INDIA WAS JUSTIFIED IN ENHANCING THE

PUNISHMENT WHITHOUT GIVING THE APPALENT AN OPPORTUNITY OF BEING
HEARD?

ANALYSIS

Considering the incredible position which the advocates have during the time spent
association of value and value movement structure, the courts truly expect from the legal
counselors a high standard of professional and moral responsibility in the arrival of their
commitments. Any act or rejection regarding an attorney which upsets or deceives the blessed
movement of value or which conveys a professional despicable of right to practice the upside
of the profession would amount to misconduct attracting the displeasure of disciplinary
locale.

The litigant himself was missing on the date of hearing. He had appealed to God for an
adjournment on the ground of his problem which was dismissed. The knowledge for the
litigant was heard in offer. It would have been extraordinary if the Bar Council of India
having heard the charm would have first situated its perspective on record that the discoveries
displayed at by the State Bar Council against the litigant were being kept up with by it. Then
the appealing party should have been given a reasonable warning calling upon him to
showcause why the discipline constrained by the State Bar Council be not updated. Ensuing
to offering him a shot at archiving a reply and a short time later hearing him the Bar Council
could have for inspirations to be put on record, overhauled the discipline. Nothing such was
done. The activity by the Bar Council of India of capacity to vacillate the sentence to the
inclination of the litigant is vitiated in the current case for not offering the appealing party
reasonable shot at being heard.

The appealing party was at genuine problem for professional misconduct yet since the bar
council of India didn't observe the guideline of ordinary value hereafter its request was saved
in this way the request for the State bar council was restored. This was a best decision taken
by the litigant didn't get a suitable chance to be heard before the Council and there was an
overhaul of his discipline. Notwithstanding, that itself should be adequate inspiration to block
an overhaul the conditions of the actual appealing party and the offense he had submitted
didn't require any improvement and was not advocated.

DECISION

For the earlier reasons the charm is generally allowed. The seeing that the appealing party is
as accountable of professional misconduct is kept up with yet the sentence conceded by the
Rajasthan State Bar Council suspending the litigant from practice for a period of five years is
kept up with and restored. Similarly, the request for the Bar Council of India, just to the level
of working on the discipline, is saved. No structure concerning the costs.

4. P.D. GUPTA VS RAMMURTHI AIR 1998 SC 283

FACTS

One Mr. Krishnan passed on 5-6-1980. His sister Vidyawati reported a suit for decleration of
title on the side of herself for explicit properties of Mr. Krishnan, Ramamurthi and others
went against the suit stating title on the side of themselves. P.D.Gupta was the Advocate of
Vidyawati. Right when the suit was approaching P.D. Gupta purchased part of the challenged
property for Rs.18000 and sold it for 34000 immediately. Mr. ramamurthi reported a dissent
against P.D.Gupta before the Delhi Bar Council charging professional misconduct. The
essential case is that he has purchased the piece of the challenged property from his client
during the pendency of the suit. Since the enquiry was not completed inside one year the
matter is moved to the Bar Council of India. In the wake of hearing both the gatherings, the
Bar Council of India passed a request suspending him from the practice for a period of one
year. The court held that an embarrassment as extreme impact is accessible when an
Advocate buys property of his own client. Against this request P.D. Gupta recorded an appeal
under the watchful eye of the Supreme court. In the appeal his basic struggle was that his
client or her legal recipients has not recorded any dissent with respect to professional
misconduct, and the enquiry drove subject to the protesting by some other individual isn't
right.

ISSUES

• WHETHER THE ACT OF BUYSING THE PROPERTY IN DISPUTE OF THE

CLIENT WAS MISCONDUCT ON BEHALF OF THE ADVOCATE?
• WHETHER THE SENTENCE OF ONE YEAR OF SUSPENSION
DISPROPORTIONATE TO HIS GUILT?

ANALYSIS

The Supreme Court saw that the contention of the Appellant had no reason. The contention of
charges not being clear and not being in charge of the property are not considerable. The
charges are direct and the fact that he doesn't guarantee the property doesn't decrease the
misconduct of buying the challenged property regardless. The Court expressed "An attorney
owes commitment to be sensible not only to his client anyway to the court similarly
concerning the opposite party ahead of the pack of the case. Association of Justice is stream
which should be kept pure and clean. It should be kept unpolluted. Association of Justice isn't
something which concern the Bench so to speak. It concerns the Bar as well. Bar is the
central ground for enrolling Judges. No one should have the choice to raise a finger about the
direct of a legal counsellor.

Different events have been found in the occasions of Motor Accident Claims. In all
likelihood, there is no bar for an attorney to purchase property anyway by uprightness of
ordinary sensibility remarkably a law acknowledging individual will not at any point truly
prefer to purchase the property, the title of which is under question" The Supreme Court of
India saw that bar council of India, in the current case, has pondered all of the relevant
conditions and has suitably arrived at the goal that Shri P.D. Gupta is to blame for miscount
along these lines he is suspended from practice for one year.

The case in analysis relates to at its middle the commitment of the advocate to not appreciate
subjects of discussion for individual expansion. A legal advisor is a man with mind blowing
data on the law and should grasp which acts of his could be blocking and augmentation
multifaceted design of the suits and discussions reachable.

Thusly, it is pertinent that a legal advisor should reliably recall the rules of the BCI and
besides act reasonably while doing his profession. The profession obliges the advocate to
keep law and control and sponsorship smooth working of public value structure. It is
important to have trustworthiness in abundance and nothing should be done that could
disintegrate his legitimacy.
In each professional work, an advocate should be cautious and should be as per the
requirements of the law. Any encroachment of the norms of professional morals is as
unfortunate anyway more essentially prohibited.

DECISION

The charge of professional or other misconduct by an advocate is nothing to joke about

should be considered and disposed of by the Disciplinary panel of a state Bar council rapidly
and inside season of one year. We can't comprehend in regards to why the Disciplinary
Committee of the Delhi Bar council couldn't dispose of the matter inside the supported time-
frame and it was passed on the pinnacle body to oversee it.

5. ARUNAVA GHOSH and OTHERS V, BAR COUNCIL OF WEST BENGAL

AND ANDAMAN and NICOBAR ISLAND AIR 1996 CAL 331

FACTS

Bar Council of West Bengal through an objective dated third May, 1941 settled that "This
Council having considered the disturbing circumstance of Alipore Criminal Court and the
Howrah Court and having furthermore seen the letter of the West Bengal Judicial Services
Association dated 2-5-1994, it is inferred that with the exception of in case steps are taken by
fitting specialists for moving the Criminal Courts of Alipore and the Magistrates' Court at
Howrah by and by organized at the Red Building (Howrah) which is a scolded Building, to a
suitable construction and this Council are told thereof by4p.m. on 6th May, 1994, all
Courts/Tribunals/Authorities including the Courts of Andaman and Nicobar Islands will see
Cease Work from 10th to sixteenth May, 1994. These two things will furthermore be
considered at an emergency meeting on 6th May, 1994 at 4.30 p.m."

Further, on 6th May, 1994 the Bar Council again passed an objective and rehashed the
assertions made in the social affair held tight 03rd May, 1994. Later the Bar Council through
another objective dated 11th May, 1994 criticized the advocates who mishandled the
objectives of West Bengal Bar Council. Not limited to the Condemnation of the advocated
who visited Court, the Bar Council through its another objective dated thirteenth May, 1994
gave a show brief notice to the advocated.

ISSUES
• WHETHER THE BAR COUNCIL OF WEST BENGAL HAS THE POWER TO
DIRECT THE ADVOCATES TO CEASE THEIR WORK FROM ATTENDING COURT?

• WHETHER THE RESOLUTIONS OR CIRCULARS PASSED BY THE BAR

COUNCIL ARE BINDING UPON THE ADVOCATES?

• WHETHER THE BAR COUNCIL HAS JURISDICTION TO TAKE ACTIONS

AGAINST THE ADVOCATES WHO CHOOSES TO IGNORE SUCH RESOLUTIONS OR
CIRCULARS?

ANALYSIS

The Court resulting to considering the disputes of both the sides expressed that, the powers
provided for the Bar Councils under Section 6(1)(d) of the Advocates Act can't overpower
Section 35 of the Advocates Act. Such objective would be indirectly ending individual of
permission to legal chief and value. Legal chief is essential for presence of Rule of Law.
Nevertheless, the Court decided not to intrude with Bar Council's actions dedicated in
interests of Advocates. The Bar Council are permitted to finish disciplinary actions under
Advocates act. In any case, such decisions will be reasonable and freed from intercession.

Further, objective to keep advocates from going to court procedures is encroaching upon
Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. Article 19(1)(g) guarantees people to practice any
profession. Advocates have head right to practice their profession of law subject to
reasonable constraint. As per the Courts see, the reasonable limit is a lot of given under
Section 14 of the Advocates Act. Accordingly, beside Section 14 any legitimization is
incredible in law.

It is impossible that the singular interest of a particular Advocate or individual interest of

Advocates as a class can revoke the greater interest In the subject of association of value, the
commitment to the Court and to the Society and the Bar Council being a legal body and
besides being a watchman canine for the upkeep of standard to morals and dignity of the
profession and its high standard and genuineness, for practicing its ability towards getting the
freedoms, benefits and interest of an Advocates.

Bar Council can't have the ward or capacity to call upon the Advocates, on its must stop
work, and such an objective if any of the Bar Council will not be limiting upon the Advocates
on its work and for getting the freedoms, interests and the upsides of the Advocates in
practicing its abilities under Section 6(1)(d) and (I) of the Advocates Act, the Bar Council
can't impact the right of an Advocate to practice as of right. Altogether the criticized
objective calling upon the Advocates in its must stop work, rebuffing the Advocates who
went against such calls and the decision to give show cause notice against the Advocates who
opposed the calls are vitiated and can't be kept up with.

DECISION

The Calcutta High Court has strangely coordinated an issue where the power and locale of a
Bar Council was tended to. The Court in the wake of examining the contention of the
Petitioners and Respondent held that the Bar Council of West Bengal and Andaman and
Nicobar Island is a state under Article 12 of Constitution of India. Furthermore, the Court
was of view that the decisions of State will be reasonable and will be give taught thinking
behind such decisions. Any decisions made out in the open interest ought to be an informed
choice. Accepting anyone veers off from it, profound onus of affirmation lies on him.

6. SUPREME COURT BAR ASSOCIATION V UOI AIR 1998 SC 1895

FACTS

The Court found the Contemner, an advocate, at real fault for perpetrating criminal hatred of
Court for having meddled with and "impeding the course of equity by attempting to
compromise, overawe and overbear the court by utilizing annoying, impolite and
undermining language", While granting discipline, keeping in view the gravity of the
disobedient conduct of the contemner, the Court said:

" The facts and conditions of the Present Case legitimize our summoning the force under
Article 129 read with Article 142 of the Constitution to grant to the contemner a suspended
sentence of detainment along with suspension of his practice as and advocate in the way
coordinated thus. We as needs be sentence the contemner for his conviction for the offense of
the criminal scorn as under:

(a) The contemner Vinay Chandra Mishra is therefore condemned to go through

straightforward detainment for a time of about a month and a half. Notwithstanding, in the
conditions of the case, the sentence will stay suspended for a time of four years and might be
activated in the event that the contemner is indicted for some other offense of hatred of court
inside the said period; and

(b) The contemner will stand suspended from practicing as an advocate fro a time of a long
time from today with the result that all held by him in his ability as an advocate, will stand
abandoned by him forthwith.

Bothered by the course that the "Contemner will stand suspended from practicing as an
Advocate for a time of three years" gave by this Court by summoning powers under Articles
129 and 142 of the Constitution, the Supreme Court Bar Association, through its Honorary
Secretary, has documented this request under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, looking
for the accompanying alleviation:

" Issue and proper writ, bearing, or statement, pronouncing that the disciplinary boards of
trustees of the Bar Councils set up under the Advocates Act, 1961, alone have elite locale to
ask into and suspend or debar an advocate from practicing law for professional or other
misconduct, emerging out of discipline forced for hatred of court or in any case and further
proclaim that the Supreme Court of India or any High Court in exercise of its innate purview
has no such unique ward, force or authority in such manner regardless the opposite view
held by this Hon'ble Court in Contempt Petition (Crl.) No. 3 of 1994 dated 10.3.1995."

On 21.3.1995, while giving Rule in the writ request, following request was made by the
Division Bench:

" The inquiry which emerges is whether the Supreme Court of India can while managing
Contempt Proceedings practice power under Article 129 of the Constitution or under Article
129 read with Article 142 of the Constitution or under Article 142 of the Constitution can
debar a practicing legal counselor from carrying on his profession as a legal advisor for any
period at all, We direct notification to issue on the Attorney General of India and on the
respondents in this. Notice will likewise issue on the application for between time stay.
Having in regards to the significance of the previously mentioned question we further direct
that this appeal be set before a Constitution Bench of this Court."

ISSUES
THE PUNISHMENT FOR ESTABLISHED CONTEMPT OF COURT COMMITTED BY
AN ADVOCATE CAN INCLUDE PUNISHMENT TO DEBAR THE CONCERNED
ADVOCATE FROM PRACTICE BY SUSPENDING HIS License FOR A SPECIFIED
PERIOD, IN EXERCISE OF ITS POWERS UNDER ARTICLE 129 READ WITH
ARTICLE 142 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA?

ANALYSIS

The Court repulsed the contentions progressed for the benefit of the contemner, the U.P. Bar
Association and the U.P. Bar Council, that the Court can't while distributing the contemner
with any of the "customary" or "acknowledged" disciplines for hatred, additionally suspend
his permit to practice as an advocate. Since that force is explicitly depended by the Advocates
Act, 1961 to the disciplinary panels of the State Bar Council as well as the Bar Council of
India. The Bench thought:

What is further, the ward and powers of this Court under Article 142 which are advantageous
in nature and are given to do finish equity in any matter, are autonomous of the locale and
forces of this Court under Article 129 which can't be hampered in any capacity by any legal
arrangement including the arrangements of the Advocates Act or the scorn purview of the
court including of this Court and the disdain of Courts Act, 1971 being a resolution can't
expose, confine or limit the forces of this Court to make a move for hatred under Article 129.

DECISION

Mr. Kapil Sibal, learned senior insight showing up for the Supreme Court Bar Association,
and Dr. Rajiv Dhawan, senior advocate showing up for the Bar Council of U.P. what's more,
Bar Council of India attacked the accuracy of the above discoveries and presented that forces
gave on this Court by Article 142, however exceptionally wide in their fitness, can be
practiced uniquely to "do finish equity regardless or cause forthcoming before it " and since
the issue of 'professional misconduct' isn't the topic of "any reason" forthcoming under the
steady gaze of this court while bargain

7. IN RE: VINAY CHANDRA MISHRA (THE ... Versus UNKNOWN AIR 1995
SC 2348

FACTS
For this situation an advocate was viewed blameworthy of criminal scorn of Court and he
was condemned to go through straightforward detainment for a time of six years and
suspended from practicing as an advocate for a time of three years. The discipline of
detainment was suspended for a time of four years and was to be activated in the event of his
conviction for some other offense of scorn of Court inside the said period.

The Court held that the permit of an advocate to practice legal profession might be suspended
or dropped by the Supreme Court or High Court in the activity of the scorn locale.

ISSUES

• WHAT IS THE AMPLITUDE AND EXTENT OF "PROFESSIONAL

MISCONDUCT" IN SECTION 35 OF ADVOCATES ACT, 1961?

• WHETHER AN ACT AMOUNTS TO MISCONDUCT EVEN THOUGH THE

INDIVIDUAL WAS NOT ACTING IN THE CAPACITY OF AN ADVOCATE?

ANALYSIS

It was set out that the Supreme Court can take discernment of the scorn of High Court. Being
the Court of record the Supreme Court has the ability to rebuff for the disdain of the courts
subordinate to it. Accordingly, the Supreme Court is completely equipped to take insight of
the hatred of the High Courts or courts subordinate to it. It was additionally guaranteed that
the Judge before whom the hatred has been submitted ought to be prohibited. This case was
not economical in the perspective on the Court. It noticed further that its hatred locale under
Article 129 of the Constitution can't be confined or removed by a resolution, be it the
Advocates Act, 1961 or the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. The Court has likewise seen that
the hatred ward of the predominant Court's did not depend on the legal arrangements yet it is
innate purview accessible to them by virtue of being a court of record. As respects the
procedure to be followed the Court has seen that the Courts of record can manage
immediately with a wide range of hatred. Concerning Article 142 of the Constitution the
Court saw that the purview and forces of the Supreme Court which are valuable in nature and
are given to do finish equity in any way, are autonomous of the ward and powers of the
Supreme Court under Article 129 which can't be encumbered in any way by any legal
arrangement including any arrangements of the Advocates Act, 1961 or the Contempt of
Courts Act, 1971.
The Advocates Act, 1961 steers clear of the hatred purview of the Court, and the Contempt of
Courts Act, 1971 being a resolution can't expose the, confine or limit the forces of this Court
to act for scorn under Article 129.

DECISION

The Supreme Court likewise held that it being redrafting authority under Section 38 of the
Advocates Act, 1961 can force discipline referenced in Section 35 of the said Act.
Subsequently, the Supreme Court might suspend or drop the permit of an advocate to practice
his profession for disdain of Court.

It at long last said that the danger of prompt discipline is the best impediment against the
misconduct. They underlined that the time factor was critical and hauling the hatred
procedures implies an extended interference to the principle procedures which deadened the
Court for quite a while.

This case was overruled by Supreme Court Bar Association v. Association of India and
Another

8. IN RE: LILY ISABEL THOMAS VS UNKNOWN AIR 1964 SC 855

FACTS

The solicitor was taken a crack at the Madras High Court on November 15, 1955 under the
Indian Bar Councils Act, 1926 and was conceded to the rolls of this Court on October 29,
1960 under Order IV of the Supreme Court Rules as the then stood. She expresses that as an
Advocate qualified for practice in this Court, she is entitled as of right not simply to argue yet
in addition to act, and that the rules of this Court which recommend capabilities before she
could be allowed to act are along these lines invalid. The supplication which she makes by
her appeal is hence for an affirmation that standard 16(1) of Order IV of the Supreme Court
Rules as corrected in 1962 which contains this remedy of capabilities be announced ultra
vires of this Court and a further presentation that she is qualified for practice as an Advocate
on record in this Court without adjusting to the prerequisites currently forced by the criticized
rule.

ISSUES
• WHAT IS THE AMPLITUDE AND EXTENT OF "PROFESSIONAL
MISCONDUCT" IN RULE 16 OF ORDER IV OF THE SUPREME COURT RULES AS
AMENDED IN 1962?

• WHETHER AN ACT AMOUNTS TO MISCONDUCT?

ANALYSIS

The contention addressed to us with significant sincerity was that under the Article the rules
to be outlined under the things (a) to (I) were all to be outlined for controlling the practice
and procedure of the Court which she encouraged demonstrated the hidden reason with which
the standard making power was vested in the Court. Also she asked that if head (a) - in sub-
Article (1) perusing "rules with respect to the people practicing under the steady gaze of the
Court", were treated as an autonomous subject, altogether, separated from the setting of the
initial words "practice and procedure of the Court", and still, at the end of the day the ability
to make the standard was bound to the guideline of the conduct of the people practicing for
example qualified under the law for practice thus practicing under the watchful eye of the
Court.

However various decisions were refered to us with respect to what was implied by 'practice
and procedure of the Court' we don't think it valuable or important to allude to them. They
would have been significant and might require genuine thought if the whole ability to make
the standard was to rely simply upon the words "directing the practice and procedure of the
Court" however the Article explicitly makes arrangement empowering rules to be made "as to
people practicing under the steady gaze of the Court." We are leaned to understand thing (a)
as an autonomous head of rulemaking power and not as just a piece of an ability to make
rules for "managing the practice and procedure of the Court." The word 'counting' which goes
before the list of the things (a) to (I) just as the topic of thing (a), stamp it as a free head of
force.

Depending on the differentiation between the two articulations "people practicing" and
"people qualified for practice" the accommodation was that the words "people practicing
under the watchful eye of the Court" was smaller and gave this Court ability to outline rules
just to decide the way where people who had acquired an option to practice under a law made
by Parliament by temperance of its force under passage 77 could practice that right. In this
association she drew a differentiation between 'being qualified for practice' which would
incorporate deciding or recommending the capabilities that an individual ought to have prior
to becoming qualified for practice, which she encouraged was the topic of passage 77, and a
standard concerning "an individual practicing under the steady gaze of a court" which was the
second stage after the option to practice had been acquired by Parliamentary enactment. All
in all, the accommodation was that by a standard made under Art. 145(1)(a) this Court could
neither qualifies an individual for practice nor force capabilities regarding the option to
practice - these being matters altogether inside passage 77 and accordingly only for
parliamentary enactment.

DECISION

There is no doubt of a contention between the administrative force of Parliament and the
standard making force of this Court, in light of the fact that by reason of the initial
expressions of Art. 145, any standard made by this Court would have activity simply
dependent upon laws made by Parliament regarding the matter of the qualification to practice.
The court, thusly, was unmistakably of the assessment that based on the express conditions of
Art. 145(1)(a) the criticized rules 16 and 17 are legitimate and inside the standard making
power.

9. RAMAON SERVICES PVT. LTD. V. SUBHASH KAPOOR and ORS. (2001) 1

SCC 118

FACTS

Litigant organization was in control of a structure as occupant at Barakhamba Road, New

Delhi. A suit was recorded against the litigant for ousting from the structure and other
considerable reliefs which was opposed by the appealing party by raising different conflicts.
Issues in the suit were outlined by the Court and the case was posted of 26.8.1998 for
preliminary. None of the advocates having a place with the firm of attorneys which was
locked in by the appealing party appeared to the court on the day in light of the fact that the
advocates were on a strike called by the advocates affiliation concerned. As no one for the
appealing party was available the court set the respondent ex-parte and proof of the offended
party was recorded. Litigant whose business environment was in Mumbai, on coming to
know about the turns of events, applied under Order 9 Rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure
(for short the "Code"). In any case, the application was excused and at last the suit was
declared on 13.11.1998. From there on, litigant recorded an application to save the ex-parte
order. The said application was excused by the preliminary Court, for which the
accompanying thinking, entomb alia, has been expressed :

"It is settled law that strike or blacklist by the advocates is no ground for adjournment.
Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mahabir Prasad Singh v. Jacks Aviation, 1998-RLR-SC-644, has
held that every one of the courts need to do legal business during courts hours. It is the grave
obligation of each attorney to go to the court. The litigant and the advice realize that the case
was fixed on 26.8.98 for offended party's proof. Insight for the respondent (something like 8
guidance had been locked in by the litigant) and the litigant purposely didn't show up on
26.8.98. There is no genuine or sensible ground set forward by the respondent or their
insight for non-appearance. They were knowing the outcomes of non-appearance. I, thusly,
find no ground in permitting the application under Order IX Rule 16 CPC. The application is
thusly excused with costs."

ISSUES

• WHAT WAS THE APPROPRIATE PUNISHMENT AND PENALTY TO BE

GIVEN AND UNDER WHAT AUTHORITY?

• CAN AN APPEAL PERTAINING TO THE SAME MATTER BE REPEALED FOR

A VARRIED OUTCOME?

ANALYSIS

However we like the remain of the senior advice that an advocate would hereinafter dare to
disregard the blacklist call, I can't concur with the learned senior direction that the courts had
before felt for the Bar and consented to dismiss cases during the strikes or blacklists. If any
court had suspended cases during such periods it was not because of any compassion toward
the strikes or blacklists, yet because of powerlessness in specific cases to do in any case
without the guide of an insight. Nor do we surrender to the dispute that this Court pronounced
the legal position just when Mahabir Prasad Singh (supra) was concluded that strikes or
blacklists are illegal. We have refered to supra the prior decisions delivered by the Court in
line with a similar stand.

Consequently, we grant the appealing party to acknowledge half of the said measure of Rs.
5000/ - from the firm of advocates M/s. B.C. Das Gupta and Co. or then again from any of its
accomplices. At first we imagined that the litigant could be allowed to understand the entire
sum from the said firm of advocates. Nonetheless, we are leaned to save the firm from
bearing the expenses somewhat since the Supreme Court is taking on such an action
interestingly and the direction would not have been aware of such a result coming upon them.
In any case we put the profession to see that in future the advocate would likewise be
responsible for the outcome endured by the party if the non-appearance was exclusively on
the ground of a strike call. It is shameful and discriminatory to cause the party alone to
languish over the self inflicted desolation of his advocate. We might additionally add that the
defendant who endures totally because of his advocate's non-appearance in court, he has
likewise the solution for sue the advocate for harms yet that cure would remain uneffected by
the course embraced for this situation. All things being equal, in circumstances like this,
when the court mulcts the party with costs for the disappointment of his advocate to show up,
we clarify that a similar court has ability to allow the party to understand the expenses from
the advocate concerned. In any case, such bearing can be passed solely after managing the
cost of a chance to the advocate. In the event that he has any legitimate reason the court can
absolutely clear him from such a risk. In any case, the advocate can't get exonerated just on
the ground that he didn't go to the court as he or his affiliation was on a strike. In the event
that any advocate guarantees that his entitlement to strike should be with next to no
misfortune to him except for the misfortune should just be for his guiltless customer such a
case is offensive to any standard of reasonable play and groups of morals. So when he selects
to strike work or blacklist the court he should also be ready to bear essentially the financial
misfortune endured by the prosecutor customer who shared his brief with that advocate with
all certainty that his motivation would be protected in the possession of that advocate.

DECISION

In all situations where court is fulfilled that the ex-parte request (passed because of the
shortfall of the advocate as per any strike call) could be saved on conditions the court can too
allow the party to understand the expenses from the advocate worried without driving such
party to start one more legal action against the advocate.

We may likewise see that it is available to the Court as an elective course to allow the party
(while saving the ex-parte request or announcement prior passed in support of himself) to
understand the expense fixed by the Court for that reason, from the guidance of the other
party whose nonattendance caused the death of such ex-parte request, if the court is fulfilled
that such nonappearance was because of that advice boycotting the court for taking part in a
strike.

10. SHAMSHER SINGH BEDI VS HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA

AIR 1995 SC 1974

FACTS

One Gurdial Singh was captured based on a F.I. R. dated 24th April, 1983 by the police of
Anandpur Sahib, District Ropar, for offenses under Sections 307/353/392/394 and so on of
the Indian Penal Code. He was then created before Shri N. C. Prashar, Judicial Sub-
Divisional Magistrate, Anandpur Sahib, for remand and he was remanded to legal
guardianship. A bail application was recorded and the learned Magistrate denied bail
however it was anything but a case under Section 307, I.P.C. Oppressed by this request,
Gurdial Singh notified the Magistrate which was drafted by the appealing party and which
was served on the Magistrate by Shri Shamesher Singh, Advocate Kharar. In the said notice,
certain comments have been made against the learned Magistrate. Since they were viewed as
fairly shocking, procedures under Contempt of Courts Act were started and the matter was
put under the steady gaze of the High Court. A Division Bench subsequent to considering the
comments made against the Judge arrived at the resolution that they are shameful and that
they will in general deviant the course of equity and liable to meddle with the appropriate
organization of equity. It could be referenced here that notification of hatred was given to
Shri Gurdial Singh just as Shri Shamsher Singh and all the three contemnors including the
appealing party for being heard. The other two contemnors were likewise indicted and
condemned, yet they are not before us.

The guard taken by the appealing party is that he didn't despatch the notification nor assumed
any liability as for the assertion in that and that he never encouraged Shri Shamsher Singh to
serve the notification and that he had basically drafted the said notice which was his
professional obligation and in such a circumstance, the Judicial Officer isn't secured for
malevolent and mala fide acts. Nonetheless, it was likewise argued that on the off chance that
the Court arrived at the resolution that the litigant has submitted disdain, he expects to
delicate a genuine statement of regret. The High Court in its judgment has completely
extracted the whole notification and has alluded to the objectional comments which justified
foundation of the disdain procedures and after an intricate conversation fulfilled itself that the
litigant just as the other two contemnors have submitted scorn and in like manner sentenced
them.

ISSUES

• WHAT IS THE AMPLITUDE AND EXTENT OF "PROFESSIONAL

MISCONDUCT" IN SECTION 35 OF ADVOCATES ACT, 1961?

• WHETHER AN ACT AMOUNTS TO MISCONDUCT EVEN THOUGH THE

INDIVIDUAL WAS NOT ACTING IN THE CAPACITY OF AN ADVOCATE?

ANALYSIS

We have gone through the whole judgment and especially the substance of the notification.
As a matter of fact the appealing party drafted the notification and he can't get away from the
obligation of having drafted something very similar in his professional limit, which
implicates him. In the notification it is referenced that the Magistrate had no ability to reject
bail to Gurdial Singh and by denying something similar, he acted with mala fide aim and with
a view not to disappoint the neighbourhood police. It is likewise expressed in section 12 of
the notification which peruses as follows:

That as opposed to showing your legal autonomy and passing a bail request in similarity with
the compulsory arrangements of law you attempted to help the nearby police in their odious
plans and activities to keep Sarpanch Gurdial Singh in care as far as might be feasible to
embarrass him and to put strain upon him that no protest ought to be recorded against him.

These comments against the Magistrate who would not allow bail are most certainly
shameful and are certainly regarding the release of his legal capacity. We can't concur with
Mr. Sodhi that the questionable comments made in the notification don't in any capacity
meddled with the organization of equity by that Court.

DECISION

It isn't important to demonstrate certifiably that there has been an actual obstruction with the
organization of equity by reason of such abusive articulation; it is sufficient in case it is
logical, or tends in any capacity, to meddle with the appropriate organization of law.

Having given our sincere thought, the court was, not ready to concur with the accommodation
of the learned Counsel, Mr. Sodhi that the abusive Statements referenced above were just
focused on the individual and were not prone to meddle with the organization of equity by
that

11. RADHA MOHAN LAL VS RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT 2003 3 SCC 427

FACTS

Rajasthan High Court ( Jaipur seat) in March 1993 , conveyed a judgment against the
Appellant Radha Mohan Lal and his advocate Shri Sualal Yadav, for submitting Contempt of
Court and condemned to 90 days basic detainment other than fine of Rs. 1000 each and in
default of installment, further basic improvement for 15 days.

The premise of commencement and Punishment for Contempt of Court is the assertion made
in the application made under the watchful eye of the single judge of High Court in a Civil
update application. In the assertion it was referenced that the appealing party and different
solicitors have moved to whine recorded as a hard copy against Honorable Shri. R.R.
Kejriwal to the Honorable Chief Justice mentioning him to list the above amendment before a
Bench of which Shri. R.S.Kejriwal isn't a part as they have sensible Grounds to accept that no
fair equity would be granted from this Bench.

This modification request emerged out of a between time request elapsed in a civil suit
recorded by the appealing party Radha Mohan Lal and four others to guarantee the
admittance to the sanctuary and not hindered by the Rajasthan Sports Council.

At the point when the Contempt request came in the mood for hearing, the Appellant Radha
Mohan gave an endeavor to this Court that he will record a sworn statement inside multi
week unqualified expression of remorse for the claims made by him against R.S. Kejriwal of
the High Court of Rajasthan and will delicate such expression of remorse to him. Likewise,
the Appellant offered conciliatory sentiment under the watchful eye of the Court.

The matter came ready for hearing under the watchful eye of the Supreme Court. The
Supreme Court put away the discipline of basic improvement as likewise the fine forced on
the Appellant. Notwithstanding, the instance of Appellant's advocate Sualal Yadav is unique.
He kept up with that whatever he has composed is according to the directions by his customer
and thusly he isn't blameworthy.
The Supreme Court saw that the advocate can't get away from his obligation regarding
drafting a shocking notification to Magistrate on the ground that he did as such in his
professional limit.

ISSSUES

• WHAT IS THE AMPLITUDE AND EXTENT OF "PROFESSIONAL

MISCONDUCT" IN SECTION 35 OF ADVOCATES ACT, 1961?

• WHETHER AN ACT AMOUNTS TO MISCONDUCT EVEN THOUGH THE

INDIVIDUAL WAS NOT ACTING IN THE CAPACITY OF AN ADVOCATE?

ANALYSIS

From the record, intentional explanation dated 2-12-92 of Shri Radha Mohan Lal and the
contentions which were raised by Shri S.L. Yadav and Radha Mohan Lal before us is that as
per Radha Mohan Lal he had just passed on the data contained in para 4 of the application
dated 18-9-1991 to his advice Shri S.L. Yadav and Shri S.L. Yadav says that he had just
joined such data in para 4 of the application dated 18-9-1991 as was given to him by his
customer and, hence, the fuse of such data combined with the petition made in that and. the
annexing of the marks consequently and the show thereof was finished by him as he was the
guidance. Shri S.L. Yadav has additionally alluded to the grievance dated 17-9-1991
addressed to the Hon'ble C.J. against Hon'ble R.S. Kejriwal, J. also, he has alluded to it as the
'mother application' throughout contentions. On the solicitation of Shri S.L. Yadav, a
duplicate of this protest was got remembered for the record of this case, yet we are concerned
distinctly with respect to the substance of para 4 of the application dated 18-9-1991
whereupon Shri R.S. Kejriwal recorded on 19-9-1991 to put the matter before C.J. what's
more, immediately this D.B. was established.

us, the legal position which arises based on the mediations in the aforementioned cases is that
the insight who signs and presents an application containing charges of denouncing the fair-
mindedness of a Judge, of showing absence of certainty and to look for posting of the case
before other Bench to the rejection of the Judge against whom the claims are made and
checks out seeking after such applications without requiring the least difficulty or work to
confirm even by all appearances the rightness or in any case of such claims against the Judge
regarding which he is educated by his customer is at fault for similarly insubordinate conduct.
To uphold the supplication and petition that, 'no unprejudiced equity would be conferred
from this Bench' and further that, 'non-applicants are known to have lost confidence in this
seat for reasons self-evident', combined with the petition that, 'the above correction may
mercifully be permitted to be recorded before a seat not comprised of Hon'ble Mr. Justice
Kejriwal' is adequate to show inadequate respect for Shri R. S. Kejriwal as a Judge of this
Court; trying to trash his conduct to harm his appearance as a vital part of the legal executive
as a foundation; it tries to scorn the Judge from one perspective and shakes the certainty
about the organization of equity making a feeling that the Judge was fractional and essentially
sets a question mark against his fair-mindedness then again. We are in this manner
completely persuaded and have no dithering in holding that Shri. S. L. Yadav has acted in a
way to debilitate the feeling of certainty which individuals have in the organization of equity
and, thusly, we hold that Shri S. L. Yadav is likewise at legitimate fault for submitting the
scorn inside the significance of Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.

DECISION

Going to the subject of sentence, it shows up from the request for the High Court that the
litigant had embraced a rebellious demeanor and attempted to legitimize the slanders made by
him even without figuring it important to apologize under the watchful eye of this Court
likewise, the appealing party has neither communicated any remorse nor has he any apology
for the awful claims made against the learned Judges of the High Court. In any case, then
again, he has shown a hounded assurance to seek after the matter, no matter what. A perusing
of his update of grounds and the composed and marked contentions show that he has
wandered into one more episode of charges against the High Court Judges and continued in
his mission of denunciation. His current conduct has bothered as opposed to relieving his
offense."

In this perspective on the matter, we have no faltering in passing the request for discipline
against non-candidates Shri S. L. Yadav and Radha Mohal Lal for submitting the scorn of the
Court and every one of them is condemned to 90 days' basic detainment with a fine of Rs.
1,000/ - each and in default of installment of fine every one of them needs to additionally go
through basic detainment for 15 days. The two of them might be arrested to carry out the
punishment.

12. IN RE: AJAY KUMAR PANDEY, ADVOCATE VS UNKNOWN AIR 1998 SC

3299

FACTS
Apparently the claimed contemner had recorded one more objection on 12.9.1994 Under
Sections 500 and 504 IPC against seven advocates to be specific (1) Shri Prakash Narayan
Awasthi (2) Shri R.P. Misra (3) Shri Vishambhar Singh (4) Shri T.N. Misra (5) Shri Srikant
Verma (6) Shri Pankaj Sinha and (7) Shri N.C. Pradhan, in which it was claimed that those
advocates had made abusive attributions with respect to the connection among him and Ms.
Saroj Bala, Add l. Locale Judge. In that objection an application giving a rundown of 31
advocates for being gathered as witnesses was recorded. That application was dismissed by
the Trial Court. He, subsequently, documented Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 4114 of
1995 against that request.

(underlined by us) In the reminder of the petitions, comparable articulations in more extreme
language projecting slanders on the conduct of different legal officers and ascribing thought
processes to them in the release of their legal capacities have been utilized. We abstain from
repeating every such entry, in spite of the fact that we drew the sharp consideration of the
claimed contemner to the equivalent. He has assaulted the fair-mindedness of the named
judges in generally disgusting and unreasonable language. There is not really any analysis of
the "judgment" and all that the contemner appears to have done is to censure and denounce
the Judge by ascribing thought processes and showering maltreatments on every single one of
the judges who managed his cases at one phase or the other.

ISSUES

• WHETHER THE APPLENT WAS GUILTY OF GROSS PROFESSIONAL

MISCONDUCT?

ANALYSIS

The definition is simple. Outraging the Judges or the Courts will in general bring the power
and organization of law into unsavoriness and is an attack against the magnificence (and
respect) of law. Such acts establish criminal disdain of court. Nobody can be allowed to foul
the wellspring of equity. If the authority of the court is sabotaged or blocked by acts or
distributions, the wellspring of equity would get contaminated making doubt and mistrust in
the personalities of the defendant public and the right-thinking public on the loose. For sure,
everyone is qualified for offer his legit viewpoint about the accuracy or legality of a judgment
or sentence or a request for a Court. Objective analysis is admissible furnished it is made with
separation in a stately language and deferential tone. The freedom of articulation can't be
treated as a permit to embarrass the court and on second thought of reprimanding the
judgment to censure the judge who conveyed it.

DECISION

In the moment case, from a scrutiny of the reminder of different petitions documented by the
contemner in this court and the language utilized in that, it is clear that he has projected
slanders on every single learned Judge who in the release of his legal capacities chose the
matter not jumped at the chance to by the affirmed contemner at one phase or the other. The
slanders cast by him without a doubt tend to embarrass the Court. The claimed contemner has
been endeavoring to frighten the learned subordinate Judges just as the learned Judge of the
High Court and cause impedance in the organization of equity. Indeed, even in this Court,
after the Rule was given to him, he attempted to frighten the court. He recorded an
application expressing mat since he had documented a disdain appeal against the Judges
comprising the decision.

13. L.C. GOYAL V. MRS. SURESH JOSHI and ORS AIR 1999 SC 2222

FACTS

The respondent had attracted the appealing party, who is a practicing Advocate of the High
Court of Delhi similarly as an Advocate on Record, for reporting a suit for mandate in the
Delhi High Court. Having done as prepared, the appealing party is professed to have
energized a cost adding to Rs. 25,491/ - , and moreover a further measure of Rs.6,500/ - out
of which Rs.3,500/ - was paid through check and a measure of Rs.3,000/ - in genuine cash,
which the respondent appropriately paid.

In 1992 the respondent came to understand that the appealing party had not put away the
interaction charge and besides didn't press the application for between time request archived
in the suit. It was along these lines found on enquiry by the respondent that the litigant had
mishandled a measure of Rs. 25,102/ - and moreover didn't take any steps towards the
headway of the case.

The litigant from that point on gave a check dated 31.3.93 for a measure of Rs. 38,000/ - on
account of markdown of court charge total close by revenue. The check was affronted in light
of insufficiency of resources. All further trades sent by the respondent was neglected and
under such conditions the complainant recorded a complaint before the Delhi Bar Council.
Since the said complaint couldn't be picked inside the predetermined time it stood moved to
Bar Council of India.

The Bar Council of India having found that the litigant has submitted professional
misconduct, suspended his grant to practice for a period of five years vide its request dated
02.03.1998. Troubled by the said request, the litigant recorded a charm under the careful
focus of the Apex Court.

ISSUES

• WHETHER PURPOSELY FAILING TO SHOW THE EXACT AMOUNT OF

COURT FEE TO BE PAID ON THE PLAINT WITH THE INTENTION TO
MISAPPROPRIATE MONEY AMOUNTS TO MISCONDUCT?

ANALYSIS

The Court settled all of the issues raised by both the gatherings, including the instances of the
appealing party that the respondent had purportedly distorted the blemish on the disgraced
check. The Court was in simultaneousness with the seeing as recorded by the Bar Council
and were of the view that the recently referenced set up conditions clearly exhibit that exact
proportion of court charge to be paid on the plaint was intentionally kept questionable and in
this way three pages were subbed so the complainant may not prepared to know the exact
proportion of court cost paid on the plaint.

The Apex Court continued to hold that:

"The legal profession is known as a noteworthy profession having high practices and has
been obliging the need of the overall population for apparently everlastingly past. Likewise,
the people from this profession are depended upon to keep up with those traditions and serve
the overall population with genuineness and truly. In the event that such are the
presumptions from a good profession, its people ought to act which may be meriting
impersonating. By doing any act which is contrary to the recognized principles and
standards of this profession, a person from the profession disrespects himself, yet
furthermore conveys reputation to the profession to which he has a spot."

DECISION

On the appealing party's recommendation having given an undertaking to support the litigant
to such an extent that the litigant would conform to the rules of the legal profession, and on
account of the fact that he has saved a measure of Rs. 40,000/ - to be paid to the respondents,
The Supreme Court changed the request for the Disciplinary Committee, of suspending the
appellants license to practice for a period five years and reduced it to more than two years,
given the appealing party moreover stores interest on Rs. 38,000/ - w.e.f 31.03.1993 till the
date of portion of money to the offended gatherings @ Rs. 9% per annum.

14. EX-CAPT. HARISH UPPAL V. Association OF INDIA. 2003(1) ALLMR (SC)

1169

FACTS

Two or three Petitions raise the issue whether attorneys hold a decision to strike similarly as
give a call for blacklists of Court/s. The applicants presented that strike as a mean for all out
bargaining is seen phenomenally in present day examines. He presented that attorneys who
are specialists of the Court can't utilize strikes as a way to deal with coercion the Courts or
the customers. He presented that the Courts should make a move against the Committee
individuals for giving such procedures the explanation that they have submitted disdain of
court. He presented that the law is that a legal advisor who has perceived a Vakalat to serve a
customer should go to Court and if he doesn't go to Court it would add up to professional
misconduct and additionally scorn of court. He presented that Court should now graph rules
by which the Courts manage the right of legal counselors to show up under the careful
attention of the Court. He presented that Courts should outline rules by which any legal
advisor who mis-acts and submits hatred of court by disagreeing or boycotting a Court won't
be permitted to practice in that Court.

ISSUE

GOING ON A COLLECTIVE STRIKE BY ADVOCATES AMOUNTS TO

PROFESSIONAL MISCONDUCT?

ANALYSIS

A few Petitions raise the issue whether legal counselors hold a decision to strike also as give
a call for boycotts of Court/s. The applicants introduced that strike as a mean for complete
bargaining is seen phenomenally in present day inspects. He introduced that attorneys who
are experts of the Court can't use strikes as a way of managing coercion the Courts or the
clients. He introduced that the Courts should take action against the Committee people for
giving such procedures the clarification that they have submitted hatred of court. He
introduced that the law is that a legal counselor who has seen a Vakalat to serve a client ought
to go to Court and if he doesn't go to Court it would amount to professional misconduct and
moreover contempt of court. He introduced that Court should now graph rules by which the
Courts deal with the right of legal counselors to appear under the cautious look of the Court.
He introduced that Courts should chart rules by which any legal counselor who mis-acts and
submits scorn of court by differing or boycotting a Court will not be allowed to practice in
that Court.

The court was stood up to with a test as a peaceful total strike was a regular occasion by
various walks around profession in India. Nonetheless, the court picked such difference was
not friendly by virtue of an attorney considering the fact that insofar as a legal counselor
holds the vakalat for his client and has not been as expected delivered, he has no advantage to
do without appearing in Court even on the ground of a strike called by the Bar Association or
another collection of legal advisors. If he so stays away from, he presents a professional
misconduct, a break of professional commitment, a break of contract and moreover a break of
trust and he will be in danger to persevere through all of the aftermaths thereof. There is no
important right, either under Article 19 or under Article 21 of the Constitution, which permits
or supports a legal advisor to avoid appearing in Court for a circumstance wherein he holds
the vakalat for a party in light of everything. There are diverse strategy for quiet difference
which a legal advisor can approach yet not at the order of the advantages of his/her clients.

DECISION

The Supreme Court of India inferred that the strike by an advocate is considered unlawful
and illegal. A strike may be permitted in the most phenomenal of the unprecedented
conditions where decency, respect, and working of the courts are at the stake. A serene
dissatisfaction can be showed or a social event to the press and media can be given, till the
time it doesn't impact the working of the courts.ivision Bench which had givenourt. We see
no legitimacy in this allure, it is likewise excused

15. HARISH CHANDRA TIWARI V. BAIJU AIR 2002 SC 548

FACTS

Appealing party Harish Chandra Tiwari was selected as an advocate with the Bar Council of
the State of U.P. in May, 1982 and has been practicing beginning now and for a significant
length of time, basically in the Courts at Lakhimpur Kheri area in U.P. Respondent Baiju
related with the delinquent advocate in a land procurement case in which the respondent was
a candidate for remuneration. The disciplinary panel has portrayed the respondent as "an old,
powerless, unprotected incompetent individual". Pay of Rs. 8,118/ - for the getting of the
detect that is known for the said Baiju was saved by the State in the Court. Appealing party
applied for passing on the total and according to requests of the Court, he pulled out the said
absolute on 2.9.1987. In any case, he didn't return it to the customer to whom it was payable
nor did he edify the customer about the receipt as for the aggregate. Long starting there on,
when the customer came to consider it and coming about to neglect to "get the total returned
by the advocate, a difference was ended by him with the Bar Council of the State for starting
reasonable disciplinary action against the litigant.

ISSUES

• WHETHER THE ORDER PASSED BY THE BAR COUNCIL IS VALID?

• WHETHER THE PUNISHMENT IS ACCORDING TO THE GRAVITY OF THE

MISCONDUCT?

ANALYSIS

Court held that among the various types of misconduct imagined for a legal practitioner
misappropriation of the customer's cash should be viewed as one of the gravest. In this
professional cutoff the legal practitioner needs to gather cash from the customer towards
costs of the case, or take out cash from the court payable to the customer or take cash of the
customer to be taken care of in court. In each such case, when the cash of the customer
appears at his hand, it is a trust. If a close by power mishandles cash, he is trustworthy to be
reproached under the current Prevention of Corruption Act, with control which will not be
short of what one year. He makes sure to be absolved from administration. Notwithstanding,
if an advocate mishandles cash of the customer there is no defend in de-expanding the gravity
of the awful conduct. Maybe the piece of the gravity of such break of trust would be
coordinated when the misappropriation remained unquestionably for a brief period. There
might be support to give a lesser discipline for a situation where the delinquent advocate
returned the cash prior to beginning the disciplinary procedures.

The practice of Law with extending activist skylines, professional morals can't be held back
ed in a Bar Council rule nor in ordinary cant in the books yet in new standards of internal
voice which will arrange individuals from the calling of significant worth to submit to rules
of huge quality and utility, clear in the set case-law and liberal when made a pass at the
inquiries of high rules.

This is an achievement case as it oversees potentially the most unavoidable issue looked by
clients of advocates. As a profession an advocate's commitment is to give value to any person
who approaches him stuck between a rock and a hard place. Regardless, if an advocate
abuses cash for something basically the same from the client it is a grave attack against
his/her commitment and conveys a terrible remaining to the profession and results in loss of
trust among the general populace in the value structure itself. Hence, the Bar Council or the
actual court can't depend its trust in just a single rule for articulating professional misconduct
and needs to expand its augmentation and change as indicated by each circumstance to
present sensible discoveries.

DECISION

In the going with case the Supreme Court felt that the cases refered to by the Appellant are of
no help as the facts of the case in different are altogether unforeseen and address themselves.
Along these lines, Supreme Court held that the misconduct of the Appellant is of a far
pointrel broadness. The Supreme Court constrained the discipline of departure of the name of
the Appellant from the roll of the Advocates and was held debarred from practicing in any
court of law or before any force or individual in India.

The Supreme Court said that the cases refered to by the Appellant will not help in vindicating
the quantum of discipline.