Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint, Gillespie V Barker, Rodems, Cook, 05-CA-7205, May 5, 2010

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL
CIRCUIT IN AND FOR HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY, FLORIDA
GENERAL CIVIL DIVISION
NEIL J. GILLESPIE,
Plaintiff, CASE NO.: 05-CA-7205 RICmlViO

vs.
MAY 05 2010
BARKER, RODEMS & COOK, P.A., DIVISION: C
a Florida professional service corporation, CLERK OF CIRCUIT COURT
HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY, Fl
WILLIAM J. COOK, DEMAND FOR TRIAL BY JURY
Defendants.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _----'1
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO SUBMIT
PLAINTIFF'S FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT
Plaintiff pro se Neil J. Gillespie moves for leave to submit Plaintiff's First
Amended Complaint pursuant to Rule 1. 190(a), Fla.R.Civ.P. A party may amend a
pleading once as a matter of course. Leave ofcourt shall be given freely when justice so
requires. A copy of the amended pleading is attached to this motion.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 5th day of May, 2010.
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been
furnished by hand to Ryan Christopher Rodems, attorney, Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A.,
Attorneys for Defendants, 400 North Ashley Drive, Suit 0, pa, I . 33602,
this 5th day of May, 2010.
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL
CIRCUIT IN AND FOR HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY, FLORIDA
GENERAL CIVIL DIVISION
NEIL J. GILLESPIE,
Plaintiff, CASE NO.: 05-CA-7205

vs.
BARKER, RODEMS & COOK, P.A., DIVISION: C

a Florida professional service corporation,
WILLIAM J. COOK, DEMAND FOR TRIAL BY JURY
RYAN CHRISTOPHER RODEMS,
CHRIS A. BARKER,
Defendants.
_________________________________/
PLAINTIFF’S FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT
Plaintiff, NEIL J. GILLESPIE, sues defendants, BARKER, RODEMS, & COOK,
P.A., a Florida professional service corporation, and WILLIAM J. COOK, RYAN
CHRISTOPHER RODEMS, and CHRIS A. BARKER, corporate officers and natural
persons, and alleges:
Parties
1. Plaintiff, NEIL J. GILLESPIE, resides in Ocala, Marion County, Florida. (“Plaintiff”).
2. Defendant BARKER, RODEMS & COOK, P.A. is a Florida professional service
corporation and law firm with offices located at 400 North Ashley Drive, Suite 2100 in
the city of Tampa, Hillsborough County, Florida, 33602. (“BRC”). For the purpose of
this complaint, BRC is a successor law firm to Alpert, Barker, Rodems, Ferrentino &
Cook, P.A. (“Alpert firm”), the predecessor law firm.

3. Defendant CHRIS A. BARKER is licensed attorney, Florida Bar ID no. 885568, a
corporate officer of BRC, and a natural person. (“Mr. Barker” or “Barker”). Mr. Barker is
added to Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint under the relation back doctrine,
Fla.R.Civ.P., Rule 1.190(c). Mr. Barker was a partner of the predecessor Alpert firm.
4. Defendant RYAN CHRISTOPHER RODEMS is a licensed attorney, Florida Bar ID
no. 947652, a corporate officer of BRC, and a natural person. (“Mr. Rodems” or “Rodems”).
Rodems is added to Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint under the relation back doctrine,
Fla.R.Civ.P., Rule 1.190(c). Mr. Rodems was a partner of the predecessor Alpert firm.
5. Defendant WILLIAM J. COOK is a licensed attorney, Florida Bar ID no. 986194,
a corporate officer of BRC, and a natural person. (“Mr. Cook” or “Cook”). Mr. Cook was
a partner of the predecessor Alpert firm.
Jurisdiction and Venue
6. This is an action for damages that exceed $15,000.00.
7. The events complained of occurred in Hillsborough County, Florida. BRC has
offices located in Hillsborough County, Florida.
8. Mr. Barker, Mr. Rodems, and Mr. Cook reside in Hillsborough County, Florida.
Background
9. The Alpert law firm sought Plaintiff to serve as class-action representative in two
separate lawsuits, one against ACE Cash Express and one against AMSCOT Corporation.
The litigation was over so-called “payday loans” which are delayed deposit check
cashing schemes that can result in usurious rates of interest for the consumer. The Alpert
firm needed Plaintiff to intervene and save the AMSCOT case from dismissal as its initial
plaintiff Eugene Clement was unqualified. Defendants assumed the case after the Alpert
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firm imploded. Defendants later failed to prevail on the merits, and AMSCOT settled for
business reasons. In settling AMSCOT, Defendants broke the contingent fee agreement
with Plaintiff, lied about a claim to $50,000 in “court-awarded fees and costs” and
wrongfully took over 90% of the total recovery for themselves.
The Florida Attorney General intervened in the ACE class-action. Defendants did
not prevail on the merits is ACE either. Defendants represented Plaintiff so poorly that he
called opposing counsel for help and negotiated his own settlement. The Florida AG did
better for its constituencies. The AG obtained $250,000 for the Florida State University
School of Law, and $250,000 for the Department of Banking and Finance. The AG also
obtained loan forgiveness for many consumers. Defendants finished poorly for their
remaining client Eugene Clement, and later split their attorney’s fees with him.
During the course of representation, Mr. Barker, Mr. Rodems and Mr. Cook
conspired to exploit their clients, broke bar rules, and breached their duty to clients.
Defendants’ formed their firm in secret while working for the Alpert firm. The charade
went on for months. Co-conspirators Barker, Rodems and Cook secretly arranged to take
clients, cases, and employees away from Jonathan Alpert. Once Defendants controlled
the AMSCOT case, they stopped representing the interest of Plaintiff. Defendants
hijacked the case for their own benefit. They disobeyed Plaintiff’s instructions to settle.
Plaintiff became a hostage in a case controlled by three bullies with law degrees.
After taking 90% of the AMSCOT settlement by fraud, Defendants relied upon
the parol evidence rule to enforce their scam. When Plaintiff complained to the Florida
Bar, Defendants accused him of extortion. When Plaintiff later alerted AMSCOT,
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Defendants sued him for libel. It was all part of a corrupt business model that also
involved other clients of Barker, Rodems & Cook, PA.
General Allegations
10. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 9.
11. Barker, Rodems & Cook, PA (“BRC”) is a law firm and Florida professional
service corporation formed August 4, 2000. The firm employs three lawyers, Mr. Barker,
Mr. Rodems, and Mr. Cook, and various support staff.
12. Prior to the formation of BRC, individual Defendants Mr. Barker, Mr. Rodems,
and Mr. Cook were employed at Alpert, Barker, Rodems, Ferrentino & Cook, P.A., a law
firm led by Jonathan Louis Alpert, Florida Bar no. 121970. (“Alpert firm”).
13. BRC and the Alpert firm existed concurrently for a period of about four (4)
months, August 4, 2000 through December 12, 2000. During that time Mr. Barker, Mr.
Rodems, and Mr. Cook were engaged in a conflict of interest and divided loyalties with
their clients, litigation, and law partners, especially Mr. Alpert.
14. In early December 1999 the Alpert firm commenced at least three separate class
action lawsuits with plaintiff Eugene R. Clement. After the Alpert firm imploded all three
cases were assumed by Defendants, who failed to prevail on the merits in any case.
a. On December 9, 1999 the Alpert firm filed a class action complaint in United
States District Court, Middle District of Florida, Tampa Division, Eugene R. Clement v.
AMSCOT Corporation, case no. 99-2795-CIV-T-26C. (“AMSCOT”). The action was
based on “payday lending” and alleged violation of federal and state laws. Mr. Alpert
signed the complaint as lead attorney in the lawsuit. Plaintiff was later sought to
intervene to save this action from dismissal because Mr. Clement was unqualified.
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b. On December 6, 1999 the Alpert firm and Mr. Clement commenced a class
action complaint in United States District Court, Middle District of Florida, Tampa
Division, Eugene R. Clement v. Payday Express, Inc., case no. 99-2768-CIV-T-23C.
(“Payday Express”). The action was based on “payday lending” and alleged violation of
federal and state laws. Mr. Alpert signed the complaint as lead attorney in the lawsuit.
Plaintiff was not involved in this lawsuit, but the outcome of this case is pertinent to
Plaintiff’s claim that Defendants were not entitled to “court-awarded fees and costs”.
c. On December 6, 1999 the Alpert firm and Mr. Clement commenced a lawsuit
state court, Eugene R. Clement v. ACE Cash Express, Inc., case no. 99-09730, Circuit
Court for the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit in Hillsborough County. (“ACE”). The action
was based on “payday lending” and alleged a violation of the Florida Deceptive and
Unfair Trade Practices, sections 501.201 to 501.23 of the Florida Statutes. Plaintiff’s
lawsuit against ACE would later be consolidated with this case, and the Florida Attorney
General would later intervene in this action.
15. The AMSCOT and Payday Express cases each pled three counts, one federal and
two state. Count I alleged violation of the Federal Truth in Lending Act (TILA). Count II
alleged violation of state usury laws pursuant to sections 687.02, 687.03, and 687.04
Florida Statutes. Count III alleged violation of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade
Practices Act, sections 501.201 to 501.23 Florida Statutes. A count was later added to the
Payday Express case alleging violation of civil RICO under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) which
was later dismissed.
16. The lead plaintiff in the AMSCOT case, Eugene R. Clement, was unqualified to
serve as a class representative and doomed the case from the outset. AMSCOT’s lawyer,
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John Anthony, challenged the ability of Mr. Clement to serve as class representative in
AMSCOT’s Response in Opposition to Clement’s Motion for Class Certification and
Memorandum of Law in Support. Mr. Anthony wrote: “It has become unquestionably
clear, after taking Clement’s deposition, that his complete lack of trustworthiness,
honesty and credibility make Clement a wholly inadequate class representative.” (p.4,
¶1). “First Clement lied under oath numerous time, including making misrepresentations
about his criminal background.” (p.4, ¶2). Clement had suffered both a conviction and
pre-trial intervention for prostitution within the past two years, the later just nine months
prior. (p.4, ¶2). Clement’s debt exceeded $450,000.00, and there was some question
about Clement’s sanity. (p.6, ¶1,2).
17. United States District Judge Richard A. Lazzara commented on Mr. Clement’s
inability to serve as class representative in an Order of September 20, 2000 compelling
Clement’s testimony: “Whether Mr. Clement used money obtained through deferred
deposit transactions for the hiring of prostitutes is highly relevant to his ability to
adequately serve as class representative.” AMSCOT’s Motion to Compel Clement to
Respond to Certified Question and Related Questions and Memorandum of Law in
Support Thereof alleged that Clement failed to disclose two Florida-based criminal
proceedings relating to his hiring of prostitutes, including one dated October 29, 1999,
just two months before the initiation of the AMSCOT lawsuit. In support of the
allegations was a criminal report affidavit/notice to appear charging Clement with
solicitation of prostitution against section 796.07, Florida Statutes, together with
Clement’s mug shot.
Plaintiff Referred to Defendants
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18. Florida Department of Banking and Finance attorney Susan Sandler referred
Plaintiff to the Alpert firm for “payday loans” he could no longer pay. Plaintiff owed a
total principal balance of $2,186.27 on six “payday loans” despite having paid $4,081.08
in fees and costs on the loans over a two year period.
19. Plaintiff met Mr. Alpert at his law firm at 100 South Ashley Drive, Tampa,
Florida, December 28, 1999. Mr. Cook was present and requested Plaintiff’s records of
transactions with AMSCOT Corporation. At that time Plaintiff did not owe AMSCOT
any money but did have five other outstanding “payday loans” to EZ Check Cashing,
Check ‘n Go, ACE Cash Express, Check Smart, and America$h. Plaintiff settled pro se
with National Cash Advance on December 24, 1999.
Company Loan amount Total interest paid Current balance (NSF)
EZ Check Cashing $450.00 $917.50 $500.00 (later settled pro se)

Check ‘n Go $300.00 $876.25 $338.00
ACE $300.00 $1,108.20 $336.94
AMSCOT $100.00 $148.47 $ ---
National Cash Advance $300.00 $884.00 338.00 (settled pro se)
Check Smart $300.00 $76.66 $338.33
America$h $300.00 $70.00 $335.00
Total $2,050.00 $4,081.08 $2,186.27
Plaintiff listened to what the lawyers said about “payday loans” and told them he would
be in touch if he decided to proceed.
Plaintiff Becomes a Client of the Alpert Firm
20. Mach 20, 2000 Plaintiff met Mr. Cook who agreed to investigate his claims
against ACE Cash Express and America$h. Mr. Cook declined to represent Plaintiff’s
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claims against EZ Check Cashing1 or Check ‘n Go2. Mr. Cook said Plaintiff may benefit
from the AMSCOT case, which was already being litigated.
21. March 21, 2000 Plaintiff signed a Class Representation Contract with Alpert,
Barker, Rodems, Ferrentino & Cook, P.A. to investigate potential claims from
transactions with ACE Cash Express and America$h3. Mr. Cook signed the contingent
fee agreement for the Alpert firm. (Exhibit 1).
22. April 12, 2000 Mr. Cook called Plaintiff to copy his transactions with ACE Cash
Express. Plaintiff produced his ACE file the next day at the Alpert firm.
23. April 14, 2000 a class action complaint was filed, Neil Gillespie v. ACE Cash
Express, Inc., case no. 8:00-CV-723-T-23B, in United States District Court, Middle
District of Florida, Tampa Division. (“ACE”). (Exhibit 1). The ACE lawsuit pled three
counts, one federal and two state. Count I alleged violation of the Federal Truth in
Lending Act (TILA). Count II alleged violation of state usury laws pursuant to sections
687.02, 687.03, and 687.04 Florida Statutes. Count III alleged violation of the Florida
Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act, sections 501.201 to 501.23 Florida Statutes.
Mr. Cook4 signed the complaint for Alpert, Barker, Rodems, Ferrentino & Cook, P.A.
The lawsuit was based on “payday lending” alleged violation of federal and state laws.
The Alpert firm represented Plaintiff on a contingent fee basis. Plaintiff believed the
1
Gillespie later settled this matter pro se.
2
Gillespie was part of a class that settled claims in Reuter v. Check ‘N Go of Florida, Inc., Fifteenth
Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach County, Florida, case no.: 502001CA001164XXOCAI.
3
On May 3, 2000, Mr. Cook wrote Gillespie that he would not represent him in a claim against America$h.
4
On April 30, 2000, Gillespie wrote Mr. Cook about errors in the Complaint, that paragraphs 19 and 20
were incomplete, and that paragraphs 14 and 15 were repeated. Mr. Cook ignored the errors, and Gillespie
again wrote Mr. Cook on May 7, 2000, citing his carelessness, lack of proofreading, and unprofessional
attitude. All of this is more evidence of Defendants incompetence.
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contract he signed with Mr. Cook March 21, 2000 was a contingent fee agreement
regulated by The Florida Bar.
24. On or about May 19, 2000, the Florida Attorney General unilaterally served a
subpoena duces tecum upon Ace Cash Express, Inc.
25. On August 1, 2000 Neil Gillespie v. ACE Cash Express, Inc., case no. 8:00-CV-
723-T-23B was consolidated with Eugene R. Clement v. ACE Cash Express, Inc., which
was removed to federal court March 27, 2000, case no. 8:00-CV-593-T-26C (former case
no. 99-09730, Circuit Court for the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit in Hillsborough County).
Mr. Alpert Attacks Attorney Arnold Levine - Mr. Rodems a Witness
26. A Tampa Police Department report dated June 5, 2000, case number 00-42020,
alleges Mr. Alpert committed battery, Florida Statutes §784.03, upon attorney Arnold
Levine by throwing hot coffee on him. At the time Mr. Levine was a 68 year-old senior
citizen. The report states: “The victim and defendant are both attorneys and were
representing their clients in a mediation hearing. The victim alleges that the defendant
began yelling, and intentionally threw the contents of a 20 oz. cup of hot coffee which
struck him in the chest staining his shirt. A request for prosecution was issued for
battery.” Mr. Rodems is listed as a witness on the police report and failed to inform
Plaintiff that Mr. Alpert attacked attorney Arnold Levine.
27. Mr. Levine previously sued Alpert, Barker & Rodems, PA, a $5 million dollar
claim for defamation, Buccaneers Limited Partnership v. Alpert, Barker & Rodems, PA,
US District Court, Middle District of Florida, Tampa Division, case 99-2354-CIV-T-23C.
Mr. Alpert Runs for State Attorney After Suicide of Harry Lee Coe
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28. On or about July 20, 2000 Mr. Alpert became a candidate for state attorney for
Hillsborough County5. The vacancy was created by the suicide of State Attorney Harry
Lee Coe who shot himself July 13, 2000 over gambling debts and related matters. A
report on the matter showed Mr. Coe had $5,000 in bad check fees alone. The tragedy
shows the serious societal problems created by excessive bank fees.
29. Defendants’ deceived Plaintiff by their financial support of Mr. Alpert for state
attorney, while concealing his recent criminal behavior. Each made a $500.00
contribution to the Alpert campaign, the maximum allowed under Florida law. Records
from the Florida Division of Elections show the following contributions:
a. Chris Barker made a $500.00 contribution on July 21, 2000
b. Ryan Christopher Rodems made a $500.00 contribution on July 21, 2000
c. William J. Cook made a $500.00 contribution on July 26, 2000.
Political Crusade Against Payday Loans Hurts Lawsuit
30. Mr. Alpert campaigned on his record with “payday loan companies”. His political
advertisements stated that Jonathan Alpert has spent his life standing up for working
people and protecting consumers, and that “The Alpert Record” has “Protected working
families by taking on payday loan companies”. The paid political advertisement stated
that “Now, he wants to take that experience and fight to protect us as our State Attorney.
He will fight for us - and he knows how to get results!”
31. Plaintiff believed in fighting “payday loan companies” and supported Alpert’s
campaign with a $25 contribution. Plaintiff mailed his $25 check to Mr. Cook at the
Alpert firm together with a letter dated August 23, 2000. Mr. Cook delivered Plaintiff’s
5
Mr. Alpert was defeated and eliminated in the September 5, 2000 primary election.
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check to the Alpert campaign. Plaintiff received a “thank you” letter from Mr. Alpert
dated August 31, 2000.
32. Mr. Alpert’s political crusade against “payday loan companies” was detrimental
to the AMSCOT lawsuit, according to AMSCOT’s Response in Opposition to Clement’s
Motion for Class Certification and Memorandum of Law in Support. AMSCOT’s lawyer
John Anthony wrote: “Finally, there are some serious questions as to whether Jonathan L.
Alpert, Esquire will properly prosecute this class action for the benefit of the class.
Specifically, Mr. Alpert is currently running for the position of state attorney and has
made it clear that one of his primary platforms is that he will, if elected, pursue criminal
action against the payday advance industry. AMSCOT is in the process of obtaining a
copy of the transcript from a recent television show wherein Mr. Alpert made his
intentions clear. Accordingly, it is likely that Mr. Alpert is running for elected office on
this lawsuit, and that, accordingly, his motives in prosecuting the lawsuit may very likely
be different than those of the class he is seeking to represent.”
Defendants Form Law Firm In Secret: Barker, Rodems & Cook, PA
33. On August 2, 2000, Mr. Barker executed Articles of Incorporation for Barker,
Rodems & Cook, P.A, principal place of business at 300 W. Platt Street, Tampa, Florida.
Defendants formed their new law firm in secret from Jonathan Alpert, rented office
space, and acquired things needed to open a new law office. Defendants later hired-away
staff from the Alpert firm, including a receptionist and a legal secretary. Defendants
worked on their plans quietly, in secret, to the extent possible. Defendants did not
publicly announce the formation of their new law firm until December 6, 2000. (Exhibit
3). Prior to that time, Mr. Cook told Plaintiff that he and Mr. Barker and Mr. Rodems
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formed their own law firm, and asked Plaintiff to keep the information secret from Mr.
Alpert. Defendants’ double-dealing and deception against Mr. Alpert placed Plaintiff in a
position of conflict and divided loyalties with the lawyers and law firm representing him.
Defendants Pressured Plaintiff to Intervene in the AMSCOT Lawsuit
34. Mr. Cook was under pressure to replace the unqualified Mr. Clement as lead
plaintiff in the AMSCOT lawsuit to prevent its dismissal. Mr. Cook solicited Plaintiff to
intervene in the AMSCOT lawsuit to save the litigation.
35. Plaintiff declined to sue AMSCOT a year earlier during his initial meeting with
Mr. Cook on December 28th, 1999. Plaintiff did not owe AMSCOT money. Plaintiff’s
debt to AMSCOT was paid in full, unlike the other five “payday loan” companies, whom
he owed a total of at least $1,848.27. Plaintiff wanted to concentrate his effort resolving
matters with the remaining five “payday loan” companies. Plaintiff’s exposure with
AMSCOT was limited to transactions of $100.00 each, and the total fees and costs he
paid AMSCOT amounted to just $148.47.
36. Plaintiff explained the circumstances the preceding paragraph to Mr. Cook, but
Cook continued to solicit Plaintiff to sue AMSCOT. When Plaintiff argued to Mr. Cook
that his exposure with AMSCOT was limited, Cook responded that Plaintiff’s position
was selfish. Mr. Cook pressured Plaintiff to sue AMSCOT, based on Plaintiff’s political
beliefs that “payday loan companies” were bad, detrimental to people and society, and
charged usurious rates of interest disguised as fees and costs. Mr. Cook assured Plaintiff
that AMSCOT had, in fact, committed the violations plead in the class-action complaint.
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37. Mr. Cook’s pressure on Plaintiff to sue AMSCOT created a conflict with Plaintiff
because Mr. Cook already represented Plaintiff in the ACE lawsuit. Plaintiff wanted to
keep Mr. Cook happy for the benefit of Plaintiff’s interest in the ACE lawsuit.
38. Mr. Cook provided Plaintiff pleadings from the AMSCOT lawsuit even though he
was not yet a party. In a letter dated September 25, 2000, Mr. Cook provided Plaintiff an
Order he received in the AMSCOT case. Plaintiff felt pressured that Cook provided him
pleadings in the AMSCOT lawsuit where he was not a party together with information
about the ACE lawsuit. Mr. Cook was linking Plaintiff, AMSCOT and ACE together.
Defendants Offer Plaintiff Incentives to Sue AMSCOT Corporation
39. Mr. Cook offered Plaintiff a number of incentives to sue AMSCOT, because
recovery of $148.47 Plaintiff paid in fees to AMSCOT was not compelling. Mr. Cook
offered Plaintiff the following incentives to sue AMSCOT:
a. Mr. Cook told Plaintiff that he would receive a fee for serving as a class
representative, and the amount awarded by the Court to compensate Plaintiff would likely
be between $5,000.00 and $10,000.00. Mr. Cook said class representatives in the Tampa
Bay Buccaneers lawsuit received $5,000.00 each, and this case was worth more, he said.
NOTE: In Reuter v. Check ‘N Go of Florida, Inc., Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach
County, Florida, case no.: 502001CA001164XXOCAI, the Final Approval Order And
Judgment of May 16, 2008 by Circuit Court Judge Edward A. Garrison approved
$25,000 to Donna Reuter as a fair and reasonable Class Representative Award.
b. Mr. Cook said Plaintiff would receive statutory damages in addition to the
recovery of the $148.47 Plaintiff paid in fees to AMSCOT. The statutory damages under
TILA, the federal Truth In Lending Act, are $1,000.00.
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c. Mr. Cook said Plaintiff would likely receive punitive damages under the state
law claim of Usury, section 687, Florida Statutes, and actual damages under the state law
claim of Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act, section 501 Florida Statutes.
d. Under the terms of the contingent fee agreement, the above awards and
damages and any costs and attorney’s fees awarded would become part of the Total
Recovery and divided according to the percentages of the contingent fee agreement.
e. Mr. Cook said Plaintiff would get special attention as a favorite client of his
newly formed law firm. The new firm would be anxious for business which Defendants
hoped Plaintiff would provide. Cook said once Defendants were free from the control of
Mr. Alpert they would be able to decide themselves what cases to accept and litigate.
40. Plaintiff finally relented to Mr. Cook’s pressure and intervened in the AMSCOT
lawsuit, see Motion For Intervention As Plaintiffs And Proposed Class Representatives,
submitted November 9, 2000. This occurred while Plaintiff was a client of the Alpert
firm a month before Defendants told Mr. Alpert that they formed a new law firm and
were taking his clients and lawsuits away from him. Mr. Cook also convinced Ms. Gay
Ann Blomefield to sue AMSCOT. Now Mr. Cook had two prospective class
representatives to replace the unqualified Mr. Clement. If either Plaintiff or Ms.
Blomefield were later disqualified as lead plaintiffs, the AMSCOT lawsuit could proceed
with the remaining plaintiff. The US District Court granted the motion for intervention
On March 20, 2001.
41. In a letter to Plaintiff dated March 8, 2010, Mr. Rodems wrote: “you did not have
actual damages” in the AMSCOT case. (page 2, paragraph 8). This is further evidence
that Defendants used Plaintiff solely for Defendants’ own personal benefit and gain.
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42. Defendants’ pressure of Plaintiff and offer of incentives to sue AMSCOT was
likely a crime under section 877.01(1), Florida Statutes, Instigation of litigation, and an
overt act in furtherance of their conspiracy against Plaintiff and the other co-plaintiffs.
43. Following the breakup of the Alpert firm, Plaintiff brought new potential claims
to Defendants at BRC, which now represented Plaintiff in the AMSCOT lawsuit and the
ACE lawsuit. In a March 22, 2001 letter to Mr. Cook, Plaintiff requested representation
in his efforts with the Florida Department of Vocational Rehabilitation. (DVR). Mr. Cook
responded March 27, 2001 that we are not in a position to represent you for any claims
you may have with Vocational Rehabilitation.
44. In a May 22, 2001letter to Mr. Cook, Plaintiff requested representation in his
effort to obtain job placement services from St. Petersburg Junior College for students
with disabilities. Mr. Cook responded May 25, 2001 we are not in the position to pursue
litigation with St. Petersburg Junior College.
45. Mr. Cook’s assurance to Plaintiff of assistance with other claims was a deception
to induce Plaintiff to sue AMSCOT. Mr. Cook also led Plaintiff to believe that
Defendants would assist him in finding employment. Plaintiff provided Defendants his
resume, but Defendants did not assist Plaintiff with finding employment.
46. Mr. Cook and Plaintiff signed a Class Representation Contract to sue AMSCOT
November 3, 2000. (Exhibit 2). The Alpert firm represented Plaintiff on a contingent fee
basis. Plaintiff believed the contract was a contingent fee agreement regulated by The
Florida Bar.
47. Mr. Cook signed the contract on behalf of Alpert, Barker, Rodems, Ferrentino &
Cook, P.A. even though Mr. Cook knew that he and Mr. Barker and Mr. Rodems already
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formed a new law firm in August, 2000. Defendants were partners in two law firms at the
same time, one of which was secret. Mr. Alpert was the senior partner in the firm
representing Plaintiff in two lawsuits, AMSCOT and ACE. This placed Plaintiff in a
position of conflict and divided loyalties with the lawyers and law firm representing him.
48. Defendants’ deceit and conflict of interest created by executing the Class
Representation Contract to sue AMSCOT November 3, 2000, knowing they already
formed another law firm and did not plan to honor the contract, was an overt act in
furtherance of their conspiracy against Plaintiff, Ms. Blomefield and Mr. Clement.
49. Defendants announced the formation of their new law firm, Barker, Rodems &
Cook, P.A., by letter to Plaintiff dated December 6, 2000. (Exhibit 3). This occurred four
(4) months after Mr. Barker filed the Articles of Incorporation for the new law firm.
50. On December 12, 2000 a Joint Stipulation for Substitution of Counsel was
submitted by Mr. Alpert and Mr. Cook, transferring the AMSCOT case from the Alpert
firm to BRC as counsel of record.
51. On December 12, 2000 a Joint Stipulation for Substitution of Counsel was
submitted by Mr. Alpert and Mr. Cook, transferring the ACE case from the Alpert firm to
BRC as counsel of record.
52. Defendants began representing Plaintiff in the AMSCOT case on a contingent fee
basis December 12, 2000. There is no signed contingent fee agreement between
Defendant Barker, Rodems & Cook, PA and Plaintiff in the AMSCOT lawsuit.
Defendants did not execute a contingent fee agreement with Plaintiff when it assumed the
case December 12, 2000. Plaintiff asked Mr. Cook about the lack of a contingent fee
agreement in July, 2001. Mr. Cook responded by letter dated July 23, 2001 (Exhibit 4)
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and provided new attorneys’ fees contracts for both the AMSCOT (Exhibit 5) and ACE
lawsuits, but the parties did not sign either contract.
53. Defendants began representing Plaintiff in the ACE case on a contingent fee basis
December 12, 2000. There is no signed contingent fee agreement between Defendant
Barker, Rodems & Cook, PA and Plaintiff in the ACE lawsuit. Defendants did not
execute a contingent fee agreement with Plaintiff when it assumed the case December 12,
2000. Plaintiff asked Mr. Cook about the lack of a contingent fee agreement in July,
2001. Mr. Cook responded by letter dated July 23, 2001 (Exhibit 4) and provided new
attorneys’ fees contracts for both the AMSCOT and ACE (Exhibit 6) lawsuits, but the
parties did not sign either contract.
AMSCOT Counterclaim Against Plaintiff and Ms. Blomefield
54. On or about March 27, 2001, AMSCOT filed a counterclaim against Plaintiff and
Ms. Blomefield. Defendants failed to advise Plaintiff he was subject to a counterclaim.
There was no provision in the Alpert firm Class Representation Contract (Exhibit 2) for
defending a counterclaim. At the time of the AMSCOT counterclaim there was no
contingent fee agreement whatsoever between Defendants and Plaintiff.
TILA Claims Not Valid in ACE Lawsuit
55. On December 21, 2000 United States District Court Judge James S. Moody, Jr.
issued an Order in the ACE lawsuit that dismissed with prejudice Count I, Plaintiff’s
TILA claims, and remanded the case to the Circuit Court of the Thirteenth Judicial
Circuit for Count II, the alleged violation of state usury laws pursuant to sections 687.02,
687.03, and 687.04 Florida Statutes, and Count III alleged violation of the Florida
Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act, sections 501.201 to 501.23 Florida Statutes.
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Judge Moody explained his decision to dismiss with prejudice the TILA claims on page
3, paragraph 3 of the Order. “On March 31, 2000, the Federal Reserve Board ("FRB'')
promulgated revisions to a regulation that interprets TILA as applying to check-cashing
transactions. See 65 Fed. Reg. 17129, 30 (2000), to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 226. The
revision to the regulation states, however, that the effective date of the new rule is March
24,2000, but that compliance is "optional" until October 1, 2000. Id. The Court agrees
with Defendant that the plain language of the regulation means that compliance was not
mandated until October 1, 2000. The transactions at issue in this case occurred prior to
the FRB's regulation. Since Plaintiffs' transactions occurred prior to October 1, 2000,
TILA is not applicable and cannot form a basis for relief against Defendant. Accordingly,
Plaintiffs' claims under TILA are dismissed.” (Exhibit 7).
TILA Claims Not Valid in Payday Express Lawsuit
56. On April 6, 2001, United States District Magistrate Judge Steven D. Merryday
issued an Order in the Payday Express lawsuit that dismissed with prejudice the TILA
and RICO claims, and dismissed without prejudice the remaining state law claims of
usury and FDUTPA. Judge Merryday held that “Because TILA’s mandatory disclosures
were not required of the defendants before October 1, 2000, TILA cannot form a basis for
relief of the plaintiff’s claims.” (page 4, last paragraph).
TILA Claims Not Valid in AMSCOT Lawsuit
57. On August 1, 2001, United States District Judge Richard A. Lazzara issued an
order in the AMSCOT lawsuit denying class certification as moot, dismissed Count I
with prejudice, the alleged violation of the Federal Truth in Lending Act (TILA). The
Order dismissed Counts II and III without prejudice to bring in state court, and closed the
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file. Count II alleged violation of state usury laws pursuant to sections 687.02, 687.03,
and 687.04 Florida Statutes. Count III alleged violation of the Florida Deceptive and
Unfair Trade Practices Act, sections 501.201 to 501.23 Florida Statutes. (Exhibit 8).
58. Defendants knew ten (10) months before making the closing statement in the
AMSCOT settlement that the AMSCOT lawsuit was not a fee-shifting TILA action. On
August 1, 2001 the AMSCOT lawsuit ceased being a fee-shifting TILA action when the
TILA claim was dismissed with prejudice. Defendants also knew from the decisions in
ACE and Payday Express that TILA could not form a basis for relief in AMSCOT.
Florida Attorney General Motion to Intervene in ACE
59. On or about February 9, 2001 the Florida Attorney General moved to intervene in
the ACE lawsuit citing Florida RICO jurisdiction. Roger B. Handberg, Senior Assistant
Attorney General, Economic Crimes Division, appeared for the AG. An Order granted
the intervention April 3, 2001. The AG filed its 82 page complaint April 12, 2001.
$5,000 Improper Payoff Attempt
60. Soon after Judge Lazzara’s Order dismissing AMSCOT, John Anthony offered
Mr. Cook a $5,000 “consulting fee” or “non-refundable retainer” to refrain from
appealing the ruling or filing state law claims or suing AMSCOT in the future. This was
in violation of Rule 4-5.6(a). Mr. Cook described this payment as an “improper payoff
attempt” and not an offer to settle. Mr. Cook said that “the Florida Bar likely would
prohibit such an agreement.” Mr. Cook did not report Anthony’s Rule 4-5.6(a) violation
to the Florida Bar as required by Rule 4-8.3(a). Mr. Cook did not report Mr. Anthony’s
“improper payoff attempt” to the Florida Bar as required by Rule 4-8.3(a).
Breach of Fiduciary Duty
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61. Defendants represented Plaintiff as his attorneys. Defendants owed Plaintiff a
fiduciary duty. It is long established that the relationship between an attorney and his
client is one of the most important, as well as the most sacred, known to the law. The
responsibility of an attorney to place his client’s interest ahead of his own in dealings
with matters upon which the attorney is employed is at the foundation of our legal
system. (Deal v. Migoski, 122 So. 2d 415). It is a fiduciary relationship involving the
highest degree of truth and confidence, and an attorney is under a duty, at all times, to
represent his client and handle his client’s affairs with the utmost degree of honesty,
forthrightness, loyalty, and fidelity. (Gerlach v. Donnelly, 98 So. 2d 493).
62. On August 15, 2001 Mr. Cook announced that Defendants would not honor the
AMSCOT contingent fee agreement with Plaintiff. Cook said Plaintiff’s damages were
limited to $1,000, the fee-shifting provision of TILA. This was false. Defendants did not
prevail on any TILA claims. Defendants breached its fiduciary duty owed to Plaintiff,
Ms. Blomefield and Mr. Clement by failing to put their clients’ interest ahead of their
own in dealings with matters upon which Defendants were employed.
63. Defendants refusal to honor the contingent fee agreement in the AMSCOT
lawsuit was an overt act in furtherance of their conspiracy against Plaintiff, Ms.
Blomefield and Mr. Clement.
Defendants Commit Fraud Against Their Own Clients
64. Defendants conspired to defraud Plaintiff, Ms. Blomefield and Mr. Clement in the
AMSCOT lawsuit using a corrupt business model that relied upon a five part deception.
Defendants’ corrupt business model worked as follows:
a. Defendants breached their fiduciary duty to Plaintiff and the other clients.
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b. Defendants fraudulently procured a favorable agreement from Plaintiff and the
other clients taking 90 percent of the AMSCOT settlement for their own benefit.
c. Defendants relied upon the parol evidence rule to enforce the settlement.
b. Defendants further argued that bar rules prohibit them from honoring a
contingent fee agreement since that amounts to splitting attorney’s fees with a nonlawyer.
65. Defendants fraudulently procured a favorable agreement from Plaintiff in the
AMSCOT settlement with a five part deception:
a. Part 1: Defendants created a “sticking part” argument that blamed its clients
for suing AMSCOT. Mr. Cook told Plaintiff that AMSCOT resented him and that was a
“sticking part” to settling because AMSCOT did not want to pay Plaintiff any money.
b. Part 2: Mr. Cook told Plaintiff that AMSCOT did not resent Defendants and
wanted to pay money to the Defendants to settle the lawsuit.
c. Part 3: Defendants falsely claimed entitlement to fee-shifting TILA damages to
evade the contingent fee agreement with Plaintiff, Ms. Blomefield and Mr. Clement.
d. Part 4: Defendants used deceit to induce Plaintiff, Ms. Blomefield, and
Clement to sign a “Release and Settlement Agreement” with AMSCOT October 30,
2001.
e. Part 5: Defendants used deceit to induce Plaintiff to sign a “closing statement”
November 1, 2001 in order to receive $2,000 promised in the “Release and Settlement
Agreement” with AMSCOT on October 30, 2001.
66. During a meeting with Plaintiff August 15, 2001, Mr. Cook told Plaintiff that
AMSCOT did not want to pay the plaintiffs anything because AMSCOT resented the
plaintiffs for suing. Mr. Cook told Plaintiff this was a “sticking part” or barrier to a
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settlement. Mr. Cook told Plaintiff that AMSCOT did not resent Defendants and wanted
to pay money to Defendants to settle the lawsuit. Mr. Cook said that the “sticking part”
was a $1,000 payment to each of three plaintiffs, not a $50,000 payment to Defendants.
67. Defendants “sticking part” argument was an overt act in furtherance of their
conspiracy against Plaintiff, Ms. Blomefield and Mr. Clement.
68. Defendants false claim to court-awarded fees and costs was an overt act in
69. During the August 15, 2001 meeting with Plaintiff, Mr. Cook falsely told Plaintiff
that Defendants incurred costs and expenses of $33,000 in the AMSCOT lawsuit. Cook
used this amount as a basis to justify his $50,000 demand from AMSCOT. Plaintiff later
learned that the actual costs and expenses were only $3,580.67, plus $2,544.79 paid to
Mr. Alpert, for total costs and expenses of $6,125.46. These costs and expenses were not
itemized on the closing statement as required by bar Rule 4-1.5(f)(5).
70. Defendants false claim that it incurred $33,000 in costs and expenses was an overt
act in furtherance of their conspiracy against Plaintiff, Ms. Blomefield and Mr. Clement.
71. Defendants creation of a deceptive closing statement, and failure to itemize costs
and expenses of $6,125.46 as required by bar Rule 4-1.5(f)(5), was an overt act in
72. On August 15, 2001 Mr. Cook wrote that Plaintiff “authorized” Defendants to
appeal the dismissal of TILA claims, but not file a new lawsuit in State court. Mr. Cook
also wrote that Plaintiff “authorized” Defendants to demand $1,000 to settle his claim
plus $50,000 in attorney’s fees and costs. (Exhibit 9). Plaintiff’s so-called ‘authorization’
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was contrary to his interest, induced by false information Defendants provided him as
described herein, and was therefore void.
73. Defendants’ separate negotiation with AMSCOT for its attorneys’ fees placed
Defendants in a position of conflict with Plaintiff, Ms. Blomefield and Mr. Clement.
Defendants’ August 15, 2001 letter is prima facie evidence of breach of fiduciary duty.
74. Defendants separate negotiation with AMSCOT for its attorneys’ fees, and
Defendants’ August 15, 2001 letter to Plaintiff were overt acts in furtherance of their
Defendants Hijack The AMSCOT Lawsuit And Hold Plaintiff Hostage
75. On August 16, 2001 Plaintiff instructed Mr. Cook by letter to settle the AMSCOT
lawsuit. (Exhibit 10). Plaintiff believed Defendants no longer represented his interest in
the litigation. Plaintiff requested that Defendants provide copies of his settlement
instruction letter to Ms. Blomefield and Mr. Clement. Plaintiff provided Defendants the
following instructions to settle the AMSCOT litigation:
“I agree with you that the Defendant will probably not accept your
settlement offer. I believe the sticking point is your request for $50,000 in
attorney’s fees and costs. I do not believe the $1,000 request each for
myself, Mr. Clement and Ms. Blomefield is a barrier to settlement.
Therefore I suggest you ask for a lesser amount of attorney’s fees and
costs. Given your lack of success in this matter thus far, I suggest you ask
for $10,000 in attorney’s fees and costs. I believe this is a more realistic
amount. Given how poorly the case has gone up to now, I believe it is in
our interest to settle quickly.”
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Plaintiff was concerned that Defendants no longer represented his interest, and
among other things he would be indebted to AMSCOT for its costs and
attorney’s fees since Defendants failed to prevail on the TILA claim.
76. Defendants did not obey Plaintiff’s August 16, 2001 written instructions
to settle the AMSCOT lawsuit.
77. Defendants did not obey Plaintiff’s September 15, 2001 written
instructions to settle his claims the AMSCOT lawsuit.
78. Defendants did not obey Plaintiff’s September 21, 2001 instructions to
settle his claims in the AMSCOT lawsuit.
79. Defendants hijacked the AMSCOT lawsuit for their own benefit and held
Plaintiff hostage for Defendants’ financial gain.
80. On or about July 25, 2005, Plaintiff sent a copy of his August 16, 2001
letter to Defendants instructing them to settle the lawsuit, to Ian Mackechnie,
President of AMSCOT with a cover letter. (Exhibit 11). A month later John
Anthony responded to Plaintiff and wrote (in part): “Amscot is disappointed that
your lawyer apparently did not obey your instructions regarding discontinuing
litigation you and he knew to be frivolous.” (Exhibit 12).
81. Defendants failure to obey Plaintiff’s instructions to settle the AMSCOT case,
and hijack of the case for Defendants’ own benefit, were overt acts in furtherance of their
Defendants Written Evidence of Fraud Against Its Clients
82. In a memorandum dated Monday, August 20, 2001, Mr. Cook wrote the following
to memorialize his conversation with Plaintiff about AMSCOT: (Exhibit 13).
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a. “I explained to him that I did not believe that the sticking part was created
through the attorney’s fees, but rather it was the payment to the clients.”
b. “I told him of my conversation with John Anthony in which he offered to pay
this firm $5,000.00 but would not agree to pay our client’s anything. I told him I rejected
that offer. He asked me why I had not mentioned the settlement offer to him previously.
I told him it was not a settlement offer. It was an improper payoff attempt.”
c. “I told him that the $50,000.00 demand was not set in stone and we would
consider the $10,000.00 offer that he suggested.”
83. Defendants submitted a written offer to AMSCOT August 20, 2001. Mr. Cook
wrote (in part): “…our clients are willing to accept $1,000.00 each, representing the
amount of their individual TILA statutory damages. They would also want any
outstanding loans forgiven. In addition, we would accept $50,000.00 to settle this firm's
outstanding attorneys' fees and costs.” (page 1, paragraph 3) (Exhibit 14).
84. Defendants’ August 20, 2001 written settlement offer to AMSCOT is prima facie
evidence of Defendants’ breach of fiduciary duty. Plaintiff was not restricted to TILA
statutory damages in his recovery. TILA damages did not apply. The TILA claims were
dismissed with prejudice. Defendants’ separate demand for $50,000 to settle the firm’s
outstanding attorneys’ fees and costs was speculative, not supported by actual fees and
expenses incurred, and put Defendants interests ahead of Plaintiff. It was evidence of
Defendants’ proprietary interest in the AMSCOT litigation.
85. Defendants negotiated with AMSCOT on behalf of Ms. Blomefield and Mr.
Clement to have any outstanding loans forgiven. Plaintiff did not have outstanding debt
or loans to AMSCOT. Defendants did not seek alternative compensation for Plaintiff.
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Defendants further breached their fiduciary duty to Plaintiff by failing to obtain a
settlement of equal value for him from AMSCOT.
86. AMSCOT made a counter offer and agreed to pay each plaintiff $1,000, forgive
any outstanding debts (Plaintiff did not have outstanding debts to AMSCOT), and a
$10,000 payment to the Defendants, in a letter dated August 24, 2001.
87. AMSCOT then offered to pay the Defendants the sum of $50,000. AMSCOT
offered to pay each plaintiff $2,000. There is no documentation supporting AMSCOT’s
increased offer. Defendants did not provide a bill to AMSCOT for legal services, nor
provided any basis for the $50,000 in attorney’s fees and cost.
88. Once AMSCOT agreed to pay Plaintiff and the other clients a monetary
settlement, Defendants created a new deceit to evade the contingent fee agreement.
Under the agreement, attorneys’ fees became part of the Total Recovery. To evade that
clause, Defendants represented to Plaintiff that the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit awarded $50,000 in attorney’s fees and costs to the Defendants, and this
precluded recovery under the Representation Contract, citing a “whichever is higher”
provision for court-awarded attorney’s fees and costs. Defendants referred to the $50,000
as a “claim against AMSCOT for court-awarded fees and costs”.
United States Court of Appeals: No Fee-Shifting TILA Costs or Fees
89. Defendants’ representation in the preceding paragraph was false. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit did not award Defendants $50,000 in
attorney’s fees and costs to the. Defendants did not have a claim to court-awarded fees
and costs because Defendants did not prevail on a TILA claim.
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90. Defendants false claim that the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit awarded them $50,000 in attorney’s fees and costs is an overt act in furtherance
of their conspiracy against Plaintiff, Ms. Blomefield and Mr. Clement.
91. Defendants filed a notice of appeal in AMSCOT August 20, 2001 to the United
States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit, Case No. 01-14761-A. Defendants submitted
Appellants Initial Brief October 2, 2001. AMSCOT did not submit a reply brief.
92. AMSCOT settled the lawsuit for business reasons October 30, 2001. Defendants
did not prevail on a TILA claim. The AMSCOT settlement agreement had a “No
Admission” clause. It was expressly understood that the Parties explicitly denied any
wrongdoing, liability, or obligation whatsoever to the other party relating to the
settlement.
93. Mr. Cook submitted a Joint Stipulation For Dismissal With Prejudice in the
AMSCOT case November 6, 2001 with the US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
that the parties amicably resolved the matter and moved for dismissal with prejudice with
each party bearing its own attorneys’ fees and costs. (Exhibit 15). This is conclusive
evidence that Defendants did not have an award of attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to a
fee-shifting TILA statute. Likewise Defendants did not have a “claim against AMSCOT
for court-awarded fees and costs.”
94. On December 7, 2001 the US District Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
ruled that the Joint Stipulation for Dismissal with Prejudice was construed as a motion to
dismiss the appeal with prejudice, with the parties bearing their own costs and attorney’s
fees. (Exhibit 16). This is conclusive evidence that Defendants did not have an award of
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attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to a fee-shifting TILA statute. Likewise Defendants
did not have a “claim against AMSCOT for court-awarded fees and costs.”
FRAUD IN THE INDUCEMENT, Release and Settlement Agreement with AMSCOT
95. On October 30, 2001 Defendants fraudulently induced Plaintiff, Ms. Blomefield
and Mr. Clement to sign a Release and Settlement Agreement with AMSCOT
Corporation. (“AMSCOT agreement”). (Exhibit 17). Paragraph 1 is Settlement with
Plaintiffs for $2,000 each. Paragraph 2 is Settlement with Firm, the Defendants, and
reads: “Amscot shall pay the Firm the sum of Fifty Thousand Dollars and No/100
($50,000), in satisfaction of Plaintiffs' claims for attorneys' fees and costs, as more fully
described herein, against Amscot as asserted in the Action.” To induce Plaintiff to sign
the AMSCOT agreement:
a. Defendants represented to Plaintiff, Ms. Blomefield and Mr. Clement that the
$50,000 sum was a claim for court-awarded fees and costs. The representation was a
false statement concerning a material fact. The TILA claims were dismissed and there
was no claim to court-awarded fees and costs.
b. Defendants made the statement knowing that the representation was false.
Defendants knew the TILA claims were dismissed and there was no claim to court-
awarded fees and costs.
c. Defendants intended the representation would induce Plaintiff to act upon it
and signed the Release and Settlement Agreement with AMSCOT.
d. Plaintiff relied upon Defendants falsehood as true and signed the agreement
October 30, 2001 in return for payment of $2,000 from AMSCOT. Plaintiff suffered
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financial loss of $7,143.68 by accepting the sum of $2,000 instead of the sum of
$9,143.68 to which Plaintiff was entitled under law and the Representation Contract.
96. Defendants fraud to induce Plaintiff to sign the AMSCOT agreement was an overt
97. Plaintiff, Ms. Blomefield and Mr. Clement did not immediately receive the
$2,000 payment from AMSCOT described in paragraph 1 of the AMSCOT agreement.
Payment was held for three days until Plaintiff, Ms. Blomefield and Mr. Clement signed
Defendants closing statement on November 1, 2001.
FRAUD IN THE INDUCEMENT, Defendants’ Closing Statement in AMSCOT
98. On November 1, 2001, Defendants fraudulently induced Plaintiff to sign a closing
statement prepared by Defendants in the AMSCOT lawsuit. (Exhibit 18). Defendants also
fraudulently induced Ms. Blomefield and Mr. Clement to sign similar closing statements.
To induce Plaintiff to sign the closing statement:
a. Defendants represented to Plaintiff, Ms. Blomefield and Mr. Clement that
“…AMSCOT Corporation separately paid my attorneys $50,000.00 to compensate my
attorneys for their claim against AMSCOT for court-awarded fees and costs.” The
representation was a false statement concerning a material fact. The TILA claims were
dismissed and there was no claim to court-awarded fees and costs.
and signed the closing statement made by Defendants in the AMSCOT lawsuit.
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d. Plaintiff relied upon Defendants falsehood as true and signed the closing
statement November 1, 2001 in return for payment of $2,000 from AMSCOT. Plaintiff
suffered financial loss of $7,143.68 by accepting the sum of $2,000 instead of the sum of
99. Defendants fraud to induce Plaintiff to sign the closing statement was an overt act
in furtherance of their conspiracy against Plaintiff, Ms. Blomefield and Mr. Clement.
Defendants AMSCOT Closing Statement Does Not Comply with Florida Bar Rules
100. Defendants’ closing statement in the AMSCOT lawsuit (Exhibit 18) does not
comply with Rule 4-1.5(f)(5), The Rules Regulating The Florida Bar. Defendants closing
statement fails to:
(a) Reflect an itemization of all costs and expenses. Costs and expenses in the
AMSCOT lawsuit of $3,580.88 were not itemized as required.
(b) Show the amount of fee received by each participating lawyer or law firm.
Payment to Jonathan Alpert for the AMSCOT lawsuit of $2,544.79 was not shown.
(c) A copy of the closing statement was not executed by all participating lawyers.
Jonathan Alpert received payment of $2,544.79 from the AMSCOT settlement but did
not execute the closing statement.
101. Defendants preparation and execution of a closing statement in the AMSCOT
lawsuit that does not comply with Rule 4-1.5(f)(5) was an overt act in furtherance of their
102. Defendants cannot avoid compliance with Rule 4-1.5(f)(5), The Rules Regulating
The Florida Bar, by claiming AMSCOT paid its attorneys’ fees and costs. The rule does
not alleviate attorneys from compliance under this claimed contingency.
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103. Defendants’ closing statement in the AMSCOT lawsuit further violates Rule 4-
1.5(f)(5), The Rules Regulating The Florida Bar, by falsely stating Defendants had a
$50,000 “claim against AMSCOT for court-awarded fees and costs” or that AMSCOT
separately paid this “claim”. Defendants did not have a claim against anyone in the
AMSCOT lawsuit for $50,000 in court-awarded fees and costs. Defendants did not
prevail on a TILA claim. The fee-shifting TILA claims were dismissed with prejudice by
the court. Defendants knew that three separate courts dismissed three separate lawsuits
they brought, and each court held that TILA claims were not possible because the law
was not retroactive. AMSCOT settled the lawsuit for business reasons October 30, 2001.
The AMSCOT settlement agreement had a “No Admission” clause and it was expressly
understood that the Parties explicitly denied any wrongdoing, liability, or obligation
whatsoever to the other party in the settlement.
Conclusion of the ACE Lawsuit
104. Defendants failed to adequately represent Plaintiff in the ACE lawsuit.
105. On or about May 22, 2002 Plaintiff called opposing counsel, Mr. Paul D. Watson,
was greeted by voice mail, and left a message that was substantially the following:
“This is Neil Gillespie, my number is 246-5186, I am calling about the ACE case, I had
called Bush, Ross and was told you left and that you took the case with you. At this point
I am interested in settling the case and am not real satisfied with the current counsel that I
have and would like to speak with you more about that.”
106. On June 12, 2002 a mediation was held in the ACE lawsuit. The mediator was
Gasper Ficarrotta of Tampa. Opposing counsel Neil A. Sivyer was present and
acknowledged Plaintiff’s voice mail to Mr. Watson of May 22, 2002. Mr. Sivyer assured
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Plaintiff he would settle his claims in the ACE lawsuit that day regardless of what
Defendants did with their other client Mr. Clement. (Ms. Blomefield was not a party in
the ACE lawsuit).
107. Roger B. Handberg, Senior Assistant Attorney General, was present and
represented the AG June 12, 2002 at the mediation described in the preceding paragraph.
108. On June 12, 2002 a Stipulation Of The Parties settled the ACE lawsuit for
Plaintiff and Mr. Clement. ACE paid Plaintiff and Clement $5,000 each, with each party
bearing their own fees and costs and shall share in the mediation fees. (Exhibit 19).
109. Plaintiff essentially negotiated for himself because Defendants failed to
adequately represent him. Defendants were still Plaintiff’s attorney of record.
110. Plaintiff obtained a $2,000 net settlement negotiating on his own behalf.
Defendants obtained a lesser net amount for Mr. Clement while negotiating for him.
111. Defendants prepared a closing statement in the ACE lawsuit dated June 24, 2002.
The closing statement is contrived and shows Plaintiff received a $500 payment from Mr.
Clement’s settlement. The statement also contains the following language: “I
acknowledge receipt of $500.00 from my Co-Plaintiff, Eugene R. Clement.” (Exhibit 20).
112. Defendants’ closing statement in the ACE lawsuit violates bar rules because there
is no provision for Plaintiff, a non-lawyer, to receive settlement proceeds in a contingent
fee case belonging to a co-plaintiff or non-lawyer client.
113. Defendants their split attorney’s fees with Mr. Clement. Mr. Cook told Plaintiff
that Defendants paid Mr. Clement an additional $500 from Defendants attorneys’ fees
after the closing statement in the ACE lawsuit was executed to lessen the disparity in
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Clement’s settlement compared to Plaintiff’s settlement. Mr. Cook said Defendants
reduced its attorneys’ fees and paid Mr. Clement the difference.
Florida Attorney General Settlement with ACE Cash Express
114. The Florida AG and ACE entered a Settlement Agreement December 30, 2002.
(Exhibit 21). ACE paid a total of $500,000 in settlement and for issuance by the Florida
Department of Banking and Finance, Division of Securities and Finance (“DBF”) of
authorizations, licenses, or other approvals necessary for ACE to continue in business in
Florida, and for releases and other stipulations. ACE paid $250,000 to the DBF
Regulatory Trust Fund in full satisfaction of all attorney's fees, costs, and other expenses
incurred by the DBF in connection with this matter. ACE made a contribution of
$250,000 to the Florida State University College of Law in full satisfaction of all
attorney's fees, costs and other expenses incurred by the Attorney General in connection
with this matter. ACE also agreed to loan forgiveness by an affiliated company, Goleta
National Bank for the "Goleta Loan Consumers” with an independent audit paid by ACE.
Plaintiff Discovers Defendants Fraud in the AMSCOT Settlement
115. On or about May 9, 2003 Defendants disclosed to Plaintiff the actual costs and
expenses incurred in the AMSCOT lawsuit, $6,125.46. (Exhibit 22). Because of the
significant discrepancy between the actual amount and the amount that Mr. Cook said
were incurred, $33,000, Plaintiff further investigated the settlement.
116. Plaintiff located the Appellate Court file and read that the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit granted a Motion for Dismissal with the parties bearing
their own costs and attorney’s fees. This information and the other evidence provided in
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this amended complaint proved the falsity of Defendants’ assertion that it had a claim to
$50,000 in “court-awarded fees and costs” or an actual award of $50,000 under TILA.
117. As a result of Defendants fraud, Plaintiff was not able to give his Informed
Consent in the AMSCOT lawsuit or settlement.
ACAP - Attorney Consumer Assistance Program
118. After Plaintiff found evidence of fraud by Defendants in the AMSCOT lawsuit,
he consulted counsel who in turn referred him to The Florida Bar. On June 12, 2003
Plaintiff spoke with Donald M. Spangler of the Attorney Consumer Assistance Program.
(ACAP). Mr. Spangler assigned reference no. 03-18867 to the matter. Upon a review of
the facts as Plaintiff described, Mr. Spangler said Plaintiff could make a bar complaint.
Mr. Spangler also said Plaintiff could contact Mr. Cook to try and settle the matter. The
Florida Bar complaint form specifically states “…you should attempt to resolve your
matter by writing to the subject attorney, before contacting ACAP or filing a complaint.
Even if this is unsuccessful, it is important that you do so in order to have documentation
of good-faith efforts to resolve your matter.”
119. Plaintiff wrote Mr. Cook June 13, 2003 in a good faith effort to resolve the
matter. Plaintiff included a spreadsheet showing how he arrived at the proposed
resolution.
120. Mr. Barker responded to Plaintiff by letter of June 19, 2003 on behalf of Mr.
Cook and Defendants. Mr. Barker misquoted Plaintiff’s good faith effort to resolve this
matter through ACAP and accused Plaintiff of felony extortion. Barker wrote “First, you
state that if our law firm does not pay you money, then you will file a complaint against
Mr. Cook with the Florida Bar and contact our former clients. We consider this threat to
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be extortionate. See § 836.05 Fla. Stat. (2000); Carricarte v. State, 384 So.2d 1261 (Fla.
1980); Cooper v. Austin, 750 So.2d 711 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000); Gordon v. Gordon, 625
So.2d 59 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993); Berger v. Berger, 466 So.2d 1149 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985).”
COUNT 1 – BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY
122. Plaintiff adds this allegation of breach of fiduciary duty in the AMSCOT lawsuit
to the amended complaint under the relation back doctrine, Fla.R.Civ.P., Rule 1.190(c).
123. At all times pertinent Defendants were in a fiduciary relationship with Plaintiff.
124. An attorney has a personal fiduciary obligation to a client independent of any
employee relationship he may have with his law firm.
125. Defendants’ actions alleged above constituted a breach of that fiduciary
obligation in that Defendants sought to advance its own interests over the interests of
Plaintiff.
126. Plaintiff was damaged in that he did not receive the full value for his claims in the
lawsuit forward by Defendants nor did he receive full value from Defendants’ services.
127. Defendants’ actions were the direct cause of Plaintiff’s damages.
WHEREFORE Plaintiff demands judgment in the amount of his loss of $7,143.68
for beach of fiduciary duty, plus treble punitive damages of $21,431.04, for judgment of
$28,574.72 against Defendants, with interest, costs, expenses, and attorney’s fees.
COUNT 2 - BREACH OF IMPLIED-IN-LAW CONTRACT, AMSCOT
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130. A representation contract must comply with The Rules Regulating The Florida
Bar. A representation contract that does not comply with The Rules Regulating The
Florida Bar is void and unenforceable.
131. Defendants represented Plaintiff in the AMSCOT lawsuit on a contingent fee
basis beginning December 12, 2000.
132. From December 12, 2000 through July 22, 2001, there was no contingent fee
contract whatsoever between Plaintiff and Defendants.
133. Defendants belatedly prepared a written contingent fee agreement in the
AMSCOT lawsuit approximately seven (7) months later on or about July 23, 2001, in
violation of Bar Rule 4-1.5(f)(2).
134. The belatedly prepared written contingent fee agreement in the AMSCOT lawsuit
was not signed by Plaintiff or Defendants in violation of Bar Rule 4-1.5(f)(2). (Exhibit
5). The agreement remains unsigned today.
135. The Total Recovery in the AMSCOT lawsuit was $56,000.
136. At the time AMSCOT settled there were three plaintiffs. Each plaintiff is entitled
to a one-third share of the $56,000 Total Recovery or $18,666.66 each.
137. Defendants are prohibited from claiming any part of the $56,000 Total Recovery
in the AMSCOT lawsuit as attorneys’ fees because an unsigned contingent fee agreement
is a violation of Bar Rule 4-1.5(f)(2) and therefore void and unenforceable.
138. Defendants paid Plaintiff $2,000 in the AMSCOT lawsuit.
139. Defendants owe Plaintiff $16,666.66 in the AMSCOT lawsuit.
WHEREFORE Plaintiff demands judgment for $16,666.66 against Defendants,
together with punitive damages, interest, costs, expenses, and attorney’s fees.
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COUNT 3 - BREACH OF IMPLIED-IN-FACT CONTRACT, AMSCOT
141. Plaintiff alleges an alternative claim for relief under breach of contract in the
AMSCOT lawsuit settlement pursuant to Rule 1.110(g), Fla.R.Civ.P.
143. Defendants represented Plaintiff in the AMSCOT lawsuit on a contingent fee
basis beginning December 12, 2000.
144. From December 12, 2000 through July 22, 2001, there was no contingent fee
contract whatsoever between Plaintiff and Defendants.
145. Defendants belatedly prepared a written contingent fee agreement in the
AMSCOT lawsuit approximately seven (7) months later on or about July 23, 2001, in
violation of Bar Rule 4-1.5(f)(2).
146. The belatedly prepared written contingent fee agreement in the AMSCOT lawsuit
was not signed by any of the parties in violation of Bar Rule 4-1.5(f)(2). (Exhibit 5). The
agreement remains unsigned today.
147. The AMSCOT lawsuit settled on October 30, 2001 for business reasons.
Defendants did not prevail on the merits or appeal in the AMSCOT lawsuit.
148. The Total Recovery in the AMSCOT lawsuit was $56,000.
149. Defendants refused to honor the terms of the contingent fee agreement with
Plaintiff in the settlement of the AMSCOT lawsuit when disbursing his share of the
$56,000 Total Recovery.
150. Under the terms of the contingent fee agreement in the AMSCOT lawsuit, and the
Rules Regulating The Florida Bar, a lawful accounting is calculated as follows:
Page - 37
Total Recovery $56,000 $56,000
- Costs and Expenses - $3,580.70 $52,419.30
- Lien, Jonathan L. Alpert - 2,544.70 $49,874.60
- 45% Contingent Fee - $22,443.57 $27,431.03
- 2/3 due to the 2 other clients - $18,287.35 $9,143.68
- $2,000 already paid - $2,000 $7,143.68
151. Contrary to law and the contingent fee agreement, Defendants took $50,000 from
the Total Recovery under the guise of court-awarded attorney’s fees and costs in the
AMSCOT lawsuit.
152. Defendants unjust enrichment was $21,431.03 in the AMSCOT lawsuit.
153. Plaintiff’s lawful share of the settlement is $9,143.68 in the AMSCOT lawsuit.
154. Defendants paid Plaintiff $2,000.00 in the AMSCOT lawsuit.
155. Defendants owe Plaintiff $7,143.68 in the AMSCOT lawsuit.
156. Defendants actions were the direct cause of the Plaintiffs damages.
WHEREFORE plaintiff demands judgment for $7,143.68 against Defendants,
COUNT 4 - FRAUD, AMSCOT RELEASE AND SETTLEMENT
158. Plaintiff adds an allegation of Fraud in the Release and Settlement with AMSCOT
to Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint under the relation back doctrine, Fla.R.Civ.P.,
Rule 1.190(c).
159. Under Florida law, partners engaged in the practice of law are each responsible
for the fraud or negligence of another partner when the later acts within the scope of the
Page - 38
ordinary business of an attorney. Smyrna Developers, Inc. v. Bornstein, 177 So.2d 16
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1965).
161. On October 30, 2001 Defendants fraudulently induced Plaintiff, Ms. Blomefield
and Mr. Clement to sign a Release and Settlement Agreement with AMSCOT
Corporation. (AMSCOT agreement). (Exhibit 17). Paragraph 1 is Settlement with
Plaintiffs for $2,000 each. Paragraph 2 is Settlement with Firm, the Defendants, and
reads: “Amscot shall pay the Firm the sum of Fifty Thousand Dollars and No/100
($50,000), in satisfaction of Plaintiffs' claims for attorneys' fees and costs, as more fully
described herein, against Amscot as asserted in the Action.” To induce Plaintiff to sign
the AMSCOT agreement:
a. Defendants represented to Plaintiff, Ms. Blomefield and Mr. Clement that the
$50,000 sum was a claim for court-awarded fees and costs. The representation was a
false statement concerning a material fact. The TILA claims were dismissed and there
was no claim to court-awarded fees and costs.
and signed the Release and Settlement Agreement with AMSCOT.
d. Plaintiff relied upon Defendants falsehood as true and signed the agreement
October 30, 2001 in return for payment of $2,000 from AMSCOT. Plaintiff suffered
Page - 39
financial loss of $7,143.68 by accepting the sum of $2,000 instead of the sum of
for fraud, plus treble punitive damages of $21,431.04, for judgment of $28,574.72
against Defendants, together with interest, costs, expenses, and attorney’s fees.
COUNT 5 - FRAUD, CLOSING STATEMENT
166. On November 1, 2001, Defendants fraudulently induced Plaintiff to sign a closing
statement prepared by Defendants in the AMSCOT lawsuit. (Exhibit 18). Defendants also
fraudulently induced Ms. Blomefield and Mr. Clement to sign similar closing statements.
To induce Plaintiff to sign the closing statement:
a. Defendants represented to Plaintiff, Ms. Blomefield and Mr. Clement that
“…AMSCOT Corporation separately paid my attorneys $50,000.00 to compensate my
attorneys for their claim against AMSCOT for court-awarded fees and costs.” The
representation was a false statement concerning a material fact. The TILA claims were
dismissed and there was no claim to court-awarded fees and costs.
Page - 40
and signed the closing statement made by Defendants in the AMSCOT lawsuit.
d. Plaintiff relied upon Defendants falsehood as true and signed the closing
statement November 1, 2001 in return for payment of $2,000 from AMSCOT. Plaintiff
suffered financial loss of $7,143.68 by accepting the sum of $2,000 instead of the sum of
COUNT 6 - NEGLIGENCE
169. Plaintiff adds this allegation of negligence in the AMSCOT lawsuit to Plaintiff’s
First Amended Complaint under the relation back doctrine, Fla.R.Civ.P., Rule 1.190(c).
171. Defendants had a duty under law to conform to a certain standard of conduct for
the protection of others, including the Plaintiff.
Page - 41
172. As set forth in Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint, Defendants failed to perform
the duty owed Plaintiff.
173. Defendants were the proximate cause of Plaintiff’s damages.
WHEREFORE Plaintiff demands judgment against Defendants in the amount of
his loss and damages plus punitive damages, together with interest, costs, expenses, and
attorney’s fees.
COUNT 7 - NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION
175. Plaintiff adds this allegation of negligent misrepresentation in the AMSCOT
lawsuit to Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint under the relation back doctrine,
Fla.R.Civ.P., Rule 1.190(c).
177. Defendants misrepresented to Plaintiff that his damages in the AMSCOT lawsuit
were limited to $1,000 under a fee-shifting provision of the federal Truth In Lending Act
(TILA). This was a misrepresentation of a material fact.
178. Defendants either knew of the misrepresentation, made the misrepresentation
without knowledge of its truth or falsity, or should have known the representation was
false.
179. Defendants intended to induce Plaintiff to act on the misrepresentation. Plaintiff
lacked Informed Consent, the ability to make an informed choice when he signed the
Page - 42
Release and Settlement with AMSCOT and Closing Statement because of Defendants’
deceptions set forth in Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint.
180. Plaintiff suffered financial loss of $7,143.68 while acting in justifiable reliance
upon the misrepresentation by accepting the sum of $2,000 instead of the sum of
COUNT 8 - UNJUST ENRICHMENT
182. Plaintiff adds this allegation of unjust enrichment in the AMSCOT lawsuit to
Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint under the relation back doctrine, Fla.R.Civ.P., Rule
1.190(c).
184. Plaintiff has conferred a benefit on Defendants, who have knowledge thereof, the
overpayment of $16,666.66 in Count 3, Breach of Implied-In-Law contract.
185. Plaintiff has conferred a benefit on Defendants, who have knowledge thereof, the
overpayment of $7,143.68 in Count 4, Breach of Implied-In-Fact contract.
186. Defendants voluntarily accepted and retained the benefit conferred.
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187. The circumstances render Defendant’s retention of the benefit inequitable unless
the Defendant pays to Plaintiff the value of the benefit.
188. Defendant has been unjustly enriched at the expense of Plaintiff.
189. Plaintiff is entitled to damages as a result of Defendant’s unjust enrichment,
including the disgorgement of all monies unlawfully accepted by Defendant from
Plaintiff.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands judgment for monetary damages against
Defendants for unjust enrichment and such other relief this Court deems just and proper,
COUNT 9 - CIVIL CONSPIRACY
191. Plaintiff adds this allegation of civil conspiracy in the AMSCOT lawsuit to
1.190(c).
192. Named Defendants Mr. Barker, Mr. Rodems and Mr. Cook are parties to a civil
conspiracy.
193. Named Defendants Mr. Barker, Mr. Rodems and Mr. Cook conspired to do both
lawful and unlawful acts by unlawful means.
194. Named Defendants Mr. Barker, Mr. Rodems and Mr. Cook conspired to do the
things complained about in this lawsuit to harm Plaintiff, including Breach of Fiduciary
Duty, Breach of Implied-In-Law Contract, Breach of Implied-In-Fact Contract, Fraud,
Negligence, Negligent Misrepresentation, Unjust Enrichment, Invasion of Privacy and
Abuse of Process.
Page - 44
195. Named Defendants Mr. Barker, Mr. Rodems and Mr. Cook owed a duty to
Plaintiff as his attorneys to protect Plaintiff from harm resulting from Breach of Fiduciary
Duty, Breach of Implied-In-Law Contract, Breach of Implied-In-Fact Contract, Fraud,
Negligence, Negligent Misrepresentation, Unjust Enrichment, Invasion of Privacy, and
Abuse of Process.
196. Upon information and belief, Defendants conspired against other clients. An
application submitted by Mr. Rodems showed former clients Rita M. Pesci and Roslyn
Vazquez made complaints they were overcharged in contingent fee agreements.
197. Defendants’ pressure of Plaintiff and offer of incentives to sue AMSCOT was
likely a crime under section 877.01(1), Florida Statutes, Instigation of litigation, and an
overt act in furtherance of their conspiracy against Plaintiff and the other co-plaintiffs.
198. Defendants’ deceit and conflict of interest created by executing the Class
Representation Contract to sue AMSCOT November 3, 2000, knowing they already
formed another law firm and did not plan to honor the contract, was an overt act in
199. Defendants refusal to honor the contingent fee agreement in the AMSCOT
lawsuit was an overt act in furtherance of their conspiracy against Plaintiff, Ms.
Blomefield and Mr. Clement.
200. Defendants “sticking part” argument was an overt act in furtherance of their
201. Defendants false claim to court-awarded fees and costs was an overt act in
Page - 45
202. Defendants false claim that it incurred $33,000 in costs and expenses was an overt
203. Defendants creation of a deceptive and misleading closing statement, and failure
to itemize costs and expenses of $6,125.46 required by bar Rule 4-1.5(f)(5), was an overt
204. Defendants separate negotiation with AMSCOT for its attorneys’ fees, and
Defendants’ August 15, 2001 letter to Plaintiff were overt acts in furtherance of their
205. Defendants failure to obey Plaintiff’s instructions to settle the AMSCOT case,
and hijack of the case for Defendants’ own benefit, were overt acts in furtherance of their
206. Defendants false claim that the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit awarded them $50,000 in attorney’s fees and costs is an overt act in furtherance
of their conspiracy against Plaintiff, Ms. Blomefield and Mr. Clement.
207. Defendants fraud to induce Plaintiff to sign the AMSCOT agreement was an overt
208. Defendants fraud to induce Plaintiff to sign the closing statement was an overt act
in furtherance of their conspiracy against Plaintiff, Ms. Blomefield and Mr. Clement.
209. Defendants accusation that Plaintiff committed felony extortion for his good-faith
effort to settle this matter through the Attorney Consumer Assistance Program (ACAP)
of The Florida Bar. Mr. Barker accused Plaintiff of criminal extortion for his effort to
settle the matter was an overt act in furtherance of their conspiracy against Plaintiff.
210. Defendants’ conspiracy and their overt acts caused Plaintiff to suffer damages.
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WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands judgment for damages against Defendants Mr.
Barker, Mr. Rodems and Mr. Cook for civil conspiracy and such other relief this Court
deems just and proper together with punitive damages, interest, costs, expenses, and
attorney’s fees.
COUNT 10 - INVASION OF PRIVACY
212. Plaintiff adds this allegation of invasion of privacy in the AMSCOT lawsuit to
1.190(c).
213. Defendants published Plaintiff’s privileged medical information during the course
of the AMSCOT lawsuit. Defendants published information about Plaintiff’s disability,
treatment and rehabilitation. Plaintiff’s medical condition was not at issue in the
AMSCOT lawsuit. The AMSCOT litigation concerned check cashing, the federal Truth
In Lending Act (TILA), Florida state usury law, and the Florida Deceptive and Unfair
Trade Practices Act.
214. Defendants published Plaintiff’s privileged medical information in response to
AMSCOT’s interrogatories to Neil Gillespie. Defendants failed to object to
interrogatories about Plaintiff’s privileged medical information.
215. Defendants published Plaintiff’s privileged medical information during a
deposition with AMSCOT. Plaintiff was deposed May 14, 2001 by John A. Anthony,
attorney for AMSCOT Corporation. Approximately twenty pages of the 122 page
transcript concerned Plaintiff’s disability, treatment and rehabilitation. Defendants failed
to object to interrogatories about Plaintiff’s privileged medical information. Defendants
Page - 47
later published the information by ordering and distributing the transcript of the
deposition. Defendants allowed co-plaintiff Gay Ann Blomefield to attend Plaintiff’s
deposition and hear Plaintiff’s privileged medical information.
216. Defendants published private facts about Plaintiff that are offensive and are not of
legitimate public concern. Defendants permitted a wrongful intrusion into Plaintiff’s
private activities, in such manner as to outrage or cause mental suffering, shame, or
humiliation to a person of ordinary sensibilities.
217. The Florida Supreme Court has held that public disclosure of private facts—the
dissemination of truthful private information which a reasonable person would find
objectionable, is one of four types of wrongful conduct that can be remedied through an
action for invasion of privacy. See Agency for Health Care Admin. v. Associated Indus. of
Fla., Inc., 678 So.2d 1239, 1252 n. 20 (Fla. 1996).
WHEREFORE Plaintiff demands judgment against Defendants for Invasion of
Privacy in an amount determined by a jury, together with punitive damages, interest,
costs, expenses, and attorney’s fees.
COUNT 11 - ABUSE OF PROCESS
219 Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 218.
220. Defendants BRC and Mr. Cook sued Plaintiff January 19, 2006 in a counterclaim
for libel over a July 25, 2005 letter Plaintiff wrote to Ian Mackechnie, President of
AMSCOT Corporation. In fact Plaintiff’s letter to Mackechnie also included another
enclosed letter. The letter to Mackechnie discussed the lawsuit Clement v. Amscot
Corporation, Case No. 8:99-ev-2795-T-26C where Defendants represented Plaintiff. The
Page - 48
second enclosed letter was a copy of Plaintiff’s letter to Mr. Cook dated August 16, 2001
written during the course of the AMSCOT lawsuit instructing Mr. Cook to settle the
lawsuit. Defendants failed to obey Plaintiff’s instruction to settle. The letter (but not
enclosure) was attached to Plaintiff’s initial complaint as Exhibit 8. The letter and
attachment is attached to Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint as Exhibit 11.
221. The filing of a counterclaim may constitute issuance of process for the purpose of
an abuse of process action. Peckins v. Kaye, 443 So.2d 1025, 1026 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983).
222. On September 7, 2006 attorney David M. Snyder representing Plaintiff notified
Mr. Rodems by letter that “Defendant's counterclaim for defamation, while it may have
stated a cause of action at the outset, has little chance of ultimate success given the
limited distribution and privileged nature of the publication complained of. See e.g.
Nodar v. Galbreath, 462 So. 2d 803 (Fla. 1984).”
223. Upon information and belief, Defendants’ counterclaim for libel against Plaintiff
is a willful and intentional misuse of process for the collateral purpose of making
Plaintiff drop his claims against Defendants and settle this lawsuit on terms dictated by
them. Defendants have perverted the process of law for a purpose for which it is not by
law intended. Defendants are using their counterclaim as a form of extortion.
234. On at lease six (6) separate occasions Defendants, by and through their counsel
Mr. Rodems, now a Defendant himself, have offered a “walk-away” settlement:
a. September 14, 2006, Mr. Rodems wrote Plaintiff’s lawyer Mr. Snyder that “We
would agree, however, to a walk away. That is, each party dismisses all claims with
prejudice, each party to bear his or its own attorneys' fees and costs.”
Page - 49
b. October 5, 2006, Mr. Rodems wrote Plaintiff’s lawyer Mr. Snyder and stated:
“To clarify, our offer to settle is as follows: (1) We will dismiss our claims with
prejudice, Gillespie dismisses his with prejudice, and neither side will pay the other any
money; and, (2) Gillespie agrees to sign a general release to be prepared by us; and, (3)
Gillespie must agree to appear in court to announce the settlement and submit to
questioning from me regarding the voluntariness of his settlement; and, (4) Gillespie
must agree to hire and pay a court reporter to transcribe the settlement hearing. The offer
is open until 5:00 p.m. on Friday, October 6, 2006 and must be accepted in writing
received in this office before the deadline by facsimile or hand delivery with your or his
signature.”
c. February 7, 2007 Mr. Rodems contacted Plaintiff directly by letter and wrote
(in part): “If it is your desire to end this litigation, we are prepared to offer the following
settlement terms: We mutually agree to dismiss all claims pending in this action, and to
waive any other claims we or you may have, with each party to bear his or its own fees
and costs. We will not seek any attorneys' fees or costs from you. A mutual release is
enclosed. You are free to consult with an attorney regarding this offer, at your own
expense. You are not obligated to accept this offer.”
d. At various time during 2007 and possibly 2008 Mr. Rodems made similar
settlement offers to Plaintiff’s former counsel Robert W. Bauer.
e. Some time in August or September 2009 Mr. Rodems made a similar
settlement offer to attorney Seldon J. “Jeff” Childers on Plaintiff’s behalf.
f. January 28, 2010 Mr. Rodems contacted Plaintiff directly by letter with the
following offer, a resubmission of a failed email from January 26, 2010:
Page - 50
“However, I would like to once again propose to you an opportunity to settle with Mr.
Cook and Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A. whereby you would pay them no money and
they would pay you no money. The offer is as follows: Mr. Cook and Barker, Rodems &
Cook, P.A. would dismiss the counterclaims for libel and would issue a satisfaction of
judgment for the judgment against you in exchange for your dismissal of your pending
claims.”
235. In a letter to Plaintiff dated November 19, 2007, Chief Branch Disciplinary
Counsel Susan V. Bloemendaal, The Florida Bar, responded to Plaintiff’s allegation that
Mr. Rodems improperly filed a counterclaim. Bloemendaal wrote (relevant portion):
“Concerning you allegation that the claim is frivolous, this is an issue for the trial court in
the pending civil case.”
WHEREFORE Plaintiff demands judgment against Defendants the amount of his
loss, his attorney’s fees and costs for defending the counterclaim, together with punitive
damages, interest, costs, expenses, and attorney’s fees.
COUNT 12 - Claim for Punitive Damages Pursuant to §768.72 Florida Statutes
238. Pursuant to section 768.72(1), Florida Statutes, Plaintiff amends his complaint to
assert a claim for punitive damages. The rules of civil procedure shall be liberally
construed so as to allow the claimant discovery of evidence which appears reasonably
calculated to lead to admissible evidence on the issue of punitive damages.
Page - 51
239. Pursuant to section 768.72(2) Florida Statutes, Plaintiff asserts a claim for
punitive damages because Defendants were personally guilty of fraud, intentional
misconduct or gross negligence.
240. Pursuant to section 768.72(3) Florida Statutes, Plaintiff asserts a claim for
punitive damages against Barker, Rodems & Cook, PA for the conduct of Mr. Barker,
Mr. Rodems and Mr. Cook and states their conduct meets the criteria specified in
subsection (2) and the corporation actively and knowingly participated in such conduct;
The officers, directors, or managers of the corporation knowingly condoned, ratified, or
consented to such conduct; and the corporation engaged in conduct that constituted gross
negligence and that contributed to the loss, damages, or injury suffered by the Plaintiff.
WHEREFORE Plaintiff demands final judgment on all counts for compensatory
and punitive damages against Defendants, together with interest, costs, expenses, and
attorney's fees, and other remedy the Court deems just and proper.
Demand for Trial by Jury
Pursuant to Rule 1.430(b) of the Fla. R. Civ. P., plaintiff demands trial by jury.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 5th da~
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing has been furnished by hand to
Ryan C. Rodems, attorney for Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A., 400 North Ashley ive,
Suite 2100, Tampa, Florida 33602, this 5th day of May \
Page - 52
Table of Contents
Exhibit 1 Class Representation Contract, ACE (Alpert firm) March 21, 2000
Exhibit 2 Class Representation Contract, AMSCOT (Alpert firm) November 6, 2000
Exhibit 3 Letter of William J. Cook to Neil Gillespie, December 6, 2000, new firm formed
Exhibit 4 Letter of William J. Cook to Neil Gillespie, July 23, 2001, new fee contracts
Exhibit 5 New fee contract, AMSCOT (BRC), not signed, never executed
Exhibit 6 New fee contract, ACE (BRC), not signed, never executed
Exhibit 7 Order in ACE, TILA claims & case dismissed, US Dist. Judge Moody, Dec-21-2000
Exhibit 8 Order in AMSCOT, TILA claims & case dismissed, US Dist. Judge Lazzara, Aug-01-2001
Exhibit 9 Letter of William Cook to Neil Gillespie, August 15, 2001, rejects contingent fee agreement
Exhibit 10 Letter of Neil Gillespie to William J. Cook, August 16, 2001, instructions to settle AMSCOT
Exhibit 11 Letter of Neil Gillespie to Ian Mackechnie, President, AMSCOT, July 25, 2005
Exhibit 12 Letter of John A. Anthony to Neil Gillespie, August 26, 2005, BRC did not obey instructions
Exhibit 13 Memorandum of William J. Cook, August 20, 2001, $50K “improper payoff attempt” etc.
Exhibit 14 Letter of William J. Cook to John Anthony, demands $1K for clients, $50K for BRC
Exhibit 15 US Court of Appeals, 11th Cir., Joint Stipulation for Dismissal AMSCOT, Nov-11-2001
Exhibit 16 US Court of Appeals, 11th Cir., Order, parties bear own fees & costs, AMSCOT, Dec-07-01
Exhibit 17 Release and Settlement Agreement, AMSCOT, October 30, 2001
Exhibit 18 Closing Statement, AMSCOT, November 1, 2001 without itemized expenses
Exhibit 19 Stipulation Of The Parties, ACE, June 12, 2002
Exhibit 20 Closing Statement, ACE, June 24, 2002 with itemized expenses
Exhibit 21 Florida AG and ACE Settlement Agreement December 30, 2002
Exhibit 22 Letter from William J. Cook, May 9, 2003, itemized expenses in AMSCOT

CLASS REPRESENTATION CONTRACT
I. PURPOSE
IIWe, ~~l ~ (r,' (les f. }{ ,

do hereby retain and employ the law firm of Alpert, Barker, Rodems, Fe rentino & qok,
~., to investigate my potential claim resulting from Mr., "" .so.~ !vJ,' /~
<<<
C. E ~ A foI\t ri' '''' s'" '

and, if advisable, to pursue necessary litigation on my behalf.
IIWe understand that I/we may be one of several plaintiff(s) or part of a class of
plaintiff(s) represented by Alpert, Barker, Rodems, Ferrentino & Cook, P.A
II. COSTS AND EXPENSES
IIWe hereby agree to pay for the costs and expenses of the investigation and
preparation of my/our claims for damages. Should it be necessary to institute a lawsuit or
arbitration proceeding, IIwe agree to pay all costs and expenses associated with any Court
or arbitration proceeding. If an appeal of any decision is filed, regardless of the person or
party filing such appeal, I agree to pay the costs and expenses associated with initiating
or responding to such appeal.
IIWe authorize Alpert, Barker, Rodems, Ferrentino & Cook, P.A, to advance and
pay any costs and expenses it deems appropriate to the handling of my case. IIWe will
pay Alpert, Barker, Rodems, Ferrentino & Cook, P.A, for the costs and expenses
advanced out of the portion of any recovery remaining after attorneys' fees have been
subtracted. IIWe will then receive the portion of what remains, which is known as the "net
recovery". Thus, the "total recovery" (all monies received or collected, including attorneys'
fees, if awarded) less Alpert, Barker, Rodems, Ferrentino & Cook, P.A's attorneys' fees
and any costs and expenses will equal the "net recovery".
IIWe understand that my/our portion of the "net recovery" will be a prorated or per
person share which will be proportional to that of all other class members. The amount of
money I/we receive will be determined by dividing the "net recovery" (the amount of any
recovery remaining after attorneys' fees and expenses have been subtracted) by the
number of class members who are determined eligible to receive proceeds from any
judgment or settlement. IIWe understand that the Court or other tribunal may approve a
different ratio or formula depending upon the circumstances.
If there is no recovery. or if the total recovery is not adequate to pay for all of the
costs and expenses advanced, I/we understand that Alpert. Barker, Rodems, Ferrentino
& Cook. P.A. will not seek payment from me for any expenses.
If I/we terminate this contract, then Alpert, Barker, Rodems, Ferrentino & Cook, P.A,
may seek payment from me/us for any costs and expenses allowed by law.
III. ATTORNEYS' FEES
In almost all cases in America, each party to a lawsuit or arbitration proceeding pays
its own attorneys' fees. In rare cases, the Defendant(s) may pay all or part of the attorneys'
fees or the Court or arbitration panel may award attorneys' fees based upon a statute or
otherwise.
l!We agree to pay Alpert, Barker, Rodems, Ferrentino & Cook, P.A, an attorneys'
fee if it is successful in obtaining any monies or other benefit on my behalf. I!We
understand that Alpert, Barker, Rodems, Ferrentino & Cook, P.A, will receive the
attorneys' fees awarded by a Court or arbitration panel or will receive the applicable
percentage of the "total recovery" (all monies received from the Defendant(s) including, but
not limited to, money for actual damages, punitive damages, interest, penalties, attorneys'
fees and expenses), whichever is higher. The applicable percentages shall be as follows:
A 33.334% of the "total recovery" prior to the time that an answer
is filed or a demand for appointment of arbitrator(s) is made;
thereafter,
B. 40% of the "total recovery" from the time of the filing of an
answer orthe demand for appointment of arbitrator(s), through
the entry of a judgment;
C. An additional 5% of the "total recovery" after a Notice of
Appeal is filed by any person or party or if post-judgment relief
or action is required for recovery on the judgment.
In the event that my/our claim is settled on terms of an agreement calling for
payment in installments, whether monthly, annually or otherwise, in the future, my/our
attorneys' contingent fee percentage shall be calculated on the costs of any structured
settlement or, if the cost is unknown, on the present money value of the structured
settlement. If both the damages and the attorneys' fees are to be paid out in future
installments, this limitation shall not apply.
l!We understand that if there is no recovery. "we will not be indebted to Alpert,
Barker. Rodems. Ferrentino & Cook. P.A. for any attorneys' fees.
2
If I/we terminate this contract, then Alpert, Barker, Rodems, Ferrentino&Cook, P.A.,
may seek payment from me/us for any attorneys' fees allowed by law.
IV. ALPERT, BARKER, RODEMS, FERRENTINO & COOK, P.A. MAY

WORK WITH OTHER LAWYERS ON MY CASE
l!We understand that Alpert, Barker, Rodems, Ferrentino & Cook, P.A., in its
discretion, may work with other lawyers on my/our case if deemed necessary. If Alpert,
Barker, Rodems, Ferrentino & Cook, P.A., agrees to work with other lawyers on my/our
case, I/we understand that the attorneys' fees I/we will have to pay will not increase. Other
law firms or lawyers hired by Alpert, Barker, Rodems, Ferrentino & Cook, P.A., will be paid
out of the attorneys' fees agreed to in this contract and, if I/we so desire, I/we will be
advised regarding how the attorneys' fees are divided.
V. WHAT THIS CONTRACT COVERS
A. Scope of Representation
At the time of signing this contract, I/we also signed a Statement of Client's Rights
as well as an Acknowledgment regarding investigation of my claim. These three
documents encompass the entire agreement between me/us and Alpert, Barker, Rodems,
Ferrentino & Cook, P.A. These signed agreements take the place of any prior, oral or
written agreements and may only be changed or modified by a separate, written agreement
signed and dated by me/us and Alpert, Barker, Rodems, Ferrentino & Cook, P.A.
This contract is to be interpreted in accordance with Florida law.
l!We understand that Alpert, Barker, Rodems, Ferrentino & Cook, P.A., has no duty
to re~resent me/us in any matters other than my/our potential claim resulting from Ac
E
a "'~ A Me.r ~CQ.$ ' " ~r", r.>.s~d'il>t'S .
l!We understand that if Alpert, Barker, Rodems, Ferrentino & Cook, P.A.,
determines, at some later date, that my claim should not or cannot be reasonably
prosecuted by the Firm, the Firm may notify me in writing of this decision and withdraw as
my attorneys. Under such circumstances, I shall be responsible to Alpert, Barker, Rodems,
Ferrentino & Cook, P.A., only for any fees and costs permitted by law.
B. Documents and Information
3
I/we authorize the lawyers to utilize my/our documents and/or information in any
regulatory, enforcement, or other proceedings of any kind as may be necessary in the
lawyers' sole discretion.
APPROVAL OF THIS CONTRACT
The undersigned client(s) has/have, before signing this contract, received and read
the Statement of Client's Rights and understands each of the rights set forth therein. The
undersigned c1ient(s) has/have signed the Statement and received a signed copy to refer
to while being represented by the undersigned attorneys.
This contract may be cancelled by written notification to the attorneys at any time
within three (3) business days of the date the contract was signed, as shown below, and
if cancelled the c1ient(s) shall not be obligated to pay any fees to the attorneys for the work
performed during that time. If the attorneys have advanced funds to others in
representation of the client(s), the attorneys are entitled to be reimbursed for such amounts
as the attorneys have reasonably advanced on behalf of the c1ient(s).
l!We have read this contract and any documents specifically referenced herein, and
agree to all terms referenced within such documents.
DATED: ,A;y. c~ 2 II 2.,,0 0 DATED: ,/1/htd? l I 2~ocJ
_~~-=--....::::..~~..::....:..~ of
Alpert, Barker odems,
Ferrentino & Cook, P.A.
Post Office Box 3270
Tampa, Florida 33601-3270
813/223-4131 Client
I. PURPOSE
INVe, Ud (;{le5f:' ~ ,
do hereby retain and employ the law firm of Alpert, Barker, Rodems, Ferrentin & Cook,
P.A., to investigate my potential claim resulting from
t\j~ s(.O\
Mi +r., t
N ':>t'\.(., t,OAJ> \IV: ~
and. if advisable, to pursue necessary litigation on my behalf.
INVe understand that I/we may be one of several plaintiff(s) or part of a class of
plaintiff(s) represented by Alpert, Barker. Rodems, Ferrentino & Cook, P.A.
INVe hereby agree to pay for the costs and expenses of the investigation and
arbitration proceeding, I/we agree to pay all costs and expenses associated with any Court
INVe authorize Alpert, Barker, Rodems, Ferrentino & Cook, P.A., to advance and
pay any costs and expenses it deems appropriate to the handling of my case. INVe will
pay Alpert, Barker, Rodems, Ferrentino & Cook, P.A., for the costs and expenses
advanced out of the portion of any recovery remaining after attorneys' fees have been
subtracted. INVe will then receive the portion of what remains, which is known as the "net
recovery". Thus, the "total recovery" (ill! monies received or collected, including attorneys'
fees, if awarded) less Alpert, Barker, Rodems, Ferrentino & Cook, P.A.'s attorneys' fees
and any costs and expenses will equal the "net recovery".
INVe understand that my/our portion of the "net recovery" will be a prorated or per
judgment or settlement. INVe understand that the Court or other tribunal may approve a
If there is no recovery, or if the total recovery is not adequate to pay for all of the
costs and expenses advanced, I/we understand that Alpert, Barker, Rodems, Ferrentino
& Cook, P.A., will not seek payment from me for any expenses.
If IIwe terminate this contract, then Alpert, Barker, Rodems, Ferrentino & Cook, P.A.,
may seek payment from me/us for any costs and expenses allowed by law.
2
otherwise.
l!We agree to pay Alpert, Barker, Rodems, Ferrentino & Cook, P.A., an attorneys'
fee if it is successful in obtaining any monies or other benefit on my behalf. I!We
understand that Alpert, Barker, Rodems, Ferrentino & Cook, P.A., will receive the
attorneys' fees awarded by a Court or arbitration panel or will receive the applicable
percentage of the "total recovery" (~monies received from the Defendant(s) including, but
not limited to, money for actual damages, punitive damages, interest, penalties, attorneys'
fees and expenses), whichever is higher. The applicable percentages shall be as follows:
A. 33.334% of the "total recovery" prior to the time that an answer
thereafter,
answer or the demand for appointment of arbitrator(s), th roug h
c. An additional 5% of the "total recovery" after a Notice of
payment in installments, whether monthly, annually or otherwise, in the future, my/our
l!We understand that if there is no recovery, I/we will not be indebted to Alpert,
Barker, Rodems, Ferrentino & Cook, P.A., for any attorneys' fees.
If I/we terminate this contract, then Alpert, Barker, Rodems, Ferrentino & Cook, P.A.,
may seek payment from me/us for any attorneys' fees allowed by law.
IV. ALPERT, BARKER, RODEMS, FERRENTINO & COOK, P.A. MAY

l!We understand that Alpert, Barker, Rodems, Ferrentino & Cook, P.A., in its
discretion, may work with other lawyers on my/our case if deemed necessary. If Alpert,
Barker, Rodems, Ferrentino & Cook, P.A., agrees to work with other lawyers on my/our
case, I/we understand that the attorneys' fees I/we will have to pay will not increase. Other
law firms or lawyers hired by Alpert, Barker, Rodems, Ferrentino & Cook, P.A., will be paid
out of the attorneys' fees agreed to in this contract and, if I/we so desire, I/we will be
advised regarding how the attorneys' fees are divided.
documents encompass the entire agreement between me/us and Alpert, Barker, Rodems,
Ferrentino & Cook, P.A. These signed agreements take the place of any prior, oral or
written agreements and may only be changed or modified by a separate, written agreement
signed and dated by me/us and Alpert, Barker, Rodems, Ferrentino & Cook, P.A.
l!We understand that Alpert, Barker, Rodems, Ferrentino & Cook, P.A., has no duty
to represent me/us in ?ny matters 0 her than my/our potential claim resulting from _ _
t"\ -t r C' fi Xl ~ '-, '~lIV \ {l, M S{ 0 .
l!We understand that if Alpert, Barker, Rodems, Ferrentino & Cook, P.A.,
determines, at some later date, that my claim should not or cannot be reasonably
prosecuted by the Firm, the Firm may notify me in writing of this decision and withdraw as
my attorneys. Under such circumstances, I shall be responsible to Alpert, Barker, Rodems,
Ferrentino & Cook, P.A., only for any fees and costs permitted by law.
The undersigned c1ient(s) has/have, before signing this contract, received and read
undersigned client(s) has/have signed the Statement and received a signed copy to refer
if cancelled the client(s) shall not be obligated to pay any fees to the attorneys for the work
representation of the client(s), the attorneys are entitled to be reimbursed for such amounts
as the attorneys have reasonably advanced on behalf of the c1ient(s).
l!We have read this contract and any documents specifically referenced herein, and
DATED: I_l_-_~_~_'_2_Cl_~_U_"_ _
~"--'----h,L--------- of
Alpert, Bar r, Rodems,
Ferrentino & Cook, P.A.
813/223-4131 Client
ALPERT, BARKER, RODEMS, FERRE~TINO & COOK

PROFESSIO:>:AL ASSOCI' 1'10:>:
.HTOR:>:nS AT l·'"
;;~o·" ... .,~ ;)!: S< ;JF

100 SOL HI \SlIl.£Y DRI' £. Slll £ !OOO .\t..\ILl:-.l(; ·:a.':>:J.~~3j
?::>5; Jr,'" .:~ ;l,:( J':
.V: ... :. .:. -.1 J C.::) '" T."IP\. F1.0RIO, JJbO!
·-.U.I~:a. =;. ]3'3-';'.1'::-':
:" ==".:;;;:J!-I.) N t: l.>j!] 1 2 ~ J . .: . j:
;:: J,,;( '::I 1 ) ; ::.:: J ;loj I'::
December 6, 2000
Neil J. Gillespie
Apartment C-2
1121 Beach Drive NE
St. Petersburg, Florida 33701-1434
Re: Gillespie v. ACE America's Cash Express. Inc.
U.S.D.C., Middle District, Florida, Case NO.8 :OOCY-723- T-23B
Our File No. 00.4813
Dear Neil:
I, along with my partners, Chris Barker and Chris Rodems, are pleased to announce the
formation of our own law firm. I will be happy to take your case with me if you would like; however,
you have the option of deciding whether you wish to remain with our current firm or whether yOLi
wish to retain new attorneys to handle your case.
Should you wish for me to take your file, please execute the attached Client Consent f0l11l and
return it to me as soon as possible.
Thank you for your time and attention to this matter and I look forward to hearing from you
soon.
Sincerely, ~ 4; /
/ , Il 1Iz/~
t vv 0f7
William J. Cook
WJC/mss
Enclosures
BARKER, RODEMS & COOK

PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIAnON
ATIORNEYS AT LAW
CHRIS A. BARKER Telephone 813/489-1001

RYAN CHRISTOPHER RODEMS
300 West Platt Street, Suite 150
Facsimile 813/489.1008
WILLIAM J. COOK Tampa, Florida 33606
July 23,2001
Neil 1. Gillespie
Apartment C-2
1121 Beach Drive NE
Re: Eugene R. Clement, et at. v. AMSCOT Corporation
Case No. 99.2795-Civ-T-26C
Our File No. 99-4766
Re: Eugene R. Clement v. ACE Cash Express, Inc.
Circuit Court, Thirteenth Judicial Circuit
Consolidated Case No. 99-9730; Division J
Our File No.: 99.4764
Dear Neil:
I am enclosing new attorneys' fees contracts for each of the two cases in which we are
representing you. The agreements are simply a formality to confirm that you have a contractual
agreement with our new law firm.
Please review the agreements carefully and if they meet with your approval, please sign them
and return them to me.
Thank you for your attention to this.
Sincerely,
William 1. Cook
WJC/so
Enclosures
I. PURPOSE
I/We, Neil Gillespie ,do hereby retain and employ the law firm of Barker,
Rodems & Cook, P.A., to investigate my potential claim resulting from my payday loans
with AMSCOT Corporation and, if advisable, to pursue necessary litigation on my
behalf.
I/We understand that I/we may be one of several plaintiff(s) or part of a class of
plaintiff(s) represented by Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A.
II. COSTS AN 0 EXPENSES
I/We hereby agree to pay for the costs and expenses of the investigation and
I/We authorize Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A., to advance and pay any costs and
expenses it deems appropriate to the handling of my case. I/We will pay Barker, Rodems
& Cook, P.A., for the costs and expenses advanced out of the portion of any recovery
remaining after attorneys' fees have been subtracted. I/We will then receive the portion
of what remains, which is known as the "net recovery". Thus, the "total recovery" (all
monies received or collected, including attorneys' fees, if awarded) less Barker, Rodems
& Cook, P.A.'s attorneys' fees and any costs and expenses will equal the "net recovery".
IiVVe understand that my/our portion of the ';net recovery" wiii be a prorated or per
judgment or settlement. I/We understand that the Court or other tribunal may approve a
If there is no recovery. or if the total recovery is not adequate to pay for all of the
costs and expenses advanced, l/we understand that Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A., will not
seek payment from me for any expenses.
If I/we terminate this contract, then Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A, may seek
payment from me/us for any costs and expenses allowed by law.
otherwise.
l!We agree to pay Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A, an attorneys' fee if it is successful
in obtaining any monies or other benefit on my behalf. !/\fIJe understand that Barker,
Rodems & Cook, P.A, will receive the attorneys' fees awarded by a Court or arbitration
panel or will receive the applicable percentage of the "total recovery" (.§1l monies received
from the Defendant(s) including, but not limited to, money for actual damages, punitive
damages, interest, penalties, attorneys' fees and expenses), whichever is higher. The
applicable percentages shall be as follows:
A 33.334% of the "total recovery" prior to the time that an answer

thereafter,
answer or the demand for appointment of arbitrator(s), through

payment in instaliments, whether monthiy, annualiy or otherwise, in the future, my/our
l!We understand that if there is no recovery, I/we will not be indebted to Barker.
Rodems & Cook. P.A. for any attorneys' fees.
If I/we terminate this contract, then Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A, may seek
payment from me/us for any attorneys' fees allowed by law.
IV. BARKER, RODEMS & COOK, P.A. MAY

ItWe understand that Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A, in its discretion, may work with
other lawyers on my/our case if deemed necessary. If Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A,
agrees to work with other lawyers on my/our case, I/we understand that the attorneys' fees
I/we will have to pay will not increase. Other law firms or lawyers hired by Barker, Rodems
& Cook, P.A, will be paid out of the attorneys' fees agreed to in this contract and, if I/we
so desire, I/we will be advised regarding how the attorneys' fees are divided.
documents encompass the entire agreement between me/us and Barker, Rodems & Cook,
P.A These signed agreements take the place of any prior, oral or written agreements and
may only be changed or modified by a separate, written agreement signed and dated by
me/us and Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A
I/We understand that Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A, has no duty to represent me/us
in any matters other than my/our potential claim resulting from my payday loans with
AMSCOT Corporation
ItWe understand that if Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A, determines, at some later
date, that my claim should not or cannot be reasonably prosecuted by the Firm, the Firm
may notify me in writing of this decision and withdraw as my attorneys. Under such
circumstances, I shall be responsible to Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A, only for any fees
and costs permitted by law.
3
representation of the cl ient(s), the attorneys are entitled to be reimbursed for such amounts
as the attorneys have reasonably advanced on behalf of the client(s).
IlWe have read this contract and any documents specifically referenced herein, and
DATED: _ DATED: _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ of
Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A. Client
Tampa, Florida 33606
813/489-1001 Client
I. PURPOSE
I/We, Neil Gillespie ,do hereby retain and employ the law firm of Barker,
Rodems & Cook, P.A, to investigate my potential claim resulting from my payday loans
with ACE Cash Express, Inc. and, if advisable, to pursue necessary litigation on my
behalf.
I/We understand that I/we may be one of several plaintiff(s) or part of a class of
plaintiff(s) represented by Bark(~r, Rodems & Cook, P.A
I/We hereby agree to pay for the costs and expenses of the investigation and
I/We authorize Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A, to advance and pay any costs and
expenses it deems appropriate to the handling of my case. I/We will pay Barker, Rodems
& Cook, P.A, for the costs and expenses advanced out of the portion of any recovery
remaining after attorneys' fees have been subtracted. I/We will then receive the portion
of what remains, which is known as the "net recovery". Thus, the "total recovery" (.§l1
monies received or collected, including attorneys' fees, if awarded) less Barker, Rodems
& Cook, P.A's attorneys' fees and any costs and expenses will equal the "net recovery".
I/We understand that my/our portion of the "net recovery" wi!! be a prorated or per
judgment or settlement. I/We understand that the Court or other tribunal may approve a
If there is no recovery, or if the total recovery is not adequate to pay for all of the
costs and expenses advanced, IIwe understand that Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A, will not
seek payment from me for any expenses.
If I/we terminate this contract, then Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A., may seek
payment from me/us for any costs and expenses allowed by law.
otherwise.
I/We agree to pay Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A., an attorneys' fee if it is successful
in obtaining any monies or other benefit on my behalf. I/We understand that Barker,
Rodems & Cook, P.A., will receive the attorneys' fees awarded by a Court or arbitration
panel or will receive the applicable percentage of the "total recovery" (.9.11 monies received
from the Defendant(s) including, but not limited to, money for actual damages, punitive
damages, interest, penalties, attorneys' fees and expenses), whichever is higher. The
applicable percentages shall be as follows:
A. 33.334% of the "total recovery" prior to the time that an answer
thereafter,
answer or the demand for appointment of arbitrator(s), through

payment in installments, whether monthly, annually or otherwisd, in the future, my/our
I/We understand that if there is no recovery, l/we will not be indebted to Barker,
Rodems & Cook, P.A., for any attorneys' fees.
If I/we terminate this contract, then Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A., may seek
payment from me/us for any attorneys' fees allowed by law.
IV. BARKER, RODEMS & COOK, P.A. MAY

I/We understand that Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A., in its discretion, may work with
other lawyers on my/our case if deemed necessary. If Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A.,
agrees to work with other lawyers on my/our case, "we understand that the attorneys' fees
"we will have to pay will not increase. Other law firms or lawyers hired by Barker, Rodems
& Cook, P.A., will be paid out of the attorneys' fees agreed to in this contract and, if "we
so desire, I/we will be advised regarding how the attorneys' fees are divided.
At the time of signing this contract, "we also signed a Statement of Client's Rights
documents encompass the entire agreement between me/us and Barker, Rodems & Cook,
P.A. These signed agreements take the place of any prior, oral or written agreements and
may only be changed or modified by a separate, written agreement signed and dated by
me/us and Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A.
I/We understand that Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A., has no duty to represent me/us
in any matters other than my/our potential claim resulting from my payday loans with
ACE Cash Express, Inc.
I/We understand that if Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A., determines, at some later
date, that my claim should not or cannot be reasonably prosecuted by the Firm, the Firm
may notify me in writing of this decision and withdraw as my attorneys. Under such
circumstances, I shall be responsible to Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A., only for any fees
and costs permitted by law.
representation of the cI ient( s), the attorneys are entitled to be reimbursed for such amounts
as the attorneys have reasonably advanced on behalf of the client(s).
I/We have read this contract and any documents specifically referenced herein, and
DATED: _ DATED: _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ of
Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A. Client
813/489-1001 Client
4
Case 8:00-cv-00723-JSM Document 25 Filed 12/22/2000 Page 1 of 4
7
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION
EUGENE R. CLEMENT, -
r::
GAY ANN BLOMEFIELD, and , t.
NEIL GILLESPIE, individually and -I"

>=.
:::;~
on behalf ofothers similarly situated, ,,:..

?~:-:
-Tj::".',
r~
o -
Plaintiffs, ~~l
C....,
'P"
v. CASE NO: 8:99-cv-279~r-26iAJ
c·"
;:>
AMSCOT CORPORATION,
Defendant.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _--'1
ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Class Certification and
supporting memorandum (Dkts. 89 and 92), Amscot's Response in Opposition (Dkt.
101), Plaintiffs' Notice of Supplemental Authority (Dkt. 93). Plaintiffs' Reply
Memorandum (Dkt. 114), and all depositions, exhibits, declarations, affidavits, and
materials on file. After careful consideration, the Court concludes that the motion should
be denied as moot and this case should be dismissed.
This Lawsuit
Defendant Amscot Corporation is a Florida corporation doing business in
Hillsborough County, Florida. Defendant operates a check cashing business licensed
under Chapter 560 of the Florida Statutes. (Dkt. 14 at pg. 2).
8
PlaintiffEugene R. Clement is a resident of Hillsborough County, Florida, and
was a customer ofDefendant at a Tampa branch. (Dkt. 14 at pgs. 1 and 4). In December
1997, Mr. Clement filled out an application which provided in part in upper case letters:
"Chapter 832, Florida Statutes, makes it a crime for any person to knowingly issue a bad
check." (Dkt. 14 at pg. 4 and Exh. A). Mr. Clement periodically engaged in "deferred
deposit" transactions by providing Defendant one or more non-postdated checks or
postdated checks in return for cash. (Dkt. 14 at pg. 4). Mr. Clement also engaged in
rollover transactions with Defendant. (Dkt. 14 at pg. 5). Rollover transactions occur
approximately two weeks after the initial transaction when persons may pay an additional
10% of the face amount of the check to extend the "deferral period" another two weeks.
(Dkt. 14 at pg. 5).
PlaintiffGay Ann Blomefield is a resident of Hillsborough County, Florida, and
was a customer of Defendant at a Tampa branch. She periodically engaged in "deferred
deposit" transactions by providing Defendant one or more non-postdated or postdated
checks in return for cash. (Dkt. 86 at pg. 4). Ms. Blomefield also engaged in rollover
transactions with Defendant. (Dkt. 86 at pg. 4). She engaged in a series ofvarious
transactions with Defendant for approximately two years before this lawsuit was filed.
(Dkt. 86 at pg. 4).
Neil Gillespie is a resident of Pinellas County, Florida, and was a customer of
Defendant at a St. Petersburg branch. (Dkt. 86 at pg. 5). Mr. Gillespie periodically
engaged in "deferred deposit" transactions by providing Defendant one or more non

postdated checks. (Okt. 86 at pg. 5). He engaged in deferred deposit transactions on at
least eleven occasions ending in November of 1999. (Okt. 86 at pg. 5).
In two complaints the Plaintiffs and Intervenor Plaintiffs sued Defendant for
various violations focusing on its failure to disclose certain infonnation in the
transactions and its charging usurious interest. Count I seeks reliefunder the Truth-in-
Lending Act (the TILA). Counts II and III assert state law claims for usury and
violations ofFlorida's Deceptive and UnfairTrade Practices Act (FDUTPA),
respectively.
Procedural Background
On September 8, 2000, this Court denied the motion to dismiss the First Amended
Class Action Complaint, ruling at that time that sufficient facts were alleged to avoid
dismissal of the suit. (Okt.45V Neither party directed this Court's attention to 65 Fed.
Reg. 17129, in which the Board ofGovemors ofthe Federal Reserve System (Board)
published revisions to the official staff commentary to Regulation Z promulgated
pursuant to the TILA. The revisions, dated March 31, 2000, addressed short-tenn cash
advances known as "payday loans." After considering the arguments made and all the
authorities now before it, the Court finds that count I fails to allege a claim for relief
On March 20, 2001, this Court permitted intervention of Plaintiffs Gay Ann
Blomefield and Neil Gillespie and denied class certification without prejudice. (Dkt.
85). On March 23,2001, Plaintiffs' counsel filed the Class Action Complaint-in
Intervention. (Dkt. 86).
under the TILA.2 Moreover, any attempt at stating a claim under the TILA would be
futile. Having reached this conclusion, the motion for class certification is now moot.
Count I: Truth-in-Lending Violations
The Board's RQle
Congress delegated expansive authority to the Board to promulgate regulations to
carry out the purpose ofthe TILA. ~ 15 U.S.C.A. § 1604(a}; Ford Motor Credit Co. v.
Milhollin.444 U.S. 555, 560, 566 (1980). One ofthe purposes ofthe TILA is "to assure
a meaningful disclosure ofcredit tenns so that the consumer will be able to compare
more readily the various credit tenns available to him and avoid the uninformed use of
credit." See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1604(a). The Board created Regulation Z as a regulation
necessary to effectuate the purposes ofthe TILA. See 12 C.F.R. § 226 (a) ("This
regulation, known as Regulation Z, is issued by [the Board] to implement the [TILA],
which is contained in Title I ofthe Consumer Credit Protection Act, as amended (15
U.S.C. 1601 et seq.}.").
Apart from the promulgation of regulations to implement the TILA, the Board
may also rely on its staffto issue administrative interpretations in the form ofan official
staff commentary. See IS U.S.C.A. § 1640(f). As stated by the Board in its March 31,
2000, issuance of a fmal rule addressing payday loans:
2 As to the remaining two state-law claims for usury and violations ofFlorida's
Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (FDUTPA), the Court finds it inappropriate to
exercise its pendent jurisdiction.
The Board's official stafIcommentary (12 C.F.R. part 226
(Supp. I» interprets [Regulation Z], and provides guidance to
creditors in applying the regulation to specific transactions.
The commentary is a substitute for individual staff
interpretations; it is updated periodically to address
significant questions.
Congress has bestowed such great authoritative weight to the interpretations and
applications by the staff ofthe Board, that "it is unrealistic to draw a radical distinction
between opinions issued under the imprimatur ofthe Board and those submitted as
official staff memoranda." See Ford Motor. 444 U.S. at 566 n.9.
The Court's Role
"[T]he legislative history evinces a decided preference for resolving interpretive
issues by unifonn administrative decision, rather than piecemeal through litigation."
Ford Motor, 455 U.S. at 568. Thus, courts should not substitute their interpretations of
the TILA for that of the Board, "so long as the latter's lawmaking is not irrational." ~
Ford Motor, 455 U.S. at 568. Where the Board and its staffhave effectively clarified an
area ofthe law, the courts must accept those opinions construing the TILA and the
regulations and consider them dispositive absent "some obvious repugnance to the
statute." See Anderson Bros. Ford v. Valencia. 452 U.S. 205,219 (1981) (citing Ford
Motor). Apart from detennining whether the commentary is repugnant to the statute,
however, the court's more difficult role, at least in this case, is deciding whether the
commentary should be applied retroactively to transactions occurring before the effective
date of the commentary. See, ~ McPhillips v. Gold Key Lease. Inc.• 38 F.Supp.2d 975
(M.D.Ala. 1999); Wiley v. Earl's Pawn & Jeweky. Inc.. 950 F.Supp. 1108 (S.D.Ala.
1997).
"Payday Loan" as an Extension o(Credit
This action involves "payday loans" which, as argued by Plaintiffs and many other
plaintiffs in similar cases, requires an examination ofthe term "credit" as that term is
defmed by the TILA, Regulation Z, and any official staff commentaries. Credit is
defined the same by the TILA and Regulation Z as ''the right granted by a creditor to a
debtor to defer payment ofdebt or to incur debt and defer its payment." See 15 U.S.C.A.
§ 1602(e); 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(a)(14). The official staffcommentary now defines credit to
specifically include payday loans:
2(a)(14) "Credit".
2. Payday loans; deferred presentment. Credit includes a

transaction in which a cash advance is made to a consumer in
exchange for the consumer's personal check, or in exchange
for the consumer's authorization to debit the consumer's
deposit account, and where the parties agree either that the
check will not be cashed or deposited, or that the consumer's
deposit account will not be debited, until a designated future
date. This type oftransaction is often referred to as a "payday
loan" or "payday advance" or "deferred presentment loan."
A fee charged in connection with such a transaction may be a
finance charge for purposes of § 226.4, regardless of how the
fee is characterized under state law. Where the fee charged
constitutes a finance charge under § 226.4 and the person
advancing funds regularly extends consumer credit, that
person is a creditor and is required to provide disclosures
consistent with the requirements of Regulation Z. See §
226.2(a)(17).
12 C.F.R. Pt. 226 (Supp. I).
All ofthe transactions in this action occurred before the effective date ofthe
official staffcommentary, which is March 24, 2000. See 65 Fed. Reg. 17129. Generally,
retroactive application ofadministrative rules is not favored. See Bowen v. Georgetown
Univ. Hosp.• 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988). Some courts, however, have held that this
general rule disfavoring retroactivity "does not necessarily apply to agency
commentaries." See McPhillips, 38 F.Supp.2d at 980 (citing Barlow v. Evans. 992
F.Supp. 1299, 1305 (M.D.Ala. 1997». In any event, the court must give deference to the
agency's classification of the commentary as either a clarification Of a change. See
McPhillips. 38 F.Supp.2d at 980 (citing Wright v. Director. Federal Emergency
Management Agency, 913 F.2d 1566, 1571 (l1'" Cir. 1990». Nevertheless, "unfettered
deference to an agency's classification of its revision as a clarification would allow an
agency to make substantive changes, with retroactive effect, merely by referring to the
new interpretation as a clarification." See McPhillips. 38 F.Supp.2d at 980 (citing ~
v. Shalala, 998 F.2d 473, 482 (7th Cir. 1993), overruled on other grounds. Johnson v.
Apfel, 189 F.3d 561 (7th Cir. 1999».
Clarification versus Amendment or Chan~e
To detennine whether the March 2000 official staff revision should have
retroactive application to this case, the revision must be examined in view of the past
interpretations by the agency of the particular subject matter of the revision. See
McPhillips v. Gold Key Lease, Inc.. 38 F.Supp.2d 975, 980 (M.D.Ala. 1999) ("court
should consider whether the revision is consistent with prior interpretations and views
expressed by the agency"). In the event there are no prior interpretations ofthe particular
transaction, this fact should also be considered,] If a court finds that revisions to the
official staffcommentary amount to a substantive change, rather than simply a
clarification of existing law, then the commentary is not applied retroactively. See
McPhillips, 38 F,Supp.2d at 980 (court found that revisions amounted to substantive
change in law even though Board interpreted its revision as a clarification).
First, the evolution of the official staffcommentary adding payday loans and
deferred presentments to the defmition ofcredit must be examined. Beginning on
November S, 1999, the Board published for comment proposed revisions to the official
staff commentary to Regulation Z with respect to short-term cash advances or "payday
loans." See 64 Fed. Reg. 60368. The November publication noted that the revisions to
the commentary would be adopted in fmal form in March 2000 and "to the extent the
revisions impose new requirements on creditors, compliance would he optional until
October 1,2000, the effective date/or mandatory compliance." (Emphasis added). This
] Plaintiffs cite Barlow v. Evans, 992 F.Supp. 1299, 1305 (M.D.Ala. 1997), and
Wiley v. Earl's Pawn & Jewelty, 950 F.Supp. 1108, 1112 (S.D.Ala. 1997), as court
opinions holding that the staff commentary subjecting pawnbrokers to the TILA applied
to transactions that preceded the commentary's effective date. These cases involved a
different revision. Each new revision should be examined as a whole to determine its
applicability to the individual case.
statement makes it clear that any new requirements placed on the creditors will not be
enforced through mandatory compliance until six months after the effective date of the
rule.
The Board addressed in particular the defmition of credit in the November
publication in pertinent part as follows:
The Board has been asked to clarify whether Upayday

loans"-also known as "cash advance loans," "check
advance loans," and "post-dated check loans"---eonstitute
credit for purposes ofTILA. Typically in such transactions, a
short-term cash advance is made to a customer in exchange
for the consumer's personal check in the amount ofthe
advance, plus a fee; sometimes the advance is made in
exchange for the consumer's authorization to debit
electronically the consumer's checking account in the amount
of the advance, plus a fee. The transaction occurs with
knowledge by both parties that the amount advanced is not,
or may not be, available from the consumer's checking
account at the time ofthe transaction. Thus, the parties agree
that the consumer's check will not be cashed or the account
electronically debited until a designated future date. On that
date, the consumer usually has the option to repay the
obligation by allowing the party advancing the funds to cash
the check or electronically debit the consumer's checking
account, or by providing cash or some other means of
payment. The consumer may also have the option to defer
repayment beyond the initial period by paying an additional
fee.
Section 226.2(a)(14) dermes credit as the right to defer the

payment of debt or the right to incur debt and defer its
payment. In the case of payday loans, this includes the
agreement to defer cashing the check or debiting the
consumer's account. Comment 2(aX14)-2 would be added to
clarify that payday loan transactions constitute credit for
purposes ofTILA. Persons that regularly extend payday
loans and impose a finance charge are required to provide
TILA disclosures to consumers.
64 Fed. Reg. 60368 at ·60368-60369 (emphasis added). The commentary employs the
word "clarify" two times in the above-referenced section. The first time "clarify" is used
in the sense that the commentary will be determining once and for all if (not when)
payday loans fall within the definition of credit under the TILA and Regulation Z. The
second time "clarifY" appears in the above section, it merely states that the comment will
be added to definitively make payday loans an example of something that constitutes
credit.
Having received comments, thereafter on March 31, 2000, the Board published
the final revisions to the official staffcommentary to Regulation Z. The effective date of
the revised commentary was March 24, 2000, with the proviso that "[c]ompliance is
optional until October 1,2000." See 65 Fed. Reg. 17129. The background section of
the revised commentary reveals the various comments made regarding the applicability
ofthe TILA and Regulation Z to payday loans and provides in pertinent part:
In November 1999, the Board published proposed

amendments to the commentary (64 FR 60368, November 5,
1999). The Board received more than 50 comment letters.
Most of the comments were from financial institutions, other
creditors, and their representatives. Comments were also
received from state attorneys general, state regulatory
agencies, and consumer advocates. The comment letters were
focused on the proposed comment concerning payday loans.
Most commenters supported the proposal. A few
commenters, mostly payday lenders and their representatives,
were opposed.
As discussed below, the commentary is being adopted

substantially as proposed. Some revisions have been made
for clarity in response to commenters' suggestions. The
commentary revision concerning payday loans clarifies that
when such transactions involve an agreement to defer
payment ofa deb~ they are within the definition of credit in
TILA and Regulation Z.
65 Fed. Reg. 17129 (emphasis added). The term "clarifies" found in this section appears
to mean the same thing as it did in the November publication-that payday loans are now
defmed as credit.
Under "Commentary Revisions" ofthe March 2000 publication, the commentary
expounded upon the comments submitted regarding payday loans as follows:
2(aXI4) Credit.
The Board proposed to add comment 2(a)(14)-2 to clarify
that transactions commonly known as "payday loans"
constitute credit for purposes ofTILA.. . . .
Most commenters supported the proposal because they

believed that payday loans are credit transactions. A few
commenters opposed the proposal. These commenters
questioned whether payday loans should be covered under
TILA when applicable state law does not treat such
transactions as credit. They were concerned that Regulation
Z would preempt state law where, for example, the
transactions are regulated under check-cashing laws, and they
also asserted that providing TILA disclosures would result in
unnecessary compliance costs. These commenters also
questioned whether disclosure ofthe APR in such
transactions provides consumers with useful information.
One commenter asserted that the proposed comment's scope
was unclear, and believed the comment might be interpreted
too broadly, resulting in the application of Regulation Z to
noncredit transactions. This commenter also suggested that
payday lenders will be unable to determine whether
transactions are consumer credit or for an exempt purpose,
such as business credit.
For the reasons discussed below, comment 2(aX14)-2 is

adopted to clarify that payday loans, and similar transactions
where there is an agreement to defer payment of a debt,
constitute credit for purposes ofTILA. Some revisions have
been made for clarity to address commenters' concerns.
(Emphasis added). Obviously, some issues existed with respect to a state law's effect on
the TILA. The tenn "clarify" or "clarifies" in this section ultimately determines that
payday loans fall within the defmition of credit.
The March 2000 publication specifically addresses the interplay between state
laws and the TILA and Regulation Z as follows:
TILA, as implemented by Regulation Z, reflects the intent of

the Congress to provide consumers with unifonn cost
disclosures to promote the infonned use ofcredit and assist
consumers in comparison shopping. This purpose is
furthered by applying the regulation to transactions, such as
payday loans, that fall within the statutory definition of credit,
regardless ofhow such transactions are treated or regulated
under state law. The fact that some creditors may have to
comply with state laws as well as with Regulation Z, and that
creditors may bear compliance costs, is not a sufficient basis
to disregard TILA's applicability to the covered transactions.
Where a creditor is unable to detennine if a transaction is
primarily for an exempt purpose, such as business-purpose
credit, the creditor is free to make disclosures under TILA,
and the fact that disclosures are made would not be
controlling on the question ofwhether the transaction was
exempt. See Comment 3(a)-1.
A few commenters questioned the effect of the proposed

comment on state laws that regulate payday loans and similar
transactions. Section 226.28 of Regulation Z describes the
effect ofTILA on state laws. As a general matter, state laws
are preempted ifthey are inconsistent with the act and
regulation, and then only to the extent of the inconsistency.
A state law is inconsistent if it requires or pennits creditors to
make disclosures or take actions that contradict the
requirements of federal law. A state law may not be deemed
inconsistent if it is more protective of consumers.
TILA does not impair a state's authority to regulate or

prohibit payday lending activities. Persons that regularly
extend payday loans and otherwise meet the definition of
creditor (§226.2(a)(17» are required, however, to provide
disclosures to consumers consistent with the requirements of
Regulation z.. . . The Board will review any issues
brought to its attention regarding the effect ofTILA and
Regulation Z on particular state laws.. . .
The Board recognizes in this section that certain states have passed laws sheltering the
fees charged for payday loans from characterization as finance charges or interest, such
as Florida. The commentary places everyone on notice that the TILA and Regulation Z
in essence trump state law characterizations of fees as something other than what the
federal laws prescribe. In that vein, the March publication provides:
In describing payday loan transactions, the proposed

comment referred to the fact that consumers typically must
pay a fee. Some commenters questioned whether such fees
are finance charges for purposes of Regulation Z. Theses
commenters noted that under some state laws, the fees
charged for payday loans and similar transactions are not
considered interest or finance charges.
A fee charged in connection with a payday loan may be a

finance charge for purposes ofTILA pursuant to section
226.4 of Regulation Z, regardless of how the fee is
characterized for state law purposes. Where the fee charged
constitutes a fmance charge under TILA, and the person
advancing funds regularly extends consumer credit, that
person is a creditor covered by Regulation Z. See
§226.2(a)(17). Comment 2(a)(14)-2 has been revised to
reflect this guidance.
(Emphasis added.) Thus, proponents ofpayday lenders in most instances can no longer
rely on the argument that state law preempts the TILA and Regulation Z.
Finally, at the end ofthe revision, the staffattempts to classifY the revision as a
clarification rather than a change in the law with respect to payday loans:
Comment 2(a)(14)-2 has been added as an example ofa

specific type oftransaction that involves an agreement to
defer payment ofa debt. Because sllch a transaction falls
within the existing statlltory and reglliatory definition of
"credit," the comment does not represent a change in the
law. Generally, updates to the Board's staffcommentary are
effective upon publication. Consistent with the reqllirements
ofsection l05(d) ofTlL4, however, the Board typically
provides an implementation period 01six months or longer.
Dllring that period, compliance with the pllblished IIpdate is
optional so that creditors may adjllSt their docllments to
accommodate TlLA's disclosllre reqllirements.
(Emphasis added). While the Board's staffhas stated that the comment "does not
represent a change in law,n at the same time it provided creditors an implementation
period "so that creditors may adjust their documents to accommodate TILA's disclosure
requirements." This allowance seems to admit that the Board's staffwas aware that this
particular area had not been made a part ofthe law as it existed at the time ofthe notice
for the proposed rule. Indeed, the Board entertained comments and took a position on
how to handle the TILA with co-existing state laws for check cashing.
This Court is unaware ofany prior interpretations by the staffdefmitively making
payday loans part of credit as that term is defmed by the TILA and Regulation Z. This
case presents a situation in which no final commentary addressing payday loans existed
prior to the fmal March 2000 revision which made payday loans part of credit under the
TILA and Regulation Z. There is no question that in Florida the effect ofthe TILA and
Regulation Z has been unclear with respect to those properly registered under Chapter
560 of the Florida Statutes. While some federal district court opinions outside ofFlorida
have held that payday loans are extensions ofcredit under the TILA and Regulation Z,4
the decisions within Florida have not been unifonn. See Gonzales v. Easy Money. Inc..
No. 5:00-cv-2-0c-l0GRJ (Feb. 22,2001); Clement v. Ace Cash Express. Inc.. No. 8:00
cv-593-T-26C (M.D.Fla. Dec. 21, 2000); Betts v. McKenzie Check Advance of Florida.
LLC, No. 8:99-cv-2828-T-30F (M.D.Fla. Dec. 20, 2000). Based on the comments
solicited by the Board and the fact that no prior interpretations by the agency had been
expressed, the Court fmds that the March 2000 revision effects a substantive change in
the law without retroactive application. Because the transactions at issue in this case
occurred before compliance with the official staffcommentary was either optional or
mandatory, the official staff commentary should not be applied to them.
Based on the above reasons and absent any authority from the Eleventh Circuit or
United States Supreme Court to the contrary, the Court finds that the official staff
commentary at issue should not be given retroactive application in this case.
Consequently, count I is dismissed with prejudice.
Counts II and ill: Violations of Florida's Usury Law and FDUTPA
Because the Court has resolved Plaintiffs' federal claims against Defendant, only
4 See Hartke v. Illinois Payday Loans. Inc., 1999 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 14937, *6
(C.D.IlI. Sept. 13, 1999); Turner v. E-Z Check Cashing of Cookeville. TN. Inc.• 35
F.Supp. 2d 1042, 1048 (M.D. Tenn. 1999); In re: Brigance. 219 B.R. 486, 492
(Bankr.W.D. Tenn. 1998); Hamilton v. York. 987 F.Supp. 953, 957-958 (E.D.Ky. 1997).
Plaintiffs' state law claims remain in this action. Title 28, Section 1367 ofthe United
States Code provides that the district courts may decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over state claims where it has dismissed all the underlying federal claims.
~ 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). In making this detennination, the court should consider
factors such as "comity, judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and the like."
See Crosby v. Paulk, 187 F.3d 1339, 1352 (lIth Cir. 1999) (quoting Roche v. John
Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. 81 F.3d 249, 257 (1st Cir. 1996». Although this decision is
discretionary, see Englehardt v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 139 F.3d 1346, 1350 (11th Cir.
1998 ), the dismissal ofstate law claims is strongly encouraged where the federal claims
are dismissed prior to trial. See Baggett v. First Nat'l Bank, 117 F.3d 1342, 1353 (11th
Cir. 1997). Where the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over such
claims, the claims should be dismissed without prejudice so they can be refiled in the
appropriate state court. See Crosby, 187 F.3d at 1352. In the interest ofjudicial economy
and convenience, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the
remaining state law claims in this action.
Accordingly, it is therefore ordered and adjudged as follows:
1. Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Class Certification (Dkt. 89) is denied as
moot.
2. Count I is dismissed with prejudice.
3. Counts II and III are dismissed without prejudice to bringing them in state
court.
4. The Clerk is directed to close this file.
DONE AND ORDERED at Tampa, Florida, on this -.1 day of August, 2001.
COPIES FURNISHED TO:

Counsel ofRecord
F I L E COP Y
Date Printed: 08/02/2001
Notice sent to:

John A. Anthony, Esq.
Gray, Harris, Robinson, Shackleford, Farrior
501 E. Kennedy Blvd., Suite 1400
P.O. Box 3324
Tampa, FL 33601
William J. Cook, Esq.
Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A.
300 W. Platt St., Suite 150
Tampa, FL 33606
Peter J. Grilli
Peter J. Grilli, P.A.
100 S. Ashley Dr., Suite 1300
Tampa, FL 33602
PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION
ATIORNEYS AT LAW
CHRIS A. BARKER Telephone 813/489.1001

RYAN CHRISTOPHER RODEMS 300 West Platt Street, Suite 150
Facsimile 813/489.1008
WILLIAM J. COOK Tampa, Florida 33606
August 15,2001
Neil 1. Gillespie
Apartment C-2
1121 Beach Drive NE
Re: Eugene R. Clement, individually and on behalfofothers similarly situated,

AMSCOT Corporation
OUf File No. : 99-4766
Dear Neil:
This confirms that you authorized us to appeal the decision in the above-referenced case. We
will not be filing a new lawsuit in State court. In addition, you authorized us to demand $1,000.00
to settle your claim plus $50,000.00 in attorneys' fees and costs.
Of course, we will keep you updated on the appeal and any settlement negotiations. As we
discussed, however, we do not believe that the Defendant will accept our settlement offer.
William 1. Cook
WJC/mss
9
Neil J. Gillespie
1121 Beach Drive NE, Apt. C-2
Telephone and Fax: (727) 823-2390
VIA FAX AND FIRST CLASS MAIL
August 16, 200 I
William J. Cook, Attorney at Law

Barker, Rodems & Cook, PA

AMSCOT Corporation
Your File No. : 99-4766
Dear Bill,
Thank you for your letter dated August 15,2001 relative to the above captioned
case. I agree with you that the Defendant will probably not accept your settlement offer.
I believe the sticking point is your request for $50,000 in attorney's fees and costs. I do
not believe the $1,000 request each for myself, Mr. Clement and Ms. Blomefield is a
barrier to settlement. Therefore I suggest you ask for a lesser amount of attorney's fees
and costs.
Given your lack of success in this matter thus far, I suggest you ask for $10,000 in
attorney's fees and costs. I believe this is a more realistic amount. Given how poorly the
case has gone up to now, I believe it is in our interest to settle quickly.
Thank you for your kind consideration.
Sincerely,
4P~~
ell J. Gillespie /
cc: Kindly provide a copy of this letter to Mr. Clement and Ms. Blomefield
10
Fax
From: Neil J. Gillespie
1121 Beach Drive NE, Apt C-2
St. Petersburg, FL 33701
Phone/Fax: (727) 823-2390
To: William Cook, Attorney at Law

Fax: 813-489-1008
Date: August 16, 2001
Pages: 2 including this page
Re: AMSCOT Corporation
o Urgent 0 Please Reply 0 For Your Review
• Comments: see accompanying letter.

Neil J. Gillespie
8092 SW 115th Loop
Ocala, Florida 34481
Telephone: (813) 810-0151
July 25, 2005
Ian Mackechnie, President

Amscot Corporation
600 N. Westshore Blvd., 12th Floor
RE: Clement, et al. v. Amscot Corporation, Case No. 8:99-ev-2795-T-26C, US District

Court, Middle District Florida, Tampa Division; on appeal, Case No. 01-14761-A US
Court of Appeals, For the Eleventh Circuit
Dear Mr. Mackechnie,
I was a plaintiff in the above captioned lawsuit. While this action is settled, I
regret becoming involved, and was pressured into it by my lawyer, William Cook. I am
sorry for the consequences you suffered. About two years ago I found discrepancies in
the case file. This is part of my attempt to uncover the truth. As I see it, you paid
$43,000.00 too much to settle this case. Here's why.
Prior to my involvement in the above captioned lawsuit, Mr. Cook represented me

in a lawsuit against ACE, America's Cash Express, for payday loan roll-over transactions.
The lawsuit was joined by Florida Attorney General Robert Butterworth. I still believe
the ACE litigation was justified. However, in my view Amscot was not as culpable as
ACE, and I initially declined Mr. Cook's solicitation to join the lawsuit. But Mr. Cook
said that I was selfish for not suing Amscot, and I relented.
During the course of litigation it became apparent to me that Mr. Cook and his
associates were incompetent and not truthful. During the settlement negotiations I tried
to settle this case for $10,000.00 in legal fees and $1,000.00 to each of the three plaintiffs
(see copy of my letter, enclosed). You ultimately paid $56,000.00 to settle, and I believe
this was the result of our lawyers' collusion. This is my opinion, and I welcome any
supporting evidence. In the alternative, perhaps your lawyer John Anthony was just a
very poor negotiator, and you paid $43,000.00 too much to settle the lawsuit.
I filed a complaint against William Cook with the Florida Bar (TFB No. 2004
11,734(13C) to no avail. I am available to discuss this further if you wish. Thank you.
Sincerely,
:f;~~-
11
Neil J. Gillespie
1121 Beach Drive NE, Apt. C-2
Telephone and Fax: (727) 823-2390
VIA FAX AND FIRST CLASS MAIL
August 16, 200 I
William J. Cook, Attorney at Law

Barker, Rodems & Cook, PA

AMSCOT Corporation
Your File No. : 99-4766
Dear Bill,
Thank you for your letter dated August 15,2001 relative to the above captioned
case. I agree with you that the Defendant will probably not accept your settlement offer.
I believe the sticking point is your request for $50,000 in attorney's fees and costs. I do
not believe the $1,000 request each for myself, Mr. Clement and Ms. Blomefield is a
barrier to settlement. Therefore I suggest you ask for a lesser amount of attorney's fees
and costs.
Given your lack of success in this matter thus far, I suggest you ask for $10,000 in
attorney's fees and costs. I believe this is a more realistic amount. Given how poorly the
case has gone up to now, I believe it is in our interest to settle quickly.
Thank you for your kind consideration.
Sincerely,
4P~~
ell J. Gillespie /
cc: Kindly provide a copy of this letter to Mr. Clement and Ms. Blomefield
SUITE 2200
GRAY
ROBINSON
201 N. FRANKLIN STREET
POST OFFICE
(33602)
Box 3324
ATTORNEYS AT LAW TAMPA, FL 33601 CLERMONT
TEL 813-273-5000 JACKSONVILLE

FAX 813-273-5145 KEY WEST
gray-robinson.com
LAKELAND
MELBOURNE
813-273-5066 NAPLES
[email protected] ORLANDO
August 26, 2005
TALLAHASSEE
TAMPA
VIA FED EX
Neil J. Gillespie
8092 SW 11 5th Loop
Ocala, FL 34481
Re: Eugene R. Clement, individually and ou behalf of others

similarly situated, vs. Amscot Corporation, a Florida corporation
United States District Court, Case No. 99-2795-CIV-T-26C
Dear Mr. Gillespie:
I have been asked to respond to your letter to Ian MacKechnie of July 25, 2005. Amscot is
disappointed that your lawyer apparently did not obey your instructions regarding discontinuing litigation
you and he knew to be frivolous. Amscot is disappointed that you did not admit that the litigation lacked
merit when I deposed you. We regret that Amscot was required to expend time, money, and other
resources defending frivolous litigation. I assure you that we did our best as lawyers to move the case to
the correct conclusion, without making it more expensive for all involved. We are pleased that this matter
has been concluded, and consider it to have been a closed controversy for some time now. We hope you
will put it all behind you as well.
John A. Anthony
JAA/aw
cc: Ian MacKechnie
# 708746 vI
12
MEMORANDUM
TO File
FROM WJC~
DATE Monday, August 20, 2001
RE Clement v. AMSCOT
99.4766
I spoke with Neil Gillespie on August 17, 2001. We had a fairly lengthy conversation
about the pluses and minuses of going forward with the appeal and the settlement offer.
I explained to him that I did not believe that the sticking part was created through the
attorneys' fees, but rather it was the payment to the clients. I told him of my conversation
with John Anthony in which he offered to pay this firm $5,000.00 but would not agree to
pay our clients anything. I told him that I rejected that offer. He asked me why I had not
mentioned the settlement offer to him previously~ I told him that it was not a settlement
offer. Itwas anJ.mp.rop..~!:2.(~~QfLattempt.At the end of the conversation, when I told him
that I would wait until Monday befui:eisent the settlement offer, he told me that that was
not necessary. He simply wanted to advise me that he was not necessarily happy with the
$50,000.00 settlement demand. I told him that the $50,000.00 demand was not set in
stone and we could consider the $10,000.00 offer that he suggested. I told him that it was
not likely that we would receive such an offer, however.
WJC
WJC/mss
13


ATIORNEYS AT LAW
CHRIS A.. BARKER Telephone 813/489 .. 1001
RYAN CHRISTOPHER RODEMS 300 West Platt Street, Suite 150
Facsimile 813/489 .. 1008
WILLIAM J. COOX: Tampa, Florida 33606
August 20, 2001
Jo~ A. Anthony, Esquire

Gray, Harris, Robinson, Shackleford, Farrior
Re: Eugene R. Clement, individually and on behalfof others similarly situated,

AMSCOT Corporation
'Our File No. : 99-4766
Dear Mr. Anthony:
Tn our recent telephone conversation, you said that your client would be willing to pay this
firm some kind of "consulting fee" or '~on-refundableretainer" in the amount of $5,000.00 if our
clients were to refrain from appealing Judge Lazarra's recent ruling or refile their state law claims in
state court. You did not offer any money to our clients. That offer is rejected.
We cannot and will not agree to resolve our clients' claims without any consideration going
to our clients.
If your client truly wishes to resolve these claims, our clients are willing to accept $1,000.00
each, representing the amount oftheir individual TILA statutory damages. They would also want any
outstanding loans forgiven. In addition, we would accept $50,~00.00 to settle this firm's outstanding
attorneys' fees and costs.
I am sure that you realize that our actual fees and costs are far in excess ofthis amoup.t. If our
clients were to prevail on appeal, the court undoubtedly would enter summary judgment against your
client, thereby entitling us to an award ofour fees and costs. Our motion for class certification likely
would also be granted, in that your opposition to our class certification motions focused primarily on
the merits of our clients' claims.
14
John A. Anthony, Esquire
August 20, 2001
Page 2
We view our chances of success on appeal as good, as at least one district court has already
decided the same issue contrary to Judge Lazarra's ruling. Indeed, Judge Lazarra himselfexplicitly
recognized in his order that the retroactivity issue was difficult.
.This offer is being made on behalf ofthe individual plaintiffs only and not on behalfofany
class. Consequently, our clients' agreement to settle on the above-descnoed temis would not affect
the claims of any other Amscot customers.
This offer shall remain open for thirty (30) days.
Thank you for yom attention to this matter.
Sincerely,
William J. Cook
WJC/so
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
CASE l-IO . 01-14761~····""
i
~
~
1
EUGENE R. CLEMENT, I,'.~
GAY ANN BLOME FIELD , and 1
NEIL GILLESPIE, individually and I
on behalf of others similarly situated, I
~
Appellants,
v.
AMSCOT CORPORATION,
Appellee.
______________, 1
JOINT STIPULATION FOR DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE
The Parties, by and th_ou(Jh tI-leir undersigrled counsel, ha·v~. flg
amicably resolved this matter, pursuant to Federal Rule of
A~I)pel1ate Procedure 42 (b) move for dismissal with prejtldice ""to: th
each party bearing its own attorn~s' fees and costs.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ~ day of November, 2001.
BA~KER; RODEMS & COOK, P~A4 Gray, Harris, Bobinson,

Shackleford, Farrior
WILLIAM J. CO K, ESQUIRE R. FERNANDEZ, ES

Florida Bar No. 986194 Florida Bar No. 008 5
300 West Platt Street 501 E. Kennedy Blvd
~)uite 150 Sllite 1400
Tampa, Florida 33606 Tampa, Florida 33602
(813) 489-1001 (TEL) (813) 273-5000 (TE"L)
(813) 489-1008 (FAX) (t~J3) 273-5145 (F~AX)
Z.:\.t to rrle :i5 for Appe 11 ant ~3 . ~tt~~~jrneys for Appellee
15
CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS
AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.1 and
Eleventh Circuit Rule 26.1-1, counsel for the Appellants certify
that the following persons and entities have an interest in the
outcome of this case.
Alpert, Jonathan L., Esq.
Alpert & Ferrentino, P.A.
Amscot Corporation
Anthony, John A., Esq.
Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A.
Barker, Chris A., Esq.
Blomefield, Gay Ann
Clement, Eugene R.
Cook, William J., Esq.
Gillespie, Neil
Gray, Harris, Robinson, Shackleford, Farrior, P.A.
Lazzara, The Honorable Richard A.
United States District Judge, Middle District of Florida
MacKechnie, Ian
Rodems, Ryan Christopher, Esq.
IN TIlE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR TIlE ELEVENTH CJ:RCUI~:t----.--. -=:~ --..__

riLED
u.s. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVEN '" GJI~GUIT
No-.Ol-14161-I\A
OEC 0 7 2001
EUGENE R. CLEMENT,
individually and on behalf of others silnila::-ly TlfOMASK.KI\Iir4
situated, CI [ftK
_ pJajlltiff-AEpel!~nt,
GAY ANN BLOMEFIELD,
NEIL GILLESPIE,
b'~ 91- C~- c?? /9S-: I ~ '-e--~--I-lJ-~"""
Plailltiffs- Illtervenors
Counter-Defendants-A~pellmlts.
. -
versus
AMSCOT CORPORATION,
A Florida Corporation,
Defendant-Interveno~:-Coul"iter
-Clailnarlt:-l\p~elltj=y.
....J
_.~~-----~----~~~--~~-~---~
On Appeal front tIle United States District COUl:t for tIle

Middle District of Florida
BEFORE: EDMONDSON and BARKETt·, Circuit Judges.
BY THE COUI~T:
The parties jOillt. stipulation for disI11issal of lIlis appeal
with prejudice, which is construed as a motioIl to distniss this
appeal wit}1 prejudice, witl"l the parties bearing t.lleir 0"111 costs
and attorney's fees, is G~'BD.
ATRUE Copy - ATlESTE.D:
CLERK U.S. COURT Of APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
oj,. Ike ~uu:::

;Y Duun CLERK
AlUIITA, GEORQIA
16

RELEASE AND SETTLE!\lENT AGREEMENT
This Release And Settlement Agreement (this "Agreement") is made and entered into this
~ day of October, 2001, by and between Amscot Corporation ("Amscot"), Eugene R. Clement
("Clement"), Gay Ann Blomefield ("B lomefield"), and Neil Gillespie ("Gillespie"), individually alld
on behalf of others similarly situated (collectively, the "Plaintiffs"), and Barker, Rodcl11s & Cook,
P.A. (the "Firm") collectively referred to herein as the "Parties," who hereby execute this Agreement
and state as follows:
1. Settlemen t 'VitlI Plain tiffs. Amscot shall pay each 0 fthe Plainti frs the sum 0 f' TWll
Thousand Dollars and No/100 ($2,000), in satisfaction of their claims for damages, as more Cully
described herein, against Amscot as asserted in the matters styled (i) Eu£enc R. Clement, et_al. v.
Amscot Corporation, Case No, 8:99-cv-2795-T-26C, pending in the United States District ('ourt,
Middle District of Florida, Tampa Division and (ii) EU!:!ene R. Clement. et ai. v. Amscot
Corporation, Case No. 01-14761-A, pending in the United States Court of Appeals, For the Eleventh
Circuit (collectively, referred to as the "Action").
2. Settlemen t 'Vitll Firm. Amscot shall pay the Finn the sum of Fifty TlJolisalld
Dollars and Noll 00 ($50,000), in satisfaction of Plaintiffs' claims for attorneys' fees and costs, as
more fully described herein, against Amscot as asserted in the Action.
3. A~e, Competence, and Authority. To procure payment of said sum as referenced
in paragraph number one, the Plaintiffs hereby declare that they are each more than eighteen (18)
years of age, and are otherwise competent and fully authorized to execute this Agreement. To
procure payment ofsaid sum as referenced in paragraph number two, the Firm hereby represents and
warrants that it is a corporation duly organized, validly existing and in good standing under the laws
of the State of Florida. The Finn has the necessary corporate power, authority, and has obtained all
17

necessary consents required to execute, deliver and perfonn the obligations under the provisions of
this Agreement.
4. Unknown and llnanticipated DaIIla~es. The Plaintiffs and the Finn hereby agree
that, as a further consideration and inducement [or this Agreemcnt, this Agreement shall apply to
all unknown and unanticipated damages resulting from the transactions and OCClllTences alleged or
that could have been alleged in the complaint initiating this Action filed by the Plainti ffs.
5. Amicable Civil Resolution. Without in any way admitting guilt or liability in
connection with the referenced events, by or on behalf of any of the Parties, the Parties have agreed
to an amicable civil resolution of all causes of action arising out oflhe transactions and occurrences
alleged or that could have been alleged in the complaint initiating this Action filed by the Plaintiffs.
6. IVlutual Releases. Upon Plaintiffs' and the Fiml's receipt of the considcration
required pursuant to paragraph numbers one and two (1. and 2.) hereoe this Agrcement shall operate
as a general and mutual release by the Plaintiffs and the Fiml against Amscot and by Amscot against
the Plaintiffs and the Finn, and all ofboth Amscot's and the Finn's shareholders, directors, officers,
employees, and agents of any kind, and all successors and assigns, from any and all liability relating
to the transaction outlined generally in paragraph numbers one and two (I.and 2.) herein. This
mutual release shall therefore discharge all claims, liens, debts, actions, demands, damages, costs,
expenses, actions, and causes of actions, or assertions of any kind whatsoever, both at law and
equity, whether knO\vn, unknown, alleged, direct, indirect, disputed, contingent, real, or imagined,
that in any way relate to the Action or said transactions relating to the Action.
7. Release of Liens: The Plaintiffs and the Firm represent that there are no
outstanding claims, liens or subrogation rights against the released parties resulting from or in any
-2

way related to the damages claimecl in the Action, and all occurrences thereaCter other than 1110:;\..'
which will be satisfied by the Plaintiffs and the Firm.
8. Indemnification/Hold Harmless: Plaintiffs ancl the Fiml agree to protect, defend,
indenmify and hold Amscot harmless from and against any ancl all liabilities, damages, claims,
demands, costs or expenses, including, without limitation, reasonable attorneys' fees as hereinaftcr
set forth resulting from or relating to the Action, including specifically, any lien asserted by the
fonner film who represented the Plaintiffs, Alpert, Barker, Rouellls, Ferrcntino & Cook, P.A. IIJkJa
Alpert & felTentino, P.A.
9. Confidentiality. The consideration for Amscot acceding to the terms of this
Agreement is favorable community relations and the maintenance of good will and favorable
reputation of Arnscot. The Parties agree that no disclosure shall be made to any third parly
regarding the transaction generally outlined in paragraph numbers one and two (1. and 2.) !Jerci II,
except as required by existing State of Florida statutes, under the laws of the United States 0['
Amelica, or pursuant to a third party subpoena, or in connection with resolution of any olltstanding
third-paliy liens.
10. No Admission. It is expressly understood that the Pariies explicitly delly allY
wrongdoing, liability, or obligation whatsoever to the other party relating to the transaction set forlh
in paragraph numbers one and two (1. and 2.) herein. Because this Agreement is a settlcmenl
document, it is agreed by the Parties that this Agreement shall not be filed, introduced into evidence,
or otherwise used for any purpose in connection with the transaction set forth generally in paragraph
numbers one and 2 (1. and 2.) herein. The provisions hereof are intended to be broader than the
provisions offlorida Statutes § 90.408 and Federal Rule of Evidence 408.
-3

11. No Interpretation Against the Drafter. The Parties ackJlO\vledge that this
Agreement is voluntarily entered into by all of them. All having had the right to counsel ill
connection with the negotiation, execution, and drafting hereof, no portion of this Agreement shall
be construed against any of the Parties 011 the grounds that its counsel may have been the primary
drafter hereof.
12. l\'IodificatioIl. The teffi1S and conditions of this Agreement may not be modified
except in writing signed by the Parties.
13. Florida ContractfHillsborough County Venue. This Agreement is hereby deemed
a Florida contract, executed and perfoffi1ed in Hillsborough County, Florida. This Agreement shall
be construed according to the laws of the State of Florida, regardless of whether this Agreement is
executed by certain of the parties hereto in other states or counties. The Parties consent to
jurisdiction and venue in Hillsborough County, Florida.
14. \Vaiver of Jurv Trial. The Parties hereby knowingly, voluntarily, and intentionally
waive the right to a trial by jury in respect of any litigation based hereon, or arising out oC under or
in cOllnection with this Agreement, and any agreement contemplated to be executed in conjunction
therewith, or in the course of conduct, course of dealing, statements (whether verbal or written), or
actions of any of the Parties. The Parties acknowledge that this provision is a material inducement
for this Agreement.
15. Third Party Rights: Nothing in this Agreement, whether express or implied, is
intended or should be construed to confer upon, or to grant to, any person, except the Parties and
their respective assignees and successors, any claim, right, or remedy under or because of either this
Agreement or any provision of it. Conversely, none of the Parties are waiving, releasing, or
-4

otherwise modifying their rights as against any third party except as expressly providcd hcrein.
1G. Execution in Counterparts. This Agreement is binding on, and inures to the bendit
of, the respective successors, pennitted assignees, and personal representatives of the Parties. The
Parties may execute this Agreement in counterparts. Each executed counterpart will be considered
an original, and both of them togetller \vilt constitute the same agreement. This Agrcemcnt will
become effective as of its stated effective date when each party has executed a counterpart and
delivered it to the other party.
IN 'WITNESS \VHEREOF, the Parties hereto have executed this Agreement on the day and
year first above written.
AlVISCOT CORPORt\TION
By: _
Name: _
Title: _
BAIUillR, RODEMS & COOK, P.A.
By:-..lL-~=-_b_L'_b__n'----'-'--""------
N ame:~W~:l..(~h. .:-~ /I\_- - -.o. .J,j'_\_c",-o=d...:....k _
Title :__ S.!-~-=(~(-=-e.

...:....h:.!.-f-Y-f-(-ff:...l.<'' ' ' :'C({:...L'1::!-V(!......:e:....c., _
1141 2987/ldw
-5
.L I • \) ,) u
lftJ 006
16. Execut.ion ill Counterparts. This Agreement is binding on, and inures to the benefit
0f, tl1~.~ n:0pccti;< successor~, permitted assignees, and personul representatives of the Parties. The
?<::.,ti-:-s may e:"ecut( ,his Agreement in counterparts. Each executed counterpart \vill be considered
an original, and boU) of them together will constitute lie same agreement. This Agreement will
become eff,=cti ve as of its stated effective date when each party has executed a counterpart and
delivered it to the other party.
IN \VITNESS WHEREOI", the Parties hereto have executed this Agreement on the day ami
year first aboYl.'~ written.
AlVISCOT CORPORATION
Eugene R. Clement
,
Title: 02E-s: (0.£--J\
Gay Ann Blomefield Neil Gillespie
BARKER, RODEMS & COOK, P.A.
Bv:
J . .._._. . _•. _
Name:
:J4J2987ildw
-5
BARKER, RODEl\'1S & COOK, P.A.
CLOSIN'C STATEMENT
Style of Case: Eugene R. Clement, Gay Ann Blomelleld, and As of: October 31, 2001
Neil Gillespie v. AMSCOT Corporation.
Our File No.: 99.4766
ATTORNEYS' FEES $ 50,000.00
& COSTS
PAYMENTS TO CLIENTS
EUGENE R. CLEMENT $ 2,000.00

GAY ANN BLOMEFIELD 2,000.00
NEIL GILLESPIE 2,000.00
TOTAL $ 56,000.00
I .
i
In signing this closing statement, I acknowledge that ANISCOT Corporation separately paid
my attomeys $50,000.00 to compensate my attorneys for their claim against AMSCOT for court
awarded fees and costs. I also acknowledge that I have received a copy of the fully executed Release
and Settlement Agreement dated October 30, 2001.
18

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
IN AND FOR lllLLSBOROUGH COUNTY, FLORIDA
CMLDMSION
EUGENE R. CLEMENT, individually and

on behalf of others similarly situated,
Plaintiff,
v, Consolidated Case No. 99-9730
Division J
ACE CASH EXPRESS, INC., a Texas corporation Class Representation
d/b/a ACE America's Cash Express, Jury Trial Demanded
Defendant.
-----------------...,:/
NEIL GILLESPIE, individually and on behalf
of others similarly situated,
Plaintiff,
v.
ACE CASH EXPRESS, INC., a Texas corporation

d/b/a ACE America's Cash Express,
Defendant.
---------------_---:/
STIPULATION OF THE PARTIES
Pursuant to the Mediation Conference held the 12th day of June, 2002, the parties have agreed to
abide by the following:
I. The Defendant, ACE CASH EXPRESS, INC., agrees to pay and the Plaintiffs, EUGENE
R. CLEMENT and NEIL GILLESPIE, agree to accept the sum of$5,000.00 each, in full and
complete settlement of any and all claims against all defendants that have been brought or
could have been brought in the above styled cause.
2. Clement and Gillespie shall execute releases of all defendants. ACE will release Clement
and Gillespie.
3. The Defendant, ACE CASH EXPRESS, INC., shall forward said sum to the Plaintiff's
attorney within thirty (30) days of the date of this Stipulation.
4. Each party shall bear their own fees and costs, and shall share in the mediation fees.
19

5. After receipt of the funds, the Plaintiffs will cause this action and the related appeal in the
Second District Court of Appeal to be dismissed, with prejudice.
Date
ACE CASH EXPRESS, INC.
/'~~
~: ... ',.
--- '
N~
WILLIAM 1. COOK :Attorney for Plaintiffs
'--..
BARKER, RODEMS & COOK, P.A.
Closing Statement as of June 24,2002
Style of Case: NEIL GILLESPIE, et al. v. ACE CASH EXPRESS, INC., a Texas
corporation, d/b/a ACE America's Cash Express
Our File No.: 99-4764
CREDITS:
SETILEMENT PROCEEDS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. $ 5,000.00
PAYMENT FROM EUGENE R. CLEMENT'S SETTLEMENT $ 500.00
DEBITS:
ATTORNEYS' FEE (per contract and agreement at mediation on 6/12/02) $ 1,500.00
COSTS (see attached) $ 2,000.00
NET TO CLIENT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. $ 2,000.00
I acknowledge receipt of $500.00 from my Co-Plaintiff, Eugene R Clement. As an

administrative convenience, I am receiving the amount directly from my attorneys' Trust
Account as part of my settlement proceeds.
The above closing statement is hereby approved by the undersigned on the above date.
NEIL GILLESPIE BARKER, RODEMS & COOK, P.A.
By: buftL
20
Listing Order: Transaction Date, Client-Matter
Expense Listing

Code: All Codes
Client: CLEMENT, EUGENE Person: All Persons
Matter: Ace Cash Express Responsible: All Responsible
Date Range: 12101/2000 - 06124/2002 Invoicing Status: Invoiced and Not Invoiced
.:<:.. . p~~~,. ": t{ •• l-I( I tIl' -,.),. ' . . • ... r 1'1~1. , ~r"I; l..lll ( , •• , , t ) I ~'- t-~3~
229 01/08/2001 000049·994764 S Postage $3.20 $3.20
66601/08/2001 000049-994764 S Photocopies 4 $1.00 $1.00
481 01/10/2001 000049-994764 S Photocopies . $0.25 $0.25
168 01/11/2001 000049·994764 S Postage $0.34 $0.34
493 01/11/2001 000049·994764 S Photocopies 2 $0.50 $0.50
47001/31/2001 000049·994764 S Facsimiles $9.00 $9.00
119801/31/2001 000049-994764 S Legal Research $21.86 $21.86
961 02108/2001 000049-994764 S Photocopies @ .25 per page 23 $5.75 $5.75
979 02108/2001 000049·994764 S Postage $0.68 $0.68
1071 0211212001 000049·994764 S Postage $1.31 $1.31
1086 0211212001 000049·994764 S Facsimiles $9.50 $9.50
1148 0211212001 000049·994764 S Photocopies @ .25 per page 87 $21.75 $21.75
1154 02113/2001 000049·994764 S Photocopies @ .25 per page 9 $2.25 $2.25
116702113/2001 000049-994764 S Postage $2.20 $2.20
123502113/2001 000049·994764 S Photocopies @ .25 per page 64 $16.00 $16.00
1177 02114/2001 000049-994764 S Postage $0.76 $0.76
1529 02127/2001 000049·994764 S Postage $0.76 $0.76
1585 0212712001 000049·994764 S Facsimiles $3.50 $3.50
1589 02127/2001 000049·994764 S Facsimiles $13.50 $13.50
1601 02127/2001 000049·994764 S Postage $1.39 $1.39
1611 02128/2001 000049·994764 S Postage $2.36 $2.36
Page: 1 Barl<er. Rodems & Cook, P.A. 0612412002 12:19pm

Expense Listing
Code: All Codes
Date Range: 12101/2000 - 06/24/2002 Invoicing Status: Invoiced and Not Invoiced
161802128/2001 000049-994764 S Photocopies @ .25 per page 44 $11.00 $11.00
1694 03/0212001 000049-994764 S Postage $1.65 $1.65
1711 03/02/2001 000049-994764 S Postage $0.34 $0.34
1712 03/05/2001 000049-994764 S Postage $4.38 $4.38
1846 03/08/2001 000049-994764 S Photocopies @ .25 per page $0.25 $0.25
2019 03/15/2001 000049-994764 S Legal Research $66.36 $66.36
213503/19/2001 000049-994764 S Photocopies @ .25 per page 10 $2.50 $2.50
217903/19/2001 000049-994764 S Legal Research $1.80 $1.80
2254 03/31/2001 000049-994764 S Facsimiles 6 pages on 3/20 and 3/29 $3.00 $3.00
2292 03/31/2001 000049-994764 S Photocopies @ .25 per page 98 $24.50 $24.50
2355 03/31/2001 000049-994764 S Postage $5.66 $5.66
2431 04/18/2001 000049-994764 S Clerk of the Court, Middle District of Florida - Miscellaneous $4.50 $4.50
expenses
2535 04/28/2001 000049-994764 S Facsimiles 4 $2.00 $2.00
2546 04/28/2001 000049-994764 S Facsimiles 10 $5.00 $5.00
2560 04/28/2001 000049-994764 S Facsimiles 4 $2.00 $2.00
2698 04/2812001 000049-994764 S Postage $1.57 $1.57
2761 04/2812001 000049-994764 S Postage $1.78 $1.78
2851 05/01/2001 000049-994764 S Facsimiles 7 $3.50 $3.50
285305/01/2001 000049-994764 S Facsimiles 11 $5.50 $5.50
2840 05/0212001 000049-994764 S Postage $2.78 $2.78
285805/0212001 000049-994764 S Facsimiles 17 $8.50 $8.50
3058 05/03/2001 000049-994764 S Facsimiles 7 $3.50 $3.50
Page: 2 Barker. Rodems & Cook. P.A. 0612412002 12:19pm

Expense Listing

Code: All Codes
2895 05/0412001 000049-994764 S Postage $0.34 $0.34
306805/07/2001 000049-994764 S Facsimiles 2 $1.00 $1.00
3072 05/08/2001 000049-994764 S Facsimiles 4 $2.00 $2.00
3088 05/08/2001 000049-994764 S Postage $0.34 $0.34
310505/08/2001 000049-994764 S Postage $5.43 $5.43
3064 05/09/2001 000049-994764 S Clerk of the Court, Middle District of Florida - Copy Services $120.00 $120.00
3112 05/09/2001 000049-994764 S Postage $0.89 $0.89
3121 05109/2001 000049-994764 S Postage $0.68 $0.68
3166 05/09/2001 000049·994764 S Photocopies @ .25 per page 3 $0.75 $0.75
3131 05/10/2001 000049-994764 S Postage $5.91 $5.91
3204 05/11/2001 000049-994764 S Postage $1.86 $1.86
324505/11/2001 000049-994764 S Facsimiles 4 $2.00 $2.00
3251 05/14/2001 000049-994764 S Facsimiles 6 $3.00 $3.00
3181 05/15/2001 000049-994764 S Legal Research $2.03 $2.03
3184 05/15/2001 000049-994764 S Legal Research $35.01 $35.01
3197 05/15/2001 000049-994764 S Legal Research $21.53 $21.53
3217 05115/2001 000049-994764 S William J. Cook· Miscellaneous charges $22.12 $22.12
325605/16/2001 000049-994764 S Facsimiles 3 $1.50 $1.50
326005/16/2001 000049-994764 S Facsimiles 2 $1.00 $1.00
3294 05/16/2001 000049-994764 S Facsimiles 3 $1.50 $1.50
329805/16/2001 000049-994764 S Facsimiles 2 $1.00 $1.00
33180511612001 000049-994764 S Photocopies @ .25 per page 4 $1.00 $1.00
3322 05/16/2001 000049·994764 S Postage $0.34 $0.34
3409 05/16/2001 000049·994764 S Facsimiles 4 $2.00 $2.00

Expense Listing
Code: All Codes
Matter: Ace Cash Express Respon~lble: All Responsible
Date Range: 1210112000 - 06/24/2002 Invoicing Status: Invoiced and Not Invoiced
341905/1812001 000049-994764 S Facsimiles 8 $4.00 $4.00
3424 05/21/2001 000049-994764 S Facsimiles $0.50 $0.50
346605/23/2001 000049-994764 S Postage $0.34 $0.34
3527 05/23/2001 000049-994764 S Facsimiles 2 $1.00 $1.00
3503 05/24/2001 000049-994764 S Postage $1.02 $1.02
3509 05/24/2001 000049-994764 S Postage $0.34 $0.34
351905/24/2001 000049-994764 S Postage $0.68 $0.68
3541 05/24/2001 000049-994764 S Facsimiles 2 $1.00 $1.00
3590 05/24/2001 000049-994764 S Facsimiles 2 $1.00 $1.00
3629 05/25/2001 000049-994764 S Postage $1.65 $1.65
360605/29/2001 000049-994764 S Facsimiles 2 $1.00 $1.00
4434 06/01/2001 000049-994764 S Department of Banking and Finance - Copy Services $7.80 $7.80
3760 06/04/2001 000049-994764 S Postage $3.12 $3.12
3844 06/04/2001 000049-994764 S Facsimiles 15 $7.50 $7.50
3927 06/06/2001 000049-994764 S Postage $0.68 $0.68
12441 06/08/2001 000049-994764 S Postage $0.68 $0.68
400506/1212001 000049-994764 S Legal Research $13.88 $13.88
Page: 4 Barker, Rodems & Cook. P A. 0612412002 12:19pm

listing Order: Transaction Date, Client-Matter
Expense Listing
Code: All Codes
4087 0611212001 000049-994764 S Facsimiles 2 $1.00 $1.00
4091 06/1212001 000049-994764 S Facsimiles 4 $2.00 $2.00
410606/1212001 000049·994764 S Postage $0.68 $0.68
4141 06/1212001 000049-994764 S Facsimiles 4 $2.00 $2.00
414406/12/2001 000049-994764 S Facsimiles 16 $8.00 $8.00
416206/1212001 000049-994764 S Postage $1.65 $1.65
412406/13/2001 000049-994764 S Long Distance Telephone Calls $0.33 $0.33
4225 06/14/2001 000049-994764 S Facsimiles 9 $4.50 $4.50
4259 06/15/2001 000049-994764 S Postage $0.34 $0.34
434006/15/2001 000049-994764 S Postage $2.46 $2.46
4405 06/15/2001 000049-994764 S Facsimiles 44 $22.00 $22.00
441006/15/2001 000049-994764 S Facsimiles 9 $4.50 $4.50
441406/18/2001 000049·994764 S Facsimiles 2 $1.00 $1.00
4417 06/19/2001 000049-994764 S Facsimiles 2 $1.00 $1.00
4422 06/19/2001 000049-994764 S Facsimiles $0.50 $0.50
4463 06/20/2001 000049-994764 S Facsimiles $0.50 $0.50
4294 06/21/2001 000049-994764 S Office of the Comptroller· Copy Services $173.10 $173.10
4384 06/21/2001 000049-994764 S Postage $0.68 $0.68
438606/21/2001 000049-994764 S Postage $0.34 $0.34
4465 06/21/2001. 000049·994764 S Facsimiles 5 $2.50 $2.50
Page: 5 Barl<er. Rodems & Cook. P.A. 0612412002 12:19pm

Expense Listing
Code: All Codes
4520 06/25/2001 000049-994764 S Postage $3.12 $3.12
4529 06/25/2001 000049-994764 S Postage $0.34 $0.34
4541 06/25/2001 000049-994764 S Facsimiles 15 $7.50 $7.50
4546 06/25/2001 000049-994764 S Facsimiles 6 $3.00 $3.00
4733 06/26/2001 000049-994764 S Berryhill & Associates, Inc. - Deposition Fee $140.00 $140.00
4734 06127/2001 000049-994764 S Berryhill & Associates, Inc. - Deposition Fee $50.00 $50.00
474507/0212001 000049-994764 S Facsimiles 2 $1.00 $1.00
4757 07/03/2001 000049-994764 S William J. Cook - Parking Expense $24.00 $24.00
5231 07/03/2001 000049-994764 S Postage $0.68 $0.68
5233 07/03/2001 000049-994764 S FedEx Shipping Charges $22.88 $22.88
4847 07/05/2001 000049-994764 S Facsimiles 4 $2.00 $2.00
483607/06/2001 000049-994764 S Postage $0.68 $0.68
4854 07/06/2001 000049-994764 S Facsimiles 6 $3.00 $3.00
4861 07/09/2001 000049-994764 S Facsimiles 2 $1.00 $1.00
4970 07/11/2001 000049-994764 S William J. Cook - Travel Expense- Hotel/Airline $601.10 $601.10
5321 07111/2001 000049-994764 S Comptroller, State of Florida - Copy Services $59.10 S59.10
5047 07/1212001 000049-994764 S Photocopies @ .25 per page 3 SO.75 SO.75
511307/1212001 000049-994764 S Postage $0.68 SO.68
525907/1212001 000049-994764 S Facsimiles 2 $1.00 $1.00
5304 07/17/2001 000049-994764 S Postage $1.14 $1.14

Expense Listing

Code: All Codes
Date Range: 12101/2000·06/24/2002 Invoicing Status: Invoiced and Not Invoiced
5333 07/20/2001 000049-994764 S Legal Research $2.25 $2.25
5337 07/20/2001 000049·994764 S Legal Research $128.28 $128.28
5620 07/26/2001 000049·994764 S Facsimiles 10 $5.00 $5.00
5692 07/30/2001 000049-994764 S Department of Banking and Finance· Copy Services $9.45 $9.45
567607/31/2001 000049-994764 S Facsimiles 5 $2.50 $2.50
571908/01/2001 000049-994764 S Facsimiles 7 $3.50 $3.50
5723 08/01/2001 000049-994764 S Facsimiles 6 $3.00 $3.00
5706 08/0212001 000049·994764 S Postage $2.52 $2.52
5738 08/03/2001 000049-994764 S Facsimiles 5 $2.50 $2.50
6023 08/14/2001 000049·994764 S Long Distance Telephone Calls $0.86 $0.86
651608/31/2001 000049-994764 S FedEx Shipping Charges $20.68 $20.68
6739 09/13/2001 000049-994764 S Long Distance Telephone Calls $0.12 $0.12
6851 09/21/2001 000049-994764 S Legal Research $62.28 $62.28
718609/28/2001 000049-994764 S Facsimiles 6 $3.00 $3.00
7266 10101/2001 000049-994764 S Facsimiles 3 $1.50 $1.50
7428 10103/2001 000049-994764 S Berryhill & Associates, Inc. - Miscellaneous charges $50.00 $50.00
7315 10104/2001 000049-994764 S Facsimiles 5 $2.50 $2.50
7611 10/11/2001 000049-994764 S Postage $0.34 $0.34
7578 10/15/2001 000049·994764 S FedEx Shipping Charges $15.08 $15.08
Page: 7 Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A. 0612412002 12:19pm

Listing Order: Transaction Date, CHent-Matter
Expense Listing

Code: All Codes
7747 10/1612001 000049-994764 S Facsimiles 2 $1.00 $1.00
7940 10/24/2001 000049-994764 S Facsimiles 3 $1.50 $1.50
8399 11/09/2001 000049-994764 S Postage $3.78 $3.78
8408 11/09/2001 000049-994764 S Facsimiles 3 $1.50 $1.50
8411 11/09/2001 000049-994764 S Facsimiles 24 $12.00 $12.00
8427 11/13/2001 000049-994764 S Clerk of Court, Second District Court of Appeal - Filing Fee $250.00 $250.00
8428 11/13/2001 000049-994764 S Clerk of the Circuit Court, Thirteenth Circuit - Filing Fee $156.00 $156.00
8490 11/13/2001 000049-994764 S Postage $1.14 $1.14
8468 11/14/2001 000049-994764 S Legal Research $4.54 $4.54
8609 11/20/2001 000049-994764 S Facsimiles $0.50 $0.50
8657 11/27/2001 000049-994764 S Postage $0.34 $0.34
8697 11/27/2001 000049-994764 S Facsimiles 2 $1.00 $1.00
9196 1211212001 000049-994764 S Facsimiles 2 $1.00 $1.00
9199 12114/2001 000049-994764 S Berryhill & Associates, Inc. - Deposition Fee $126.50 $126.50
9259 12117/2001 000049-994764 S Facsimiles 9 $4.50 $4.50
9260 1211712001 000049-994764 S Facsimiles 27 $13.50 $13.50
9326 12118/2001 000049-994764 S Facsimiles 4 $2.00 $2.00
9389 12118/2001 000049-994764 S Postage $1.36 $1.36
9575 01/0212002 000049-994764 S Postage $2.39 $2.39

Expense Listing
Code: All Codes
9703 01/04/2002 000049-994764 S Facsimiles 2 $1.00 $1.00
9708 01/07/2002 000049·994764 S Facsimiles 3 $1.50 $1.50
9773 01/10/2002 000049·994764 S Postage $2.85 $2.85
9893 01/10/2002 000049-994764 S Facsimiles 7 $3.50 $3.50
991401/10/2002000049-994764 S Photocopies @ .25 per page 30 $7.50 $7.50
981001/15/2002000049-994764 S Facsimiles 3 $1.50 $1.50
981801/16/2002000049-994764 S Facsimiles 2 $1.00 $1.00
982801/17/2002000049-994764 S Facsimiles 2 $1.00 $1.00
9837 01/21/2002 000049-994764 S Long Distance Telephone Calls $0.34 $0.34
9993 01/22/2002 000049-994764 S Postage $2.04 $2.04
9995 01/2212002 000049-994764 S Postage $2.39 $2.39
1012601/25/2002000049-994764 S Facsimiles 40 $20.00 $20.00
1020501/25/2002000049-994764 S Postage $2.85 $2.85
10449 0211212002 000049-994764 S Legal Research $5.59 $5.59
10467 0211212002 000049-994764 S Long Distance Telephone Calls $1.19 $1.19
10800 02128/2002 000049·994764 S Facsimiles 7 $3.50 $3.50
1097203/11/2002000049·994764 S Long Distance Telephone Calls $0.95 $0.95
1101603/11/2002000049·994764 S Postage $5.00 $5.00
11179 03/13/2002 000049-994764 S Facsimiles 6 $3.00 $3.00
11341 03/24/2002 000049-994764 S Postage $3.75 $3.75
11357 03/24/2002 000049-994764 S Facsimiles 18 $9.00 $9.00
1145503/29/2002 000049·994764 S Facsimiles 5 $2.50 $2.50
Page: 9 Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A. 0612412002 12:19pm

Expense Listing
Listing Order: Transaction Date, Client-Malter Code: All Codes
MaUer: Ace Cash Express Responsible: All Responsible
11679 04/0112002 000049-994764 S Facsimiles 2 $1.00 $1.00
11985 04/15/2002 000049·994764 S Postage $0.68 $0.68
12024 04/15/2002 000049-994764 S Facsimiles 3 $1.50 $1.50
1209004/17/2002 000049-994764 S Facsimiles 3 $1.50 $1.50
12104 04/18/2002 000049-994764 S Facsimiles 17 $8.50 $8.50
1211404/2212002000049-994764 S Facsimiles 9 $4.50 $4.50
12122 04/2212002 000049-994764 S Facsimiles 5 $2.50 $2.50
12125 04/23/2002 000049-994764 S Facsimiles 5 $2.50 $2.50
12259 04/25/2002 000049·994764 S IKON Office Solutions - Copy Services $172.32 $172.32
12282 04/25/2002 000049-994764 S Postage $29.04 $29.04
12287 04/26/2002 000049-994764 S Postage $2.64 $2.64
12780 05/15/2002 000049-994764 S Facsimiles 8 $4.00 $4.00
12790 05/16/2002 000049-994764 S Facsimiles 2 $1.00 $1.00
12924 05/17/2002 000049-994764 S Facsimiles 9 $4.50 $4.50
12925 05/20/2002 000049-994764 S Facsimiles 9 $4.50 $4.50
13218 06/03/2002 000049-994764 S Facsimiles 9 $4.50 $4.50
13225 06/04/2002 000049-994764 S Facsimiles 5 $2.50 $2.50
1345906/1212002000049-994764 S Gasper J. Ficarrotta - Mediation Fee $344.00 $344.00
13371 06/13/2002 000049-994764 S Facsimiles 2 $1.00 $1.00
1347906/17/2002000049-994764 S Facsimiles 4 $2.00 $2.00
Transaction Listing Total: $4,901.69 $4,901.69

STATE OF FLORIDA
DEPARTMENT OF BANKING AND FINANCE
AND
OFFICE OF THE AnORNEY GENERAL
IN RE:
ACE CASH EXPRESS, INC. d/b/a
ACE AMERICA'S CASH EXPRESS, DBF CASE NO.: 9177-F-9/02
----------------I
SETILEMENT AGREEMENT
The Florida Department of Banking and Finance, Division of Securities and Finance
("DBF"), the Office of the Attorney General (UAttorney General") and ACE Cash Express, Inc.
d/b/a ACE America's Cash Express ("Respondent" or "ACE") agree as follows:
1. JURISDICTION. OBF is charged \vith the administration of Chapter 516, 560,
and 687, Florida Statutes~ and the Attorney General is charged \vith the administration of
~
Chapters 501, 559, 687, 895" and 896, Florida Statutes. This agreement applies to Florida
transactions only.
2. BACKGROUND.
Attorney General
a. The Attorney General moved to intervene as plaintiff in two civil cases
that were pending against ACE~ contending that ACE had violated Chapters· 501,
516, 559, . 687, 895, and 896, Florida Statutes, in connection with deferred
560~
deposit check cashing services.provided by ACE in Florida prior to ApriL.2000.
Those cases are: Eugene I~. (~Jenlellt aJld Neil Gille.\. pie alld ..~'tate ofFlorida,
Office qfthe Atlorlley Gellert,l, Depllrtnlent ofLegal Affairs liS. ACE Cash
Express. IIIC., Allerilative FinclJlcia/, IIIC•• J~' ofthe Treas11re (~oast, Il1e., Raymond
c. Henln1ig, DOllold H. Neusll1dl. Kll)' I). Zilliox, J~()l1l1/d J. Schmitt, and unknowl1
FINAL
21
entities Gnd individuals, (~oll.\·oli,ll1'ed (~clse No. 99 09730, in the Circuit Court for
the Thirteenth Judicial District of Florida (the "Clement" case); and Betls v. Ace
Cash Expr~'s, 927 So.2d 294 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002), (the "Betts" case). DBF was
not a named party in either case.
b. ACE and the other defendants disagreed with the claims made by the
Plaintiffs and the Attorney General in each of those cases.
c. The Attorney General's Inotion to intervene in the Betts case was denied.
d. In the Clement case, the individual Plaintiffs' clailns were dismissed with
prejudice, leaving the Attorney General as the sole Plaintiff. The Attorney
General's RICO claims were dislnissed with prejudice and are subject ofa
pending appeal before the Second District Coul1 of AppeaJ of Florida styled ..')tate
ofFlorida, Qffice ofthe AI/oriley General v. Zilliox, Case No. 2002-2340
(consolidated with Case No. 2002-3] 13). All of the claims asserted by the
Attorney General in' the Clement case are to be settled pursuant to this
Agreement, with the Attorney General voluntarily dismissing their claims.
e. ACE 'and the individual defendants have denied and continue to deny that
they engaged in any wrongdoing., and this Agreement shall not constitute any
adlnission of any wrongdoing or liability on the part of ACE or any of the
individual defendants.
f. The, Attorney General and ACE wish to avoid the time and expense·
involved, in further litigation.
FINAL 2
Department of Banking and Finance
g. Goleta National Bank, a national bank located in Goleta, California
("Goleta"), has offered loans to residents of Florida since April 2000. ACE has
provided agency ·services to Goleta related to those loans in Florida. On October
25 and 28, 2002. ACE and Goleta entered into separate consent orders with the
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency of the United States ("OCC"), pursuant
to which Goleta agreed, among other things, to generally cease the origination,
renewal and rollover of its loans in Florida and ACE agreed, among other things,
to generally cease providing services to Goleta related to the origination, renewal
and rollover of such Goleta loans, both by no later than December 31, 2002.
Goleta, ACE and the OC..c agreed that the loans provided by Goleta and serviced
by ACE were made pursuant to 12 U.S.C. §85 and that the interest rate charged
by Goleta was permissible under the laws of the United States for national banks
located in the State of California. DBF was not a party to the agreement between
Goleta, ACE, and the OCC..
h. ACE also offers a bill paying service through which it offers to accept or
receive voluntary utility payments from its Florida customers and, for a fee,
electronically transmit the payment to the utility. The DBF has informed ACE
that to offer this service, ACE should be licensed as a Funds Transmitter under
Part II, Chapter 560, Florida Statutes. ACE disagrees with the position taken by
the DBF, but, to avoid the expense and uncertainty of litigation. ACE agreed to
file, and has pending with OBF. an application to act as a Funds Transmitter
..,
FINAL J
under Part II.. Chapter 560, Florida Statutes. The DBF will issue that license, as
well as the license authorizing ACE to act as a Deferred Presentment Provider
under Part IV, Chapter 560, Florida Statutes, on or before the effective date ofthis
Agreement. Ace agrees that future transactions involving the transmission of
funds will be governed by the provisions of Part II, Chapter 560, Florida Statutes,
and ACE will comply with those provisions in all future transactions.
i. ACE is licensed with DBF as a Check Casher under Part III, Chapter 560,
Florida Statutes.
Pu roose and Intent
J. The parties wish to resolve and to release any clailns that were asserted, or
could have been asserted, or could be asserted, because of or arising from the
investigation, litigation, pr regulatory review· conducted by the DBV or the
Attorney General.
k. The DBF agrees that ACE has fully cooperated with it in this matter.
I. It is the intent of the parties that this agreement be implemented promptly,
and without injury or inconvenience to ACE customers.
m. It is. the intent of the parties that OBF issue or renew any authorization or
license necessary for ACE to contin~le to offer services in Florida, including
deferred presentment transactions.. check cashing, bill paying debit card

9
transactions, money orders~ wire transfers and other products that are authorized
under Florida law.
n. It 'is the intent of the parties that this agreement be implemented without
causing competitive disadvantage to ACE..
FINAL 4
3. CONSIDERATION.· ACE, the DSF, and the Attorney General agree as follows:
8. ACE will cease providing agent services to Goleta in connection with the
origination,:'-enewal, or rollover of any Goleta loans in the State of Florida by
December 31, 2002. ACE may, howevef, continue to provide services to Goleta
related to the servicing and collection of Goleta loans originated, renewed, or
rolled overin the State of Florida before January 1, 2~03, subject to paragraph
3(g) below.
b. ACE has applied fOf.. and DBF agrees to issue upon the issuance of the
final order contelnplated by this agreelnent, a license with an effective date of
December 30, 2002, authorizing ACE to act as a Deferred Presentment Provider
under Part IV, Chapter 560~ Florida Statutes. ACE agr,ees not to enter into any
deferred presentment trapsactions in Florida unless such deferred presentment
transactions are completed in accordance with Part IV-, Chapter 560, Florida
Statutes. DBF agrees that ACE may act as a Deferred Presentment Provider under
Part IV, Chapter 560.. Florida Statutes, and as a Funds Transmitter under Part II,
Chapter 560, Florida Statutes, between December 30, 2002 and the issuance of
the final' order, provided that all such funds transmission .and .deferred presentment
transactions engaged in during this tilne period are otherwise completed in
accordance with Part II, Chapter 560, Florida Statutes, and Part IV, Chapter 560,
Florida Statutes. OBF agrees that this is consistent with the public interest and
will not constitute a violation of this Agreement or any applicable law, including
but not limited t0 9 ~hapters 501 . 516,559,560,687,895 and 896, Florida
Statutes, or an Rules related to those statutes.
FINAL 5
c. ACE represents and warrants that it has obtained the consent of Goleta so
that no Goleta loans entered into before 'the effective date of this Agreement will
be extendect (except for the custolners' five-day extension options that are part of
the terms of outstanding loans) or converted, without full payment by the Goleta
loan customers, to any other type of transaction. Where applicable., ACE agrees
that it will not otler deferred presentlnent services to a Goleta loan customer
unless that customer's Goleta loan is r~paid or cancelled in accordance with
paragraph 3(g)-below. DBF agrees that the continued services provided under
the Goleta loan prograln authorized by this subp~ragraph and by paragraph 3(a)
above are consistent with the public interest and will not constitute a violation of
this Agreement or any applicable law~ including but not lilnited to, Chapters 501,
516.. 559, 560, 687, 8951lnd 896, Florida Statutes., or any Rules related to those
statutes.
d. DBF agrees to issue to ACE licenses pursuant to Part II, Chapter 560,
Florida Statutes, and Part IV, Chapter 560, Florida Statutes, with an effective date
of December 30, 2002 upon the issuance of the final order contemplated in this
Agreement. ACE and the DSF agree that, until the issuance of the final ord~r
contemplated in this. agreement.. ACE will continue to offer its bill paying service
in order to avoid injury to those customers who rely on that service. DBF and the
Attorney General agree that continuing to offer that service is consistent with the
public interest and will not constitute a violation of this Agreement or any
applicable law, including but not limited to, Chapters 501 . 516, 559, 560, 687,
895, and 896.. Florida Statutes, or any Rules related to those statutes.
FINAL 6
e. DBF acknowledges that no additional in.formation is needed from ACE for
it to issue the Ijcenses contemplated by this Agreement..
f: ACe agrees to pay a total of $500,000 in settlement and for issuance by
DBF of authorizations, licenses, or other approvals necessary for ACE to continue
in business in Florida, and for the releases in paragraphs 7 and 8 below. Of the
$500.000 total settlelnent, ACE has agreed to pay $250,000 to the DBF
Regulatory Trust Fund in full satisfaction of all attorney's fees, costs, and other
expenses incurred by the DBF in connection with this matter and, ACE has agreed
to deliver to the Attorney General, a contribution of$250,000 to the Florida State
University College of Law in full satisfaction of all· attorney's fees, costs and
other expenses incurred by the Attorney General in connection with this matter.
These amounts will be p~id by check, and will be delivered to the DBF or the
Attorney General upon entry of the Final Order as provided for herein.
g. ACE represents and warrants that it has obtained the consent of Goleta so
that loans that are delinquent as of October I, 2002. and remain unpaid as of the
effective date of this agreement, from customers who engaged in Goleta loan
transactions commenced or originated before October I, 2002 in Florida
(collectively" the "Goleta Loan Custonlers") need not be repaid,. and the debt
owed to Goleta from Goleta Loan Customers will be cancelled.
h. If Goleta, either directly or through ACE, its agent,. .has notified a credit-
reporting agency ofa Goleta Loan Customer's delinquent debt to Goleta, then
ACE represents and warrants that it has obtained the consent of Goleta for ACE to
notify the credit agency that the delinquent amount has been cancelled. .
FINAL 7
I. In addition to the amount specified in paragraph 3(f) above, ACE will pay
up to $15,000 for an independent audit of the loan cancellations provided in
paragraph ~g) above, the credit reporting notifications provided in paragraph 3
(h) above, and verification of compliance with the transition from the Goleta loan
product to the state licensed product contemplated in paragraph 3(b) and 3(c)
above. DBF will select the independent auditor, after consultation with ACE.
The independent auditor selected will be required to report to the DBF within 90
days of the selection.
j. The entry ofa Final Order by OBF in the form of the Attachment to this
agreement.
k. Within 10 days after the entry of the final order contemplated herein, the
Attorney General will di~miss with prejudice its lawsuit, Eugene R. Clement alld
Neil Gillespie and State ofFlorida. qffice ofthe Attorney General, Department of
Legal Affairs vs. ACE Cash Express, IIlC., Altemative Financial, Inc., JS ofthe .
Treasure Coast, blc.,.Raymond C. Hemmig, DOllald H. Neustadt, Kay D. Zil/iox,
Ronald J. Schmitt, alld unknown emilies and iJ~dividllals. Consolidated Case No.
9909730, in the Circuit Court for the Thirteenth Judicial District of Florida, as to
all defendants.
1. Within 10 days after the entry of the final order contemplated in 30)
above, the Attorney General will dismiss with prejudice its appeal of any orders in
the Clement case..litigation. including State ofFlorida, Office ofthe Attorney
General v. Zi//iox, Case No. 2002-2240 and Slale ofFlorida, Office ofthe
Attomey Gener,,1 1'. AItematil;e FiflCI/lc:i"t, /flC., Case No. 2002-3113.
FINAL 8
4. CONSENT. Without adlnitting or denying any wrongdoing, Respondent
consents to the issuance by the DBF ofa Final Order, in substantially the form of the attached
Final Order, which incorp~rates the terms of this Agreelnent.
5. FINAL ORDER. The Final Order incorporating this Agreelnent is issued
pursuant to Subsection 120.57(4),. Florida Statutes, and upon its issuance shall be a final
administrative order.
6. WAIVERS. Respondent knowingly and voluntarily waives:
a. its right to an adlninistrative hearing provided for by Chapter 120, Florida
Statutes,. to contest the specific agreements included in this Agreement;
b. any requirelnent that the Final Order incorporating this Agreenlent contain
separately stated Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law or Notice of Rights;
c. its right to the isslJance ofa Recommended Order by an administrative law
judge froln the Division of Adlninistrative Hearings or froln the DBF;
d. any and all rights to object to or challenge in any judicial proceeding,
including but not limited to, an appeal pursuant to Section 120.68.. Florida
Statutes, any aspect, provision or requirement concerning the content, issuance,
procedure or timeliness of the Final Order incorporating this Agreement; and
e. any causes of action in law or in equity, which Respondent may have
arising out of the specific matters addressed in this agreement. DBF for itself and
the DBF.Released Parties, ac~epts this release and waiver by Respondent without
in any way acknowledging or admitting that any such calise of action does or may
exist, and DBF, for ~tself and the DBF Released Parties, expressly denies that any
such right or cause of action does in .fact exist.
FINAL 9
7. ATIORNEY GENERAL R~LEASE. The Attorney Genera]9 for himselfand
his predecessors. successors and assigns, hereby waives, releases and forever discharges ACE, its
predecessors, successors, aniliates, subsidiaries and parent corporations, shareholders, directors,
officers, attorneys, employees, agents.. franchisees and assigns, and Goleta, and its predecessors,
successors, affiliates, subsidiaries and parent corporations, shareholders, directors, officers,
attorneys, employees, agents, franchisees and assigns (collecti,vely, the "ACE Released Parties"),
from any and all claims, demands.. causes of action.. suits, debts, dues.. duties, sums of money,
accounts, fees, penalties, damages, judglnents'l 'Iiabi-tities and obligations, both contingent and
fixed, known and unknown.. foreseen and unforeseen. anticipated and unanticipated, expected
and unexpected, related to or arising out of Goleta's or ACE's operations in Florida prior to the
effective date of this agreement. This release includes.. but is not limited to, any claims related to
any loans made~ renewed, or rolled over.bY Goleta in Florida and any services provided by ACE
or its franchisees related thereto.. any clainls related to any violation of Chapters 501,516,559,
560,687, 772, 895 and 896, Florida ,\'la{lIle:~', any clailns related to check cashing services
provided prior to the effective date of Part IV, Chapter 560, Florida L~'ta/lites, and any claims
related to any licensing requirements for the services provided by ACE to its customers in
Florida prior to the effective date of this agreement. Without limiting the generality of the
foregoing, this release also includes all claims asserted or that could have been or could be
asserted against the parties named as defendants or that could have been named as defendants in
ElIgel1e R Clen1ell1 alld Neil Gi//eSlJie clIld ,~'taJe (!f Flori,la, (~ffice of the Att()rlley Gel/era!, .
Departn1£!11t ofLegal A.ffairs liS. A(~E (~ash Ex/Jress. IIIC., A/JerI/alive Financial, [IIC., ,)5' a/the
rreaS!,re (;oast. IIIC., Raynl011d (~. !-!enlnlig, [Jollald H. Neustadt. Kay [J. Zilliox, ROl1ald J.
~'chn1itt, GIld l1111a,OlVII entities and iJ,divi,hlllls, (~ol/.\·()lidalc!LI (~"se No. 99 09730. ACE, for itself
FINAL 10
and on behalf of the ACE Released Parties, accepts this release and waiver by the Attorney
General without in any way acknowledging or adlnitting that any such cause of action does or
may exist, and ACE, for it~lf and on behalf of the ACE Released Parties, expressly denies that
any such right or cause of action does in fact exist. Respondent hereby waives~ releases and
forever discharges the Attorney General and his respective employees.. agents, and
representatives (collectively, the Attorney'General Released Parties") from any causes of action'
lL
in law or in equity, which Respondent may have arising out of the specific matters addre~sed in
this agreement. The Attorney General, for themselves and the Attorney General Released
Parties, accept this release and waiver by Respondent without in any way acknowledging' or
admitting that any such cause of action does or may exist, the Attorney General, for himself and
the Attorney General Released Parties, expressly deny that any such right or cause of action does
in fact exist.
8. DEPARTMENT OF BANKING AND FINANCE RELEASE. The DBF, for
itself and its predecessors, successors and assigns, hereby waives, releases and forever
discharges ACE and its predecessors, successors, subsidiaries and parent corporations,
shareholders, directors, officers, attorneys, elnployees, agents, franchisees andass-igns, and·
Goleta, and its predecessors.. successors, affiliates, subsidiaries and parent corporations,
shareholders, directors, officers, attorneys.. employees, agents, franchisees and assigns
(collectively, the "ACE Released Parties"), froln any and all claims, demands, causes of action,
suits, debts, dues, duties, sums of money, accounts, fees, penalties, damages.. judgments,
liabilities and obligations, both contingent and fixed, known and unknown, foreseen and
unforeseen, anticipated and un.anticipated, expected and unexpect~d, related to or arising out of
the conduct of ACE and/or Goleta in connection with the offering of deferred presentment
FINAL 11
services or loans in Florida~ \vhere such conduct occurred prior to the effective date of this
Agreement.. This release includes.. but is not liJnited to, any claims related to any.loans made,
renewed, or rolled over by poleta in 'Florida and any services provided by ACE or its franchisees
related thereto, any claims related to any violation of Chapters 501, 516, 559, 560,687, 772, 895
and 896, Florida LS'tatllles.. any claims related to check cashing selVices provided prior to the
effective date of Part IV, Chapter 560, F/orid(J ." Illlllles, and any claims related to any licensing
requirements for the services provided by ACE to its custolners in Florida prior to the effective
date of this Agreelnent. ACE, for itself and on behalf of the ACE Released Parties, accept this
release and waiver by the Attorney General and the DBF without in any way acknowledging or
adtnitting that any such cause of action does or may exist~ and ACE for itself and on behalf of
9
the ACE Released Parties, expressly denies that any such right or cause of action does in fact
exist.
9. EXCLUSION. This release does not include any claiIns under Chapter 560,
Florida Statutes, against franchisees of ACE related to deferred presentment transactions
engaged in after the effective date of Part IV.. Chapter 560" Florida Statutes, unless such
transactions were under the Goleta loan program.
10. ATTORNEYS' FEES. Each party to this Agreement shalJ be solely respon~ible
for its separate costs and attorneys' fees incurred in the prosecution, defense or negotiation in
this matter up to entry of the Final Order incorporating this Agreelnent and the dismissals by the
Attorney General provided for in 3 (k) and 3 (I) above.
11. EFFECTIVE DATE. The effective date of this agreement is December ~O, 2002.
12. FAILURE TO COMPLY. Nothing in this Agreelnent limits Respondent's right
to contest any finding or determination made by DBF or the Attorney General concerning
FINAL 12
Respondent's alleged failure to comply with any of the terms and provisions ofthis Agreement
or of the Final Order incorporating this Agreement.
WHEREFORE. in consid~ration of the foregoing. DBF. the Attorney General. and ACE
execute this Agreement on the dates indicated below.
By: Qrt"~~ Date:

D N SAXON
Division Director
OFFICE 0t) TR ~'IT~~ENERAL

By: ~ «~ Date:
RICHARD DORAN. Attorney General
ACE CASH EXPRESS, INC., d/b/a •

ACE AMERICA'S CASH EXPRESS
By: Date:
ERIC C. NORRINGTON
Vice President
STATE OF FLORIDA
COUNTY OF _
BEFORE ME, the undersigned authority. personally appeared --'-~
as of ACE CASH EXPRESS. TNC.. d/b/a ACE AMERICA'S CASH

EXPRESS, who is personally known to me or who has produced
_ _ _ _ _ _--'- as identification. and who. after being duly sworn. states that he
has read and understands the contents of this Agreement and voluntarily executed the same on
behalfof ACE CASH EXPRESS. INC.. d/b/a ACE AMERICA'S CASH EXPRESS.
FINAL 13
Respondent's alleged failure to comp1y ~itl1 any of the tenns arid provisions of this Agreement
or of the Final Order incorporating this Agreement.
WHEREFORE. in considiration of the foregoing, DBF, the Attome}" General, and ACE
1.
execute this Agreement on the dates indicated below.
By: Date:
DON SAXON
Division Director
OFFICE OF YG~NERAL
By: Date:
RICHARD DORAN, Attorney General
ACE CASH EXPRESS, INC., d/b/a

ACE A RICA'S CASH EXPRESS·
By: Date:
STATE OF FLORlDA
COUNTY OF - - -
BEFORE ME\ the -undersigned authority, personally appeared _

as of ACE CASH EXPRESS, INC., dIo/a ACE AMERICA"S CASH
EXPRESS, who is personally known to me or \vho has produced
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ as identification, and who, after being duly sworn, states that he
has read and understands th-e contents ofthis Agreement and voluntarily executed the same on
behalf of ACE CASH EXPRE-SS. INC., d/b/a ACE AMERICA'8 CASH EXPRESS.
FINAL 13
SWORN AND SUBSCRI.BED before me this _ _ day of , 2002.
NOTARY PUBLIC
State of Florida
Print Nalne:
My COlnlnission No.:
My C0111111ission Expires:
(SEAL)
FINAL 14
A A"C·E
AIoIf",.. "iC<\JIr'",'Ue
1231 Greenway Drive #600
Irving, Texas 75038
(972) 550-5000
INVOICE AMOUNT PAID
COMMENT GROSS DEDUCTION
NUMBER DATE
12123/02 12123/02 Settlement 250,000.00 250.000.00
PAYMENT ADVICE
WELLS FARGO BANK

CHECK
005132
A A·C· E
AMf'CA'S GuN UJlfUJe
1231 Greenway Drive #600
Irving, Texas 75038
(972) 550-5000
NUMBER
DATE AMOUNT
12/19/02 $**....*'*·**~50.000.00
PAY Two Hundred Fifty Thousand 00/1 00 dollars··**....·******·***********·..··*****·***********··*********'*******....*••****..*******'**'*
TO THE ORDER OF
Flordia State University College of Law
425 West Jefferson Street
Tallahassee, FL 32306 .
.~
liP
liP
II· 00 5 Ii :I 211· I: ~ ~ ~0 ~ ? a ? 0 I: .. ? 5 ~ b 3 00 118 118

ATTORNEYS AT LAW
CHRIS A. BARKER Telephone 813/489-1001

RY AN CHRISTOPHER RODEMS
Facsimile 813/489-1008
WILLIAM J. COOK Talupa, Florida 33606
JEFFREY W. GIBSON
May 9,2003
Mr. Neil J. Gillespie

301 'v\,Test Platt Street, 1"~0. 155
Dear Neil:
Pursuant to your request, I am enclosing a copy of our expenses from the Amscot case. You
did not receive one of these when you settled your case because you were not required to pay any
expenses out of your settlement. As you know, the Defendant paid our fees and costs separately.
Also, our fonner finn advised us that it incurred expenses of$2,544.79.
I was good to hear from you. I hope everything is going well.
Sincerely,
William J. Cook
WJC:SDW
Enclosure
22
Expense Listing
Listing Order: Transaction Date, Client-Matter Code: All Codes
Matter: Clement v. Amscot Responsible: All Responsible
[R;~ordl Date I Cllent·Matter ~I Description ~I

223 01108/2001 000049-994766 P Postage $1.43 $1.43
22601/08/2001 000049-994766 P Postage $1.43 $1.43
659 01/0812001 000049-994766 P Photocopies $0.25 $0.25
660 01/08/2001 000049-994766 P Photocopies $0.25 $0.25
663 01/08/2001 000049-994766 P Photocopies 270 $67.50 $67.50
680 01/0812001 000049-994766 P Photocopies 8 $2.00 $2.00
84 01/10/2001 000049-994766 P Facsimiles $0.50 $0.50
231 01/10/2001 000049-994766 P Postage $0.68 $0.68
47901110/2001 000049-994766 P Photocopies 4 $1.00 $1.00
177201/10/2001 000049-994766 P Long Distance Telephone Calls $0.05 $0.05
485 01/11/2001 000049-994766 P Photocopies 2 $0.50 $0.50
172 01/11/2001 000049-994766 P Postage $0.34 $0.34
162 01/1212001 000049-994766 P Postage $0.34 $0.34
530 01/1212001 000049-994766 P Photocopies 8 $2.00 $2.00
15301/16/2001 000049-994766 P Postage $0.68 $0.68
511 01/16/2001 000049-994766 P Photocopies 6 $1.50 $1.50
21901/18/2001 000049-994766 P Postage $0.34 $0.34
59701/18/2001 000049-994766 P Photocopies $0.25 $0.25
304 01/22/2001 000049-994766 P Postage $0.34 $0.34
31201/22/2001 000049-994766 P Postage $0.34 $0.55
60601/22/2001 000049-994766 P Photocopies 33 $8.25 $8.25
609 01/2212001 000049-994766 P Photocopies $0.25 $0.25
31901/23/2001 000049-994766 P Postage $0.34 $0.34
558 01/23/2001 000049-994766 P Photocopies 2 $0.50 $0.50
107 01/26/2001 000049-994766 P Facsimiles $1.00 $1.00
36301/26/2001 000049-994766 P Postage $0.34 $0.34
Page: 1 Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A. 05109/2003 12:33pm

Expense Listing
- -
I';e;;d] Date I Client-Matter ~ DescriptIon
--~----
Units
-
Our Coat Client Cost
733 01126/2001 000049-994766 P Photocopies 162 $40.50 $40.50
44801/30/2001 000049-994766 P Postage $1.18 $1.18
69901/30/2001 000049-994766 P Photocopies 42 $10.50 $10.50
119901/31/2001 000049-994766 P Legal Research $15.72 $15.72
1210 01/31/2001 000049-994766 P Legal Research $7.50 $7.50
1212 01/31/2001 000049-994766 P Legal Research $26.21 $26.21
657 02/01/2001 000049-994766 P Postage $0.34 $0.34
834 02/05/2001 000049-994766 P Postage $0.89 $0.89
849 02105/2001 000049-994766 P Postage $0.34 $0.34
872 02105/2001 000049-994766 P Photocopies @ .25 per page 14 $3.50 $3.50
864 02106/2001 000049-994766 P Postage $1.39 $1.39
899 02106/2001 000049-994766 P Facsimiles $15.50 $15.50
1062 02107/2001 000049-994766 P Regency Reporting Service. Inc. - Deposition Fee $59.60 $59.60
100402108/2001 000049-994766 P Facsimiles $1.00 $1.00
117402114/2001 000049-994766 P Postage $1.81 $1.81
1259 02/14/2001 000049-994766 P Photocopies @ .25 per page 80 $20.00 $20.00
126702115/2001 000049-994766 P Photocopies @ .25 per page 2 $0.50 $0.50
1291 02115/2001 000049-994766 P Postage $0.34 $0.34
1393 0212212001 000049-994766 P Susan O'Dell - Copy Services $11.00 $11.00
169903/0212001 000049-994766 P Postage $0.34 $0.34
1945 03/07/2001 000049-994766 P Facsimiles $1.00 $1.00
1932 03/1212001 000049-994766 P Postage $0.76 $0.76
Page: 2 Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A. 05/0912003 12:33pm

Expense Listing

_.
[R;;d] Date I Cllent·Matter ~
- --- -'D;s~rl~tlo~------- - - - - - -. --~T O-u;c~~i _. T Client Cost
218003/19/2001 000049-994766 P Legal Research $0.43 $0.43
2247 03/3112001 000049-994766 P Facsimiles 10 pages on 3/19 and 3/26 $5.00 $5.00
2335 03/31/2001 000049-994766 P Postage $2.75 $2.75
2248 04/04/2001 000049-994766 P Facsimiles 2 pages on 4/01 $1.00 $1.00
2450 04/23/2001 000049-994766 P Chris Barker - Miscellaneous charges $7.04 $7.04
2455 04/23/2001 000049-994766 P Legal Research Lexis $38.75 $38.75
2474 04/24/2001 000049-994766 P IKON Document Services· Copy Services $468.42 $468.42
277804/27/2001 000049-994766 P Facsimiles 2 $1.00 $1.00
2536 04/28/2001 000049-994766 P Facsimiles 3 $1.50 $1.50
2686 04/28/2001 000049-994766 P Postage $2.72 $2.72
2755 04/28/2001 000049-994766 P Postage $0.34 $0.34
2826 05/03/2001 000049-994766 P Postage $0.34 $0.34
2827 05/03/2001 000049-994766 P Miscellaneous expenses Lit. Copys and binders $468.42 $468.42
3087 05/08/2001 000049-994766 P Postage $1.10 $1.10
315505/10/2001 000049-994766 P Facsimiles 6 $3.00 $3.00
334905/14/2001 000049-994766 P Postage $0.55 $0.55
318205/15/2001 000049-994766 P Legal Research $187.10 $187.10
3185 05/15/2001 000049-994766 P Legal Research $11.02 $11.02
3439 OS/22/2001 000049-994766 P Photocopies @ .25 per page 24 $6.00 $6.00
3585 OS/25/2001 000049-994766 P Photocopies @ .25 per page 15 $3.75 $3.75
3630 05/25/2001 000049-994766 P Postage $0.55 $0.55
Page: 3 Barker, Rodems & Cook. P.A. 05/0912003 12:33pm

Expense Listing
Listing Order: Transaction Date, Client-MaUer Code: All Codes
__.- --_..
. ----------. - ----- .-.
[R~WdJ I ~
---~----
Date Client-Matter Description Units Oyr CO$t \"'CllentCost .
377905/29/2001 000049-994766 P Regency Reporting Service. Inc. - Deposition Fee $417.75 $417.75
3714 06/01/2001 000049-994766 P Postage $0.97 $0.97
4023 06/1212001 000049-994766 P Postage $0.34 $0.34
4236 06/14/2001 000049-994766 P Richard Lee Reporting - Deposition Fee $524.30 $524.30
463406/15/2001 000049-994766 P Postage $0.34 $0.34
4342 06/18/2001 000049-994766 P Postage $0.55 $0.55
4526 06/25/2001 000049-994766 P Postage $0.34 $0.34
4652 06/26/2001 000049-994766 P Facsimiles $0.50 $0.50
4655 06/27/2001 000049-994766 P Facsimiles 5 $2.50 $2.50
4853 07105/2001 000049-994766 P Facsimiles 2 $1.00 $1.00
4835 07106/2001 000049-994766 P Postage $0.34 $0.34
4857 07106/2001 000049-994766 P Facsimiles 2 $1.00 $1.00
4859 07109/2001 000049-994766 P Facsimiles 4 $2.00 $2.00
4957 07/10/2001 000049-994766 P Facsimiles 3 $1.50 $1.50
502807/10/2001 000049-994766 P Photocopies @ .25 per page 2 $0.50 $0.50
506507/10/2001 000049-994766 P Postage $1.02 $1.02
5087 07/10/2001 000049-994766 P Postage $2.18 $2.18
5090 07/10/2001 000049-994766 P Postage $3.95 $3.95

Expense Listing
listing Order: Transaction Date, Client-Matter Code: All Codes
[ Record I Date' I ..
Cllent·Matter ~ Description ~- ourc;t=T--C~-;;tC~st
509207/10/2001 000049-994766 P Postage $0.34 $0.34
531907/12/2001 000049-994766 P American Investigations Management Inc. - Deposition Fee $32.03 $32.03
5596 07/19/2001 000049-994766 P Postage $0.34 $0.34
5338 07/20/2001 000049-994766 P Legal Research $9.86 $9.86
5426 07/23/2001 000049-994766 P Postage $0.34 $0.34
5502 07/24/2001 000049-994766 P Postage $1.71 $1.71
5678 07/31/2001 000049-994766 P Postage $0.80 $0.80
568907/31/2001 000049-994766 P Postage $0.57 $0.57
5717 08/01/2001 000049-994766 P Facsimiles 2 $1.00 $1.00
5911 08/06/2001 000049-994766 P Facsimiles 20 $10.00 $10.00
5962 08/08/2001 000049-994766 P Postage $5.04 $5.04
6057 08/10/2001 000049-994766 P Postage $1.95 $1.95
5941 08/13/2001 000049-994766 P Division of Administrative Hearings - Copy Services $21.25 $21.25
5998 08/14/2001 000049·994766 P Legal Research $19.90 $19.90
5999 08/14/2001 000049-994766 P Legal Research $9.01 $9.01
6087 08/14/2001 000049-994766 P Postage $0.34 $0.34
6181 08/15/2001 000049-994766 P Postage $0.34 $0.34
632708/16/2001 000049-994766 P Facsimiles 2 $1.00 $1.00
Page: 5 Barker, Rodems & Cook. P.A. 05109/2003 12:33pm

Expense Listing

[~R;C;mu Date I Client-Matter ~ Description ~ Ourcost~-~~ntco;t
61870811712001 000049-994766 P Clerk of the Court, Middle District of Florida - Filing Fee $105.00 $105.00
623408/17/2001 000049-994766 P Postage $0.68 $0.68
6289 0811712001 000049-994766 P Photocopies @ .25 per page 4 $1.00 $1.00
6238 08/20/2001 000049-994766 P Postage $0.68 $0.68
6254 08/21/2001 000049-994766 P Postage $1.02 $1.02
6393 08/23/2001 000049-994766 P Postage $1.03 $1.03
637008/24/2001 000049-994766 P Facsimiles 3 $1.50 $1.50
6463 08/28/2001 000049-994766 P Postage $0.68 $0.68
6474 08/28/2001 000049-994766 P Postage $0.34 $0.34
6569 08/29/2001 000049-994766 P Facsimiles 3 $1.50 $1.50
6552 08/31/2001 000049-994766 P Postage $2.29 $2.29
6852 09/21/2001 000049-994766 P Legal Research $6.77 $6.77
6989 09/21/2001 000049-994766 P Facsimiles 2 $1.00 $1.00
710309/25/2001 000049-994766 P Photocopies @ .25 per page $0.25 $0.25
7204 10/02/2001 000049-994766 P IKON Document Services - Copy Services $96.40 $96.40
7309 10/0212001 000049-994766 P Postage $3.95 $3.95
7573 10/0212001 000049-994766 P FedEx Shipping Charges $32.24 $32.24
Page: 6 Barker. Rodems & Cook. P.A. 05/0912003 12:33pm

Expense Listing

.. _ - - _ . _ .
[Rec;dJ Date I Client-Matter ~I Description ~ Our Cost --J Client Cost
7797 10/0212001 000049-994766 P IKON Document Services - Copy Services $55.51 $55.51
7541 10/10/2001 000049-994766 P Postage $1.02 $1.02
7522 10/15/2001 000049-994766 P Legal Research $27.68 $27.68
7536 10/15/2001 000049-994766 P Legal Research $177.29 $177.29
7837 10/23/2001 000049-994766 P Postage $0.34 $0.34
7948 10/29/2001 000049-994766 P Facsimiles 6 $3.00 $3.00
7976 10/29/2001 000049-994766 P Facsimiles 7 $3.50 $3.50
7979 10/29/2001 000049-994766 P Facsimiles 6 $3.00 $3.00
7946 10/30/2001 000049-994766 P Facsimiles 6 $3.00 $3.00
7964 10/30/2001 000049-994766 P Postage $0.57 $0.57
7987 10/30/2001 000049-994766 P Facsimiles 7 $3.50 $3.50
7965 10/31/2001 000049-994766 P Postage $0.34 $0.34
7970 10/31/2001 000049-994766 P Photocopies @ .25 per page $0.25 $0.25
8056 11/01/2001 000049-994766 P Postage $0.34 $0.34
810411/02/2001 000049-994766 P Facsimiles 2 $1.00 $1.00
8116 11/02/2001 000049-994766 P Postage $0.34 $0.34
8340 11/06/2001 000049-994766 P Postage $1.59 $1.59
8351 11/08/2001 000049-994766 P Postage $0.57 $0.57
8453 11/14/2001 000049-994766 P Legal Research $7.56 $7.56
851711/15/2001 000049-994766 P Facsimiles $0.50 $0.50
Page: 7 Barker. Rodems & Cook. P.A. 05/0912003 12:33pm

Expense Listing

f"R;CQ;dJ Date I Client-Matter ~ -=D.:.es=cc:;r.:..llp::..=t::..=lo:.:..:n,-- ,--"",,- ~--(h;C~tTc"~~t-Cost
8731 11/21/2001 000049-994766 P Postage $4.63 $4.63
9038 1211212001 000049-994766 P Long Distance Telephone Calls $0.06 $0.06
Transaction Listing Total: $3,580.67 $3,580.88
Page: 8 Barker. Rodems & Cook. PA 0510912003 12:33pm

Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint, Gillespie V Barker, Rodems, Cook, 05-CA-7205, May 5, 2010

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Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint, Gillespie V Barker, Rodems, Cook, 05-CA-7205, May 5, 2010

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IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL

CIRCUIT IN AND FOR HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY, FLORIDA

GENERAL CIVIL DIVISION

Plaintiff, CASE NO.: 05-CA-7205 RICmlViO

Amended Complaint pursuant to Rule 1. 190(a), Fla.R.Civ.P. A party may amend a

requires. A copy of the amended pleading is attached to this motion.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 5th day of May, 2010.

Plaintiff, CASE NO.: 05-CA-7205

BARKER, RODEMS & COOK, P.A., DIVISION: C

WILLIAM J. COOK, DEMAND FOR TRIAL BY JURY

RYAN CHRISTOPHER RODEMS,

PLAINTIFF’S FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

Plaintiff, NEIL J. GILLESPIE, sues defendants, BARKER, RODEMS, & COOK,

P.A., a Florida professional service corporation, and WILLIAM J. COOK, RYAN

CHRISTOPHER RODEMS, and CHRIS A. BARKER, corporate officers and natural

persons, and alleges:

1. Plaintiff, NEIL J. GILLESPIE, resides in Ocala, Marion County, Florida. (“Plaintiff”).

2. Defendant BARKER, RODEMS & COOK, P.A. is a Florida professional service

Cook, P.A. (“Alpert firm”), the predecessor law firm.

4. Defendant RYAN CHRISTOPHER RODEMS is a licensed attorney, Florida Bar ID

5. Defendant WILLIAM J. COOK is a licensed attorney, Florida Bar ID no. 986194,

a partner of the predecessor Alpert firm.

Jurisdiction and Venue

6. This is an action for damages that exceed $15,000.00.

7. The events complained of occurred in Hillsborough County, Florida. BRC has

offices located in Hillsborough County, Florida.

wrongfully took over 90% of the total recovery for themselves.

involved other clients of Barker, Rodems & Cook, PA.

10. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 9.

Mr. Rodems, and Mr. Cook, and various support staff.

their clients, litigation, and law partners, especially Mr. Alpert.

AMSCOT Corporation, case no. 99-2795-CIV-T-26C. (“AMSCOT”). The action was

Division, Eugene R. Clement v. Payday Express, Inc., case no. 99-2768-CIV-T-23C.

General would later intervene in this action.

was later dismissed.

AMSCOT’s Response in Opposition to Clement’s Motion for Class Certification and

about Clement’s sanity. (p.6, ¶1,2).

inability to serve as class representative in an Order of September 20, 2000 compelling

adequately serve as class representative.” AMSCOT’s Motion to Compel Clement to

Respond to Certified Question and Related Questions and Memorandum of Law in

allegations was a criminal report affidavit/notice to appear charging Clement with

solicitation of prostitution against section 796.07, Florida Statutes, together with

Clement’s mug shot.

Plaintiff Referred to Defendants

in fees and costs on the loans over a two year period.

with National Cash Advance on December 24, 1999.

Company Loan amount Total interest paid Current balance (NSF)

EZ Check Cashing $450.00 $917.50 $500.00 (later settled pro se)

Total $2,050.00 $4,081.08 $2,186.27

be in touch if he decided to proceed.

Plaintiff Becomes a Client of the Alpert Firm

from the AMSCOT case, which was already being litigated.

fee agreement for the Alpert firm. (Exhibit 1).

regulated by The Florida Bar.

subpoena duces tecum upon Ace Cash Express, Inc.

Mr. Alpert Attacks Attorney Arnold Levine - Mr. Rodems a Witness

Plaintiff that Mr. Alpert attacked attorney Arnold Levine.

US District Court, Middle District of Florida, Tampa Division, case 99-2354-CIV-T-23C.

shows the serious societal problems created by excessive bank fees.

from the Florida Division of Elections show the following contributions:

a. Chris Barker made a $500.00 contribution on July 21, 2000

b. Ryan Christopher Rodems made a $500.00 contribution on July 21, 2000

c. William J. Cook made a $500.00 contribution on July 26, 2000.