TLL and Ansal University'S 1 National Online Moot Court Competition, 2020

MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT
TM09 (R)
TLL AND ANSAL UNIVERSITY’S 1ST NATIONAL ONLINE MOOT

COURT COMPETITION, 2020
BEFORE THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDICA
UNDER ART. 32 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDICA
IN THE MATTER OF
SHISHLAMIC LEAGUE LEADER SIYARAM UMESH........PETITIONER
RJD LEADER TANUJ JHA...............................................PETITIONER
TMC M.P. SAHIYA BOITRA.............................................PETITIONER
ASIS LEADER OSAWUDDIN KUWAISI.............................PETITIONER
V.
UNION OF INDICA AND OTHERS…………....................RESPONDENT
WRIT PETITION N o . - - - OF 2020
UPON SUBMISSION TO THE HON’BLE CHIEF JUSTICE AND OTHER HON’BLE

JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF INDICA
WRITTEN SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT
Page 1 of 34
TABLE OF CONTENTS
S. No. HEADING Page No.
1. COVER PAGE 1
2. TABLE OF CONTENTS 2
3. LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 3
4. INDEX OF AUTHORITIES 4-6
5. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 7
6. STATEMENT OF FACTS 8-9
7. ISSUES RAISED 10
8. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 11 - 12
9. ARGUMENTS ADVANCED 13 - 33
1. Whether or not The Citizenship Amendment Act is

13 -17
Constitutionally Valid?
2. Whether or not the Protests leading to riots could be

17 - 21
included as valid peaceful protests?
3. Whether or not the Fundamental Rights of any Section is

being violated by the Act and Whether or not the Govt. 22 - 27
failed to fulfill any constitutional directives?
4. Whether or not the Internet Ban has violated any

27 - 33
Fundamental Right to the Indican Constitution?
10. PRAYER 34
Page 2 of 34
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
& And
¶ Paragraph
AIR All India Reporter
Co. Company
Ltd. Limited
Art. Article
Hon’ble Honorable
Ors. Others
Anr. Another
SC Supreme Court
SCC Supreme Court Cases
SCR Supreme Court Reports
v. Versus
UOI Union of India
SLP Special Leave Petition
PIL Public Interest Litigation
CAA Citizenship Amendment Act
DPSP Directive Principles of State Policy
Para Paragraph
Govt. Government
ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
UDHR Universal Declaration on Human Rights
Page 3 of 34
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
❖ TABLE OF CASES
1. Devadoss (dead) by L. RS v. Veera Makali Amman Koil Athalur, AIR 1998 SC 750.
2. State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, AIR 1952 SC 75
3. Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice S R Tendolkar, 1959 SCR 279
4. Bal Patil v. Union of India, (2005) 6 SCC 690
5. Francis v. Cheif of Police, (1973) 2 All ER 251
6. State of West Bengal v. Subodh Gopal Bose, AIR1954 SC 92
7. Dr. D.C. Saxena v. Hon'ble Chief Justice of India, (1996) 5 SCC 216
8. Gulam Abbas v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR1981 SC 2198
9. Moti Das v. State of Bihar AIR 1954 SC 657
10. Chandrika Prasad v. State of Bihar AIR 1972 SC 109
11. UOI v. Naveen Jindal, AIR 2004 SC 1559
12. Budhan Choudhry and Ors. vs. The State of Bihar, AIR 1955 SC 191
13. Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice S.R. Tendolkar, AIR 1958 SC 538
14. Justice K.S. Puttaswamy and Ors. vs. Union of India (UOI) and Ors. (2019) 1 SCC 1
15. E.P. Royappa v. State of T.N., (1974) 4 SCC 3
16. State of Uttar Pradesh v. Kaushailiya and Ors., AIR 1964 SC 416
17. Binoy Viswam vs. Union of India (UOI) and Ors., AIR 2017 SC 2967
18. Kumari Chitra Ghosh v. Union of India, (1969) 2 SCC 228
19. R. C. Poudyal v. Union of India, 1994 Supp (1) SCC 324 at page 386
20. State of M.P. v. Bhopal Sugar Industries Ltd., (1964) 6 SCR 846, 850
21. Glanrock Estate (P) Ltd. v. State of T.N., (2010) 10 SCC 96
22. Kedar Nath Bajoria v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1953 SC 404
23. Welfare Association v. Ranjit P. Gohil, (2003) 9 SCC 358
24. Dharam Dutt v. Union of India, (2004) 1 SCC 712
25. Chandrima Das Case, (2000) 2 SCC 465
26. Indo-China Steam Navigation cases, (1964) 6 SCR 594
27. Gazula Dasaratha Rama Rao v. State of AP, AIR 1961 SC 564
28. Assam Sanmilita Mahasangha & Ors v. Union of India & Ors,, (2014) SC 792
29. Railway Board v. Chandrima Das, (2000) 2 SCC 465
Page 4 of 34
30. Hans Muller of Nurenburg v. Superintendent, Presidency, 1955 SCR (1)1284

31. Mr. Louis De Raedt & Ors v. Union of India, 1991 SCR (3) 149
32. Ktaer Abbas Habib Al Qutaifi v. Union of India, 1999 CriLJ 919
33. Sakal Papers (P) Ltd. & Ors. v. Union of India, [1962] 3 S.C.R. 842
34. Babulal Parate v. State of Bombay, AIR 1960 SC 51
35. Madhu Limaye v. Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Monghgyr, (1970) 3 SCC 746
36. Chintaman Rao v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, [1950] S.C.R. 759
37. State of Bihar v. Shailabala Devi, [1952] S.C.R. 654
38. Dr. Ramesh Yeshwant Prabhoo v. Prabhakar Kashinath Kunte & Ors., 1996 (1) SCC
130
39. Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras, (1950) SCR 594
40. Odyssey Communications Pvt. Ltd. v. Lokvidayan Sanghatana, (1988) 3 SCC 410
41. State of Gujarat v. Mirzapur Moti Kureshi Kassab Jamat, (2005) 8 SCC 534
42. Ramjilal Modi v. State of Uttar Pradesh, [1957] S.C. R.860
43. Superintendent, Central Prison, Fatehgarh v. Ram Manohar Lohia, [1960] 2 S.C.R. 821
44. State of Madras v. V.G. Row, AIR 1952 SC 196
45. Modern Dental College & Research Centre v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2016) 7 SCC
353
46. A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 27
47. Rustom Cavasjee Cooper v. Union of India, 1970 (1) SCC 248
48. Rangarajan v. P. Jagjivan Ram, (1989) 2 SCC 574 at page 599
49. Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, (2015) 5 SCC 1
50. Ramlila Maidan Incident v. Home Secretary, Union of India & Ors., (2012) 5 SCC
1
51. Madhu Limaye and Anr v. Ved Murti and Ors., (1970) 3 SCC 746
52. Radhe Das v Jairam Mahto, 123 Ind Cas 73
53. Manzur Hasan v Muhammad Zaman, (1921) ILR 43 All 692
54. Shaik Piru Bux v. Kalandi Pati, 1969 SCR (2) 563
Page 5 of 34
❖ BOOKS
S. No. Books Referred Edition & Year
1. B.N. RAU, INDIAN CONSTITUTION IN THE MAKING 1960
2. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 9th edition, 2009
3. D.D. BASU COMMENTARY ON CONSTITUTION OF INDIA 8th edition, 2008
4. H.M. SEERVAI, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INDIA 4th Edition, 2008
5. KD GAUR, INDIAN PENAL CODE 6th Edition, 2016
6. M.P. JAIN, INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 6th Edition, 2010
❖ WEBSITES
1. www.judis.nic.in
2. www.liiofindia.org
3. www.scconline.com
4. www.manupatra.com
5. www.supremecourtcaselaw.com
Page 6 of 34
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Hon’ble Supreme Court of Indica has the jurisdiction in this matter under Art. 32 of the
Constitution of Indica which reads as follows:
“32. Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part-
(1) The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of
the rights conferred by this Part is guaranteed
(2) The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or orders or writs, including writs
in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari,
whichever may be appropriate, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by this Part.”
Page 7 of 34
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Indica being the largest democracy in the world has the lengthiest written Constitution. In a
democracy, the right and duties of the citizen are broadly specified. In India the concept of
Citizenship, at the same time is very essential, as it being the second most populous country,
can provide certain exclusive rights only to her citizens. However, the idea of citizenship was
alleged to be largely disturbed by the influx of a number of illegal immigrants in the country
via the undefined and poorly demarcated North eastern border of the country. The country
surrounded by multiple nations from the Northern Frontier, has been periodically reporting the
instances of the arrival and settlement of many illegal immigrants since independence.
Owing to this reason, the Central and State Govt. in collaboration, launched the National
Register of Citizens for Nassam, which contained entries of the people being original
inhabitants of the state and as the Govt. claims, excluded all the illegal immigrants. The
Register was informed to be released with the aim to identify the real citizens and provide them
with certain exclusive citizenship rights, and reach to a nodal decision w.r.t. the illegal
immigrants. However, to the astonishment of many, even a big number of Citizens who claimed
themselves to be the original residents of the state did not find their names in the register.
Meanwhile, to tackle the issue of illegal immigrants at National Level, the Central Govt. came
up with a bill called Citizenship Amendment Bill, which was alleged to have some provisions
being grossly against secularism, and being discriminatory against Shislamians. Despite of the
objections, the bill was passed in both the houses of the Indican Parliament, which led to
widespread protests around the Nation.
The constitutional validity of the Citizenship Amendment Act was challenged into various
High Courts and Supreme Court, by the Shislamians, claiming that the bill arbitrarily
discriminates against Shislamians. On the other hand, the Central Govt. denied any such claim
and argued that the Act is constitutionally valid and in no way challenges the Fundamental
Rights of any Religious Community and also the citizenship status of the community.
The protests soon turned violent and led to mass bloodshed between the two religious’ groups.
It majorly involved students from certain universities and political groups like PMI and KNU,
leading to large scale loss of lives.
In response to the legislation, several sit off protests were organised by the member of
Shislamik community. One such site of protest being Rahim Baugh witnessed a sit in protest.
Page 8 of 34
However, soon after a few days a complaint of road blockage and Public Nuisance to started
finding their place in media reports. Various state Govt. took cognizance of the situation asking
the protestors to hault their actions. However, continuous denial and an explicit incident of
making a call through loudspeaker from a local mosque, which called the members of the
Shislamik community to continue their fight for justice, invited prompt action by the Govt. and
some of the state Govt. in turn ordered an Internet ban in various cities. Local people including
organisers of protest moved to High Court on the ground of violation of their Fundamental
Rights.
Page 9 of 34
ISSUES RAISED
ISSUE- 1
Whether or not The Citizenship Amendment Act is Constitutionally Valid?
ISSUE- 2
Whether or not the Protests leading to riots could be included as valid peaceful
protests?
ISSUE- 3
Whether or not the Fundamental Rights of any Section is being violated by the Act and
Whether or not the Government failed to fulfil any constitutional directives?
ISSUE- 4
Whether or not the Internet Ban has violated any Fundamental Right to the Indican
Constitution?
Page 10 of 34
SUMMARY OF ARGUEMENTS
[1.] Whether or not The Citizenship Amendment Act is Constitutionally

Valid?
It is most humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Indica that the Citizenship
Amendment Act, 2019 is constitutionally valid on four grounds, Firstly, The Amendment Act
is in accordance with Art. 11 and Classification is reasonable [1.1]. Secondly, The Amendment
Act doesn’t violate any Fundamental Right and it passes the test of Art. 14 [1.2]. Thirdly, The
Amendment is not against the basic tenants of our Indica constitution, Secularism [1.3].
Fourthly, The Amendment is in conformity with Indica’s international obligations [1.4].
[2.] Whether or not the Protests leading to riots could be included as valid
peaceful protests?
It is most humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Indica that the protest
leading to riots could not be included as valid peaceful protest on three grounds, Firstly, it
violates the Art. 19(1)(a) and Art. 19(1)(b) of the constitution as the right to protest is not
absolute in nature [2.1]. Secondly, the protest is done by an unlawful assembly under Section
141 of the IPC [2.2]. Thirdly, it is the duty of protestors to safeguard public property & to
abjure violence under Art. 51A [2.3].
[3.] Whether or not the Fundamental Rights of any Section is being violated
by the Act and Whether or not the Government failed to fulfil any
constitutional directives?
It is most humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Indica that the Fundamental
Rights of any Section is not being violated by the Act and the Govt. has not failed to fulfil
constitutional directives on two grounds, Firstly, The Amendment doesn’t violate Art. 14 and
Art. 15 of the Indica Constitution [3.1]. Secondly, The Govt. has not failed to fulfil
constitutional directives under Aricle 51(c) of Indican Constitution [3.2].
Page 11 of 34
[4.] Whether or not the Internet Ban has violated any Fundamental Right to
the Indican Constitution?
It is most humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Indica that Internet Ban has
not violated Fundamental Right to the Indican Constitution on two grounds, firstly, The Internet
Ban doesn’t violate Art. 19(1)(a) of the Indican Constitution, and the Internet Ban passes the
test of proportionality and was Reasonable Restriction under Art. 19(2) [4.1]. Secondly, The
Internet Ban is in accordance with Section 144 of Cr.P.C. and Section 69A of the IT Act [4.2].
Page 12 of 34
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE CITIZENSHIP AMENDMENT ACT IS

CONSTITUTIONALLY VALID?
[¶1] It’s the applicant contention that the Citizenship Amendment Act, 2019 is constitutionally
valid on four grounds, Firstly, The Amendment Act is in accordance with Art. 11 and
Classification is reasonable [1.1]. Secondly, The Amendment Act doesn’t violate any
Fundamental Right and it passes the test of Art. 14 [1.2]. Thirdly, The Amendment is not
against the basic tenants of our Indica constitution, Secularism [1.3]. Fourthly, The
Amendment is not in conformity with Indica’s international obligations [1.4].
[1.1] The Amendment Act is in accordance with Art. 11 and Classification is reasonable
[¶2] Citizenship is the legal right to belong to a particular country. In other words, citizenship
grants individual’s membership in a national political community. Part II of the Constitution
relates to Citizenship of India. Art. 5 to 9 of the Constitution determine who are Indian citizens
at the commencement of the Constitution. Art. 10 provides for their continuance as such
citizens subject to the provisions of any law that may be made by Parliament. Art. 11 widens
the power of the Parliament to regulate the right of citizenship.
[¶3] Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, the Chairman of the Drafting Committee of the Constitution of India
had expressed hardship in drafting Art. 5 when he stated: "this Art. refers to, citizenship not in
any general sense but to citizenship on the date of commencement of this Constitution. It is not
the object of this particular Art. to lay down a permanent law of citizenship for the country.
The business of laying down permanent law of citizenship has been left to the Parliament, and
as members will see from the wording of Art. 6 (present day Art. 11) as I have moved, the
entire matter regarding citizenship has been left to Parliament to determine by any law it may
deem fit".
[¶4] Dr. Ambedkar also pointed out: "... but the Parliament may make altogether a new law
embodying new principles. That is the first proposition that has to be borne in mind..." and also
that "...they must not understand that the provisions that we are making for citizenship on the
Page 13 of 34
date of commencement of this constitution are going to be permanent or unalterable. All that
we are doing is to decide ad hoc for the time being."1
[¶5] Dr. Syama Prasad Mookerjee spoke on 19 April, 1950 in Parliament : "...the circumstances
that have led to my resignation are primarily concerned with the treatment of minorities in
Pakistan, especially in Bangladesh… ...Let us not forget that the Hindus of East Bengal are
entitled to the protection of India, not on humanitarian considerations alone, but by virtue of
their sufferings and sacrifices, made cheerfully for generations, not for advancing their own
parochial interests, but for laying the foundations of India's political freedom and intellectual
progress… ...The establishment of 'a homogenous Islamic State' is Pakistan's creed and a
planned extermination of Hindus and Sikhs and expropriation of their properties constitute its
settled policy. As a result of this policy, life for the minorities in Pakistan has become "nasty,
brutish and short".
[¶6] From the above, both the need for legislation and the competency of the parliament to
enact such legislation can be inferred. In order to properly interpret any statute, it is imperative
to understand the statement of objects and reasons. The Law Commission of India, in its report
has stated that the extrinsic aids to construe a statute may include debates in Parliament, report
of the parliamentary Committees, Commissions, Statement of Objects and Reasons, Notes on
Clauses, any international treaty or international agreement which is referred to in the statute,
any other document relevant to the subject matter of the statute, etc.2 However, it must also be
noted that it cannot be used to ascertain the true meaning and effect of the substantive provision
of the statute,3 and hence we also need to look at the reports of the Joint Parliamentary
Commission as well as other authorities.
[¶7] The statement of objects and reasons of the Citizenship Amendment Bill talks about: A
historical fact that trans-border migration of population has been happening continuously
between the territories of India and the areas presently comprised in Pakistan, Afghanistan and
Bangladesh. A large number of citizens of undivided India belonging to various faiths were
staying in the said areas of Pakistan and Bangladesh when India was partitioned in 1947.4
1
Constituent Assembly of India Debates (Proceedings) - Volume IX
2
Law Commission of India, Report No.60, Law Commission of India, Report No.183
3
Devadoss (dead) by L. RS v. Veera Makali Amman Koil Athalur, AIR 1998 SC 750.
4
Prof. J.N. Saxena, "Legal Status of Refugees: Indian Position", Indian Journal of Int. Law, Vol. 26, No. 3 & 4,
1986, P.501.
Page 14 of 34
[¶8] This statement forms the basis of intelligible differentia for non-Muslim immigrants and
creates the legal and constitutional basis for leaving out Muslim immigrants who entered India
or stayed in India without valid documents. The Legislative Department of the Ministry of Law
and Justice submitted as under: "The Amendment Act doesn’t violate the spirit of Art. 14, as
mentioned earlier, as it upholds the test of reasonable classification as propounded by a seven
Judge Bench in the State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar.5 Based on the clear classification
adopted in the Act, which is clear and substantial, there are sufficient reasons for making the
distinction.
[1.2] The Amendment Act doesn’t violate any Fundamental Right and it passes the test
of Art. 14
[¶9] The Amendment Act doesn’t violate any Fundamental Right and there is reasonable
classification under Art. 14. The legislation is aimed at those were ‘forced or compelled to seek
shelter in India due to persecution on the ground of religion’ and aims to protect such people
from the legal ramifications of illegal migration. In the case of Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice
S R Tendolkar,6 wherein the true meaning and scope of Art. 14 was reiterated as follows; "It is
now well established that while Art. 14 forbids class legislation, it does not forbid reasonable
classification for the purposes of legislation. In order, however, to pass the test of permissible
classification two conditions must be fulfilled, namely, (i) that the classification must be
founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped
together from others left out of the group, and (ii) that that differentia must have a
rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question. The
classification is founded reasonable and there is intelligible differentia and it is according to
objects.” In the present case, religious persecution in neighbouring Islamic states is the
intelligible differentia as per the Govt., and the object is to provide a one-time relief to such
category of persons.
[¶10] The Act has added a proviso to the definition of "illegal migrant" under Section 2 of the
Citizenship Act. In effect, Hindus, Sikhs, Buddhists, Jains, Parsis and Christians from
Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Pakistan will not be treated as illegal migrants under the Act. The
law is therefore, inclusionary in nature, and it can be inferred from the objective, structure and
intent. An analogy can be drawn to the various personal laws that exist in India, governing
5
State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, AIR 1952 SC 75
6
Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice S R Tendolkar, 1959 SCR 279
Page 15 of 34
particular sections of the community. The ground for persecution is religion, and hence the
ground for citizenship is victim of religious persecution as per the act. If the act was drafted in
a manner such that it excluded other communities, then it might've been discriminatory.
Tomorrow, if the Govt. chooses to, they can enact another legislation for the Rohingyas, and
that too would be perfectly valid, even though it doesn't include other religions. This is
therefore a question of policy, and not a question of constitutional or legal validity.
[¶11] An example of the aforementioned analogy is if there was an act saying that only Hindus
can get married, and if you don't complete the ‘saptapadi’, irrespective of your religion, then
that would be an unfair legislation. But saying that the Home of Ministry Affairs covers only
Hindus, Sikhs, Jains and Buddhists, does not mean it discriminates against Muslims. Separate
Legislations thus can govern separate communities, as long as it is not violative of Art. 14 or
15 of the Constitution. There can be no element of arbitrariness in the classification proposed
by virtue of these just reasons. With regard to Art. 25, the Amendment Act does not, in anyway,
affect the right of any person to freely profess, practice and propagate religion in the country.”
[1.3] The Amendment is not against the basic tenants of Indica constitution, Secularism
[¶12] The Citizenship Amendment Act, 2019 does not go against the concept of secularism. In
the case of Bal Patil v. Union of India7, a 3 judge bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court has
held that it is “for the State Govt. to decide as to whether the Jain community should be treated
as a minority community in their respective States after taking into account their
circumstances/conditions in that State”. Therefore, it can be argued that the Govt. of Indica is
well within its discretion to give certain group of migrants on basis of their faith Indian
Citizenship excluding the majority of the three countries, so as to elevate them to the same
position as the others.
[1.4] The Amendment is in conformity with Indica’s international obligations
[¶13] The Citizenship Amendment Act, 2019 is not in violation of Indica’s obligations under
ICCPR and UDHR. It is clear from the scheme of the Amendment Act that Indica has not
discriminated or set aside people from any particular community. The Act does not state that
the Muslims will not be granted citizenship, since the Act is made under an obligation to protect
the minority community which was a result of the partition because of Pakistan not honouring
the Nehru-Liaquat Pact, the Govt. made a reasonable classification to prefer the minority
7
Bal Patil v. Union of India, (2005) 6 SCC 690
Page 16 of 34
communities viz. Hindu, Sikhs, Jains, Parsis, Christians and Buddhist who were affected by
the partition and because we share common borders, it does not although anywhere state that
if a Muslim immigrant applies for citizenship it will be discarded or will not be considered.
Art. 355 of the Constitution of Indica asks the Union to protect states against external
aggression and internal disturbance. The Union is thus duty bound to protect the country from
any external aggression such as illegal immigrants and internal disturbance.
[¶14] In fact, we may also observe that the Amendment Act had come in to effect because of
the gross violations of Art. 27 of the ICCPR8. The Govt. of India is only furthering its obligation
under UDHR Art. 14 (which states everyone has the right to seek and enjoy other countries
asylum) and ICCPR by granting citizenship to immigrants that have fled from their country
trying to escape religious persecution. It is completely within the sovereign domain of a country
to choose a class of foreigners or migrants for citizenship and reject others keeping security
and demographic concerns in its mind, so that there is no alteration to the nature of state, its
civil and cultural integrity and democratic principles.
[¶15] There is no violation of obligation under UDHR as well, as there is no discrimination

against the Muslim immigrants as the above stated Act does not in any way deny them asylum
or refuge in the country nor does it say that their application for citizenship will be rejected.
Hence, it is humbly submitted that the Citizenship Amendment Act, 2019 should be declared
constitutionally valid.
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE PROTEST LEADING TO RIOTS

COULD BE INCLUDED AS VALID PEACEFUL PROTEST?
[¶16] It’s the applicant contention that the protest leading to riots could not be included as valid
peaceful protest on three grounds, Firstly, it violates the Art. 19(1)(a) and Art. 19(1)(b) of the
constitution as the right to protest is not absolute in nature [2.1]. Secondly, the protest is done
by an unlawful assembly under Section 141 of the IPC [2.2]. Thirdly, it is the duty of protestors
to safeguard public property & to abjure violence under Art. 51A [2.3].
8
In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall
not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess
and practise their own religion, or to use their own language.
Page 17 of 34
[2.1] It is a violation of Art. 19(1)(a) and Art. 19(1)(b) of the Constitution
[¶17] While it is necessary to maintain and preserve freedom of speech and expression in a
democracy, so also it is necessary to place some curbs on this freedom of speech and expression
for the maintenance of social orders as no freedom can be absolutely or completely
unrestricted.9 Also there cannot be any liberty absolute in nature and uncontrolled in operation
so as to confer a right wholly free from any restraint10 so, in the present case the Anti-CAA
protesters tried to exploit the right given to them under Art. 19(1)(a) and Art. 19(1)(b) as they
turned their protest into a riot which led to mass bloodshed.
[¶18] The protest can be declared null & void if it violates the “public order” or “security of
the state” under Art. 19(2). The term public order covers a small riot, an affray, breaches of
peace, or acts disturbing public tranquillity11. In the moot proposition “continuous denial and
an explicit incident of making a call through loudspeaker from a local mosque”12 and not
obeying Govt. orders violates the “public order” of the country. Also, the Privy Council
justified restrictions on the use of loudspeakers at public meetings under “public order” giving
the phrase a meaning wide enough to cover action taken for avoidance of excessive noise
seriously interfering with the comfort or convenience of the people13 so, in the present case the
protestors were violating the public order of the state by not obeying the orders of the Govt. of
the India and instead they continuously blocking the roads and creating public nuisance.
[¶19] State has a duty to protect itself against certain unlawful actions and, therefore, may enact
laws which would ensure such protection. The right that springs from Art. 19(1)(a) is not
absolute and unchecked. Had there been no restraint, the rights and freedoms may become
synonymous with anarchy and disorder14 and Art. 38, under the DPSP contained in Part IV of
the Constitution, places a constitutional obligation upon the State to strive to promote the
welfare of the people by securing and protecting, as effectively as it may, a social order in
which justice- social, economic and political- shall inform all the institutions of the national
life so, in the present case instead of following the orders of the Govt., the protestors were
continuously violating the orders of the Govt. and protesting in the unlawful manner which led
to massive bloodshed in the country and mere apprehension of breach of peace was sufficient
9
Ramlila Maidan Incident v. Home Secretary 2012 SCC 1
10
11
MP JAIN, Indian Constitutional Law, eighth edition, pg no. 1085
12
Moot Proposition, para 14
13
Francis v. Cheif of Police, (1973) 2 All ER 251
14
State of West Bengal v. Subodh Gopal Bose MANU/SC/0018/1953: AIR1954 SC 92
Page 18 of 34
and that Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure permitted anticipatory action and pass
appropriate prohibitor orders so, the action taken by the Govt. is valid.
[¶20] The restriction placed on a fundamental right would have to be examined with reference
to the non-interference with liberty of others. Therefore, a restriction on the right to assemble
and raise protest has also to be examined on similar parameters and values. In other words,
when you assert your right, you must respect the freedom of others. Besides imposition of a
restriction by the State, the non-interference with liberties of others is an essential condition
for assertion of the right to freedom of speech and expression15 and as given in the moot
proposition ...soon after a few days a complaint of road blockage and Public Nuisance to started
finding their place in media reports...16, it clearly shows that the protest had taken place by
providing problems to the others and freedom of speech and expression could not be taken
place by interfering in the liberties of the others by the means of road blockage and public
nuisance.
[¶21] Art. 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(b) are subject to the reasonable restrictions which may be
imposed on exercise of such right and which are in the interest of sovereignty and integrity of
India, security of the State, public order, decency or morality. Thus, sphere of such restrictions
is very wide. While some may be exercising their fundamental rights under Art. 19(1)(a)and
19(1)(b) of the Constitution, others may be entitled to the protection of social safety and
security in terms of Art. 21 of the Constitution and the State may be called upon to perform
these functions in the discharge of its duties under the constitutional mandate and the
requirements of DPSP also in the case of Gulam Abbas v. State of Uttar Pradesh17, the Court
clearly stated that preservation of public peace and tranquillity is the primary function of the
Govt. and in a given situation, a private right must give in to public interest but in the present
case the continuous denial of obeying orders of the Govt. and breaching the limit of freedom
of speech & expression shows that the protest does not been done within the ambit of given
rights which lead to large scale loss of lives.
[¶22] Therefore, it is humbly submitted that the freedom to protest is not absolute or unchecked
in nature. The Govt. is competent to impose restrictions on such rights under Art. 19(2) and
under Art. 19(3) for the maintenance of social order. Also, such right to protest cannot be given
by taking away the liberties of other. But in the instant case the protestors refuse to follow the
15
Dr. D.C. Saxena v. Hon'blethe Chief Justice of India MANU/SC/0627/1996 :(1996) 5 SCC 216,
16
Moot Proposition, Para 13
17
Gulam Abbas v. State of Uttar Pradesh MANU/SC/0059/1981: AIR1981 SC 2198
Page 19 of 34
Govt. orders and continue to create public nuisance and road blockage which is harming the
liberties of other people and later the protest turned violent which in any case, the protestors
have no such right to do so. Hence, the peaceful protest turned violent must be declared void
because it infringes various kinds of rights.
[2.2] The protest is done by an unlawful assembly under Section 141 of the IPC and it is
converted into riot under Section 146 of the IPC
[¶23] It is further submitted that the protest may started as a peaceful protest but once it
converted into the violence then the assembly of the protestors must be declared void. In the
case of Moti Das v. State of Bihar18, it was held that an assembly which was lawful to start
once indulged in any criminal act by any of the member then it becomes unlawful also the in
another case of Chandrika Prasad v. State of Bihar19, wherein the unlawful object of the
assembly developed at the spot of occurrence and the members continued in the assembly and
indulged in overacts along with others, which though lawful to start which became unlawful
by subsequent conduct of its members, such assembly must be declared void. Similarly, in the
present case the Anti-CAA protestors clash with other group and the violence between them
led to massive bloodshed as now their agenda moved from peaceful protest to violent protest
and also their rigid denial of Govt. orders make them an unlawful assembly.
[¶24] Also when the state Govt. asked the protestors to hault the place because of various
complaints of road blockage and public nuisance20 in the country and they were reluctant to
obey the orders shows that they were resisting in the execution of any law or any legal process,
which is an offence under Section 141 of the Indian Penal Code. Further Section 146 clearly
states that once an unlawful assembly uses force or violence by any of the member then they
must be prosecuted under the offence of riot under Section 146 of the IPC and as in the present
case the protests turned violent and led to mass bloodshed leading to large scale loss of lives.
[¶25] Therefore, it is humbly submitted that once any peaceful assembly do any unlawful
things then they become an unlawful assembly and if such unlawful assembly turned violent
then such unlawful assembly must be prosecuted under the offence of riot. As in the instant
case the Anti-CAA protestors turned violent during their protest which lead to large scale loss
18
Moti Das v. State of Bihar AIR 1954 SC 657
19
Chandrika Prasad v. State of Bihar AIR 1972 SC 109
20
Moot Proposition, para 13
Page 20 of 34
of lives. Hence, the peaceful protests turned violent and it is leading to riot and it must not be
declared as valid peaceful protest in the light of above circumstances.
[2.3] It is the duty of protestors to safeguard public property & to abjure violence
[¶26] It is humbly submitted that the Supreme Court has said that “fundamental duties are
implicit in the concept of fundamental rights, the former providing certain restrictions on the
exercise of the latter”21. Art. 51A requires an individual to abide by the law, to safeguard public
property and to abjure violence. It also requires the individual to uphold and protect the
sovereignty, unity and integrity of the country. All these duties are not insignificant22 also Art.
51A deals with the fundamental duties that it shall be the duty of every citizen of India to abide
by the Constitution, to promote harmony and the spirit of common brotherhood, to safeguard
public property and to abjure violence. As in the present case the protestors while enjoying
their fundamental right of freedom of express & assemble they forget their fundamental duties
to promote harmony & to abjure violence. The SC clearly states that the fundamental duties
implies certain restrictions on the way to enjoy the fundamental rights by the citizens.
[¶27] In the light of the above circumstances, it is submitted that fundamental rights come
along with certain kinds of fundamental duties like to promote harmony & to abjure violence.
But in the instant case the protestors did not obey their fundamental duties and instead of it
they are creating public nuisance and blocking the roads which later turned violent and many
people lost their lives. Hence, protest leading to riot must not be included as peaceful right as
they were indulged in violence and constitution did not give any kind of right to do violence
and to hamper the harmony of the country.
Hence, it is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the protest leading to riots
should not be included as valid peaceful protest.
3. WHETHER OR NOT THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF ANY

SECTION IS BEING VIOLATED BY THE ACT AND WHETHER
OR NOT THE GOVERNMENT FAILED TO FULFILL ANY
CONSTITUTIONAL DIRECTIVES?
21
UOI v. Naveen Jindal, AIR 2004 SC 1559
22
Page 21 of 34
[¶28] It’s the applicant contention that the Fundamental Rights of any Section is not being
violated by the Act and the Govt. has not failed to fulfil constitutional directives on two
grounds, Firstly, The Amendment doesn’t violate Art. 14 and Art. 15 of the Indica Constitution
[3.1]. Secondly, The Govt. has not failed to fulfil constitutional directives under Art. 51(c) of
Indican Constitution [3.2].
[3.1] The Amendment doesn’t violate Art. 14 and Art. 15 of the Indica Constitution
[¶29] It has been held in multiple cases by this Hon’ble Court that reasonable classification is
allowed under Art. 14 of the Constitution. The Amendment Act is not violative of Art. 14, as
this Art. permits “reasonable classification”. The Amendment creates a valid distinction
between the communities, based on the object of the law. The object sought to achieve in the
instant case is that the religious minorities who have illegally migrated to escape persecution
on the lines of religion are to be given citizenship. The Amendment doesn’t violate the spirit
of Art. 14 as it upholds the test of reasonable classification as propounded by a seven Judge
Bench of this Hon’ble Court in the case of State of West Bengal vs. Anwar Ali Sarkar23. The
positive concept of equality does not postulate equal treatment of all persons without distinction
but rather stresses on equality of treatment in equal circumstances as to similarly situated
persons and the Amendment appears to have the object of facilitating all such members of
minority communities without any discrimination.
[¶30] This Amendment Act is based on the principle of intelligible differentia: Like to be
treated alike, and consequently allows unlike to be treated differently. In Budhan Choudhry
and Ors. vs. The State of Bihar24, it has been held by a 7 judge bench of the Hon’ble Court that
Art. 14 of the Constitution prohibits class legislation but permits reasonable classification: “It
is now well-established that while Art. 14 forbids class legislation, it does not forbid reasonable
classification for the purposes of legislation In order, however, to pass the test of permissible
classification two conditions must be fulfilled, namely, (i) that the classification must be
founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped
together from others left out of the group and (ii) that that differentia must have a rational
relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question.”
23
State of West Bengal vs. Anwar Ali Sarkar, AIR 1952 SC 75
24
Budhan Choudhry and Ors. vs. The State of Bihar, AIR 1955 SC 191
Page 22 of 34
[¶31] A 5-judge bench of the Hon’ble Court in Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice S.R. Tendolkar25
has held that: “Para 11. The principal ground urged in support of the contention as to the
invalidity of the Act and/or the notification is founded on Art. 14 of the Constitution. In Budhan
Choudhry v. State of Bihar,26 a Constitution Bench of seven Judges of this Court explained the
true meaning and scope of Art. 14 .... It is now well established that while Art. 14 forbids class
legislation, it does not forbid reasonable classification for the purposes of legislation… What
is necessary is that there must be a nexus between the basis of classification and the object of
the Act under consideration……
[¶32] Further, A Five Judge bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of E.P. Royappa
v. State of T.N.27 has explained the term arbitrary as very simply the lack of any reasoning,
which is not present in the instant case as in the instant case there has been a detailed and logical
explanation provided. The said explanation has been further reiterated by another 5-judge
bench of this Hon’ble Court in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy and Ors. vs. Union of India (UOI) and
Ors.28 “Para 378. A challenge Under Art. 14 can be made if there is an unreasonable
classification and/or if the impugned measure is arbitrary. The classification is unreasonable if
there is no intelligible differentia justifying the classification and if the classification has no
rational nexus with the objective sought to be achieved. Arbitrariness, which was first
explained at para 85 of E.P. Royappa v. State of T.N.,29 is very simply the lack of any
reasoning.” Further, another 5-judge bench of this Hon’ble Court in State of Uttar Pradesh v.
Kaushailiya and Ors.30 in Para 7 echoed the same sentiment.
[¶33] Recently, a 2-judge bench of this Hon’ble Court in Binoy Viswam vs. Union of India
(UOI) and Ors.31 reaffirmed the same and held that: “Para 96. What follows is that Art. 14
forbids class legislation; it does not forbid reasonable classification of persons, objects and
transactions by the Legislature for the purpose of achieving specific ends. Differential
treatment does not per se amount to violation of Art. 14 of the Constitution and it violates Art.
14 only when there is no reasonable basis. The Govt. has a right to make the classification
based on what it feels is necessary and for the greater good when there is a proper classification.
25
Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice S.R. Tendolkar, AIR 1958 SC 538
26
Budhan Choudhry v. State of Bihar, (1955) 1 SCR 1045
27
E.P. Royappa v. State of T.N., (1974) 4 SCC 3
28
Justice K.S. Puttaswamy and Ors. vs. Union of India (UOI) and Ors. (2019) 1 SCC 1
29
E.P. Royappa v. State of T.N., (1974) 4 SCC 3
30
State of Uttar Pradesh v. Kaushailiya and Ors., AIR 1964 SC 416
31
Binoy Viswam vs. Union of India (UOI) and Ors., AIR 2017 SC 2967
Page 23 of 34
The same was held in the case of Kumari Chitra Ghosh v. Union of India32 where 5 judge
benches of this Court have held that: “Para 9. ….. If the sources are properly classified whether
on territorial, geographical or other reasonable basis it is not for the courts to interfere with the
manner and method of making the classification.”
[¶34] A 5-judge bench of this Hon’ble Court in R. C. Poudyal v. Union of India33 has held that:
“Para 130. In State of M.P. v. Bhopal Sugar Industries Ltd.,34 this Court said: “The Legislature
has always the power to make special laws to attain particular objects and for that purpose
has authority to select or classify persons, objects or transactions upon which the law is
intended to operate. Differential treatment becomes unlawful only when it is arbitrary or not
supported by a rational relation with the object of the statute…. Where application of unequal
laws is reasonably justified for historical reasons, a geographical classification founded on
those historical reasons would be upheld.”
[¶35] A 3-judge bench of this Hon’ble Court in Glanrock Estate (P) Ltd. v. State of T.N.35 has
held that: “Para 37. The doctrine of classification under Art. 14 has several facets … Equality
is a comparative concept. A person is treated unequally only if that person is treated worse
than others, and those others (the comparison group) must be those who are “similarly
situated” to the complainant….”
[¶36] In several cases, this hon’ble Court has often invoked Chief Justice Patanjali Sastri’s
words that Art. 14 of the Constitution does not require that the classification brought about by
legislation be “scientifically perfect or logically complete”.36 In that case, Chief Justice Sastri
held that Art. 14 does not “mean that all laws must be general in character and universal in
application” or deprive the state of its “power of distinguishing and classifying persons or
things for the purposes of legislation.”37 What was required in such cases, he wrote, was that
the classification must be “based on an intelligible principle having a reasonable relation to the
object which the legislature seeks to attain.”38
32
Kumari Chitra Ghosh v. Union of India, (1969) 2 SCC 228
33
R. C. Poudyal v. Union of India, 1994 Supp (1) SCC 324 at page 386
34
State of M.P. v. Bhopal Sugar Industries Ltd., (1964) 6 SCR 846, 850
35
Glanrock Estate (P) Ltd. v. State of T.N., (2010) 10 SCC 96 at page 111
36
Kedar Nath Bajoria v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1953 SC 404 (paragraph 9, SCC Online version). See,
e.g., Welfare Association v. Ranjit P. Gohil, (2003) 9 SCC 358 (paragraph 60); Dharam Dutt v. Union of
India, (2004) 1 SCC 712 (paragraph 56).
37
Ibid, paragraph 7 (SCC Online version).
38
Ibid.
Page 24 of 34
[¶37] In the Amendment Act, the classification between Muslims and Non-Muslims from these
three countries has not been done only on the basis of religion. The reason of exclusion of
Muslims of these three countries from the group of beneficiaries of the Amendment Act in not
only religion, but a fact that they are living in a country dominated by their own religion and
there is an insignificant chance for them to face religious persecution as being faced by non-
Muslims.
[3.1.1] The Amendment Act doesn’t violate Art. 15 of Indian Constitution
[¶38] In Chandrima Das39 (2 Judge Bench); and Indo-China Steam Navigation cases40 (5
Judge Bench); a non-citizen cannot take benefit of Art. 15. Hence, for the reason of non-
application of Art. 15 for noncitizens, a classification which has religious inklings cannot be
dismissed at the threshold in this case since the impugned law is with respect to non-citizens,
and such classification shall be constitutional if it passes the tests of Art. 14.
[¶39] This Hon’ble Court, in Gazula Dasaratha Rama Rao v. State of AP41, held that Art. 15
prohibits discrimination on some special grounds — religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or
any of them, but that is available to citizens only. Hence, the plea that Act violates Art. 15 does
not have any merit as the amendment deals only with those who are not citizens of India. In
2015, the Supreme Court in Assam Sanmilita Mahasangha & Ors v. Union of India & Ors42,
directed the Govt. to take necessary steps to deal with the problem of illegal immigration from
Bangladesh.
[¶40] The Hon’ble Court in Railway Board v. Chandrima Das43, has held that: “Para 28. The
fundamental rights are available to all the “citizens” of the country but a few of them are also
available to “persons”. While Art. 14, which guarantees equality before law or the equal
protection of laws within the territory of India, is applicable to “person” which would also
include the “citizen” of the country and “non-citizen”, both, Art. 15 speaks only of “citizen”
and it is specifically provided therein that there shall be no discrimination against any
“citizen”.
39
Chandrima Das Case, (2000) 2 SCC 465
40
Indo-China Steam Navigation cases, (1964) 6 SCR 594
41
Gazula Dasaratha Rama Rao v. State of AP, AIR 1961SC564
42
Assam Sanmilita Mahasangha & Ors v. Union of India & Ors, 2014 Latest Caselaw 792 SC
43
Railway Board v. Chandrima Das, (2000) 2 SCC 465
Page 25 of 34
[3.2] The Govt. has not failed to fulfil constitutional directives under Art. 51(c) of
Indican Constitution
[¶41] The Govt. failed to fulfil constitutional directives under Art. 51(c) of Indican Constitution
because the Act was aimed to provide Citizens who are religiously prosecuted. Even though
India is not a signatory to the 1951 Convention on refugees and also the 1967 Protocol, it is a
signatory to a number of United Nations and World Conventions on Human Rights, refugee
issues and related matters. Hence its obligations in regard to refugees arise out of the latter.
India has also voted affirmatively to adopt the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which
affirms rights for all persons, citizens and noncitizens alike.44
[¶42] Even though there may be a case to distinguish them from the rest of the ‘foreigners’,
the current position in India is that they are dealt with under the existing Indian laws, both
general and special, which are otherwise applicable to all foreigners. This is because there is
no separate law to deal with ‘refugees. For the same reason, cases for refugee ‘status’ are
considered on a case-by-case basis. UNHCR often plays a complementary role to the efforts of
the Govt., particularly in regard to verification about the individual’s background and the
general circumstances prevailing in the country of origin. That agency also plays an important
role in the resettlement of refugees etc. The Foreigners Act vests an absolute and unfettered
discretion in the Central Govt. to expel foreigners from India. Note, this does not apply to
Indian citizens, regardless of their religion. The non-refoulment principle is the heart of the
Refugee Convention which prevents deportation to a persecuting country. The Supreme Court
of India in Hans Muller of Nurenburg v. Superintendent, Presidency45 gave “absolute and
unfettered” power to the Govt. to throw out foreigners. The said judgment was again upheld
by the Supreme Court in Mr. Louis De Raedt & Ors v. Union of India.46 In the same judgment,
Supreme Court also held that foreigners have the right to be heard.
[¶43] In the judgment of Ktaer Abbas Habib Al Qutaifi v. Union of India,47 the High Court of
Gujarat held that the principle of non-refoulment avoids ejection of a displaced person where
his life or freedom would be undermined by virtue of his race, religion, nationality, enrolment
44
India’s Refugee Policy, https://www.indianbarassociation.org/indias-refugee-policy/
45
Hans Muller of Nurenburg v. Superintendent, Presidency, 1955 SCR (1)1284
46
Mr. Louis De Raedt & Ors v. Union of India, 1991 SCR (3) 149
47
Ktaer Abbas Habib Al Qutaifi v. Union of India, 1999 CriLJ 919
Page 26 of 34
of a specific social gathering or political conclusion. Its application ensures life and freedom
of a person irrespectively of his nationality.
Hence, it is humbly submitted that the Fundamental Rights of any Section is not being
violated by the Act and the Govt. has not failed to fulfil constitutional directives.
4. WHETHER OR NOT THE INTERNET BAN HAS VIOLATED

ANY FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO THE INDICAN
CONSTITUTION?
[¶44] It’s the applicant contention that Internet Ban has not violated any Fundamental Right to
the Indican Constitution on two grounds [4.1]. firstly, The Internet Ban doesn’t violate Art.
19(1)(a) of the Indican Constitution, and the Internet Ban passes the test of proportionality and
was Reasonable Restriction under Art. 19(2); Secondly, The Internet Ban is in accordance with
Section 144 of Cr.P.C. and Section 69A of the IT Act [4.2].
[4.1] The Internet Ban doesn’t violate Art. 19(1)(a) of the Indican Constitution, and the
Internet Ban passes the test of proportionality and was Reasonable Restriction under
Art. 19(2)
[¶45] It’s the applicant contention that the order of State Govt. doesn’t violate Art. 19(1)(a) as
the Internet allow the people to send messages and communicate with a number of people at
the same time, could be used as a means to incite violence. The purpose of banning the use of
internet is to ensure that the situation on the ground would not be aggravated by targeted
messages from outside. Further, the internet allows for the transmission of false news or fake
images, which are then used to spread violence. The dark web allows individuals to purchase
weapons and illegal substances easily. Furthermore, free speech relating to newspapers cannot
be applied to the internet, as both the media are different. While newspapers only allowed one-
way communication, the internet makes two-way communication by which spreading of
messages are very easy. The different context should be kept in mind by the Court while dealing
with the restrictions with respect to the two media.
Page 27 of 34
[¶46] In Sakal Papers (P) Ltd. & Ors. v. Union of India48, this Hon’ble Court said: “It may
well be within the power of the State to place, in the interest of the general public, restrictions
upon the right of a citizen to carry on business…..Freedom of speech can be restricted only in
the interests of the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign State, public order,
decency or morality or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence.”
Relying on Babulal Parate v. State of Bombay49 and Madhu Limaye v. Sub-Divisional
Magistrate, Monghgyr50, it is contended that the situation in the State was such that the orders
could be justified in view of maintenance of the "security of the State". In the Present case, the
Protest turned violent51 and Public Nuisance was created52 and in order to prevent violence and
maintain the Security of State, the State ordered the Internet Ban which comes within the
purview of ‘Reasonable Restriction’ under Art. 19(2).
[¶47] In Chintaman Rao v. The State of Madhya Pradesh53, this Hon’ble Court said: “The
phrase "reasonable restriction" connotes that the limitation imposed on a person in enjoyment
of the right should not be arbitrary or of an excessive nature, beyond what is required in the
interests of the public. The word "reasonable" implies intelligent care and deliberation, that is,
the choice of a course which reason dictates. In State of Bihar v. Shailabala Devi54, an early
decision of this Court said that an Art., in order to be banned must have a tendency to excite
persons to acts of violence. In the present case, there was presence of violence in the Protest 55,
so some of the State Govt. ordered an Internet ban in various cities56. So, the Internet Ban is
Reasonable Restriction under Art. 19(2) and there is presence of Intelligible differentia as the
purpose of the Internet Ban is to prevent Violence and Public Nuisance in the State and
maintain Social order.
[¶48] In Dr. Ramesh Yeshwant Prabhoo v. Prabhakar Kashinath Kunte & Ors.57, Section 123
(3A) of the Representation of People Act was upheld only if the enmity or hatred that was
spoken about in the Section would tend to create immediate public disorder and not otherwise.
In Ram Manohar Lohia’s case, the Court held: “The approach to the question regarding the
48
Sakal Papers (P) Ltd. & Ors. v. Union of India, [1962] 3 S.C.R. 842
49
Babulal Parate v. State of Bombay, AIR 1960 SC 51
50
Madhu Limaye v. Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Monghgyr, (1970) 3 SCC 746
51
Para 11, Moot Proposition
52
53
Chintaman Rao v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, [1950] S.C.R. 759
54
State of Bihar v. Shailabala Devi, [1952] S.C.R. 654
55
56
57
Dr. Ramesh Yeshwant Prabhoo v. Prabhakar Kashinath Kunte & Ors., 1996 (1) SCC 130
Page 28 of 34
constitutionality of the rule should be whether the ban that it imposes on demonstrations would
be covered by the limitation of the guaranteed rights contained in Art. 19 (2) and 19(3). In
regard to both these clauses the only relevant criteria which has been suggested by the
respondent-State is that the rule is framed "in the interest of public order".
[¶49] In Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras58, the question was as to the validity of Section
9(1-A) of the Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act, 23 of 1949. That section authorised
the Provincial Govt. to prohibit the entry and circulation within the State of a newspaper “for
the purpose of securing the public safety or the maintenance of public order.” Similarly, in the
Present case the order of Internet ban is for the purpose of public safety and maintaining Public
order, hence constitutionally valid.
[¶50] In Odyssey Communications Pvt. Ltd. v. Lokvidayan Sanghatana,59 it was held that the
right of citizens to exhibit films on Doordarshan, subject to the terms and conditions to be
imposed by the Doordarshan, is a part of the fundamental right of freedom of expression
guaranteed Under Art. 19(1)(a), which can be curtailed only under circumstances set out Under
Art. 19(2). Expression through the internet has gained contemporary relevance and is one of
the major means of information diffusion. Therefore, the freedom of speech and expression
through the medium of internet is an integral part of Art. 19(1)(a) and accordingly, any
restriction on the same must be in accordance with Art. 19(2) of the Constitution. In the present
Case, the ban on Internet is as similar as Reasonable Restriction mentioned under Art. 19(2).
[¶51] The right provided Under Art. 19(1) has certain exceptions, which empowers the State
to impose reasonable restrictions in appropriate cases. The study of aforesaid case law points
to three propositions which emerge with respect to Art. 19(2) of the Constitution. (i) Restriction
on free speech and expression may include cases of prohibition. (ii) There should not be
excessive burden on free speech even if a complete prohibition is imposed, and the Govt. has
to justify imposition of such prohibition and explain as to why lesser alternatives would be
inadequate. (iii) Whether a restriction amounts to a complete prohibition is a question of fact,
which is required to be determined by the Court with regard to the facts and circumstances of
each case.60
58
Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras, [ (1950) SCR 594]
59
Odyssey Communications Pvt. Ltd. v. Lokvidayan Sanghatana, (1988) 3 SCC 410
60
State of Gujarat v. Mirzapur Moti Kureshi Kassab Jamat, (2005) 8 SCC 534
Page 29 of 34
[¶52] In Ramjilal Modi v. State of Uttar Pradesh,61 it was pointed out that the language
employed by the Constitution, that is to say, 'in the interest of' was wider than the expression
'for the maintenance of' and the former expression made the ambit of the protection very wide.
It was observed that 'a law may not have been designed to directly maintain public order and
yet it may have been enacted in the interest of public order'. In Superintendent, Central Prison,
Fatehgarh v. Ram Manohar Lohia,62 this Court held that public order is synonymous with
public safety and tranquility; it is the absence of disorder involving breaches of local
significance in contradistinction to national upheavals, such as revolution, civil strife, war,
affecting the security of the State. The decision in Superintendent, Central Prison, Fatehgarh
v. Ram Manohar Lohia,63 the expression 'in the interest of public order fell to be considered’.
Subbarao, J. traced the exposition of the phrase, particularly the expression 'public order’. In
the Present case, the order of some of the State Govt. of banning Internet in various cities64 is
for maintaining Public Order.
[¶53] This Hon’ble Court, in State of Madras v. V.G. Row,65 while laying down the test of
reasonableness, held that: “…... It is important in this context to bear in mind that the test of
reasonableness, wherever prescribed, should be applied to each individual statute impugned,
and no abstract standard or general pattern, of reasonableness can be laid down as applicable
to all cases. The nature of the right alleged to have been infringed, the underlying purpose of
the restrictions imposed, the extent and urgency of the evil sought to be remedied thereby, the
disproportion of the imposition, the prevailing conditions at the time, should all enter into the
judicial verdict....”. This Hon’ble Court in Modern Dental College & Research Centre v. State
of Madhya Pradesh,66 has held that no constitutional right can be claimed to be absolute in a
realm where rights are interconnected to each other, and limiting some rights in public interest
might therefore be justified. In fact, such a provision in Art. 19 itself on the one hand guarantees
some certain freedoms in Clause (1) of Art. 19 and at the same time empowers the State to
impose reasonable restrictions on those freedoms in public interest. This notion accepts the
modern constitutional theory that the constitutional rights are related. This relativity means that
61
Ramjilal Modi v. State of Uttar Pradesh, [1957] S.C. R.860
62
Superintendent, Central Prison, Fatehgarh v. Ram Manohar Lohia, [1960] 2 S.C.R. 821
63
Superintendent, Central Prison, Fatehgarh v. Ram Manohar Lohia, [1960] 2 S.C.R. 821
64
Para 15, Moot proposition
65
State of Madras v. V.G. Row, AIR 1952 SC 196
66
Modern Dental College & Research Centre v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2016) 7 SCC 353
Page 30 of 34
a constitutional licence to limit those rights is granted where such a limitation will be justified
to protect public interest or the rights of others.
[¶54] Taking into consideration the aforesaid analysis, Dr. Sikri, J., in K.S. Puttaswamy
(Retired) v. Union of India,67 reassessed the test laid down in Modern Dental College Case
(supra) which was based on the German Test and modulated the same as against the tests laid
down by Bilchitz. Therein this Court held that: In Modern Dental College & Research Centre
v. State of M.P.,68 four sub-components of proportionality which need to be satisfied were taken
note of. These are: (a) A measure restricting a right must have a legitimate goal (legitimate
goal stage). (b) It must be a suitable means of furthering this goal (suitability or rational
connection stage). (c) There must not be any less restrictive but equally effective alternative
(necessity stage). (d) The measure must not have a disproportionate impact on the right-holder
(balancing stage). In the present case, all the four sub-components of Proportionality are
fulfilled.
[¶55] The restrictions provided Under Art. 19(2) of the Constitution follow a utilitarian
approach wherein individualism gives way for commonality of benefit, if such restrictions are
required and demanded by law. In this context, the test of 'direct impact' as laid down in A.K.
Gopalan v. State of Madras,69 has been subsequently widened in Rustom Cavasjee Cooper v.
Union of India,70 wherein the test of 'direct and inevitable consequence' was propounded. A
restriction imposed with `law and order' in mind would be least intruding into the guaranteed
freedom while `public order' may qualify for a greater degree of restriction since public order
is a matter of even greater social concern.71 In the Present case, the order for Internet ban aimed
to maintain Public order. In Rangarajan v. P. Jagjivan Ram,72 where it has been held: Freedom
of expression which is legitimate and constitutionally protected, cannot be held to ransom by
an intolerant group of people. The fundamental freedom under Art. 19(1)(a) can be reasonably
restricted only for the purposes mentioned in Art. 19(2) and the restriction must be justified on
the anvil of necessity and not the quicksand of convenience or expediency. In the present case,
the Internet ban is justified on the basis of reasonable Restriction and anvil of necessity.
67
K.S. Puttaswamy (Retired) v. Union of India, (2019) 1 SCC 1
68
Modern Dental College & Research Centre v. State of M.P., (2016) 7 SCC 353,
69
A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 27
70
Rustom Cavasjee Cooper v. Union of India, 1970 (1) SCC 248
71
In Re Ramlila Maidan Incident, (2015) 5 SCC 1 [Para 35]
72
Rangarajan v. P. Jagjivan Ram, (1989) 2 SCC 574 at page 599
Page 31 of 34
[4.2] The Internet Ban is in accordance with Section 144 of Cr.P.C. and Section 69A of
the IT Act
[¶56] The purpose of Section 144 is to issue an order absolute at once in urgent cases of
nuisance or apprehended danger. The gist of action under Section 144 is the urgency of the
situation; its efficacy is the likelihood of being able to prevent some harmful occurrences.
Section 144, Code of Criminal Procedure is one of the mechanisms that enable the State to
maintain public peace. It forms part of the Chapter in the Code of Criminal Procedure dealing
with "Maintenance of Public Order and Tranquillity" and is contained in the sub-chapter on
"urgent cases of nuisance or apprehended danger". The structure of the provision shows that
this power can only be invoked in "urgent cases of nuisance or apprehended danger". Section
144, Code of Criminal Procedure enables the State to take preventive measures to deal with
imminent threats to public peace. The gist of action Under Section 144 is the urgency of the
situation, its efficacy in the likelihood of being able to prevent some harmful occurrences. As
it is possible to act absolutely and even ex parte. it is obvious that the emergency must be
sudden and the consequences sufficiently grave. Section 144 of Cr.P.C. resides as the sole
occupant under the chapter of 'temporary measures to maintain public tranquility' and
gives State Govt. the power to issue orders for immediate remedy in urgent cases of
nuisance or apprehended danger. In the present case, there was apprehended danger as
Protest became violent 73 and Public Nuisance were created, so Govt. passed order of
Internet ban in order to maintain public peace.
[¶57] Section 69A of the IT Act empowers the Govt. to block any information that is generated
or transmitted through any computer resource for the reasons that are enlisted in the provision.
The SC in the case of Shreya Singhal v. Union of India74 has upheld the constitutional validity
of this section and has specifically mentioned that Internet services can be blocked under this
section. The Supreme Court in the case of Ramlila Maidan Incident v. Home Secretary,
Union of India & Ors., 75 illustrated that the degree of threat involved for the use of this
provision need not be 'quandry, imaginary or a merely likely possibility, but a real threat
to public peace and tranquility.' The Supreme Court in case of Madhu Limaye and Anr v.
Ved Murti and Ors., 76 has held that the scope of Section 144 extends to making an order
73
74
Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, (2015) 5 SCC 1
75
Ramlila Maidan Incident v. Home Secretary, Union of India & Ors., (2012) 5 SCC 1
76
Madhu Limaye and Anr v. Ved Murti and Ors., (1970) 3 SCC 746
Page 32 of 34
which is either prohibitory or mandatory in nature and 'urgency' is the only criteria that
can justify an order under this Section. In the present case, some of the State Govt. ordered
an Internet ban in various cities 77 because there arises urgency like situation such as Road
Blockage, Public Nuisance 78 and the Protest turned into violent. 79
[¶58] The type of speech that can be restricted was clarified by the Supreme Court in t he
recent landmark judgment of Shreya Singhal v. Union of India. 80 While highlighting the
subtle difference between discussion, advocacy, and incitement, it was held that only
speech that may lead to 'incitement' can justifiably be curtailed under Art. 19(2).
Therefore, when this right is restricted, firstly, there has to be surety of a looming danger
that has a 'direct and proximate nexus' with the expression being curtailed, secondly, this
expression needs to qualify as 'incitement' and not mere advocacy of one's opinion, and
thirdly, the measure imposed should be the last resort and unavoidable. In Radhe Das v
Jairam Mahto,81 the Supreme Court held that Section 144 can only be invoked in order to
prevent a disturbance of the public tranquillity or a riot or an affray. Further in cases Manzur
Hasan v Muhammad Zaman82 and Shaik Piru Bux v. Kalandi Pati,83 it was stressed that the
section must only be imposed keeping in mind the urgency of the situation and the power is to
be used for maintaining public peace and tranquillity. In the Present case, the purpose of
banning Internet was to maintain public peace in the situation arose like urgency due to violent
protest and Public Nuisance as well as Road blockage.
Hence, it is respectfully submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the Internet Ban has not
violated any Fundamental Right to the Indican Constitution because the Internet ban was in
accordance with Section 144 of Cr.P.C. as well as section 69A of IT Act and the order of
Internet ban was passed in order to maintain Public Peace and Public Order.
77
78
79
80
Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, (2015) 5 SCC 1
81
Radhe Das v Jairam Mahto, 123 Ind Cas 73
82
Manzur Hasan v Muhammad Zaman, (1921) ILR 43 All 692
83
Shaik Piru Bux v. Kalandi Pati, 1969 SCR (2) 563
Page 33 of 34
PRAYER
It is hereinafter humbly prayed before this Hon’ble Supreme Court of Indica that in the light
of issue raised, argument advanced, authorities cited and pleadings made, the Hon’ble Court
may be pleased to adjudge and declare:
1. That, the Citizenship Act is Constitutionally Valid.

2. That, the Protests leading to riots should not be included as Valid Peaceful Protests.
3. That, the Fundamental Right of any Section is not being violated by the Act and the Govt.
has not failed to fulfil any constitutional directives.
4. That, the Internet ban has not violated any Fundamental Right to the Indican Constitution.
OR / OTHERWISE
PASS ANY OTHER ORDER OR DIRECTION THAT THIS HON’BLE COURT MAY
DEEM FIT IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE, EQUITY AND GOOD
CONSCIENCE.
FOR THIS ACT OF KINDNESS, THE COUNSELS SHALL FOREVER PRAY.
Sd/-
(Counsel for the Respondent)
Page 34 of 34

TLL and Ansal University'S 1 National Online Moot Court Competition, 2020

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MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

TLL AND ANSAL UNIVERSITY’S 1ST NATIONAL ONLINE MOOT

BEFORE THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDICA

UNDER ART. 32 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDICA

SHISHLAMIC LEAGUE LEADER SIYARAM UMESH........PETITIONER

RJD LEADER TANUJ JHA...............................................PETITIONER

TMC M.P. SAHIYA BOITRA.............................................PETITIONER

ASIS LEADER OSAWUDDIN KUWAISI.............................PETITIONER

UNION OF INDICA AND OTHERS…………....................RESPONDENT

WRIT PETITION N o . - - - OF 2020

UPON SUBMISSION TO THE HON’BLE CHIEF JUSTICE AND OTHER HON’BLE

WRITTEN SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

S. No. HEADING Page No.

4. INDEX OF AUTHORITIES 4-6

6. STATEMENT OF FACTS 8-9

1. Whether or not The Citizenship Amendment Act is

2. Whether or not the Protests leading to riots could be

3. Whether or not the Fundamental Rights of any Section is

4. Whether or not the Internet Ban has violated any

AIR All India Reporter

SCC Supreme Court Cases

SCR Supreme Court Reports

UOI Union of India

SLP Special Leave Petition

PIL Public Interest Litigation

CAA Citizenship Amendment Act

DPSP Directive Principles of State Policy

ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

UDHR Universal Declaration on Human Rights

30. Hans Muller of Nurenburg v. Superintendent, Presidency, 1955 SCR (1)1284

S. No. Books Referred Edition & Year

1. B.N. RAU, INDIAN CONSTITUTION IN THE MAKING 1960

2. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 9th edition, 2009

3. D.D. BASU COMMENTARY ON CONSTITUTION OF INDIA 8th edition, 2008

4. H.M. SEERVAI, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INDIA 4th Edition, 2008

5. KD GAUR, INDIAN PENAL CODE 6th Edition, 2016

6. M.P. JAIN, INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 6th Edition, 2010

“32. Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part-

Whether or not The Citizenship Amendment Act is Constitutionally Valid?

[1.] Whether or not The Citizenship Amendment Act is Constitutionally

1. WHETHER OR NOT THE CITIZENSHIP AMENDMENT ACT IS

[1.4] The Amendment is in conformity with Indica’s international obligations

[¶15] There is no violation of obligation under UDHR as well, as there is no discrimination

2. WHETHER OR NOT THE PROTEST LEADING TO RIOTS

[2.1] It is a violation of Art. 19(1)(a) and Art. 19(1)(b) of the Constitution

3. WHETHER OR NOT THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF ANY

[3.1.1] The Amendment Act doesn’t violate Art. 15 of Indian Constitution

4. WHETHER OR NOT THE INTERNET BAN HAS VIOLATED

1. That, the Citizenship Act is Constitutionally Valid.

FOR THIS ACT OF KINDNESS, THE COUNSELS SHALL FOREVER PRAY.

(Counsel for the Respondent)

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