11/6/21, 3:38 PM [ G.R. No.

224521, February 17, 2020 ]

THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 224521, February 17, 2020 ]
BISHOP SHINJI AMARI OF ABIKO BAPTIST CHURCH,
REPRESENTED BY SHINJI AMARI AND MISSIONARY BAPTIST
INSTITUTE AND SEMINARY, REPRESENTED BY ITS DIRECTOR
JOEL P. NEPOMUCENO, PETITIONERS, VS. RICARDO R.
VILLAFLOR, JR., RESPONDENT.

DECISION

GESMUNDO, J.:

This is an appeal by certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the October 27, 2015 Decision[1]
and April 26, 2016 Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 08067. The
CA reversed and set aside the July 15, 2013 Decision[3] and September 30, 2013 Resolution[4]
of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and reinstated the February 12, 2013
Decision[5] of the Labor Arbiter (LA) with instructions to the latter to re-compute the monetary
awards of backwages, separation pay, and attorney's fees based on the date of finality of the
CA's Decision.

Antecedents

The controversy stemmed from the Letter dated November 24, 2011[6] where Ricardo R.
Villaflor, Jr. (respondent) was informed of his removal as a missionary of the Abiko Baptist
Church, cancellation of his American Baptist Association (ABA) recommendation as a national
missionary, and exclusion of his membership in the Abiko Baptist Church in Japan.

Respondent believed that he was dismissed from his employment without the benefit of due
process and valid cause; thus, he filed a complaint before the NLRC. He claimed that he was
illegally dismissed from his work as missionary/minister because he refused to sign a
resignation letter and vacate the property where he had already constructed a house and church
building. Consequently, his salary was cut off.[7]

For their part, petitioners alleged that in 1999, respondent became a missionary sponsored by
Bishop Shinji Amari of the Abiko Baptist Church (BSAABC). Respondent was appointed as an
instructor at the Shinji Amari & Missionary Baptist Institute and Seminary (MBIS; petitioner)
effective June 1999.[8] However, a Certification issued by MBIS Director Joel Nepomuceno
states that sometime during the schoolyear 2006-2007, respondent told Bishop Shinji Amari that
he cannot continue teaching due to the distance between San Carlos City, where his mission
work was, and MBIS, Minglanilla, Cebu. His appointment as volunteer teacher was thereafter
cancelled.[9]
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Petitioners further claimed that since the Baptist Church was already successfully organized and
established at San Carlos City, respondent's mission was already finished. Thus, BSAABC
ordered him to be transferred to other areas of mission work; but in defiance to the order,
respondent refused without justifiable reason. After investigation, it was discovered that
respondent's refusal to leave San Carlos City was because he had built his personal house on the
land owned by BSAABC without the latter's consent. On November 20, 2011, after earnest
efforts of negotiating with respondent and giving him adequate opportunity to ventilate his side,
the members of the BSAABC unanimously voted to remove him as missionary and cancel his
ABA recommendation. He was informed of the decision in the November 24, 2011 Letter. In
the same letter, BSAABC demanded respondent to vacate the property as soon as possible, and
offered to buy the house erected thereon at the estimated cost of building materials.[10]

This prompted respondent to file a Complaint for Illegal Dismissal on September 10, 2012.[11]

The LA Ruling

The LA found respondent's dismissal illegal. Petitioners were ordered to pay backwages,
separation pay, 13th month pay, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.[12]

The LA held that it has jurisdiction over the matter considering that respondent was appointed
as instructor of MBIS. His being a member of the Abiko Baptist Church of Japan was only
incidental to his main duties and responsibilities as instructor.[13] Respondent's Appointment
Paper was considered sufficient evidence to establish the employer-employee relationship. It
further ruled that considering respondent had attained regular status, he cannot be dismissed
unless for a cause. The November 24, 2011 Letter was, in effect, a way of terminating the
employment of respondent, hence, illegal. [14]

The NLRC Ruling

The NLRC reversed the LA's ruling and dismissed the complaint on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction. It held simply that the expulsion of respondent from their church was an
ecclesiastical affair, and as such, has no remedy in civil courts.[15]

The CA Ruling

On appeal to the CA, the NLRC's Decision and Resolution were reversed and set aside.
Accordingly, the LA's ruling was reinstated.

The CA ruled that both the LA and NLRC had jurisdiction over the matter. It found that the
November 24, 2011 Letter served as: (1) notice for the termination of respondent's employment,
and (2) exclusion of his membership in the church. The tenor of the letter itself implicitly
demonstrated that these incidents were distinct from each other. Respondent's status as a
missionary on one hand, and his membership in the church on the other, were separate matters.
The former was a purely secular matter, and the latter was an ecclesiastical affair; and one does
not necessarily include the other.[16]

The CA recognized that there may be a scenario where a minister is removed from his
employment as a consequence of his exclusion from the church. But in such situation, the
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church, as employer, can and should deal with the employment aspect separately and observe
due process.[17]

It also held that respondent was an employee of BSAABC and MBIS because of the existence
of the four (4) elements which determine an employment relationship. First, as to the selection
and engagement of the employee, the CA said that the Appointment Paper was credible
evidence of BSAABC and MBIS' power to select and engage him as an employee. Second, the
payment of wages was shown through the "love gifts" given to respondent who was even
described as a "salaried missionary." Third, the power of control was shown in the duties
enumerated in the Appointment Paper, together with BSAABC's evident power to order him to
areas of mission work. Finally, the November 24, 2011 Letter clearly established the power of
dismissal.[18]

The CA found no just cause for the termination of respondent's employment. It dismissed the
claim of BSAABC that respondent disobeyed it by building his own house, instead of a church,
on its property without its consent. The Certification[19] presented by respondent disproves the
claim that he was not authorized to build his own house thereon. It also appears that any
misunderstanding was already settled between the parties citing the Agreement[20] between
respondent and BSAABC dated February 23, 2010. Also, there was no credible proof of
respondent's supposed refusal to be reassigned to another area.[21]

Issue

Petitioners raise the sole issue of whether the CA erred in ruling that respondent was illegally
dismissed despite the fact that the dispute involves an ecclesiastical affair as the latter was a
member of the Abiko Baptist Church.[22]

The Court's Ruling

At the outset, the Court finds the need to distinguish a purely ecclesiastical affair from a secular
matter. While the State is prohibited from interfering in purely ecclesiastical affairs, the Church
is likewise barred from meddling in purely secular matters.[23]

An ecclesiastical affair is '"one that concerns doctrine, creed, or form of worship of the church,
or the adoption and enforcement within a religious association of needful laws and regulations
for the government of the membership, and the power of excluding from such associations those
deemed unworthy of membership.' Based on this definition, an ecclesiastical affair involves the
relationship between the church and its members and relate[s] to matters of faith, religious
doctrines, worship and governance of the congregation. To be concrete, examples of these so-
called ecclesiastical affairs in which the State cannot meddle are proceedings for
excommunication, ordinations of religious ministers, administration of sacraments and other
activities with attached religious significance."[24] Secular matters, on the other hand, have no
relation whatsoever with the practice of faith, worship or doctrines of the church.[25]

In this case, there were three (3) acts which were decided upon by the Abiko Baptist Church
against respondent in its November 24, 2011 Letter, to wit: (1) removal as a missionary of

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Abiko Baptist Church; (2) cancellation of the ABA recommendation as a national missionary;
and (3) exclusion of membership from Abiko Baptist Church in Japan.

To the mind of the Court, the exclusion of membership from Abiko Baptist Church in Japan and
the cancellation of ABA recommendation as a national missionary are ecclesiastical matters
which this jurisdiction will not touch upon. These matters are exclusively determined by the
church in accordance with the standards they have set. The Court cannot meddle in these affairs
since the church has the discretion to choose members who live up to their religious standards.
The ABA recommendation as a national missionary is likewise discretionary upon the church
since it is a matter of governance of congregation.

We are left to determine whether respondent's removal as a missionary of Abiko Baptist Church
is an ecclesiastical affair.

Indeed, the matter of terminating an employee, which is purely secular in nature, is different
from the ecclesiastical act of expelling a member from the religious congregation.[26]
Petitioners insist that this case is an ecclesiastical affair as there is no employer-employee
relationship between BSAABC/MBIS and respondent.

In order to settle the issue, it is imperative to determine the existence of an employer-employee

relationship. We have previously ruled that "[i]n an illegal dismissal case, the onus probandi
rests on the employer to prove that its dismissal of an employee was for a valid cause. However,
before a case for illegal dismissal can prosper, an employer-employee relationship must first be
established. Thus, in filing a complaint before the LA for illegal dismissal, based on the premise
that he was an employee of [petitioners], it is incumbent upon [respondent] to prove the
employer-employee relationship by substantial evidence."[27]

Although based on the Rule 45 parameters, the Court cannot generally touch factual matters, We
allow certain exceptions in the exercise of our discretionary appellate jurisdiction, all in the
interest of giving substance and meaning to the justice We are sworn to uphold and give
primacy to.[28] Thus, We deem it appropriate to re-examine the records and analyze the
appreciation on of evidence by the lower tribunals.

The lower tribunals used the "four-fold test" in determining the existence of an employer-
employee relationship, to wit: (a) the selection and engagement of the employee; (b) the
payment of wages; (c) the power of dismissal; and (d) the power to control the employee's
conduct.[29]

First, the LA and the CA anchored their findings of employer-employee relationship on the
Appointment Paper presented by respondent. This evidence, however, refers to his appointment
as an instructor, as well as his duties and responsibilities as such; but, to emphasize, respondent
as removed as a missionary of Abiko Baptist Church, not as an instructor of MBIS. There is no
evidence or allegation to show that respondent's status as a missionary is the same or dependent
on his appointment as an instructor of MBIS. True, the removal as a missionary may have
affected respondent's status as instructor of MBIS, but the Court is not convinced that there was
an illegal dismissal.

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In this relation, We find the statement of the LA, that respondent's membership with Abiko
Baptist Church of Japan as merely incidental to his main duties and responsibilities as an
instructor,[30] misplaced. On the contrary, it is more appropriate to say that being an instructor
of MBIS was part of respondent's mission work as a missionary/minister of BSAABC.

Respondent's removal as a missionary of Abiko Baptist Church is different from his status as an
instructor of MBIS. The Mission Policy Agreement[31] shows that the mission was accepted by
respondent as early as September 15, 1998, while the appointment as an instructor was made on
a different instrument, an Appointment Paper made effective in June 1999.[32] These two (2)
instruments establish two (2) different positions held by respondent, and means that being a
missionary of BSAABC is separate from being an instructor of MBIS, though they may be
completely related.

Be that as it may, petitioners' unrebutted claim that respondent voluntarily excused himself
sometime in 2007 from teaching in MBIS, due to the distance of the school from his missionary
work in San Carlos City,[33] raises doubt on the allegation of illegal dismissal.

Second, We do not find in the records concrete evidence of the alleged monthly compensation
of respondent amounting to $550. Respondent is not even consistent in claiming the exact
amount of his supposed salary as he claims he was receiving $650 in his Motion for
Reconsideration[34] with the NLRC and Petition[35] before the CA. Although petitioners do not
deny that respondent was receiving "love gifts" in the amount of $550, they aver that these came
from ABA and Abiko Baptist Church in Japan. Respondent also admitted that the "main bulk of
the fund [came] from donor American Baptist Association[.]"[36] Thus, there may be merit in
petitioners' claim that funds given to missionaries like respondent come from the ABA, not
BSAABC or MBIS. In fact, the document from which the CA based its conclusion that there
was payment of wages and the recipient thereof called a "salaried missionary" is the Mission
Policy as contained in the ABA yearbook. In addition, the designation of "salaried missionary"
is not determinative of the existence of an employer-employee relationship. "Salary" is a general
term defined as remuneration for services given,[37] but the term does not establish a certain
kind of relationship.

Absent any clear indication that the amount respondent was allegedly receiving came from
BSAABC or MBIS, or at the very least that ABA, Abiko Baptist Church of Japan and BSAABC
and MBIS are one and the same, We cannot concretely establish payment of wages.

As to the third element, We find that dismissal is inherent in religious congregations as they
have the power to discipline their members. Admittedly, the nature of respondent's position as a
missionary calls on the exercise of supervision by the church of which he is a member
considering that the basis of the relationship between a religious corporation and its members is
the latter's absolute adherence to a common religious or spiritual belief.[38] Although
respondent's removal is clear from the November 24, 2011 Letter, this alone cannot establish an
employer-employee relationship.

Lastly, as to the power of control, the CA ruled that the duties enumerated in the Appointment
Paper, together with BSAABC's power to order respondent to areas of mission work, as well as
the Mission Policy Agreement, all indicated the exercise of control.
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We do not agree. The use of the LA and CA of the Appointment Paper, as basis of the
employer-employee relationship in this case, is misplaced considering that respondent failed to
establish that such duties enumerated therein are the duties only of a missionary. Again, the said
document refers to respondent's status as an instructor of MBIS.

Even then, this Court sees that respondent's appointment as instructor of petitioners' own
educational institution was by virtue of his membership with Abiko Baptist Church. It is one of
his duties as a missionary/minister of the same. He himself admitted that he was teaching "bible
history, philosophy, Christian doctrine, public speaking, English and other religious subjects to
seminarians in [MBIS intending] to be [a] pastor/minister[.]"[39] These subject matters and how
they prepare or educate their ministers are ecclesiastical in nature which the State cannot
regulate unless there is clear violation of secular laws. It follows, therefore, that even his alleged
exclusion as instructor is beyond the power of review by the State considering that this is purely
an ecclesiastical affair. It is up to the members of the religious congregation to determine
whether their minister still lives up to the beliefs they stand for, continues to share his
knowledge, and remains an exemplar of faith to the members of their church.

True, the Mission Policy Agreement may show badges of control over its members and
missionaries; nevertheless, respondent, as member of the religious congregation, must be
subjected to a certain sense of control for the church to achieve the ends of its belief. As to the
power to order respondent to areas of mission work, the Court deems it appropriate not to
expound on this because aside from the fact that it is a mere allegation, it is also an
ecclesiastical matter as it concerns governance of the congregation.

Other than the Appointment Paper (as an instructor), no other evidence was adduced by
respondent to show an employer-employee relationship. Respondent, as the one alleging an
employer-employee relationship, failed to establish with clear and convincing evidence that
such relationship exists. With this, We do not see the need to discuss whether the dismissal as a
missionary was illegal as it is clearly an ecclesiastical affair.

Respondent is trying to confuse the Court in claiming that his appointment as instructor of
MBIS is basis of an employer-employee relationship while at the same time, claiming the
benefits accorded him as a missionary of BSAABC, such as the privilege to live on the latter's
property and the financial support he was receiving. Respondent obviously filed the instant case
to protect his property rights over the house he built on the land of BSAABC, which is not
within the ambit of a labor case. Then again, he was not able to sufficiently prove the existence
of an employer-employee relationship which is the first requirement to claim relief in a labor
case.

Admittedly, there is a thin line between secular and ecclesiastical matters with regard to
respondent's status as a missionary. Respondent's claim of illegal dismissal is dependent on the
existence of the employer-employee relationship. Unfortunately, respondent failed to prove his
own affirmative allegation.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED. The October
27, 2015 Decision and April 26, 2016 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
08067 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the July 15, 2013 Decision of the
National Labor Relations Commission dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction is hereby
REINSTATED.
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SO ORDERED.

Carandang and Gaerlan, JJ., concur.

concurring opinions.
Leonen and Zalameda, JJ., see separate

[1]
Rollo, pp. 21-34; penned by Associate Justice Marilyn Lagura-Yap, with Associate Justices
Gabriel T. Ingles and Marie Christine Azcarraga-Jacob, concurring.

[2]Id. at 35-36; penned by Associate Justice Marilyn Lagura-Yap, with Associate Justices
Gabriel T. Ingles and Pamela Ann Abella Maxino, concurring.

[3]CA rollo, pp. 27-33, penned by Commissioner Julie C. Rendoque, with Presiding
Commissioner Violeta Ortiz-Bantug and Commissioner Jose G. Gutierrez, concurring.

[4] Id. at 35-36.

[5] Id. at 101-115, penned by Acting Executive Labor Arbiter Romulo P. Sumalinog.

[6] Id. at 58.

[7] Id. at 39-54, Complainant's Position Paper.

[8] Id. at 55.

[9] Id. at 78.

[10] Id. at 61-71, Position Paper for Respondents.

[11] Id. at 37.

[12] Id. at 114-115.

[13] Id. at 110.

[14] Id. at 110-112.

[15] Id. at 32-33.

[16] Rollo, pp. 26-28.

[17] Id. at 28.

[18] Id. at 29-30.

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[19] CA rollo, p. 57, which reads:

"This is to certify that Pastor Ricardo N. Villaflor, Jr. is a Missionary Pastor under
the authority of Abiko Baptist Church in Chiba, Japan. Presently, he is laboring as
missionary in San Carlos City, Negros Occidental, Philippines.

Being a missionary, Pastor Ricardo Villaflor, Jr. has been commissioned to preach
the Gospel and Baptize converts.

This is to certify further that he is authorized to build his own Pastoral house on the
portion of acquired lot of Bishop Shinji Amari of Abiko Baptist Church Inc., known
as lot No. 2 Block 1 containing an area of 208 Sq. meters. Located at St. Vincent
subdivision, San Carlos City, Philippines.

This certification was issues upon the request of Pastor Ricardo Villaflor, Jr."

[20] Id. at 145.

[21] Rollo, pp. 30-31.

[22] Id. at 10-11.

[23] Austria v. National Labor Relations Commission, 371 Phil. 340, 353 (1999).

[24] Id.

[25] Id.

[26] Id. at 353-354.

[27] See Reyes v. Glaucoma Research Foundation, Inc., 760 Phil. 779, 789 (2015).

[28] Philman Marine Agency, Inc. v. Cabanban, 715 Phil. 454, 471 (2013).

[29] See Alilin v. Petron Corporation, 735 Phil. 509, 527 (2014).

[30] CA rollo, p. 110.

[31] Id. at 137-138.

[32] Supra note 8.

[33] Supra note 9.

[34] CA rollo, p. 152.

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[35] Id. at 8.

[36] Id. at 40, Complainant's Position Paper.

[37] Reyes v. Glaucoma Research Foundation, supra note 27 at 792.

[38] Long v. Basa, 418 Phil. 375, 397 (2001).

[39] Supra note 36.

SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION

LEONEN, J.:

I concur in the result of the ponencia written by Justice Alexander G. Gesmundo. The exclusion
of respondent Ricardo Villaflor (Villaflor), Jr. as a member of Abiko Baptist Church in Japan is
an ecclesiastical affair and is, therefore, beyond the ambit of this Court's jurisdiction to resolve.
However, I am of the view that his removal as a missionary was likewise ecclesiastical in
nature, having been done in the exercise of Abiko Baptist Church's right to select and control
who to minister its faithful.

As discussed in the ponencia, an ecclesiastical affair is "one that concerns doctrine, creed or
form or worship of the church, or the adoption and enforcement within a religious association of
needful laws and regulations for the government of the membership, and the power of excluding
from such associations those deemed unworthy of membership."[1] All that has no relation with
the practice of faith, worship, or doctrine is considered secular.[2]

Determining whether a controversy involves an ecclesiastical affair or a secular matter is, in

turn, essential in determining whether civil courts may take cognizance of it. If the controversy
involves an ecclesiastical affair, civil courts must yield to the decision of the ecclesiastical
tribunal, in deference to two key provisions of the Constitution. In Article II, Section 6, the
Constitution declares that "[t]he separation of Church and State shall be inviolable." The Bill of
Rights in Article III, Section 5 provides for the non-establishment and free exercise clauses,
thus:

ARTICLE III
Bill of Rights

Section 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or

prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious
profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be
allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political
rights.

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Under Article III, Section 5, it is the State's duty to respect the free exercise of any religious
faith. The State is likewise forbidden from establishing, endorsing, or favoring any religion, in
contrast with the Spanish crown which established a national religion during the colonial period.
Strictly reading Article III, Section 5 ensures the inviolability of the separation of Church and
State, which separation is notably unqualified and should therefore be absolute.

The exclusion of Villaflor from membership in Abiko Baptist Church is clearly ecclesiastical in
nature. It involves "the relationship between the church and its members and relates to matters
of. . . worship and governance of the congregation."[3] The free exercise clause, in as much as it
guarantees the right of individuals to freely exercise any religion of their own choosing, equally
guarantees the right of religious institutions to determine who may personify their doctrines and
beliefs.

However, I am of the opinion that the removal of Villaflor as missionary/minister was not
purely secular; rather, it was an ecclesiastical decision. It is true that employer-employee
relationships are covered by the Labor Code, and that a religious institution like Abiko Baptist
Church may form employer-employee relationships.

Still, more than an employment decision, removing a missionary/minister inevitably involves

the governance of a religious congregation. Being a minister is a position of leadership in the
church, involving the teaching of religious doctrine to the faithful. Mission work requires
evangelizing non-believers, equally involving matters of religious doctrine and worship.
Necessarily, employment decisions of churches with respect to their ministers are ecclesiastical
in nature. The State cannot compel a church to reinstate a minister that it has decided to remove,
for not only will it inevitably and excessively entangle itself with matters of religion, it will be
effectively dictating to a religious institution who its officials should be.

I am aware of this Court's decision in Austria v. National Labor Relations Commission.[4] In

that case, Dionisio V. Austria (Austria) served, first, as a literature evangelist; then, as an
Assistant Publishing Director before becoming a pastor in Central Philippine Union Mission
Corporation of the Seventh-Day Adventists. He served the Seventh-Day Adventists for 28 years
until his services were terminated for failing to account for church tithes and offerings collected
by his wife. This caused Austria to file an illegal dismissal complaint, and the Labor Arbiter
ruled in his favor and ordered his reinstatement. Reversing the Labor Arbiter, the National
Labor Relations Commission dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.[5]

Austria, who appealed before this Court, and the Office of the Solicitor General, while
appearing for the National Labor Relations Commission, interestingly argued that the
Commission wrongly dismissed Austria's illegal dismissal complaint. According to the Office
of the Solicitor General, the validity of the termination of Austria's employment was a
controversy within the National Labor Relations Commission's jurisdiction, as it was secular in
nature.[6]

This Court agreed with the Office of the Solicitor General, holding that the "principle of
separation of church and state finds no application in [the] case."[7] It found that "the matter of
terminating an employee''[8] is "purely secular in nature"[9] and does not involve "the practice of
faith, worship 9r doctrines of the church,"[10] matters traditionally regarded as ecclesiastical
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affairs. The Labor Code, said the Court, is "comprehensive enough to include religious
corporations"[11] such as the Central Philippine Union Mission Corporation of the Seventh-Day
Adventists. The Court found that the Seventh-Day Adventists failed to prove that Austria
pocketed tithes an offerings from its faithful; hence, Austria was deemed illegally dismissed.
The Seventh-Day Adventists was thus ordered to reinstate Austria to his former position as
pastor and to even pay him backwages, among others.[12]

In my view, Austria too conveniently disposed of an important constitutional issue by framing

the case as a labor dispute. Austria involved a pastor removed by his church. He then appealed
his dismissal to the secular courts, praying that his church be ordered to reinstate him. The
principle of separation of Church and State was certainly applicable, if not central, in Austria.

The very controversy that the religion clauses bar secular courts from resolving is whether or
not a church followed its internal procedure for removing its pastors, ministers, and all those of
equivalent authority. Taking cognizance of such cases will directly violate the separation of
Church and State. If secular courts are to reverse the decision of the ecclesiastical tribunal, it
will be infringing on a church's freedom to choose who its religious leaders should be. If the
State orders a church to retain a dismissed minister, it will be interfering with ecclesiastical
affairs.

Distinguishing between an ecclesiastical affair and a secular matter is theoretically and

conceptually understandable. In actuality, however, employment disputes between churches and
their ministers will necessarily involve matters traditionally regarded as secular. As a leadership
position, being a minister will involve administrative functions such as handling of church funds
as well as managing personnel. The approach taken by the Court in Austria avoids the reality
that the duties of a minister cannot be purely ecclesiastical.

While not controlling in this jurisdiction, Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and
School v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission[13] is notable for introducing the concept
of "ministerial exception." Under this concept, secular courts are barred from taking cognizance
of employment controversies between churches and their ministers on the basis of the First
Amendment.

Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School employed Cheryl Perich (Perich) as
one of its "called teachers." "Called" teachers, as opposed to "lay" ones, had to undergo a
"colloquy" program at a Lutheran college or university. "Called" teachers were required to take
courses in theology, in addition to the endorsement of their local Synod district and an oral
examination.[14] It took six (6) years for Perich to finish the program.[15]

Into her fifth year of teaching in Hosanna-Tabor, Perich developed narcolepsy, which required
her to take a one-year disability leave. When she notified the school of her return, the school
replied that it had already contracted a "lay" teacher, one who need not undergo the "colloquy"
program or to even be Lutheran, to teach in her place. Perich insisted on returning and to not
resign, informing the school that she had already sought legal counsel and would be asserting
her rights. This led the local Synod to rescind Perich's "call," and her employment was
terminated for "insubordination and disruptive behavior."[16]

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Perich filed a charge before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, claiming that she
was discriminated on the ground of disability. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
agreed and sued Hosanna-Tabor before the district court. It prayed that Perich be reinstated to
her former position.[17]

Hosanna-Tabor moved for summary judgment and argued that the First Amendment barred the
suit filed by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. According to Hosanna-Tabor, it
fired Perich for a religious reason given that her threat to sue the church was contrary to the
Christian teaching of resolving disputes internally.[18]

The District Court granted summary judgment and dismissed the complaint, agreeing with
Hosanna-Tabor that the suit was barred by the First Amendment. It held that allowing the suit
would infringe upon the religious freedom of Hosanna-Tabor to choose those who could teach
Lutheran doctrine in its school. Reversing the District Court, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit remanded the case. While recognizing that the First Amendment barred suits filed by
ministers whose employment were terminated by their churches, the Court of Appeals held that
the "ministerial exception" did not apply considering that Perich was not a minister.[19]

The United States Supreme Court disagreed with the Court of Appeals and held that the
"ministerial exception" applied in the case. First, it discussed the history and development of the
religion clauses and how they were formulated to primarily bar the Federal Government from
meddling with ecclesiastical affairs, unlike the English Crown which established a national
church and at times imposed its preferences as to the religious officers to be appointed.
Specifically on the non-establishment clause, its purpose is to "[prevent] the Government from
appointing ministers."[20] As for the free exercise clause, it "prevents [the Government] from
interfering with the freedom of religious groups to select their own."[21]

It had yet to decide a case involving government interference with the employment choices of
religious groups, so the United States Supreme Court, instead, discussed cases involving
disputes over church properties and found that it usually declined jurisdiction by virtue of the
First Amendment" Hosanna-Tabor, decided in 2012, was the first case where it had to squarely
resolve the issue of whether or not secular courts may resolve employment discrimination suits
filed by ministers against the religious institutions that employed them. On this issue, the United
States Supreme Court said that secular courts have no such jurisdiction, citing the "ministerial
exception” anchored on the First Amendment. Essentially, the ministerial exception bars suits
involving "the employment relationship between a religious institution and its ministers,"
because taking cognizance of such cases infringes on the right of religious organizations to
choose who to personify and teach their beliefs. In Hosanna-Tabor:

The members of a religious group put their faith in the hands of their ministers.
Requiring a church to accept or retain an unwanted minister, or punishing a church
for failing to do so, intrudes upon more than a mere employment decision. Such
action interferes with the internal governance of the church, depriving the church of
control over the selection of those who will personify its beliefs. By imposing an
unwanted minister, the state infringes the Free Exercise Clause, which protects a
religious group's right to shape its own faith and mission through its appointments.
According the state the power to determine which individuals will minister to the

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faithful also violates the Establishment Clause, which prohibits government

involvement in such ecclesiastical decisions.[22]

The purpose of the "ministerial exception" is not to determine whether the dismissal was indeed
done on religious grounds, but to ensure that the decision to dismiss the minister exclusively
belongs to the religious institution. It is "not to safeguard a church's decision to fire a minister
only when it is made for a religious reason. The exception instead ensures that the authority to
select and control who will minister to the faithful—a matter 'strictly ecclesiastical'—is the
church's alone."[23]

The United States Supreme Court conceded that Perich was not a minister. Nevertheless,
Hosanna-Tabor held her out as one, especially since being a "called" teacher required a
significant amount of religious training and even a formal process of commissioning. Even
Perich held herself out as a minister, accepting tax concessions available to employees earning
compensation "in the exercise of the ministry." After she was terminated, she wrote the Synod
and said that "I feel that God is leading me to serve in the teaching ministry. . . I am anxious to
be in the teaching ministry again soon."[24]

Moreover, like a minister, she taught religion in Hosanna Tabor, "reflecting a role in conveying
the Church's message and carrying out its mission."[25] Her duties included "lead[ing] others
toward Christian maturity"[26] and "teach[ing] faithfully the Word of God, the Sacred
Scriptures, in its truth and purity and as set forth in all the symbolical books of the Evangelical
Lutheran Church."[27] Ultimately, the decision of the Court of Appeals was reversed, and the
summary dismissal of Perich's employment discrimination case was upheld. Hosanna-Tabor
concludes with:

The interest of society in the enforcement of employment discrimination statutes is

undoubtedly important. But so too is the interest of religious groups in choosing who
will preach their beliefs, teach their faith, and carry out their mission. When a
minister who has been fired sues her church alleging that her termination was
discriminatory, the First Amendment has struck the balance for us. The church must
be free to choose those who will guide it on its way.[28]

The right to work is imbued with public interest, so much that the Constitution affords full
protection to labor.[29] Employer-employee relations between religious institutions and their
ministers, however, will involve matters inherently religious in nature. Considering that the
Constitution prohibits the State from entangling itself in religious disputes, resolving the issue
of who to employ as ministers and who to personify their beliefs is best left to religious
institutions. After all, in ministry and missionary work, the right to wage should only be
incidental.

All told, Villaflor's exclusion as a member of Abiko Baptist Church and his removal as minister
are matters ecclesiastical in nature. These matters are outside the jurisdiction of secular courts,
including this Court.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, I vote to GRANT the Petition for Review on Certiorari
and REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-
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G.R. SP No. 08067. The Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission dismissing the
illegal dismissal complaint filed by respondent Ricardo Villaflor, Jr. for lack of jurisdiction must
be REINSTATED.

[1]Ponencia, p. 5, citing Austria v. National Labor Relations Commission, 371 Phil. 340, 353
(1999) [Per J. Kapunan, First Division].

[2] Id.

[3] Id.

[4] 371 Phil. 340 (1999) [Per J. Kapunan, En Banc].

[5] Id. at 347-350.

[6] Id. at 352.

[7] Id.

[8] Id. at 353.

[9] Id. at 354.

[10] Id. at 353.

[11] Id. at 354.

[12] Id. at 362.

[13] 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012) [Per C.J. Roberts, United States Supreme Court].

[14] Opinion of the United States Supreme Court in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran
Church and School v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, p. 2. Available at
<https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/11pdf/10-553.pdf>. (Last accessed on February 11,
2020).

[15] Id. at 16.

[16] Id. at 3-4.

[17] Id. at 4-5.

[18] Id. at 5.

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[19] Id.

[20] Id. at 9.

[21] Id.

[22] Id. at 13-14.

[23] Id. at 20.

[24] Id. at 17.

[25] Id.

[26] Id.

[27] Id.

[28] Id. at 21-22.

[29] CONST., Art. XIII, sec. 3 partly provides:

Section 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas,
organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of
employment opportunities for all.

SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION

ZALAMEDA, J.:

[W]henever the questions of discipline, or of faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or

law have been decided by the highest of these church judicatories to which the
matter has been carried, the legal tribunals must accept such decisions as final, and
as binding on them, in their application to the case before them.[1]

I agree with the ponencia which reinstated the ruling of the National Labor Relations
Commission and declared that "being an instructor of [Missionary Baptist Institute and
Seminary (MBIS)] was part of [Ricardo Villaflor, Jr.'s (Villaflor)] mission work as a
missionary/minister of [Abiko Baptist Church (ABC)]." Villaflor's "removal as a missionary of
[ABC] is different from his status as an instructor of MBIS." Villaflor failed to prove that he
was an employee of ABC and MBIS; hence, there can be no finding of illegal dismissal. The

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clash between ABC's right to exercise its religious freedom in the choice of its members and
Villaflor's property rights to income and abode was more apparent than real.

To be sure, the ponencia recognizes the distinction between ecclesiastical and secular matters,
and the corresponding exercise of jurisdiction of the civil courts. This underscores the
Philippine Constitution's commitment to the separation of Church and State, as well as the
preferential treatment it gives to the right to exercise one's religion.

The provision on religion in Section 5, Article III of the 1987 Constitution is substantially the
same as in the 1935[2] and 1973[3] Constitutions: "No law shall be made respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and
enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall
forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political
rights." The 1934 Constitutional Convention accepted the basic provision without debate,[4] and
paved the way for the adoption of interpretations of this provision from the United States (US),
its country of origin.

In Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC[5] (Hossana-Tabor), the

US Supreme Court provided the historical backdrop for the adoption of the First Amendment's
Non-Establishment and Free Exercise clauses.[6] Hossana-Tabor traced the beginnings of the
Non-Establishment clause from the first clause of the Magna Carta.[7] In 1215, King John of
England agreed with the Archbishop of Canterbury's proposal that the English Church shall be
free, there will be no diminution of the English Church's rights nor impairment of its liberties,
and there shall be freedom in the elections in the English Church. This freedom, however,
existed only in theory. For example, through the First Act of Supremacy in 1534,[8] King Henry
VIII declared himself "the only supreme head in earth of the Church of England." Thus, the
founding generation of the US institutionalized its desire to remove the government from church
matters in their Constitution:

By forbidding the "establishment of religion" and guaranteeing the "free exercise

thereof," the Religion Clauses ensured that the new Federal Government—unlike the
English Crown—would have no role in filling ecclesiastical offices. The
Establishment Clause prevents the Government from appointing ministers, and the
Free Exercise Clause prevents it from interfering with the freedom of religious
groups to select their own.[9]

This exclusion of government participation in church matters was subsequently challenged in

court. The deference test was initially articulated by the US Supreme Court in Watson v. Jones.
[10] The property dispute in Watson arose from a difference in the positions of the church
authorities about slavery. The General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church was against
slavery. Watson, on the other hand, was a member of the Walnut Street Church Session, which
was the governing body of the Walnut Street Presbyterian Church, and was for slavery. Majority
of the members of the Walnut Street Presbyterian Church took the view of the General
Assembly. The General Assembly removed Watson as an elder of the church and filed a case
against Watson and his followers to prevent them from possessing church property.

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The US Supreme Court formulated the deference test to resolve the dispute in Watson. The
Court deferred to the decision of the General Assembly when it removed Watson as an elder.
The General Assembly, as the highest deciding body in the church's structure, had the authority,
procedure, and organization to resolve the church’s internal disputes. Watson further
underscored the lack of jurisdiction of Civil courts over ecclesiastical matters:

But it is a very different thing where a subject matter of dispute, strictly and purely
ecclesiastical in its character - a matter over which the civil courts exercise no
jurisdiction - a matter which concerns theological controversy, church discipline,
ecclesiastical government, or the conformity of the members of the church to the
standard of morals required of them - becomes. the subject of its action. It may be
said here also that no jurisdiction has been conferred on the tribunal to try the
particular case before it, or that, in its judgment, it exceeds the powers conferred
upon it, or that the laws of the church do not authorize the particular form of
proceeding adopted, and, in a sense often used in the courts, all of those may be said
to be questions of jurisdiction. But it is easy to see that if the civil courts are to
inquire into all these matters, the whole subject of the doctrinal theology, the usages
and customs, the written laws, and fundamental organization of every religious
denomination may and must be examined into with minuteness and care, for they
would become in almost every case the criteria by which the validity of the
ecclesiastical decree would be determined in the civil court. This principle would
deprive these bodies of the right of construing their own church laws, would open
the way to all the evils which we have depicted as attendant upon the doctrine of
Lord Eldon, and would, in effect, transfer to the civil courts where property rights
were concerned the decision of all ecclesiastical questions.[11]

Serbian Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich[12] another case decided by the US Supreme Court,
quoted Watson's formulation of the deference test when it ruled in favor of the Holy Assembly
of Bishops and the Holy Synod of the Serbian Orthodox Church (Mother Church). The Mother
Church suspended and subsequently removed Milivojevich as Bishop of its American-Canadian
Diocese. Milivojevich sought relief from the Illinois Circuit Court to prevent the Mother Church
from interfering with the assets of his diocese, and to declare himself as the diocese's true
Bishop. The Illinois Supreme Court ruled in favor of Milivojevich because it found that the
proceedings for Milivojevich's removal were procedurally and substantively defective under the
Mother Church's own internal regulations. The US Supreme Court reversed the Illinois Supreme
Court and declared that the Illinois Supreme Court made inquiries into matters of ecclesiastical
cognizance and polity. Thus, the Illinois Supreme Court's actions pursuant to its inquiry ran
contrary to the US Constitution's First [13] and Fourteenth[14] Amendments. The US Supreme
Court concluded:

In short, the First and Fourteenth Amendments permit hierarchical religious

organizations to establish their own rules and regulations for internal discipline and
government, and to create tribunals for adjudicating disputes over these matters.
When this choice is exercised and ecclesiastical tribunals are created to decide
disputes over the government and direction of subordinate bodies, the Constitution
requires that civil courts accept their decisions as binding upon them.[15]

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Aside from the deference test, the US Supreme Court also articulated the ministerial exception.
Hossana-Tabor explained that the ministerial exception removes religious organizations from
the application of employment discrimination laws. Like the deference test, the ministerial
exception is also anchored on the First Amendment:

The members of a religious group put their faith in the hands of their ministers.
Requiring a church to accept or retain an unwanted minister, or punishing a church
for failing to do so, intrudes upon more than a mere employment decision. Such
action interferes with the internal governance of the church, depriving the church of
control over the selection of those who will personify its beliefs. By imposing an
unwanted minister, the state infringes the Free Exercise Clause, which protects a
religious group's right to shape its own faith and mission through its appointments.
According the state the power to determine which individuals will minister to the
faithful also violates the Establishment Clause, which prohibits government
involvement in such ecclesiastical decisions.

xxxx

The purpose of the exception is not to safeguard a church's decision to fire a minister
only when it is made for a religious reason. The exception instead ensures that the
authority to select and control who will minister to the faithful—a matter "strictly
ecclesiastical,"—is the church's alone.

xxxx

The interest of society in the enforcement of employment discrimination statutes is

undoubtedly important. But so too is the interest of religious groups in choosing who
will preach their beliefs, teach their faith, and carry out their mission. When a
minister who has been fired sues her church alleging that her termination was
discriminatory, the First Amendment has struck the balance for us. The church must
be free to choose those who will guide it on its way.

In Hossana-Tabor, the US Supreme Court considered the circumstances of Perich's employment

and found her to be a minister as defined by the Evangelical Lutheran Church. In its application
of the ministerial exception to Perich, the Court considered the formal title accorded to Perich
by the Church (Minister of Religion, Commissioned), the substance reflected in the formal title
(Perich had to complete extensive religious training, apply for endorsement from her local
Synod, pass an oral examination, and be elected by the congregation to become a minister),
Perich's use of the title (these included Perich's acceptance of the formal call to religious
service, claim to special housing allowance on her taxes, and reference to herself as a minister),
and Perich's religious functions for the Church (Perich was a teacher of religion and conducted
religion-related activities outside of her teaching hours). The Court dismissed the employment
discrimination suit filed by Perich against Hossana-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and
School.

Needless to say, this Court has also found the occasion to rule on the apparent clashes between
the exercise of religious freedom and the property rights to income.

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In Austria v. National Labor Relations Commission[16] (Austria), this Court reached a

conclusion which is different from that of the ponencia. The difference in conclusion, however,
lies in the allegations put forward by the church to justify the removal of its employee-minister.
In Austria, the employee-minister received a letter terminating his services on the grounds of
misappropriation of denominational funds, willful breach of trust, serious misconduct, gross and
habitual neglect of duties, and commission of an offense against the person of employer's (the
church) duly authorized representative. This Court found that the church removed the minister
as its employee and not as its church official or even its church member. Moreover, the church
belatedly questioned the jurisdiction of the administrative bodies and actively participated in the
hearings. Austria’s distinction between secular and ecclesiastical affairs provides an
enlightening discussion:

The rationale of the principle of the separation of church and state is summed up in
the familiar saying, "Strong fences make good neighbors." The idea advocated by
this principle is to delineate the boundaries between the two institutions and thus
avoid encroachments by one against the other because of a misunderstanding of the
limits of their respective exclusive jurisdictions. The demarcation line calls on the
entities to "render therefore unto Ceasar [sic] the things that are Ceasar's [sic] and
unto God the things that are God's." The Church is likewise barred from meddling in
purely secular matters.

The case at bar does not concern an ecclesiastical or purely religious affair as to bar
the State from taking cognizance of the same. An ecclesiastical affair is "one that
concerns doctrine, creed or form or worship of the church, or the adoption and
enforcement within a religious association of needful laws and regulations for the
government of the membership, and the power of excluding from such associations
those deemed unworthy of membership." Based on this definition, an ecclesiastical
affair involves the relationship between the church and its members and relate to
matters of faith, religious doctrines, worship and governance of the congregation. To
be concrete, examples of this so-called ecclesiastical affairs to which the State
cannot meddle are proceedings for excommunication, ordinations of religious
ministers, administration of sacraments and other activities which attached religious
significance. The case at bar does not even remotely concern any of the abovecited
examples. While the matter at hand relates to the church and its religious minister it
does not ipso facto give the case a religious significance. Simply stated, what is
involved here is the relationship of the church as an employer and the minister as an
employee. It is purely secular and has no relation whatsoever with the practice of
faith, worship or doctrines of the church. In this case, petitioner was not
excommunicated or expelled from the membership of the SDA but was terminated
from employment. Indeed, the matter of terminating an employee, which is purely
secular in nature, is different from the ecclesiastical act of expelling a member from
the religious congregation.

As pointed out by the OSG in its memorandum, the grounds invoked for petitioner's
dismissal, namely: misappropriation of denominational funds, willful breach of trust,
serious misconduct, gross and habitual neglect of duties and commission of an
offense against the person of his employer's duly authorized representative, are all
based on Article 282 of the Labor Code which enumerates the just causes for
termination of employment. By this alone, it is palpable that the reason for
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petitioner's dismissal from the service is not religious in nature. Coupled with this is
the act of the SDA in furnishing NLRC with a copy of petitioner's letter of
termination. As aptly stated by the OSG, this again is an eloquent admission by
private respondents that NLRC has jurisdiction over the case. Aside from these,
SDA admitted in a certification issued by its officer, Mr. Ibesate, that petitioner has
been its employee for twenty­ eight (28) years. SDA even registered petitioner With
the Social Security System (SSS) as its employee. As a matter of fact, the worker's
records of petitioner have been submitted by private respondents as part of their
exhibits. From all of these it is clear that when the SDA terminated the services of
petitioner, it was merely exercising its management prerogative to fire an employee
which it believes to be unfit for the job. As such, the State, through the Labor Arbiter
and the NLRC, has the right to take cognizance of the case and to determine whether
the SDA, as employer, rightfully exercised its management prerogative to dismiss an
employee. This is in consonance with the mandate of the Constitution to afford full
protection to labor.[17]

Long v. Basa,[18] on the other hand, involved church members who questioned their expulsion
from the church before the Securities and Exchange Commission. Their expulsion was
predicated on acts that "espous[e] doctrines inimical or injurious to the faith of the church."[19]
The church members sought the annulment of the membership list that excluded their names on
the ground of lack of prior notice and hearing. In upholding the church members' expulsion, this
Court made a distinction between a religious corporation and a corporation that is organized for
profit, as well as underscored the importance of adherence to a common religious belief as a
qualification for church membership. We declared:

The CHURCH By-law provision on expulsion, as phrased, may sound unusual and
objectionable to petitioners as there is no requirement of prior notice to be given to
an erring member before he can be expelled. But that is how peculiar the nature of a
religious corporation is vis-à-vis an ordinary corporation organized for profit. It must
be stressed that the basis of the relationship between a religious corporation and its
members is the latter's absolute adherence to a common religious or spiritual belief.
Once this basis ceases, membership in the religious corporation must also cease.
Thus, generally, there is no room for dissension in a religious corporation. And
where, as here, any member of a religious corporation is expelled from the
membership for espousing doctrines and teachings contrary to that of his church, the
established doctrine in this jurisdiction is that such action from the church authorities
is conclusive upon the civil courts. As far back in 1918, we held in United States vs.
Canete that:

". . . in matters purely ecclesiastical the decisions of the proper church

tribunals are conclusive upon the civil tribunals. A church member who
is expelled from the membership by the church authorities, or a priest or
minister who is by them. deprived of his sacred office, is without remedy
in the civil courts, which will not inquire into the correctness of the
decisions of the ecclesiastical tribunals." (Emphasis ours)

Obviously recognizing the peculiarity of a religious corporation, the Corporation

Code leaves the matter of ecclesiastical discipline to the religious group concerned.
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Section 91 of the Corporation Code, which has been made explicitly applicable to
religious corporations by the second paragraph of Section 109 of the same Code,
states:

"SECTION 91. Termination of membership. — Membership shall be

terminated in the manner and for the causes provided in the articles of
incorporation or the by-laws: Termination of membership shall have the
effect of extinguishing all rights of a member in the corporation or in its
property, unless otherwise provided in the articles of incorporation or the
by-laws." (Emphasis ours)

Moreover, the petitioners really have no reason to bewail the lack of prior notice in
the By-laws. As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, they have waived such
notice by adhering to those By-laws. They became members of the CHURCH
voluntarily. They entered into its covenant and subscribed to its rules. By doing so,
they are bound by their consent.[20]

Indeed, upon showing of sufficient proof, the Court will not hesitate to uphold the exercise of
religious freedom over property rights to income and even to abode, once the church hierarchy
has made its. decision involving ecclesiastical matters. Accordingly, an intrusion into the
church's religious freedom in disciplining and in expelling its missionaries cannot be
countenanced, as in this case. Hence, I concur with the ponencia and vote to GRANT the
Petition.

[1] Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 722 (1871).

[2] Section 1(7), Article III.

[3] Section 8, Article IV.

[4]Joaquin G. Bernas, SJ, THE 1987 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE

PHILIPPINES: A COMMENTARY 318 (2003).

[5] 565 U.S. 171 (2012).

[6] The First Amendment reads: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a
redress of grievances."

[7]The First Clause of the Magna Carta reads: "First, that we have granted to God, and by this
present charter have confirmed for us and our heirs in perpetuity, that the English Church shall
be free, and shall have its rights undiminished, and its liberties unimpaired. That we wish this so
to be observed, appears from the fact that of our own free will, before the outbreak of the
present dispute between us and our barons, we granted and confirmed by charter the freedom of
the Church's elections - a right reckoned to be of the greatest necessity and importance to it -
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and caused this to be confirmed by Pope Innocent III. This freedom we shall observe ourselves,
and desire to be observed in good faith by our heirs in perpetuity."

[8] The First Act of Supremacy reads: "Albeit the king's Majesty justly and rightfully is and
ought to be the supreme head of the Church of England, and so is recognized by the clergy of
this realm in their convocations, yet nevertheless, for corroboration and confirmation thereof,
and for increase of virtue in Christ's religion within this realm of England, and to repress and
extirpate all errors, heresies, and other enormities and abuses heretofore used in the same, be it
enacted, by authority of this present Parliament, that the king, our sovereign lord, his heirs and
successors, kings of this realm, shall be taken, accepted, and reputed the only supreme head in
earth of the Church of England, called Anglicana Ecclesia; and shall have and enjoy, annexed
and united to the imperial crown of this realm, as well the title and style thereof, as all honors,
dignities, preeminences, jurisdictions, privileges, authorities, immunities, profits, and
commodities to the said dignity of the supreme head of the same Church belonging and
appertaining; and that our said sovereign lord, his heirs and successors, kings of this realm, shall
have full power and authority from time to time to visit, repress, redress, record, order, correct,
restrain, and amend all such errors, heresies, abuses, offenses, contempts and enormities,
whatsoever they be, which by any manner of spiritual authority or jurisdiction ought or may
lawfully be reformed, repressed, ordered; redressed, corrected, restrained, or amended, most to
the pleasure of Almighty God, the increase of virtue in Christ's religion, and for the
conservation of the peace, unity, and tranquility of this realm; any usage, foreign land, foreign
authority, prescription, or any other thing or things to the contrary hereof notwithstanding."

[9] Hossana-Tabor collectively refers to the Non-Establishment and Free Exercise clauses as the
Religion Clauses.

[10] Supra at note 1.

[11] Id.

[12] 426 U.S. 696 (1976).

[13] Supra at note 1.

[14] The Fourteenth Amendment is composed of five sections, which read as follows:

Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they
reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

Section 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several states according

to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each state,
excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice
of electors for President and Vice President of the United States, Representatives in

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Congress, the executive and judicial officers of a state, or the members of the
legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such state, being
twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged,
except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation
therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens
shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such
state.

Section 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of

President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United
States, or under any state, who, having-previously taken an oath, as a member of
Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any state
legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any state, to support the
Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion
against the same or given aid or comfort to The enemies thereof. But Congress may
by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability.

Section 4. The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law,
including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in
suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United
States nor any state shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of
insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any claim for the loss or
emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations and claims shall be held
illegal and void.

Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of this article.

[15] 426 US 696, 724-725 (1976).

[16] G.R. No. 124382, 371 Phil. 340 (1999).

[17] Id. at 352-354; citations omitted.

[18] G.R. Nos. 134963-64, 135152-53 & 137135, 418 Phil. 375 (2001).

[19] Id. at 389.

[20] Id. at 396-398; citations omitted.

Source: Supreme Court E-Library | Date created: February 11, 2021

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