NATO Strategy Documents 1949 - 1969
NATO Strategy Documents 1949 - 1969
M.C. 48/1(FINAL)
9 December 1955
EUGENE A. SALET
Colonel, U.S. Army
Secretary, SGN
EUGENE A. SALET
Colonel, USA
Secretary
M.C. 48/1
M.C. 48/1
26 September 1955
I. THE PROBLEM
II. INTRODUCTION
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e. Logistic Support.
V. PRINCIPAL PROBLEMS
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12. Readiness. The risk of surprise attack makes a strong case for
the maintenance at a high degree of readiness of our land, sea and air
forces and of those civil defense organizations necessary to contend
with an assault on national territories. Nations must maintain the
highest degree of readiness commensurate with national capabilities,
recognizing that the higher the degree of readiness achieved, the
greater will be NATO’s deterrent.
* The term “the general order of magnitude” implies sufficient latitude in the
adjustment of force goals should the composition of forces require such changes in
light of evolutionary developments provided these forces retain an equivalent
fighting value.
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16. The first task has been to review the existent structure for
command and control of Air Defense efforts and development of a basis
for effective coordination. The Military Committee has submitted its
recommendations in this connection (M.C. 54) to the Council. It is
too early to forecast when the remaining SHAPE Studies will be
completed or to define their influence on the pattern of NATO military
strength.
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27. NATO Naval Strategy and Basic Tasks. NATO naval strategy
must be designed to secure our sea communications from the outset of
hostilities by establishing, maintaining and exploiting Allied control
of the seas. To achieve this, the basic tasks are:
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31. NATO Naval Force Pattern. The pattern of NATO naval forces
must be such as to accomplish the basic tasks described above and to
provide a naval component of NATO forces-in-being which will act as a
deterrent. This calls for effective modernized naval forces with
characteristics described for forces-in-being in the Enclosure to
M.C. 48 and of a general order of magnitude not lower than the 1956
planned goals established in the 1953 Annual Review.
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E. LOGISTIC SUPPORT
35. War Reserve Stocks. Most of the NATO countries are deficient
in providing stocks for the various categories of their forces in
accordance with agreed stock
levels. In particular, critical deficiencies exist in the war reserve
stocks for D-day forces which, at the present rate of provisioning,
will not be remedied during the period under discussion. Although
resupply action would be initiated upon the outbreak of hostilities,
it is vital that all countries attain at the earliest possible date
the agreed level of reserves, which is the minimum acceptable, in
order that our D-day forces could continue to fight until resupply can
be established.
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forward and rear areas becomes essential. Provision must also be made
for dispersal of reserve stocks primarily to avoid concentration of
any item in one area, thereby reducing its vulnerability.
CONCLUSIONS
a. Reaffirms that:
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39. The Military Committee further concludes that the date for
effective implementation of a forward strategy will be delayed beyond
mid-1957 for possibly as much as two years. During this delay period
the USSR will continue to improve the capability of its forces-in-
being for atomic war. This delay creates the requirement for
developing NATO forces capable of accomplishing the defensive aims of
NATO under conditions both of Allied atomic superiority and Soviet
bloc atomic plenty. Hence it is most important that Nations should
maintain their defense efforts and improve the state of readiness and
effectiveness of their forces. These forces should be of a general
order of magnitude* not lower than the 1956 planned goals established
in the 1953 Annual Review.
RECOMMENDATIONS
* The term “the general order of magnitude” implies sufficient latitude in the
adjustment of force goals should the composition of forces require such changes in
light of evolutionary developments provided these forces retain an equivalent
fighting value.
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