CASTILLO MIKE MARTIN D

STUDENT
SUBJECT: EVIDENCE

Spouses Latip v. Chua, G.R. No. 177809, [October 16, 2009], 619 PHIL 155-170)

Facts: A year after the commencement of the lease and with Spouses Latip already occupying the leased
cubicles, Rosalie, through counsel, sent the spouses a letter demanding payment of back rentals and
should they fail to do so, to vacate the leased cubicles. When Spouses Latip did not... heed Rosalie's
demand, she instituted the aforesaid complaint.

In their Answer, Spouses Latip refuted Rosalie's claims. They averred that the lease of the two (2)
cubicles had already been paid in full as evidenced by receipts showing payment to Rosalie

The MeTC ruled in favor of Rosalie

In stark contrast, the RTC reversed the MeTC and ruled in favor of Spouses Latip. The RTC did not give
credence to the contract of lease, ruling that it was not notarized and, in all other substantial aspects,
incomplete.

In yet another turn of events, the CA, as previously mentioned, reversed the RTC and reinstated the
decision of the MeTC.

On the issue of whether the amount of P2,570,000.00 merely constituted payment of goodwill money, the
CA took judicial notice of this common practice in the area... of Baclaran, especially around the
Redemptorist Church. According to the appellate court, this judicial notice was bolstered by the Joint
Sworn Declaration of the stallholders at Roferxane Bldg. that they all had paid goodwill money to Rosalie
prior to occupying the stalls... thereat.

Issues: whether Spouses Latip should be ejected from the leased cubicles.

Ruling: The doctrine of judicial notice rests on the wisdom and discretion of the courts. The power to take
judicial notice is to be exercised by courts with caution; care must be taken that the requisite notoriety
exists; and every reasonable doubt on the subject... should be promptly resolved in the negative.

Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the matter must be one of
common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or
uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within the limits of the... jurisdiction of the court. The principal
guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can
be said that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records and facts of general notoriety.

To say that a court will take judicial notice of a fact is merely another way of saying that the usual form of
evidence will be dispensed with if knowledge of the fact can be otherwise acquired. This is because the
court assumes that the matter is so notorious that it will not... be disputed. But judicial notice is not judicial
knowledge. The mere personal knowledge of the judge is not the judicial knowledge of the court, and he
is not authorized to make his individual knowledge of a fact, not generally or professionally known, the
basis of his action. Judicial cognizance is taken only of those matters which are "commonly" known.
 Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15 & 146738, [March 2, 2001], 406 PHIL 1-142)

Facts: Joseph “Erap” Estrada alleges that he is the President on leave while Gloria Macapagal-

Arroyo claims she is the President. From the beginning of Erap’s term, he was plagued by

problems that slowly but surely eroded his popularity. His sharp descent from power started

on October 4, 2000. Singson, a longtime friend of Estrada, went on air and accused the

Estrada, his family and friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords. The exposé

immediately ignited reactions of rage. On January 19, Estrada fell from power. At 1:20 p.m.

of said day, the Erap informed then Executive Secretary Edgardo Angara that General

Angelo Reyes, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, had defected. January

20 turned to be the day of Erap’s surrender. On January 22, the Monday after taking her

oath, Arroyo immediately discharged the powers and duties of the Presidency. After his fall

from the pedestal of power, Erap’s legal problems appeared in clusters. Several cases

previously filed against him in the Office of the Ombudsman were set in motion.

ISSUE: Whether or not Arroyo is a legitimate (de jure) president.

HELD: The SC holds that the resignation of Estrada cannot be doubted. It was confirmed

by his leaving Malacañang. In the press release containing his final statement, (1) he

acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President of the Republic albeit with

thereservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of

the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our

nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind of inability and that he

was going to re-assume the presidency as soon as the disability disappears; (3) he

expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he

was referring to the past opportunity given him to serve the people as President; (4) he

assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same

service of our country. Estrada’s reference is to a future challenge after occupying the office

of the president which he has given up; and (5) he called on his supporters to join him in the
promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the

national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up the

presidency. The press release was petitioner’s valedictory, his final act of farewell. His

presidency is now in the past tense. Even if Erap can prove that he did not resign, still, he

cannot successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is merely

unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the

decision that respondent Arroyo is the de jure President made by a co-equal branch of

government cannot be reviewed by this Court

Facts:
On September 6, 1999, Korean Airlines (KAL), through Atty. Aguinaldo, filed a Complaint against
Expertravel and Tours, Inc. (ETI) with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, for the collection of the
principal amount of P260,150.00, plus attorney’s fees and exemplary damages. The verification and
certification against forum shopping was signed by Atty. Aguinaldo, who indicated therein that he was the
resident agent and legal counsel of KAL and had caused the preparation of the complaint. ETI filed a
motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that Atty. Aguinaldo was not authorized to execute the
verification and certificate of non-forum shopping as required by Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court.

During the hearing of January 28, 2000, Atty. Aguinaldo claimed that he had been authorized to file the
complaint through a resolution of the KAL Board of Directors approved during a special meeting held on
June 25, 1999. KAL submitted on March 6, 2000 an Affidavit of even date, executed by its general
manager Suk Kyoo Kim, alleging that the board of directors conducted a special teleconference on June
25, 1999, which he and Atty. Aguinaldo attended. It was also averred that in that same teleconference,
the board of directors approved a resolution authorizing Atty. Aguinaldo to execute the certificate of
non-forum shopping and to file the complaint. Suk Kyoo Kim also alleged, however, that the corporation
had no written copy of the aforesaid resolution.

The trial court issued an Order denying the motion to dismiss, giving credence to the claims of Atty.
Aguinaldo and Suk Kyoo Kim that the KAL Board of Directors indeed conducted a teleconference on June
25, 1999, during which it approved a resolution as quoted in the submitted affidavit.

ETI filed a motion for the reconsideration of the Order, contending that it was inappropriate for the court to
take judicial notice of the said teleconference without any prior hearing. The trial court denied the motion
in its Order dated August 8, 2000. ETI then filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus, assailing the
orders of the RTC.

The CA rendered judgment dismissing the petition, ruling that the verification and certificate of non-forum
shopping executed by Atty. Aguinaldo was sufficient compliance with the Rules of Court. According to the
appellate court, Atty. Aguinaldo had been duly authorized by the board resolution approved on June 25,
1999, and was the resident agent of KAL. As such, the RTC could not be faulted for taking judicial notice
of the said teleconference of the KAL Board of Directors.
ETI filed a motion for reconsideration of the said decision, which the CA denied. Hence, this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the court should take judicial notice as to the use of teleconference as a means of
conducting meetings of board of directors for purposes of passing a resolution.

Held:
In this age of modern technology, the courts may take judicial notice that business transactions may be
made by individuals through teleconferencing. Teleconferencing is interactive group communication (three
or more people in two or more locations) through an electronic medium. In general terms,
teleconferencing can bring people together under one roof even though they are separated by hundreds
of miles. This type of group communication may be used in a number of ways, and have three basic
types: (1) video conferencing - television-like communication augmented with sound; (2) computer
conferencing - printed communication through keyboard terminals, and (3) audio-conferencing-verbal
communication via the telephone with optional capacity for telewriting or telecopying.
Teleconferencing can only facilitate the linking of people; it does not alter the complexity of group
communication. Although it may be easier to communicate via teleconferencing, it may also be easier to
miscommunicate. Teleconferencing cannot satisfy the individual needs of every type of meeting.
In the Philippines, teleconferencing and videoconferencing of members of board of directors of private
corporations is a reality, in light of Republic Act No. 8792. The Securities and Exchange Commission
issued SEC Memorandum Circular No. 15, on November 30, 2001, providing the guidelines to be
complied with related to such conferences. Thus, the Court agrees with the RTC that persons in the
Philippines may have a teleconference with a group of persons in South Korea relating to business
transactions or corporate governance.
However, even given the possibility that Atty. Aguinaldo and Suk Kyoo Kim participated in a
teleconference along with the respondent’s Board of Directors, the Court is not convinced that one was
conducted; even if there had been one, the Court is not inclined to believe that a board resolution was
duly passed specifically authorizing Atty. Aguinaldo to file the complaint and execute the required
certification against forum shopping.
The Court is, thus, more inclined to believe that the alleged teleconference on June 25, 1999 never took
place, and that the resolution allegedly approved by the respondent’s Board of Directors during the said
teleconference was a mere concoction purposefully foisted on the RTC, the CA and this Court, to avert
the dismissal of its complaint against the petitioner.
Estrada v. Badoy, Jr., A.M. Nos. 01-12-01-SC & SB-02-10-J, [January 16, 2003], 443
PHIL 296-322

Facts:

Justice Anacleto Badoy of the Sandiganbayan is one of the Justices who heard the Plunder
Case against Joseph Estrada and Jinggoy Estrada. On November 29, 2001, Justice Badoy,
aboard an ambulance, “whisked himself” to the GMA Broadcast Station in Quezon City for a
live interview in the news program Saksi There, he announced the loss of a Resolution he
penned in connection with the plunder case against former President Estrada and others.
The media sarcastically referred to the event as a “staged comedy” or a “television tryst.”
Leading newspapers sarcastically remarked on the action resorted to by Justice Badoy. In
his defense, Justice Badoy alleged that three days prior to the incident, he could not find his
Resolution ordering that former President Estrada be detained at Fort Sto. Domingo. So he
requested the NBI to conduct an investigation but to no avail. Thus, on November 29, 2001,
agitated that someone might have stolen the Resolution and claimed that it was sold for a
fee, he decided to go to GMA-7 and report its loss in order that the public may know that he
is honest. In going there, he chose to ride in an ambulance because he felt very sick and
cold, intending to proceed in the hostpital after the interview

Issue:

Whether or not Justice Badoy guilty of conduct unbecoming a Justice?

Held:

Yes. It has constantly been held that a justice must avoid impropriety or any appearance
thereof at all times. Furthermore, justice should not be bound by the individual
idiosyncrasies of those who administer it. A judge should adopt the usual and expected
method of doing justice, and not seek to be spectacular or sensational in the conduct of his
court. Justice Badoy tramples upon the foregoing norms. There is no reason why he should
rush to GMA-7 to inform the public about the loss of a Resolution. It is an internal office
incident which should not be reported to the whole nation. Not only did his conduct give an
image that he could not manage his work effectively, but it also indicated that he had
corrupt personnel. Moreover, it dragged innocent parties as possible culprits. The loss of
such Resolution, being an internal matter, could have been addressed inside his own
chamber. If lawyers are prohibited from making public statements in the media regarding a
pending case to arouse public opinion for or against a party, with more reason should judges
be prohibited from seeking publicity. Disclosure of such internal matter/information to the
public for purposes of vanity makes a magistrate guilty of conduct unbecoming of a judge.
 Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15 & 146738 (Resolution), [April 3, 2001], 408 PHIL
194-255

FACTS: It began in October 2000 when allegations of wrong doings involving bribe-taking,
illegal gambling, and other forms of corruption were made against Estrada before the Senate
Blue Ribbon Committee. On November 13, 2000, Estrada was impeached by the Hor and, on
December 7, impeachment proceedings were begun in the Senate during which more
serious allegations of graft and corruption against Estrada were made and were only stopped
on January 16, 2001 when 11 senators, sympathetic to the President, succeeded in suppressing
damaging evidence against Estrada. As a result, the impeachment trial was thrown into an
uproar as the entire prosecution panel walked out and Senate President Pimentel resigned
after casting his vote against Estrada. On January 19, PNP and the AFP also withdrew their
support for Estrada and joined the crowd at EDSA Shrine. Estrada called for a snap
presidential election to be held concurrently with congressional and local elections on May
14, 2001. He added that he will not run in this election. On January 20, SC declared that the
seat of presidency was vacant, saying that Estrada “constructively resigned his post”. At noon,
Arroyo took her oath of office in the presence of the crowd at EDSA as the 14th President.
Estrada and his family later left Malacañang Palace. Erap, after his fall, filed petition for
prohibition with prayer for WPI. It sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from
“conducting any further proceedings in cases filed against him not until his term as president
ends. He also prayed for judgment “confirming Estrada to be the lawful and incumbent
President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his
office.

ISSUE(S): 1. WoN the petition presents a justiciable controversy. 2. WoN Estrada resigned as
President. 3. WoN Arroyo is only an acting President. 4. WoN the President enjoys immunity
from suit. 5. WoN the prosecution of Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial publicity

RULING: 1. Political questions- "to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be
decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is
concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure."
Legal distinction between EDSA People Power I EDSA People Power II: EDSA I exercise of the
people power of revolution which overthrew the whole government. extra constitutional and
the legitimacy of the new government that resulted from it cannot be the subject of judicial
review presented a political question;

EDSA II exercise of people power of freedom of speech and freedom of assemblyto petition
the government for redress of grievances which only affected the office of the President. intra
constitutional and the resignation of the sitting President that it caused and the succession
of the Vice President as President are subject to judicial review. involves legal questions

The cases at bar pose legal and not political questions. The principal issues for resolution
require the proper interpretation of certain provisions in the 1987 Constitution: Sec 1 of Art II,
and Sec 8 of Art VII, and the allocation of governmental powers under Sec 11 of Art VII. The
issues likewise call for a ruling on the scope of presidential immunity from suit. They also
involve the correct calibration of the right of petitioner against prejudicial publicity.

2. Elements of valid resignation: (a)an intent to resign and (b) acts of relinquishment. Both
were present when President Estrada left the Palace. Totality of prior contemporaneous
posterior facts and circumstantial evidence— bearing material relevant issues—President
Estrada is deemed to have resigned— constructive resignation. SC declared that the
resignation of President Estrada could not be doubted as confirmed by his leaving Malacañan
Palace. In the press release containing his final statement: 1. He acknowledged the
oath-taking of the respondent as President; 2. He emphasized he was leaving the Palace for
the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process (he did not say that he was
leaving due to any kind of disability and that he was going to reassume the Presidency as
soon as the disability disappears); 3. He expressed his gratitude to the people for the
opportunity to serve them as President (without doubt referring to the past opportunity); 4.
He assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come in the same
service of the country; 5. He called on his supporters to join him in promotion of a
constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. Intent to resign—must be
accompanied by act of relinquishment—act or omission before, during and after January 20,
2001. 3. The Congress passed House Resolution No. 176 expressly stating its support to Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines and subsequently passed
H.R. 178 confirms the nomination of Teofisto T. Guingona Jr. As Vice President. Senate passed
HR No. 83 declaring the Impeachment Courts as Functius Officio and has been terminated. It
is clear is that both houses of Congress recognized Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in
that recognition is the premise that the inability of Estrada is no longer temporary as the
Congress has clearly rejected his claim of inability. The Court therefore cannot exercise its
judicial power for this is political in nature and addressed solely to Congress by constitutional
fiat. In fine, even if Estrada can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim
that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily.
That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that Arroyo is the de jure,
president made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by this Court. 4. The
cases filed against Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder, bribery and graft
and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these crimes, especially plunder which
carries the death penalty, be covered by the alleged mantle of immunity of a non-sitting
president. He cannot cite any decision of this Court licensing the President to commit
criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability. The rule is that
unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not
acting as such but stands in the same footing as any trespasser. 5. No. Case law will tell us
that a right to a fair trial and the free press are incompatible. Also, since our justice system
does not use the jury system, the judge, who is a learned and legally enlightened individual,
cannot be easily manipulated by mere publicity. The Court also said that Estrada did not
present enough evidence to show that the publicity given the trial has influenced the judge
so as to render the judge unable to perform. Finally, the Court said that the cases against
Estrada were still undergoing preliminary investigation, so the publicity of the case would
really have no permanent effect on the judge and that the prosecutor should be more
concerned with justice and less with prosecution.
Gonzales-Saldana v. Spouses Niamatali, G.R. No. 226587, [November 21, 2018]
Atillo III v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119053 (Resolution), [January 23, 1997], 334 PHIL
546-555)
 Bitong v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 123553, CA-G.R. Nos. 33291 & 33873, [July 13, 1998], 354
PHIL 516-546

Facts:

Petitioner Bitong allegedly acting for the benefit of Mr. & Ms. Co. filed a derivative suit before the SEC
against respondent spouses Apostol, who were officers in said corporation, to hold them liable for fraud
and mismanagement in directing its affairs. Respondent spouses moved to dismiss on the ground that
petitioner had no legal standing to bring the suit as she was merely a holder-in-trust of shares of JAKA
Investments which continued to be the true stockholder of Mr. & Ms. Petitioner contends that she was a
holder of proper stock certificates and that the transfer was recorded. She further contends that even in
the absence of the actual certificate, mere recording will suffice for her to exercise all stockholder rights,
including the right to file a derivative suit in the name of the corporation. The SEC Hearing Panel
dismissed the suit. On appeal, the SEC En Banc found for petitioner. CA reversed the SEC En Banc
decision.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner is the true holder of stock certificates to be able institute a derivative suit.

Ruling: NO.

Sec 63 of the Corporation Code envisions a formal certificate of stock which can be issued only upon
compliance with certain requisites. First, the certificates must be signed by the president or
vice-president, countersigned by the secretary or assistant secretary, and sealed with the seal of the
corporation. A mere typewritten statement advising a stockholder of the extent of his ownership in a
corporation without qualification and/or authentication cannot be considered as a formal certificate of
stock. Second, delivery of the certificate is an essential element of its issuance. Hence, there is no
issuance of a stock certificate where it is never detached from the stock books although blanks therein
are properly filled up if the person whose name is inserted therein has no control over the books of the
company. Third, the par value, as to par value shares, or the full subscription as to no par value shares,
must first be fully paid. Fourth, the original certificate must be surrendered where the person requesting
the issuance of a certificate is a transferee from a stockholder.
U.S. v. Blanco, G.R. No. L-12435, [November 9, 1917], 37 PHIL 126-132

Facts: Defendant pleaded guilty to a charge of Conspiracy to Possess with Intent to Distribute Cocaine in
violation 21 U.S.C. § 846. On June 2, 2017, Defendant was sentenced to 109 months' imprisonment (Dkt.
#638). The BOP has calculated Defendant's estimated release date to be more than 12 months from now,
on July 6, 2023.
Defendant is 38 years old and claims he should be released from BOP because he is concerned about
his potential exposure to COVID-19 and his various health issues including back injuries and latent
tuberculosis.
Defendant has requested that, because of risks to his health associated with the COVID-19 pandemic
and his other health concerns, he be released from the Federal Prison Camp in Duluth, Minnesota, where
he is currently serving his sentence.
Defendant submitted a request for compassionate release to his warden on May 22, 2020. According to
Defendant, the warden has failed to respond within 30 days of his request.
The Government opposes Defendant's motion, arguing that the COVID-19 pandemic is not an
extraordinary and compelling reason justifying a reduction in Defendant's sentence. The Government also
claims that Defendant failed to establish that he otherwise qualifies for compassionate release as defined
by statute. Thus, according to the Government, Defendant cannot show that an extraordinary and
compelling reason exists under the statute.

Issue:

Held: A judgment of conviction imposing a sentence of imprisonment "constitutes a final judgment and
may not be modified by a district court except in limited circumstances." Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S.
817, 824, 130 S. Ct. 2683, 177 L.Ed.2d 271 (2010) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3582(b)); see also 18 U.S.C. §
3582(c). One such circumstance, invoked by Defendant, arises from 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), which
authorizes a district court to reduce a term of imprisonment when "extraordinary and compelling reasons"
for a reduction exist that are "consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing
Commission," and other procedural and substantive requirements are met. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).
Although Defendant has met section 3582(c)(1)(A)'s exhaustion requirement, he has not met the statute's
requirement that "extraordinary and compelling reasons" exist "consistent with applicable policy
statements issued by the Sentencing Commission," warranting a reduction of his sentence. Defendant's
motion, therefore, must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
In Re: Elbanbuena y Marfil, G.R. No. 237721, [July 31, 2018]

FACTS:
In the South China Sea Arbitration between the Republic of the
Philippines and the People’s Republic of China the Arbitral Tribunal constituted
under Annex VII to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea on 29
October 2015 issued its Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility. The Tribunal
rejected China’s objection that the disputes presented by the Philippines
concerned, in essence, the extent of China’s territorial sovereignty in the South
China Sea and were thus outside the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. The Tribunal found,
inter alia, that the Philippines’ submissions reflected disputes between the parties
concerning the interpretation or application of the Convention, that there was no
other State indispensable to the proceedings, and that the Philippines had met
the requirement under Article 283 of the Convention that the parties exchange
views regarding the settlement of their disputes.

ISSUE:
Does China have overlapping entitlements to an exclusive economic
zone or continental shelf in the areas of Mischief Reef or Second Thomas Shoal?

RULING:
The Tribunal’s jurisdiction to decide on the merits of some of the
Philippines’ Submissions may depend upon the status of certain maritime
features in the South China Sea. Specifically, if (contrary to the Philippines’
position) any maritime feature in the Spratly Islands constitutes an “island” within
the meaning of Article 121 of the Convention, generating an entitlement to an
exclusive economic zone or continental shelf, it may be the case that the
Philippines and China possess overlapping entitlements to maritime zones in the
relevant areas of the South China Sea. In that case, the Tribunal may not be
able to reach the merits of certain of the Philippines’ Submissions (Nos. 5, 8, and
9) without first delimiting the Parties’ overlapping entitlements, a step that it
cannot take in light of Article 298 and China’s declaration.
If, however, another maritime feature claimed by China within 200 nautical miles
of Mischief Reef or Second Thomas Shoal were to be an “island” for the
purposes of Article 121, capable of generating an entitlement to an exclusive
economic zone and continental shelf, the resulting overlap and the exclusion of
boundary delimitation from the Tribunal’s jurisdiction by Article 298 would
prevent the Tribunal from addressing this Submission.
Mangibin | 2

The Tribunal has held that Mischief Reef and Second Thomas Shoal are
low-tide elevations and, as such, generate no entitlement to maritime zones of
their own. The Tribunal has also now held (see paragraph 626 above) that
neither Itu Aba, nor any other high-tide feature in the Spratly Islands, is a fully
entitled island for the purposes of Article 121 of the Convention. As such,
pursuant to the operation of Article 121(3) of the Convention, these features are
legally considered to be “rocks” and to generate no exclusive economic zone or
continental shelf. The Tribunal also notes that there is no maritime feature that is
above water at high tide in its natural condition and that is located within 12
nautical miles of either Mischief Reef or Second Thomas Shoal. From these
conclusions, it follows that there exists no legal basis for any entitlement by
China to maritime zones in the area of Mischief Reef or Second Thomas Shoal.
Accordingly, there is no situation of overlapping entitlements that would call for
the application of Articles 15, 74, or 83 to delimit the overlap.
 Gabrillo v. Heirs of Pastor, G.R. No. 234255, [October 2, 2019]

Facts:

Petitioner filed before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Talisay, Cebu (Branch 1)[3] a Complaint to
expropriate a property of the respondents. In an Order dated April 8, 1997, the MTC dismissed the
Complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. It... reasoned that "[e]minent domain is an exercise of the
power to take private property for public use after payment of just compensation. In an action for eminent
domain, therefore, the principal cause of action is the exercise of such power or right. The fact that the
action also... involves real property is merely incidental. An action for eminent domain is therefore within
the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court and not with this Court."

RTC also dismissed the Complaint when filed before it, holding that an action for eminent domain affected
title to real property; hence, the value of the property to be expropriated would determine whether the
case should be filed before the MTC or the RTC.

petitioner appealed directly to this Court, raising a pure question of law.

the Court denied the Petition for Review

Issues:

Which court, MTC or RTC, has jurisdiction over cases for eminent domain or expropriation where tha
assessed value of the subject porperty is below Twenty Thousand )P20,000.00) Pesos?

Ruling:

The Petition is meritorious.

We agree with the petitioner that an expropriation suit is incapable of pecuniary estimation.

Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or... remedy sought.
If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary
estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first instance would
depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic... issue is something other than the right to
recover a sum of money, or where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the
principal relief sought, like in suits to have the defendant perform his part of the contract (specific
performance) and in actions for... support, or for annulment of a judgment or to foreclose a mortgage, this
Court has considered such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in
terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance. The rationale of the rule... is
plainly that the second class cases, besides the determination of damages, demand an inquiry into other
factors which the law has deemed to be more within the competence of courts of first instance, which
were the lowest courts of record at the time that the first organic... laws of the Judiciary were enacted
allocating jurisdiction (Act 136 of the Philippine Commission of June 11, 1901)

In the present case, an expropriation suit does not involve the recovery of a sum of money. Rather, it
deals with the exercise by the government of its authority and right to take private property for public use.[

"The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the court of `the
just compensation for the property sought to be taken.' This is done by the Court with the assistance of
not more than three (3) commissioners. The order fixing the just... compensation on the basis of the
evidence before, and findings of, the commissioners would be final, too. It would finally dispose of the
second stage of the suit, and leave nothing more to be done by the Court regarding the issue. x x x'"

It should be stressed that the primary consideration in an expropriation suit is whether the government or
any of its instrumentalities has complied with the requisites for the taking of private property. Hence, the
courts determine the authority of the government entity,... the necessity of the expropriation, and the
observance of due process.[13] In the main, the subject of an expropriation suit is the government's
exercise of eminent domain, a matter that is incapable of pecuniary estimation.

True, the value of the property to be expropriated is estimated in monetary terms, for the court is
duty-bound to determine the just compensation for it. This, however, is merely incidental to the
expropriation suit. Indeed, that amount is determined only after the court is... satisfied with the propriety of
the expropriation.

To emphasize, the question in the present suit is whether the government may expropriate private
property under the given set of circumstances. The government does not dispute respondents' title to or
possession of the same. Indeed, it is not a question of who has a better title... or right, for the government
does not even claim that it has a title to the property. It merely asserts its inherent sovereign power to
"appropriate and control individual property for the public benefit, as the public necessity, convenience or
welfare may demand."
 Juego-Sakai v. Republic, G.R. No. 224015, [July 23, 2018]

FACTS: Petitioner Stephen I. Juego-Sakai and Toshiharu Sakai got married on August 11, 2000 in Japan
pursuant to the wedding rites therein. After two (2) years, the parties, by agreement, obtained a divorce
decreev in said country dissolving their marriage. Thereafter, on April 5, 2013, petitioner filed a Petition for
Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 40, Camarines
Norte. In its Decision dated October 9, 2014, the RTC granted the petition and recognized the divorce
between the parties as valid and effective under Philippine Laws. On November 25, 2015, the CA
affirmed the decision of the RTC. In an Amended Decision dated March 3, 2016, however, the CA
revisited its findings and recalled and set aside its previous decision.

ISSUES: WoN the CA gravely erred when it held that the second requisite for the application of the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is not present because the petitioner gave consent to
the divorce obtained by her Japanese husband

Held: YES. The issue before Us has already been resolved in the landmark ruling of

Republic v. Manalo the facts of which fall squarely on point with the facts herein. Despite the fact that
petitioner participated in the divorce proceedings in Japan, and even if it is assumed that she initiated the
same, she must still be allowed to benefit from the exception provided under Paragraph 2 of Article 26.
Consequently, since her marriage to Toshiharu Sakai had already been dissolved by virtue of the divorce
decree they obtained in Japan, thereby capacitating Toshiharu to remarry, petitioner shall likewise have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law. Nevertheless, as similarly held in Manalo, We cannot yet grant
petitioner's Petition for Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment for she has yet to comply with certain
guidelines before our courts may recognize the subject divorce decree and the effects thereof. The
Office of the Solicitor General does not dispute the existence of the divorce decree, rendering the same
admissible. What remains to be proven, therefore, is the pertinent Japanese Law on divorce considering
that Japanese laws on persons and family relations are not among those matters that Filipino judges are
supposed to know by reason of their judicial function