19.in Re Gutierrez, 5 SCRA 661

A.M. No.
L-363 July 31, 1962
IN RE: DISBARMENT PROCEEDINGS AGAINST ATTY. DIOSDADO Q. GUTIERREZ, respondent.
Victoriano A. Savellano for complaint.
Nestor M. Andrada for respondent.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
Respondent Diosdado Q. Gutierrez is a member of the Philippine Bar, admitted to it on October 5,

1945. In criminal case No. R-793 of the Court of First Instance of Oriental Mindoro he was convicted
of the murder of Filemon Samaco, former municipal mayor of Calapan, and together with his co-
conspirators was sentenced to the penalty of death. Upon review by this Court the judgment of
conviction was affirmed on June 30, 1956 (G.R. No. L-17101), but the penalty was changed to
reclusion perpetua. After serving a portion of the sentence respondent was granted a conditional
pardon by the President on August 19, 1958. The unexecuted portion of the prison term was remitted
"on condition that he shall not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines."
On October 9, 1958 the widow of the deceased Filemon Samaco, victim in the murder case, filed a
verified complaint before this Court praying that respondent be removed from the roll of lawyers
pursuant to Rule 127, section 5. Respondent presented his answer in due time, admitting the facts
alleged by complainant regarding pardon in defense, on the authority of the decision of this Court in
the case of In re Lontok, 43 Phil. 293.
Under section 5 of Rule 127, a member of the bar may be removed suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court by reason of his conviction of a crime insolving moral turpitude. Murder
is, without doubt, such a crime. The term "moral turpitude" includes everything which is done contrary
to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals. In re Carlos S. Basa, 41 Phil. 275. As used in disbarment
statutes, it means an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private and social duties which a
man owes to his fellowmen or to society in general, contrary to the accepted rule of right and duty
between man and man. State ex rel. Conklin v. Buckingham, 84 P. 2nd 49; 5 Am. Jur. Sec. 279. pp.
428-429.
The only question to be resolved is whether or not the conditional pardon extended to respondent
places him beyond the scope of the rule on disbarment aforecited. Reliance is placed by him squarely
on the Lontok case. The respondent therein was convicted of bigamy and thereafter pardoned by the
Governor-General. In a subsequent viction, this Court decided in his favor and held: "When
proceedings to strike an attorney's name from the rolls the fact of a conviction for a felony ground for
disbarment, it has been held that a pardon operates to wipe out the conviction and is a bar to any
proceeding for the disbarment of the attorney after the pardon has been granted."
It is our view that the ruling does not govern the question now before us. In making it the Court
proceeded on the assumption that the pardon granted to respondent Lontok was absolute. This is
implicit in the ratio decidendi of the case, particularly in the citations to support it, namely. In Re
Emmons, 29 Cal. App. 121; Scott vs. State, 6 Tex. Civ. App. 343; and Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall, 380.
Thus in Scott vs. State the court said:
We are of opinion that after received an unconditional pardon the record of the felony conviction could
no longer be used as a basis for the proceeding provided for in article 226. The record, when offered
in evidence, was met with an unconditional pardon, and could not, therefore, properly be said to afford
"proof of a conviction of any felony." Having been thus cancelled, all its force as a felony conviction
was taken away. A pardon falling short of this would not be a pardon, according to the judicial
construction which that act of executive grace was received. Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall, 344; Knote v.
U.S., 95 U.S. 149, and cases there cited; Young v. Young, 61 Tex. 191.
And the portion of the decision in Ex parte Garland quoted with approval in the Lontok case is as
follows:
A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and the guilt of the offender; and
when the pardon is full, it releases the punishment and blots out the existence of guilt, so that in the
eye of the law the offender is as innocent as if he had never committed the offense. It granted before
conviction, it prevents any of the penalties and disabilities, consequent upon conviction, from
attaching; if granted after conviction, it removes the penalties and disabilities, and restores him to all
his civil rights it makes him, as it were, a new man, and gives him a new credit and capacity.
The pardon granted to respondent here is not absolute but conditional, and merely remitted the
unexecuted portion of his term. It does not reach the offense itself, unlike that in Ex parte Garland,
which was "a full pardon and amnesty for all offense by him committed in connection with rebellion
(civil war) against government of the United States."
The foregoing considerations rendered In re Lontok are inapplicable here. Respondent Gutierrez must
be judged upon the fact of his conviction for murder without regard to the pardon he invokes in defense.
The crime was qualified by treachery and aggravated by its having been committed in hand, by taking
advantage of his official position (respondent being municipal mayor at the time) and with the use of
motor vehicle. People vs. Diosdado Gutierrez, supra. The degree of moral turpitude involved is such
as to justify his being purged from the profession.
The practice of law is a privilege accorded only to those who measure up to certain rigid standards of
mental and moral fitness. For the admission of a candidate to the bar the Rules of Court not only
prescribe a test of academic preparation but require satisfactory testimonials of good moral character.
These standards are neither dispensed with nor lowered after admission: the lawyer must continue to
adhere to them or else incur the risk of suspension or removal. As stated in Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S.
263, 27 Law ed., 552, 556: "Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound to
uphold the laws. He is their sworn servant; and for him, of all men in the world, to repudiate and
override the laws, to trample them under foot and to ignore the very bonds of society, argues recreancy
to his position and office and sets a pernicious example to the insubordinate and dangerous elements
of the body politic.
WHEREFORE, pursuant to Rule 127, Section 5, and considering the nature of the crime for which
respondent Diosdado Q. Gutierrez has been convicted, he is ordered disbarred and his name stricken
from the roll of lawyers.
Bengzon, C.J., Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon and Regala, JJ., concur.
Padilla, J., took no part.

19.in Re Gutierrez, 5 SCRA 661

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19.in Re Gutierrez, 5 SCRA 661

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A.M. No.

L-363 July 31, 1962

IN RE: DISBARMENT PROCEEDINGS AGAINST ATTY. DIOSDADO Q. GUTIERREZ, respondent.

Victoriano A. Savellano for complaint.

Nestor M. Andrada for respondent.

Respondent Diosdado Q. Gutierrez is a member of the Philippine Bar, admitted to it on October 5,

Padilla, J., took no part.

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