AZGOP v. Hobbs - APPLICATION FOR ISSUANCE OF WRIT UNDER EXERCISE OF ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

ARIZONA SUPREME COURT
ARIZONA REPUBLICAN PARTY, No. _____________

a recognized political party; and
YVONNE CAHILL, an officer and
member of the Arizona Republican
Party and Arizona voter and taxpayer.
Petitioners
v.
KATIE HOBBS, in her official

capacity as Arizona Secretary of
State; and STATE OF ARIZONA,
a body politic.
Respondents
APPLICATION FOR ISSUANCE OF WRIT UNDER EXERCISE OF

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
Alexander Kolodin (030826)

Veronica Lucero (030292)
Roger Strassburg (016314)
Arno Naeckel (026158)
Davillier Law Group, LLC
4105 N. 20th St., Ste. 110
Phoenix, AZ 85016
T: (602) 730-2985 F: (602) 801-2539
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected] (file copies)
Attorneys for Petitioners
Arizona Republican Party and Yvonne Cahill, hereby apply for the issuance
of a writ in the exercise of this Court’s original jurisdiction, as more fully set forth
in the Verified Petition for Special Action filed herewith and expressly incorporated
herein by reference. This application is made pursuant to Arizona Supreme Court
Rule 1 and the other authorities cited therein.
DATED this 25th day of February 2022.
By: /s/Alexander Kolodin
Attorney for Petitioners
2
ARIZONA SUPREME COURT
ARIZONA REPUBLICAN PARTY, No. _____________

a recognized political party; and
YVONNE CAHILL, an officer and member
of the Arizona Republican Party and
Arizona voter and taxpayer.
Petitioners
v.
KATIE HOBBS, in her official

capacity as Arizona Secretary of
State; and STATE OF ARIZONA,
a body politic.
Respondents
VERIFIED PETITION FOR SPECIAL ACTION

Original Jurisdiction
Alexander Kolodin (030826)

Veronica Lucero (030292)
Roger Strassburg (016314)
Arno Naeckel (026158)
4105 N. 20th St., Ste. 110
Phoenix, AZ 85016
T: (602) 730-2985 F: (602) 801-2539
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected] (file copies)
Table of Contents
Page
Table of Authorities ................................................................................................ ii
Introduction ............................................................................................................ 1
Jurisdictional Statement ......................................................................................... 6
Statement of the Issues ......................................................................................... 13
Statement of Facts ................................................................................................ 14
Argument .............................................................................................................. 15
I. Signature Verification Guidelines Must Be Included in the EPM ............. 15
II. The Secretary May Not Authorize Voting Via Drop-boxes ...................... 17
III. No-excuse Mail-in (or “Early” or “Absentee”) Voting

Is Unconstitutional, Either in Whole or in Part; Alternatively,
It Must Be Narrowly Construed to Conform
to the Arizona Constitution ........................................................................ 19
A. Arizona Constitutional Provisions—by their Plain Meaning,

History, and Initial Principles—Require In-person Voting
at the Polls on a Specific Day ...................................................... 21
B. “Early Voting” is Contrary to Secure, In-person Voting at the

Polls on a Specific Day and Is Therefore Unconstitutional ......... 39
C. In the Alternative, “Early Voting” Must Be Construed

Narrowly to Conform to the Arizona Constitution ...................... 40
Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 44
Table of Authorities
Cases
Adams v. Bolin,
77 Ariz. 316 (1954)..........................................................................................8
Ariz. Ctr. for Law in Pub. Interest v. Hassell,
172 Ariz. 356 (App. 1991).............................................................................44
Arizonans for Second Chances, Rehab., & Pub. Safety v. Hobbs,

249 Ariz. 396 (2020)........................................................................................1
Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n. v. Brewer,

229 Ariz. 347 (2012) .......................................................................................7
Ariz. Pub. Integrity All. v. Fontes,
250 Ariz. 58 (2020) ................................................................................passim
Ariz. Sch. Bds. Ass’n v. State,
No. CV-21-0234-T/AP, 2022 Ariz. Lexis 31(Jan. 6, 2022) ..........................20
Armory Park Neighborhood Ass’n v. Episcopal Cmty. Servs.,
148 Ariz. 1 (1985 ...........................................................................................11
Baca v. Ortiz,
P.2d 320 (N.M. 1936) ....................................................................................20
Brewer v. Burns,
222 Ariz. 234 (2009)........................................................................................7
Bourland v. Hildreth,
26 Cal. 161 (1864) .........................................................................................20
Burdick v. Takushi,
504 U.S. 428 (1992).....................................................................................1, 8
Chase v. Miller,
41 Pa. 403 (1862)....................................................................................passim
Chavez v. Brewer,
222 Ariz. 309 (App. 2009).......................................................................17, 24
ii
Citizens for Growth Mgmt. v. Groscost,
199 Ariz. 71 (2000)..........................................................................................7
City of Phoenix v. Yates,

69 Ariz. 68 (1949)....................................................................................23, 37
City of Surprise v. Ariz. Corp. Comm’n,

246 Ariz. 206 (2019)........................................................................................7
Clark v. Nash,
192 Ky. 594 (1921) ..................................................................................20, 21
David C. v. Alexis S.,

240 Ariz. 53 (2016)........................................................................................24
Dobson v. State ex rel. Comm’n. on App. Ct. Appointments,

233 Ariz. 119 (2013)........................................................................................7
Fann v. State,
493 P.3d 246 (Ariz. 2021) .......................................................................23, 37
Forty-Seventh Legislature v. Napolitano,
213 Ariz. 482 (2006)......................................................................................18
In re Contested Election,
281 Pa. 131 (1924).........................................................................................20
Lake Havasu City v. Mohave Cty.,
138 Ariz. 552 (App. 1983).............................................................................19
Leach v. Hobbs,
250 Ariz. 572 (2021)......................................................................................19
Marbury v. Madison,
5 U.S. 137 (1803)...........................................................................................20
McLaughlin v. Bennett,
225 Ariz. 351 (2010)......................................................................................26
McLinko v. Commonwealth,
2022 Pa. Commw. Lexis 12 (Commw. Ct. Jan. 28, 2022) .....................passim
iii
McKenna v. Soto,
250 Ariz. 469 (2021)..................................................................................2, 16
Miller v. Picacho Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 33,

179 Ariz. 178, 180 (1994) .............................................................................27
Pedersen v. Bennett,
230 Ariz. 556 (2012)........................................................................................1
Perini Land & Dev. Co. v. Pima Cty.,

170 Ariz. 380 (1992)......................................................................................22
Randolph v. Groscost,
195 Ariz. 423 (1999)........................................................................................8
Rios v. Symington,
172 Ariz. 3 (1992)............................................................................................8
Rodgers v. Huckelberry,
247 Ariz. 426 (App. 2019).............................................................................11
Saban Rent-a-Car LLC v. Ariz. Dep’t of Revenue,
246 Ariz. 89 (2019)..................................................................................24, 26
Sherman v. City of Tempe,
202 Ariz. 339 (2002)................................................................................38, 39
Thompson v. Scheier,
57 P.2d 293 (N.M. 1936) ...............................................................................20
Twitchell v. Blodgett,
13 Mich. 127 (1865) ......................................................................................20
US W. Communs., Inc. v. Ariz. Corp. Comm’n,

201 Ariz. 242 (2001)......................................................................................41
Warth v. Seldin,
422 U.S. 490 (1975).................................................................................11, 12
iv
Constitutional Provisions
Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 3 ..............................................................................................41

Ariz. Const. art. 4, § 1 ...................................................................................... passim
Ariz. Const. art. 5, § 9 ..............................................................................................17

Ariz. Const. art. 6, § 5 ................................................................................................6
Ariz. Const. art. 7, § 1 ...................................................................................... passim
Ariz. Const. art. 7, § 2 ........................................................................................29, 34

Ariz. Const. art. 7, § 4 ........................................................................................36, 37
Ariz. Const. art. 7, § 5 ..............................................................................................37
Ky. Const. § 147 ......................................................................................................21

Penn. Const. art. 7, § 1 .......................................................................................29, 35
Penn. Const. art. 7, § 4 .............................................................................................31
Statutes
1925 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 75, § 1 ...........................................................................28

1991 Ariz. Sess. Laws, vol. 1, ch. 51 § 1 ...............................................28, 37, 41, 42
A.R.S. § 12-2021........................................................................................................6
A.R.S. § 16-101........................................................................................................10
A.R.S. § 16-211........................................................................................................38
A.R.S. § 16-404..................................................................................................18, 23
A.R.S. § 16-411..................................................................................................18, 22
A.R.S. § 16-452.................................................................................................passim
A.R.S. § 16-502........................................................................................................25
A.R.S. § 16-515........................................................................................................23
v
A.R.S. § 16-541......................................................................................29, 33, 40, 42
A.R.S. § 16-542............................................................................................11, 18, 33

A.R.S. § 16-548............................................................................................17, 19, 35
A.R.S. § 16-550..................................................................................................15, 35
A.R.S. § 16-552........................................................................................................11
A.R.S. § 16-609........................................................................................................16
A.R.S. § 16-621........................................................................................................11
A.R.S. § 16-821........................................................................................................10
A.R.S. § 16-822........................................................................................................10
A.R.S. § 16-825........................................................................................................10
A.R.S. § 16-827........................................................................................................10
Rules
RPSA 1 ...................................................................................................................8, 9
RPSA 3 ..............................................................................................................passim
RPSA 7 .......................................................................................................................6
Other Authorities
Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner,

Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts (2012)...............................24
Ariz. Republican Party, Bylaws,

https://azgop.com/about/bylaws ....................................................................12
Ariz. Republican Party, Proposal 9,

https://azgop.com/call/resolution...................................................................12
Ariz. Republican Party, State Party, Elected Officers,

https://azgop.com/directory/state-party .........................................................10
vi
Ariz. Sec’y of State, Arizona Election Laws & Publications,
https://azsos.gov/elections/arizona-election-laws-publications ................1, 16
Ariz. Sec’y of State, 2019 Elections Procedures Manual,

https://azsos.gov/sites/default/files/2019ELECTIONS_
PROCEDURES_MANUAL_APPROVED.pdf .....................................passim
Ariz. Sec’y of State, Elections Calendar & Upcoming Events, 2022 Elections,
https://azsos.gov/elections/elections-calendar-upcoming-events .................... 9
Ariz. Sec’y of State, Signature Verification Guide (July 2020),
https://azsos.gov/sites/default/files/
AZSOS_Signature_Verification_Guide.pdf...........................................passim

https://azsos.gov/sites/default/files/
AZSOS_Signature_Verification_Guide.pdf...........................................passim
Ariz. Sec’y of State, Voter Registration Statistics – January 2022,
https://azsos.gov/elections/voter-registration-historical-election-data. ......... 13
Cambridge Dictionary,
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/at .............................34
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/thereto ....................36
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/therefrom ................ 36
John C. Fortier & Norman J. Ornstein,

The Absentee Ballot and the Secret Ballot:
Challenges for Election Reform,
36 U. Mich. J. L. Reform 483 (2003) .....................................................passim
John R. Lott, Why Do Most Countries Ban Mail-In Ballots? They Have Seen
Massive Vote Fraud Problems, SSRN (Aug. 3, 2020),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3666259 ...................... 3
The Records of the Arizona Constitutional Convention of 1910
(John S. Goff ed., 1990) ..........................................................................25, 32
vii
Introduction
As this Court has recognized, “[e]lection laws play an important role in
protecting the integrity of the electoral process.” Ariz. Pub. Integrity All. v. Fontes,
250 Ariz. 58, 61 ¶ 4 (2020) (citing Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 441 (1992)
(“[T]he right to vote is the right to participate in an electoral process that is
necessarily structured to maintain the integrity of the democratic system.”)). In
Arizona, however, ongoing abuse of election laws is jeopardizing public
confidence in the electoral process.
In July 2020, Arizona Secretary of State Katie Hobbs (“Secretary”) issued a
Signature Verification Guide (“2020 Guide”) outlining procedures for verifying
signatures on early ballot envelopes. 1 However, the Secretary has never added
these procedures to the operative Elections Procedures Manual (“EPM”), 2 or an
addendum thereto, as required by A.R.S. § 16-452. If adopted into the EPM and
approved by the Governor and Attorney General, the procedures would have the
force of law, and their violation would be punishable as a misdemeanor. Id. at (C);
1
https://azsos.gov/sites/default/files/AZSOS_Signature_Verification_Guide.pdf.
The Court may take judicial notice of publicly available records “from sources
whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Arizonans for Second Chances,
Rehab., & Pub. Safety v. Hobbs, 249 Ariz. 396, 403 n.1 (2020) (citing Pedersen v.
Bennett, 230 Ariz. 556, 559 ¶ 15 (2012)).
2
See Ariz. Sec’y of State, Arizona Election Laws & Publications,
https://azsos.gov/elections/arizona-election-laws-publications (linking to EPM and
noting “current EPM went into effect on December 20, 2019”).
1
Ariz. Pub. Integrity All., 250 Ariz. at 63 ¶ 16; McKenna v. Soto, 250 Ariz. 469, 473
¶ 21 (2021).
The Secretary’s failure to execute her non-discretionary duty under A.R.S.
§ 16-452(B) to include the procedures in the EPM means county recorders are not
required to follow them. Even if they were, the Secretary’s procedures purport to
authorize counties to supplement her rules with their own See, e.g., 2020 Guide
at 1. Failure to include the procedures in the EPM also means the Secretary can
modify them at will without the checks and balances that approval by the Governor
and Attorney General provides. Thus, the Secretary’s signature verification
procedures do not ensure that “the maximum degree of correctness, impartiality,
uniformity and efficiency,” A.R.S. § 16-452(A), will be achieved among Arizona
counties in the 2022 state general election.
On the other hand, exceeding her legal authority, the Secretary has
prescribed rules in the EPM allowing county officials to “develop and implement
procedures” for placing drop-boxes, including “unstaffed drop-box[es],” in various
locations throughout the several counties.3 Neither the Secretary nor county
recorders have statutory authority to implement “drop-box” voting under Arizona
law. Moreover, the legislature may not delegate this authority to the Secretary, nor
3
Ariz. Sec’y of State, 2019 Elections Procedures Manual,
https://azsos.gov/sites/default/files/2019_ELECTIONS_PROCEDURES_MANUA
L_APPROVED.pdf at 60–62.
2
may the Secretary delegate a portion of this authority to county recorders, as the
EPM purports to do. See EPM at 60–61.
These recent abuses are possible because of a longstanding deviation from
Arizona’s constitutional mandates regarding the time, place, and manner of
elections. Stated simply, Arizona’s “early voting” statutes—which provide for
“absentee” or “no-excuse mail-in” voting—violate the Arizona Constitution, in
whole or in part.
Absentee voting naturally lends itself to these and other abuses,4 which is
why Arizona’s constitution is a product of the national movement to implement the
“Australian ballot system,” a secure system quickly adopted by several states with
little controversy and containing the following four essential provisions: (1) ballots
printed and distributed at public expense; (2) ballots containing the names of all the
candidates duly nominated by law (a “blanket ballot”); (3) ballots distributed “only
by election officers at the polling place (‘exclusive’ or ‘official ballot’)”; and (4)
detailed provisions for compartments and “other physical arrangements to ensure
secrecy in casting the vote.” John C. Fortier & Norman J. Ornstein, The Absentee
Ballot and the Secret Ballot: Challenges for Election Reform, 36 U. Mich. J. L.
4
Most European democracies have banned absentee voting due to security
concerns. See John R. Lott, Why Do Most Countries Ban Mail-In Ballots? They
Have Seen Massive Vote Fraud Problems, SSRN (Aug. 3, 2020),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3666259.
3
Reform 483, 488 (2003) (emphasis added).
Accordingly, the Arizona Constitution prescribes that “Official Ballot[s]”
are to be provided “at the next regular general election” 5 in “such manner that the
electors may express at the polls their approval or disapproval of [a] measure.”
Ariz. Const. art. 4, § 1(10). The provision that voting is to take place “at the polls”
appears in three other places. See id. at (1), (3), & (15). Additional constitutional
provisions, discussed more fully below, further support the proposition that in-
person voting at the polls on a fixed date is the only constitutionally permissible
manner of voting. The Court found this to be obvious in 1913, the year after the
constitution was ratified: “We thus find that the people, who are the source of all
power, in a proper manner, by their votes, at a proper place, at the polls, and at a
proper time, a general election, have registered the public will….” Allen v. State,
14 Ariz. 458, 460 (1913) (emphasis added).
Thus, at minimum, Arizona’s no-excuse mail-in voting system, adopted in
1991, violates the Arizona Constitution. In fact, a Pennsylvania appellate court
recently struck down that state’s no-excuse mail-in voting system as
unconstitutional under provisions like those in Arizona’s constitution. See McLinko
v. Commonwealth, 2022 Pa. Commw. Lexis 12, at *61 (Commw. Ct. Jan. 28,
5
Therefore, as discussed more fully below, this provision applies to all general
election ballots.
4
2022) (discussing history of constitutional challenges and noting irreconcilability
of absentee voting with state constitutions containing “secrecy” provisions), prob.
juris. noted. And although the constitutionality of absentee voting has been
challenged in other states, Arizona has never squarely addressed the question with
either a constitutional amendment or a decision by this Court—perhaps due to the
odd timing of Arizona’s entry into the union, coming as it did, between two waves
of litigation on the subject. See Fortier & Ornstein, supra at 493–500 & 506–11.
Whether or not the Court agrees with this constitutionality argument, it
should nevertheless provide a final resolution to the question and articulate what, if
anything, the Arizona Constitution authorizes regarding absentee voting, the source
of this authority, and any applicable limiting principles.
For these reasons, Petitioners Arizona Republican Party (“AZGOP”) and
Yvonne Cahill (collectively, “Petitioners”) ask this Court to exercise its original
jurisdiction over this special action and compel the Secretary to include the 2020
Guide in the EPM, prohibit her from including drop-box rules in the EPM, and
enjoin the State from enforcing Arizona’s unconstitutional absentee voting laws.
Petitioners also respectfully request that the Court expedite this matter so that state
officials, candidates, and voters will have certainty in the upcoming general
election.
5
Jurisdictional Statement
Jurisdiction
This Court has original jurisdiction over actions seeking mandamus,
injunction, and other extraordinary writs against the state and its officers. Ariz.
Const. art. 6, § 5; A.R.S. § 12-2021; See also Ariz. Sup. Ct. R. 1; Ariz. R. P.
Special Actions R. (“RPSA”) 1, 3, & 7 (replacing prior procedures, describing
questions which may be raised, and allowing such a case to be brought in this
Court via “special action…initiated by the filing of a petition”).
The relief Petitioners seek in this special action falls within the traditional
categories this Court considers when exercising its original jurisdiction. Petitioners
seek to compel the Secretary to include uniform signature verification guidelines in
the EPM—to be used by all county recorders in Arizona—as required by A.R.S.
§ 16-452(A). Additionally, Petitioners seek to prohibit the Secretary from
including ballot drop-box provisions in the EPM because she lacks legal authority
to prescribe rules that are not authorized by statute, and no Arizona statute
authorizes drop-boxes in lieu of official polling places. Further, even if the
legislature were to enact a statute authorizing drop-boxes, as discussed below, such
legislation would violate the Arizona Constitution. Thus, Petitioners also seek to
prohibit the State from enforcing unconstitutional early voting statutes and to
compel it instead to abide by the constitution.
6
Although the Court’s original jurisdiction is discretionary, it has often
exercised it in cases that (1) involve purely legal questions of first impression, (2)
involve matters of substantial public impact that are likely to be appealed to this
Court regardless of a lower court’s decision, or (3) require a final resolution on an
expedited basis. See, e.g., City of Surprise v. Ariz. Corp. Comm’n, 246 Ariz. 206,
209 ¶¶ 5–7 (2019) (exercising original jurisdiction to clarify scope of
commission’s authority because jurisdiction is appropriate in cases involving
purely legal questions of statewide importance or requiring an immediate and final
resolution, particularly when a defendant proceeds or threatens to proceed without
legal authority); Dobson v. State ex rel. Comm’n. on App. Ct. Appointments, 233
Ariz. 119, 121 ¶¶ 5–8 (2013) (exercising original jurisdiction where petitioners
sought to declare unconstitutional and enjoin a statute because petition presented
purely legal questions of statewide importance that turned on interpretation of
constitution and required immediate and final resolution); Ariz. Indep.
Redistricting Comm’n. v. Brewer, 229 Ariz. 347, 348 ¶¶ 11–14 (2012) (exercising
original jurisdiction because legal issues required prompt resolution and were of
first impression and statewide importance); Brewer v. Burns, 222 Ariz. 234, 237
¶¶ 8–9 (2009) (exercising jurisdiction because issue was of one of first impression,
statewide importance, purely legal, and turned on meaning of constitution);
Citizens for Growth Mgmt. v. Groscost, 199 Ariz. 71, 71–72 ¶¶ 1–2 (2000)
7
(exercising jurisdiction over challenge to description of ballot initiative); Randolph
v. Groscost, 195 Ariz. 423, 425 ¶ 6 (1999) (exercising jurisdiction over challenge
to commission’s authority); Rios v. Symington, 172 Ariz. 3, 4 (1992) (challenge to
governor’s line item vetoes); Adams v. Bolin, 77 Ariz. 316, 317 (1954) (whether
secretary of state was required to accept petitioner’s nomination papers for
congressional election).
This petition (1) involves purely legal questions of first impression that are
(2) matters of substantial public impact (and that will certainly be appealed to this
Court regardless of a lower court’s decision) and that (3) require a final resolution
on an expedited basis because there is no “equally plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy by appeal.” RPSA 1. Whether the Secretary must include signature
verification guidelines in the EPM, whether she may create drop-box rules without
legal authority, and whether mail-in voting statutes are constitutional (a question
that requires this Court to interpret the Arizona Constitution) are purely legal
questions of first impression that Arizona courts have never addressed.
Moreover, this case involves issues of substantial public impact. “The right
to vote is the right to participate in an electoral process that is necessarily
structured to maintain the integrity of the democratic system.” Burdick, 504 U.S. at
441. “Election laws play an important role in protecting the integrity of the
electoral process.” Ariz. Pub. Integrity All., 250 Ariz. at 61 ¶ 4. In Arizona, the
8
Secretary is tasked with prescribing “rules to achieve and maintain the maximum
degree of correctness, impartiality, uniformity and efficiency on the procedures for
early voting and voting.” A.R.S. § 16-452(A). Because of the substantial public
impact of a decision on any one of Petitioners’ claims—each of which concerns
Arizona election laws—this Court should be the only court to weigh in, thus
preventing the confusion and delay that would inevitably result from a lower
court’s ruling.
Additionally, a ruling by a lower court simply would not suffice here
because Petitioners, election officials, and voters require a speedy and final
resolution of these claims, and there is no “equally plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy by appeal.” RPSA 1. Because of the upcoming Arizona general election,
which will occur months from now, it is in the state’s best interest for the Court to
resolve on an expedited basis the serious issues Petitioners raise. Early voting
begins October 12, 2022, for the State General Election to be held on November 8,
2022. 6
If the Court grants Petitioners’ requested relief, election officials need time
to adopt the uniform signature guidelines and to ensure there are sufficient polling
places to replace drop-box and no-excuse mail-in voting. Commencing this action
6
Ariz. Sec’y of State, Elections Calendar & Upcoming Events, 2022 Elections,
https://azsos.gov/elections/elections-calendar-upcoming-events.
9
in trial court would necessarily expand its duration and render it difficult, if not
impossible, for election officials to comply with the law prior to the upcoming
statewide election. Commencing this action in a lower court would also waste
judicial resources by triggering an appeal—because even though a lower court
could address these legal questions, only this Court can provide a final resolution.
Thus, Petitioners lack an “equally plain, speedy, and adequate remedy by appeal.”
For these reasons, Petitioners respectfully request this Court to exercise its
original jurisdiction over this special action and grant the expedited relief
Petitioners seek.
Standing
Petitioner Cahill has standing as an Arizona citizen and voter. In Arizona
Public Integrity Alliance, this Court held that “Arizona citizens and voters” have
“sufficient beneficial interest to establish standing” in a mandamus action seeking
to compel public officials to comply with state election laws. 250 Ariz. at 62 ¶ 12.
Petitioner Cahill is an Arizona citizen and a registered voter7 seeking to compel the
Secretary to perform her non-discretionary duty to include signature verification
7
Petitioner Cahill is a statutory officer (Secretary) of the AZGOP’s state
committee. See AZGOP, State Party, Elected Officers,
https://azgop.com/directory/state-party; A.R.S. § 16-827. As such, she is required
by law to be a precinct committeeman (an elected party and public official), and
being a registered Arizona voter is a statutory requirement to hold the office of
precinct committeeman. See A.R.S. §§ 16-101, 16-821(A), 16-822(A), 16-825,
16-827.
10
guidelines in the EPM, to prohibit the Secretary and State from exceeding their
legal authority by executing and enforcing invalid election laws, and to compel
them to operate within the statutory and constitutional limitations of state election
laws. Thus, Petitioner Cahill has standing to bring this challenge. 8
Petitioner AZGOP has direct interests in the outcome of this litigation
because state election laws establish its right and duty to monitor the early voting
process against improprieties. See, e.g., ARS §§ 16-621(A) & 16-552(C) & (H).
Striking down as unconstitutional some or all of Arizona’s early voting statutes,
and enjoining the Secretary’s unlawful acts, would affect these duties in regards to
early ballots.
Petitioner AZGOP also has standing to assert the claims of its members in a
representational capacity. Armory Park Neighborhood Ass’n v. Episcopal Cmty.
Servs., 148 Ariz. 1, 5–6 (1985). In Arizona, “cases such as this need not be
determined by rigid adherence to the three-prong [standing] test of Warth, although
those factors may be considered.” Id. at 6 (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490
8
Petitioner Cahill also has standing as a taxpayer. As set forth below, mail-in
voting is unconstitutional. Arizona funds the pre-paid postage for mail-in ballots.
See A.R.S. § 16-542 (“The county recorder…shall mail the early ballot and the
envelope for its return postage prepaid to the address provided by the requesting
elector.”). Thus, the State is making illegal expenditures and will continue doing so
unless compelled to follow the constitution. See Rodgers v. Huckelberry, 247 Ariz.
426, 429 ¶ 11 (App. 2019).
11
(1975)).9 “The issue in Arizona is [1] whether, given all the circumstances in the
case, the association has a legitimate interest in an actual controversy involving its
members and [2] whether judicial economy and administration will be promoted
by allowing representational appearance.” Id.
Regarding the first Armory factor, the AZGOP has a legitimate interest in an
actual controversy involving its members, which include voters and candidates.
The Secretary’s failure to include signature verification procedures and her
addition of drop-box procedures in the EPM (as well as her unlawful delegation of
this authority to counties) compromises the uniformity of the election procedures
under which the AZGOP’s candidates compete and implicates Petitioner’s ability
to ensure its members are elected in a lawful process.10 Further, ensuring that
Republican voters and candidates are elected pursuant to the laws and constitution
of this state is germane to the AZGOP’s resolution to protect the “electoral
process” by, inter alia, ensuring that all Arizona voters are required to prove their
identities and qualifications 11 (e.g., via uniform signature verification procedures
or by presenting identification, which voters cannot do at drop-box locations or via
9
The three factors are: (a) association members would have standing to sue in their
own right; (b) the interests which the association seeks to protect are relevant to the
organization’s purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested
requires the participation of individual members. For the reasons stated below,
establishing standing under Arizona’s test, Petitioners also meet the Warth factors.
10
AZGOP, Bylaws at 1, https://azgop.com/about/bylaws.
11
AZGOP, Proposal 9, https://azgop.com/call/resolutions (passed).
12
mail-in voting and which, under current election laws, they can do only “at the
polls”).
Regarding the second factor, judicial economy and administration will be
promoted by allowing representational appearance because the AZGOP is
comprised of 1.5 million registered voters,12 and it is not feasible to address their
concerns through individual lawsuits. Thus, Petitioner AZGOP—like Petitioner
Cahill—has standing to seek the requested special-action relief.
Statement of the Issues
1. Must the Arizona Secretary of State include uniform signature verification
guidelines in the EPM pursuant to A.R.S. Title 16? RPSA 3(a).
2. Was/is the Secretary required to propound an EPM providing only
statutorily and constitutionally authorized procedures for returning ballots?
RPSA 3(a). Or was/is the Secretary instead without legal authority to
prescribe “drop-box” rules in the EPM when those rules are not statutorily or
constitutionally authorized? RPSA 3(b).
3. Was/is the State required to provide for a statutory voting system that
conforms to the Arizona Constitution? RPSA 3(a). Or was/is the State
instead without legal authority to enact, enforce, or facilitate unconstitutional
12
Ariz. Sec’y of State, Voter Registration Statistics – January 2022,
https://azsos.gov/elections/voter-registration-historical-election-data.
13
early (“absentee” or “no-excuse mail-in”) voting statutes? RPSA 3(b).
4. Alternatively, do Respondents abuse their discretion in doing any of the
above? RPSA 3(c).
Statement of Facts
Because this petition asks the Court to resolve purely legal questions, there
are no facts on record for the Court to review. All facts presented in the petition are
derived from publicly available documents, statutes, and constitutional provisions.
The essential facts of the case are these: (1) The Secretary has prescribed signature
verification procedures via the 2020 Guide, 13 which is not included in the EPM or
an addendum thereto. (2) The Secretary has authorized the use of ballot drop-boxes
in the EPM. See EPM at 60. 14 (3) Arizona election laws provide for no-excuse
mail-in voting.
Moreover, Petitioners do not assert any claims regarding election integrity or
lack thereof. Instead, Petitioners argue that—based on the text of election materials
(e.g., the EPM and the 2020 Guide), Arizona election statutes, and applicable
constitutional provisions—the Secretary fails to perform a non-discretionary duty
and exceeds her legal authority, and the State, without legal authority, is executing
13
This document also purports to authorize county recorders to supplement the
Secretary’s procedures with their own. See, e.g., 2020 Guide at 1.
14
Notably, the Secretary cites no statutory authority for drop-boxes as she does for
other items in the EPM.
14
and enforcing unconstitutional election statutes rather than complying with the
Arizona Constitution.
Argument
I. Signature Verification Guidelines Must Be Included in the EPM.
A.R.S. § 16-550 requires county recorders to ensure that signatures on mail-
in ballot envelopes are valid by verifying that signatures on envelopes match
electors’ signatures on file in voter registration records. However, the statute itself
does not establish procedures for such verification. Instead—“to achieve and
maintain the maximum degree of correctness, impartiality, uniformity and
efficiency on the procedures for early voting and voting, and of producing,
distributing, collecting, counting, tabulating and storing ballots”—A.R.S.
§ 16-452(A) delegates this responsibility to the Secretary, who must include these
rules “in an official instructions and procedures manual” (i.e., the EPM) no later
than December 31 of each year preceding the general election. A.R.S.
§ 16-452(A)–(B). Before its issuance, “the manual shall be approved by the
governor and the attorney general,” and the Secretary “shall submit the manual to
the governor and the attorney general not later than October 1 of the year before
each general election.” Id. However, addenda may be added to the EPM outside of
15
this timeframe. 15 “Once adopted, the EPM has the force of law; any violation of an
EPM rule is punishable as a class two misdemeanor.” Ariz. Pub. Integrity All., 250
Ariz. at 63 ¶ 16; McKenna, 250 Ariz. at 473 ¶ 21.
Because invalid ballots may not be counted, A.R.S. § 16-609(A), it is
imperative that election officials ensure the validity of signatures on all mail-in
ballot envelopes. Thus, the Secretary’s failure to include the guidelines in the EPM
is not only remiss but also perpetuates inconsistent and non-uniform signature
verification procedures by allowing her and the various Arizona counties to create
and change their own procedures at will, whatever those may be, without the
safeguard of the Governor’s and the Attorney General’s approval.
Ensuring the validity of ballots in a unform manner throughout Arizona is
vital “to protecting the integrity of the electoral process.” Ariz. Pub. Integrity All.,
250 Ariz. at 61 ¶ 41. Because the Secretary has failed to perform her duty to ensure
that all mail-in ballot envelopes are verified in the same manner—thus achieving
the maximum degree of correctness, impartiality, uniformity and efficiency” as
required by A.R.S. § 16-452(A)—Petitioners urge this Court to compel the
15
See Ariz. Sec’y of State, Arizona Election Laws & Publications,
https://azsos.gov/elections/arizona-election-laws-publications (linking to the
Electronic Adjudication Addendum to the 2019 Elections Procedures Manual
(“EPM Addendum”)). Note that in their cover letters, the Secretary, the Governor,
and the Attorney General all conclude that adding an addendum to the EPM is
lawful.
16
Secretary to include the guidelines in the current EPM, or an addendum thereto,
and submit them to the Governor and Attorney General for review and approval.
II. The Secretary May Not Authorize Voting Via Drop-boxes.
The Arizona Constitution provides that “the powers and duties of Secretary
of State…shall be as prescribed by law.” Ariz. Const. art. 5, § 9. See also Chavez v.
Brewer, 222 Ariz. 309, 316 ¶ 17 (App. 2009). The Secretary—in the current
EPM—has prescribed rules for county officials to “develop and implement
procedures” for placing “unstaffed drop-box[es]” in various locations throughout
the several counties. See EPM at 60–62. However, unlike virtually every other
portion of the EPM, the Secretary cites no authority for prescribing drop-box rules.
Id. Indeed, the Secretary lacks statutory authority to authorize drop-box voting and
should be enjoined from doing so. Ariz. Pub. Integrity All., 250 Ariz. at 62 ¶ 14
(Public officials may be enjoined from acts beyond their power.).
Arizona statutes provide only two ways for early voters to transmit ballots
for tabulation: (1) delivering or mailing “to the county recorder or other officer in
charge of elections” or (2) depositing “at any polling place in the county.” A.R.S.
§ 16-548(A) (emphasis added). Thus, early voters may deliver their ballots to the
county recorder (or other officer) or deposit their early ballots “at any polling place
in the county.” A drop-box is not an office of the county recorder, nor is it a
“polling place.” Polling places are designated by county boards of supervisors.
17
A.R.S. § 16-411(B). Polling places have a “sufficient number of voting booths on
which voters may conveniently mark their ballots screened from the observation of
others.” A.R.S. § 16-404.
Moreover, although county boards may authorize “voting centers,” A.R.S. §
16-411 (B)(4), drop-boxes are also not voting centers—which, like polling places,
are staffed so that a voter may present identification “to receive the appropriate
ballot for that voter on election day.” A.R.S. § 16-411(B)(4).
A “county recorder may also establish any other early voting locations.”
A.R.S. § 16-542(A). However, “other early voting locations” are also not drop-
boxes because the statute states that “[a]ny on-site early voting location or other
early voting location shall require each elector to present identification…before
receiving a ballot.” Id. Electors cannot present identification at unstaffed drop-
boxes.
As explained below, the Arizona Constitution never contemplated and does
not authorize mail-in voting, much less a system by which voters deliver ballots to
unstaffed drop-boxes. But even assuming, arguendo, that the constitution allows
the legislature to authorize drop-boxes, the legislature has never enacted such a
law. Thus, the Secretary exceeds her legal authority by prescribing drop-box rules.
See Ariz. Pub. Integrity All., 250 Ariz. at 62 ¶ 14. See also Forty-Seventh
Legislature v. Napolitano, 213 Ariz. 482, 489 ¶ 26 (2006) (Governor’s veto
18
exceeded her constitutional authority and was therefore invalid.).
A.R.S. § 16-452 does not grant the Secretary authority to expand the scope
of statutes such as A.R.S. § 16-548(A). Leach v. Hobbs, 250 Ariz. 572, 576 at ¶ 21
(2021) (EPM regulation exceeding scope of its statutory authorization or
contravening an election statute’s purpose does not have force of law). And even if
the legislature intended A.R.S. § 16-452 to authorize the Secretary to establish
additional locations for returning early ballots, this would be an illegal delegation
because “[i]t is a well settled principle of law that the state legislature may not
delegate its power to make laws.” Lake Havasu City v. Mohave Cty., 138 Ariz.
552, 559 (App. 1983) (citations omitted). By including EPM rules allowing voters
to cast ballots at unsupervised drop-boxes, the Secretary is effectively authorizing
drop-boxes, but only the legislature, if constitutionally permissible, may do so.
For these reasons, Petitioners request that the Court prohibit the Secretary
from exceeding her legal authority by authorizing counties to use drop-boxes in the
2022 general election and beyond.
III. No-excuse Mail-in (or “Early” or “Absentee”) Voting Is

Unconstitutional, Either in Whole or in Part; Alternatively, It Must
Be Narrowly Construed to Conform to the Arizona Constitution.
In-person voting at the polls on a fixed date (election day) is the only
constitutional manner of voting in Arizona. The Court found this to be obvious a
year after the constitution was ratified. See Allen, 14 Ariz. at 460. Yet Arizona has
19
since implemented (and repeatedly expanded) absentee voting.
Although litigants have challenged various mail-in voting statutes on other
grounds, the statutory scheme itself has never been directly challenged on state
constitutional grounds or directly authorized by constitutional amendment. But see,
e.g., Bourland v. Hildreth, 26 Cal. 161 (1864); Twitchell v. Blodgett, 13 Mich. 127
(1865); Chase v. Miller, 41 Pa. 403 (1862); Clark v. Nash, 192 Ky. 594 (1921); In
re Contested Election, 281 Pa. 131 (1924); Thompson v. Scheier, 57 P.2d 293
(N.M. 1936); Baca v. Ortiz, 61 P.2d 320 (N.M. 1936) (successful constitutional
challenges to absentee voting in other states). See also Fortier & Ornstein, supra at
496–500, 506–08 (explaining that several states amended their constitutions
throughout the 1800s to expressly authorize mail-in voting, first for soldiers and
again during the early 1900s in response to further constitutional challenges to
expansions of absentee voting).
Petitioners now respectfully ask this Court to determine whether Arizona’s
no-excuse mail-in statutory scheme is constitutional—to fulfill its “duty…to say
what the law is,” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803)—and to clarify for those
who, like Petitioners, are intimately affected by election laws and seek guidance as
to what the constitution presently allows. “The responsibility of determining
whether the legislature has followed constitutional mandates that expressly govern
its activities is given to the courts.” Ariz. Sch. Bds. Ass’n v. State, No. CV-21-
20
0234-T/AP, 2022 Ariz. Lexis 31, at *13 (Jan. 6, 2022) (describing this as the
Court’s core duty). Whether or not the Court finds Arizona’s no-excuse mail-in
voting statutes constitutional, it should articulate the constitutional authority for its
holding and establish whether there are any limiting principles to that authority.
However, as detailed below, the constitution is plain that no-excuse mail-in
voting is unlawful and must be struck down. And while it may be “regretted that so
convenient, useful and popular legislation should be found in conflict with our
basic law,” as the Kentucky Supreme Court remarked when striking down that
state’s mail-in voting system as unconstitutional under a similar provision of
Kentucky’s constitution, “[t]he only remedy is an amendment to the Constitution,
which the people can have, if they wish, allowing the passage of an absent voters
act.” Clark, 192 Ky. at 597–98 (interpreting in-person provision 16 of state
constitution). Kentuckians later ratified a constitutional amendment to allow for
mail-in voting, and Arizonans may do the same. That, however, is a choice for the
people, and not the legislature, to make.
A. Arizona Constitutional Provisions—by their Plain Meaning, History,

and Initial Principles—Require In-person Voting at the Polls on a
Specific Day.
“[I]f the Constitutional language is clear, judicial construction is neither
16
“All elections by the people shall be by secret official ballot, furnished by public
authority to the voters at the polls, and marked by each voter in private at the polls
and then and there deposited.” Ky. Const. § 147.
21
required nor proper.” Perini Land & Dev. Co. v. Pima Cty., 170 Ariz. 380, 383
(1992). The text of the Arizona Constitution is clear that voting rights are to be
exercised “at the polls”:
“Official ballot. When any initiative or referendum…shall be

filed…with the secretary of state, he shall cause to be printed on the
official ballot at the next regular general election the title and number
of said measure, together with the words ‘yes’ and ‘no’ in such manner
that the electors may express at the polls their approval or disapproval
of the measure.”
Ariz. Const. art. 4, § 1(10) (emphasis added). The provision that voting is
exercised “at the polls” appears in three other places. See id. at (1) (reserving to
people the “power to propose laws and amendments to the Constitution and to
enact or reject such laws and amendments at the polls…and they also reserve…the
power to approve or reject at the polls any” legislative act); id. at (3) (“Legislature,
or five per cent of the qualified electors, may order the submission to the people at
the polls of any measure…enacted by the Legislature[.]”); id. at (15) (“Nothing in
this section shall be construed to deprive or limit the Legislature of the right to
order the submission to the people at the polls of any measure, item, section, or
part of any measure.”) (Emphasis added for all.)
The ordinary meaning of “polls” is “[o]ne of the places where the votes are
cast at an election. The place of holding an election within a district, precinct, or
other territorial unit.” Polls, Ballentine’s Law Dictionary (3rd ed. 2010). See also
A.R.S. § 16-411(B) (polling places designated by county boards of supervisors);

22
id. at (J) (Secretary shall “provide for a method to reduce voter wait time at the
polls” in primary and general elections) (emphasis added); A.R.S. § 16-404
(polling places have “sufficient number of voting booths on which voters may
conveniently mark their ballots screened from the observation of others”); A.R.S. §
16-515(A) (prohibiting electioneering “inside the seventy-five foot limit while the
polls are open”). Mail-in voting does not occur at a specific place designated by
county boards or a place with a sufficient number of voting booths, regardless of
where mail-in votes are actually tallied, and wait times and electioneering are
irrelevant at one’s own home. Because no-excuse mail-in voting is not exercised at
the polls, it is unconstitutional.
If the Court does not find that “at the polls” ordinarily means in-person
voting at a specific polling place, it may apply principles of statutory construction.
In interpreting constitutional and statutory provisions, courts give words their
ordinary meaning unless it appears from the context or otherwise that a different
meaning is intended; accordingly, courts interpret statutory language in view of the
entire text and consider the context in which it was used. Fann v. State, 493 P.3d
246, 255 ¶ 25 (Ariz. 2021) (quotations and citations omitted). Courts “also avoid
interpreting a statute in a way that renders portions superfluous.” Id. “Each word,
phrase, and sentence must be given meaning so that no part will be [void], inert,
redundant, or trivial.” City of Phoenix v. Yates, 69 Ariz. 68, 72 (1949).
23
“Constitutions, meant to endure, must be interpreted with an eye to syntax, history,
initial principle, and extension of fundamental purpose.” Saban Rent-a-Car LLC
v. Ariz. Dep’t of Revenue, 246 Ariz. 89, 95 ¶ 21 (2019) (quotations and citations
omitted; emphasis added). See also Chavez, 222 Ariz. at 319 ¶ 32. Moreover,
“[s]tatutes that are in pari materia—those of the same subject or general purpose—
should be read together and harmonized when possible.” David C. v. Alexis S., 240
Ariz. 53, 55 ¶ 9 (2016). See also Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law:
The Interpretation of Legal Texts 252 (2012) (Any word or phrase interpreted by a
court “is part of a whole statute, and its meaning is therefore affected by other
provisions of the same statute. It is also, however, part of an entire corpus juris….
Hence laws dealing with the same subject…should if possible be interpreted
harmoniously.”). Keeping an eye to these principles, it becomes even more
apparent the constitution not only requires in-person voting at the polls but also
requires voting to be on election day.
For instance, although the “at the polls” provisions appear in article 4
(addressing the legislative department and reserving certain law-making powers to
the people) of the constitution rather than in article 7 (addressing suffrage and
elections), the “at the polls” language is not limited to elections on referenda and
initiatives for the simple reason that referenda and initiatives are always decided
“at the next regular general election.” Ariz. Const. art. 4, § 1(10). Moreover, these
24
provisions were adopted contemporaneously with the provisions in article 7. See
The Records of the Arizona Constitutional Convention of 1910, 1402–05 & 1416–
17 (John S. Goff ed., 1990) (documenting constitution as originally adopted in
1910). Thus, the framers intended all voting to occur at the polls. Additionally,
specific provisions in article 7, discussed below, establish that in-person voting at
the polls on a fixed date is the only constitutional manner of voting in Arizona.
1. Ariz. Const. art. 7, § 1
Article 7, section 1 provides: “All elections by the people shall be by ballot,
or by such other method as may be prescribed by law; Provided, that secrecy in
voting shall be preserved.” Ariz. Const. art. 7, § 1 (emphasis added). As detailed
below, the phrase “as may be prescribed by law” is not a broad and general grant
of authority allowing the legislature to deviate from the Australian ballot system.
Rather, the framers included the phrase “such other method” to allow the
legislature to authorize voting machines in lieu of paper ballots. They included the
phrase “[p]rovided, that secrecy in voting shall be preserved” to clarify that voting
machines, if used, must adhere to the Australian ballot system.
A “ballot” is a printed implement of voting marked by electors to indicate
their preferences. Ariz. Const. art. 4, § 1(10); A.R.S. § 16-502 (Title: “Form and
contents of ballot”). See also Ballot, Ballentine’s Law Dictionary (3rd ed. 2010)
(directing reader to also see “Australian ballot system”). An “election by ballot” is
25
“[n]othing less than an election by secret ballot.” Id. A “secret ballot” is a “method
of election essential to the preservation of the integrity of the election. A secret
method of voting at an election.” Id. “Secrecy in voting” is not limited to privacy
in voting but, rather, is a term of art encompassing the understanding that voting by
“secret ballot” is intended “to protect individual voters from coercion.” See, e.g.,
McLaughlin v. Bennett, 225 Ariz. 351, 354 ¶ 11 (2010). “Secrecy” thus refers to
the “Australian ballot system.” To understand why the framers included this
specific language in the constitution, it is helpful to look at the “history” and
“initial principle[s],” Saban Rent-a-Car, 246 Ariz. at 95 ¶ 21, behind adoption of
the Australian ballot system in the U.S.
In the late 1800s, the U.S. underwent a major election reform cycle inspired
by a new Australian policy that allowed the government to control and standardize
election procedures and ballot distribution. Prior to this reform, political parties
and individuals created their own ballots, engendering a system rife with coercion
and fraud and devoid of any consistent privacy or security standards. Derek T.
Muller, Ballot Speech, 58 Ariz. L. Rev. 693, 696–697 (2016). As discussed above,
the “Australian ballot system” requires that ballots: (1) be printed and distributed at
public expense; (2) contain the names of all duly nominated candidates; (3) be
distributed only by election officers at the polling place; and (4) contain detailed
provisions to ensure secrecy in casting the vote. Fortier & Ornstein, supra at 488
26
(emphasis added).
Once voting by written ballot became standardized, confidential, and secure
across the nation, the next major election reform cycle involved development of
“absentee ballots,” which expanded the franchise to those unable to cast their
ballots at their local polling places. Id. at 492. “The early impetus behind absentee
balloting was war: making sure that soldiers on the battlefield were not
disenfranchised by their military service.” Id. However, even advocates of absentee
ballots were “cognizant of the tensions between the reforms that led to the
Australian ballot and the absentee ballot, which was voted away from the polling
place without its privacy protections.” Id. Because “absentee voting took place
away from the voter’s home voting booth, there were serious questions about fraud
and coercion, the same kind of concerns that had been the impetus behind the
move to adopt the Australian ballot.” Id. (emphasis added). Recognizing this
tension, many states in the early 1900s developed “elaborate provisions to
safeguard voter privacy and the integrity of the ballot.” Id. at 492–493.
Notably, mail-in ballots, by their very nature, cannot be made entirely secret
or free from coercion. If bad actors wish to pay for votes or coerce electors to vote
a certain way, there is nothing to stop them from standing over electors as they
complete their ballots. See e.g., Miller v. Picacho Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 33,
179 Ariz. 178, 180 (1994) (Despite statutory prohibition, “District employees with
27
a pecuniary interest in the override’s passage delivered [absentee] ballots to
electors whom they knew. Although these electors did not ask for ballots, school
employees urged them to vote and even encouraged them to vote for the override.
District employees went to the homes of the electors and stood beside them as they
voted.”).
In Arizona, the legislature enacted absentee voting in 1925. See 1925 Ariz.
Sess. Laws, ch. 75, § 1. As originally enacted, absentee voting extended only to a
“qualified elector” who was “absent from the county of which he or she [was] an
elector” or “who furnishe[d] the County Recorder with a doctor’s certificate that”
the elector “[would] not, because of a physical disability, be able to go to the
polls.” Id. To secure an absentee ballot and vote, electors had to prove identity by
appearing before a “registration officer” or “Notary Public” and signing an
affidavit. Id. at §§ 2–6. Thus, although absentee voting took place away from the
polls, the law at least attempted to provide enough security measures—more so
than a simple signature on the back of a ballot envelope, as the law presently
allows—to guard against fraud and coercion while maintaining the “secrecy” of the
ballot.
In 1991, the legislature expanded absentee voting from six categories of
electors to “[a]ny qualified voter.” See 1991 Ariz. Sess. Laws, vol. 1, ch. 51 § 1.
Simultaneously, it also removed the witness requirement for the affidavit, thus
28
eradicating a great deal of the prior law’s protections against coercion and fraud
and, throwing the baby out with the bathwater, further erasing the initial principles
underlying the American ballot system (modeled on the Australian system).17
The current law, codified at A.R.S. § 16-541 et seq. and titled “Early
Voting,” expands voting such that any elector, without excuse, may vote early, by
mail, and at random voting places—none of which are constitutionally
authorized—as discussed in Part B below. Indeed, a Pennsylvania appellate court
recently struck down Pennsylvania’s “no-excuse mail-in voting” system, which
“created the opportunity for all Pennsylvania electors to vote by mail without
having to demonstrate a valid reason for absence from their polling place on
Election Day, i.e., a reason provided in the Pennsylvania Constitution.” McLinko,
2022 Pa. Commw. Lexis 12, at *4. The court based its reasoning on three
constitutional provisions like those found in Arizona’s constitution.
First, article 7, section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides that
electors “shall have resided in the election district where he or she shall offer to
vote.”18 Id. at *9 (quoting Penn. Const. art. 7, § 1). The McLinko court explained
17
If this Court finds that federal constitutional concerns (e.g., 14th Amendment
and Supremacy Clause) make striking all absentee voting improper, Petitioners
suggest below that the Court strike the 1991 and post-1991 amendments to
absentee voting rather than declaring that all absentee voting is unlawful. Any such
concerns should not be implicated in the system existing prior to 1991.
18
Compare with Ariz. Const. art. 7, § 2 (irrelevant portions omitted; emphasis
added):
29
that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in striking down the state’s prior military
absentee voter law in 1862, had already construed the words “offer to vote by
ballot” as meaning “to present oneself, with the proper qualifications, at the time
and place appointed, and to make manual delivery of the ballot to the officers
appointed by law to receive it.” Id. at *10–11 (quoting Chase, 41 Pa. at 419).
The ballot cannot be sent by mail or express, nor can it be cast outside
of all Pennsylvania election districts and certified into the county where
the voter has his domicil. We cannot be persuaded that the Constitution
ever contemplated any such mode of voting, and we have abundant
reason for thinking that to permit it would break down all the safeguards
of honest suffrage.
Id. at *12 (quoting Chase, 41 Pa. at 419). Further, the “constitution meant, rather,
that the voter, in propia persona, should offer his vote in an appropriate election
district.” Id. “Mail-in ballots present particular challenges with respect to
‘safeguards of honest suffrage.’” Id. at *13 n.12 (quoting Chase, 41 Pa. at 419).
Following the Chase court’s decision, Pennsylvania amended its constitution
in 1864 to permit electors in military service to vote by absentee ballot. Id. at *13
(citing Penn. Const. art. 3, §4 (1864)). However, as the McLinko court explains, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court invalidated another iteration of absentee voting in
No person shall be entitled to vote at any general election…unless such

person…shall have resided in the state for the period of time preceding
such election as prescribed by law, provided that qualifications for
voters at a general election for the purpose of electing presidential
electors shall be as prescribed by law.
30
1924 because the constitution limited absentee voting to active military,
“concluding that the election should be determined solely on the basis of ballots
cast in person on Election Day.” Id. at *14 (citing In re Contested Election of Fifth
Ward of Lancaster City, 126 A. 199 (Pa. 1924)).
Next, the McLinko court detailed the historical background and initial
principles underlying Article 7, section 4 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, which
provides that “[a]ll elections by the citizens shall be by ballot or by such other
method as may be prescribed by law: Provided, That secrecy in voting be
preserved.” McLinko, 2022 Pa. Commw. Lexis 12, at *16–24 (quoting Penn.
Const. art. 7, § 4). That provision is nearly identical to article 7, section 1 of
Arizona’s constitution: “All elections by the people shall be by ballot, or by such
other method as may be prescribed by law; Provided, that secrecy in voting shall
be preserved.” Ariz. Const. art. 7, § 1.
The McLinko court explained that the provision, adopted in 1901, derives
from the Australian ballot reforms, noting that the “1901 amendment guaranteed
the secrecy of the ballot, both in its casting and in counting. ‘[T]he cornerstone of
honest elections is secrecy in voting. A citizen in secret is a free man; otherwise, he
is subject to pressure and, perhaps, control.’” McLinko, 2022 Pa. Commw. Lexis
12, at *21 (quoting In re Second Legislative District Election, 4 Pa. D. & C. 2d 93,
95 (1956)). The court also noted that “such other method” was included to
31
authorize “mechanical devices” (i.e., voting machines) in lieu of paper ballots at
polling places. Id. at *23–24. See also Goff, supra at 559–60 (documenting that
Arizona’s framers similarly fashioned article 7, section 1 to preserve state’s ability
to adopt voting machines).
Finally, the McLinko court analyzed Article 7, section 14 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution, the amendment authorizing military and other absentee
voting after the Chase court struck down absentee voting prior to the constitutional
amendment. Because Arizona’s constitution has not been amended, the analysis is
largely irrelevant to Petitioners’ argument here. However, importantly, the court
noted that “Pennsylvania and many other states recognized that absentee voting by
the military conflicted with the ‘constitutional provisions for in person voting, and
undertook to amend their state constitutions in order to pass appropriate
legislation.’” McLinko, 2022 Pa. Commw. Lexis 12, at *26. Again, Arizona has not
amended the constitution to enable the legislature to create methods of voting other
than by paper ballots or voting machines at the polls on election day. To the
contrary, as Petitioners explain below, the constitution contains several other
provisions which make it plain that voting is to be in person at the polls on a
specific day.
Moreover, as the McLinko court explains, logic dictates that the phrase “such
other method” cannot be read “to authorize a system of no-excuse mail-in voting to
32
be conducted from any location.” Id. at *36. “To begin, ‘such other method’ is
limited to one that is ‘prescribed by law,’” including the fundamental law “that
voting must be in person except where there is a specific constitutional exception”
pursuant to article 7, section 4. Id.
The court rejected “the suggestion that ‘the law’ in Section 4 refers only to
the legislature’s work product and not to the Pennsylvania Constitution.” Id.
Further, the court explained, “the Supreme Court could have, but did not, state that
‘such other method’ included voting by mail, a system in existence and used for
military absentee voting at the time Lancaster City was decided.” Id. Instead, the
phrase “such other method” authorized mechanical devices at the polling place. Id.
(citing Lancaster City, 126 A. at 201). The better reading is that the phrase
indicates “a type of voting that takes place at the polling place, so long as it
preserves secrecy.” Id.
Relevant to the argument here, the McLinko court concluded that “such other
method as prescribed by law” could not be interpreted to authorize mail-in voting
for two reasons. Id. at *38. “First, no-excuse mail-in voting uses a paper ballot and
not some ‘other method.’” Id. The same is true for mail-in voting in Arizona. See,
e.g., A.R.S. § 16-541(A) (“Any election called pursuant to the laws of this state
shall provide for early voting. Any qualified elector may vote by early ballot.”).
Second, such an interpretation divorces the phrase from the remainder of article 7
33
“as well as its historical underpinnings,” ignoring “the in-person place requirement
that was made part of [the] fundamental law” when the constitution was amended
to include the “offer to vote” provision. McLinko, 2022 Pa. Commw. Lexis 12, at
*38. The same reasoning applies here. As further discussed below, articles 7 and 4
of Arizona’s constitution also contain several other provisions establishing an “in-
person place requirement,” and those provisions were adopted to maintain the
integrity of elections.
Article 7, section 2 is comparable to the “offer to vote” language found in
the elector qualification provisions of the Pennsylvania Constitution: “No person
shall be entitled to vote at any general election…unless such person…shall have
resided in the state for the period of time preceding such election…provided that
qualifications for voters at a general election for the purpose of electing
presidential electors shall be as prescribed by law.” Ariz. Const. art. 7 § 2
(emphasis added).
The meaning of the words “at any general election” or “at a general
election” is plain. The first two definitions of the word “at” are (1) a preposition
“used to show an exact position or particular place”; (2) a preposition “used to
show an exact or particular time.”19 The words “at a general election” thus refer to
19
Cambridge Dictionary, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/at.
34
the exact place and time of the general election and are just as explicit as the
words “where he or she shall offer to vote by ballot” as construed in McLinko. See
McLinko, 2022 Pa. Commw. Lexis 12, at *10–13 (quoting Penn. Const. art. 7, § 1
and interpreting the words to mean “to present oneself, with the proper
qualifications, at the time and place appointed, and to make manual delivery of the
ballot to the officers appointed by law to receive it”).
To interpret the words “at a general election” to encompass mail-in voting is
illogical. Nevertheless, Arizona’s legislature has continued to expand the time for
both voting and counting early ballots, allowing electors to fill out their ballots at
any place they choose and at any time from “twenty-seven days before the
election” to election day. See A.R.S. § 16-542(A) (On-site “early voting
locations…shall be open and available for use beginning the same day that a
county begins to send out the early ballots.”); id. at (C) (“[E]arly ballot distribution
shall not begin more than twenty-seven days before the election.”); A.R.S.
§ 16-548(A) (Early voter may deposit ballot at “any polling place in the county” on
election day.). Tallying of ballots may begin immediately. A.R.S. § 16-550(B). On
the other hand, under some circumstances, Arizona’s early voting statutes do not
require election officials to even open early voting envelopes, let alone begin
tabulating ballots, until five business days after election day. A.R.S. 16-550(A).
There is nothing “exact” or “particular” about this timing.
35
Article 7, section 4 provides: “Electors shall in all cases, except treason,
felony, or breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during their attendance at
any election, and in going thereto and returning therefrom.” Ariz. Const. art. 7, § 4
(emphasis added).
“Attendance” is defined as “[p]hysical presence plus freedom to perform the
duties of an attendant.” Attendance, Ballentine’s Law Dictionary (3rd ed. 2010).
The plain meaning of “thereto” is “to the thing just mentioned.”20 The plain
meaning of “therefrom” is “from that or from there; from a thing or place that has
been previously mentioned.”21 Accordingly, the words “attendance at,” “thereto,”
and “therefrom” in section 4 can be read thus: “Electors shall…be privileged from
arrest during their physical presence at any election, and in going to any election
and returning from any election.”
As with article 7, section 2, it is illogical to interpret the words in section 4
to encompass mail-in voting because Arizona’s early voting statutes allow electors
to fill their ballots anywhere and do not require physical presence at any election
on a specific day, as discussed above. In fact, even in 1991, the mail-in statutes
were entitled “absentee voting,” meaning that the elector did not have to be
20
Cambridge Dictionary, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/thereto.
21
Cambridge Dictionary, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/therefrom.
36
physically present. See 1991 Ariz. Sess. Laws, vol. 1, ch. 51 § 1.
Because mail-in voting does not require physical attendance at the polls on
election day, it is impossible for “[e]lectors…in all cases…[to] be privileged from
arrest during their attendance at any election, and in going thereto and returning
therefrom,” Ariz. Const. art. 7, § 4 (emphasis added), rendering this provision void,
inert, or trivial. Yet “[e]ach word, phrase, and sentence must be given meaning so
that no part will be [void], inert, redundant, or trivial.” Yates, 69 Ariz. at 72.
Article 7, section 5 provides: “No elector shall be obliged to perform
military duty on the day of an election, except in time of war or public danger.”
Ariz. Const. art. 7, § 5 (emphasis added). The words “on the day of an election” are
self-explanatory and plainly refer to an election that takes place on a particular day.
Furthermore, if the constitution provided for absentee voting, it would render this
provision without purpose. Courts avoid interpreting statutes and constitutional
provisions “in a way that renders portions superfluous.” Fann, 493 P.3d at 255 ¶
25. “Each word, phrase, and sentence must be given meaning so that no part will
be [void], inert, redundant, or trivial.” Yates, 69 Ariz. at 72.
Importantly, Petitioners are not challenging Arizona election statutes that
implement the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act, because
providing for absentee voting for soldiers is now expressly required by federal law.
37
See 52 U.S.C. § 20301 et seq. However, this provision still serves to illuminate the
framers’ original intent in this regard.
Article 7, section 11 provides: “There shall be a general election of
Representatives in Congress, and of State, county, and precinct officers on the first
Tuesday after the first Monday in November of the first even numbered year after
the year in which Arizona is admitted to Statehood and biennially thereafter.” Ariz.
Const. art. 7, § 11 (emphasis added). As with article 7, section 5, this provision is
self-explanatory and plainly mandates that the general election must take place on
a specific day. See Sherman v. City of Tempe, 202 Ariz. 339, 343–44 ¶¶ 14–20
(2002).
In Sherman, this Court held that “the Arizona Constitution and Arizona’s
election statutes employ the word ‘election’ to refer to a particular day.” Id. at 343
¶ 19. The Court explained that the constitution “states that ‘there shall be a general
election…on the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November,” and “A.R.S.
section 16-211 provides for a general election on the first Tuesday in November.”
Id. at 343–44 ¶ 19 (citing Ariz. Const. art. 7, § 11 and A.R.S. § 16-211 (1996)).
Thus, the Court held, “according to the Constitution and Arizona election statutes,
elections occur on one particular date and the term ‘election’ refers to that date.”
Id. at 344 ¶ 19.
38
As explained above, Arizona’s mail-in voting statutes allow electors to cast
their ballots up to twenty-seven days before election day. Thus, voting, return, and
tabulation of early ballots need not occur on election day, that is, “on the first
Tuesday after the first Monday in November of the first even numbered year….”
Ariz. Const. art. 7, § 11 (emphasis added). Yet “according to the Constitution and
Arizona election statutes, elections occur on one particular date and the term
‘election’ refers to that date.” Sherman, 202 Ariz. at 344 ¶ 19. If the constitution
allows the definition of election day to be stretched so far, is there a limiting
principle? Or may the legislature constitutionally authorize mailing and counting
of ballots for the next general election to begin the day after the last election? The
simple answer is that early voting, in its present form, violates the Arizona
Constitution.
B. “Early Voting” Is Contrary to Secure, In-person Voting at the Polls

on a Specific Day and Is Therefore Unconstitutional.
Article 7 of the Arizona Constitution establishes the supreme law of the state
regarding suffrage and elections. Sections 1, 4, 5, and 11 of article 7—which have
remained unchanged since they were first adopted in 1910—make it plain that the
framers intended elections to be secure and in person at a specific voting location
(at the polls) on a specific day every other year. The provisions in article 4, part 1,
section 1 of the constitution, which require that voting be done “at the polls,”
further support this plain-meaning construction of the constitution.

39
Construing together in pari materia all the constitutional provisions of
article 4 and article 7, the constitution makes it plain that elections are to be in
person at the polls on a specific day. Elections held in this manner, in conformance
with the initial principles underlying the Australian ballot system (the system the
state adopted in 1912 when it ratified the constitution), protect the integrity of
elections by preventing the possibility of coercion and fraud and by providing
consistent privacy and security standards. Muller, supra at 696–697.
C. In the Alternative, “Early Voting” Must Be Construed Narrowly to

Conform to the Arizona Constitution.
As discussed above, the “Australian ballot system” contains four essential
provisions. Fortier & Ornstein, supra at 488. Currently, Arizona’s early voting
statutes do not incorporate the final two essential provisions: (3) ballots distributed
only by election officers at the polling place and (4) detailed provisions to ensure
secrecy in casting the vote. Id. (emphasis added). It would be inappropriate for this
Court to consider the factual question of whether alternative safeguards would be
adequate to achieve the goal of protecting the integrity of elections. Arizona’s
framers have already made a determination that is conclusive on this point unless
and until the constitution is amended. Accordingly, Petitioners ask this Court to
declare A.R.S. § 16-541 et seq. unconstitutional and enjoin the State from
enforcing no-excuse mail-in voting statutes.
Petitioners recognize that the Secretary might argue that, even if absentee
40
voting is wholly prohibited by Arizona’s constitution, the complete abolition of
absentee voting would raise other issues under the U.S. Constitution. The Arizona
Constitution recognizes that in certain cases its provisions might conflict with
those of the U.S. Constitution, Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 3, and this Court has already
addressed how such conflicts are to be handled. See e.g., US W. Communs., Inc. v.
Ariz. Corp. Comm’n, 201 Ariz. 242, 246 ¶ 23 (2001) (“Whenever possible…we
construe the Arizona Constitution to avoid conflict with the United States
Constitution and federal statutes.”). Therefore, even if this Court concludes that
striking all early voting would run afoul of federal constitutional requirements, it
must still strike the 1991 amendment, which adopted no-excuse absentee voting,
see 1991 Ariz. Sess., vol. 1, Laws, ch. 51 § 1, as well as subsequent expansions of
the no-excuse absentee voting system, as unconstitutional.
To the extent, if any, the U.S. Constitution requires some form of absentee
voting (e.g., for those who are physically unable to make it to the polls), Arizona’s
pre-1991 system of absentee voting with excuses was sufficient to satisfy such
requirements. Immediately prior to the 1991 adoption of Arizona’s current no-
excuse system, “absentee voting” statutes authorized absentee voting for (1)
electors expected to be absent from their precincts on election day, (2) electors
physically unable to go to the polls, (3) electors 65 years of age or older, (4)
electors living more than 15 miles from their polling places, (5) electors unable to
41
attend the polls on election day because of their religion, and (6) electors with
visual defects. 1991 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 51 § 1. In addition to limiting absentee
voting to those with qualified excuses, the pre-1991 law required electors to
validate their excuses by swearing before an “officer empowered to administer
oaths” to receive a ballot. Id. Additionally, when filling out their ballots, electors
were required to swear before an officer that they were qualified electors and
personally voted their ballots. Id.
By requiring electors to appear before an official empowered to administer
oaths and requiring electors to prove their identities and swear that they personally
voted their ballots, the law maintained some of the protections of the Australian
ballot system, specifically, (3) ballots distributed only by election officers at the
polling place and (4) detailed provisions to ensure secrecy in casting the vote.
Fortier & Ornstein, supra at 488 (emphasis added).
If the Court does not find that Arizona’s early voting statutes (A.R.S.
§ 16-541 et seq.) are entirely unconstitutional, the Court should, at minimum,
construe the statutes narrowly to conform to the Arizona Constitution. Specifically,
Petitioners ask this Court to:
1. in the alternative to declaring that mail-in voting is entirely unlawful,
declare that the 1991 amendment providing for no-excuse mail-in
voting is unconstitutional, strike it, prohibit election officials from
42
enforcing the 1991 amendment, and compel election officials to
enforce this constitutional restraint; and/or
2. declare that tabulation of votes may not occur prior to election day,
prohibit election officials from doing so, and compel election officials
to enforce this constitutional restraint; and/or
3. declare that voting on initiatives and referenda may only occur “at the
polls,” prohibit election officials from allowing electors to vote on
initiatives and referenda by mail, and compel election officials to
enforce this constitutional restraint; and/or
4. declare that drop-boxes are unconstitutional because they are not
polling places, prohibit election officials from implementing drop-
boxes, and compel them to enforce this constitutional restraint; and/or
5. declare that early voting is constitutional only if voters personally cast
their ballots at the polls, prohibit election officials from implementing
mail-in voting, and compel election officials to abide by this
constitutional restraint; and/or
6. provide such other relief as may be just and proper.
43
Conclusion
Petitioners request that this Court accept original and special action
jurisdiction and grant them the relief they are requesting by: (1) ordering the
Secretary to include the Signature Verification Guide in the current EPM or an
addendum thereto and submit it to the Governor and Attorney General for their
review and approval; (2) prohibiting the Secretary from authorizing drop-boxes in
the 2022 general election and beyond; (3) either striking down no-excuse mail-in
voting as unconstitutional or providing the alternative relief Petitioners request in
Part C above. Arizona’s election officials must not continue to run Arizona
elections however they see fit. For when public officials “change the law based on
their own perceptions of what they think it should be, they undermine public
confidence in our democratic system and destroy the integrity of the electoral
process.” Ariz. Pub. Integrity All., 250 Ariz. at 61.
Attorney Fees
Petitioners request attorney fees and costs pursuant to Ariz. R. Civ. App. P.
21, A.R.S. § 12-2030, the private attorney general doctrine, see Ariz. Ctr. for Law
in Pub. Interest v. Hassell, 172 Ariz. 356, 371 (App. 1991), and other applicable
law.
44
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 25th day of February 2022.
By /s/ Veronica Lucero

Alexander Kolodin
Veronica Lucero
Roger Strassburg
Arno Naeckel
45
DocuSign Envelope ID: A6831657-211E-40C1-9980-F1B739558B56
VERIFICATION
A.R.S. § 12-2021 states: “A writ of mandamus may be issued by the supreme or

superior court…on the verified complaint of the party[.]” (emphasis added). RPSA
1(a), however, states: “[A]ny reference in any statute or rule to any of these writs,
unless excepted in the next subsection, shall be deemed to refer to the special action
authorized under this Rule. Special forms and proceedings for these writs are replaced
by the special action provided by this Rule[.]”
RPSA 7 provides: “A special action brought in any appellate court shall be initiated
by the filing of a petition in the form prescribed by this rule.” RPSA 7 does not
mention a complaint or verification.
The facts set forth in the petition to which this verification is attached are all readily
ascertainable from sources for which this Court may take judicial notice. Further, as
set forth above, it no longer appears that verification is required. However, in an
abundance of caution, I verify that the facts set forth therein are true and correct to the
best of my knowledge and belief.
DATE: 2/25/2022
Yvonne Cahill
PRINTED NAME:
SIGNATURE:
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that on this 25th day of February 2022, a copy
of the foregoing Petition for Special Action was sent via email. Hand-delivery to be
completed on February 28, 2022. It is addressed to the following:
Sambo (Bo) Dul

General Counsel
Arizona Secretary of State
[email protected]
Office: 602-542-8683
1700 W Washington St.
Phoenix, AZ 85007
Jennifer Wright
Assistant Attorney General
Office of the Arizona Attorney General
Solicitor General's Office
Elections Integrity Unit
[email protected]
2005 North Central Ave.
Phoenix, AZ 85004
Greg Jernigan
General Counsel
Arizona Senate
[email protected]
Phoenix, AZ 85007
Andy Pappas
General Counsel
Arizona House of Representatives
[email protected]
Phoenix, AZ 85007
/s/Yuka Bacchus

AZGOP v. Hobbs - APPLICATION FOR ISSUANCE OF WRIT UNDER EXERCISE OF ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

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AZGOP v. Hobbs - APPLICATION FOR ISSUANCE OF WRIT UNDER EXERCISE OF ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

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ARIZONA SUPREME COURT

ARIZONA REPUBLICAN PARTY, No. _____________

KATIE HOBBS, in her official

APPLICATION FOR ISSUANCE OF WRIT UNDER EXERCISE OF

Alexander Kolodin (030826)

herein by reference. This application is made pursuant to Arizona Supreme Court

Rule 1 and the other authorities cited therein.

DATED this 25th day of February 2022.

Davillier Law Group, LLC

By: /s/Alexander Kolodin

Attorney for Petitioners

ARIZONA REPUBLICAN PARTY, No. _____________

KATIE HOBBS, in her official

VERIFIED PETITION FOR SPECIAL ACTION

Alexander Kolodin (030826)

Table of Authorities ................................................................................................ ii

Jurisdictional Statement ......................................................................................... 6

Statement of the Issues ......................................................................................... 13

Statement of Facts ................................................................................................ 14

I. Signature Verification Guidelines Must Be Included in the EPM ............. 15

III. No-excuse Mail-in (or “Early” or “Absentee”) Voting

A. Arizona Constitutional Provisions—by their Plain Meaning,

B. “Early Voting” is Contrary to Secure, In-person Voting at the

C. In the Alternative, “Early Voting” Must Be Construed

Arizonans for Second Chances, Rehab., & Pub. Safety v. Hobbs,

Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n. v. Brewer,

City of Phoenix v. Yates,

City of Surprise v. Ariz. Corp. Comm’n,

David C. v. Alexis S.,

Dobson v. State ex rel. Comm’n. on App. Ct. Appointments,

Miller v. Picacho Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 33,

Perini Land & Dev. Co. v. Pima Cty.,

US W. Communs., Inc. v. Ariz. Corp. Comm’n,

Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 3 ..............................................................................................41

Ariz. Const. art. 5, § 9 ..............................................................................................17

Ariz. Const. art. 7, § 1 ...................................................................................... passim

Ariz. Const. art. 7, § 2 ........................................................................................29, 34

Ky. Const. § 147 ......................................................................................................21

Penn. Const. art. 7, § 4 .............................................................................................31

1925 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 75, § 1 ...........................................................................28

A.R.S. § 16-542............................................................................................11, 18, 33

Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner,

Ariz. Republican Party, Bylaws,

Ariz. Republican Party, Proposal 9,

Ariz. Republican Party, State Party, Elected Officers,

Ariz. Sec’y of State, 2019 Elections Procedures Manual,

Ariz. Sec’y of State, Signature Verification Guide (July 2020),

John C. Fortier & Norman J. Ornstein,

As this Court has recognized, “[e]lection laws play an important role in

(“[T]he right to vote is the right to participate in an electoral process that is

necessarily structured to maintain the integrity of the democratic system.”)). In

Arizona, however, ongoing abuse of election laws is jeopardizing public

confidence in the electoral process.

In July 2020, Arizona Secretary of State Katie Hobbs (“Secretary”) issued a

Signature Verification Guide (“2020 Guide”) outlining procedures for verifying

these procedures to the operative Elections Procedures Manual (“EPM”), 2 or an

The Secretary’s failure to execute her non-discretionary duty under A.R.S.

and Attorney General provides. Thus, the Secretary’s signature verification

procedures do not ensure that “the maximum degree of correctness, impartiality,

uniformity and efficiency,” A.R.S. § 16-452(A), will be achieved among Arizona

counties in the 2022 state general election.

procedures” for placing drop-boxes, including “unstaffed drop-box[es],” in various

recorders have statutory authority to implement “drop-box” voting under Arizona