Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Bixler V Scientology: Petition For Review
Bixler V Scientology: Petition For Review
Jorge E. Navarrete, Clerk and Executive Officer of the Court Jorge E. Navarrete, Clerk and Executive Officer of the Court
Electronically RECEIVED on 2/25/2022 at 5:38:47 PM Electronically FILED on 2/25/2022 by Ines Calanoc, Deputy Clerk
S273276
S__________
IN THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS AND REAL ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT AND REAL
PARTIES IN INTEREST CHURCH OF PARTY IN INTEREST RELIGIOUS
SCIENTOLOGY INTERNATIONAL & TECHNOLOGY CENTER
CELEBRITY CENTRE
INTERNATIONAL
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................ 7
2
D. The decision below conflicted with cases forbidding
hostility to religion. ......................................................... 35
CONCLUSION ............................................................................... 42
3
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
Cases
Abbo v. Briskin
(Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1995) 660 So.2d 1157 .................................. 35
4
Encore Prods., Inc. v. Promise Keepers (D.Col. 1999)
53 F.Supp.2d 1101 .................................................................... 20
Howard v. Goldbloom
(2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 659, 664 .......................................... 41, 42
Jabri v. Qaddura
(Tex.App. 2003) 108 S.W.3d 404 .............................................. 23
In re Marriage of Bonds
(2000) 24 Cal.4th 1 .................................................................... 32
In re Marriage of Weiss
(1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 106 .................................................. 32, 34
5
Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru
(2020) 140 S.Ct. 2049 ................................................................ 37
Sotnick v. Sotnick
(Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1995) 650 So.2d 157 .................................... 33
Watson v. Jones
(1871) 80 U.S. 679 ..................................................................... 37
Zummo v. Zummo
(Pa.Super. 1990) 574 A.2d 1130 ......................................... 32, 34
Statutes
9 U.S.C. § 2 ..................................................................................... 30
6
ISSUES PRESENTED
Does the First Amendment bar enforcement of a religious
religious arbitration?
of the religion?
INTRODUCTION
In what opposing counsel has publicly called a “landmark
one of the parties.1 Courts in this state and across the country
7
arbitration. They impose no unique limits on their enforcement
These decisions not only comply with the Federal Arbitration Act
pluralistic society.
certain claims with a church, just because she has “left the faith.”
Under this new rule, which supposedly derives from the First
8
an order to show cause. The resulting order creates ambiguity on
case and the parties before it. The decision below announced a
9
as written in this state, as they are in every other jurisdiction in
California law with that of other states and the federal judiciary.
its final disposition, but also in each step of its analysis. First,
10
decision below thus suggested, contrary to cases interpreting the
for public policy reasons. This irreconcilable split in the case law
requires review by this Court, so that the lower courts apply the
the terms of joining a faith offend the First Amendment. But the
authority, civil courts may not decide how and under what
11
For all these reasons, review by this Court is critical to
Defendants.”
1 and Jane Doe No. 2 were each a plaintiff in the trial court, a
12
through “binding religious arbitration in accordance with” the
4.) But these alleged assaults are not the basis of Plaintiffs’
making the allegations. (Id. at 5.) Plaintiffs also allege that when
they discussed and reported the assaults outside the Church, the
13
Plaintiffs’ claims are false. The Church Defendants did not
called “Fair Game,” nor does it have any other doctrine that
14
in order to be bound by it,” and that to “the extent that the
to by the” Plaintiffs.
the petition. (Id. at 37.) The decision below found that Plaintiffs
15
At the same time, the Court declined to endorse critical
analysis.” (Id. at 26.) Thus, even after holding that the question
chance to address below. See Cal. Gov. Code § 68081. The Court
of Appeal denied the petition for rehearing and this petition for
review followed.
16
REASONS FOR GRANTING REVIEW
Review is warranted because the decision below is the first
thus the threat is real. This Court should provide clear guidance
17
provide clarity on this important issue. The Court of Appeal’s
“that sits without a jury and decides private disputes through the
(D.C. 2005) 869 A.2d 343, 348; see also Dial 800 v. Fesbinder
(2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 32, 46. Some “Beth Din panels are ad hoc
18
detailed procedural rules and hear hundreds of cases each year.”
procedural rules governing the Beth Din. (See, e.g., Beth Din of
America Rule 3.c.)3 Beth Din panels are used to resolve disputes
submit their dispute to the Beth Din. See Broyde, Jewish Law
19
Denominations in the Christian faith have also taken to
2750099, *1. The ICC Rules establish that “the Holy Scriptures
20
Rules make provision for parties who do not “profess to be
springs from a belief that religious law rather than secular law
21
by observing that “the fact three rabbis are the arbitrators and
408-09.
22
court rejected the argument, holding that although “it may not be
the ICC Rules because she was not a member of the faith and did
contention, finding that the plaintiff had no “legal right for her
(same).
23
“pursuant to the laws of Islam” by an arbitration court of an
Plaintiffs have left the faith. The issue resolved by the Court of
24
The Court of Appeal’s holding jeopardized more than just
that he has left the faith—or at least left the denomination that
faith.
and others have requested its publication so that they can rely on
and of other religions will and are using the decision to target
25
The decision below has also received extensive coverage in
26
“landmark decision” this disruptive and significant should not
What makes the decision below cry out for review is that it
impact.
27
State action provides such a ground here. The state action
LLC (9th Cir. 2017) 877 F.3d 833, 837. Yet judicial enforcement
1282, 1291 (arbitration is “not state action” and thus not subject
Tennessee Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001)
(alterations omitted).
28
instead relied on a line of non-arbitration cases (discussed below,
That will not only undercut the state’s and nation’s strong
within and without the state holding that the FAA, not the First
29
Amendment, should provide the rule of decision here. Under the
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion (2011) 563 U.S. 333, 339. The
with whom the parties choose to arbitrate their disputes and the
church and state.” Id. at 43. But the Court of Appeal—in the
30
dictates “a strong federal public policy favoring the enforcement
Id. at 49.
Agreements.6
31
sufficiently tied to the religious law chosen to resolve their
32
of Appeal had the power to invalidate the Agreements on public
that context does not raise “those types of public policy concerns.”
33
children in a particular faith, religious arbitration agreements
remain enforceable).
rituals (and the finding in the trial court was that it does not).
clause.
34
D. The decision below conflicted with cases
forbidding hostility to religion.
finding that the First Amendment not only permits but requires
the Supreme Court has repeatedly noted that the Free Exercise
35
against religion, thereby depriving [defendant] of its free exercise
rights”); see also Spivey, supra, 122 So.3d at p. 995 (same). The
between them and the Church Defendants. (Opn. 10.) Yet the
this Court should provide the ultimate guidance on. As it is, the
36
Court of Appeal’s holding conflicted with the decisions in other
37
F. The Court of Appeal’s attempt to justify its
decision finds no support in the record and
provides further reasons for review.
occurring after they left the Church. (Opn. 34-35.) Thus, the
38
arrangement by explicit agreement.” See, e.g., Litton Fin.
501 U.S. 190, 201. That is precisely what the parties agreed to
here.
Cir. 2020) 971 F.3d 284, 293 (reversing order denying arbitration
Markets, Inc. (11th Cir. 2010) 622 F.3d 1335, 1343. Because the
Plaintiffs assert that they left the faith, review by this Court is
39
connection to their contractual relationship with the Church to
faith.” But this purported right was the sine qua non of the
Plaintiffs “alleged these acts occurred both while they were in the
religion and after they exited the religion.” (Petition for Writ of
after they petitioned for a writ of mandate. (Ibid.) This was plain
40
their pleadings through an unsworn statement in a letter brief.
377, 398.
“stem” (Opn. 34) or “arise” (id. at 28) from the Agreements, the
[Plaintiffs] and the Church. (Id. at 11.) Those terms reach “all
2018) 898 F.3d 869, 874, 876; see also Howard v. Goldbloom,
41
Furthermore, the operative pleading exhaustively describes
Plaintiffs are “enemies” in the eyes of the Church and are thus
CONCLUSION
Religious arbitration has increasing importance and
42
provide guidance on this critical issue for religious organizations
By:
William H. Forman
By: Mallett
Matthew D. Hinks
43
CERTIFICATE OF WORD COUNT
Pursuant to Rule 8.204(c)(1) of the California Rules of
the text of this brief was produced using 13 point font and
By:
William H. Forman
By: MM
Matthew D. Hinks
44
ATTACHMENT: COURT OF APPEAL OPINION
45
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
DIVISION FIVE
Jan 19, 2022
CHRISSIE CARNELL BIXLER, et al., B310559
kdominguez
Respondent;
CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY
INTERNATIONAL, et al.,
2
The trial court granted the motion to compel, and
petitioners sought writ relief. We issued an order to show cause,
and now grant the petition. Individuals have a First
Amendment right to leave a religion. We hold that once
petitioners had terminated their affiliation with the Church,
they were not bound to its dispute resolution procedures to
resolve the claims at issue here, which are based on alleged
tortious conduct occurring after their separation from the
Church and do not implicate resolution of ecclesiastical issues.
We issue a writ directing the trial court to vacate its order
compelling arbitration and instead to deny the motion.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. Allegations of the Operative Complaint
The operative complaint is the first amended complaint.
Plaintiffs are Chrissie Carnell Bixler, her husband Cedric
Bixler-Zavala, Jane Doe #1, Jane Doe #2, and Marie Riales.
Riales was not a member of the Church, was not subject to the
order compelling arbitration, and is not party to the current writ
proceeding. As such, we use “petitioners” to refer to all plaintiffs
except Riales.
The defendants are Church of Scientology International,
Religious Technology Center, Church of Scientology Celebrity
Centre International, Daniel Masterson and David Miscavige.1
Plaintiffs allege that Church of Scientology International and
3
Religious Technology Center “along with a network of
Scientology organizations that sit underneath [them], including
[Celebrity Centre International], make up what is informally
known to the public as ‘The Church of Scientology’ or
‘Scientology.’ ” We collectively refer to the institutional
defendants as “Scientology” or “the Church.” Defendant
Masterson is an individual member of the Church. Plaintiffs
allege both that Masterson was an agent of the Church, and that
the Church was an agent of Masterson.2 The Church and
Masterson are real parties in interest in this writ proceeding.
Plaintiffs Bixler, Jane Doe #1, Jane Doe #2, and Riales each
allege that Masterson raped them. This, however, is not the
gravamen of their complaint in this case; in fact, they state no
cause of action against Masterson for sexual assault.3 Instead,
they allege causes of action against all defendants for stalking
4
(Civ. Code, § 1708.7), physical invasion of privacy (§ 1708.8,
subd. (a)), constructive invasion of privacy (id., at subd. (b)),
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and (as to plaintiff
Bixler-Zavala) loss of consortium. We summarize the allegations
supporting these causes of action:4
According to plaintiffs, Scientology forbids members from
contacting police to report a crime committed by a member. It
instructs members that reporting such incidents is considered a
“high crime” and subjects the reporting member to punishment.
Scientology utilizes so-called “Fair Game” tactics to “attack,
harass, embarrass, humiliate, destroy, and/or injure individuals
who Defendants declare to be an enemy of Scientology, known in
Scientology as a ‘Suppressive Person’ . . . .” Masterson is a
television actor; Scientology granted him special treatment when
he achieved “celebrity status.” To that end, Scientology worked
to prevent plaintiffs from reporting Masterson’s crimes and, once
they did, declared plaintiffs Suppressive Persons. Scientology
then mobilized an aggressive Fair Game campaign against them.
While the Fair Game campaigns against each plaintiff
differed, collectively plaintiffs allege Scientology’s agents
committed the following acts against them: surveilled them,
hacked their security systems, filmed them, chased them,
hacked their email, killed (and attempted to kill) their pets,
tapped their phones, incited others to harass them, threatened
to kill them, broke their locks, broke into their cars, ran them off
the road, posted fake ads purporting to be from them soliciting
anal sex from strangers, broke their windows, set the outside of
their home on fire, went through their trash, and poisoned trees
5
in their yards. This conduct was alleged to be pursuant to
Scientology’s policies and procedures. According to plaintiffs’
complaint, Scientology’s directives are that Suppressive Persons
are to be silenced by whatever means necessary. Scientology
instructs members “to damage the person’s professional
reputation, file frivolous lawsuits, and harass and surveil ‘the
enemy.’ ” Scientology’s “policies and procedures encourage
and/or instruct followers to ‘ruin [the individual] utterly.’ ”
It will become relevant to our analysis whether the claimed
tortious conduct on which petitioners sue took place before or
after they left Scientology.5 While petitioners have clearly
represented they are not seeking to recover from Scientology for
the sexual assaults themselves, the allegations of petitioners’
complaint include allegations relating to Scientology’s attempts
to cover up the sexual assaults while petitioners were still
members. These include, for example, Jane Doe #1’s allegation
that, when she reported that Masterson had raped her to her
Scientology ethics officer, he required her to do an ethics
program which pressured her into confessing the “evil purposes”
she had toward Masterson and Scientology. Jane Doe #1 alleged
that, while she was still a member, she was given a formal
censure within the church, called a “non-enturbulation order.”
Similarly, Bixler alleged that, while she was still a member,
Scientology forced her to sign a document stating she would
6
never speak publicly about her relationship with Masterson or
sue him for any reason.
In addition to events occurring while still a Scientology
member, each petitioner alleged an invasive Fair Game
campaign occurring entirely after she had left the church.6
Bixler alleged that she formally terminated her relationship
with the Church in October 2016, then reported Masterson to
the police. It was only after her report that she was declared a
Suppressive Person and she and her husband were subjected to
the Fair Game campaign. Jane Doe #1 learned in June 2005
that she had been declared a Suppressive Person and was no
longer permitted to engage in religious services at the Church.
More than a decade later (after she asked the LAPD to reopen
its investigation into Masterson), the Church commenced its
Fair Game campaign against her. Jane Doe #2 ceased practicing
Scientology entirely in 2004. In 2017, she reported Masterson’s
assault to the LAPD, at which point the Fair Game harassment
began.
As to whether the conduct that occurred while petitioners
were still Church members was actionable, or merely
background, the complaint was not entirely clear. Plaintiffs
included conspiracy allegations, which alleged Scientology
“engaged in wrongful conduct, including but not limited to
information suppression, coercion, deception, stalking,
harassment, surveillance, threats, vandalism, theft, and/or
fraud.” “Information suppression” and “coercion” could include
7
the pre-Fair Game (and pre-separation) attempts to force
petitioners to be silent about the rapes. However, when it came
time to allege the facts supporting each individual cause of
action, plaintiffs’ focus was limited to the Fair Game campaigns
themselves. For example, the cause of action for intentional
infliction of emotional distress: Although the cause of action
incorporates the earlier foundational facts, it does not allege that
any wrong took place prior to separation. Instead, the cause of
action alleges, “Defendants surveilled, harassed, stalked, and
photographed Plaintiffs. Specifically, Defendants trespassed on
Plaintiffs’ personal property, looked in windows, followed and
stalked, hacked personal online accounts and emails, engaged in
surveillance of and interference with Plaintiffs’ daily lives, and/or
called, and/or texted, and/or otherwise attempted to communicate
repeatedly.” In sum, it appears that the vast bulk of the
operative allegations related to facts occurring after the
petitioners left Scientology. As we shall discuss, the trial court
attempted to obtain clarity from plaintiffs’ counsel as to whether
the complaint sought relief for any pre-separation conduct by the
Church.
2. The Arbitration Agreements
Before we turn to the motions to compel arbitration, we set
out the language of the agreements on which Scientology relied to
support its motion.7 Specifically, defendants represented that all
8
petitioners had signed agreements containing arbitration clauses
in connection with their receipt of specific Scientology services
and/or their enrollment in Scientology in general.8
Petitioners Bixler, Bixler-Zavala and Jane Doe #1 executed
the same version of the Religious Services Enrollment
Application, Agreement and General Release.9 It provides, in
pertinent part:
“This Contract memorializes my freely given consent to be
bound exclusively by the discipline, faith, internal organization,
and ecclesiastical rule, custom, and law of the Scientology
religion . . . in all my dealings of any nature with the Church, and
in all my dealings of any nature with any other Scientology
church or organization which espouses, presents, propagates or
9
practices the Scientology religion. By signing this Contract, I
recognize, acknowledge and agree that:
“a. My freely given consent to be bound exclusively by the
discipline, faith, internal organization, and ecclesiastical rule,
custom, and law of the Scientology religion . . . in all my dealings
of any nature with the Church, and in all my dealings of any
nature with any other Scientology church or organization which
espouses, presents, propagates or practices the Scientology
religion means that I am forever abandoning, surrendering,
waiving, and relinquishing my right to sue, or otherwise seek
legal recourse with respect to any dispute, claim or controversy
against the Church, all other Scientology churches, all other
organizations which espouse, present, propagate or practice the
Scientology religion, and all persons employed by any such
entity both in their personal and any official or representational
capacities, regardless of the nature of the dispute, claim or
controversy.
“b. The abandonment, surrender, waiver, and
relinquishment to which I refer in the immediately preceding
subparagraph is unconditional and irrevocable and applies
equally to anyone acting or purporting to be acting on my behalf
or for my benefit, whether I am alive or dead, whether I am
disabled or incapacitated, and under any and all circumstances
foreseen or unforeseen, in perpetuity, without exception or
limitation.
“c. Should I or anyone acting or purporting to be acting on
my behalf ever sue, or otherwise seek legal recourse with respect
to any dispute, claim or controversy against the Church, any
other Scientology church, any other organization which
espouses, presents, propagates or practices the Scientology
10
religion, or any person employed by any such entity, regardless
of the nature of the dispute, claim or controversy, I intend for the
submission of this Contract to the presiding judicial officer to be
a complete and sufficient basis for the immediate dismissal of
any and all such proceedings with prejudice to further
proceedings of any kind.
“d. In accordance with the discipline, faith, internal
organization, and ecclesiastical rule, custom, and law of the
Scientology religion, and in accordance with the constitutional
prohibitions which forbid governmental interference with
religious services or dispute resolution procedures, should any
dispute, claim or controversy arise between me and the Church,
any other Scientology church, any other organization which
espouses, presents, propagates or practices the Scientology
religion, or any person employed by any such entity, which
cannot be resolved informally by direct communication, I will
pursue resolution of that dispute, claim or controversy solely and
exclusively through Scientology’s Internal Ethics, Justice, and
binding religious arbitration procedures, which include
application to senior ecclesiastical bodies, including, as
necessary, final submission of the dispute to the International
Justice Chief of the Mother Church of the Scientology religion,
Church of Scientology International (‘IJC’) or his or her
designee.
“e. Any dispute, claim or controversy which still remains
unresolved after review by the IJC shall be submitted to binding
religious arbitration in accordance with the arbitration
procedures of Church of Scientology International, which provide
that:
11
“i. I will submit a request for arbitration to the IJC
and to the person or entity with whom I have the dispute, claim
or controversy;
“ii. in my request for arbitration, I will designate one
arbitrator to hear and resolve the matter;
“iii. within fifteen (15) days after receiving my
request for arbitration, the person or entity with whom I have
the dispute, claim or controversy will designate an arbitrator to
hear and resolve the matter. If the person or entity with whom I
have the dispute, claim or controversy does not designate an
arbitrator within that fifteen (15) day period, then the IJC will
designate the second arbitrator;
“iv. the two arbitrators so designated will select a
third arbitrator within fifteen (15) days after the designation of
the second arbitrator. If the arbitrators are unable to designate
a third arbitrator within the fifteen (15) day period, then the IJC
will choose the third arbitrator;
“v. consistent with my intention that the arbitration
be conducted in accordance with Scientology principles, and
consistent with the ecclesiastical nature of the procedures and
the dispute, claim or controversy to which those procedures
relate, it is my specific intention that all such arbitrators be
Scientologists in good standing with the Mother Church.”
The fourth petitioner, Jane Doe #2 signed an earlier
version of the agreement several times between 1997 and 2001.
Pursuant to that agreement, in exchange for being permitted to
participate in specific religious services, Jane Doe #2 agreed, in
part, as follows:
“I understand and acknowledge that because of
constitutional prohibitions which forbid governmental
12
interference with religious services or dispute resolution
procedures, that in the event I have any dispute, claim or
controversy with the Church . . . which cannot be resolved
informally by direct communication, resolution of the dispute,
claim or controversy may be pursued solely through the internal
procedures of the Church’s Ethics, Justice and Binding Religious
Arbitration system. . . . I understand and acknowledge that the
Church’s religious dispute resolution procedure includes
application to senior ecclesiastical bodies, including, as
necessary, final submission of the dispute to the International
Justice Chief of the Mother Church – Church of Scientology
International – (‘IJC’) or his designate.
“Any dispute, claim or controversy which still remains
unresolved after submission to the IJC shall be submitted to
Binding Religious Arbitration in accordance with the published
arbitration procedures of the Church of Scientology
International, which provide [similar procedures for selecting
the three-arbitrator panel]. Consistent with the intent that the
arbitration be conducted in accordance with Scientology
principles of justice and fairness, and consistent with the
ecclesiastical nature of the procedures and the dispute, claim or
controversy to which such procedures relate, all arbitrators shall
be Scientologists in good standing with the Mother Church.”10
13
3. Scientology’s Motions to Compel Arbitration
The Church moved to compel arbitration pursuant to Code
of Civil Procedure section 1281.2.11 However, Scientology
argued that the religious nature of the arbitration exempted it
from certain standards which would apply to routine civil
arbitrations. The Church argued that its arbitration agreements
with petitioners were enforceable under either the California
Arbitration Act or the Federal Arbitration Act. “More
importantly,” the Church argued, “under the Free Exercise and
Establishment Clauses of the United States and California
Constitutions the Church may establish its own rules governing
its relationship with its members exempt from civil law. The
14
Church’s ecclesiastical arbitration is a condition of participating
in Scientology services. This Court may not interfere with this
condition by imposing civil rules for arbitration.”12 “The only
permissible inquiry is what [petitioners] and the Church agreed
to. This Court may not impose its own notions of ‘fairness’ in
deciding whether [petitioners’] agreements with the Church are
fair or right. To do so would interfere with a Church’s rules over
its members, which is clearly forbidden by Serbian E[.] Orthodox
[Diocese v. Milivojevich (1976) 429 U.S. 696].”13
The Church supported its motion with the declaration of
Lynn Farny, one of its corporate officers and ordained ministers,
who explained the Scientology Ethics and Justice system, and
the level to which it was intertwined with the Scientology
religion. Farny declared, “The justice codes and procedures are
an inherent part of the religion, and are derived from our core
beliefs.” Farny set forth, in some detail, the ways in which
15
Scientology’s beliefs are interwoven with its justice principles.14
Scientology justice “contains exact procedures for resolving
matters ranging from Chaplain’s Courts (to resolve matters of
dispute between individuals) to a fact-finding body addressing
all other disputes (called a Committee of Evidence).” Scientology
jurisprudence “is required [to] be used in all matters relating to
Scientology organizations, groups and concerns.” Farny stated,
“The decisions, findings, judgments or other determinations
made in a Scientology justice proceeding reflect fundamental
religious beliefs, such as the ‘greatest good for the greatest
number of dynamics.’ Therefore, it is a matter of Scientology
doctrine that only specially qualified members of the Church,
who are well-versed in Scientology policy, can adjudicate
disputes concerning the proper interpretation and application of
its religious laws.”15
16
4. Criminal Proceedings Against Masterson
Between the time Scientology’s motions to compel and
petitioners’ opposition were filed, criminal proceedings were
commenced against Masterson. He was charged with three
counts of forcible rape, against victims Bixler, Jane Doe #1, and
Jane Doe #2, (Pen. Code, § 261, subd. (a)(2)) and pleaded not
guilty.16
5. Petitioners’ Opposition to the Motion to Compel
Petitioners jointly opposed all of Scientology’s motions to
compel. Among a number of grounds for opposition, they argued
that the dispute resolution procedure Scientology was
attempting to compel was not an arbitration at all, but a
religious ritual – a “form of religious punishment for
nonbelievers who did not follow church doctrine.”17 This
encompassed two subsidiary arguments. First, petitioners
argued it was unconstitutional to force them to participate in
such a ritual, as they have exercised their constitutional right to
change religions. Petitioners supported their motion with
17
declarations stating that the campaign of harassment occurred
after they left the church. Second, they argued they would be
unable to receive a fair adjudication because, as they had been
declared Suppressive Persons, any arbitration panel comprised
of “Scientologists in good standing” would be required, by the
Fair Game doctrine, to rule against them, or risk being declared
Suppressive Persons themselves.
6. Scientology’s Reply
In reply, Scientology took the position that its dispute
resolution proceedings were not religious rituals. Scientology
argued that its dispute resolution procedures were to be
governed by Scientology law, claiming, the “[a]greement to be
bound by Scientology law, including Scientology dispute
resolution procedures and arbitration, is a condition for
acceptance into Scientology religion.”
The Church argued, “Plaintiffs ask this Court to adopt a
radical position never embraced by any court in the United
States: Agreements to submit disputes to religious arbitration
are null and void when one of the signatories later decides to
leave the religion. The entire thrust of the Opposition is that an
apostate – a person who has left a religion – may not be ‘forced’
to participate in religious arbitration for fear of violating the
First Amendment. This argument runs counter to every
principle of contract law and arbitration law, and itself creates
an impermissible and unconstitutional separate standard for
adjudicating agreements entered into by churches.”
The Church represented that petitioners had not, in fact,
been declared Suppressive Persons, but argued that, in any
event, this was a “dispute over orthodoxy” which should be
“litigated ‘exclusively’ in an ecclesiastical setting. This court
18
may not adjudicate what is and is not Scientology doctrine, or
whether Plaintiffs have been ‘declared’ by the Church under its
doctrine, but that is what Plaintiffs seek.”18
As part of its Reply, Scientology submitted an additional
declaration of Lynn Farny. Farny declared that “Fair Game” is
not a Church doctrine and that, in fact, “[i]n the authorized
published works of the Church, comprising some 70 million
printed and spoken words, the phrase ‘Fair Game’ never
appears.” Plaintiffs had relied on a 1967 Scientology document
indicating that the penalty for an “ENEMY” was “SP Order.
Fair game. May be deprived of property or injured by any means
by any Scientologist without any discipline of the Scientologist.
May be tricked, sued or lied to or destroyed.” Farny represented
that this document was canceled in 1968, and is no longer
Church doctrine.
7. Sur-reply Raising Additional Issues
In response to the reply, petitioners filed an unauthorized
sur-reply, in which they raised new arguments against
arbitration. Specifically, they had obtained a criminal protective
order against Masterson, and argued that compelling arbitration
would violate both the protective order and Marsy’s Law (Cal.
Const., art. I, § 28), in that the Scientology proceedings would
enable Masterson to continue to harass them. They even
envisioned a scenario in which Masterson, as a Scientologist in
19
good standing, could be appointed one of the three arbitrators.
Although the trial court did not consider the unauthorized sur-
reply, it made a point of reviewing the protective order to ensure
that it would not forbid arbitration.
8. Hearing
On November 6, 2020, the court held a hearing on the
motions to compel. The court expressed concern that the acts
underlying the complaint occurred after the petitioners’
relationship with the Church had terminated. Scientology
argued that the complaint included allegations “that they were
abused by the Church while they were at the Church, that the
Church ignored their complaints about Mr. Masterson, but they
covered up complaints about Mr. Masterson while they were at
the Church. And these are incorporated into all their claims,
that these incorporate facts that go to their participation in the
Church into their claims. So there’s that part of the scope.” The
court asked petitioners’ counsel if there was a legal distinction,
for purposes of enforcing the arbitration agreement, between
claims based on events that occurred after a former member left
the church and claims based on events that happened while the
former member was still a member. Petitioners’ counsel
declined to specifically answer the question, taking the position
that, since the Scientology arbitration itself would be a religious
procedure, what mattered was that petitioners had left the
Church prior to the proposed arbitration, not whether they had
left prior to the alleged tortious conduct.
Scientology argued that the agreement to arbitrate
survived termination of the agreement itself, stating, “this is a
pledge for as long as you might have claims against the Church
to arbitrate your issues against the Church.” In response,
20
petitioners again argued that the contemplated procedure was a
religious ritual, and they had a First Amendment right to leave
the Church and no longer be compelled to participate in that
ritual.
9. Additional Briefing
The court sought additional briefing and argument on the
applicability of the Federal Arbitration Act. The Church again
argued that petitioners’ claims had their genesis in their
relationship to the Church and the Church’s alleged cover-up
(pursuant to Church doctrine) of the rapes.
Petitioners’ December 9, 2020 opposition brief took the
position – for the first time in unequivocal language – that the
causes of action did not, in fact, rely on conduct arising before
they left the Church: “All claims alleged by Plaintiffs occurred
after Plaintiffs left Scientology and therefore do not arise from
the agreements which covered Plaintiffs’ religious services when
they were members.”
10. Ruling
The court issued its ruling on December 30, 2020. The
court agreed with petitioners’ limited view of their complaint,
stating, “Defendants state that Plaintiffs’ claims against them as
entities are that they were subject to mistreatment pursuant to
official Church doctrine after they filed police reports;
contentions that they could have prevented the violence against
them committed by Masterson; and allegations of traumatic
experiences while they were part of the Church. [Citations.] [¶]
The causes of action begin at paragraph 262 of the complaint
and incorporate all preceding paragraphs. However, the
charging allegations of the causes of action themselves are
21
limited to the alleged harassment Plaintiffs experienced after
they came forward regarding the alleged sexual violence.”
Turning to the merits, the court rejected petitioners’
argument that compelling arbitration would force petitioners to
engage in a religious ritual, on the basis that they had submitted
no admissible evidence to prove it was a ritual. To the extent
the arbitration may have a religious component, petitioners
voluntarily agreed to it.
The court determined that, under the agreements, the issue
of arbitrability was for the court to determine. Although the
court agreed with petitioners that their complaint was limited to
post-separation conduct, the court concluded the conduct was
nonetheless arbitrable. The court reasoned that the plain words
of the agreements encompassed all claims against Scientology
and not merely those arising from the contracts.
The court declined to address petitioners’ challenges to the
fairness of the procedure, stating, “whether the rules of
Scientology are fair as applied to Plaintiffs would require the
Court to delve into the doctrines of Scientology. The First
Amendment Free Exercise Clause prevents the court from
engaging in that inquiry.” The court concluded this would be an
inquiry of faith, which must be left to adjudication of the Church
itself, under the doctrine of religious abstention.
11. Writ Proceedings
Petitioners filed a petition for writ of mandate. On
March 9, 2021, in a divided opinion, we denied the petition on
the basis that petitioners had an adequate remedy by way of
appeal if the court entered an order confirming an adverse
arbitration award. On May 26, 2021, the Supreme Court
granted review and transferred the matter back to this court
22
with directions to vacate the denial and issue an order to show
cause. We did so. The case has been fully briefed and argued,
and we now issue the writ.19
DISCUSSION
This case involves both petitioners’ First Amendment
rights to leave a faith and Scientology’s right to resolve disputes
with its members without court intervention. When applied to a
dispute that arose after petitioners left the faith, and which can
be resolved on neutral principles of tort law, we find petitioners’
right to leave the faith must control.
We first discuss the constitutional right to leave a faith;
then we turn to the potential applicability of the religious
abstention doctrine.
23
1. Standard of Review
The party seeking to compel arbitration has the burden of
proving the existence of an enforceable arbitration agreement by
a preponderance of the evidence, and the party opposing the
petition bears the burden of proving by a preponderance any fact
necessary to its defense. (Caballero v. Premier Care Simi Valley
LLC (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 512, 517.) When the evidence is not
in conflict, we review the court’s ruling on a petition to compel
arbitration de novo. (Banc of California, National Assn. v.
Superior Court (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 357, 367.) Here, although
certain facts may be contested, the core facts necessary to
resolve the issues before us are not disputed. Accordingly we
employ the de novo standard of review.
2. The Constitutional Right to Leave a Faith
We begin by considering the constitutional implications of a
member’s decision to leave a faith. An individual possesses an
“inalienable First Amendment right to the free exercise of
religion, which includes her right to change her religious beliefs
. . . .” (In re Marriage of Weiss (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 106, 118.)
“The constitutional freedom to question, to doubt, and to change
one’s convictions, protected by the Free Exercise and
Establishment Clauses, is important for very pragmatic reasons.
For most people, religious development is a lifelong dynamic
process even when they continue to adhere to the same religion,
denomination, or sect.” (Zummo v. Zummo (Pa. Super. 1990)
574 A.2d 1130, 1146.) “The First Amendment specifically
preserves the essential religious freedom for individuals to grow,
to shape, and to amend this important aspect of their lives, and
the lives of their children. Religious freedom was recognized by
our founding fathers to be inalienable. It remains so today.” (Id.
24
at p. 1148, italics omitted.) “One of the fundamental purposes of
the First Amendment is to protect the people’s right to worship
as they choose. Implicit in the right to choose freely one’s own
form of worship is the right of unhindered and unimpeded
withdrawal from the chosen form of worship.” (Guinn v. Church
of Christ of Collinsville (Okla. 1989) 775 P.2d 766, 777, fn.
omitted (Guinn) [concluding plaintiff had a right to leave her
church even when the church took the position withdrawal was
doctrinally impossible].)
California precedent counsels against enforcing agreements
that would violate an individual’s right to change religions. The
issue arose in In re Marriage of Weiss, supra, 42 Cal.App.4th
106. There, prior to marrying her Jewish husband, a woman
converted to Judaism and executed a written “Declaration of
Faith,” in which she pledged to rear all their children “ ‘in
loyalty to the Jewish faith and its practices.’ ” (Id. at p. 109.)
After the couple divorced, the woman returned to Christianity.
(Ibid.) She was attending church and had enrolled the couple’s
child in Sunday school. The child also attended a weekly club
meeting at the church and had attended church summer camp.
The father “acknowledged [the mother] had the right to expose
the minor to her religion, but objected to the minor’s being
indoctrinated in the Christian faith or being enrolled in any
activity ‘that would be contrary to his Jewish faith.’ ” (Id. at
p. 110.)
The trial court refused to restrain the mother’s religious
activity with the child. The father appealed, arguing the court
erred in not enjoining the mother from engaging the child in
Christian religious activity. (In re Marriage of Weiss, supra,
42 Cal.App.4th at p. 110.) The Court of Appeal affirmed,
25
recognizing the rule in California that a parent cannot enjoin the
other parent from involving their child in religious activities in
the absence of a showing of harm to the child. (Id. at p. 112.)
The father argued that the written antenuptial agreement
should be enforced as an exception to that rule and that the
mother should be bound by her promise. (Id. at p. 117.) Relying
heavily on the analysis of the Pennsylvania appellate court in
Zummo v. Zummo, supra, 574 A.2d 1130, the Weiss court
disagreed. (Weiss, at pp. 117-118.) The court concluded the
agreement was legally unenforceable for two reasons:
enforcement would result in improper judicial entanglement in
religious matters and would violate the mother’s First
Amendment right to change her religion. (Id. at 118.) As
Presiding Justice Klein wrote, “Further, in view of [the
mother’s] inalienable First Amendment right to the free
exercise of religion, which includes the right to change her
religious beliefs and to share those beliefs with her offspring,
her antenuptial commitment to raise her children in [the
father’s] faith is not legally enforceable for that reason as
well.” (Ibid.) While a parent’s religious freedom may yield to
other competing interests, “ ‘it may not be bargained away.’
[Citation.]” (Ibid.)
We pause to point out that, in the briefs filed both in the
trial court and this court, petitioners spend considerable time on
whether Scientology arbitration constitutes a religious ritual,
such that compelling their participation in the ritual would
violate their First Amendment rights for that reason. Whether
Scientology arbitration is a ritual is immaterial to our analysis.
The issue properly phrased is: after petitioners have left the
faith, can Scientology still require that all of Scientology’s future
26
conduct with respect to petitioners – including torts of whatever
kind – be governed by Scientology law, with disputes to be
resolved solely in Scientology tribunals by Scientology members?
We conclude it cannot. Just like written antenuptial agreements
to raise children in a particular faith are not enforceable against
a parent who has left the faith, Scientology’s written arbitration
agreements are not enforceable against members who have left
the faith, with respect to claims for subsequent non-religious,
tortious acts. To hold otherwise would bind members
irrevocably to a faith they have the constitutional right to
leave.20
27
Our analysis takes a somewhat different path to the same
result with respect to Jane Doe #1. Jane Doe #1 does not allege
that she voluntarily left the Church; instead, she learned in 2005
that she had been declared a Suppressive Person and was told
she was no longer permitted to engage in religious services at
the Church. Having excluded Jane Doe #1 from its religious
services, and allegedly committed torts against her more than 10
years later, the Church cannot now enforce against Jane Doe #1
the arbitration clause in an agreement she signed in order to
obtain the religious services from which she has been excluded.
If the religious relationship has been terminated – by either
party – and the parishioner is no longer a member of the
Church, the arbitration clause does not survive to cover disputes
arising from future non-religious tortious conduct.
3. The Religious Abstention Doctrine Does Not Change
the Analysis
Scientology’s motion described itself as a motion to compel
“religious arbitration.” That Scientology sought to compel an
arbitration that was religious, rather than secular, in nature
was a critical part of its motion. Scientology argued that
because it was seeking to compel religious arbitration, the court
could not review the proposed arbitration procedures for
28
“fairness.” It argued that its right to govern its relations with its
members was protected by the First Amendment, and rendered
its procedures “all but unreviewable.” This argument invokes
the legal doctrine of religious abstention.
We do not purport to review the procedures of Scientology
arbitration. We do find that a discussion of religious abstention
as imposed on courts and the reasons for, and limitations of, this
doctrine, supports our conclusion.
Religious (or ecclesiastical) abstention compels courts to
abstain from resolving religious issues. Courts instead yield to
the decision of the highest religious tribunal to address the
issue. “In short, the First and Fourteenth Amendments permit
hierarchical religious organizations to establish their own rules
and regulations for internal discipline and government, and to
create tribunals for adjudicating disputes over these matters.
When this choice is exercised and ecclesiastical tribunals are
created to decide disputes over the government and direction of
subordinate bodies, the Constitution requires that civil courts
accept their decisions as binding upon them.” (Serbian E.
Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, supra, 426 U.S. at pp. 724-
725.)
Religious abstention first arose in Watson v. Jones (1871)
80 U.S. 679, a case involving a Kentucky Presbyterian church
whose members, in the years leading up the Civil War, split over
the issue of slavery. The schism in the church membership led
to a dispute over which side controlled the property owned by
the church. The overarching institution, the Presbyterian
Church of the United States, supported emancipation and
therefore sided with the anti-slavery faction. (Id. at pp. 690-
692.) When the dispute reached the U.S. Supreme Court, the
29
court yielded to the resolution of the mother church, saying, “In
this class of cases we think the rule of action which should
govern the civil courts, founded in a broad and sound view of the
relations of church and state under our system of laws, and
supported by a preponderating weight of judicial authority is,
that, whenever the questions of discipline, or of faith, or
ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law have been decided by the
highest of these church judicatories to which the matter has
been carried, the legal tribunals must accept such decisions as
final, and as binding on them, in their application to the case
before them.” (Id. at p. 727.)
Over the years, the doctrine has been applied in additional
cases involving disputes over church property (e.g. Presbyterian
Church in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l
Presbyterian Church (1969) 393 U.S. 440, 449-450; Kedroff v. St.
Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church (1952) 344 U.S.
94, 109) and disputes between a church and its ministers (e.g.,
Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, supra, 426 U.S. at
pp. 697-698.) In the latter setting, religious abstention
manifests in the so-called “ministerial exception,” which exempts
religious organizations’ decisions regarding the employment of
ministers and teachers from employment discrimination laws.
(Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC
(2012) 565 U.S. 171, 188 [ministerial exception barred EEOC
and individual claims of discrimination under the American with
Disabilities Act]; Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru
(2020) ___ U.S. ___ [140 S. Ct. 2049, 2055, 2060] [extending
ministerial exception to religious school teachers who are not
ministers].)
30
Religious abstention does not control the result in this case
for the reason that the doctrine is restricted to the adjudication
of religious matters. Civil law must defer to a religious
authority’s resolution of ecclesiastical questions. If the matter
does not concern “theological controversy, church discipline,
ecclesiastical government, or the conformity of the members of
the church to the standard of morals required of them,” there is
no cause for abstention. (Watson v. Jones, supra, 80 U.S. at
p. 733.)
This limitation was recognized in Garcia v. Church of
Scientology Flag Service Organization, Inc., supra, 2021 WL
5074465, the Eleventh Circuit case confirming an arbitration
award in what may have been the first Scientology arbitration
held. There, a religious tribunal directed the Church to refund
part of a donation former parishioners had made to the Church
when they were members. The former members moved to vacate
the award because they claimed the amount did not fully
compensate them. The district court denied the motion to vacate
and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. In doing so, the court
rejected Scientology’s argument that Milivojevich and other
religious abstention cases limited the court’s review of the
arbitration. “Those decisions make clear that civil courts may
not disturb the decisions of ecclesiastical tribunals on matters of
church discipline and governance, minister selection, and other
matters of faith and doctrine. [Citations.] But the Garcias do
not ask us to disturb an ecclesiastical tribunal’s resolution of a
dispute that is ‘ecclesiastical in its character,’ such as a dispute
about ‘theological controversy, church discipline, ecclesiastical
government, or the conformity of the members of the church to
the standard of morals required of them.’ [Citation.] They
31
instead ask us to review a monetary award issued by an
arbitration panel. Our review of that award poses no risk of
intruding upon the authority of the Church of Scientology in
matters of ‘ecclesiastical cognizance.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. *10.)
The Eleventh Circuit also held religious abstention did not bar
the court from reviewing whether the arbitrators exhibited
partiality or committed misconduct. A civil court conducting
such review uses neutral principles of law; it is not a question of
religious doctrine. (Id. at p. *11.)
Similarly, in a case specifically involving imposition of
discipline by a church on a former member, the Oklahoma
Supreme Court held that religious abstention did not apply
because the issue was whether the actions of church elders
violated the plaintiff’s right to be free from torts, not whether
the discipline was appropriate under church doctrine. (Guinn,
supra, 775 P.2d at p. 773 & fn. 25.)
Here, petitioners’ lawsuit against Scientology is based on
neutral principles. They are not alleging that the “Fair Game”
campaign against them did not comport with Scientology law;
they are alleging that the conduct the Church engaged in was
tortious under California law. California courts can resolve this
issue under neutral principles of law.21 Similarly, the issue of
32
arbitrability itself can be resolved under neutral principles of
law – here, petitioners’ constitutional right to change religions.
The issue is not one of Scientology doctrine, but generally
applicable principles of law.
Religious abstention has its roots in consent – specifically,
an individual’s voluntary membership in, or employment by, a
church, or a local church’s voluntary alignment with a mother
church. In Watson v. Jones, supra, the court explained its
rationale in this manner: “The right to organize voluntary
religious associations to assist in the expression and
dissemination of any religious doctrine, and to create tribunals
for the decision of controverted questions of faith within the
association, and for the ecclesiastical government of all the
individual members, congregations, and officers within the
general association, is unquestioned. All who unite themselves to
such a body do so with an implied consent to this government,
and are bound to submit to it.” (Watson v. Jones, supra, 80 U.S.
at pp. 728-729, emphasis added; Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v.
Milivojevich, supra, 426 U.S. at pp. 710-711 [quoting Watson].)
Here, petitioners withdrew their consent when they left the
faith. The notion of consent no longer exists as the necessary
predicate for religious abstention.
33
4. Denying Arbitration Does Not Evince Hostility to
Religion
In a related argument, Scientology contends that failing to
enforce the arbitration clause in its agreements violates its Free
Exercise rights, in that our conclusion shows hostility to religion.
The argument continues that, because as a general principle,
arbitration contracts may survive termination of the underlying
contractual relationship, the same should be true for religious
arbitration. We reject Scientology’s premise; it has provided no
authority upholding an arbitration agreement ad infinitum, and
the California case on which Scientology relies for this
proposition is distinguishable. In Buckhorn v. St. Jude Heritage
Medical Group (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1401, a physician
formerly employed by a medical group sued the medical group
for wrongful termination and for torts allegedly committed after
he was discharged. Specifically, he alleged that after he left, the
medical group informed his patients that he had left the medical
group for a variety of false reasons (e.g., marital or mental
problems). He alleged causes of action for defamation, negligent
interference with prospective business advantage, and unfair
competition. (Id. at pp. 1404-1405.) When the medical group
sought to compel arbitration, based on an arbitration clause in
his employment agreement, the physician argued that the
arbitration clause did not apply to the tortious conduct which
occurred after he was terminated. The Fourth District Court of
Appeal rejected this argument, on the basis that his tort claims
“stem[med] from the contractual relationship between the
parties,” and were therefore within the scope of the arbitration
agreement. (Id. at p. 1403.) Here, petitioners’ claims against
Scientology do not stem from the contractual relationship; they
34
stem from the alleged “Fair Game” campaign Scientology
engaged in as retribution for reporting Masterson to police after
they left the Church. This harassment allegedly arose because
of petitioners’ relationship with Masterson and their reporting
his conduct to police, not because of their prior affiliation with
Scientology. Indeed, plaintiff Riales alleged a similar Fair Game
campaign of harassment, and it is undisputed she was never a
member.
As we recognized at the outset, this case involves two free
exercise rights: petitioners’ right to leave a faith and
Scientology’s right to resolve disputes with its members without
court intervention. Resolving this tension does not reflect
hostility to religion.
5. The Court Erred in Compelling Arbitration
Scientology takes the position that petitioners agreed to its
dispute resolution procedures as a condition of joining the
Church (or, as to Bixler-Zavala, as a condition of receiving
services from the Church). It argues that, even though
petitioners have left the Church, they are still bound by the
terms of their contracts.
We reject this argument. Much like the mother in Weiss
who by written agreement covenanted to raise her child Jewish
but then left the faith, petitioners have a constitutional right to
disassociate from a religious community. Having exercised this
right to disassociate, they are no longer members subject to the
Church’s religion and rules, which otherwise would bind them to
Scientology dispute resolution for life.
We acknowledge that petitioners have not been entirely
consistent about whether the alleged facts on which they base
their causes of action were limited to those occurring after they
35
separated from the Church; they ultimately represented that
such was the case, and the trial court found it to be so. In this
court, petitioners first asserted that they “allege these acts
occurred both while they were in the religion and after they
exited the religion.” But in response to our request for
supplemental letter briefing, petitioners state that “their causes
of action are based on conduct after they left the Church . . . .”
Our decision is predicated on that final representation, and we
construe petitioners’ claims for relief as limited to conduct
occurring after they left the faith. The alleged campaign of
harassment which forms the basis of petitioners’ lawsuit
occurred after petitioners had left Scientology and expressly or
impliedly had withdrawn their consent to be governed by its
religious rules.
As we stated at the outset of this opinion, we hold that once
petitioners terminated their affiliation with the Church, they
were not bound to its dispute resolution procedures to resolve
the claims at issue here, which are based on alleged tortious
conduct occurring after their separation from the Church and do
not implicate resolution of ecclesiastical issues.22
Scientology argues that petitioners simply agreed to be
bound by Scientology dispute resolution procedures no matter
what. As Scientology puts it, “An ‘irrevocable’ agreement to
‘forever’ waive civil proceedings and submit to Scientology
36
Ethics and Justice Codes in ‘any dispute’ with Churches of
Scientology is a condition for participation in the religion.” It
argues that this agreement should be enforced like any other
agreement. Enforcing this provision without regard to
petitioners’ First Amendment rights would mean that if the
Church or a Church member committed any intentional or
negligent tort against a former member of the Church, that
former member would be bound by Scientology dispute
resolution procedures regardless of the fact that the member had
left the Church years, even decades, before the tort. In effect,
Scientology suggests that one of the prices of joining its religion
(or obtaining a single religious service) is eternal submission to a
religious forum – a sub silencio waiver of petitioners’
constitutional right to extricate themselves from the faith.23 The
Constitution forbids a price that high.
DISPOSITION
The petition is granted. Let a writ of mandate issue
directing respondent court to vacate its order granting the
Church’s petitions to compel arbitration and enter a new and
37
different order denying the motions.. Petitioners shall recover
recov
their costs.
RUBIN, P
P.. J.
I CONCUR:
MOOR,
M OO
OR, J.
38
Chrissie Bixler v. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County
B310559
BAKER, J.
PROOF OF SERVICE
C.C.P. §1013(a), 2015.5
over the age of eighteen years, and not a party to the within
Robert W. Thompson
Thompson Law Offices
700 Airport Boulevard, Suite 160
Burlingame, CA 94019
Email: [email protected]
Marci A. Hamilton
36 Timber Knoll Drive
Washington Crossing, PA 18977
Email: [email protected]
62
I, the undersigned, also hereby declare under penalty of
Pamela Tanigawa
63
Supreme Court of California
Jorge E. Navarrete, Clerk and Executive Officer of the Court
Electronically FILED on 2/25/2022 by Ines Calanoc, Deputy Clerk
PROOF OF SERVICE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
Supreme Court of California
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
Supreme Court of California
Case Name: Chrissie Carnell Bixler, et al. v. Superior Court of California, County of Los
Angeles
Case Number: TEMP-E96BJCZ8
Lower Court Case Number:
1. At the time of service I was at least 18 years of age and not a party to this legal action.
250038
Marci A. Hamilton [email protected] e-Serve 2/25/2022 5:38:46 PM
262928
Matthew D. Hinks [email protected] e-Serve 2/25/2022 5:38:46 PM
200750
Robert E. Mangels [email protected] e-Serve 2/25/2022 5:38:46 PM
274353
Alexander H. Cote [email protected] e-Serve 2/25/2022 5:38:46 PM
211558
This proof of service was automatically created, submitted and signed on my behalf through my agreements with
TrueFiling and its contents are true to the best of my information, knowledge, and belief.
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.
2/25/2022
Date
/s/William Forman
Signature