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Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v Morts Dock & Engineering Company (‘The Wagon

Mound No. 1’) [1961] AC 388


Chapter 4

Relevant facts

Morts Dock & Engineering Company (‘Morts’) carried on the business of ship-building,
ship-repairing and general engineering at its wharf in Morts Bay in Sydney Harbour. On
30 October 1951, Morts employees were working on a vessel moored at the wharf using
electric and oxy-acetylene welding equipment. A vessel owned by Overseas Tankship
(UK) Ltd (‘OT’), the ‘Wagon Mound’, was moored at Caltex Wharf on the opposite shore
of the harbour, approximately 600 feet from Morts Wharf, to enable the discharge of
gasoline products and taking in of furnace oil. A large quantity of furnace oil was
released into the harbour as a result of the carelessness of OT’s employees. The oil
spread to Morts Wharf. When the Morts works manager became aware of the presence
of the oil, he made enquiries with the manager of Caltex. The response he received as
well as his own belief that furnace oil was inflammable in the open led him to believe
that the work at Morts Wharf could safely continue. However, he gave instructions that
safety precautions should be taken to prevent inflammable material falling from Morts
wharf into the oil. On 1 November 1951, hot metal from the welding at Morts Wharf fell
on cotton waste in the harbour and ignited the furnace oil. Consequently, the wharf and
the vessel upon which Morts employees were working caught fire. Considerable
damage was done to the wharf and to the equipment on it.

Morts sued OT for negligence. In hearing an appeal from the decision of the Trial judge,
the Supreme Court of New South Wales held that OT was liable in negligence for the
damage suffered by Morts. OT appealed to the Privy Council.

Legal issue

Is a negligent defendant responsible for all the consequences of their actions including
those that are not reasonably foreseeable?

Decision

On 18 January 1961, the Privy Council unanimously held that OT was only liable for the
consequences of its actions that were reasonably foreseeable at the time of the
negligent act. OT was not liable for unforeseeable consequences of its negligence.

The Privy Council was of the view that a defendant’s liability should be limited to those
acts that are natural and probable consequences of its carelessness, and that acts that
were foreseeable were the natural and probable consequences. The Privy Council held
that although OT had owed Morts a duty of care and that duty had been breached, the
damage suffered by Morts was not reasonably foreseeable. Critical to this determination
was the Privy Council’s acceptance of the Trial Judge’s finding, based on the extensive
expert evidence given at trial, that OT did not know and could not reasonably be
expected to have known that furnace oil was flammable when spread on water.

The Privy Council rejected the previous rule that a defendant was liable for all harm
directly caused by, or a direct consequence of, their breach of duty, even if that harm
was not reasonably foreseeable. According to Viscount Simonds in his judgement on
behalf of the Privy Council:

It is a principle of civil liability, subject only to qualifications which have no present


relevance, that a man must be considered to be responsible for the probable
consequences of his act. To demand more of him is too harsh a rule, to demand
less is to ignore that civilised order requires the observance of a minimum
standard of behaviour….

For, if some limitation must be imposed upon the consequences for which the
negligent actor is to be held responsible - and all are agreed that some limitation
there must be - why should that test (reasonable foreseeability) be rejected
which, since he is judged by what the reasonable man ought to foresee,
corresponds with the common conscience of mankind, and a test (the ‘direct’
consequence) be substituted which leads to no-where but the never-ending and
insoluble problems of causation.

…. [T]he essential factor in determining liability is whether the damage is of such


a kind as the reasonable man should have foreseen. This accords with the
general view thus stated by Lord Atkin in Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562
at p 580: ‘The liability for negligence, whether you style it such or treat it as in
other systems as a species of 'culpa,' is no doubt based upon a general public
sentiment of moral wrongdoing for which the offender must pay.’ It is a departure
from this sovereign principle if liability is made to depend solely on the damage
being the ‘direct’ or ‘natural’ consequence of the precedent act. Who knows or
can be assumed to know all the processes of nature? But if it would be wrong
that a man should be held liable for damage unpredictable by a reasonable man
because it was ‘direct’ or ‘natural,’ equally it would be wrong that he should
escape liability, however ‘indirect’ the damage, if he foresaw or could reasonably
foresee the intervening events which led to its being done … Thus foreseeability
becomes the effective test.

Significance

This case confirmed the remoteness rule: a defendant who has breached their duty of
care is only liable for harm caused by the breach that is reasonably foreseeable, and is
not liable for harm caused by the breach that is too remote or far-fetched.

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