Crimes Against Persons

Art. 246. Parricide.

In this felony, the person killed must be:
- father )
- mother ) – whether legitimate or illegitimate
- child )
-or-
- other ascendants or descendants, not the father,
mother or child of the offender, who must be legitimate.
-or-
- spouse, who must be legitimate of the offender.
Relationship by blood.
• What distinguishes parricide from
other felonies involving destruction
of life is the element of relationship
by blood. Even in the case of legal
adoption, the killing of an adopted
child is not parricide as the
relationship is not by blood.
• Knowledge of such relationship by
the offender is not required.
 Art. 62, par. 3, RPC, Book I.
“circumstances that arise from the private
relations with the offended party serve to
aggravate or mitigate the liability of those as
to whom such circumstances are attendant.”
 Art. 247. Death or physical injuries
under exceptional circumstances.
Preliminary Requisites:
Legally married person with respect to his/her
spouse.
Parents with respect to daughters:
- Legitimate or illegitimate,
- Under 18 years of age, and
- Living with them.
 Common requisites.
• The married person or parent
surprises the spouse/daughter in
the act of sexual intercourse;
• The spouse/daughter and their
paramour or seducer are killed or
serious physical injuries are inflicted
upon them by the married person
or parent.
 Not a felony, no penalty.
“…Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code does
not define a crime…” (Pp vs Araquel, GR No. L-
12629)
“Inflicting death under exceptional
circumstances is not murder. X X X
Punishment, consequently, is not inflicted
upon the accused. He is banished, but that is
intended for his protection.” (Pp vs Abarca, GR
No. 74433)
 “…in the act or immediately
thereafter,”
The killing/serious physical injuries must be
committed while the wife/daughter is in the
act of sexual intercourse or immediately
thereafter (right after the sexual intercourse.)
 “…immediately thereafter…”
It only requires that the death caused be the
proximate result of the outrage overwhelming
the accused after chancing upon his spouse in
the basest act of infidelity. (Abarca)
 “…in the act of committing sexual
intercourse…”
Where there is no clear showing that sexual
intercourse has occurred, the article is not
applicable. Bituanan (Man and wife were
seen sleeping on the same bed), Gonzales
(Wife was rising up while man was buttoning
his drawers).
 “…in the act of committing sexual
intercourse…”
It is not necessary that he see the carnal act. It
is enough that the circumstances reasonably
show that that carnal act is being committed
or has just been committed.
 “…in the act of committing sexual
intercourse…”
It is, therefore, necessary that sexual intercourse
is established.
Where sexual intercourse is not clearly
established or if only preparatory acts are
committed, Art. 247 is not applicable.
 Highly unlikely.
Neither is it likely that a woman thirty years of
age, like Sixta Quilason, and twenty-five-year-
old Isabelo Evangelio, both of sound judgment
as is to be supposed, had dared to have carnal
intercourse near the toilet of the offended
party's house, a place which is naturally
frequented by some persons. (Pp vs. Gonzales,
69 Phil 66)
Promiscuity.
• To satisfy this burden, appellant must
prove that he actually surprised his wife
and Florencio in flagrante delicto, and
that he killed the man during or
immediately thereafter. However, all
that appellant established was
Florencio's promiscuity, which was
inconsequential to the killing. (People v.
Puedan, G.R. No. 139576, September 2,
2002)
 Art. 248. Murder.

The unlawful killing of another which is not parricide or

infanticide, with the presence of any of the six
circumstances enumerated.
1. Treachery…
2. Price…
3. Inundation…
4. Calamities…
5. Evident premeditation;
6. Cruelty
 Par. 3 vs Par.’s 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6.
Par. 3. “By means of
inundation, fire, poison, …”

Par.’s 1, 5 and 6. “With…”

Par. 2. “In consideration…”
Par. 4. “On the occasion…”
 By means of fire.
• The rule in these decisions is that: there is a need to
establish intent to kill, by means of fire, on the part
of the offender to qualify the killing to murder.
• Pp vs. Galura, 16 CA Rep 70
• Pp vs. Pugay, GR No. 74324, Nov. 17, 1988.
 Pp vs. Cagoco, G.R. No. 38511,
October 06, 1933.
"Considering that there is no moral or legal
incompatibility between treachery and the
mitigating circumstance No. 3 of article 9 of
the Penal Code, because the former depends
upon the manner of execution of the crime
and the latter upon the tendency of the will
towards a definite purpose,
 Killing a child of tender years.
“…the killing of a child of tender age,
defenseless and unprotected, must
always be classified as murder. Even
though the deceased children had
been awake they could not have
defended themselves or have fled
or escaped from the attack of their
assailants.” (US vs. ANTONIO, G.R.
No. 10562, August 03, 1915)
 Treachery
As long as treachery was present, the killing is
murder even though intent to kill is not
established.*

*Cagoco
 Treachery
The essence of treachery is a deliberate and
sudden attack that renders the victim unable
and unprepared to defend himself by reason
of the suddenness and severity of the attack.
(Pp vs Lopez, GR No. 177302, Apr 16, 2009)
Killing was preceded by a fight.
• There may still be treachery even if,
before the assault, the assailant and
the victim had an altercation and a
fisticuffs and, after the lapse of
some time from the said altercation,
the assailant attacks the
unsuspecting victim without
affording the latter any real chance
to defend himself. (Pp vs. Lacaden,
GR No. 187682, Nov. 25, 2009)
 Several qualifying circumstances.
“The trial court ruled that the crime committed was
murder after finding that the killings were attended
by treachery, evident premeditation, dwelling and
price or reward. Only one aggravating circumstance
is enough to qualify the killing to murder, the rest
constitute generic aggravating circumstances.” (PAÑA
vs. JUDGE BUYSER, G.R. No. 130144, May 24, 2001)
 Taking advantage of superior
strength.
To take advantage of superior strength is to use
force out of proportion to the means available
to the person attacked to defend himself. In
order to be appreciated, it must be clearly
shown that there was deliberate intent on the
part of the malefactors to take advantage
thereof. (Pp vs Regalario, GR No. 174483, Mar
31, 2009)
 Taking advantage of superior
strength.
To appreciate the attendant circumstance of abuse of
superior strength, what should be considered is whether
the aggressors took advantage of their combined
strength in order to consummate the offense. Mere
superiority in number is not enough to constitute
superior strength. There must be clear proof that the
assailants purposely used excessive force out of
proportion to the defense available to the person
attacked. Pp vs Amodia, GR No. 177356, Nov 20, 2008
 Qualifying circumstances must be
proved.
It is an ancient but revered doctrine that
qualifying and aggravating circumstances
before being taken into consideration, for the
purpose of increasing the penalty to be
imposed, must be proved with equal certainty
as those which establish the commission of
the criminal offense. (Pp vs Abdulah, GR No.
182518, Jan 20, 2009)
 Sec. 8 and 9, Rule 110, RROC.
Sec. 8. Designation of the offense – “…specify its
qualifying and aggravating circumstances.
Sec. 9. Cause of the accusation – “…the
qualifying and aggravating circumstances must
be stated in ordinary and concise language…”
Ultimate facts must be alleged.
• “…to merely state in the information that treachery was attendant is
not enough because the usage of such term is not a factual averment
but a conclusion of law…(People v. Solar y Dumbrique, G.R. No.
225595, August 6, 2019)
 Art. 249. Homicide.
The elements of homicide are as follows: 1) a
person was killed; 2) the accused killed him
without any justifying circumstance; 3) the
accused had the intention to kill, which is
presumed; and 4) the killing was not attended
by any of the qualifying circumstances of
murder, or by that of parricide or infanticide.
(Villamor vs Pp, GR No. 182156, Nov. 25,
2009)
 Intent to kill
• Intent to kill - specific intent
which the prosecution must
prove by direct or circumstantial
evidence,
• General criminal intent -
presumed from the commission
of a felony by dolo.
• Intent to kill is conclusively
presumed when the victim dies.
 Establishing intent to kill.
“…the means used by the malefactors, the nature, location
and number of wounds sustained by the victim, the
conduct of the malefactors before, at the time, or
immediately after the killing of the victim, the
circumstances under which the crime was committed
and the motives of the accused.” RIVERA vs. PP, G.R. No.
166326, Jan 25, 2006.
 Inconsistent with negligence.
No such felony as Reckless imprudence resulting
in attempted homicide.
If there is intent(dolo) it follows that there can
be no culpa.
Art. 251. Death caused in a
tumultuous affray.
• Several individuals involved
that do not constitute
organized groups.
• They fight or quarrel in a
confused and tumultuous
manner.
• Someone is killed in the fight
and the one responsible
cannot be ascertained.
 Offender
1. One who inflicted serious physical injuries
on the victim, or
2. One who used violence on the victim.

The victim need not be a participant in the fight.

 Art. 253. Giving assistance to
suicide.
The scenarios are:
1. A person assists another to commit suicide
and the suicide is consummated (prision
mayor);
2. A person assists another to commit suicide
and the suicide is not consummated (arresto
mayor med – max);
 Scenarios con’t.
3. A person assists another to commit suicide by
doing the killing himself and the suicide is
consummated (reclusion temporal);
4. A person assists another to commit suicide by
doing the killing himself and the suicide is not
consummated (one or two degrees lower
than reclusion temporal.)
Art. 254. Discharge of firearms.
Elements:
1. The offender discharges a
firearm against or at
another person;
2. That the offender has not
intention to kill that person.
“… who shall shoot at another with
any firearm...”
It is not necessary that the firearm was pointed at the
victim at the actual time of discharge. It is sufficient
that the firearm was pointed at the victim prior to
the actual discharge.

There must be no intent to kill. The purpose is to

intimidate or frighten the victim.
 Art. 255. Infanticide.
Elements:
1. A child is killed;
2. The child is less than 3 days (72 hours) of age;
3. The offender killed the child.
 Infanticide.
When the mother or grandparents of the victim
commits the crime to conceal the mother’s
dishonor. – Mitigating
If child is born dead or could not sustain
independent life outside the womb,
infanticide is not committed.
 Art. 256. Intentional Abortion.
Abortion is the killing of a fetus in the womb or its
expulsion from the womb causing its death.
2 ways of committing intentional abortion.
1. Using violence upon the pregnant woman;
2. Without using violence (drugs/beverages):
A) With consent of the pregnant woman,
B) Without consent of the pregnant woman.
 Elements of intentional abortion
1. Pregnant woman;
2. Violence is exerted or drugs or beverages are
administered, or offender acts upon such
pregnant woman;
3. The fetus dies as a result;
4. Intentional.
 Art. 257. Unintentional Abortion.
Elements:
1. Pregnant woman;
2. Violence is used without intending an
abortion;
3. The violence is intentional;
4. Fetus dies as a result of the violence.
 Knowledge of pregnancy
Jeffrey – offender need not know that the
woman was pregnant.
Carnaso – accused must have known of the
pregnancy.
 Art. 258. Abortion practiced by the
woman herself or by her parents.
The woman who consents to the abortion is
liable under this article. The penalty is
mitigated if the purpose is to conceal her
dishonor.

The parents of the pregnant woman with her

consent for the purpose of concealing her
dishonor are also liable.
Violence must be the proximate cause.
• There is no evidence on record to prove that the slapping and pushing
of Gemma by Lydia that occurred on July 17, 1981 was the proximate
cause of the abortion. (Gelig v. People, G.R. No. 173150, July 28,
2010)
Art. 259. Abortion practiced by a physician or
midwife and dispensing abortives.
Applicable only in intentional abortion.
Physician or midwife who causes the abortion
and takes advantage of scientific knowledge or
skill is imposed the maximum penalty.
 Art. 262. Mutilation.
Two kinds:
1. Intentionally mutilating another’s organ
(totally or partially) for reproduction.
2. Any other mutilation (lopping off or clipping
off some part of the body.)
 Intent in Mutilation.
Intentionally deprive another of: a) organ of
reproduction, or b) any other part of the body.
“Intentional” – the purpose in cutting or lopping
off must be for a definite or specific purpose
otherwise the crime might be serious physical
injuries.
 Art. 263. Serious Physical Injuries.
Par. 1. The victim becomes insane, an imbecile,
impotent or blind.
Par. 2. The victim:
a) Loses the use of speech, power to hear or smell;
b) Loses an eye, hand, foot, arm, leg or the use of any
such member of the body.
c) Becomes incapacitated for work in which he was
habitually engaged.
 Art. 263. Serious Physical Injuries.
Par. 3. The victim:
a) Becomes deformed. (Physical ugliness,
permanent, conspicuous and visible);
b) Loses any other part or use of the body;
c) If the victim becomes ill or incapacitated for
the performance of the work in which he was
habitually engaged for a period of 90 days.
 Art. 263. Serious Physical Injuries.
Par. 4. If the injuries causes illness or incapacity
for labor for more than 30 days.
Period of medical attendance/Illness or
incapacity for labor that is material.
“Work” include studies.
Qualified (Parricide or Murder) except in the
case of a parent (excessive chastisement)
 Art. 265. Less serious physical
injuries.
The offended party is
incapacitated for labor (any
kind of work) or requires
medical attendance for a
period of 10 days or more but
not more than 30 days.
 Art. 266. Slight Physical Injuries.
The offended party is incapacitated for labor or require
medical attendance for a period of one to nine days.

Also committed:
- Physical injuries do not incapacitate the victim for
labor nor require medical attendance.
- Maltreatment is when the act of the offender does
not cause any injury.
 Art. 266-A. Rape.
Par. 1. Committed by a man having sexual intercourse
with a woman:
- Through force or intimidation;
- Woman is deprived of reason/unconscious;
- By means of fraudulent machination or
grave abuse of authority;
- Offended party is under 12 years old or
demented (statutory rape)
 Art. 266-A. Rape, par. 2 Sexual
Assault. (RA 8353, Oct. 22, 1997)
Committed by any person who:
1. Inserts penis into the mouth or anal orifice;
2. Inserts instrument or object into the genital or anal
orifice of another ( does not include the mouth)
Offender – any person
Offended party – any person
 Gravamen of the offense, rape.
The gravamen of the offense of rape is sexual
intercourse without consent. In the instant
case, accused-appellant obtained carnal
knowledge of private complainant by the use
of force, threat, and intimidation. (Pp vs
Nogpo, GR No. 184791, Apr 16, 2009)
 Carnal knowledge
“Carnal knowledge” = sexual intercourse.
Requires penetration.
 Penetration.
As we have said in unnumbered cases, full or deep
penetration is not necessary to consummate sexual
intercourse; it is enough that there is the slightest
penetration of the male organ into the female sex
organ. The mere touching by the male organ of the
labia of the pudendum of the woman’s private part is
sufficient to consummate rape. (Pp vs Castro, GR No.
172874, Jan 17, 2008)
 Touching/Introduction
• Judicial depiction of consummated rape under Article 266-A has not
been confined to the oft-quoted "touching of the female organ," but
has also progressed into being described as "the introduction of the
male organ into the labia of the pudendum." Thus, there has to be at
least the introduction of the male organ into the labia majora of the
pudendum to be sufficient to consummate rape under Article 266-A,
paragraph 1of the RPC. (Pp vs CCC, GR No. 228822, Jun 19, 2019)
Attempted Rape.
• Attempted rape is committed, therefore, when the "touching" of the
vagina by the penis is coupled with the intent to penetrate. The intent
to penetrate is manifest only through the showing of the penis
capable of consummating the sexual act touching the external
genitalia of the female. Without such showing, only the felony of acts
of lasciviousness is committed. (Cruz y Bartolome v. People, G.R. No.
166441, October 8, 2014)
 Force, threat or intimidation.
Force need not be irresistible.
That degree of force necessary to bring about
the desired result.
 Degree of force.
What is essential here is that the offender
employed sufficient force to enable him to
have sexual intercourse with the victim. Force
should not be equated with lack or absence of
resistance on the part of the victim. “Besides,
physical resistance is not an essential element
of rape.” Pp v Arraz, Oct 24, 2008, GR No.
183696.
 Moral ascendancy.
Moral ascendancy can take the place of force and
intimidation in certain cases like in incestuous rape.

“…the father’s moral ascendancy and influence over

his daughter substitutes for violence and intimidation
in rape cases…” (Pp vs Jimenez, GR #170235, 24 Apr
2009.)
 Deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious.
Deprived of reason:
- insane;
- feebleminded;
Otherwise unconscious:
- asleep;
- administered a drug that deprives her of will
power.
 Statutory rape.
When the victim is under 12 years of age or is
demented, sexual intercourse with her,
regardless of the presence or absence of
consent or the other three circumstances, is
rape.
 Par. 2. Sexual Assault.
Offender – any person.
Offended party – any person.
Took effect Oct. 22, 1997. (Pp. v. Remario Palma,
GR #148869-74, Dec. 11, 2003.)
1) Insert penis into mouth or anal orifice;
2) Insert object into genital or anal orifice;
 Finger.
Under the present law on rape, Article 266-A of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 8353
(or the "The Anti-Rape Law of 1997" which took
effect on October 22, 1997) x x x insertion of one’s
finger into the genital of another constitutes "rape
through sexual assault. (Pp vs. Bon., G.R. No.
149199, Jan 28, 2003)
 Qualified Rape. Art. 266-B
• With the use of a deadly weapon, or by two or
more persons;
• By reason or on the occasion victim becomes
insane;
• By reason or on the occasion homicide is
committed (includes attempted rape)
• 10 aggravating/qualifying circumstances.
 Rape with Homicide.
Rape with Homicide is committed when “by
reason or on the occasion of the rape,
homicide is committed.” The main intention
of the offender must be rape and homicide
was committed by reason of the rape or on
the occasion of the rape.
Rape with Homicide.
• …this Court pronounced that accused could not be convicted of rape
with frustrated homicide as there is no such crime (People v. Ytim y
Pamaylaon, G.R. No. 203045 (Notice), July 22, 2015)
 Sweetheart theory.
“Interposing the “sweetheart theory,” he claims that he
and private complainant were lovers who engaged in
consensual sex at dawn on 9 March 2001. From the
foregoing arguments, the burden of evidence has
shifted to accused-appellant. He should prove with
clear and convincing evidence his affirmative defense
that it was a consensual sexual intercourse. (Nogpo)
 Sweetheart theory is a weak
defense. (Nogpo)
- not credible on the bare testimony of the accused.
- is self-serving.
- deserves scant consideration, considering that such
defense needs strong corroboration,
- A sweetheart cannot be forced to have sex against her
will – love is not a license for lust.
 Time and date of commission.
The date or time the rape was committed is not
an essential ingredient as it is the carnal
knowledge through force and intimidation
that is the gravamen of the offense. It is, thus,
sufficient that the date of commission alleged
is as near as possible to the actual date. (Pp vs
Aboganda, GR No. 183565, Apr 8, 2009)
 Place of commission.
Either way, this Court has observed in numerous cases
that lust does not respect either time or place. The evil
in man has no conscience -- the beast in him bears no
respect for time and place, driving him to commit rape
anywhere, even in places where people congregate
such as in parks, along the roadside, within school
premises, and inside a house where there are other
occupants. (Pp vs Mahinay, GR No. 179190, Jan 20,
2009)
 Physical injuries not an element.
We have ruled in a number of cases that the lack of
lacerated wounds does not negate sexual
intercourse. A freshly broken hymen is not an
essential element of rape. Even the fact that the
hymen of the victim was still intact does not rule out
the possibility of rape. Research in medicine even
points out that negative findings are of no
significance, since the hymen may not be torn
despite repeated coitus. (Pp vs Garcia, GR No.
177740, Apr 5, 2010)
 Guiding principles.
(1) an accusation of rape can be made with facility and while the
accusation is difficult to prove, it is even more difficult for the
accused, though innocent, to disprove; (2) considering that in the
nature of things, only two persons are usually involved in the crime
of rape, the testimony of the complainant should be scrutinized
with great caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must
stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw
strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. As a
result of these guiding principles, credibility becomes the single
most important issue. (Pp vs Pelagio, GR No.172052, Dec. 16, 2008;
Pp vs. Lagarde, GR No. 182549, Jan 20, 2009)
 Lone testimony
• When a woman says that she has been raped, she says in effect all
that is necessary to show that rape has in fact been committed.
• Lone testimony of the victim - sufficient to sustain a verdict of
conviction. Rationale - nature of the offense; only evidence is usually
only the offended party's testimony.
• In the case of mentally-deficient rape victims, mental retardation per
se does not affect credibility. (Pp vs Umanito, GR No. 208648, Apr 13,
2016)
 Rape and RA 7610.
Charging the accused with two different offenses for the same act
committed on the same date against the said victim is erroneous
as it is illegal, except where the law itself so allows. Section 5 (b)
Republic Act 7610, however, does not so allow. The said law in
fact provides that if the child is below 12 years old, the accused
must be prosecuted under Article 335 of the Revised Penal
Code. Conversely, if the child is above 12 years old but below 18
years old, then the accused must be prosecuted under Republic
Act 7610 for the so called “child abuse. (Pp vs Optana, GR No.
133922, Feb 12, 2001.)
 Rules in Optana.
Victim is below twelve (12) years old – accused
should be charged under Art. 335 (Art. 266-A,
Rape) of the Revised Penal Code.
Victim is above 12 but below 18 years old –
accused should be charged under RA 7610
 People v. Tulagan, G.R. No. 227363, March 12,
2019
Crime Committed: Age of Victim: Under 12 years old or demented 12 years old or below 18, or 18 under 18 years old and above
special circumstances
Acts of Lasciviousness committed against Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of Lascivious conduct under Section 5 (b) of Not applicable
children exploited in prostitution or other the RPC in relation to Section 5 (b) of R.A. R.A. No. 7610: reclusion temporal in its
sexual abuse No. 7610: reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua
medium period
Sexual Assault committed against children Sexual Assault under Article 266-A (2) of Lascivious Conduct under Section 5 (b) of Not applicable
exploited in prostitution or other sexual the RPC in relation to Section 5 (b) of R.A. R.A. No. 7610: reclusion temporal in its
abuse No. 7610: reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua
medium period
Sexual Intercourse committed against Rape under Article 266-A (1) of the Sexual Abuse 77 under Section 5 (b) of Not applicable
children exploited in prostitution or other RPC: reclusion perpetua, except when the R.A. No. 7610: reclusion temporal in its
sexual abuse victim is below 7 years old in which case medium period to reclusion perpetua
death penalty shall be imposed 76
Rape by carnal knowledge Rape under Article 266-A (1) in relation to Rape under Article 266-A (1) in relation to Rape under Article 266-A
Art. 266-B of the RPC: reclusion Art. 266-B of the RPC: reclusion perpetua (1) of the RPC: reclusion
perpetua, except when the victim is below perpetua
7 years old in which case death penalty
shall be imposed
Rape by Sexual Assault Sexual Assault under Article 266-A (2) of Lascivious Conduct under Section 5 (b) of Sexual Assault under
the RPC in relation to Section 5 (b) of R.A. R.A. No. 7610: reclusion temporal in its Article 266-A (2) of the
No. 7610: reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua RPC: prision
medium period
 Art. 266-C. Pardon.
A subsequent valid marriage between the
offender and the offended party.
Extinguishes the criminal action or penalty
imposed.
No longer extends to accomplices and
accessories.
Does not extinguish all liability in case of
multiple rape.
 Husbands can now commit Rape.
Marriage must be legal.
Forgiveness by the wife extinguishes criminal
action or penalty imposed. (2nd Par. Art. 266-C)
 Art. 266-D. Presumptions.
Evidence that may be accepted in prosecution of
rape:
1. Any physical overt act manifesting resistance.
2. Situations that render the victim incapable of
giving consent.
Marital Rape.
• Husbands are once again reminded
that marriage is not a license to
forcibly rape their wives. (People v.
Jumawan, G.R. No. 187495, April 21,
2014)
 Pardon
• “…we find the marriage between appellant and
private complainant to have been contracted
validly, legally, and in good faith, as an expression
of their mutual love for each other and their desire
to establish a family of their own. Given public
policy considerations of respect for the sanctity of
marriage and the highest regard for the solidarity
of the family, we must accord appellant the full
benefits of Article 89, in relation to Article 344 and
Article 266-C of the RPC.” (Pp vs De Guzman, GR
No. 185843, Mar 3, 2010)