Garcia Complaint
Garcia Complaint
NICOLE HERRERA §
§
MENDEZ, in her individual capacity and in
her capacity as an heir §
§
of Jesus Benito Garcia, Sr.; and LISA
GARCIA, AMANDA VICTORIA §
GARCIA, JESSICA LISA GARCIA, §
JESUS BENITO GARCIA JR., and § CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:22-CV-198
THOMAS LEE GARCIA, in their §
individual capacities, §
§
Plaintiffs, §
§ JURY TRIAL DEMAND
v. §
§
BRANDIN JOHN MORAN, in §
his individual capacity; §
and THE COUNTY OF BEXAR, TEXAS, §
§
Defendants. §
ORIGINAL COMPLAINT
1. This lawsuit is about a disastrous and unlawful use of deadly force by a Bexar County
Sheriff’s Deputy.
disturbance between Jesus Benito Garcia, Sr. (“Mr. Garcia”) and his wife, Lisa (“Ms. Garcia”).
He was the first officer to arrive at the scene. Mr. Garcia pleaded for his wife not to leave him
and warned that he would harm himself. For several long minutes Sergeant Reyes was alone with
the Garcias in their small trailer using de-escalation techniques. Throughout this approximately
four-minute encounter Sergeant Reyes refrained from using any force at all, much less deadly
force, because other reasonable methods for resolving the domestic disturbance existed.
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3. Bexar County Sheriff’s Deputy Brandin Moran was the second officer to respond. In
sharp contrast with Sergeant Reyes’s de-escalation efforts, Deputy Moran almost immediately
and without any warning fired seven gunshots, five of which hit Mr. Garcia and ultimately killed
him. Approximately ten seconds passed between Deputy Moran’s arrival and his use of deadly
4. For about seventeen minutes Deputy Moran did nothing to help the man he just shot. He
ignored Bexar County Sheriff’s Office policy requiring him to render aid and his own extensive
first aid training while he paced around the inside of the Garcias’ trailer. When EMS arrived they
performed CPR on Mr. Garcia for more than twenty minutes before ultimately pronouncing him
dead.
5. Mr. Garcia was a husband and a father of five. While nothing can bring Mr. Garcia back
to his family, through this civil action his loved ones seek redress from Bexar County and
Deputy Moran for the deprivation of their rights secured under the Constitution and laws of the
United States.
PARTIES
Sr. and resides in Bexar County, Texas. She is suing in her capacity as an heir of Jesus Benito
Garcia, Sr. pursuant to the Texas Survival Statute, Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 71.021,
for injuries resulting from the deprivation of Jesus Benito Garcia, Sr.’s constitutional rights.
Plaintiffs, including NICOLE HERRERA MENDEZ, are the only heirs of Jesus Benito Garcia,
Sr. See Tex. Estates Code Ann. § 201. Mr. Garcia died intestate with minimal assets and no
known statutory basis that would necessitate an administration of his estate. See id. § 306.002.
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All heirs have entered into and duly executed a Family Settlement Agreement. Among other
provisions, the Family Settlement Agreement: (1) provides for the distribution among the heirs
of any current or future assets of the Estate of Jesus Benito Garcia, Sr. (“Estate”); (2) provides
for the payment of any debt of the Estate; and (3) expresses the desire of all heirs for NICOLE
HERRERA MENDEZ to bring claims in this suit under the Texas Survival Statute on behalf of
7. NICOLE HERRERA MENDEZ also brings suit in her individual capacity as a surviving
child of Jesus Benito Garcia, Sr. for injuries related to her mental anguish and the loss of
companionship resulting from the death of her father pursuant to the Texas Wrongful Death Act,
8. Plaintiff LISA GARCIA is the spouse of Jesus Benito Garcia, Sr. and resides in Bexar
County, Texas. She is suing in her individual capacity as the surviving spouse of Jesus Benito
Garcia, Sr. for injuries related to mental anguish and the loss of companionship resulting from
the death of her husband pursuant to the Texas Wrongful Death Act.
9. Plaintiff AMANDA VICTORIA GARCIA is the daughter of Jesus Benito Garcia, Sr. and
resides in Bexar County, Texas. She is suing in her individual capacity as a surviving child of
Jesus Benito Garcia, Sr. for injuries related to mental anguish and the loss of companionship
resulting from the death of her father pursuant to the Texas Wrongful Death Act.
10. Plaintiff JESSICA LISA GARCIA is the daughter of Jesus Benito Garcia, Sr. and resides
in Atascosa County, Texas. She is suing in her individual capacity as a surviving child of Jesus
Benito Garcia, Sr. for injuries related to mental anguish and the loss of companionship resulting
from the death of her father pursuant to the Texas Wrongful Death Act.
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11. Plaintiff JESUS BENITO GARCIA JR. is the son of Jesus Benito Garcia, Sr. and resides
in Marion County, Indiana. He is suing in his individual capacity as a surviving child of Jesus
Benito Garcia, Sr. for injuries related to mental anguish and the loss of companionship resulting
from the death of his father pursuant to the Texas Wrongful Death Act.
12. Plaintiff THOMAS LEE GARCIA is the son of Jesus Benito Garcia, Sr. and resides in
Kleburg County, Texas. He is suing in his individual capacity as a surviving child of Jesus
Benito Garcia, Sr. for injuries related to mental anguish and the loss of companionship resulting
from the death of his father pursuant to the Texas Wrongful Death Act.
13. Defendant BRANDIN JOHN MORAN (“Deputy Moran”) resides in Bexar County,
Texas. At all relevant times, Deputy Moran was employed by the Bexar County Sheriff’s Office
(the “BCSO”) and was acting within the scope of his employment and under color of state law
within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Deputy Moran is sued in his individual capacity.
governmental organization that may be served by serving its County Judge, Nelson W. Wolff,
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(j)(2)(B) and section 17.024(a) of the Texas Civil Practice and
Remedies Code.
15. Plaintiffs bring this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a civil cause of action
against persons who, under color of law, deprive a person of constitutional rights. This Court has
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 (federal question) and 1343(a)(3), (a)(4) (civil rights)
as this action is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the Fourth and Fourteenth
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16. Venue is proper in this district pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2) because a substantial
part of the actions that give rise to the claims took place in Bexar County.
17. The Court has the authority to grant declaratory relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and
2202.
FACTS
18. On Monday, March 9, 2020, Jesus Benito Garcia, Sr., Lisa Garcia, and their son Jesus
19. Around 3:00 PM, a neighbor observed Ms. Garcia and Mr. Garcia having a dispute
20. Several minutes later, Sergeant David Antonio Reyes, with the Elmendorf Police
Department, was the first law enforcement officer to arrive at the Garcia home.
21. Sergeant Reyes knocked on the door and Jesus, Jr. answered. Complying with Reyes’
instructions, Jesus, Jr. exited the home with his dog and kneeled on the ground. Reyes then
22. When Sergeant Reyes entered the home, Mr. and Ms. Garcia were engaged in an
emotional exchange.
23. Mr. Garcia was holding a screwdriver to his own neck and was pleading with his wife not
to leave him. Ms. Garcia was crying. She feared that her husband would harm himself.
24. Sergeant Reyes asked Mr. Garcia to drop his knife. Ms. Garcia responded that Mr. Garcia
25. Mr. Garcia never threatened to attack or harm Ms. Garcia, Sergeant Reyes, or anyone
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26. At no point did Reyes tell dispatch that Mr. Garcia had a gun or that either Ms. Garcia or
27. At no point did Mr. Garcia state that he would attack anyone with the screwdriver or
otherwise verbally threaten to harm anyone other than himself. Nor did Mr. Garcia brandish the
28. Several minutes later, Deputy Moran arrived on scene. He entered the home aggressively
29. At that time, Ms. Garcia was on the floor next to the couch and her husband was kneeling
30. In less than 10 seconds after bursting into the home, Deputy Moran fired seven shots.
Five of Moran’s bullets hit Mr. Garcia, who fell on top of his wife.
31. Deputy Moran never identified himself as an officer or warned Mr. Garcia that he would
32. When Deputy Moran entered the home, Sergeant Reyes began holstering his weapon and
reaching for his taser. Upon information and belief, Reyes intended to continue his attempts to
de-escalate the situation, by switching from a gun to a taser, in preparation for using less deadly
33. The BCSO policy manual regarding the use of force prioritizes the activities its officers
should take when responding to a call: (1) stop violent behavior with the least amount of force
necessary, (2) rescue victims, (3) provide medical assistance to victims and actors, and (4)
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34. Any reasonable officer in Moran’s position would have known that shooting a gun in the
direction of Mr. and Ms. Garcia was clearly excessive, where other measured and proportionate
steps were available to the officers, including but not limited to Sergeant Reyes’ use of a taser.
35. Any reasonable officer in Deputy Moran’s position would have known that firing his
weapon in the direction of Mr. Garcia posed a great risk of harm to Ms. Garcia given her
36. After Moran shot Mr. Garcia, Sergeant Reyes checked Ms. Garcia for injuries and took
her outside.
37. After shooting Mr. Garcia, Deputy Moran stated over the law enforcement scanner, “I got
one.” He then proceeded to walk back and forth inside the home.
38. Upon information and belief, Deputy Moran is trained in tactical first aid, general first
39. Despite his extensive training, and in violation of BCSO policy, Deputy Moran did not
attempt to render any form of life-saving medical assistance to Mr. Garcia. For seventeen
minutes, Deputy Moran did nothing to save the life of the man he shot; he just stood by while
40. At approximately 3:30 PM, emergency medical personnel arrived at the scene and
41. Almost one-half hour later, Mr. Garcia was pronounced deceased and emergency medical
42. According to Mr. Garcia’s certificate of death, an autopsy was performed on the body,
the manner of death was deemed to be a homicide, and the immediate cause of death was stated
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43. Five bullets from Deputy Moran’s firearm hit Mr. Garcia’s body. From this, Plaintiffs
draw a reasonable inference that Deputy Moran at no time intended to merely disable Mr.
44. Following the death of Mr. Garcia, Ms. Garcia was hospitalized for trauma and ongoing
mental distress.
45. Mr. Garcia’s children suffer from the loss of their father and the tragic circumstances of
his death.
46. Sheriff Javier Salazar has been the Sheriff of Bexar County since he took office in
January 2017.
47. As the Sheriff of Bexar County, Sheriff Salazar is the policymaker for Bexar County in
48. At the time that Moran shot and killed Mr. Garcia, BCSO maintained a use-of-force
49. Prior to the killing of Mr. Garcia, Bexar County—through its policymaker, Sheriff
Salazar—was aware that its use-of-force policy needed to be revised. Sheriff Salazar
acknowledged, prior to the incident, that the department’s use-of-force and officer-involved
shooting policies were wordy and confusing, and that, “[w]hen you start getting into ambiguities
1
Emilie Eaton, Bexar County will review its training policies after shooting death of 6-year-old, SAN
ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS (Jan. 7, 2018), available at
https://www.expressnews.com/news/local/article/Bexar-County-will-review-its-training-policies-
12479309.php (last visited March 2, 2022).
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50. Bexar County, its policy makers, and Sheriff Salazar were also aware of the terrible
consequences of failing to revise this policy. Between April 15, 2014, and March 9, 2020, BCSO
deputies had similarly used unlawfully excessive force to kill at least three other people.
51. The first incident involved Gilbert Flores and occurred on August 28, 2015. Although
Flores did not have a firearm, two deputies opened fire on Flores as he stood “motionless in the
surrender pose, his feet still stationary.” Amador v. Bexar Cty., No. 5:15-CV-810-RP, 2017 WL
4562895, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 11, 2017), appeal dismissed sub. nom. Amador v. Vasquez, 961
F.3d 721 (5th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 1513 (Mar. 8, 2021).
52. The second incident occurred on December 21, 2017, and involved Amanda Jones and
Kameron Prescott—“[e]ven though Amanda was unarmed, the deputies discharged their
weapons approximately eighteen times killing Amanda and six-year-old Kameron.” Prescott v.
Bexar Cty., No. SA19CV1392JKPRBF, 2021 WL 812115, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 3, 2021).
53. In both cases, deputies failed to use reasonable non-deadly force or other measured and
ascending de-escalation techniques before resorting to the use of deadly force. Still, as of March
9, 2020, the date that Deputy Moran shot and killed Mr. Garcia, the BCSO use-of-force policy
54. The ambiguities and deficiencies in BCSO’s use-of-force policy include, but are not
limited, to:
force;
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avoid the need for any force and to avoid a deputy putting himself in a
55. BCSO and Sheriff Salazar knew of the inadequacies in the use-of-force policy in advance
of this incident. They also knew that failing to adopt adequate policies had deprived members of
the public of constitutional rights and that additional deprivations were likely. Despite their
knowledge, they responded with deliberate indifference by doing nothing to revise the
inadequate policies.
56. BCSO made significant changes to its use-of-force policy, effective June 26, 2020,
demonstrating both the need for and the feasibility of such changes.
57. For instance, the 2014 policy, in effect at the time Mr. Garcia was killed, states: “In each
instance of the use of force, the officer should exhaust every reasonable means of employing the
minimum amount of force to affect an objective before escalating to the next, more forceful
method. However, an officer is not required to engage in prolonged combat or struggle rather
than resorting to that method which will most quickly and safely bring the situation under
58. In the June 2020 revisions, made after Mr. Garcia’s death, this section of the use-of-force
policy was significantly altered: “When use of force is objectively reasonable and necessary,
Deputies shall exhaust every reasonable means of employing the minimum amount of force to
effect a legitimate law enforcement objective before escalating to the next, more forceful
method.”
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59. As a direct result of BCSO’s vague and inadequate use-of-force policy in effect on March
9, 2020, Deputy Moran failed to utilize any of the reasonable means of employing minimum
force that were available to him. He did not give any verbal commands to Mr. Garcia. He did not
allow Sergeant Reyes to use his taser. He did not attempt to use his own taser. He did not warn
60. Instead, Moran immediately resorted to the use of deadly force, without any regard for
Mr. Garcia’s life. Additionally, in doing so, Moran did not consider or, alternatively, considered
61. Mr. Garcia was not threatening harm to the officers or to Ms. Garcia. Had Moran
employed measured, ascending use of force, the shooting at issue would not have occurred.
62. The Elmendorf Police Department’s use-of-force policy, together with the actions taken
by Sergeant Reyes pursuant to that policy, further demonstrates that Bexar County’s inadequate
use-of-force guidance was the moving force behind Moran’s killing of Mr. Garcia.
63. In pertinent part, the Elmendorf use-of-force policy states: “Police officers, finding it
necessary to use force to achieve a lawful objective, exhaust every reasonable means of
employing the minimum amount of force to effect the objective before escalating to the next,
more forceful method. However, the type and extent of force may vary, it is the policy of this
department that officers use only that amount of objectively reasonable force which appears
necessary under the circumstances to successfully accomplish the legitimate law enforcement
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CAUSES OF ACTION
COUNT ONE:
42 U.S.C. § 1983
BROUGHT BY PLAINTIFFS AGAINST DEFENDANT BRANDIN JOHN MORAN FOR
EXCESSIVE FORCE USED ON JESUS BENITO GARCIA
64. Plaintiffs adopt and incorporate by reference all preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth
herein.
65. Pursuant to the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures safeguarded by the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, Mr. Garcia had the right to be free
66. Deputy Moran’s immediate use of lethal force against Mr. Garcia, without even
reasonably assessing the scene, let alone using measured and ascending non-lethal force, was
objectively unreasonable under the circumstances. At the time he was shot, Mr. Garcia was
threatening self-harm and pleading with his wife not to leave him. He posed no imminent or
significant threat or danger to others and was not actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade
arrest by flight.
67. Mr. Garcia was not engaged in verbal or physical threats against others prior to being
68. Sergeant Reyes’ actions on the scene, giving verbal commands, holstering his firearm,
and preparing to transition to a taser, further demonstrate that Deputy Moran acted unreasonably
69. Deputy Moran was acting under color of state law during the time period relevant to this
claim.
70. Deputy Moran’s use of excessive and lethal force against Mr. Garcia actually and
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71. Deputy Moran’s use of force was intentional, purposeful, and knowing.
72. Deputy Moran acted in reckless disregard for Mr. Garcia’s life, depriving him of his well-
established rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution.
73. Plaintiffs are entitled to recover actual, consequential, and compensatory damages from
Deputy Moran, including but not limited to past and future medical costs and funeral expenses,
past and future pain and suffering, and past and future mental anguish.
74. Deputy Moran acted willfully, deliberately, maliciously, and with reckless disregard for
Mr. Garcia’s rights, entitling Plaintiffs to recover punitive damages from Moran.
75. Deputy Moran is liable to Plaintiffs for their attorneys’ fees and costs necessary to
COUNT TWO:
42 U.S.C. § 1983
BROUGHT BY PLAINTIFFS AGAINST DEFENDANT BRANDIN JOHN MORAN
FOR FAILURE TO PROVIDE MEDICAL CARE TO JESUS BENITO GARCIA
76. Plaintiffs adopt and incorporate by reference all preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth
herein.
77. Under the Fourteenth Amendment, Mr. Garcia had the right to medical attention and the
right not to have his serious medical needs met with deliberate indifference.
78. Instead of providing medical assistance to Mr. Garcia, Deputy Moran radioed into
dispatch, “I got one.” He did nothing other than pace back and forth for approximately seventeen
79. Despite the obvious risk of harm to Mr. Garcia, Deputy Moran did not attempt to stem
the bleeding, did not attempt cardiopulmonary resuscitation, and did not provide any form of
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80. Deputy Moran has extensive training, including tactical first aid, general first aid,
cardiopulmonary resuscitation, and tactical trauma care. Deputy Moran therefore knew that
failing to render aid after he had shot Mr. Garcia five times created an excessive risk of harm to
Mr. Garcia.
81. Still, Deputy Moran disregarded that risk and did nothing for approximately seventeen
minutes before EMS arrived. When they arrived at the home, EMS deemed it necessary to render
medical aid including cardiopulmonary resuscitation. Mr. Garcia was not pronounced deceased
82. The BCSO policy regarding the use of force lists providing medical assistance as the
83. In the seventeen minutes before EMS arrived, Deputy Moran was not engaged in any
other priority activity. He was not stopping violent behavior and was not rescuing victims. Under
BCSO policy, Deputy Moran was required to provide medical assistance to Mr. Garcia.
84. Deputy Moran responded to the situation unreasonably. He disregarded his training,
disregarded BCSO policy, and disregarded Mr. Garcia’s right to medical care. Deputy Moran
had a subjective knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm to Mr. Garcia but responded
85. Deputy Moran’s failure to render aid to Mr. Garcia actually and directly caused Mr.
Garcia’s death. Had Moran acted in accordance with BCSO policy and his training he could have
86. Plaintiffs are entitled to recover actual, consequential, and compensatory damages from
Deputy Moran, including but not limited to past and future medical costs and funeral expenses,
past and future pain and suffering, and past and future mental anguish.
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87. Deputy Moran acted willfully, deliberately, maliciously, and with reckless disregard for
Mr. Garcia’s rights, entitling Plaintiffs to recover punitive damages from Moran.
88. Deputy Moran is liable to Plaintiffs for their attorneys’ fees and costs necessary to
COUNT THREE:
42 U.S.C. § 1983
BROUGHT BY PLAINTIFFS AGAINST BEXAR COUNTY UNDER MONELL
89. Plaintiffs adopt and incorporate by reference each preceding paragraph as if fully set
forth herein.
90. Bexar County—through the decisions of its policymaker Sheriff Salazar—was directly
responsible for the deprivation of Mr. Garcia’s constitutional rights as described in Plaintiffs’
First Cause of Action and is thus subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Monell v. Dep’t of
Social Servs. of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978) (“Monell”).
91. Bexar County adopted and employed a vague and constitutionally inadequate policy
pertaining to the use of force and use of deadly force by its officers, as described above.
92. Despite Sheriff Salazar’s awareness of a pattern of incidents in which BCSO officers
used excessive deadly force and his own admission that the policy was “asking for trouble,”
BCSO maintained in effect and failed to update its inadequate use-of-force policies, with
93. This failure served as a proximate cause and the moving force behind the death of Mr.
94. Plaintiffs are entitled to recover actual, consequential, and compensatory damages from
Bexar County, including but not limited to past and future medical costs and funeral expenses,
past and future pain and suffering, and past and future mental anguish.
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95. Bexar County is liable to Plaintiffs for their attorneys’ fees and costs necessary to enforce
JURY DEMAND
96. Plaintiffs seek a trial by jury of all issues in this case. Fed. R. Civ. P. 38.
RELIEF REQUESTED
97. WHEREFORE, the above premises considered, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the
A. Enter a declaratory judgment that Defendant Moran violated Mr. Garcia’s rights under
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution by using
B. Enter a declaratory judgment that Defendant Moran violated Mr. Garcia’s rights under
the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution by failing to render aid to
him;
unconstitutional policies, which were the moving force behind Mr. Garcia’s injury;
the jury;
by the jury;
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F. Enter a finding that Plaintiffs are the prevailing parties in this case and award
attorneys’ fees, litigation costs and expenses, plus pre-trial and post-trial interest
G. Award Plaintiffs all other relief as this Court deems just and proper.
Respectfully submitted,
Susan L. Watson
TSBN: 24028115
Texas RioGrande Legal Aid, Inc.
311 Plus Park Blvd., Ste. 135
Nashville, TN 37217
Tel. (615) 538-0725
Fax (615) 366-3349
[email protected]
Matthew Garcia
TSBN: 24109906
Texas RioGrande Legal Aid, Inc.
1111 North Main Ave.
San Antonio, TX 78212
Tel. & Fax: (210) 212-3755
[email protected]
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