Republic vs.

Cortez, 769 SCRA 267

G.R. No. 197472
Doctrine:
An inalienable public land cannot be appropriated and thus may not be the proper
object of possession. Hence, injunction cannot be issued in order to protect one's
alleged right of possession over the same.
While Rev. Cortez relies heavily on his asserted right of possession, he,
nevertheless, failed to show that the subject area over which he has a claim is not
part of the public domain and therefore can be the proper object of possession.
Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State.
Hence, " all lands not appearing to be clearly under private ownership are presumed
to belong to the State. Also, public lands remain part of the inalienable land of... the
public domain unless the State is shown to have reclassified or alienated them to
private persons." To prove that a land is alienable, the existence of a positive act of
the government, such as presidential proclamation or an executive order; an
administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a
legislative act or a statute declaring the land as alienable and disposable must be
established.
In this case, there is no such proof showing that the subject portion of Palaui Island
has been declared alienable and disposable when Rev. Cortez started to occupy the
same. Hence, it must be considered as still inalienable public domain.
To prove that a land is alienable, the existence of a positive act of the government,
such as, presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action;
investigative reports of Bureau of Land investigators; and a legislative act or a
statute declaring the land is alienable and disposable must be established.
AMA LAND, INC., VS. WACK-WACK RESIDENTS' ASSOCIATION, INC.,
G.R. No. 202342, July 19, 2017

Doctrine:
The prevailing rule is that, courts should avoid issuing a writ of preliminary injunction
which would in effect dispose of the main case without trial. There would in effect be
a prejudgment of the main case and a reversal of the rule on the burden of proof
since it would assume the proposition which the petitioners are inceptively bound to
prove.
To be entitled to the injunctive writ, the petitioner must show that: (1) there exists a
clear and unmistakable right to be protected; (2) this this right is directly threatened
by the act sought to be enjoined; (3) the invasion of the right is material and
substantial; and (4) there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to
prevent serious and irreparable damage.

The grant or denial of the injunctive relief rests on the sound discretion of the court
taking cognizance of the case, since the assessment and evaluation of evidence
towards the end involves findings of fact left to the conclusive determination by such
court; and the exercise of judicial discretion by such court will not be interfered with,
except upon a finding of grave abuse of discretion.

The RTC erred and/or gravely abused its discretion when it granted AMALI’s
application for preliminary injunction because, in so doing, it prematurely decided
disputed facts and disposed of merits of the case without the benefit of a full-blown
trial wherein testimonial and documentary evidence could be fully and exhaustively
presented, heard and refuted by the parties.

Lastly, the status quo prevailing before the filing of the WWRAI petition before the
CA is not the status quo ante that must be preserved. The object of a writ of
preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo, which is the last peaceable
uncontested status that preceded the pending controversy. Thus, the proper
understanding of the status quo ante should refer to the situation prior to AMALI's
unauthorized use of a portion of Fordham Street as an access road and staging area
of its AMA Tower project.
SPS. CESAR A. LARROBIS, JR. AND VIRGINIA S. LARROBIS vs.
PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK
G. R. NO. 135706, October 1, 2004

Doctrine:
The period within which the bank was pleased under receivership and liquidation is
not a fortuitous event which suspends the running of the 10-year prescriptive period
in bringing actions.
While it is true that foreclosure falls within the broad definition of “doing business”, it
should not be considered included, however, in the acts prohibited whenever banks
are “prohibited from doing business”, during receivership and liquidation
proceedings. Section 29 of Republic Act No. 265, as amended, known as the
Central Bank Act, provides that, “ when a bank is forbidden to do business in the
Philippines and placed under receivership, the person designated as receiver shall
immediately take charge of the bank’s assets and liabilities, as expeditiously as
possible, collect and gather all the assets and administer the same for the benefit of
its creditors, and represent the bank personally or through counsel as he may retain
in all actions or proceedings for against the institution, exercising all the powers
necessary for these purposes including but not limited to bringing and foreclosing
mortgages in the name of the bank.
This is consistent with the purpose of receivership proceedings, i.e., to receive
collectibles and preserve the assets of the bank in substitution of its former
management, and prevent the dissipation of its assets to the detriment of the
creditors of the bank.
MILA CABOVERDE-TANTANO vs. DOMINALDA ESPINA-CABOVERDE
G. R. NO. 203585, July 29, 2013

Doctrine:
Before appointing a receiver, courts should consider: (1) whether or not the injury
resulting from such appointment would probably be greater than the injury ensuing if
the status quo is left undisturbed; and (2) whether or not the appointment will imperil
the interest of others, whose rights deserve as much a consideration from the court
as those of the person requesting for receivership.
The court has held that a receiver should not be appointed to deprive a party who is
in possession of the property in litigation, just as a writ of preliminary injunction
should not be issued to transfer property in litigation from the possession of one
party to another where…the legal title is in dispute and the party having possession
asserts ownership in himself, except in a very clear case of evident usurpation.
Furthermore, the court has declared that the appointment of a receiver is not proper
when the rights of the parties, one of whom is in possession of the property, depend
on the determination of their respective claims to the title of such property…unless
such property is in danger of being materially injured or lost, as by the prospective
foreclosure of a mortgage on it or its portions are being occupied by third persons
claiming adverse title.
ANA MARIA A. KORUGA vs TEODORO O. ARCENAS, et al
G. R. NO. 168332, June 19, 2009
Doctrine:

The acts complained of pertain to the conduct of Banco Filipino's banking business.

The law vests in the BSP the supervision over operations and activities of banks.
Specifically, the BSP's supervisory and regulatory powers include: conduct of
examination to determine compliance with laws and regulations if the circumstances
so warrant as determined by the Monetary Board; Overseeing to ascertain that laws
and Regulations are complied with; regular investigation which shall not be oftener
than once a year from the last date of examination to determine whether an
institution is conducting its business on a safe or sound basis inquiring into the
solvency and liquidity of the institution.

Koruga's invocation of the provisions of the Corporation Code is misplaced. In an

earlier case with similar antecedents, we ruled that:

The Corporation Code, however, is a general law applying to all types of

corporations, while the New Central Bank Act regulates specifically banks and other
financial institutions, including the dissolution and liquidation thereof. As between a
general and special... law, the latter shall prevail - generalia specialibus non
derogant.

Consequently, it is not the Interim Rules of Procedure on Intra-Corporate

Controversies, or Rule 59 of the Rules of Civil Procedure on Receivership, that
would apply to this case. Instead, Sections 29 and 30 of the New Central Bank Act
should be... followed

Section 30.
the Monetary Board may summarily and without need for prior... hearing forbid the
institution from doing business in the Philippines and designate the Philippine
Deposit Insurance Corporation as receiver of the banking institution. Actions of the
Monetary Board taken under this section or under Section 29 of this Act shall be final
and executory, and may not be restrained or set aside by the court except on petition
for certiorari on the ground that the action taken was in excess of... jurisdiction or
with such grave abuse of discretion as to amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

The appointment of a receiver under this section shall be vested exclusively with the
Monetary Board.

On the strength of these provisions, it is the Monetary Board that exercises exclusive
jurisdiction over proceedings for receivership of banks.
From the foregoing disquisition, there is no doubt that the RTC has no jurisdiction to
hear and decide a suit that seeks to place Banco Filipino under receivership.
the court's jurisdiction could only have been invoked after the Monetary Board had
taken action on the matter and only on the ground that the action taken was in
excess of jurisdiction or with such grave abuse of discretion as to amount to lack or
excess of... jurisdiction.

EVELINA G. CHAVEZ and AIDA CHAVEZ-DELES vs

CA & ATTY. FIDELA Y. VARGAS
G. R. NO. 174356, January 20, 2010

Doctrine:

A petition for receivership under Section 1(b), Rule 59 of the Rules of Court required
that the property or fund subject of the action is in danger of being lost, removed, or
materially injured, necessitating its protection or preservation. Its object is the
prevention of imminent danger to the property.

The filing of administrative, civil and criminal cases, all of which with prayer for
appointment of receiver does not constitute forum shopping.

The cases here are similar only in that they involved the same parties and the private
respondent sought the placing of the properties under receivership in all of them. But
receivership is not an action. It is but an auxiliary remedy, a mere incident of the suit
to help achieve its purpose.

Consequently, it cannot be said that the grant of receivership in one case will amount
to res judicata on the merits of the other cases. The grant or denial of this
provisional remedy will still depend on the need for it in the particular action.
JOSE S. OROSA and MARTHA P. OROSA vs CA and FCP CREDIT CORP.
G. R. NO. 111080, April 5, 2000

Doctrine:

Section 9, Rule 60. After trial of the issues, the court shall determine who has the
right of possession to and the value of the property and shall render judgment in the
alternative for the delivery thereof to the party entitled to the same, or for its value in
case delivery cannot be made, and also for such damages as either party may
prove, with costs.

Nature: Complaint for replevin and damages

The dismissal of the main case wherein the replevin was availed of does not results
to the return of the property taken by the Sheriff and the payment of the full amount
of the bond posted by the applicant.

The court agrees with the Court of Appeals that the trial court erred when it ordered
private respondent to return the subject car or its equivalent considering that
petitioner had not yet fully paid the purchase price. Verily, to sustain the trial court’s
decision would amount to unjust enrichment. The Court of Appeals was
correct when it instead ordered private respondent to return, not the car itself,
but only the amount equivalent to the fourteen (14) installments actually paid
with interest. (In short, the court cannot order the payment of the balance and the
return of the car itself at the same time. The judgment should be in the alternative.)
SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC. vs. REGINA M. ASTORGA
G. R. NO. 148132, January 28, 2008

Doctrine:

An employer’s demand for payment of the market value of the car or, in the
alternative, the surrender of the car is not a labor, but a civil dispute. A dispute
which involves the relationship of debtor and creditor rather than an employee-
employer relationship falls within the jurisdiction of the regular courts.

Replevin is an action whereby the owner or person entitled to repossession of goods

or chattel may recover those goods or chattels from one who has wrongfully
distrained or taken, or who wrongfully detains such goods or chattels. It is designed
to permit one having right to possession to recover property in specie from one who
has wrongfully taken or detained the property. The term may refer either to the
action itself, for the recovery of personalty, or to the provisional remedy traditionally
associated with it, by which possession of the property may be obtained by the
plaintiff and retained during the pendency of the action.

Based on the case of Basaya Jr. vs. Militante, the court upheld the jurisdiction of the
RTC over the replevin suit, as follows:

The labor dispute involved is not intertwined with the issue in the Replevin case.
The respective issues raised in each forum can be resolved independently on the
other. In fact in November 18, 1986, the NLRC in the case before it had issued an
Injunctive Writ enjoining the petitioners from blocking the free ingress and egress to
the vessel and ordering the petitioners to disembark and vacate. That aspect of the
controversy is properly settled under the Labor Code. So also with petitioner’s right
to picket. But the determination of the question of who has the better right to take
possession of the vessel and whether petitioners can deprive the Charterer, as the
legal possessor the vessel, of that right to possess is addressed to competence of
the Civil Courts.
KENNETH HAO vs. ABE ANDRES 555 SCRA
A.M. NO. P-07-2384, June 18, 2018

Doctrine:

Section 6 of Rule 60 of the Rules of Court provides that: if within five (5) days after
the taking of the property by the Sheriff, the adverse party does not object to the
sufficiency of the bond, or if the surety or sureties thereon, or if the adverse party so
objects and the court affirms the approval of the applicant’s bond, or if the adverse
party requires the return of the property but his bond is objected to and found
insufficient and he does not forthwith file an approved bond, the property shall be
delivered to the applicant. If for any reason the property is not delivered to the
applicant, the Sheriff must return it to the adverse party.

In accordance with said rules, the respondent should have waited no less than five
(5) days in order to give the complainant an opportunity to object to the sufficiency of
the bond or if the surety or sureties thereon, or require the return of the seized motor
vehicles by filing a counter-bond. This, he failed to do.