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Constitutional Law Review 2021 Part I V 23 by Atty. Alexis Medina
Constitutional Law Review 2021 Part I V 23 by Atty. Alexis Medina
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
PART I.
NATIONAL TERRITORY
1 This collection of summaries, excerpts or capsules of selected recent jurisprudence is a work in progress, subject to continuing
revision and updating. Reproduction for purely academic purposes with due attribution to the author is permitted.
2 AB Political Science, University of the Philippines (UP), Diliman; Order of the Purple Feather (OPF), UP, College of Law; Valedictorian,
San Sebastian College-Recoletos, Manila, College of Law; Teaches Constitutional Law at San Sebastian College-Recoletos, Manila,
College of Law, and Polytechnic University of the Philippines (PUP), Manila, College of Law; Taught Constitutional Law at New Era
University, College of Law; Litigation Lawyer; Partner and Head of Public Private Partnership (PPP) Group, LIBRA LAW,
https://libralaw.com.ph/
On the other hand, baselines laws such as RA 9522 are enacted by UNCLOS III States
parties to mark-out specific basepoints along their coasts from which baselines are drawn, either
straight or contoured, to serve as geographic starting points to measure the breadth of the
maritime zones and continental shelf.
Thus, baselines laws are nothing but statutory mechanisms for UNCLOS III States parties
to delimit with precision the extent of their maritime zones and continental shelves. (Magallona
v. Ermita, G.R No. 187167, August 16, 2011)
Why the act of the government in allowing the holding of Catholic masses at
the basement of a hall of justice does not violate the principle of separation of Church
and State. -- The State recognizes the inherent right of the people to freely exercise their religion.
Our Constitution recognizes the religiosity of our people. The Roman Catholics express their
worship through the holy mass and to stop these would be tantamount to repressing the right to
the free exercise of their religion. Allowing religion to flourish is not contrary to the principle of
separation of Church and State. (In re: Holding of Religious Rituals at the Hall of Justice
Building in Quezon City, A.M. No. 10-4-19-SC, March 7, 2017)
The Family
The RH Law cannot be allowed to infringe upon this mutual decision-making. By giving
absolute authority to the spouse who would undergo a procedure, and barring the other spouse
from participating in the decision would drive a wedge between the husband and wife, possibly
result in bitter animosity, and endanger the marriage and the family, all for the sake of reducing
the population.
The right to chart their own destiny together falls within the protected zone of marital
privacy and such state intervention would encroach into the zones of spousal privacy guaranteed
by the Constitution. At any rate, in case of conflict between the couple, the courts will decide.
(Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014)
Why parental consent for a minor to access planning services is required: The
State cannot replace her natural mother and father when it comes to providing her
needs and comfort. To say that their consent is no longer relevant is clearly anti-
family. It does not promote unity in the family. It is an affront to the constitutional
mandate to protect and strengthen the family as an inviolable social institution. More
alarmingly, it disregards and disobeys the constitutional mandate that "the natural
and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth. -- Equally deplorable
is the debarment of parental consent in cases where the minor, who will be undergoing a
procedure, is already a parent or has had a miscarriage. Under Section 7 of the RH law, when a
minor is already a parent or has had a miscarriage, the parents are excluded from the decision-
making process of the minor with regard to family planning. Even if she is not yet emancipated,
the parental authority is already cut off just because there is a need to tame population growth.
It is precisely in such situations when a minor parent needs the comfort, care, advice, and
guidance of her own parents. The State cannot replace her natural mother and father when it
comes to providing her needs and comfort. To say that their consent is no longer relevant is clearly
anti-family. It does not promote unity in the family. It is an affront to the constitutional mandate
to protect and strengthen the family as an inviolable social institution.
More alarmingly, it disregards and disobeys the constitutional mandate that "the natural
and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the
development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government." To insist on a rule
that interferes with the right of parents to exercise parental control over their minor-child or the
right of the spouses to mutually decide on matters which very well affect the very purpose of
marriage, that is, the establishment of conjugal and family life, would result in the violation of
one's privacy with respect to his family. It would be dismissive of the unique and strongly-held
Filipino tradition of maintaining close family ties and violative of the recognition that the State
affords couples entering into the special contract of marriage to as one unit in forming the
foundation of the family and society. (Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014)
The State cannot, without a compelling state interest, take over the role of
parents in the care and custody of a minor child, whether or not the latter is already
a parent or has had a miscarriage. Only a compelling state interest can justify a state
substitution of their parental authority. As in the case of the conscientious objector,
an exception must be made in life-threatening cases that require the performance of
emergency procedures. In such cases, the life of the minor who has already suffered
a miscarriage and that of the spouse should not be put at grave risk simply for lack of
consent. -- The State cannot, without a compelling state interest, take over the role of parents in
the care and custody of a minor child, whether or not the latter is already a parent or has had a
miscarriage. Only a compelling state interest can justify a state substitution of their parental
authority.
Second Exception: Life Threatening Cases: As in the case of the conscientious objector, an
exception must be made in life-threatening cases that require the performance of emergency
procedures. In such cases, the life of the minor who has already suffered a miscarriage and that of
the spouse should not be put at grave risk simply for lack of consent. It should be emphasized that
no person should be denied the appropriate medical care urgently needed to preserve the
primordial right, that is, the right to life.
In this connection, the second sentence of Section 23(a)(2)(ii)249 should be struck down.
By effectively limiting the requirement of parental consent to "only in elective surgical
procedures," it denies the parents their right of parental authority in cases where what is involved
are "non-surgical procedures." Save for the two exceptions discussed above, and in the case of an
abused child as provided in the first sentence of Section 23(a)(2)(ii), the parents should not be
deprived of their constitutional right of parental authority. To deny them of this right would be an
affront to the constitutional mandate to protect and strengthen the family. (Imbong v. Ochoa,
G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014)
The intent of the Framers of the 1987 Constitution in protecting the life of the
unborn from conception was to prevent the Legislature from legalizing abortion. The
Reproductive Health Law (RH Law) is in line with this intent as the law mandates that
protection be afforded from the moment of fertilization. The RHL Law embodies the
policy to protect to the fertilized ovum. -- The clear and unequivocal intent of the Framers
of the 1987 Constitution in protecting the life of the unborn from conception was to prevent the
Legislature from enacting a measure legalizing abortion. The Reproductive Health (RH) Law is in
line with this intent and actually proscribes abortion. While the Court has opted not to make any
determination, at this stage, when life begins, it finds that the RH Law itself clearly mandates that
protection be afforded from the moment of fertilization. The RH Law is replete with provisions
that embody the policy of the law to protect to the fertilized ovum and that it should be afforded
safe travel to the uterus for implantation. Moreover, the RH Law recognizes that abortion is a
crime under Article 256 of the Revised Penal Code, which penalizes the destruction or expulsion
of the fertilized ovum. The RH Law mandates that protection must be afforded from the moment
of fertilization. By using the word" or," the RH Law prohibits not only drugs or devices that
prevent implantation, but also those that induce abortion and those that induce the destruction
of a fetus inside the mother's womb. (Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014)
The RH Law does not legalize abortion as it recognizes that -- one, there is a
need to protect the fertilized ovum which already has life; and two, the fertilized
ovum must be protected the moment it becomes existent - all the way until it reaches
and implants in the mother's womb. Any drug or device that prevents the fertilized
ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb is an abortifacient. -- The RH
Law, consistent with the Constitution, recognizes that the fertilized ovum already has life and that
the State has a bounden duty to protect it. The conclusion becomes clear because the RH Law,
first, prohibits any drug or device that induces abortion (first kind), which, refers to that which
induces the killing or the destruction of the fertilized ovum, and, second, prohibits any drug or
device the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb (third kind). By
expressly declaring that any drug or device that prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be
implanted in the mother's womb is an abortifacient (third kind), the RH Law recognizes that: one,
there is a need to protect the fertilized ovum which already has life, and two, the fertilized ovum
must be protected the moment it becomes existent - all the way until it reaches and implants in
the mother's womb. Inasmuch as it affords protection to the fertilized ovum, the RH Law does
not sanction abortion. To repeat, it is the Court's position that life begins at fertilization, not at
implantation. When a fertilized ovum is implanted in the uterine wall, its viability is sustained but
that instance of implantation is not the point of beginning of life. It started earlier. And as defined
by the RH Law, any drug or device that induces abortion, that is, which kills or destroys the
fertilized ovum or prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb,
is an abortifacient. (Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014)
The role of the State in rearing the youth. -- Parents have the natural and primary
right and duty in rearing the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character.
However, when actions concerning the child have a relation to the public welfare or the well-being
of the child, the State may act to promote these legitimate interests. State authority is therefore,
not exclusive of, but rather, complementary to parental supervision. As parens patriae, the State
has the inherent right and duty to aid parents in the moral development of their children. The
Curfew Ordinances are but examples of legal restrictions designed to aid parents in their role of
promoting their children's well-being. (Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan v. Quezon
City, G.R. No. 225442, August 8, 2017)
The Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases allow a "citizen suit," and
permit any Filipino citizen to file an action before our courts for violations of our
environmental laws. -- The Court passed the landmark Rules of Procedure for Environmental
Cases, which allow for a "citizen suit," and permit any Filipino citizen to file an action before our
courts for violations of our environmental laws: “SEC. 5. Citizen suit. - Any Filipino citizen in
representation of others, including minors or generations yet unborn, may file an action to enforce
rights or obligations under environmental laws. Upon the filing of a citizen suit, the court shall
issue an order which shall contain a brief description of the cause of action and the reliefs prayed
for, requiring all interested parties to manifest their interest to intervene in the case within fifteen
(15) days from notice thereof. The plaintiff may publish the order once in a newspaper of a general
circulation in the Philippines or furnish all affected barangays copies of said order.” (Resident
Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape of Tanon Straight v. Reyes, G.R. No. 180771, April
21, 2015)
The Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases allow any Filipino citizen, as a
steward of nature, to bring a citizen’s suit to enforce our environmental laws. -- To
further encourage the protection of the environment, the Rules enable litigants enforcing
environmental rights to file their cases as citizen suits. This provision liberalizes standing for all
cases filed enforcing environmental laws and collapses the traditional rule on personal and direct
interest, on the principle that humans are stewards of nature. Moreover, even before the Rules of
Procedure for Environmental Cases became effective, this Court had already taken a permissive
position on the issue of locus standi in environmental cases. In Oposa, we allowed the suit to be
brought in the name of generations yet unborn "based on the concept of intergenerational
responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned." Furthermore,
we said that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology, a right that does not even need to be
stated in our Constitution as it is assumed to exist from the inception of humankind, carries with
it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. In light of the foregoing, the
need to give the Resident Marine Mammals legal standing has been eliminated by our Rules,
which allow any Filipino citizen, as a steward of nature, to bring a suit to enforce our
environmental laws. It is worth noting here that the Stewards are joined as real parties in the
Petition and not just in representation of the named cetacean species. The Stewards, Ramos and
Eisma-Osorio, having shown in their petition that there may be possible violations of laws
concerning the habitat of the Resident Marine Mammals, are therefore declared to possess the
legal standing to file this petition. (Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape of
Tanon Straight v. Reyes, G.R. No. 180771, April 21, 2015)
The Voting Control Test and the Beneficial Ownership Test must be applied to
determine whether a corporation is a "Philippine national." -- Mere legal title is
insufficient to meet the 60 percent Filipino-owned "capital" required in the Constitution. Full
beneficial ownership of 60 percent of the outstanding capital stock, coupled with 60 percent of
the voting rights, is required. The legal and beneficial ownership of 60 percent of the outstanding
capital stock must rest in the hands of Filipino nationals in accordance with the constitutional
mandate. Otherwise, the corporation is "considered as non-Philippine national[s]."
Both the Voting Control Test and the Beneficial Ownership Test must be applied to
determine whether a corporation is a "Philippine national." (Gamboa v. Teves, G.R. No. 176579,
October 9, 2012)
For effective control of a public utility, at least 60 percent of the capital of the
corporation must belong to Filipino citizens: “Capital” refers to shares with voting
rights and full beneficial ownership. -- “The Constitution expressly declares as State policy
the development of an economy "effectively controlled" by Filipinos. Consistent with such State
policy, the Constitution explicitly reserves the ownership and operation of public utilities to
Philippine nationals, who are defined as Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least
60 percent of whose capital with voting rights belongs to Filipinos. The term "capital" in Section
11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution refers to shares with voting rights, as well as with full
beneficial ownership. (Gamboa v. Teves, G.R. No. 176579, October 9, 2012)
The right to vote in the election of directors, coupled with full beneficial
ownership of stocks, translates to effective control of a corporation. -- The intent of
the framers of the Constitution is to place in the hands of Filipino citizens the control and
management of public utilities. The right to vote in the election of directors, coupled with full
beneficial ownership of stocks, translates to effective control of a corporation. The legal and
beneficial ownership of 60 percent of the outstanding capital stock must rest in the hands of
Filipinos in accordance with the constitutional mandate. Full beneficial ownership of 60 percent
of the outstanding capital stock, coupled with 60 percent of the voting rights, is constitutionally
required for the State’s grant of authority to operate a public utility. (Gamboa v. Teves, G.R. No.
176579, October 9, 2012)
Voting Control Test: The term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the
Constitution refers only to shares of stock that can vote in the election of directors. -
- Considering that common shares have voting rights which translate to control, as opposed to
preferred shares which usually have no voting rights, the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII
of the Constitution refers only to common shares. However, if the preferred shares also have the
right to vote in the election of directors, then the term "capital" shall include such preferred shares
because the right to participate in the control or management of the corporation is exercised
through the right to vote in the election of directors. In short, the term "capital" in Section 11,
Article XII of the Constitution refers only to shares of stock that can vote in the election of
directors.
This interpretation is consistent with the intent of the framers of the Constitution to place
in the hands of Filipino citizens the control and management of public utilities. (Gamboa v. Teves,
G.R. No. 176579, June 28, 2011)
The President only has general supervision, not control, over an LGU. --
Consistent with the state policy of local autonomy as guaranteed by the 1987 Constitution, the
grant and release of the hospitalization and health care insurance benefits given to local
government officials and employees, through an ordinance passed by petitioner’s Sangguniang
Panlalawigan – is valid – even without approval of the President. An LGU is only under the
President’s general supervision, not control. (Province of Negros Occidental v. Commissioners,
Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 182574, September 28, 2010)
CITIZENSHIP
Those who take the Oath of Allegiance under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225
reacquire natural-born citizenship. -- It is incorrect to intimate that complying with Republic
Act No. 9225 (who take the Oath of Allegiance to reacquire Philippine citizenship) shows that the
person is a naturalized, rather than a natural-born, Filipino citizen. It is wrong to postulate that
compliance with Republic Act No. 9225 signifies the performance of acts to perfect citizenship.
Those who take the Oath of Allegiance under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225 reacquire
natural-born citizenship. "Re"-acquiring can only mean a reversion to "the way things were."
Republic Act No. 9225, therefore, does not operate to make new citizens whose citizenship
commences only from the moment of compliance with its requirements. Repatriation involves the
The oath of allegiance and the sworn and personal renunciation of foreign
citizenship are separate requirements. -- A candidate for public office cannot claim that he
has renounced his foreign citizenship by taking the Oath of Allegiance under RA 9225. The oath
of allegiance and the sworn and personal renunciation of foreign citizenship are separate
requirements, the latter being an additional requirement for qualification to run for public office.
(Chua v. Comelec, G.R. No. 216607, April 5, 2016)
The mere act of running for public offices does not suffice to serve as an
effective renunciation of foreign citizenship. -- The petitioner’s act of running for public
office does not suffice to serve as an effective renunciation of her Australian citizenship. While the
Supreme Court has previously declared that the filing by a person with dual citizenship of a
certificate of candidacy is already considered a renunciation of foreign citizenship, such ruling
was already adjudged superseded by the enactment of R.A. No. 9225 on August 29, 2003 which
provides for the additional condition of a personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship.
(Sobejana-Condon v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 198742, August 10, 2012)
Reacquisition of Philippine citizenship under RA 9225 for those who have lost
the same by naturalization before the effectivity of RA 9225 -- has no retroactive
effect. -- A former natural-born Filipino citizen re-acquires his Philippine citizenship upon
taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic. (David v. Agbay, G.R. No. 199113, March 18, 2015)
Domestic laws on adoption also support the principle that foundlings are
Filipinos. -- Domestic laws on adoption also support the principle that foundlings are Filipinos.
These laws do not provide that adoption confers citizenship upon the adoptee. Rather, the adoptee
must be a Filipino in the first place to be adopted. (Poe-Llamanzares v. Comelec, G.R. No. 221697,
March 8, 2016)
The Constitution sustains a presumption that all foundlings found in the Philippines are
born to at least either a Filipino father or a Filipino mother and are thus natural-born, unless there
is substantial proof otherwise. Consistent with Article IV, Section 1(2), any such countervailing
proof must show that both—not just one—of a foundling's biological parents are not Filipino
citizens. (David v. Senate Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 221538, September 20, 2016)
The Constitution guarantees equal protection of the laws and equal access to opportunities
for public service. The equal protection clause serves as a guarantee that "persons under like
circumstances and falling within the same class are treated alike, in terms of 'privileges conferred
and liabilities enforced.' It is a guarantee against 'undue favor and individual or class privilege, as
well as hostile discrimination or oppression of inequality.'"
SUFFRAGE
Biometrics validation is not a qualification to vote but merely regulates the
exercise of the right to vote. It is a procedural, not a substantive requirement. --
Registration regulates the exercise of the right of suffrage. It is not a qualification for such right.
Biometrics validation as part of the registration process is not a "qualification" to the exercise of
the right of suffrage, but a mere aspect of the registration procedure, of which the State has the
right to reasonably regulate. Registration is a mere procedural requirement which does not fall
under the limitation that "no literacy, property, or other substantive requirement shall be imposed
on the exercise of suffrage." (Kabataan Party List v. Comelec, G.R. No. 221318, December 16,
2015)
JUDICIAL REVIEW
In case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-
self-executing. Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should
be considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to determine
when, or whether, they shall be effective. (Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014)
Requisites for Judicial Review: The power of judicial review, like all powers granted
by the Constitution, is subject to certain limitations. Petitioner must comply with all the requisites
for judicial review before this court may take cognizance of the case. The requisites are:
(1)there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power;
(2) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the
subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the
case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement;
(3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and
(In the Matter of: Save the Supreme Court Judicial Independence, UDK-15143, January
21, 2015; Belgica v. Honorable Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013;
Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, G.R. No. 192935, December 7, 2010, 637 SCRA
78, 148; Funa v. Executive Secretary, 11 February 2010, G.R. No. 184740)
Actual case - A conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial resolution, ripe for
determination, and not conjectural. -- There must be an existing case or controversy that is
appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court
would amount to an advisory opinion. An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal
rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution. The pleadings must
show an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right, on the one hand, and a denial thereof on the
other; that is, it must concern a real and not a merely theoretical question or issue. (In The Matter
Of: Save The Supreme Court Judicial Independence and Fiscal Autonomy Movements, UDK-
15143, January 21, 2015)
Actual case requirement - The case must be ripe for adjudication, such as when
the law is already being implemented. -- The case must be ripe for adjudication, which
means the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it.
The petition challenging the constitutionality of the curfew ordinances is ripe for adjudication,
considering that these ordinances were being implemented. (Samahan Ng Mga Progresibong
Kabataan v. Quezon City, G.R. No. 225442, August 8, 2017,)
For an actual case or controversy to exist, the case must be ripe for
adjudication. -- Closely linked to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the
requirement of ripeness. A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has
had a direct adverse effect on the individual or entity challenging it. For a case to be considered
ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that an act had then been accomplished or performed by
either branch of government before a court may interfere, and the petitioner must allege the
existence of an immediate or threatened injury to himself as a result of the challenged action.
(Philconsa v. Philippine Government, G.R. No. 218406, November 29, 2016)
A case that has become moot and academic does not present an actual case. -
- As a rule, courts decline jurisdiction over such case, or dismiss it on ground of mootness.
(Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Atienza, G.R. No. 175241, February 24, 2010)
Moot case: Nothing for the court to resolve. -- An action is considered "moot" when
it no longer presents a justiciable controversy because the issues involved have become academic
or dead or when the matter in dispute has already been resolved and hence, one is not entitled to
judicial intervention unless the issue is likely to be raised again between the parties. There is
nothing for the court to resolve as the determination thereof has been overtaken by subsequent
events. (International Service for The Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications v. Greenpeace
Southeast Asia, G.R. No. 209271, July 26, 2016)
Exceptions to the moot and academic principle. -- A case is moot and academic if it
ceases to present a justiciable controversy because of supervening events so that a declaration
thereon would be of no practical use or value. There are recognized exceptions to this rule. This
court has taken cognizance of moot and academic cases when: (1) there was a grave violation of
the Constitution; (2) the case involved a situation of exceptional character and was of paramount
public interest; (3) the issues raised required the formulation of controlling principles to guide
the Bench, the Bar and the public; and (4) the case was capable of repetition yet evading review.
(Timbol v. Comelec, G.R. No. 206004, February 24, 2015)
The Court will decide cases, otherwise moot, if: first, there is a grave violation of the
Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest
are involved; third, when the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling
principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition
yet evading review. (Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Department of Justice, G.R. No. 232413,
July 25, 2017)
The petition questioning the validity a hold departure order of the DOJ that has
already been lifted. -- The petitioners impute the respondents of violating their constitutional
right to travel through the enforcement of DOJ Circular No. 41. They claim that the issuance
unnecessarily places a restraint on the right to travel even in the absence of the grounds provided
in the Constitution. There is also no question that the instant petitions involved a matter of public
interest as the petitioners are not alone in this predicament and there can be several more in the
future who may be similarly situated. It is not farfetched that a similar challenge to the
constitutionality of DOJ Circular No. 41 will recur considering the thousands of names listed in
the watch list of the DOJ, who may brave to question the supposed illegality of the issuance. Thus,
it is in the interest of the public, as well as for the education of the members of the bench and the
bar, that the Supreme Court must resolve the question on the constitutionality of DOJ Circular
No. 41. (Genuino v. De Lima, G.R. No. 197930, April 17, 2018)
“On its face" invalidation of statutes constitutes a departure from the case and
controversy requirement of the Constitution and permits decisions to be made
without concrete factual settings and in sterile abstract contexts. - A facial challenge is
“On its face" invalidation of statutes results in striking them down entirely on the ground
that they might be applied to parties not before the Court whose activities are constitutionally
protected. It constitutes a departure from the case and controversy requirement of the
Constitution and permits decisions to be made without concrete factual settings and in sterile
abstract contexts. Distinguished from an as-applied challenge which considers only extant facts
affecting real litigants, a facial invalidation is an examination of the entire law, pinpointing its
flaws and defects, not only on the basis of its actual operation to the parties, but also on the
assumption or prediction that its very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain
from constitutionally protected speech or activities. The allowance of a facial challenge in free
speech cases is justified by the aim to avert the "chilling effect" on protected speech, the exercise
of which should not at all times be abridged. (Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network v.
Anti-Terrorism Council, G.R. No. 178552, October 5, 2010)
The Court will exercise its power of judicial review only if the case is brought
before it by a party who has the legal standing to raise the constitutional or legal
question. -- The Court will exercise its power of judicial review only if the case is brought before
it by a party who has the legal standing to raise the constitutional or legal question. "Legal
standing" means a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained
or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged; while
"interest" refers to material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree or act
assailed, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental
interest. The interest of the plaintiff must be personal and not one based on a desire to vindicate
the constitutional right of some third and unrelated party. (Aguinaldo v. Aquino, , G.R. No.
224302, February 21, 2017)
"Interest" refers to material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree
or act assailed, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental
interest. The interest of the plaintiff must be personal and not one based on a desire to vindicate
the constitutional right of some third and unrelated party. (Aguinaldo v. Aquino, , G.R. No.
224302, February 21, 2017)
Legal standing as a tax payer: The case must involve illegal disbursement of
public funds or the exercise of the spending or taxing power of Congress. -- A taxpayer's
suit is allowed only when the petitioner has demonstrated the direct correlation of the act
complained of and the disbursement of public funds in contravention of law or the Constitution,
or has shown that the case involves the exercise of the spending or taxing power of Congress. (Roy
v. Herbosa, G.R. No. 207246, November 22, 2016)
Locus standi: Mere membership in the Bar is not sufficient. -- The requisite is not
met by the expedient invocation of one's citizenship or membership in the bar who has an interest
in ensuring that laws and orders of the Philippine government. The general and equivocal
allegations of petitioners on their legal standing do not justify the relaxation of the locus standi
rule. (Roy v. Herbosa, G.R. No. 207246, November 22, 2016)
The Court has already uniformly ruled that absence of direct injury on the part of the party
seeking judicial review may be excused when the latter is able to craft an issue of transcendental
importance. In Lim v. Executive Secretary, this Court held that in cases of transcendental
importance, the cases must be settled promptly and definitely, and so, the standing requirements
may be relaxed. (Aquino v. Comelec, G.R. No. 189793, April 7, 2010)
The Court has adopted a liberal attitude on the locus standi of a petitioner where the
petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people, as when the issues
raised are of paramount importance to the public. (Initiatives for Dialogue and Empowerment
[IDEAL] v. Power Sector Liabilities and Management Corporation [PSALM], G.R. No. 192088,
October 9, 2012)
The rule on standing is a matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed when the public
interest so requires, such as when the matter is of transcendental importance, of overreaching
significance to society, or of paramount public interest. (Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, April
8, 2014; Espina v. Zamora, G.R. No. 143855, September 21, 2010)
In a facial challenge, the party need not claim that a statute is unconstitutional
as applied to him. -- In overbreadth analysis, challenges to a statute are permitted to raise the
rights of third parties; and the court invalidates the entire statute "on its face," not merely "as
applied for." A particular litigant need not claim that a statute is unconstitutional as applied to
him or her. This is to remove the "chilling" or deterrent effect of the overbroad statute on third
parties. (Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network v. Anti-Terrorism Council, G.R. No.
178552, October 5, 2010)
Political Questions
Court may not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of a law. It may do so
where an attendant unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion results. (Imbong v. Ochoa,
G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014)
Whether or not the House observed its own internal rules of procedure, such
as in the election of its Minority Leader, is a political question. -- Under the Constitution,
the House has sole control over method and manner of choosing its officers other than the
Speaker. The method of choosing its officers must be prescribed by the House, not the courts.
Moreover, the House has sole authority to determine the rules of its proceedings. Mere matters of
procedure of the House are of no concern to the courts. The Supreme Court has no authority to
interfere and intrude into that exclusive realm. Thus, the Supreme Court cannot pry into the
internal workings of the House. Thus, the petition for mandamus, insisting that Rep. Baguilat
should be recognized as the Minority Leader in light of: (a) the "long-standing tradition" in the
House where the candidate who garnered the second (2nd)-highest number of votes for
Speakership automatically becomes the Minority Leader; and (b) the irregularities attending Rep.
Suarez's election to said Minority Leader position -- must be dismissed. (Baguilat v. Alvarez, G.R.
No. 227757, July 25, 2017)
The legality of the pork barrel system. -- The validity of the Pork Barrel System is
not a political question because it is not an issue dependent upon the wisdom of the political
branches of government but rather a legal one which the Constitution itself has commanded the
Court to act upon. (Belgica v. Executive Secretary Ochoa, G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013)
The sufficiency of the factual basis for the declaration of martial law. -- The
third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII (Executive Department) of the 1987 Constitution which
provides: The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within
thirty days from its filing. Section 18, Article VII reveals that it specifically grants authority to the
Court to determine the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The factual basis of the declaration of
martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is not a political
question but precisely within the ambit of judicial review. (Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R. No.
231658 July 4, 2017)
Under the doctrine of operative fact, in the interest of fair play, the actions
previous to the declaration of unconstitutionality are legally recognized, because the
existence of a law or executive act prior to its invalidation is an operative fact. -- As a
general rule, an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it
affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not been passed at all. This
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rule, however, is not absolute. Under the doctrine of operative facts, actions previous to the
declaration of unconstitutionality are legally recognized. They are not nullified. This is essential
in the interest of fair play. The doctrine of operative fact nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional
law by recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a determination of unconstitutionality
is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot always be ignored. (Chavez v.
Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 202242, July 17, 2012)
The legislative body and the voters, not the courts, would serve as the
disciplinary authority to correct abuses committed in the name of parliamentary
immunity, if the questionable remarks were made in the performance of legislative
functions. Statements falling outside the privilege and giving rise to civil injury or
criminal responsibility will not foreclose judicial review. -- Petitioner argues that the RTC
had no jurisdiction over the case, and asserts that the authority to discipline a member of Congress
lies in the assembly or the voters and not the courts. The questioned statements in this case,
however, were admittedly made in response to queries from the media during gaps in the Senate's
plenary and committee hearings, thus, beyond the purview of privileged speech or debate under
Section 11, Article VI of the Constitution.
Clearly, the Court's pronouncement that the legislative body and the voters, not the courts,
would serve as the disciplinary authority to correct abuses committed in the name of
parliamentary immunity, was premised on the questionable remarks being made in the
performance of legislative functions, on the legislative floor or committee rooms where the
privilege of speech or debate may be invoked. Necessarily, therefore, statements falling outside
the privilege and giving rise to civil injury or criminal responsibility will not foreclose judicial
review.
Why the Supreme Court cannot rule on the issue of who is the validly elected
Minority Leader of the House: The House has the prerogative on the method and
manner of choosing officers other than the Speaker. The House has the sole authority
to "determine the rules of its proceedings." The Supreme Court has no authority to
interfere and intrude into this exclusive realm. -- Under Section 16 (1), Article VI of the
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1987 Constitution, the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall be elected by a majority vote
of its entire membership. Said provision also states that the House of Representatives may decide
to have officers other than the Speaker, and that the method and manner as to how these officers
are chosen is something within its sole control. The method of choosing who will be such other
officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the constitutional
provision. Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the House of Representatives itself, not
by the Court.
Corollary thereto, Section 16 (3), Article VI of the Constitution vests in the House of
Representatives the sole authority to, inter alia, "determine the rules of its proceedings." These
"legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, do not have the imprints of permanence and
obligatoriness during their effectivity. In fact, they 'are subject to revocation, modification or
waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them.' Being merely matters of procedure, their
observance are of no concern to the courts, for said rules may be waived or disregarded by the
legislative body at will, upon the concurrence of a majority of the House of Representatives.
" Hence, as a general rule, the Court has no authority to interfere and unilaterally intrude into
that exclusive realm, without running afoul of Constitutional principles that it is bound to protect
and uphold. Constitutional respect and a becoming regard for the sovereign acts of a coequal
branch prevents the Court from prying into the internal workings of the [House of
Representatives. (Baguilat v. Alvarez, G.R. No. 227757, July 25, 2017)
Legislation
The "one title-one subject" rule does not require the Congress to employ in the
title a precise index or catalogue of all the contents of the bill. The rule is sufficiently
complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as to include the general object
which the statute seeks to effect. -- The petitioners also question the constitutionality of the
RH Law, claiming that it violates Section 26(1 ), Article VI of the Constitution, prescribing the one
subject-one title rule. According to them, being one for reproductive health with responsible
parenthood, the assailed legislation violates the constitutional standards of due process by
concealing its true intent - to act as a population control measure.
The RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule. The "one title-one subject" rule
does not require the Congress to employ in the title of the enactment language of such precision
as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. The rule is
sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as to include the general object
which the statute seeks to effect, and where, as here, the persons interested are informed of the
nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. In this case, a textual
analysis of the various provisions of the law shows that both "reproductive health" and
"responsible parenthood" are interrelated and germane to the overriding objective to control the
population growth. (Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014)
First, there is the Congressional Pork Barrel which is herein defined as a kind of lump-
sum, discretionary fund wherein legislators, either individually or collectively organized into
committees, are able to effectively control certain aspects of the fund’s utilization through various
post-enactment measures and/or practices. In particular, petitioners consider the PDAF, as it
appears under the 2013 GAA, as Congressional Pork Barrel since it is, inter alia, a post-enactment
measure that allows individual legislators to wield a collective power; and Second, there is the
Presidential Pork Barrel which is herein defined as a kind of lump-sum, discretionary fund which
allows the President to determine the manner of its utilization. (Belgica v. Executive Secretary,
G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013)
The defining feature of all forms of Congressional Pork Barrel would be the authority of
legislators to participate in the post-enactment phases of project implementation. At its core,
legislators – may it be through project lists, prior consultations or program menus – have been
accorded post-enactment authority to identify the projects they desire to be funded through
various Congressional Pork Barrel allocations. Aside from the area of project identification,
legislators have also been accorded post-enactment authority in the areas of fund release and
realignment. Clearly, these post-enactment measures which govern the areas of project
identification, fund release and fund realignment are not related to functions of congressional
oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or assume duties that properly belong to
the sphere of budget execution. The fundamental rule [is] – from the moment the law becomes
effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in
the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of powers and
is thus unconstitutional. (Belgica v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013)
The PDAF/”Pork Barrel System” undermines the system of checks and balance
by impairing the President’s item veto power. For the President to exercise his item-
veto power, there must be a proper "item" which may be the object of the veto.
Because PDAF is a lump-sum appropriation, the actual items of PDAF appropriation
would not have been written into the General Appropriations Bill and thus effectuated
without veto consideration. The legislator‘s identification of the projects after the
passage of the GAA denies the President the chance to veto that item later on. -- A
prime example of a constitutional check and balance would be the President’s power to veto an
item written into an appropriation, revenue or tariff bill submitted to him by Congress for
approval through a process known as "bill presentment." The President‘s item-veto power is
found in Section 27(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. For the President to exercise his item-
veto power, it necessarily follows that there exists a proper "item" which may be the object of the
veto. An item, as defined in the field of appropriations, pertains to "the particulars, the details,
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the distinct and severable parts of the appropriation or of the bill." An item of an appropriation
bill obviously means an item which, in itself, is a specific appropriation of money, not some
general provision of law which happens to be put into an appropriation bill.
An appropriation bill, to ensure that the President may be able to exercise his power of
item veto, must contain "specific appropriations of money" and not only "general provisions"
which provide for parameters of appropriation. An item of appropriation must be an item
characterized by singular correspondence – meaning an allocation of a specified singular amount
for a specified singular purpose, otherwise known as a "line-item.
In these cases, petitioners claim that "in the current x x x system where the PDAF is a
lump-sum appropriation, the legislator‘s identification of the projects after the passage of the GAA
denies the President the chance to veto that item later on." The Court agrees with petitioners.
Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of P24.79 Billion only appears as a collective
allocation limit since the said amount would be further divided among individual legislators who
would then receive personal lump-sum allocations and could, after the GAA is passed, effectively
appropriate PDAF funds based on their own discretion. As these intermediate appropriations are
made by legislators only after the GAA is passed and hence, outside of the law, it necessarily means
that the actual items of PDAF appropriation would not have been written into the General
Appropriations Bill and thus effectuated without veto consideration. (Belgica v. Executive
Secretary Ochoa, G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013)
The Court agrees with petitioners that certain features embedded in some forms of
Congressional Pork Barrel, among others the 2013 PDAF Article, has an effect on congressional
oversight. The fact that individual legislators are given post-enactment roles in the
implementation of the budget makes it difficult for them to become disinterested "observers"
when scrutinizing, investigating or monitoring the implementation of the appropriation law. To a
certain extent, the conduct of oversight would be tainted as said legislators, who are vested with
post-enactment authority, would, in effect, be checking on activities in which they themselves
participate. Also, it must be pointed out that this very same concept of post-enactment
authorization runs afoul of Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that no
Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall not intervene in any matter before any
office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to act on
account of his office.
With PDAF, a Congressman can simply bypass the local development council and initiate
projects on his own, and even take sole credit for its execution. Indeed, this type of personality-
driven project identification has not only contributed little to the overall development of the
district, but has even contributed to "further weakening infrastructure planning and coordination
efforts of the government."
Thus, insofar as individual legislators are authorized to intervene in purely local matters
and thereby subvert genuine local autonomy, the 2013 PDAF Article as well as all other similar
There are two (2) fundamental tests to ensure that the legislative guidelines for delegated
rule-making are indeed adequate. The first test is called the "completeness test." Case law states
that a law is complete when it sets forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or
implemented by the delegate. On the other hand, the second test is called the "sufficient standard
test." A law lays down a sufficient standard when it provides adequate guidelines or limitations in
the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate‘s authority and prevent the delegation from
running riot. To be sufficient, the standard must specify the limits of the delegate‘s authority,
announce the legislative policy, and identify the conditions under which it is to be implemented.
The Court agrees with petitioners that the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be
hereafter directed by the President" under Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of
legislative power insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient standard to adequately determine the
limits of the President‘s authority with respect to the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds
may be used. As it reads, the said phrase gives the President wide latitude to use the Malampaya
Funds for any other purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows him to unilaterally appropriate
public funds beyond the purview of the law. Thus, while Section 8 of PD 910 may have passed the
completeness test since the policy of energy development is clearly deducible from its text, the
phrase "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" under the
same provision of law should nonetheless be stricken down as unconstitutional as it lies
independently unfettered by any sufficient standard of the delegating law. (Belgica v. Executive
Secretary Ochoa, G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013)
An indefinite and unspecified period of detention will amount to excessive restriction and
will certainly violate any person's right to liberty. As discussed in Lopez, Congress' power of
contempt rests solely upon the right of self-preservation and does not extend to the infliction of
punishment as such. It is a means to an end and not the end itself. Even arguendo that detention
under the legislative's inherent power of contempt is not entirely punitive in character because it
may be used by Congress only to secure information from a recalcitrant witness or to remove an
obstruction, it is still a restriction to the liberty of the said witness. It is when the restrictions
during detention are arbitrary and purposeless that courts will infer intent to punish. Courts will
also infer intent to punish even if the restriction seems to be related rationally to the alternative
purpose if the restriction appears excessive in relation to that purpose. An indefinite and
unspecified period of detention will amount to excessive restriction and will certainly violate any
person's right to liberty. (Balag v. Senate of the Philippines, G.R. No. 234608, July 3, 2018)
Further, the Court rules that the legislative inquiry of the Senate terminates on two
instances: First, upon the approval or disapproval of the Committee Report. The Senate
Committee is required to issue a Committee Report after the conduct of the legislative inquiry.
The importance of the Committee Report is highlighted in the Senate Rules because it mandates
that the committee begin the consideration of its Report within fifteen (15) days from the
conclusion of the inquiry. Evidently, the Committee Report is the culmination of the legislative
To carry out this important duty, the President is equipped with authority over the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP), which is the protector of the people and the state. In addition,
the Executive is constitutionally empowered to maintain peace and order; protect life, liberty, and
property; and promote the general welfare. The President also carries the mandate of being the
sole organ in the conduct of foreign relations. Clearly, the power to defend the State and to act as
its representative in the international sphere inheres in the person of the President. (Saguisag v.
Ochoa, G.R. No. 212426, January 12, 2016)
Only the President can exercise the powers of the Commander-in-Chief, which
must be exercised by him in person. -- Executive power is granted only to the President. It
is only the President, as Executive, who is authorized to exercise emergency powers as provided
under Section 23, Article VI, of the Constitution, as well as the calling-out powers under Section
7, Article VII thereof. There are certain acts which, by their very nature, may only be performed
by the president as the Head of the State. One of these acts or prerogatives is the bundle of
Commander-in-Chief powers. These powers must be exercised by him in person. Thus, the
provincial governor does not possess the same calling-out powers as the President. The calling-
out powers contemplated under the Constitution is exclusive to the President. (Kulayan v. Tan,
G.R. No. 187298, July 03, 2012)
The power of the Supreme Court – to determine the sufficiency of the factual
basis of the proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus. -- The Constitution specifically grants authority to the Supreme Court to
determine the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The factual basis of the declaration of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is not a political question but precisely
within the ambit of judicial review. Moreover, the Constitution also relaxed the rule on standing
by allowing any citizen to question before this Court the sufficiency of the factual basis of such
proclamation or suspension. (Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017)
Scope of judicial review is limited to the sufficiency of the factual basis, not
correctness of the President’s decision. The Court does not need to satisfy itself that
the President's decision is correct, rather it only needs to determine whether the
President's decision had sufficient factual basis. -- The phrase "sufficiency of factual basis"
in Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution should be understood as the only test for judicial
review of the President's power to declare martial law and suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution. The Court does not need to
satisfy itself that the President's decision is correct, rather it only needs to determine whether the
President's decision had sufficient factual basis. (Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R. No. 231658, July 4,
2017)
What the Supreme Court must determine -- only sufficiency, not accuracy, of
the factual basis. -- The purpose of judicial review is not the determination of accuracy or
veracity of the facts upon which the President anchored his declaration of martial law or
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; rather, only the sufficiency of the factual
basis as to convince the President that there is probable cause that rebellion exists. The allegation
in the Lagman Petition that the facts stated in Proclamation No. 216 and the Report are false,
inaccurate, simulated, and/or hyperbolic, does not persuade. The Supreme Court is not concerned
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about absolute correctness, accuracy, or precision of the facts because to do so would unduly tie
the hands of the President in responding to an urgent situation. (Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R. No.
231658, July 4, 2017)
The public safety requirement: Rebellion alone does not justify the declaration
of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; the public
safety requirement must likewise be present. -- The overriding and paramount concern of
martial law is the protection of the security of the nation and the good and safety of the public.
Rebellion alone does not justify the declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus; the public safety requirement must likewise be present. (Lagman v.
Medialdea, G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017)
Parameters for determining the sufficiency of the factual basis for the
declaration of martial law: 1) actual invasion or rebellion; 2) public safety requires
the exercise of such power; and 3) there is probable cause for the President to believe
that there is actual rebellion or invasion. -- Section 18, Article VII itself sets the parameters
for determining the sufficiency of the factual basis for the declaration of martial law and/or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, "namely (1) actual invasion or rebellion,
and (2) public safety requires the exercise of such power." Without the concurrence of the two
conditions, the President's declaration of martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus must be struck down. In determining the existence of rebellion, the
President only needs to convince himself that there is probable cause or evidence showing that
more likely than not a rebellion was committed or is being committed. To require him to satisfy a
higher standard of proof would restrict the exercise of his emergency powers. Probable cause is
the most reasonable, most practical and most expedient standard by which the President can fully
ascertain the existence or non-existence of rebellion necessary for a declaration of martial law or
suspension of the writ. This is because unlike other standards of proof, which, in order to be met,
would require much from the President and therefore unduly restrain his exercise of emergency
powers, the requirement of probable cause is much simpler. To summarize, the parameters for
determining the sufficiency of factual basis are as follows: l) actual rebellion or invasion; 2) public
safety requires it; the first two requirements must concur; and 3) there is probable cause for the
President to believe that there is actual rebellion or invasion. (Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R. No.
231658, July 4, 2017)
Territorial coverage: The President's duty to maintain peace and public safety
is not limited only to the place where there is actual rebellion. It extends to other
areas where the present hostilities are in danger of spilling over. The discretion to
determine the territorial scope of martial law lies with the President. -- The 1987
Constitution grants to the President, as Commander-in-Chief, the discretion to determine the
territorial coverage or application of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus. He may put the entire Philippines or only a part thereof under martial law. The
discretion to determine the territorial scope of martial law lies with the President. The
Constitution grants him the prerogative whether to put the entire Philippines or any part thereof
under martial law. There is no constitutional edict that martial law should be confined only in the
particular place where the armed public uprising actually transpired. Moreover, the President's
duty to maintain peace and public safety is not limited only to the place where there is actual
rebellion; it extends to other areas where the present hostilities are in danger of spilling over.
Clearly, the power to determine the scope of territorial application belongs to the President.
(Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017)
Diplomatic Power
The President is the sole organ in the conduct of foreign relations. -- The
President is the sole organ in the conduct of foreign relations. The presidential role in foreign
affairs is dominant and the President is traditionally accorded a wider degree of discretion in the
conduct of foreign affairs. (Saguisag v. Executive Secretary Ochoa, G.R. No. 212426, January 12,
2016)
A treaty is required for initial entry of foreign military bases, troops and
facilities. -- The constitutional restriction on foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in the
Philippines refers solely to the initial entry of the foreign military bases, troops, or facilities. Once
entry is authorized, the subsequent acts are thereafter subject only to the limitations provided by
the rest of the Constitution and Philippine law, and not to the Section 25 requirement of validity
through a treaty. (Saguisag v. Executive Secretary Ochoa, G.R. No. 212426, January 12, 2016)
When executive agreements on foreign military bases, troops and facilities are
valid.-- The President may enter into an executive agreement on foreign military bases, troops,
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or facilities, if (a) it is not the instrument that allows the presence of foreign military bases, troops,
or facilities; or (b) it merely aims to implement an existing law or treaty. The EDCA can be in the
form of an executive agreement, since it merely involves "adjustments in detail" in the
implementation of the Mutual Defense Treaty and the Visiting Forces Agreement. (Saguisag v.
Executive Secretary Ochoa, G.R. No. 212426, January 12, 2016)
As the sole organ of our foreign relations, the President may generally enter into executive
agreements subject to limitations defined by the Constitution and may be in furtherance of a
treaty already concurred in by the Senate. (Saguisag v. Executive Secretary Ochoa, G.R. No.
212426, January 12, 2016)
b. The fixing of tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and
other duties or imposts, which must be pursuant to the authority granted by Congress
c. The grant of any tax exemption, which must be pursuant to a law concurred in by a
majority of all the Members of Congress
d. The contracting or guaranteeing, on behalf of the Philippines, of foreign loans that must
be previously concurred in by the Monetary Board
e. The authorization of the presence of foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in the
country must be in the form of a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate.
f. For agreements that do not fall under paragraph 5, the concurrence of the Senate is
required, should the form chosen be a treaty. (Saguisag v. Executive Secretary Ochoa, G.R. No.
212426, January 12, 2016)
The Court does not look into whether an international agreement should be in
the form of a treaty or an executive agreement; it is the President’s prerogative.-- The
Court does not look into whether an international agreement should be in the form of a treaty or
an executive agreement, save in cases in which the Constitution or a statute requires otherwise.
In view of the vast constitutional powers and prerogatives of the President in foreign affairs, the
task of the Court is to determine whether the international agreement is consistent with the
applicable limitations. (Saguisag v. Executive Secretary Ochoa, G.R. No. 212426, January 12,
2016)
1. Section 25, Article XVIII of the Constitution, contains stringent requirements that must
be fulfilled by the international agreement allowing the presence of foreign military bases, troops,
or facilities in the Philippines: (a) the agreement must be in the form of a treaty, and (b) it must
be duly concurred in by the Senate.
2. If the agreement is not covered by the above situation, then the President may choose
the form of the agreement (i.e., either an executive agreement or a treaty), provided that the
agreement dealing with foreign military bases, troops, or facilities is not the principal agreement
that first allows their entry or presence in the Philippines.
3. The executive agreement must not go beyond the parameters, limitations, and
standards set by the law and/or treaty that the former purports to implement; and must not
unduly expand the international obligation expressly mentioned or necessarily implied in the law
or treaty.
4. The executive agreement must be consistent with the Constitution, as well as with
existing laws and treaties. (Saguisag v. Executive Secretary Ochoa, G.R. No. 212426, January 12,
2016)
Invalid authority. --The GAAs of 2011 and 2012 authorized the transfers "to augment
any item in this Act", and the effect was that the 2011 and 2012 GAAs allowed the transfer of funds
to augment any item in the GAAs, even if the item belonged to an office outside the Executive, in
contravention of the Constitution. (Araullo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014)
Funds transferred were not necessarily savings. -- The transfer of funds under DAP
is invalid because DAP funds were not necessarily “savings.” Savings are realized only when the
purpose for which the funds had been allocated were already satisfied, or the need for such funds
had ceased to exist. Funds described as “unreleased or unallotted” are not necessarily savings.
(Araullo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014)
The power to augment cannot be used to fund non-existent provisions in the GAA.
(Araullo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 209287, February 3, 2015)
Cross-border transfers are prohibited. -- The transfer of funds under DAP is invalid
because some of the transfers of appropriation were not made to their respective offices. Cross-
border transfers, whether as augmentation, or as aid, are prohibited. (Araullo v. Aquino, G.R. No.
209287, July 1, 2014)
Power of Appointment
Elements for a valid appointment: (1) authority to appoint and evidence of the
exercise of the authority; (2) transmittal of the appointment paper and evidence of
the transmittal; (3) a vacant position at the time of appointment; and (4) receipt of
the appointment paper and acceptance of the appointment. There is no valid
appointment if the process lacks even one step. -- The following elements should always
concur in the making of a valid (which should be understood as both complete and effective)
appointment: (1) authority to appoint and evidence of the exercise of the authority; (2) transmittal
of the appointment paper and evidence of the transmittal; (3) a vacant position at the time of
appointment; and (4) receipt of the appointment paper and acceptance of the appointment by the
appointee who possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications. The concurrence
of all these elements should always apply, regardless of when the appointment is made, whether
outside, just before, or during the appointment ban. There is no valid appointment if the process
lacks even one step. (Velicaria-Garafil v. Office of the President, G.R. No. 203372, June 16, 2015)
It is not enough that the President signs the appointment paper; there should
be evidence that the President intended the appointment paper to be issued. -- It is
not enough that the President signs the appointment paper. There should be evidence that the
President intended the appointment paper to be issued. It could happen that an appointment
paper may be dated and signed by the President months before the appointment ban, but never
left his locked drawer for the entirety of his term. Release of the appointment paper through the
MRO is an unequivocal act that signifies the President's intent of its issuance. The inclusion of
acceptance by the appointee as an integral part of the entire appointment process prevents the
abuse of the Presidential power to appoint. Petitioners have failed to show compliance with all
four elements of a valid appointment. They cannot prove with certainty that their appointment
papers were transmitted before the appointment ban took effect. On the other hand, petitioners
admit that they took their oaths of office during the appointment ban. (Velicaria-Garafil v. Office
of the President, G.R. No. 203372, June 16, 2015)
Clustering of nominees to the judiciary by the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC)
restricts the President’s power to choose. -- The power to recommend of the JBC cannot
be used to restrict or limit the President's power to appoint as the latter's prerogative to choose
someone whom he/she considers worth appointing to the vacancy in the Judiciary is still
paramount. As long as the President appoints someone nominated by the JBC, the appointment
is valid. (Aguinaldo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 224302, February 21, 2017)
Pardoning Power
The President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be
sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the
Constitution or law. -- President Duterte must be dropped as respondent in this case. The
Court's pronouncement in David v. President Macapagal-Arroyo on the non-suability of an
incumbent President cannot be any clearer: Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his
tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is
no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of the high office of
the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court litigations while serving as such.
Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from any form of harassment, hindrance or
distraction to enable him to fully attend to the performance of his official duties and functions.
Unlike the legislative and judicial branch, only one constitutes the executive branch and anything
which impairs his usefulness in the discharge of the many great and important duties imposed
upon him by the Constitution necessarily impairs the operation of the Government. (Zabal v.
Duterte, G.R. No. 238467, February 12, 2019)
Purpose of Presidential immunity: It will degrade the dignity of the high office of
the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court litigations while serving
as such. Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from any form of harassment,
hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully attend to the performance of his official
duties and functions. -- The president is the head of the executive branch, a co-equal of the
judiciary under the Constitution. His or her prerogative is entitled to respect from other branches of
government. Inter-branch courtesy is but a consequence of the doctrine of separation of powers. As
such, the president cannot be charged with any suit, civil or criminal in nature, during his or her
incumbency in office. This is in line with the doctrine of the president's immunity from suit.
In David, this Court explained why it is improper to implead the incumbent President of the
Philippines. The doctrine has both policy and practical considerations: Settled is the doctrine that the
President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal
case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of the
high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court litigations while serving
as such. Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from any form of harassment, hindrance or
distraction to enable him to fully attend to the performance of his official duties and functions. Unlike
the legislative and judicial branch, only one constitutes the executive branch and anything which
impairs his usefulness in the discharge of the many great and important duties imposed upon him by
the Constitution necessarily impairs the operation of the Government. However, this does not mean
that the President is not accountable to anyone. Like any other official, he remains accountable to the
people but he may be removed from office only in the mode provided by law and that is by
impeachment. (Kilusang Mayo Uno v. Aquino, G.R. No. 210500, April 2, 2019)
Even if the acts complained of were not done as part of the official duties and
functions of the President, presidential immunity attaches during the entire tenure of
the President. The immunity applies whether or not the acts subject matter of the suit
are part of his duties and functions as President. -- Sen. De Lima maintains that
presidential immunity does not lie because President Duterte's attacks against her are not part of
his official duties and functions; that before presidential immunity applies, there must first be a
balancing of interest; and that the balancing favors her because her right to be protected from
harassment far outweighs the dangers of intrusion on the Office of Chief Executive. Sen. De Lima
wants us to apply principles established by the US Supreme Court in the celebrated cases
of Nixon and Clinton, supra. Such decisions, though persuasive, are not binding as case law for
us. As earlier asserted, the Philippine concept of Presidential immunity from suit diverged from
its foreign roots, from the time of the amendment of the 1973 Constitution. Presidential immunity
in this jurisdiction attaches during the entire tenure of the President. The immunity makes no
distinction with regard to the subject matter of the suit; it applies whether or not the acts subject
matter of the suit are part of his duties and functions as President. Furthermore, no balancing of
interest has ever been applied to Presidential immunity under our jurisprudence. (De Lima v.
Duterte, G.R. No. 227635, October 15, 2019)
Even if the proceedings for the writ of habeas data do not involve the
determination of administrative, civil, or criminal liabilities, the Presidential immunity
applies because the immunity does not hinge on the nature of the suit. The rationale
for the of immunity from suit -- it is important that he be freed from any form of
harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully attend to the performance
of his official duties and functions. -- Sen. De Lima argues that the rationale for Presidential
immunity does not apply in her case because the proceedings for the writ of habeas data do not
involve the determination of administrative, civil, or criminal liabilities. Again, we remind that
immunity does not hinge on the nature of the suit. In short, presidential immunity is not intended
to immunize the President from liability or accountability. The rationale for the grant to the
President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the exercise of Presidential duties and
functions free from any hindrance of distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of the
Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office-holder's time, also demands
undivided attention.
The rationale has been expanded in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo: It will degrade the
dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court
litigations while serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from any form of
harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully attend to the performance of his
official duties and functions. (De Lima v. Duterte, G.R. No. 227635, October 15, 2019)
THE JUDICIARY
Rule-Making Power
The Supreme Court’s rule making power is not shared with Congress or the
Executive. -- The 1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or
supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure. The power to promulgate rules of
pleading, practice and procedure is no longer shared by the Supreme Court with Congress, more
so with the Executive. (Baguio Market Vendors Multi-Purpose Cooperative v. Cabato-Cortes,
G.R. No. 165922, February 26, 2010)
Congress cannot grant exemptions from payment of legal fees as it will infringe
on the rule-making power of the Supreme Court and impair the judiciary’s fiscal
autonomy. -- First, payment of legal fees is part of the rule-making power of the Supreme Court,
which is no longer shared with Congress. Second, any grant by Congress of exemptions from
payment of legal fees will impair the Judiciary’s fiscal autonomy and erode its independence. (Re:
in the Matter of Clarification of Exemption from Payment of all Court and Sheriff's Fees of
Cooperative etc., A.M. No. 12-2-03-0, March 13, 2012)
The Supreme Court’s rule-making power does not confer on it primary and
direct jurisdiction over legal education. The supervision and regulation of legal
education is an Executive function. -- Petitioners in G.R. No. 242954 maintain that the
Court exercises authority over the legal profession which includes the admission to the practice
of law, to the continuing requirements for and discipline of lawyers. According to them, the rule-
making power of the Court is plenary in all cases regarding the admission to and supervision of
the practice of law. They argue that the Court's power to admit members to the practice of law
extends to admission to legal education because the latter is a preparatory process to the
application for admission to the legal profession. Contrary to petitioner's claims, the Court has no
primary and direct jurisdiction over legal education. Neither the history of the Philippine legal
education nor the Rules of Court invoked by petitioners support their argument. The supervision
and regulation of legal education is an Executive function. Regulation and supervision of legal
education had been historically and consistently exercised by the political departments. (Pimentel
v. Legal Education Board, G.R. No. 242954, September 10, 2019)
The Court's exclusive power of admission to the Bar vests upon the Court the
authority to define the practice of law, to determine who will be admitted to the
practice of law, to hold in contempt any person found to be engaged in unauthorized
practice of law, and to exercise corollary disciplinary authority over members of the
Bar. The Court's exclusive rule-making power covers the practice of law and not the
study of law. -- The 1987 Constitution departed from the 1935 and the 1973 organic laws in the
sense that it took away from the Congress the power to repeal, alter, or supplement the rules
concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law, and the
integration of the Bar and therefore vests exclusively and beyond doubt, the power to promulgate
such rules to the Court, thereby supporting a "stronger and more independent judiciary." The
Court's exclusive power of admission to the Bar has been interpreted as vesting upon the Court
the authority to define the practice of law, to determine who will be admitted to the practice of
The act of admitting, suspending, disbarring and reinstating lawyers in the practice of law
is a judicial function because it requires "(1) previously established rules and principles; (2)
concrete facts, whether past or present, affecting determinate individuals; and (3) decision as to
whether these facts are governed by the rules and principles."
Petitioners readily acknowledge that legal education or the study of law is not the practice
of law, the former being merely preparatory to the latter. The definition of the practice of law, no
matter how broad, cannot be further enlarged as to cover the study of law. (Pimentel v. Legal
Education Board, G.R. No. 242954, September 10, 2019)
The Supreme Court and its members should not and cannot be required to
exercise any power or to perform any trust or to assume any duty not pertaining to
or connected with the administering of judicial functions. Regulation and supervision
of legal education is primarily exercised by the Legislative and implemented by the
Executive, thus, it cannot be claimed by the judiciary. -- Section 12, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution clearly provides that "[t]he Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts
established by law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or
administrative functions." The Court exercises judicial power only and should not assume any
duty alien to its judicial functions, the basic postulate being the separation of powers. The
Supreme Court and its members should not and cannot be required to exercise any power or to
perform any trust or to assume any duty not pertaining to or connected with the administering of
judicial functions. Neither may the regulation and supervision of legal education be justified as
an exercise of the Court's "residual" power. A power is residual if it does not belong to either of
the two co-equal branches and which the remaining branch can, thus, exercise consistent with its
functions. Regulation and supervision of legal education is primarily exercised by the Legislative
and implemented by the Executive, thus, it cannot be claimed by the judiciary. (Pimentel v. Legal
Education Board, G.R. No. 242954, September 10, 2019)
The Court has not promulgated any rule that directly and actually regulates
legal education. -- Rules of Court do not support the argument that the Court directly and
actually regulates legal education. While the power of the Court to promulgate rules concerning
admission to the practice of law exists under the 1935 Constitution and reiterated under the 1973
and 1987 Constitutions, the Court has not promulgated any rule that directly and actually
regulates legal education. (Pimentel v. Legal Education Board, G.R. No. 242954, September 10,
2019)
The Rules of Court provide for the requisites and qualifications for admission
to the practice of law and not for admission to the study of law. -- In the exercise of its
power to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law, the Court has
prescribed the subjects covered by, as well as the qualifications of candidates to the bar
examinations. Only those bar examination candidates who are found to have obtained a passing
grade are admitted to the bar and licensed to practice law. The regulation of the admission to the
practice of law goes hand in hand with the commitment of the Court and the members of the
Philippine Bar to maintain a high standard for the legal profession. To ensure that the legal
profession is maintained at a high standard, only those who are known to be honest, possess good
moral character, and show proficiency in and knowledge of the law by the standard set by the
Court by passing the bar examinations honestly and in the regular and usual manner are admitted
to the practice of law. Thus, under the 1997 Rules of Court provide for the requisites and
qualifications for admission to the practice of law and not for admission to the study of law.
(Pimentel v. Legal Education Board, G.R. No. 242954, September 10, 2019)
The Court does not impose upon law schools what courses to teach, or the
degree to grant, but prescribes only the core academic courses which it finds essential
for an applicant to be admitted to the bar. Law schools enjoy the autonomy to teach
or not to teach these courses. -- In turn, to be admitted to the bar examinations, an applicant
must first meet the core academic qualifications prescribed under the Rules of Court. In addition
to the core courses of civil law, commercial law, remedial law, criminal law, public and private
international law, political law, labor and social legislation, medical jurisprudence, taxation, and
legal ethics, Section 5 was further amended by A.M. No. 19-03-24-SC or the Revised Law Student
Practice Rule dated June 25, 2019 to include Clinical Legal Education as a core course that must
be completed by an applicant to the bar examinations. Notably, Section 5, Rule 138 of the Rules
of Court, as amended, is not directed to law schools, but to those who would like to take the bar
examinations and enumerates the academic competencies required of them. The Court does not
impose upon law schools what courses to teach, or the degree to grant, but prescribes only the
core academic courses which it finds essential for an applicant to be admitted to the bar. Law
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schools enjoy the autonomy to teach or not to teach these courses. In similar fashion, Section 6,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court requires that an applicant to the bar examinations must have
completed a four-year high school course and a bachelor's degree in arts or sciences. Again, this
requirement is imposed upon the applicant to the bar examinations and not to law schools. These
requirements are merely consistent with the nature of a law degree granted in the Philippines
which is a professional, as well as a post-baccalaureate degree. (Pimentel v. Legal Education
Board, G.R. No. 242954, September 10, 2019)
Compliance by law schools with the prescribed core courses is but a recognition
of the Court's exclusive jurisdiction over admissions to the practice of law. -- It is a
reality that the Rules of Court, in prescribing the qualifications in order to take the bar
examinations, had placed a considerable constraint on the courses offered by law schools.
Adjustments in the curriculum, for instance, is a compromise which law schools apparently are
willing to take in order to elevate its chances of graduating future bar examinees. It is in this regard
that the relationship between legal education and admissions to the bar becomes unmistakable.
This, however, does not mean that the Court has or exercises jurisdiction over legal education.
Compliance by law schools with the prescribed core courses is but a recognition of the Court's
exclusive jurisdiction over admissions to the practice of law - that no person shall be allowed to
take the bar examinations and thereafter, be admitted to the Philippine Bar without having taken
and completed the required core courses. (Pimentel v. Legal Education Board, G.R. No. 242954,
September 10, 2019)
The Revised Law Student Practice Rule is intended to ensure access to justice
of the marginalized sectors and to regulate the law student practitioner's limited
practice of law. In allowing the law student and in governing the conduct of the law
student practitioner, what the Court regulates and supervises is not legal education,
but the appearance and conduct of a law student before any trial court, tribunal,
board, or officer, to represent indigent clients of the legal clinic - an activity rightfully
falling under the definition of practice of law. -- The Revised Law Student Practice Rule is
primordially intended to ensure access to justice of the marginalized sectors and to regulate the
law student practitioner's limited practice of law pursuant to the Court's power to promulgate
rules on pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to
the underprivileged. In allowing the law student and in governing the conduct of the law student
practitioner, what the Court regulates and supervises is not legal education, but the appearance
and conduct of a law student before any trial court, tribunal, board, or officer, to represent
indigent clients of the legal clinic - an activity rightfully falling under the definition of practice of
law. Inasmuch as the law student is permitted to act for the legal clinic and thereby to practice
law, it is but proper that the Court exercise regulation and supervision over the law student
practitioner. Necessarily, the Court has the power to allow their appearance and plead their case,
and hereafter, to regulate their actions. To reiterate, the Rules of Court are directed not towards
legal education or law schools, but towards applicants for admission to the bar and applicants for
admission to the bar examinations - consistent with the Court's power to promulgate rules
concerning admission to the practice of law, the same being fundamentally a judicial function.
(Pimentel v. Legal Education Board, G.R. No. 242954, September 10, 2019)
Quo Warranto
Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over an action for quo warranto,
including a quo warranto proceeding against an impeachable officer like the Chief
Justice. -- The petition challenges respondent's right and title to the position of Chief Justice.
The Republic avers that respondent unlawfully holds her office because in failing to regularly
declare her assets, liabilities and net worth as member of the career service prior to her
appointment as an Associate Justice, and later as Chief Justice, of the Court, she cannot be said
to possess the requirement of proven integrity demanded of every aspiring member of the
Judiciary. The Republic thus prays that respondent's appointment as Chief Justice be declared
Mandamus
Judicial Privilege
Why Congress’ power to cite to in contempt and arrest and detain in the course
of a legislative inquiry cannot be exercised over members of the Judiciary
Power of supervision over judges of lower courts: The Supreme Court has the
Constitutional duty to supervise judges of lower courts in the performance of their
official duties. --The Congressional power to cite in contempt and consequently, to arrest and
detain are indeed awesome. Yet, such could not be used to deprive the Court of its Constitutional
duty to supervise judges of lower courts in the performance of their official duties. The fact
remains that the Court of Appeals Justices are non-impeachable officers. As such, authority over
them primarily belongs to this Court and to no other. To echo the Court's ruling
in Maceda v. Ombudsman Vasquez: The Supreme Court [has] administrative supervision over
all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals down to the
lowest municipal trial court clerk. By virtue of this power, it is only the Supreme Court that can
oversee the judges' and court personnel's compliance with all laws, and take the proper
administrative action against them if they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of
government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of
powers. It is this very principle of the doctrine of separation of powers as enshrined under the
Constitution that urges the Court to carefully tread on areas falling under the sole discretion of
the legislative branch of the government. In point is the power of legislative investigation which
the Congress exercises as a Constitutional prerogative. (Agcaoili v. Marcos, July 3, 2018, G.R. No.
232395)
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Separation of powers: Because of the principle of separation of powers,
Justices, officials and employees of the Judiciary are exempt and the Judiciary's
privileged and confidential documents and information are excluded
from any compulsory processes, including the Congress' power of inquiry in aid of
legislation. -- The principle of separation of powers also serves as one of the basic postulates for
exempting the Justices, officials and employees of the Judiciary and for excluding the Judiciary's
privileged and confidential documents and information from any compulsory processes which
very well includes the Congress' power of inquiry in aid of legislation. Such exemption has been
jurisprudentially referred to as judicial privilege as implied from the exercise of judicial
power expressly vested in one Supreme Court and lower courts created by law. (Agcaoili v.
Marcos, July 3, 2018, G.R. No. 232395)
Function of JBC. -- It is the function of the JBC to search, screen, and select nominees
recommended for appointment to the Judiciary. It shall prepare a list with at least three qualified
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nominees for a particular vacancy in the Judiciary to be submitted to the President, who, in turn,
shall appoint from the shortlist for said specific vacancy. (Aguinaldo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 224302,
November 29, 2016)
Only one Congressional representative in the Judicial and Bar Council. -- There
should be only one (1) representative from Congress. (Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R.
No. 202242, July 17, 2012)
JBC can set standards or criteria for selection of nominees. -- JBC’s policy of
requiring five years of service as judges of first-level courts before they can qualify as applicant to
second-level courts is constitutional. The JBC has the authority to set the standards/criteria in
choosing its nominees for every vacancy in the judiciary, subject only to the minimum
qualifications required by the Constitution and law for every position. (Villanueva v. Judicial and
Bar Council, G.R. No. 211833, April 7, 2015)
COMMISSION ON AUDIT
COA’s power to prevent, and disallow irregular, unnecessary, excessive,
extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures of government funds. -- The COA is
endowed with latitude to determine, prevent, and disallow irregular, unnecessary, excessive,
extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures of government funds. The Court has accorded not
only respect but also finality to COA findings especially when their decisions are not tainted with
grave abuse of discretion. (Technical Education and Skills Development Authority v. Commission
on Audit, G.R. No. 196418, February 10, 2015)
Liquidated money claims against the government must be filed with COA. --
COA has primary jurisdiction over money claims against government agencies and
instrumentalities, including local governments. The COA and not the RTC has primary
jurisdiction to pass upon a money claim against a local government unit. (Province of Aklan v.
Jody King Construction and Development Corp., G.R. Nos. 197592 & 20262, November 27, 2013)
COA’s authority over money claims is limited to liquidated claims, or those determined or
readily determinable from vouchers, invoices, and such other papers within reach of accounting
officers. (Province of Aklan v. Jody King Construction and Development Corp., G.R. Nos. 197592
& 20262, November 27, 2013)
When money claims need not be filed first with COA: When there is
unreasonable delay or official inaction to the prejudice the complainant. -- Money
claims against the government need not be filed with COA first, and may be filed directly with the
courts directly, if the case falls under any of the exceptions to the rule on exhaustion of
administrative remedies, such as when there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will
irretrievably prejudice the complainant, or where the question involved is purely legal. Petitioners
aver that respondent should have first filed a claim before the Commission on Audit (COA) before
going to the courts. The government project contracted out to respondent was completed almost
two decades ago. To delay the proceedings by remanding the case to the relevant government
office or agency will definitely prejudice respondent. More importantly, the issues in the present
case involve the validity and the enforceability of the "Contract of Agreement" entered into by the
parties. For almost two decades, the public and the government benefitted from the work done by
respondent. The contractor should be duly compensated for services rendered, which were for the
benefit of the general public. To deny the payment to the contractor of the two buildings which
are almost fully completed and presently occupied by the university would be to allow the
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
The jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the candidate is considered a
Member of the House of Representatives. To be considered a Member of the House of
Representatives, there must be a concurrence of the following requisites: (1) a valid
proclamation, (2) a proper oath, and (3) assumption of office. -- According to petitioner,
Consequently, before there is a valid or official taking of the oath it must be made (1) before
the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and (2) in open session. Here, although she made
the oath before Speaker Belmonte, there is no indication that it was made during plenary or in
open session and, thus, it remains unclear whether the required oath of office was indeed
complied with. (Ongsiako Reyes v. Comelec, G.R. No. 20726, June 25, 2013)
The COMELEC has no jurisdiction over a petition for the expulsion from a party-
list organization of an incumbent party-list Member of the House of Representatives.
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution endows the HRET with jurisdiction to
resolve questions on the qualifications of members of Congress. In the case of party-
list representatives, the HRET acquires jurisdiction over a disqualification case upon
proclamation of the winning party-list group, oath of the nominee, and assumption of
office as member of the House of Representatives. -- The instant case involves two rival
factions of the same party-list organization, the Adhikaing Tinataguyod ng Kooperatiba (Ating
Koop). One group is headed by petitioner Atty. Isidro Q. Lico (the Lico Group), who represents
The COMELEC also has no jurisdiction to decide on the validity of the expulsion of an
incumbent Member of the House of Representatives from the winning party-list organization that
he represents. His expulsion from the party-list organization is not a mere intra-corporate matter
because it necessarily affects his title as member of Congress. A party-list nominee must have
been, among others, a bona fide member of the party or organization for at least ninety (90) days
preceding the day of the election. It is for the HRET to interpret the meaning of the requirement
of bona fide membership in a party-list organization. Under Section 17, Article VI of the
Constitution, the HRET is the sole judge of all contests when it comes to qualifications of the
members of the House of Representatives. (Lico v. Commission on Elections, G. R. No. 205505,
September 29, 2015)
Contrary to the ruling in Poe, in a Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel COC
on the ground of false material representation, a prior judgment by a competent court
that the candidate is guilty of an election offense is not required before the said
petition can be given due course by the COMELEC: The COMELEC is fully-clothed with
authority to make factual determinations in relation to the election contests before
it. -- The COMELEC is fully-clothed with authority to make factual determinations in relation to
the election contests before it. The COMELEC, as an adjunct to its adjudicatory power, may
investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings. weigh evidence, and draw
conclusions from them as basis for their official action. The sole ground for Petitions to Deny Due
Course or to Cancel COC is false material representation compounded by intent to deceive on the
part of the candidate and that the intent to deceive or mislead will be difficult, if not impossible,
to ascertain absent an established fact that the candidate deviated from. Contrary to Poe, the
COMELEC can be the proper body to make the pronouncement against which the truth or falsity
of a material representation in a COC can be measured. (Francisco v. Comelec, G.R. No. 230249,
April 24, 2018)
Disqualification of Candidates
Hence, if a person qualified to file a petition to disqualify a certain candidate fails to file
the petition within the twenty-five (25)-day period prescribed by Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code for whatever reasons, the elections laws do not leave him completely helpless as he
has another chance to raise the disqualification of the candidate by filing a petition for quo
warranto within ten (10) days from the proclamation of the results of the election, as provided
under Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code. The above remedies were both available to the
private respondents and their failure to utilize Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code cannot
serve to bar them should they opt to file, as they did so file, a quo warranto petition under Section
253. (Sobejana-Condon v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 198742, August 10, 2012)
The rule that the second-placer cannot be proclaimed winner if the first-placer
is disqualified or declared ineligible should be limited to situations where the
certificate of candidacy of the first-placer was valid at the time of filing, but
subsequently cancelled for a violation of law that took place, or a legal impediment
that took effect, after the filing of the CoC. -- Decisions of this Court holding that the
second-placer cannot be proclaimed winner if the first-placer is disqualified or declared ineligible
should be limited to situations where the certificate of candidacy of the first-placer was valid at
the time of filing but subsequently had to be cancelled because of a violation of law that took place,
or a legal impediment that took effect, after the filing of the certificate of candidacy. If the
certificate of candidacy is void ab initio, then legally the person who filed such void certificate of
candidacy was never a candidate in the elections at any time. All votes for such non-candidate are
stray votes and should not be counted. Thus, such non-candidate can never be a first-placer in the
elections. If a certificate of candidacy void ab initio is cancelled on the day, or before the day, of
the election, prevailing jurisprudence holds that all votes for that candidate are stray votes. If a
certificate of candidacy void ab initio is cancelled one day or more after the elections, all votes for
such candidate should also be stray votes because the certificate of candidacy is void from the very
beginning. This is the more equitable and logical approach on the effect of the cancellation of a
certificate of candidacy that is void ab initio. Otherwise, a certificate of candidacy void ab initio
can operate to defeat one or more valid certificates of candidacy for the same position. (Jalosjos
v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 193237, October 9, 2012)
Primarily, a disqualification case under Section 68 of the OEC is hinged on either: (a) a
candidate's possession of a permanent resident status in a foreign country; or (b) his or her
commission of certain acts of disqualification. Anent the latter, the prohibited acts under Section
68 refer to election offenses under the OEC, and not to violations of other penal laws. In particular,
these are: (1) giving money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the
voters or public officials performing electoral functions; (2) committing acts of terrorism to
enhance one's candidacy; (3) spending in one's election campaign an amount in excess of that
allowed by the OEC; (4) soliciting, receiving or making any contribution prohibited under
Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104 of the OEC; and (5) violating Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261,
paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, sub-paragraph 6 of the OEC. Accordingly, the same provision
(Section 68) states that any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he or she is a party, is
declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the COMELEC to have
committed any of the foregoing acts shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate for public
office, or disallowed from holding the same, if he or she had already been elected.
One who is disqualified under Section 68 is still technically considered to have been a
candidate, albeit proscribed to continue as such only because of supervening infractions which do
not, however, deny his or her statutory eligibility. In other words, while the candidate's
compliance with the eligibility requirements as prescribed by law, such as age, residency, and
citizenship, is not in question, he or she is, however, ordered to discontinue such candidacy as a
form of penal sanction brought by the commission of the above-mentioned election offenses. On
the other hand, a denial of due course to and/or cancellation of a CoC proceeding under Section
78 of the OEC is premised on a person's misrepresentation of any of the material qualifications
required for the elective office aspired for. While a disqualified candidate under Section 68 is still
considered to have been a candidate for all intents and purposes, on the other hand, a person
whose CoC had been denied due course to and/or cancelled under Section 78 is deemed to have
not been a candidate at all. The reason being is that a cancelled CoC is considered void ab initio
and thus, cannot give rise to a valid candidacy and necessarily, to valid votes. While a person who
is disqualified under Section 68 is merely prohibited to continue as a candidate, a person who
certificate is cancelled or denied due course under Section 78 is not treated as a candidate at all,
For the petition to deny due course or cancel the COC of one candidate to
prosper, the candidate must have made a material misrepresentation involving his
eligibility or qualification for the office to which he seeks election, such as the
requisite residency, age, citizenship or any other legal qualification necessary to run
for local elective office. An allegedly false nickname in the CoC is not a “material
misrepresentation” that is a ground to cancel or deny due course to a CoC under
Section 78. -- Petitioner filed the petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code
claiming that respondent committed material misrepresentation when the latter declared in his
COC that his name/nickname to be printed in the official ballot was VILLAFUERTE, LRAY JR.-
MIGZ instead of his baptismal name, VILLAFUERTE, MIGUEL-MIGZ. Section 78 states that the
false representation in the contents of the COC required under Section 74 must refer to material
matters in order to justify the cancellation of the COC. The material misrepresentation
contemplated by Section 78 of the Code refer to qualifications for elective office. Aside from the
Stating under oath in the CoC that one is eligible to run for public office, when
one is not, is a false material misrepresentation. -- Under the rules, a statement in a
certificate of candidacy claiming that a candidate is eligible to run for public office when in truth
he is not, is a false material representation, a ground for a petition under Section 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code. Section 74 requires the candidate to state under oath in his CoC "that he
is eligible for said office." A candidate is eligible if he has a right to run for the public office. If a
candidate is not actually eligible because he is not a registered voter in the municipality where he
intends to be elected, but still he states under oath in his certificate of candidacy that he is eligible
to run for public office, then the candidate clearly makes a false material representation, a ground
to support a petition under Section 78. (Hayudini v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 207900,
April 22, 2014)
COMELEC's jurisdiction to deny due course and cancel a CoC for material
misrepresentation continues even after election and proclamation, except in the
cases of congressional and senatorial candidates. -- Hayudini protests that it was a grave
error on the part of the COMELEC to have declared his proclamation null and void when no
petition for annulment of his proclamation was ever filed. However, the nullification of his
proclamation as a winning candidate is also a legitimate outcome − a necessary legal consequence
− of the cancellation of his CoC pursuant to Section 78. A CoC cancellation proceeding essentially
partakes of the nature of a disqualification case. The cancellation of a CoC essentially renders the
votes cast for the candidate whose certificate of candidacy has been cancelled as stray votes. If the
disqualification or CoC cancellation or denial case is not resolved before the election day, the
proceedings shall continue even after the election and the proclamation of the winner. Meanwhile,
the candidate may be voted for and even be proclaimed as the winner, but the COMELEC's
jurisdiction to deny due course and cancel his or her CoC continues. This rule likewise applies
even if the candidate facing disqualification has already taken his oath of office. The only
exception to this rule is in the case of congressional and senatorial candidates where the
COMELEC ipso jure loses jurisdiction in favor of either the Senate or the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal after the candidates have been proclaimed, taken the proper
oath, and also assumed office. (Hayudini v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 207900, April 22,
2014)
The duty of the Comelec to give due course to COCs filed in due form is
ministerial in character, and that while the Comelec may look into patent defects in
the COCs, it may not go into matters not appearing on their face. -- In declaring that
Kimberly, being under age, could not be considered to have filed a valid COC and, thus, could not
be validly substituted by Olivia, we find that the Comelec gravely abused its discretion. Firstly,
subject to its authority over nuisance candidates and its power to deny due course to or cancel
COCs under Sec. 78, Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 881, the Comelec has the ministerial duty to
receive and acknowledge receipt of COCs. Comelec has no discretion to give or not to give due
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course to COCs. The duty of the Comelec to give due course to COCs filed in due form is ministerial
in character, and that while the Comelec may look into patent defects in the COCs, it may not go
into matters not appearing on their face. The question of eligibility or ineligibility of a candidate
is thus beyond the usual and proper cognizance of the Comelec. (Cerafica v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 205136, December 2, 2014)
The COMELEC may not, by itself, without the proper proceedings, deny due
course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy filed in due form. -- The COMELEC acted
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in declaring that Hans
Roger, being under age, could not be considered to have filed a valid certificate of candidacy and,
thus, could not be validly substituted by Luna. The COMELEC may not, by itself, without the
proper proceedings, deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy filed in due form. In
Sanchez vs. Del Rosario, the Court ruled that the question of eligibility or ineligibility of a
candidate for non-age is beyond the usual and proper cognizance of the COMELEC. If Hans Roger
made a material misrepresentation as to his date of birth or age in his certificate of candidacy, his
eligibility may only be impugned through a verified petition to deny due course to or cancel such
certificate of candidacy under Section 78 of the Election Code. In this case, there was no petition
to deny due course to or cancel the certificate of candidacy of Hans Roger. The COMELEC only
declared that Hans Roger did not file a valid certificate of candidacy and, thus, was not a valid
candidate in the petition to deny due course to or cancel Luna’s certificate of candidacy. In effect,
the COMELEC, without the proper proceedings, cancelled Hans Roger’s certificate of candidacy
and declared the substitution by Luna invalid. (Cerafica v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
205136, December 2, 2014)
Party-List Elections
New parameters for party-list elections: Not all party-list groups must
represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors. National or regional
parties or organizations, and sectoral parties or organizations that lack "well-defined
political constituencies" (such as professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth
groups) -- do not need to represent the "marginalized and underrepresented." -- In
determining who may participate in the coming 13 May 2013 and subsequent party-list elections,
the COMELEC shall adhere to the following parameters:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or
organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the
party-list system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party,
whether major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate in
party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some
of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains
qualified.
The COMELEC excluded from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections those
that did not satisfy these two criteria: (1) all national, regional, and sectoral groups or
organizations must represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors, and (2) all
nominees must belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector they represent. As
discussed above, the disqualification of petitioners, and their nominees, under such
circumstances is contrary to the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941. (Atong Paglaum v Comelec,
G.R. No. 203766, April 2, 2013)
xxx
Since the evident purpose of the framers of the 1987 Constitution is to impose a
stricter prohibition on the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies
and assistants with respect to holding multiple offices or employment in the government
during their tenure, the exception to this prohibition must be read with equal severity. On its
face, the language of Section 13, Article VII is prohibitory so that it must be understood as
intended to be a positive and unequivocal negation of the privilege of holding multiple
government offices or employment. Verily, wherever the language used in the constitution is
prohibitory, it is to be understood as intended to be a positive and unequivocal negation. The
phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution" must be given a literal interpretation
to refer only to those particular instances cited in the Constitution itself, to wit: the Vice-
President being appointed as a member of the Cabinet under Section 3, par. (2), Article VII;
or acting as President in those instances provided under Section 7, pars. (2) and (3), Article
VII; and, the Secretary of Justice being ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by
virtue of Section 8 (1), Article VIII.
Being an appointive public official who does not occupy a Cabinet position (i.e., President,
the Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants), Duque was thus
covered by the general rule enunciated under Section 7, paragraph (2), Article IX-B. He can hold
any other office or employment in the Government during his tenure if such holding is allowed by
law or by the primary functions of his position.
Respondents insist that Duque’s ex officio designation as member of the governing Boards
of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF is allowed by the primary functions of his position
as the CSC Chairman. As to the meaning of ex officio, the Court has decreed in Civil Liberties
Union v. Executive Secretary that the term ex officio means “from office; by virtue of office.” It
refers to an “authority derived from official character merely, not expressly conferred upon the
individual character, but rather annexed to the official position.” Ex officio likewise denotes an
“act done in an official character, or as a consequence of office, and without any other appointment
or authority other than that conferred by the office.” An ex officio member of a board is one who
is a member by virtue of his title to a certain office, and without further warrant or appointment.
The ex officio position being actually and in legal contemplation part of the principal office, it
follows that the official concerned has no right to receive additional compensation for his services
in the said position. The reason is that these services are already paid for and covered by the
compensation attached to his principal office.
Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292 is clear that the CSC Chairman’s
membership in a governing body is dependent on the condition that the functions of the
government entity where he will sit as its Board member must affect the career development,
employment status, rights, privileges, and welfare of government officials and employees. Based
on this, the Court finds no irregularity in Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292
because matters affecting the career development, rights and welfare of government employees
are among the primary functions of the CSC and are consequently exercised through its Chairman.
The CSC Chairman’s membership therein must, therefore, be considered to be derived from his
Under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution, the President exercises
control over all government offices in the Executive Branch. The GSIS, PHILHEALTH,
ECC and HDMF are offices under the Executive Department, and their respective
governing Boards are under the control of the President. Thus, Chairman of the Civil
Service Commission cannot sit as a Director or Trustee of GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC
and HDMF, as this will impair the independence of the CSC. -- Apart from violating the
prohibition against holding multiple offices, Duque’s designation as member of the governing
Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF impairs the independence of the CSC. Under
Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution, the President exercises control over all government
offices in the Executive Branch. An office that is legally not under the control of the President is
not part of the Executive Branch. The Court has aptly explained in Rufino v. Endriga: The
President’s power of control applies to the acts or decisions of all officers in the Executive branch.
This is true whether such officers are appointed by the President or by heads of departments,
agencies, commissions, or boards. The power of control means the power to revise or reverse the
acts or decisions of a subordinate officer involving the exercise of discretion.
As provided in their respective charters, PHILHEALTH and ECC have the status of a
government corporation and are deemed attached to the Department of Health and the
Department of Labor, respectively. On the other hand, the GSIS and HDMF fall under the Office
of the President. The corporate powers of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF are exercised
through their governing Boards, members of which are all appointed by the President of the
Philippines. Undoubtedly, the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF and the members of their
respective governing Boards are under the control of the President. As such, the CSC Chairman
cannot be a member of a government entity that is under the control of the President without
impairing the independence vested in the CSC by the 1987 Constitution. (Funa v. Chairman, Civil
Service Commission, G.R. No. 191672, November 25, 2014)
The Civil Service Commission has jurisdiction over cases filed directly with it,
regardless of who initiated the complaint. Thus, even private individuals may file a
complaint against a member of the Civil Service with the CSC. -- The CSC, as the central
personnel agency of the government, has the power to appoint and discipline its officials and
employees and to hear and decide administrative cases instituted by or brought before it directly
or on appeal. Section 2(1), Article IX(B) of the 1987 Constitution defines the scope of the civil
service: The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of
the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters.
By virtue of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1341, PUP became a chartered state university,
thereby making it a government-owned or controlled corporation with an original charter whose
employees are part of the Civil Service and are subject to the provisions of E.O. No. 292.19 The
parties in these cases do not deny that Guevarra and Cezar are government employees and part of
the Civil Service. The controversy, however, stems from the interpretation of the disciplinary
jurisdiction of the CSC as specified in Section 47, Chapter 7, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of E.O. No.
292.
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There is no cogent reason to differentiate between a complaint filed by a private citizen
and one filed by a member of the civil service, especially in light of Section 12(11), Chapter 3,
Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the same E.O. No. 292 which confers upon the CSC the power to "hear
and decide administrative cases instituted by or brought before it directly or on appeal" without
any qualification.
In the case of Camacho v. Gloria, the Court stated that "under E.O. No. 292, a complaint
against a state university official may be filed with either the university’s Board of Regents or
directly with the Civil Service Commission." It is important to note that the Court did not interpret
the Administrative Code as limiting such authority to exclude complaints filed directly with it by
a member of the civil service. Moreover, as early as in the case of Hilario v. Civil Service
Commission, the Court interpreted Section 47, Chapter 7, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of E.O. No.
292 as allowing the direct filing with the CSC by a public official of a complaint against a fellow
government employee. The identity of the complainant is immaterial to the acquisition of
jurisdiction over an administrative case by the CSC. The law is quite clear that the CSC may hear
and decide administrative disciplinary cases brought directly before it or it may deputize any
department or agency to conduct an investigation. (Civil Service Commission v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 176162, October 9, 2012)
CSC has concurrent original jurisdiction with the Board of Regents of a state
university over administrative cases against university officials. -- The Uniform Rules
on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (the Uniform Rules) explicitly allows the CSC to hear
and decide administrative cases directly brought before it: “Section 4. Jurisdiction of the Civil
Service Commission. – The Civil Service Commission shall hear and decide administrative cases
instituted by, or brought before it, directly or on appeal, including contested appointments, and
shall review decisions and actions of its offices and of the agencies attached to it. Except as
otherwise provided by the Constitution or by law, the Civil Service Commission shall have the
final authority to pass upon the removal, separation and suspension of all officers and employees
in the civil service and upon all matters relating to the conduct, discipline and efficiency of such
officers and employees.” The Uniform Rules did not supplant the law which provided the CSC
with original jurisdiction. While the Uniform Rules may have so provided, the Court invites
attention to the cases of Civil Service Commission v. Alfonso and Civil Service Commission v.
Sojor, both of which buttressed the pronouncement that the Board of Regents shares its authority
to discipline erring school officials and employees with the CSC. The CSC may take cognizance of
an administrative case filed directly with it against an official or employee of a chartered state
college or university. This is regardless of whether the complainant is a private citizen or a
member of the civil service and such original jurisdiction is shared with the Board of Regents of
the school. (Civil Service Commission v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 176162, October 9, 2012)
Condonation Doctrine
Inconsistent with the principles that a public office is a public trust and that
the people shall be accountable to the people at all times. -- The concept of public office
is a public trust and the corollary requirement of accountability to the people at all times, as
mandated under the 1987 Constitution, are plainly inconsistent with the idea that an elective local
official’s administrative liability for a misconduct committed during a prior term can be wiped off
by the fact that he was elected to a second term of office, or even another elective post. (Carpio-
Morales v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 217126-27, November 10, 2015)
The application of the doctrine does not require that the official must be re-
elected to the same position. -- The application of the doctrine does not require that the
official must be re-elected to the same position in the immediately succeeding election. The
condonation doctrine applies to a public official elected to another office. The most important
consideration in the doctrine of condonation is the fact that the misconduct was done on a prior
term and that the subject public official was eventually re-elected by the same body politic. It is
inconsequential whether the said re-election be on another public office or on an election year
that is not immediately succeeding the last, as long as the electorate that re-elected the public
official be the same. (Ombudsman v. Vergara, G.R. No. 216871, December 6, 2017)
Bangalisan laid down the principle that if the exoneration of the employee is relative (as
distinguished from complete exoneration), an inquiry into the factual premise of the offense
charged and of the offense committed must be made. If the administrative offense found to have
been actually committed is of lesser gravity than the offense charged, the employee cannot be
considered exonerated if the factual premise for the imposition of the lesser penalty remains the
same. The employee found guilty of a lesser offense may only be entitled to back salaries when the
offense actually committed does not carry the penalty of more than one month suspension or
dismissal.
Bangalisan reiterated that the payment of back salaries, during the period of suspension
of a member of the civil service who is subsequently ordered reinstated, may be decreed only if
the employee is found innocent of the charges which caused the suspension and when the
suspension is unjustified.
In Hon. Gloria, involving the same factual situation as Bangalisan, the CA awarded the
public school teachers back salaries - for the period beyond the allowable period of preventive
suspension - since they were ultimately exonerated. In affirming the CA, the Court distinguished
preventive suspension from suspension pending appeal for the purpose of determining the extent
of an employee’s entitlement to back salaries. The Court ruled that under Executive Order (E.O.)
No. 292, there are two kinds of preventive suspension of civil service employees who are charged
with offenses punishable by removal or suspension: (i) preventive suspension pending
investigation and (ii) preventive suspension pending appeal; compensation is due only for the
period of preventive suspension pending appeal should the employee be ultimately exonerated.
Given the opportunity, Navarro could have disclosed the acquisition costs and cost of the
improvements in a more detailed way. His failure to amend his presentation, without his attention
on the matter being called, cannot be considered as indicative of an untruthful declaration of his
assets.
Evident bad faith was wanting on the part of Navarro. Although it is the duty of every
public official/employee to properly accomplish his/her SALN, it is not too much to ask for the
head of the appropriate department/office to have called his attention should there be any
incorrectness in his SALN. The DOF, which has supervision over the BIR, could have directed
Navarro to correct his SALN. This is in consonance with the above-quoted Review and Compliance
Procedure under R.A. No. 6713, as well as its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR),
providing for the procedure for review of statements to determine whether they have been
properly accomplished. It is provided in the IRR that in the event authorities determine that a
SALN is not properly filed, they should inform the reporting individual and direct him to take the
necessary corrective action.
In this case, however, Navarro was not given the chance to rectify the nebulous entries in
his SALNs. As there was only a failure to give proper attention to a task expected of an employee
because of either carelessness or indifference, Navarro should have been informed so he could
have made the necessary explanation or correction. There is nothing wrong with a generalized
SALN if the entries therein can be satisfactorily explained and verified.
The Court is mindful of the duty of public officials and employees to disclose their assets,
liabilities and net worth accurately and truthfully. Some leeway should be accorded the public
officials. They must be given the opportunity to explain any prima facie appearance of
discrepancy. To repeat, where his explanation is adequate, convincing and verifiable, his assets
cannot be considered unexplained wealth or illegally obtained. (Navarro v. Office of the
Ombudsman, G.R. No. 210128, August 17, 2016)
Considering that Navarro sufficiently explained his acquisitions as well as his other lawful
sources of income to show his and his wife's financial capacity to acquire the subject real
properties, he cannot be deemed to have committed dishonesty. He cannot be adjudged guilty of
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grave misconduct either as his alleged "lumping" of real properties in his SALN did not affect the
discharge of his duties as a revenue officer. (Navarro v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No.
210128, August 17, 2016)
In this case, there is no showing that private respondent had been given the opportunity
to correct the defects in her Statements of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth before the Complaint
was filed against her. If her or her husband's connection to Arnold L. Cruz Customs Brokerage
was too ambiguous or a cause for concern, she should have been allowed to clarify the matter-
especially since she expressly disclosed a connection with the firm.
The purpose of requiring public officials to submit statements of assets, liabilities, and net
worth is to defeat corruption. Providing an opportunity to correct a defect before being sanctioned
is aligned with this purpose. (Department of Finance Revenue Integrity Protection Service v.
Yambao, G.R. Nos. 220632 and 220634, November 06, 2019)
THE OMBUDSMAN
The independence of the Ombudsman has the following aspects: 1) It is
created by the Constitution and cannot be abolished by Congress; 2) it has fiscal
autonomy; and 3) it is insulated from executive supervision and control. -- The concept
of Ombudsman’s independence covers three (3) things: First: creation by the Constitution,
which means that the office cannot be abolished, nor its constitutionally specified functions and
privileges, be removed, altered, or modified by law, unless the Constitution itself allows, or an
amendment thereto is made; Second: fiscal autonomy, which means that the office “may not
be obstructed from [its] freedom to use or dispose of [its] funds for purposes germane to [its]
functions; hence, its budget cannot be strategically decreased by officials of the political branches
of government so as to impair said functions; and Third: insulation from executive
supervision and control, which means that those within the ranks of the office can only be
disciplined by an internal authority. (Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 217126-27,
November 10, 2015)
The independence enjoyed by the Office of the Ombudsman and by the Constitutional
Commissions shares certain characteristics – they do not owe their existence to any act of
Congress, but are created by the Constitution itself; additionally, they all enjoy fiscal autonomy.
They are not under the control of the President, even if they discharge functions that are executive
in nature. The framers of the Constitution intended that these "independent" bodies be insulated
from political pressure to the extent that the absence of "independence" would result in the
impairment of their core functions. (Gonzales v. Office of the President, G.R. No. 196231, January
28, 2014)
Although the tenor of the text in Section 13(3), Article XI15 of the Constitution merely
indicates a "recommendatory" function, this does not divest Congress of its plenary legislative
power to vest the Ombudsman powers beyond those stated in the Constitutional provision.
Pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6770, otherwise known as The Ombudsman Act of 1989, the
Ombudsman is legally authorized to directly impose administrative penalties against errant
public servants. Further, the manifest intent of the lawmakers was to bestow on the Ombudsman
full administrative disciplinary authority in accord with the constitutional deliberations.
(Ombudsman v. Quimbo, G.R. No. 173277, February 25, 2015)
The suing private individual must show a clear right to the contested office. An
acting appointee has no cause of action for quo warranto against the new appointee.
-- Quo warranto is a remedy to try disputes with respect to the title to a public office. Generally,
quo warranto proceedings are commenced by the Government as the proper party-plaintiff.
However, under Section 5, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, an individual may commence such action
if he claims to be entitled to the public office allegedly usurped by another. We stress that the
person instituting the quo warranto proceedings in his own behalf must show that he is entitled
to the office in dispute; otherwise, the action may be dismissed at any stage. Emphatically, Section
Who may initiate a quo warranto proceeding: The Solicitor General or public
prosecutor, or by any person claiming to be entitled to the public office or position
usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another. -- An action for quo warranto may be
commenced by the Solicitor General or public prosecutor, or by any person claiming to be entitled
to the public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another. That
usurpation of public office is treated as public wrong and carries with it public interest in our
jurisdiction is clear when Section 1, Rule 66 provides that where the action is for the usurpation
of public office, position or franchise, it shall be commenced by verified petition brought in the
name of the Republic of the Philippines through the Solicitor General or public prosecutor.
Nonetheless, the Solicitor General, in the exercise of sound discretion, may suspend or turn down
the institution of an action for quo warranto where there are just and valid reasons. Upon receipt
of case certified to him, the Solicitor General may start the prosecution of the case by filing the
appropriate action in court or he may choose not to file the case at all. The Solicitor General is
given permissible latitude within his legal authority in actions for quo warranto, circumscribed
only by the national interest and the government policy on the matter at hand. (Republic v.
Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018)
The judgment in a quo warranto case includes ouster and exclusion from the
office. -- In case of usurpation of public office, when the respondent is found guilty of usurping,
intruding into, or unlawfully holding or exercising public office, position or franchise, the
judgment shall include the following: (a) the respondent shall be ousted and excluded from the
office; (b) the petitioner or relator, as the case may be, shall recover his costs; and (c) such further
judgment determining the respective rights in and to the public office, position or franchise of all
the parties to the action as justice requires. The remedies available in quo warranto judgment do
not include correction or reversal of acts taken under the ostensible authority of an office or
franchise. Judgment is limited to ouster or forfeiture and may not be imposed retroactively upon
prior exercise of official or corporate duties. (Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018)
Quo warranto and impeachment are not mutually exclusive remedies. -- Quo
warranto and impeachment are not mutually exclusive remedies and may even proceed
simultaneously; the existence of other remedies against the usurper does not prevent the State
from commencing quo warranto proceeding. (Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018)
Difference in causes of action: In quo warranto, the cause of action lies on the
usurping, intruding, or unlawfully holding or exercising of public office, while in
impeachment, it is the commission of an impeachable offense . -- Essentially, respondent
points out that the inclusion of the matter on tax fraud, which will further be discussed below, is
already covered by Article of the Articles of Impeachment. Hence, respondent argues, among
others, that the petition should be dismissed on the ground of forum shopping. However, the
causes of action in the two proceedings are unequivocally different. In quo warranto, the cause of
action lies on the usurping, intruding, or unlawfully holding or exercising of public office, while
in impeachment, it is the commission of an impeachable offense. Stated in different manner, the
crux of the controversy in this quo warranto proceedings is the determination of whether or not
respondent legally holds the Chief Justice position to be considered as an impeachable officer in
the first place. On the other hand, impeachment is for respondent's prosecution for certain
impeachable offenses. To be sure, respondent is not being prosecuted herein for such impeachable
offenses enumerated in the Articles of Impeachment. Instead, the resolution of this case shall be
based on established facts and related laws. Simply put, while respondent's title to hold public
office is the issue in quo warranto proceedings, impeachment necessarily presupposes that
respondent legally holds the public office and thus, is an impeachable officer, the only issue being
whether or not she committed impeachable offenses to warrant her removal from office.(Republic
v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018)
Difference in relief sought: Quo warranto results in the ouster and exclusion
of the respondent from the office he or she is ineligible to hold, while in impeachment,
while impeachment results in the removal of the respondent from the public office
that he/she is legally holding. -- Likewise, the reliefs sought in the two proceedings are
different. Under the Rules on quo warranto, "when the respondent is found guilty of usurping,
intruding into, or unlawfully holding or exercising public office, judgment shall be rendered that
such respondent be ousted and altogether excluded therefrom." In short, respondent in quo
warranto proceeding shall be adjudged to cease from holding public office, which he/she is
ineligible to hold. On the other hand, in impeachment, conviction for the charges of impeachable
offenses shall result to the removal of the respondent from the public office that he/she is legally
holding. It is not legally possible to impeach or remove person from an office that he/she, in the
first place, does not and cannot legally hold or occupy.(Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May
11, 2018)
Even the PET Rules expressly provide for the remedy of either an election protest or
petition for quo warranto to question the eligibility of the President and the Vice-President, both
of whom are impeachable officers. In fact, this would not be the first time the Court shall take
cognizance of quo warranto petition against an impeachable officer. In the consolidated cases of
Estrada v. Desierto, et al. and Estrada v. Macapagal-Arroyo, the Court took cognizance and
assumed jurisdiction over the quo warranto petition filed against respondent therein who, at the
time of the filing of the petition, had taken an oath and assumed the Office of the President.
(Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018)
The Supreme Court's exercise of its jurisdiction over a quo warranto petition is
not violative of the doctrine of separation of powers. An action for quo warranto does
not try person's culpability of an impeachment offense, neither does writ of quo
warranto conclusively pronounce such culpability. The Court's exercise of its
jurisdiction over quo warranto proceedings does not preclude Congress from
enforcing its own prerogative of determining probable cause for impeachment, to
craft and transmit the Articles of Impeachment, nor will it preclude Senate from
exercising its constitutionally committed power of impeachment. -- Section 3(1) and
3(6), Article XI, of the Constitution respectively provides that the House of Representatives shall
have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment while the Senate shall have the sole
power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. Thus, there is no argument that the
constitutionally-defined instrumentality which is given the power to try impeachment cases is the
Senate. Nevertheless, the Court's assumption of jurisdiction over an action for quo warranto
involving person who would otherwise be an impeachable official had it not been for
disqualification, is not violative of the core constitutional provision that impeachment cases shall
be exclusively tried and decided by the Senate. Again, an action for quo warranto tests the right
of person to occupy public position. It is direct proceeding assailing the title to public office. The
issue to be resolved by the Court is whether or not the defendant is legally occupying public
position which goes into the questions of whether defendant was legally appointed, was legally
qualified and has complete legal title to the office. If defendant is found to be not qualified and
without any authority, the relief that the Court grants is the ouster and exclusion of the defendant
from office. In other words, while impeachment concerns actions that make the officer unfit to
continue exercising his or her office, quo warranto involves matters that render him or her
ineligible to hold the position to begin with. Given the nature and effect of an action for quo
warranto, such remedy is unavailing to determine whether or not an official has committed
misconduct in office nor is it the proper legal vehicle to evaluate the person's performance in the
office. Apropos, an action for quo warranto does not try person's culpability of an impeachment
offense, neither does writ of quo warranto conclusively pronounce such culpability. The Court's
exercise of its jurisdiction over quo warranto proceedings does not preclude Congress from
enforcing its own prerogative of determining probable cause for impeachment, to craft and
transmit the Articles of Impeachment, nor will it preclude Senate from exercising its
constitutionally committed power of impeachment. (Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May
11, 2018)
Congress cannot rule on the validity of the appointment of the Chief Justice. --
The impeachment tribunal cannot be expected to rule on the validity or constitutionality of the
Chief Justice's appointment, nor can their ruling be of jurisprudential binding effect to this Court.
To authorize Congress to rule on public officials' eligibility would disturb the system of checks and
balances as it would dilute the judicial power of courts, upon which jurisdiction is exclusively
vested to rule on actions for quo warranto. (Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018)
Courts may determine whether the appointee has the requisite qualifications,
absent which, his right or title thereto may be declared void. -- While an appointment is
an essentially discretionary executive power, it is subject to the limitation that the appointee
should possess none of the disqualifications but all the qualifications required by law. Where the
law prescribes certain qualifications for given office or position, courts may determine whether
the appointee has the requisite qualifications, absent which, his right or title thereto may be
declared void. Clearly, an outright dismissal of the petition based on speculation that respondent
will eventually be tried on impeachment is clear abdication of the Court's duty to settle actual
controversy squarely presented before it. (Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018)
Exercise of jurisdiction over an action for quo warranto falls within the ambit
of its judicial power to settle justiciable issues or actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable. -- Neither does the possibility of the
occurrence of constitutional crisis reason for the Court to abandon its positive constitutional duty
to take cognizance of case over which it enjoys jurisdiction and is not otherwise legally
disqualified. constitutional crisis may arise from conflict over the determination by the
independent branches of government of the nature, scope and extent of their respective
constitutional powers. Thus, there can be no constitutional crisis where the Constitution itself
provides the means and bases for the resolution of the "conflict." To reiterate, the Court's exercise
of jurisdiction over an action for quo warranto falls within the ambit of its judicial power to settle
justiciable issues or actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable. In so doing, the Court is not arrogating upon itself the Congress' power to determine
whether an impeachable officer may be removed by impeachment or not, which is political, rather
than judicial, exercise. (Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018)
LOCAL GOVERNMENT
Local ordinances must not be inconsistent with the laws or policy of the State.
Local governments cannot regulate conduct already covered by a statute involving
the same subject matter. -- The policy of ensuring the autonomy of local governments was
not intended to create an imperium in imperio and install intra-sovereign political subdivisions
independent of the sovereign state. Local ordinances must be inconsistent with the laws or policy
of the State. Local governments are precluded from regulating conduct already covered by a
statute involving the same subject matter. Thus, an ordinance that seeks to control and regulate
the use of ground water within a City, a power that pertains solely to the NWRB under the Water
Code – is ultra vires and void. (City of Batangas v. Pilipinas Shell, G.R. No. 195003, June 7, 2017)
Under the Constitution, (1) the LGUs shall have a just share in the national
taxes; (2) the just share shall be determined by law; and (3) the just share shall be
automatically released to the LGUs. -- Section 6, Article X the 1987 Constitution textually
commands the allocation to the LGUs of a just share in the national taxes, viz.: “Section 6. Local
government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the national taxes which shall
be automatically released to them.” Section 6, when parsed, embodies three mandates, namely:
(1) the LGUs shall have a just share in the national taxes; (2) the just share shall be determined
by law; and (3) the just share shall be automatically released to the LGUs. Congress has sought to
carry out the second mandate of Section 6 by enacting Section 284, Title III (Shares of Local
Government Units in the Proceeds of National Taxes), of the LGC, which is refers to “Allotment
of Internal Revenue Taxes.” (Mandanas v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 199802, July 03, 2018)
The national taxes to be included in the base for computing the just share the
LGUs should not be limited to the national internal revenue taxes (NIRTs) but should
include other national taxes such as tariff and customs duties, excise taxes,
documentary stamp taxes, and franchise taxes. -- There is no issue as to what constitutes
the LGUs' just share expressed in percentages of the national taxes (i.e., 30%, 35% and 40%
stipulated in subparagraphs (a), (b), and (c) of Section 284). Yet, Section 6, mentions national
taxes as the source of the just share of the LGUs while Section 284 ordains that the share of the
LGUs be taken from national internal revenue taxes instead. Has not Congress thereby infringed
the constitutional provision? Garcia contends that Congress has exceeded its constitutional
boundary by limiting to the NIRTs the base from which to compute the just share of the LGUs.
We agree with Garcia's contention. The phrase national internal revenue taxes engrafted in
Section 284 is undoubtedly more restrictive than the term national taxes written in Section 6. As
such, Congress has actually departed from the letter of the 1987 Constitution stating that national
taxes should be the base from which the just share of the LGU comes. Such departure is
impermissible. Equally impermissible is that Congress has also thereby curtailed the guarantee of
fiscal autonomy in favor of the LGUs under the 1987 Constitution.
Taxes are classified into national and local. National taxes are those levied by the National
Government, while local taxes are those levied by the LGUs. What the phrase national internal
revenue taxes as used in Section 284 included are all the taxes enumerated in Section 21 of the
National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC), as amended by R.A. No. 8424, viz.: “Section 21. Sources
of Revenue. — The following taxes, fees and charges are deemed to be national internal revenue
taxes:
(a) Income tax;
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(b) Estate and donor's taxes;
(c) Value-added tax;
(d) Other percentage taxes;
(e) Excise taxes;
(f) Documentary stamp taxes; and
(g) Such other taxes as are or hereafter may be imposed and collected by the Bureau of
Internal Revenue.”
In view of the foregoing enumeration of what are the national internal revenue taxes,
Section 284 has effectively deprived the LGUs from deriving their just share from other national
taxes, like the customs duties. It is clear from the foregoing clarification that the exclusion of other
national taxes like customs duties from the base for determining the just share of the LGUs
contravened the express constitutional edict in Section 6, Article X the 1987 Constitution.
In recapitulation, the national taxes to be included in the base for computing the just share
the LGUs shall henceforth be, but shall not be limited to, the following: the national internal
revenue taxes (NIRTs) enumerated in Section 21 of the NIRC, as amended, to be inclusive of the
VATs, excise taxes, and DSTs collected by the BIR and the BOC, and their deputized agents; tariff
and customs duties collected by the BOC; 50% of the VATs collected in the ARMM, and 30% of
all other national taxes collected in the ARMM; the remaining 50% of the VATs and 70% of the
collections of the other national taxes in the ARMM shall be the exclusive share of the ARMM
pursuant to Section 9 and Section 15 of R.A. No. 9054; 60% of the national taxes collected from
the exploitation and development of the national wealth; the remaining 40% will exclusively
accrue to the host LGUs pursuant to Section 290 of the LGC; 85% of the excise taxes collected
from locally manufactured Virginia and other tobacco products; the remaining 15% shall accrue
to the special purpose funds pursuant created in R.A. No. 7171 and R.A. No. 7227; the entire 50%
of the national taxes collected under Section 106, Section 108 and Section 116 of the NIRC in
excess of the increase in collections for the immediately preceding year; and 5% of the franchise
taxes in favor of the national government paid by franchise holders in accordance with Section 6
of R.A. No. 6631 and Section 8 of R.A. No. 6632. (Mandanas v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 199802, July 03,
2018)
The criteria under the Local Government Code (LGC) for the creation of a City
may be amended, not by repeal, but by way of exemption clauses in cityhood laws. -
- Congress clearly intended that the local government units covered by the Cityhood Laws be
exempted from the coverage of R.A. No. 9009 (which expressly amended the LGC and imposed
the requirement of income of P 100 Million for 2 consecutive years for the creation of a city). The
acts of both Chambers of Congress show that the exemption clauses ultimately incorporated in
the Cityhood Laws are but the express articulations of the clear legislative intent to exempt the
subject municipalities, without exception, from the coverage of R.A. No. 9009. Thereby, R.A. No.
9009, and, by necessity, the Local Government Code (provisions on the criteria for establishment
of a city) were amended, not by repeal but by way of the express exemptions embodied in the
exemption clauses in the Cityhood laws. (League of Cities v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 176951, April
12, 2011)
LGUs' share in national wealth: The 1987 Constitution conferred on LGUs the
right to share not only in the national taxes, but also in the proceeds of the utilization
of national wealth in their respective areas. -- Under Section 25, Article II of the 1987
Constitution, "(t)he State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments." In furtherance of this
State policy, the 1987 Constitution conferred on LGUs the power to create its own sources of
revenue and the right to share not only in the national taxes, but also in the proceeds of the
utilization of national wealth in their respective areas. Thus, Sections 5, 6, and 7 of Article X of
the 1987 Constitution provides:
Section 5. Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own sources of revenues
and to levy 'taxes, fees, and charges subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may
provide, consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy. Such taxes, fees, and charges shall
accrue exclusively to the local governments.
Section 6. Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the national
taxes which shall be automatically released to them.
Section 7. Local governments shall be entitled to an equitable share in the proceeds of the
utilization and development of the national wealth within their respective areas, in
the manner provided by law, including sharing the same with the inhabitants by way of direct
benefits.
Area as delimited by law, and not exercise of jurisdiction, is basis of the LGU's
equitable share. Territorial jurisdiction is defined, not by the local government, but
by the law that creates it; it is delimited, not by the extent of the LGU's exercise of
authority, but by physical boundaries as fixed in its charter. -- The Court cannot subscribe
to the argument posited by the Province of Palawan that the national wealth, the proceeds from
which the State is mandated to share with the LGUs, shall be wherever the local government
exercises any degree of jurisdiction. An LGU's territorial jurisdiction is not necessarily co-
extensive with its exercise or assertion of powers. The Provincial Government of Palawan argues
that its territorial jurisdiction extends to the Camago-Malampaya reservoir considering that its
local police maintains peace and order in the area; crimes committed within the waters
surrounding the province have been prosecuted and tried in the courts of Palawan; and the
provincial government enforces environmental laws over the same area. An LGU cannot claim
territorial jurisdiction over an area simply because its government has exercised a certain degree
of authority over it. Territorial jurisdiction is defined, not by the local government, but by the law
that creates it; it is delimited, not by the extent of the LGU's exercise of authority, but by physical
boundaries as fixed in its charter. (Republic v. Provincial Government of Palawan, G.R. No.
170867, December 4, 2018)
The UNCLOS did not confer on LGUs their own continental shelf. No law has
been enacted dividing the Philippine territory, including its continental margin and
exclusive economic zones, among the LGUs. LGUs do not have territorial jurisdiction
over the different maritime zones and the continental shelf. -- Dean Pangalangan posited
that since the Constitution has incorporated into Philippine law the concepts of the UNCLOS,
including the concept of the continental shelf, Palawan's "area" could be construed as including
its own continental shelf. The Province of Palawan and Arigo, et al. accordingly assert that
Camago-Malampaya reservoir forms part of Palawan's continental shelf. The Republic was correct
in arguing that the concept of continental shelf under the UNCLOS does not, by the doctrine of
transformation, automatically apply to the LGUs. The provisions under the UNCLOS are specific
in declaring the rights and duties of a state, not a local government unit. The UNCLOS confirms
the sovereign rights of the States over the continental shelf and the maritime zones. The UNCLOS
did not confer any rights to the States' local government units. At the risk of being repetitive,
under the express terms of the UNCLOS, the rights and duties over the maritime zones and
continental shelf pertain to the State. No provision was set forth to even suggest any reference to
a local government unit. Simply put, the UNCLOS did not obligate the States to grant to, much
less automatically vest upon, their respective local government units territorial jurisdiction over
the different maritime zones and the continental shelf. Hence, no such application can be made.
(Republic v. Provincial Government of Palawan, G.R. No. 170867, December 4, 2018)
Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and
other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora
and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. x x x
It is at once evident that the foregoing doctrines find no application in this case
which involves neither a question of what comprises the Philippine territory or the
ownership of all natural resources found therein.
There is no debate that the natural resources in the Camago-Malampaya reservoir belong
to the State. Palawan's claim is anchored not on ownership of the reservoir but on a revenue-
sharing scheme, under Section 7, Article X of the 1987 Constitution and Section 290 of the Local
Government Code, that allows LGUs to share in the proceeds of the utilization of national wealth
provided they are found within their respective areas. To deny the LGU's share on the basis of the
State's ownership of all natural resources is to render Section 7 of Article X nugatory for in such
case, it will not be possible for any LGU to benefit from the utilization of national wealth.
(Republic v. Provincial Government of Palawan, G.R. No. 170867, December 4, 2018)
Local autonomy does not preclude the national government from taking a
direct hand in implementing national social welfare programs that are implemented
locally and in coordination with LGUs. -- The concept of local autonomy does not imply the
conversion of local government units into "mini-states." The national government has not
completely relinquished all its powers over local governments. Only administrative powers over
local affairs are delegated to political subdivisions. Policy-setting for the entire country still lies in
the President and Congress. The national government is not precluded from taking a direct hand
in the formulation and implementation of national social welfare programs, such as the
Conditional Cash Transfer Program, especially where it is implemented locally in coordination
with the LGUs concerned. Thus, the P21 Billion CCTP Budget need not be directly allocated to the
LGUs. (Pimentel v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 195770, July 17, 2012)
Conversion of LGUs
Conversion will lead to material change in the political and economic rights of
not only of the component city but of the entire province. -- Sec. 10, Art. X of the
Constitution states: “No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided,
merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria
established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in
a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.” The creation, division, merger, abolition or
substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units involve a material change in the
political and economic rights of the local government units directly affected as well as the people
therein. Thus, the Constitution requires the approval of the people “in the political units directly
affected.” Similarly, conversion will lead to material change in the political and economic rights
of not only of the component city but of the entire province. (Umali v. Commission on Elections,
G.R. No. 203974, April 22, 2014)
Moreover, his claim that the province will lose shares in provincial taxes imposed in
Cabanatuan City is well–founded. This is based on Sec. 151 of the LGC. Once converted, the taxes
imposed by the HUC will accrue to itself. Prior to this, the province enjoys the prerogative to
impose and collect taxes such as those on sand, gravel and other quarry resources, professional
taxes, and amusement taxes over the component city. This reduction in both taxing jurisdiction
and shares poses a material and substantial change to the province’s economic rights, warranting
its participation in the plebiscite. Also, with the ensuing reduction in income upon separation,
there would be less funding to finance infrastructure projects and to defray overhead costs, and
the quality of services being offered by the province may suffer. These are but a few of the social
costs of the decline in the province’s economic performance, which Nueva Ecija is bound to
experience once its most progressive city of Cabanatuan attains independence. (Umali v.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 203974, April 22, 2014)
Sec 12. Cities that are highly urbanized, as determined by law, and component cities
whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for provincial elective officials, shall be
independent of the province. The voters of component cities within a province, whose
charters contain no such prohibition, shall not be deprived of their right to vote for elective
provincial officials.
If Cabanatuan City is converted into an HUC, it will be outside the general supervision of
the province and be under the direct supervision of the President. The provincial government
stands to lose the power to ensure that the local government officials of Cabanatuan City act
within the scope of its prescribed powers and functions, to review executive orders issued by the
city mayor, and to approve resolutions and ordinances enacted by the city council. The province
will also be divested of jurisdiction over disciplinary cases concerning the elected city officials of
the new HUC, and the appeal process for administrative case decisions against barangay officials
of the city will also be modified accordingly. Likewise, the registered voters of the city will no
longer be entitled to vote for and be voted upon as provincial officials. In cutting the umbilical
cord between Cabanatuan City and the province of Nueva Ecija, the city will be separated from
the territorial jurisdiction of the province, as earlier explained. The provincial government will no
longer be responsible for delivering basic services for the city residents’ benefit. Ordinances and
resolutions passed by the provincial council will no longer cover the city. In view of these changes
in the economic and political rights of the province of Nueva Ecija and its residents, the entire
province certainly stands to be directly affected by the conversion of Cabanatuan City into an
HUC. Following the doctrines in Tan and Padilla, all the qualified registered voters of Nueva Ecija
should then be allowed to participate in the plebiscite called for that purpose. (Umali v.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 203974, April 22, 2014)
A provincial governor has no power to call out the armed forces, a power
exclusive to the President; a provincial governor has no power to order general
searches and seizures; he has no power to organize private armed groups. -- The
provincial governor does not possess the same calling-out powers as the President. Respondent
provincial governor is not endowed with the power to call upon the armed forces at his own
bidding. In issuing the assailed proclamation, Governor Tan exceeded his authority when he
declared a state of emergency and called upon the Armed Forces, the police, and his own Civilian
Emergency Force. The calling-out powers contemplated under the Constitution is exclusive to the
President. An exercise by another official, even if he is the local chief executive, is ultra vires.
Respondent governor characterized the kidnapping of the three ICRC workers as a terroristic act,
and used this incident to justify the exercise of the powers enumerated under his Proclamation 1-
09. In fact, respondent governor has arrogated unto himself powers exceeding even the martial
law powers of the President, because as the Constitution itself declares, "A state of martial law
does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts
or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of the jurisdiction on military courts and
agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the
privilege of the writ.” There is nothing in the Local Government Code which justifies the acts
sanctioned under the said Proclamation. Respondents cannot rely on paragraph 1, subparagraph
(vii) of Article 465 of the LGC, as the said provision expressly refers to calamities and disasters,
whether man-made or natural. The governor, as local chief executive of the province, is certainly
empowered to enact and implement emergency measures during these occurrences. But the
kidnapping incident in the case at bar cannot be considered as a calamity or a disaster. Paragraph
2, subparagraph (vi) of Article 465 is equally inapplicable for two reasons. First, the Armed Forces
of the Philippines does not fall under the category of a "national law enforcement agency," to
which the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) and its departments belong. Its mandate is
to uphold the sovereignty of the Philippines, support the Constitution, and defend the Republic
against all enemies, foreign and domestic. Its aim is also to secure the integrity of the national
territory. Second, there was no evidence or even an allegation on record that the local police forces
were inadequate to cope with the situation or apprehend the violators. (Kulayan v. Tan, G.R. No.
187298, July 03, 2012)
The Local Government Code does not involve the diminution of central powers
inherently vested in the National Government, especially not the prerogatives solely
granted by the Constitution to the President in matters of security and defense. -- The
Local Government Code does not involve the diminution of central powers inherently vested in
the National Government, especially not the prerogatives solely granted by the Constitution to the
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President in matters of security and defense. The intent behind the powers granted to local
government units is fiscal, economic, and administrative in nature. The Code is concerned only
with powers that would make the delivery of basic services more effective to the constituents, and
should not be unduly stretched to confer calling-out powers on local executives. (Kulayan v. Tan,
G.R. No. 187298, July 03, 2012)
The Constitution does not authorize the organization of private armed groups
similar to the CEF convened by the respondent Governor. -- The Constitution does not
authorize the organization of private armed groups similar to the CEF convened by the respondent
Governor. The framers of the Constitution were themselves wary of armed citizens’ groups. Thus,
with the discussions in the Constitutional Commission as guide, the creation of the Civilian
Emergency Force (CEF) in the present case, is also invalid. (Kulayan v. Tan, G.R. No. 187298,
July 03, 2012)
A mayor has the power to order the demolition of illegal constructions after
complying with due process. -- Despite the hotel’s classification as a nuisance per accidens,
however, We still find in this case that the LGU may nevertheless properly order the hotel’s
demolition. This is because, in the exercise of police power and the general welfare
clause, property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to fulfill
the objectives of the government. Otherwise stated, the government may enact legislation that
may interfere with personal liberty, property, lawful businesses and occupations to promote the
general welfare.
One such piece of legislation is the LGC, which authorizes city and municipal governments,
acting through their local chief executives, to issue demolition orders. Under existing laws, the
office of the mayor is given powers not only relative to its function as the executive official of the
town; it has also been endowed with authority to hear issues involving property rights of
individuals and to come out with an effective order or resolution thereon. Pertinent herein is Sec.
444 (b)(3)(vi) of the LGC, which empowered the mayor to order the closure and removal of
illegally constructed establishments for failing to secure the necessary permits. In the case at bar,
petitioner admittedly failed to secure the necessary permits, clearances, and exemptions before
the construction, expansion, and operation of Boracay Wet Cove’s hotel in Malay, Aklan. This twin
violation of law and ordinance warranted the LGU’s invocation of Sec. 444 (b)(3)(vi) of the LGC,
which power is separate and distinct from the power to summarily abate nuisances per se. Under
the law, insofar as illegal constructions are concerned, the mayor can, after satisfying the
requirement of due notice and hearing, order their closure and demolition. (Aquino v.
Municipality of Malay, Aklan, G.R. No. 211356, September 29, 2014)
A mayor -- who actually held the office and exercised his functions as mayor
only after he was declared the winner in an election protest, and thus began serving
in office only during the middle of his term -- cannot be considered to have fully
served his term for purposes of the three-term limit rule. -- For four (4) successive regular
elections, namely, the 2001, 2004, 2007 and 2010 national and local elections, Abundo vied for
the position of municipal mayor of Viga, Catanduanes. In both the 2001 and 2007 runs, he
emerged and was proclaimed as the winning mayoralty candidate and accordingly served the
corresponding terms as mayor. In the 2004 electoral derby, however, the Viga municipal board
of canvassers initially proclaimed as winner one Jose Torres (Torres), who, in due time,
performed the functions of the office of mayor. Abundo protested Torres’ election and
proclamation. Abundo was eventually declared the winner of the 2004 mayoralty electoral
contest, paving the way for his assumption of office starting May 9, 2006 until the end of the
2004-2007 term on June 30, 2007, or for a period of a little over one year and one month. Then
came the May 10, 2010 elections where Abundo and Torres again opposed each other. When
Abundo filed his certificate of candidacy for the mayoralty seat relative to this electoral contest,
Torres lost no time in seeking the former’s disqualification to run, the corresponding petition xxx,
predicated on the three-consecutive term limit rule. The pivotal determinative issue then is
whether the service of a term less than the full three years by an elected official arising from his
being declared as the duly elected official upon an election protest is considered as full service of
the term for purposes of the application of the three consecutive term limit for elective local
officials. The consecutiveness of what otherwise would have been Abundo’s three successive,
continuous mayorship was effectively broken during the 2004-2007 term when he was initially
deprived of title to, and was veritably disallowed to serve and occupy, an office to which he, after
due proceedings, was eventually declared to have been the rightful choice of the electorate.
(Abundo v. Comelec, G.R. No. 201716, January 8, 2013)
A mayor who assumed office after winning his electoral protest and with only
one a little over one year left in his term cannot be considered to have fully served his
term for purposes of the three-term limit rule. The period when his rival (who was
originally proclaimed winner) held office and assumed the functions of mayor is an
involuntary interruption of the continuity of his service. -- Abundo, for the 2004 election
for the term starting July 1, 2004 to June 30, 2007, was the duly elected mayor. Accordingly, the
first requisite for the application of the disqualification rule based on the three-term limit that the
official has been elected is satisfied. This thus brings us to the second requisite of whether or not
Abundo had served for "three consecutive terms.” The facts of the case clearly point to an
involuntary interruption during the July 2004-June 2007 term. With the enforcement of the
decision of the election protest in his favor, Abundo assumed the mayoralty post only on May 9,
Atty. Alexis F. Medina CONSTITUTIONAL LAW REVIEWER - Part I Version 23 page
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2006 and served the term until June 30, 2007 or for a period of a little over one year and one
month. Consequently, it cannot be said that Mayor Abundo was able to serve fully the entire 2004-
2007 term to which he was otherwise entitled. During the period of one year and ten months, or
from June 30, 2004 until May 8, 2006, Abundo cannot plausibly claim, even if he wanted to, that
he could hold office of the mayor as a matter of right. Neither can he assert title to the same nor
serve the functions of the said elective office. The reason is simple: during that period, title to hold
such office and the corresponding right to assume the functions thereof still belonged to his
opponent, Das proclaimed election winner. The almost two-year period during which Abundo’s
opponent actually served as Mayor is and ought to be considered an involuntary interruption of
Abundo’s continuity of service. An involuntary interrupted term, cannot, in the context of the
disqualification rule, be considered as one term for purposes of counting the three-term
threshold. When the Constitution and the LGC of 1991 speak of interruption, the reference is to
the obstruction to the continuance of the service by the concerned elected official by effectively
cutting short the service of a term or giving a hiatus in the occupation of the elective office. Hence,
there was actual involuntary interruption in the term of Abundo and he cannot be considered to
have served the full 2004-2007 term. (Abundo v. Comelec, G.R. No. 201716, January 8, 2013)
Rules applying the three-term limit rule: To summarize, hereunder are the prevailing
jurisprudence on issues affecting consecutiveness of terms and/or involuntary interruption:
1. When a permanent vacancy occurs in an elective position and the official merely
assumed the position pursuant to the rules on succession under the LGC, then his service for the
unexpired portion of the term of the replaced official cannot be treated as one full term as
contemplated under the subject constitutional and statutory provision that service cannot be
counted in the application of any term limit (Borja, Jr.). If the official runs again for the same
position he held prior to his assumption of the higher office, then his succession to said position
is by operation of law and is considered an involuntary severance or interruption (Montebon).
2. An elective official, who has served for three consecutive terms and who did not seek
the elective position for what could be his fourth term, but later won in a recall election, had an
interruption in the continuity of the official’s service. For, he had become in the interim, i.e., from
the end of the 3rd term up to the recall election, a private citizen (Adormeo and Socrates).
3. The abolition of an elective local office due to the conversion of a municipality to a city
does not, by itself, work to interrupt the incumbent official’s continuity of service (Latasa).
4. Preventive suspension is not a term-interrupting event as the elective officer’s continued
stay and entitlement to the office remain unaffected during the period of suspension, although he
is barred from exercising the functions of his office during this period (Aldovino, Jr.).
5. When a candidate is proclaimed as winner for an elective position and assumes office,
his term is interrupted when he loses in an election protest and is ousted from office, thus
disenabling him from serving what would otherwise be the unexpired portion of his term of office
had the protest been dismissed (Lonzanida and Dizon). The break or interruption need not be for
a full term of three years or for the major part of the 3-year term; an interruption for any length
of time, provided the cause is involuntary, is sufficient to break the continuity of service (Socrates,
citing Lonzanida).
6. When an official is defeated in an election protest and said decision becomes final after
said official had served the full term for said office, then his loss in the election contest does not
constitute an interruption since he has managed to serve the term from start to finish. His full
service, despite the defeat, should be counted in the application of term limits because the
nullification of his proclamation came after the expiration of the term (Ong and Rivera). (Abundo
v. Comelec, G.R. No. 201716, January 8, 2013)
The view, vista, or sightline of a heritage property, such as the Rizal Monument,
is not covered by the protection of the existing heritage law. -- Section 15, Article XIV of
the Constitution provides that "the State shall conserve, promote and popularize the nation's
historical and cultural heritage and resources." Since this provision is not self-executory, Congress
passed laws dealing with the preservation and conservation of our cultural heritage. One such law
is Republic Act No. 10066,59 or the National Cultural Heritage Act of 2009, which empowers the
National Commission for Culture and the Arts and other cultural agencies to issue a cease and
desist order "when the physical integrity of the national cultural treasures or important cultural
properties [is] found to be in danger of destruction or significant alteration from its original state."
This law declares that the State should protect the "physical integrity" of the heritage property or
building if there is "danger of destruction or significant alteration from its original state." Physical
integrity refers to the structure itself - how strong and sound the structure is. The same law does
not mention that another project, building, or property, not itself a heritage property or building,
may be the subject of a cease and desist order when it adversely affects the background view, vista,
or sightline of a heritage property or building. Thus, Republic Act No. 10066 cannot apply to the
Torre de Manila condominium project in relation to the Rizal Monument. (Knights of Rizal v.
DMCI Homes, G.R. No. 213948, April 18, 2017)