Constitutional Law Review 2021 Part I V 23 by Atty. Alexis Medina

REVIEW NOTES IN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
PART I.
Selected Recent Jurisprudence (2010 to 2019) 1

By Atty. Alexis F. Medina2
The Philippine State,

Structure of Government,
Distribution of Powers, and
Intra-Government Relations
NATIONAL TERRITORY
Philippine internal waters under the Constitution or archipelagic waters under

the UNCLOS are subject to the international law norms, now codified in UNCLOS III,
granting innocent passage rights over the territorial sea or sea lane passage over
archipelagic waters. -- Petitioners contend that RA 9522 unconstitutionally "converts"
internal waters into archipelagic waters, hence subjecting these waters to the right of innocent
and sea lanes passage under UNCLOS III, including overflight. Petitioners extrapolate that these
passage rights indubitably expose Philippine internal waters to nuclear and maritime pollution
hazards, in violation of the Constitution. Whether referred to as Philippine "internal waters"
under Article I of the Constitution or as "archipelagic waters" under UNCLOS III (Article 49 [1]),
the Philippines exercises sovereignty over the body of water lying landward of the baselines,
including the air space over it and the submarine areas underneath. UNCLOS III affirms this. The
fact of sovereignty, however, does not preclude the operation of municipal and international law
norms subjecting the territorial sea or archipelagic waters to necessary, if not marginal, burdens
in the interest of maintaining unimpeded, expeditious international navigation, consistent with
the international law principle of freedom of navigation. Thus, domestically, the Philippine
government may pass legislation designating routes within the archipelagic waters to regulate
innocent and sea lanes passage. (Magallona v. Ermita, G.R No. 187167, August 16, 2011)
The right of innocent passage is a customary international law. -- In the absence

of municipal legislation, international law norms, now codified in UNCLOS III, operate to grant
innocent passage rights over the territorial sea or archipelagic waters, subject to the treaty’s
limitations and conditions for their exercise. Significantly, the right of innocent passage is a
customary international law, thus automatically incorporated in the corpus of Philippine
law. (Magallona v. Ermita, G.R No. 187167, August 16, 2011)
UNCLOS has nothing to do with the acquisition (or loss) of territory as it

regulates, among others, sea-use rights over maritime zones. -- UNCLOS III has nothing
to do with the acquisition (or loss) of territory. It is a multilateral treaty regulating, among others,
sea-use rights over maritime zones (i.e., the territorial waters [12 nautical miles from the
baselines], contiguous zone [24 nautical miles from the baselines], exclusive economic zone [200
nautical miles from the baselines]), and continental shelves that UNCLOS III delimits. UNCLOS
III was the culmination of decades-long negotiations among United Nations members to codify
norms regulating the conduct of States in the world’s oceans and submarine areas, recognizing
1 This collection of summaries, excerpts or capsules of selected recent jurisprudence is a work in progress, subject to continuing
revision and updating. Reproduction for purely academic purposes with due attribution to the author is permitted.
2 AB Political Science, University of the Philippines (UP), Diliman; Order of the Purple Feather (OPF), UP, College of Law; Valedictorian,
San Sebastian College-Recoletos, Manila, College of Law; Teaches Constitutional Law at San Sebastian College-Recoletos, Manila,
College of Law, and Polytechnic University of the Philippines (PUP), Manila, College of Law; Taught Constitutional Law at New Era
University, College of Law; Litigation Lawyer; Partner and Head of Public Private Partnership (PPP) Group, LIBRA LAW,
https://libralaw.com.ph/
Atty. Alexis F. Medina CONSTITUTIONAL LAW REVIEWER - Part I Version 23 page 1

coastal and archipelagic States’ graduated authority over a limited span of waters and submarine
lands along their coasts. (Magallona v. Ermita, G.R No. 187167, August 16, 2011)
On the other hand, baselines laws such as RA 9522 are enacted by UNCLOS III States
parties to mark-out specific basepoints along their coasts from which baselines are drawn, either
straight or contoured, to serve as geographic starting points to measure the breadth of the
maritime zones and continental shelf.
Thus, baselines laws are nothing but statutory mechanisms for UNCLOS III States parties
to delimit with precision the extent of their maritime zones and continental shelves. (Magallona
v. Ermita, G.R No. 187167, August 16, 2011)
STATE POLICIES AND PRINCIPLES
Civilian Supremacy Over the Military
A civilian President is the ceremonial, legal and administrative head of the

armed forces. -- While the President is still a civilian, Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution
mandates that civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military, making the civilian
president the nation’s supreme military leader. The net effect of Article II, Section 3, when read
with Article VII, Section 18, is that a civilian President is the ceremonial, legal and administrative
head of the armed forces. The Constitution does not require that the President must be possessed
of military training and talents, but as Commander-in-Chief, he has the power to direct military
operations and to determine military strategy. Normally, he would be expected to delegate the
actual command of the armed forces to military experts; but the ultimate power is his. (Kulayan
v. Tan, G.R. No. 187298, July 03, 2012)
Separation of Church and State
Why the act of the government in allowing the holding of Catholic masses at
the basement of a hall of justice does not violate the principle of separation of Church
and State. -- The State recognizes the inherent right of the people to freely exercise their religion.
Our Constitution recognizes the religiosity of our people. The Roman Catholics express their
worship through the holy mass and to stop these would be tantamount to repressing the right to
the free exercise of their religion. Allowing religion to flourish is not contrary to the principle of
separation of Church and State. (In re: Holding of Religious Rituals at the Hall of Justice
Building in Quezon City, A.M. No. 10-4-19-SC, March 7, 2017)
The Family
Why spousal consent in reproductive help procedures is required: The 1987

Constitution is replete with provisions strengthening the family as the basic social
institution. The RH law contain provisions which tend to wreck the family. It bars the
husband and/or the father from participating in the decision-making process
regarding their common future progeny. It likewise deprives the parents of their
authority over their minor daughter simply because she is already a parent or had
suffered a miscarriage. Reproductive health procedures like tubal litigation and
vasectomy should require mutual consent and decision between the husband and the
wife as they affect issues intimately related to the founding of a family. The RH Law
cannot be allowed to infringe upon this mutual decision-making. Decision-making
involving a reproductive health procedure is a private matter which belongs to the
couple, not just one of them. -- The 1987 Constitution is replete with provisions strengthening
the family as it is the basic social institution. In fact, one article, Article XV, is devoted entirely to
the family. In this case, contains provisions which tend to wreck the family as a solid social
institution. It bars the husband and/or the father from participating in the decision-making
process regarding their common future progeny. It likewise deprives the parents of their authority
over their minor daughter simply because she is already a parent or had suffered a miscarriage.
Section 23(a) (2) (i) of the RH Law prohibits any health care service provider who shall refuse to
perform legal and medically-safe reproductive health procedures on any person of legal age on
the ground of lack of consent or authorization of the spouse in case of married persons, and
provides that in case of disagreement, the decision of the one undergoing the procedures shall
prevail.

Reproductive health procedures like tubal litigation and vasectomy which, by their very
nature, should require mutual consent and decision between the husband and the wife as they
affect issues intimately related to the founding of a family. Section 3, Art. XV of the Constitution
espouses that the State shall defend the "right of the spouses to found a family." One person
cannot found a family. The right, therefore, is shared by both spouses.
The RH Law cannot be allowed to infringe upon this mutual decision-making. By giving
absolute authority to the spouse who would undergo a procedure, and barring the other spouse
from participating in the decision would drive a wedge between the husband and wife, possibly
result in bitter animosity, and endanger the marriage and the family, all for the sake of reducing
the population.
Decision-making involving a reproductive health procedure is a private matter which

belongs to the couple, not just one of them. The decision whether or not to undergo the procedure
belongs exclusively to, and shared by, both spouses as one cohesive unit as they chart their own
destiny. It is a constitutionally guaranteed private right. Unless it prejudices the State, which has
not shown any compelling interest, the State should see to it that they chart their destiny together
as one family.
The right to chart their own destiny together falls within the protected zone of marital
privacy and such state intervention would encroach into the zones of spousal privacy guaranteed
by the Constitution. At any rate, in case of conflict between the couple, the courts will decide.
(Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014)
Why parental consent for a minor to access planning services is required: The
State cannot replace her natural mother and father when it comes to providing her
needs and comfort. To say that their consent is no longer relevant is clearly anti-
family. It does not promote unity in the family. It is an affront to the constitutional
mandate to protect and strengthen the family as an inviolable social institution. More
alarmingly, it disregards and disobeys the constitutional mandate that "the natural
and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth. -- Equally deplorable
is the debarment of parental consent in cases where the minor, who will be undergoing a
procedure, is already a parent or has had a miscarriage. Under Section 7 of the RH law, when a
minor is already a parent or has had a miscarriage, the parents are excluded from the decision-
making process of the minor with regard to family planning. Even if she is not yet emancipated,
the parental authority is already cut off just because there is a need to tame population growth.
It is precisely in such situations when a minor parent needs the comfort, care, advice, and
guidance of her own parents. The State cannot replace her natural mother and father when it
comes to providing her needs and comfort. To say that their consent is no longer relevant is clearly
anti-family. It does not promote unity in the family. It is an affront to the constitutional mandate
to protect and strengthen the family as an inviolable social institution.
More alarmingly, it disregards and disobeys the constitutional mandate that "the natural
and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the
development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government." To insist on a rule
that interferes with the right of parents to exercise parental control over their minor-child or the
right of the spouses to mutually decide on matters which very well affect the very purpose of
marriage, that is, the establishment of conjugal and family life, would result in the violation of
one's privacy with respect to his family. It would be dismissive of the unique and strongly-held
Filipino tradition of maintaining close family ties and violative of the recognition that the State
affords couples entering into the special contract of marriage to as one unit in forming the
foundation of the family and society. (Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014)
The State cannot, without a compelling state interest, take over the role of
parents in the care and custody of a minor child, whether or not the latter is already
a parent or has had a miscarriage. Only a compelling state interest can justify a state
substitution of their parental authority. As in the case of the conscientious objector,
an exception must be made in life-threatening cases that require the performance of
emergency procedures. In such cases, the life of the minor who has already suffered
a miscarriage and that of the spouse should not be put at grave risk simply for lack of
consent. -- The State cannot, without a compelling state interest, take over the role of parents in
the care and custody of a minor child, whether or not the latter is already a parent or has had a
miscarriage. Only a compelling state interest can justify a state substitution of their parental
authority.

First Exception: Access to Information: There must be a differentiation between access to
information about family planning services, on one hand, and access to the reproductive health
procedures and modern family planning methods themselves, on the other. Insofar as access to
information is concerned, the Court finds no constitutional objection to the acquisition of
information by the minor referred to under the exception in the second paragraph of Section 7
that would enable her to take proper care of her own body and that of her unborn child. After all,
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution mandates the State to protect both the life of the mother
as that of the unborn child. Considering that information to enable a person to make informed
decisions is essential in the protection and maintenance of ones' health, access to such
information with respect to reproductive health must be allowed.
Second Exception: Life Threatening Cases: As in the case of the conscientious objector, an
exception must be made in life-threatening cases that require the performance of emergency
procedures. In such cases, the life of the minor who has already suffered a miscarriage and that of
the spouse should not be put at grave risk simply for lack of consent. It should be emphasized that
no person should be denied the appropriate medical care urgently needed to preserve the
primordial right, that is, the right to life.
In this connection, the second sentence of Section 23(a)(2)(ii)249 should be struck down.
By effectively limiting the requirement of parental consent to "only in elective surgical
procedures," it denies the parents their right of parental authority in cases where what is involved
are "non-surgical procedures." Save for the two exceptions discussed above, and in the case of an
abused child as provided in the first sentence of Section 23(a)(2)(ii), the parents should not be
deprived of their constitutional right of parental authority. To deny them of this right would be an
affront to the constitutional mandate to protect and strengthen the family. (Imbong v. Ochoa,
G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014)
Protecting the Life of the Unborn
The intent of the Framers of the 1987 Constitution in protecting the life of the
unborn from conception was to prevent the Legislature from legalizing abortion. The
Reproductive Health Law (RH Law) is in line with this intent as the law mandates that
protection be afforded from the moment of fertilization. The RHL Law embodies the
policy to protect to the fertilized ovum. -- The clear and unequivocal intent of the Framers
of the 1987 Constitution in protecting the life of the unborn from conception was to prevent the
Legislature from enacting a measure legalizing abortion. The Reproductive Health (RH) Law is in
line with this intent and actually proscribes abortion. While the Court has opted not to make any
determination, at this stage, when life begins, it finds that the RH Law itself clearly mandates that
protection be afforded from the moment of fertilization. The RH Law is replete with provisions
that embody the policy of the law to protect to the fertilized ovum and that it should be afforded
safe travel to the uterus for implantation. Moreover, the RH Law recognizes that abortion is a
crime under Article 256 of the Revised Penal Code, which penalizes the destruction or expulsion
of the fertilized ovum. The RH Law mandates that protection must be afforded from the moment
of fertilization. By using the word" or," the RH Law prohibits not only drugs or devices that
prevent implantation, but also those that induce abortion and those that induce the destruction
of a fetus inside the mother's womb. (Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014)
The RH Law does not legalize abortion as it recognizes that -- one, there is a
need to protect the fertilized ovum which already has life; and two, the fertilized
ovum must be protected the moment it becomes existent - all the way until it reaches
and implants in the mother's womb. Any drug or device that prevents the fertilized
ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb is an abortifacient. -- The RH
Law, consistent with the Constitution, recognizes that the fertilized ovum already has life and that
the State has a bounden duty to protect it. The conclusion becomes clear because the RH Law,
first, prohibits any drug or device that induces abortion (first kind), which, refers to that which
induces the killing or the destruction of the fertilized ovum, and, second, prohibits any drug or
device the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb (third kind). By
expressly declaring that any drug or device that prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be
implanted in the mother's womb is an abortifacient (third kind), the RH Law recognizes that: one,
there is a need to protect the fertilized ovum which already has life, and two, the fertilized ovum
must be protected the moment it becomes existent - all the way until it reaches and implants in
the mother's womb. Inasmuch as it affords protection to the fertilized ovum, the RH Law does
not sanction abortion. To repeat, it is the Court's position that life begins at fertilization, not at
implantation. When a fertilized ovum is implanted in the uterine wall, its viability is sustained but
that instance of implantation is not the point of beginning of life. It started earlier. And as defined
by the RH Law, any drug or device that induces abortion, that is, which kills or destroys the
fertilized ovum or prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb,
is an abortifacient. (Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014)

The Right and Duty of Parents
in the Rearing of the Youth
The role of the State in rearing the youth. -- Parents have the natural and primary
right and duty in rearing the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character.
However, when actions concerning the child have a relation to the public welfare or the well-being
of the child, the State may act to promote these legitimate interests. State authority is therefore,
not exclusive of, but rather, complementary to parental supervision. As parens patriae, the State
has the inherent right and duty to aid parents in the moral development of their children. The
Curfew Ordinances are but examples of legal restrictions designed to aid parents in their role of
promoting their children's well-being. (Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan v. Quezon
City, G.R. No. 225442, August 8, 2017)
Balanced and Healthful Ecology
The Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases allow a "citizen suit," and
permit any Filipino citizen to file an action before our courts for violations of our
environmental laws. -- The Court passed the landmark Rules of Procedure for Environmental
Cases, which allow for a "citizen suit," and permit any Filipino citizen to file an action before our
courts for violations of our environmental laws: “SEC. 5. Citizen suit. - Any Filipino citizen in
representation of others, including minors or generations yet unborn, may file an action to enforce
rights or obligations under environmental laws. Upon the filing of a citizen suit, the court shall
issue an order which shall contain a brief description of the cause of action and the reliefs prayed
for, requiring all interested parties to manifest their interest to intervene in the case within fifteen
(15) days from notice thereof. The plaintiff may publish the order once in a newspaper of a general
circulation in the Philippines or furnish all affected barangays copies of said order.” (Resident
Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape of Tanon Straight v. Reyes, G.R. No. 180771, April
21, 2015)
The Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases allow any Filipino citizen, as a
steward of nature, to bring a citizen’s suit to enforce our environmental laws. -- To
further encourage the protection of the environment, the Rules enable litigants enforcing
environmental rights to file their cases as citizen suits. This provision liberalizes standing for all
cases filed enforcing environmental laws and collapses the traditional rule on personal and direct
interest, on the principle that humans are stewards of nature. Moreover, even before the Rules of
Procedure for Environmental Cases became effective, this Court had already taken a permissive
position on the issue of locus standi in environmental cases. In Oposa, we allowed the suit to be
brought in the name of generations yet unborn "based on the concept of intergenerational
responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned." Furthermore,
we said that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology, a right that does not even need to be
stated in our Constitution as it is assumed to exist from the inception of humankind, carries with
it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. In light of the foregoing, the
need to give the Resident Marine Mammals legal standing has been eliminated by our Rules,
which allow any Filipino citizen, as a steward of nature, to bring a suit to enforce our
environmental laws. It is worth noting here that the Stewards are joined as real parties in the
Petition and not just in representation of the named cetacean species. The Stewards, Ramos and
Eisma-Osorio, having shown in their petition that there may be possible violations of laws
concerning the habitat of the Resident Marine Mammals, are therefore declared to possess the
legal standing to file this petition. (Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape of
Tanon Straight v. Reyes, G.R. No. 180771, April 21, 2015)
Writ of Kalikasan: Remedy when the constitutional right to a balanced and

healthful ecology is violated, or threatened with violation. -- The extraordinary remedy
of a Writ of Kalikasan is under the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases. Section 1, Rule 7,
Part III of the said Rules provides: “Section 1. Nature of the writ. – The writ is a remedy available
to a natural or juridical person, entity authorized by law, people’s organization, non-governmental
organization, or any public interest group accredited by or registered with any government
agency, on behalf of persons whose constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology is
violated, or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or
employee, or private individual or entity, involving environmental damage of such magnitude as
to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces.” (LNL
Archipelago Minerals v. Agham Party List, G.R. No. 209165, April 12, 2016)
The constitutional right to health: A component to the right to life is the

constitutional right to health. The Constitution is replete with provisions protecting
and promoting the right to health. -- A component to the right to life is the constitutional
right to health. In this regard, the Constitution is replete with provisions protecting and

promoting the right to health. Section 15, Article II of the Constitution provides that the State
shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among
them. Article XIII also specifically provides for the States' duty to provide for the health of the
people. Section 9, Article XVI provides that the State shall protect consumers from trade
malpractices and from substandard or hazardous products. (Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819,
April 8, 2014)
Self-Reliant and Independent National Economy

Effectively Controlled by Filipinos
National economy "effectively controlled" by Filipinos. -- The Constitution

declares as State policy the development of a national economy "effectively controlled" by
Filipinos. Under the 1987 Constitution, to own and operate a public utility, a corporation’s capital
must at least be 60 percent owned by Philippine nationals. (Gamboa v. Teves, G.R. No. 176579,
October 9, 2012)
The Voting Control Test and the Beneficial Ownership Test must be applied to
determine whether a corporation is a "Philippine national." -- Mere legal title is
insufficient to meet the 60 percent Filipino-owned "capital" required in the Constitution. Full
beneficial ownership of 60 percent of the outstanding capital stock, coupled with 60 percent of
the voting rights, is required. The legal and beneficial ownership of 60 percent of the outstanding
capital stock must rest in the hands of Filipino nationals in accordance with the constitutional
mandate. Otherwise, the corporation is "considered as non-Philippine national[s]."
Both the Voting Control Test and the Beneficial Ownership Test must be applied to
determine whether a corporation is a "Philippine national." (Gamboa v. Teves, G.R. No. 176579,
October 9, 2012)
For effective control of a public utility, at least 60 percent of the capital of the
corporation must belong to Filipino citizens: “Capital” refers to shares with voting
rights and full beneficial ownership. -- “The Constitution expressly declares as State policy
the development of an economy "effectively controlled" by Filipinos. Consistent with such State
policy, the Constitution explicitly reserves the ownership and operation of public utilities to
Philippine nationals, who are defined as Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least
60 percent of whose capital with voting rights belongs to Filipinos. The term "capital" in Section
11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution refers to shares with voting rights, as well as with full
beneficial ownership. (Gamboa v. Teves, G.R. No. 176579, October 9, 2012)
The right to vote in the election of directors, coupled with full beneficial
ownership of stocks, translates to effective control of a corporation. -- The intent of
the framers of the Constitution is to place in the hands of Filipino citizens the control and
management of public utilities. The right to vote in the election of directors, coupled with full
beneficial ownership of stocks, translates to effective control of a corporation. The legal and
beneficial ownership of 60 percent of the outstanding capital stock must rest in the hands of
Filipinos in accordance with the constitutional mandate. Full beneficial ownership of 60 percent
of the outstanding capital stock, coupled with 60 percent of the voting rights, is constitutionally
required for the State’s grant of authority to operate a public utility. (Gamboa v. Teves, G.R. No.
176579, October 9, 2012)
Voting Control Test: The term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the
Constitution refers only to shares of stock that can vote in the election of directors. -
- Considering that common shares have voting rights which translate to control, as opposed to
preferred shares which usually have no voting rights, the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII
of the Constitution refers only to common shares. However, if the preferred shares also have the
right to vote in the election of directors, then the term "capital" shall include such preferred shares
because the right to participate in the control or management of the corporation is exercised
through the right to vote in the election of directors. In short, the term "capital" in Section 11,
Article XII of the Constitution refers only to shares of stock that can vote in the election of
directors.
This interpretation is consistent with the intent of the framers of the Constitution to place
in the hands of Filipino citizens the control and management of public utilities. (Gamboa v. Teves,
G.R. No. 176579, June 28, 2011)
Beneficial Ownership Test: Full beneficial ownership of 60 percent of the

outstanding capital stock is constitutionally required.-- The legal and beneficial
ownership of 60 percent of the outstanding capital stock must rest in the hands of Filipinos in
accordance with the constitutional mandate. Full beneficial ownership of 60 percent of the
outstanding capital stock, coupled with 60 percent of the voting rights, is constitutionally required

for the State’s grant of authority to operate a public utility. (Gamboa v. Teves, G.R. No. 176579,
October 9, 2012)
Beneficial ownership: Excluded in the determination of Filipino ownership are

shares with voting rights assigned or transferred to an alien and shares with
dividends that do not accrue to a Filipino citizen. -- For stocks to be deemed owned and
held by Philippine citizens or Philippine nationals, mere legal title is not enough to meet the
required Filipino equity. Full beneficial ownership of the stocks, coupled with appropriate voting
rights is essential. If the voting right of a share held in the name of a Filipino citizen or national is
assigned or transferred to an alien, that share is not to be counted in the determination of the
required Filipino equity. In the same vein, if the dividends and other fruits and accessions of the
share do not accrue to a Filipino citizen or national, then that share is also to be excluded or not
counted. (Roy v. Herbosa, G.R. No. 207246, November 22, 2016)
Beneficial ownership: Voting power or investment power must be present for

beneficial ownership to exist. -- If the Filipino has the "specific stock's" voting power (he can
vote the stock or direct another to vote for him), or the Filipino has the investment power over the
"specific stock" (he can dispose of the stock or direct another to dispose it for him), or he has both,
then such Filipino is the "beneficial owner" of that "specific stock" and that "specific stock" is
considered (or counted) as part of the 60% Filipino ownership of the corporation. (Roy v.
Herbosa, G.R. No. 207246, November 22, 2016)
SEC Requirement: The 60 percent Filipino ownership shall be applied to BOTH

(a) the total number of outstanding shares of stock entitled to vote in the election of
directors; AND (b) the total number of outstanding shares of stock, whether or not
entitled to vote in the election of directors. -- Under the SEC-MC No. 8, for purposes of
determining compliance with constitutional or statutory ownership requirement, the required
percentage of Filipino ownership shall be applied to BOTH (a) the total number of outstanding
shares of stock entitled to vote in the election of directors; AND (b) the total number of
outstanding shares of stock, whether or not entitled to vote in the election of directors. SEC-MC
No. 8 simply implemented, and is fully in accordance with, the Gamboa Decision and Resolution.
(Roy v. Herbosa, G.R. No. 207246, November 22, 2016)
Where the 60-40 Filipino-foreign equity ownership is in doubt, the Grandfather

Rule will apply: The ultimate Filipino ownership of the shares must first be traced to
the level of the Investing Corporation. -- Where the 60-40 Filipino-foreign equity ownership
is in doubt, the Grandfather Rule will apply. Thus, the combined totals in the Investing
Corporation and the Investee Corporation must be traced (i.e., "grandfathered") to determine the
total percentage of Filipino ownership. The ultimate Filipino ownership of the shares must first
be traced to the level of the Investing Corporation and added to the shares directly owned in the
Investee Corporation. (Narra Nickel Mining and Development Corp. v. Redmont Consolidated
Mines Corp., G.R. No. 195580, April 21, 2014)
Autonomy of Local Governments
Local governments are precluded from regulating conduct already covered by

a statute involving the same subject matter. Thus, an ordinance that seeks to control
and regulate the use of ground water within a City, a power that pertains solely to
the National Water Regulatory Board (NWRB) under the Water Code – is ultra vires
and void. -- The policy of ensuring the autonomy of local governments was not intended to create
an imperium in imperio and install intra-sovereign political subdivisions independent of the
sovereign state. Local ordinances must be inconsistent with the laws or policy of the State. Local
governments are precluded from regulating conduct already covered by a statute involving the
same subject matter. Thus, an ordinance that seeks to control and regulate the use of ground water
within a City, a power that pertains solely to the National Water Regulatory Board (NWRB) under
the Water Code – is ultra vires and void. (City of Batangas v. Pilipinas Shell, G.R. No. 195003,
June 7, 2017)
The President only has general supervision, not control, over an LGU. --
Consistent with the state policy of local autonomy as guaranteed by the 1987 Constitution, the
grant and release of the hospitalization and health care insurance benefits given to local
government officials and employees, through an ordinance passed by petitioner’s Sangguniang
Panlalawigan – is valid – even without approval of the President. An LGU is only under the
President’s general supervision, not control. (Province of Negros Occidental v. Commissioners,
Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 182574, September 28, 2010)

STATE IMMUNITY FROM SUIT
An unincorporated agency enjoys immunity from suit and waives its non-
suability only when it enters into proprietary contracts. There is no waiver of
immunity when the DPWH enters into road construction contracts, which involve
exercise of government functions. -- An unincorporated agency without any separate
juridical personality of its own enjoys immunity from suit. The State will be deemed to have
impliedly waived its non-suability only if it has entered into a contract in its proprietary or private
capacity. Contracts for the construction of public roads that the DPWH enter into are done in the
exercise of its governmental functions, hence, there is no implied waiver by the DPWH simply by
entering into such contract. (Mendoza v. Department of Public Works and Highways, G.R. No.
203834, July 9, 2014)
If the government agency performs proprietary, private or non-governmental

functions, it is not immune from suit. -- If the government agency performs proprietary,
private or non-governmental functions, it is not immune from suit. If an unincorporated
government agency performs proprietary, private or non-governmental functions, it is not
immune from suit. The ATO was involved in the management and maintenance of the Loakan
Airport, which are primarily private or non-governmental functions. Hence, the ATO has no claim
to immunity from suit. (Air Transportation Office v. Spouses Ramos, G.R. No. 159402, February
23, 2011)
The doctrine of state immunity cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating

an injustice to a citizen. Even an unincorporated agency such as the DOTC may be
sued, even when performing sovereign functions, for taking of private property
without filing an expropriation case. -- The DOTC encroached on the respondents’
properties when it constructed the local telephone exchange in Daet, Camarines Norte. The
exchange was part of the RTDP pursuant to the National Telephone Program. We have no doubt
that when the DOTC constructed the encroaching structures and subsequently entered into the
FLA with Digitel for their maintenance, it was carrying out a sovereign function. Therefore, we
agree with the DOTC’s contention that these are acts jure imperii that fall within the cloak of state
immunity. However, the doctrine of state immunity cannot serve as an instrument for
perpetrating an injustice to a citizen. Whenever private property is taken for public use, it becomes
the ministerial duty of the concerned office or agency to initiate expropriation proceedings. By
necessary implication, the filing of a complaint for expropriation is a waiver of State immunity. If
the DOTC had correctly followed the regular procedure upon discovering that it had encroached
on the respondents’ property, it would have initiated expropriation proceedings instead of
insisting on its immunity from suit. The Department’s entry into and taking of possession of the
respondents’ property amounted to an implied waiver of its governmental immunity from suit.
(Department of Transportation v. Spouses Abecina, G.R. No. 206484, June 29, 2016)
The doctrine of sovereign immunity cannot be invoked to defeat a valid claim

for compensation arising from a taking without just compensation. The doctrine of
sovereign immunity is not an instrument for perpetrating any injustice on a citizen. -
- The doctrine of sovereign immunity cannot be successfully invoked to defeat a valid claim for
compensation arising from the taking without just compensation and without the proper
expropriation proceedings being first resorted to of the plaintiffs’ property. Where private
property had been taken in expropriation without just compensation being paid, the defense of
immunity from suit could not be set up by the State against an action for payment by the owners.
(Air Transportation Office v. Spouses Ramos, G.R. No. 159402, February 23, 2011)
CITIZENSHIP
Those who take the Oath of Allegiance under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225
reacquire natural-born citizenship. -- It is incorrect to intimate that complying with Republic
Act No. 9225 (who take the Oath of Allegiance to reacquire Philippine citizenship) shows that the
person is a naturalized, rather than a natural-born, Filipino citizen. It is wrong to postulate that
compliance with Republic Act No. 9225 signifies the performance of acts to perfect citizenship.
Those who take the Oath of Allegiance under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225 reacquire
natural-born citizenship. "Re"-acquiring can only mean a reversion to "the way things were."
Republic Act No. 9225, therefore, does not operate to make new citizens whose citizenship
commences only from the moment of compliance with its requirements. Repatriation involves the

restoration of former status or the recovery of one's original nationality. Repatriation results in
the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his
citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other
hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will
be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino. Thus, he or she does not become a
Philippine citizen only from the point of restoration and moving forward. He or she is
recognized, de jure, as a Philippine citizen from birth. (David v. Senate Electoral Tribunal, G.R.
No. 221538, September 20, 2016)
Natural-born Filipinos, who have been naturalized as citizens of a foreign

country and who reacquire or retain their Philippine citizenship by taking the oath of
allegiance under RA 9225, must additionally execute a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before an authorized public officer prior
or simultaneous to the filing of their certificates of candidacy, to qualify as candidates
in Philippine elections. -- R.A. No. 9225 allows the retention and re-acquisition of Filipino
citizenship for natural-born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by taking an oath
of allegiance to the Republic. The oath is an abbreviated repatriation process that restores one’s
Filipino citizenship and all civil and political rights and obligations concomitant therewith,
subject to certain conditions. R.A. No. 9225 categorically demands natural-born Filipinos who re-
acquire their citizenship and seek elective office, to execute a personal and sworn renunciation of
any and all foreign citizenships before an authorized public officer prior to or simultaneous to the
filing of their certificates of candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine elections. The rule
applies to all those who have re-acquired their Filipino citizenship, like petitioner, without regard
as to whether they are still dual citizens or not. It is a pre-requisite imposed for the exercise of the
right to run for public office. Stated differently, it is an additional qualification for elective office
specific only to Filipino citizens who re-acquire their citizenship under Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225.
It is the operative act that restores their right to run for public office. A Declaration of
Renunciation of Australian Citizenship that is not sworn before an authorized public
officer prior or simultaneous to the filing of their certificates of candidacy will not be
sufficient regain the political right to seek elective office. Unless she executes a sworn renunciation
of her Australian citizenship, she is ineligible to run for and hold any elective office in the
Philippines. Admittedly, however, the same was not under oath contrary to the exact mandate of
Section 5(2) that the renunciation of foreign citizenship must be sworn before an officer
authorized to administer oath. (Sobejana-Condon v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 198742,
August 10, 2012)
The oath of allegiance and the sworn and personal renunciation of foreign
citizenship are separate requirements. -- A candidate for public office cannot claim that he
has renounced his foreign citizenship by taking the Oath of Allegiance under RA 9225. The oath
of allegiance and the sworn and personal renunciation of foreign citizenship are separate
requirements, the latter being an additional requirement for qualification to run for public office.
(Chua v. Comelec, G.R. No. 216607, April 5, 2016)
The mere act of running for public offices does not suffice to serve as an
effective renunciation of foreign citizenship. -- The petitioner’s act of running for public
office does not suffice to serve as an effective renunciation of her Australian citizenship. While the
Supreme Court has previously declared that the filing by a person with dual citizenship of a
certificate of candidacy is already considered a renunciation of foreign citizenship, such ruling
was already adjudged superseded by the enactment of R.A. No. 9225 on August 29, 2003 which
provides for the additional condition of a personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship.
(Sobejana-Condon v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 198742, August 10, 2012)
Reacquisition of Philippine citizenship under RA 9225 for those who have lost
the same by naturalization before the effectivity of RA 9225 -- has no retroactive
effect. -- A former natural-born Filipino citizen re-acquires his Philippine citizenship upon
taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic. (David v. Agbay, G.R. No. 199113, March 18, 2015)
Citizenship, being a continuing requirement for Members of the House of

Representatives, may be questioned at any time. -- Citizenship, being a continuing
requirement for Members of the House of Representatives, may be questioned at any time.
Courts will decide a question, otherwise moot and academic, if it is "capable of repetition, yet
evading review." The question on Limkaichong’s citizenship is likely to recur if she would run
again, as she did run, for public office, hence, capable of repetition. (Vilando v. HRET, G.R. Nos.
192147 & 192149, August 23, 2011)
Foundlings as Natural-Born Citizens

As a matter of law, foundlings are natural-born citizens. (Poe-Llamanzares v. Comelec,
G.R. No. 221697, March 8, 2016)
The framers of the 1935 Constitution intended foundlings to be covered by the

enumeration on natural-born Filipino citizens. -- The deliberations of the 1934
Constitutional Convention show that the framers intended foundlings to be covered by the
enumeration on natural-born Filipino citizens. This inclusive policy is carried over into the 1973
and 1987 Constitution. (Poe-Llamanzares v. Comelec, G.R. No. 221697, March 8, 2016)
The Constitution does not permit discrimination against foundlings. -- The

constitutional provisions on equal protection, social justice, human rights, and the rights of
children contradict an intent to discriminate against foundlings. (Poe-Llamanzares v. Comelec,
G.R. No. 221697, March 8, 2016)
Domestic laws on adoption also support the principle that foundlings are
Filipinos. -- Domestic laws on adoption also support the principle that foundlings are Filipinos.
These laws do not provide that adoption confers citizenship upon the adoptee. Rather, the adoptee
must be a Filipino in the first place to be adopted. (Poe-Llamanzares v. Comelec, G.R. No. 221697,
March 8, 2016)
Foundlings are citizens under international law. -- International treaties obligate

the Philippines to grant nationality from birth and ensure that no child is stateless. Moreover, the
Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law" as part of the law of the
land. Generally accepted principles of international law are based not only on international
custom, but also on "general principles of law recognized by civilized nations." Under customary
international law, a child whose parents are both unknown shall have the nationality of the
country of birth, which is presumed to be where it was found. Also, under customary international
law, a foundling is presumed born of citizens of the country where it is found. (Poe-Llamanzares
v. Comelec, G.R. No. 221697, March 8, 2016)
To establish that a foundling is a natural-born citizen, sufficient evidence can

be presented to sustain a reasonable inference that at least one or both of his or her
parents is Filipino. -- When the names of the parents of a foundling cannot be discovered
despite a diligent search, but sufficient evidence is presented to sustain a reasonable inference
that satisfies the quantum of proof required to conclude that at least one or both of his or her
parents is Filipino, then this should be sufficient to establish that he or she is a natural-born
citizen. (David v. Senate Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 221538, September 20, 2016)
The assumption should be that foundlings are natural-born, unless there is

substantial evidence to the contrary. The Constitution mandates the State to defend
the well-being of children, guarantee equal protection of the law, equal access to
opportunities for public service, and respect human rights. This is also consistent with
related legislative enactments, executive and administrative actions, and
international instruments. -- On another level, the assumption should be that foundlings are
natural-born unless there is substantial evidence to the contrary. This is necessarily engendered
by a complete consideration of the whole Constitution, not just its provisions on citizenship. This
includes its mandate of defending the well-being of children, guaranteeing equal protection of the
law, equal access to opportunities for public service, and respecting human rights, as well as its
reasons for requiring natural-born status for select public offices. Moreover, this is a reading
validated by contemporaneous construction that considers related legislative enactments,
executive and administrative actions, and international instruments. (David v. Senate Electoral
Tribunal, G.R. No. 221538, September 20, 2016)
The Constitution sustains a presumption that all foundlings found in the Philippines are
born to at least either a Filipino father or a Filipino mother and are thus natural-born, unless there
is substantial proof otherwise. Consistent with Article IV, Section 1(2), any such countervailing
proof must show that both—not just one—of a foundling's biological parents are not Filipino
citizens. (David v. Senate Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 221538, September 20, 2016)
Concluding that foundlings are not natural-born Filipino citizens is tantamount

to permanently discriminating against foundling citizens. The Constitution
guarantees equal protection of the laws and equal access to opportunities for public
service. No substantial distinction differentiates foundlings from children with known
Filipino parents. They are both entitled to the full extent of the state's protection from
the moment of their birth. -- Concluding that foundlings are not natural-born Filipino citizens
is tantamount to permanently discriminating against our foundling citizens. They can then never
be of service to the country in the highest possible capacities. It is also tantamount to excluding
Atty. Alexis F. Medina CONSTITUTIONAL LAW REVIEWER - Part I Version 23 page
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them from certain means such as professions and state scholarships, which will enable the
actualization of their aspirations. These consequences cannot be tolerated by the Constitution.
Concluding that foundlings are not natural-born citizens creates an inferior class of citizens who
are made to suffer that inferiority through no fault of their own.
The Constitution guarantees equal protection of the laws and equal access to opportunities
for public service. The equal protection clause serves as a guarantee that "persons under like
circumstances and falling within the same class are treated alike, in terms of 'privileges conferred
and liabilities enforced.' It is a guarantee against 'undue favor and individual or class privilege, as
well as hostile discrimination or oppression of inequality.'"
Other than the anonymity of their biological parents, no substantial

distinction differentiates foundlings from children with known Filipino parents. They are both
entitled to the full extent of the state's protection from the moment of their birth. Foundlings'
misfortune in failing to identify the parents who abandoned them—an inability arising from no
fault of their own—cannot be the foundation of a rule that reduces them to statelessness or, at
best, as inferior, second-class citizens who are not entitled to as much benefits and protection
from the state as those who know their parents. It is not the Court’s business to reify
discriminatory classes based on circumstances of birth. (David v. Senate Electoral Tribunal, G.R.
No. 221538, September 20, 2016)
SUFFRAGE
Biometrics validation is not a qualification to vote but merely regulates the
exercise of the right to vote. It is a procedural, not a substantive requirement. --
Registration regulates the exercise of the right of suffrage. It is not a qualification for such right.
Biometrics validation as part of the registration process is not a "qualification" to the exercise of
the right of suffrage, but a mere aspect of the registration procedure, of which the State has the
right to reasonably regulate. Registration is a mere procedural requirement which does not fall
under the limitation that "no literacy, property, or other substantive requirement shall be imposed
on the exercise of suffrage." (Kabataan Party List v. Comelec, G.R. No. 221318, December 16,
2015)
STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
JUDICIAL REVIEW
Judicial review and constitutional interpretation: Unless the provisions clearly

express the contrary, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-
executory. -- Unless the provisions clearly express the contrary, the provisions of the
Constitution should be considered self-executory. There is no need for legislation to implement
these self-executing provisions. Unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary
to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution
are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of
self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate
of the fundamental law.
In case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-
self-executing. Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should
be considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to determine
when, or whether, they shall be effective. (Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014)
Requisites for Judicial Review: The power of judicial review, like all powers granted
by the Constitution, is subject to certain limitations. Petitioner must comply with all the requisites
for judicial review before this court may take cognizance of the case. The requisites are:
(1)there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power;
(2) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the
subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the
case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement;
(3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and

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(4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
(In the Matter of: Save the Supreme Court Judicial Independence, UDK-15143, January
21, 2015; Belgica v. Honorable Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013;
Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, G.R. No. 192935, December 7, 2010, 637 SCRA
78, 148; Funa v. Executive Secretary, 11 February 2010, G.R. No. 184740)
A controversy is said to be justiciable if: first, there is an actual case or controversy

involving legal rights that are capable of judicial determination; second, the parties raising the
issue must have standing or locus standi to raise the constitutional issue; third, the
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and fourth, resolving the
constitutionality must be essential to the disposition of the case. (Provincial Bus Operators
Association v. Department of Labor, GR No. 202275, Jul 17, 2018)
Actual Case or Controversy Requirement
Actual case - A conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial resolution, ripe for
determination, and not conjectural. -- There must be an existing case or controversy that is
appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court
would amount to an advisory opinion. An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal
rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution. The pleadings must
show an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right, on the one hand, and a denial thereof on the
other; that is, it must concern a real and not a merely theoretical question or issue. (In The Matter
Of: Save The Supreme Court Judicial Independence and Fiscal Autonomy Movements, UDK-
15143, January 21, 2015)
An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of

opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution. -- No less than the Constitution in
Article VIII, Section 1 requires an actual controversy for the exercise of judicial power. An actual
case or controversy is "one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal
claims susceptible of judicial resolution." A case is justiciable if the issues presented are "definite
and concrete, touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests." (Provincial
Bus Operators Association v. Department of Labor, GR No. 202275, Jul 17, 2018)
Actual case requirement - The conflict must not be conjectural or anticipatory;

otherwise, the Court's decision will amount to an advisory opinion. -- The conflict must
be ripe for judicial determination, not conjectural or anticipatory; otherwise, this Court's decision
will amount to an advisory opinion concerning legislative or executive action. In the classic words
of Angara v. Electoral Commission: The power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and
controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further
to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction
could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to
actualities. Even the expanded jurisdiction of this Court under Article VIII, Section 1 does not
provide license to provide advisory opinions. An advisory opinion is one where the factual setting
is conjectural or hypothetical. In such cases, the conflict will not have sufficient concreteness or
adversariness so as to constrain the discretion of this Court. After all, legal arguments from
concretely lived facts are chosen narrowly by the parties. Those who bring theoretical cases will
have no such limits. They can argue up to the level of absurdity. They will bind the future parties
who may have more motives to choose specific legal arguments. In other words, for there to be a
real conflict between the parties, there must exist actual facts from which courts can properly
determine whether there has been a breach of constitutional text. (Provincial Bus Operators
Association v. Department of Labor, GR No. 202275, Jul 17, 2018)
Actual case requirement - The Court cannot render an advisory opinion. --

Pleadings before the court must show a violation of an existing legal right or a controversy that is
ripe for judicial determination. The Court cannot render an advisory opinion. A policy that
reduces the Court to an adviser for official acts by the other departments that have not yet been
done would unnecessarily tax its resources. It is inconsistent with the Court’s role as final arbiter
and adjudicator and weakens the entire system of the Rule of Law. (In The Matter Of: Save The
Supreme Court Judicial Independence and Fiscal Autonomy Movements, UDK-15143, January
21, 2015)
Actual case requirement – Courts have not authority to resolve hypothetical or

moot questions. -- The courts will decline to pass upon constitutional issues through advisory
opinions, bereft as they are of authority to resolve hypothetical or moot questions. If there is a
lack of a specific factual milieu from which a petition originates, any pronouncement from the
Court will be a purely advisory opinion and not a decision binding on identified and definite
parties and on a known set of facts. The Court is barred from rendering a decision based on
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assumptions, speculations, conjectures and hypothetical or fictional illustrations. (Roy v.
Herbosa, G.R. No. 207246, November 22, 2016)
Actual case requirement – Courts cannot decide on theoretical issues; courts

are not advisory bodies. Courts cannot decide on theoretical circumstances. They are neither
advisory bodies, nor are they tasked with taking measures to prevent imagined possibilities of
abuse. (Kilusang Mayo Uno v. Aquino, G.R. No. 210500, April 2, 2019)
Actual case requirement - The case must be ripe for adjudication, such as when
the law is already being implemented. -- The case must be ripe for adjudication, which
means the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it.
The petition challenging the constitutionality of the curfew ordinances is ripe for adjudication,
considering that these ordinances were being implemented. (Samahan Ng Mga Progresibong
Kabataan v. Quezon City, G.R. No. 225442, August 8, 2017,)
For an actual case or controversy to exist, the case must be ripe for
adjudication. -- Closely linked to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the
requirement of ripeness. A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has
had a direct adverse effect on the individual or entity challenging it. For a case to be considered
ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that an act had then been accomplished or performed by
either branch of government before a court may interfere, and the petitioner must allege the
existence of an immediate or threatened injury to himself as a result of the challenged action.
(Philconsa v. Philippine Government, G.R. No. 218406, November 29, 2016)
Examples: No Actual Case or Controversy
A petition to declare an SEC circular void based on a hypothetical case of a

fictional corporation is not ripe for decision because any pronouncement from the
Court is a purely advisory opinion and not a decision binding on identified and definite
parties and on a known set of facts. -- Petitioners' hypothetical illustration as to how SEC-
MC No. 8 "practically encourages circumvention of the 60-40 ownership rule" is evidently
speculative and fraught with conjectures and assumptions. There is clearly wanting specific facts
against which the veracity of the conclusions purportedly following from ·the speculations and
assumptions can be validated. The lack of a specific factual milieu from which the petitions
originated renders any pronouncement from the Court as a purely advisory opinion and not a
decision binding on identified and definite parties and on a known set of facts. Petitioners fail to
allege or show how their hypothetical illustration will directly and adversely affect them. From
the foregoing, it is evident that the Court can only surmise or speculate on the situation or
controversy that the petitioners contemplate to present for judicial determination. Thus, the
petitions must fail because the Court is barred from rendering a decision based on assumptions,
speculations, conjectures and hypothetical or fictional illustrations, more so in the present case
which is not even ripe for decision. (Roy v. Herbosa, G.R. No. 207246, November 22, 2016)
A petition challenging the constitutionality of a law on the ground that the

law’s implementation may be abused belongs to the real of the merely imagined.
Allegations of abuse must be anchored on real events before courts may step in to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable. -- The possibility of abuse in the implementation of RA 9372 does not avail to take
the present petitions out of the realm of the surreal and merely imagined. Such possibility is not
peculiar to RA 9372 since the exercise of any power granted by law may be abused. Allegations of
abuse must be anchored on real events before courts may step in to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable. (Southern Hemisphere v. Anti-
Terrorism Council, G.R. No. 178552, October 5, 2010)
A petition to declare as unconstitutional peace agreements that can only be

implemented through the passage of a law and/or amendment of the Constitution is
premature and not ripe for adjudication. Until a Bangsamoro Basic Law is passed by
Congress, there is no actual case or controversy that requires the Court to exercise
its power of judicial review. -- The Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB) and
the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro (FAB) mandates the enactment of the
Bangsamoro Basic Law in order for such peace agreements to be implemented. The government
gives no commitment, express or implied, that the Constitution will be amended or that a law will
be passed comprising all the provisions indicated in the CAB and the FAB. The CAB and the FAB
require the enactment of the Bangsamoro Basic Law for their implementation. Congress has full
discretion to enact the kind of Bangsamoro Basic Law that Congress, in its wisdom, deems
necessary and proper to promote peace and development in Muslim areas in Mindanao. The
Executive branch cannot compel Congress to adopt the CAB and the FAB. The CAB and the FAB
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cannot be implemented without the passage of the Bangsamoro Basic Law. The CAB and the FAB
remain peace agreements whose provisions cannot be enforced and given any legal effect unless
the Bangsamoro Basic Law is duly passed by Congress and subsequently ratified in accordance
with the Constitution. It is not the CAB or the FAB that will establish the Bangsamoro but the
Bangsamoro Basic Law enacted by Congress and ratified in a plebiscite in accordance with the
Constitution. Clearly, any question on the constitutionality of the CAB and the FAB, without the
implementing Bangsamoro Basic Law, is premature and not ripe for adjudication. Until a
Bangsamoro Basic Law is passed by Congress, it is clear that there is no actual case or controversy
that requires the Court to exercise its power of judicial review. (Philconsa v. Philippine
Government, G.R. No. 218406, November 29, 2016)
A petition to declare a proposed bill unconstitutional does not present an actual

justiciable controversy. The filing of bills is within the legislative power of Congress
and the judiciary cannot speculate on the constitutionality or unconstitutionality of a
bill that Congress may or may not pass. -- A proposed bill does not present an actual
justiciable controversy. The filing of bills is within the legislative power of Congress and is not
subject to judicial restraint. Also, the judiciary cannot speculate on the constitutionality or
unconstitutionality of a bill that Congress may or may not pass. (In The Matter Of: Save The
Supreme Court Judicial Independence and Fiscal Autonomy Movements, DK-15143, January 21,
2015)
A petition to invalidate the DOLE administrative issuances requiring payment

of minimum wages and social welfare benefits to bus drivers on the ground that such
issuances may result in the diminution of the income of bus drivers is based on
speculation, and thus, there is no actual controversy. -- The present Petition alleges no
actual facts for this Court to infer the supposed unconstitutionality of Department Order No. 118-
12 and Memorandum Circular No. 2012-001. According to petitioners, implementing Department
Order No. 118-12 and Memorandum Circular No. 2012-001 "may [result] in [the] diminution of
the income of . . . bus drivers and conductors." The allegation is obviously based on speculation
with the use of the word "may." There was even no showing of how granting bus drivers' and
conductors' minimum wage and social welfare benefits would result in lower income for them.
Petitioners likewise claim that the part-fixed-part-performance-based payment scheme is "unfit
to the nature of operation of public transport system or business." This bare allegation, again, is
not supported by facts from which this Court may conclude that the payment scheme under
Department Order No. 118-12 are unfit to the nature of the businesses of public bus operators.
There being no actual facts from which this Court could conclude that Department Order No. 118-
12 and Memorandum Circular No. 2012-001 are unconstitutional, this case presents no actual
controversy. (Provincial Bus Operators Association v. Department of Labor, GR No. 202275, Jul
17, 2018)
A case that has become moot and academic does not present an actual case. -
- As a rule, courts decline jurisdiction over such case, or dismiss it on ground of mootness.
(Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Atienza, G.R. No. 175241, February 24, 2010)
Moot case: Nothing for the court to resolve. -- An action is considered "moot" when
it no longer presents a justiciable controversy because the issues involved have become academic
or dead or when the matter in dispute has already been resolved and hence, one is not entitled to
judicial intervention unless the issue is likely to be raised again between the parties. There is
nothing for the court to resolve as the determination thereof has been overtaken by subsequent
events. (International Service for The Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications v. Greenpeace
Southeast Asia, G.R. No. 209271, July 26, 2016)
Moot case: A decision would be of no practical value. A case becomes moot

when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events,
so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. -- A case becomes
moot when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a
declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. (Timbol v. Comelec, G.R. No. 206004,
February 24, 2015; Araullo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014)
Exceptions to the moot and academic principle. -- A case is moot and academic if it
ceases to present a justiciable controversy because of supervening events so that a declaration
thereon would be of no practical use or value. There are recognized exceptions to this rule. This
court has taken cognizance of moot and academic cases when: (1) there was a grave violation of
the Constitution; (2) the case involved a situation of exceptional character and was of paramount
public interest; (3) the issues raised required the formulation of controlling principles to guide
the Bench, the Bar and the public; and (4) the case was capable of repetition yet evading review.
(Timbol v. Comelec, G.R. No. 206004, February 24, 2015)

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Courts will still decide cases otherwise, moot and academic if: (1) there is a grave violation
of the Constitution; (2) the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public
interest is involved; (3) when the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling
principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and (4) the case is capable of repetition yet
evading review.
The Court will decide cases, otherwise moot, if: first, there is a grave violation of the
Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest
are involved; third, when the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling
principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition
yet evading review. (Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Department of Justice, G.R. No. 232413,
July 25, 2017)
Exceptions to the Moot and Academic Principle: Recent examples of petitions

decided by the Supreme Court even though the cases have become moot
The petition questioning the constitutionality of the Pork Barrel System. -- It

alleges a grave violation of the Constitution; presents a situation of exceptional character as well
as a matter of paramount public interest; involves a compelling need to formulate controlling
principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public on how public funds should be utilized; and
is an issue capable of repetition yet evading review. Thus, even on the assumption that the petition
is moot, the Court can still decide the case. (Belgica v. Honorable Executive Secretary Ochoa,
G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013)
The petition questioning the validity a hold departure order of the DOJ that has
already been lifted. -- The petitioners impute the respondents of violating their constitutional
right to travel through the enforcement of DOJ Circular No. 41. They claim that the issuance
unnecessarily places a restraint on the right to travel even in the absence of the grounds provided
in the Constitution. There is also no question that the instant petitions involved a matter of public
interest as the petitioners are not alone in this predicament and there can be several more in the
future who may be similarly situated. It is not farfetched that a similar challenge to the
constitutionality of DOJ Circular No. 41 will recur considering the thousands of names listed in
the watch list of the DOJ, who may brave to question the supposed illegality of the issuance. Thus,
it is in the interest of the public, as well as for the education of the members of the bench and the
bar, that the Supreme Court must resolve the question on the constitutionality of DOJ Circular
No. 41. (Genuino v. De Lima, G.R. No. 197930, April 17, 2018)
A petition questioning the validity of holding of dual Cabinet positions, even

after the situation ceased to exist. -- While the constitutionality of the concurrent holding
of the two positions in the Cabinet (concurrent designations as the Acting Secretary of Justice and
Acting Solicitor General) has become moot and academic (with the appointment of a new Solicitor
General), the Supreme Court may still resolve the issue because all recognized exceptions obtain.
(Funa v. Agra, G.R. No. 191644, February 19, 2013)
A petition questioning the validity of the expenditures under the Development

Acceleration Program (DAP) which has already been discontinued. -- Even if the DAP
program has already been terminated, the Court can still rule on its constitutionality because all
the exceptions to the moot and academic principle are present. (Araullo v. Aquino, G.R. No.
209287, July 1, 2014)
A petition to be included in the Comelec’s list of candidates even the elections

are over and winners have been proclaimed. -- We may no longer act on petitioner’s prayer
that his name be included in the certified list of candidates and be printed on the ballots as a
candidate for Member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod. Petitioner filed with this court his Petition
for Certiorari on March 15, 2013, 39 days after Comelec began printing the ballots on February 4,
2013. Also, the May 13, 2013 elections had been concluded, with the winners already proclaimed.
That this case is moot and academic, however, does not preclude us from setting forth "controlling
and authoritative doctrines" to be observed by respondent in motu proprio denying due course to
or cancelling certificates of candidacy of alleged nuisance candidates. (Timbol v. Comelec, G.R.
No. 206004, February 24, 2015)
EXCEPTION to the actual case or controversy

requirement in judicial review: Facial challenges
“On its face" invalidation of statutes constitutes a departure from the case and
controversy requirement of the Constitution and permits decisions to be made
without concrete factual settings and in sterile abstract contexts. - A facial challenge is

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allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible "chilling
effect" upon protected speech. The doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are
analytical tools developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech cases or, as they are
called in American law, First Amendment cases. (Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network v.
Anti-Terrorism Council, G.R. No. 178552, October 5, 2010)
“On its face" invalidation of statutes results in striking them down entirely on the ground
that they might be applied to parties not before the Court whose activities are constitutionally
protected. It constitutes a departure from the case and controversy requirement of the
Constitution and permits decisions to be made without concrete factual settings and in sterile
abstract contexts. Distinguished from an as-applied challenge which considers only extant facts
affecting real litigants, a facial invalidation is an examination of the entire law, pinpointing its
flaws and defects, not only on the basis of its actual operation to the parties, but also on the
assumption or prediction that its very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain
from constitutionally protected speech or activities. The allowance of a facial challenge in free
speech cases is justified by the aim to avert the "chilling effect" on protected speech, the exercise
of which should not at all times be abridged. (Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network v.
Anti-Terrorism Council, G.R. No. 178552, October 5, 2010)
The Standing Requirement
The Court will exercise its power of judicial review only if the case is brought
before it by a party who has the legal standing to raise the constitutional or legal
question. -- The Court will exercise its power of judicial review only if the case is brought before
it by a party who has the legal standing to raise the constitutional or legal question. "Legal
standing" means a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained
or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged; while
"interest" refers to material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree or act
assailed, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental
interest. The interest of the plaintiff must be personal and not one based on a desire to vindicate
the constitutional right of some third and unrelated party. (Aguinaldo v. Aquino, , G.R. No.
224302, February 21, 2017)
Legal standing defined: A personal, substantial and material interest in a case

such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the
challenged governmental act. -- "Legal standing" or locus standi has been defined as a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct
injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. (Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No.
204819, April 8, 2014)
"Interest" refers to material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree
or act assailed, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental
interest. The interest of the plaintiff must be personal and not one based on a desire to vindicate
the constitutional right of some third and unrelated party. (Aguinaldo v. Aquino, , G.R. No.
224302, February 21, 2017)
Locus standi or legal standing. -- It is defined as a personal and substantial interest

in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged
governmental act. (Umali v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 228628, July 25, 2017)
Locus Standi: The requirements of Injury, Causation and Redressability. -- The

party must show that (1) he will personally suffer some actual or threatened injury because of the
allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged
action; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. If the asserted injury is
more imagined than real, or is merely superficial and insubstantial, an excursion into
constitutional adjudication by the courts is not warranted. (Roy v. Herbosa, G.R. No. 207246,
November 22, 2016)
Legal standing as a citizen: The direct injury requirement. -- When suing as a

citizen, the interest of the petitioner assailing the constitutionality of a statute must be direct and
personal. He must be able to show, not only that the law or any government act is invalid, but also
that he sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its
enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. (Umali v. Judicial
and Bar Council, G.R. No. 228628, July 25, 2017)

16
Legal standing as a tax payer: There must be a showing of illegal disbursement
of public funds. -- In the case of a taxpayer, he is allowed to sue where there is a claim that
public funds are illegally disbursed, or that public money is being deflected to any improper
purpose, or that there is a wastage of public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law. (Umali v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 228628, July 25, 2017)
Legal standing as a tax payer: The case must involve illegal disbursement of
public funds or the exercise of the spending or taxing power of Congress. -- A taxpayer's
suit is allowed only when the petitioner has demonstrated the direct correlation of the act
complained of and the disbursement of public funds in contravention of law or the Constitution,
or has shown that the case involves the exercise of the spending or taxing power of Congress. (Roy
v. Herbosa, G.R. No. 207246, November 22, 2016)
Legal standing as a legislator: There must be an invasion of the powers,

prerogatives and privileges of Congress. -- Each member of Congress has a legal standing
to sue even without an enabling resolution for that purpose so long as the questioned acts invade
the powers, prerogatives and privileges of Congress. Otherwise stated, whenever the acts affect
the powers, prerogatives and privileges of Congress, anyone of its members may validly bring an
action to challenge the same to safeguard and maintain the sanctity thereof. (Umali v. Judicial
and Bar Council, G.R. No. 228628, July 25, 2017)
Locus standi: Mere membership in the Bar is not sufficient. -- The requisite is not
met by the expedient invocation of one's citizenship or membership in the bar who has an interest
in ensuring that laws and orders of the Philippine government. The general and equivocal
allegations of petitioners on their legal standing do not justify the relaxation of the locus standi
rule. (Roy v. Herbosa, G.R. No. 207246, November 22, 2016)
When direct injury on the part of the petitioner is

not required for judicial review
When the case is of transcendental or paramount importance to the public: The

standing requirement may be relaxed and the suit may be allowed even where there
is no direct injury to the petitioner. – In cases of paramount importance where serious
constitutional questions are involved, the standing requirement may be relaxed and a suit may be
allowed to prosper even where there is no direct injury to the party claiming the right of judicial
review. (Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014; Biraogo v. Philippine Truth
Commission, G.R. No. 192935, December 7, 2010)
The Court has already uniformly ruled that absence of direct injury on the part of the party
seeking judicial review may be excused when the latter is able to craft an issue of transcendental
importance. In Lim v. Executive Secretary, this Court held that in cases of transcendental
importance, the cases must be settled promptly and definitely, and so, the standing requirements
may be relaxed. (Aquino v. Comelec, G.R. No. 189793, April 7, 2010)
The Court has adopted a liberal attitude on the locus standi of a petitioner where the
petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people, as when the issues
raised are of paramount importance to the public. (Initiatives for Dialogue and Empowerment
[IDEAL] v. Power Sector Liabilities and Management Corporation [PSALM], G.R. No. 192088,
October 9, 2012)
The rule on standing is a matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed when the public
interest so requires, such as when the matter is of transcendental importance, of overreaching
significance to society, or of paramount public interest. (Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, April
8, 2014; Espina v. Zamora, G.R. No. 143855, September 21, 2010)
If the petition is anchored on a public right, such as the people’s right to

information, any citizen can be the real party in interest. -- If the petition is anchored on
a public right, such as the people’s right to information on matters of public concern, any citizen
can be the real party in interest. The requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact
that the petitioner is a citizen, and therefore, part of the general public which possesses the right.
(Initiatives for Dialogue and Empowerment [IDEAL] v. Power Sector Liabilities and
Management Corporation [PSALM], G.R. No. 192088, October 9, 2012)
In case of a facial challenge on grounds of overbreadth or vagueness: Petitioner

need not claim a violation of his own rights. -- A facial challenge on grounds of overbreadth
or vagueness is an exception to the prohibition on third-party standing. A petitioner may mount
a “facial” challenge to the constitutionality of a statute even if he claims no violation of his own

17
rights under the assailed statute where it involves free speech on grounds of overbreadth or
vagueness of the statute. This is to counter the “chilling effect” on protected speech. (Disini v.
Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 203335, February 18, 2014)
In a facial challenge, the party need not claim that a statute is unconstitutional
as applied to him. -- In overbreadth analysis, challenges to a statute are permitted to raise the
rights of third parties; and the court invalidates the entire statute "on its face," not merely "as
applied for." A particular litigant need not claim that a statute is unconstitutional as applied to
him or her. This is to remove the "chilling" or deterrent effect of the overbroad statute on third
parties. (Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network v. Anti-Terrorism Council, G.R. No.
178552, October 5, 2010)
Environmental cases - Any Filipino citizen, as a steward of nature, can file an

action before the courts for violations of our environmental laws. -- The Rules of
Procedure for Environmental Cases allow for a "citizen suit," and permit any Filipino citizen, as
a steward of nature, to file an action before our courts for violations of our environmental laws.
This collapses the traditional rule on personal and direct interest, on the principle that humans
are stewards of nature. (Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape of Tañon Strait v.
Secretary Reyes, G.R. No. 180771, April 21, 2015)
Political Questions
Political questions – to be decided by the people, or the executive or legislative

branch. -- Political questions refer to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to
be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. (Belgica v.
Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013; Vinuya v. Executive Secretary, G.R.
No. 162230, April 28, 2010)
A question is political, and not judicial, if it is a matter which is to be exercised by the

people in their primary political capacity, or that it has been specifically delegated to some other
department or particular officer of the government, with discretionary power to act. (The Diocese
of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015)
Political questions: Questions of wisdom, not the legality, of a particular

measure. -- Political questions are concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not the
legality, of a particular measure. (Belgica v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 208566, November 19,
2013; Vinuya v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 162230, April 28, 2010)
Court may not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of a law. It may do so
where an attendant unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion results. (Imbong v. Ochoa,
G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014)
Political questions: Questions of policy, not the legality, of a particular

measure. -- As they are concerned with questions of policy and issues dependent upon the
wisdom, not legality of a particular measure, political questions used to be beyond the ambit of
judicial review. However, the scope of the political question doctrine has been limited by Section
1 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution when it vested in the judiciary the power to determine
whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. (Ocampo v. Enriquez, G.R. No.
225973, November 08, 2016)
The issue to be resolved in political questions - whether or not the government

branch committed grave abuse of discretion. -- When political questions are involved, the
Constitution limits the determination to whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the official whose action is being
questioned. (The Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 205728, January 21,
2015)
Examples of political questions in recent jurisprudence
The conduct of foreign relations is a political question. -- The conduct of the

foreign relations is committed by the Constitution to the executive and legislative departments.
The Executive Department has the exclusive prerogative to determine whether to espouse Filipino
citizens’ claims against Japan. (Vinuya v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 162230, 28 April 2010)

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The sufficiency of form and substance of an impeachment complaint is a
political question. -- The determination of whether a narration of facts in an impeachment
complaint constitutes an impeachable offense is purely a political question. (Gutierrez v. House
of Representatives, G.R. No. 193459, February 15, 2011)
Who to appoint is a political question. -- Who to appoint is "a political question

involving considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide." For the
betterment of government service, the appointing authority may consider other "abstract
criteria," aside from the minimum qualifications set by law in making appointments. (Abad v.
Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 207422, March 18, 2015)
Whether or not the House observed its own internal rules of procedure, such
as in the election of its Minority Leader, is a political question. -- Under the Constitution,
the House has sole control over method and manner of choosing its officers other than the
Speaker. The method of choosing its officers must be prescribed by the House, not the courts.
Moreover, the House has sole authority to determine the rules of its proceedings. Mere matters of
procedure of the House are of no concern to the courts. The Supreme Court has no authority to
interfere and intrude into that exclusive realm. Thus, the Supreme Court cannot pry into the
internal workings of the House. Thus, the petition for mandamus, insisting that Rep. Baguilat
should be recognized as the Minority Leader in light of: (a) the "long-standing tradition" in the
House where the candidate who garnered the second (2nd)-highest number of votes for
Speakership automatically becomes the Minority Leader; and (b) the irregularities attending Rep.
Suarez's election to said Minority Leader position -- must be dismissed. (Baguilat v. Alvarez, G.R.
No. 227757, July 25, 2017)
President Duterte's decision to have the remains of Marcos interred at the

LNMB involves a political question because the decision is a question of policy based
on his wisdom that it will promote national healing and forgiveness. -- President
Duterte's decision to have the remains of Marcos interred at the Libingan ng Mga Bayani (LNMB)
involves a political question that is not a justiciable controversy. In the exercise of his powers
under the Constitution and the Executive Order (E.O.) No. 292 (otherwise known as the
Administrative Code of 1987) to allow the interment of Marcos at the LNMB, which is a land of
the public domain devoted for national military cemetery and military shrine purposes, President
Duterte decided a question of policy based on his wisdom that it shall promote national healing
and forgiveness. The President's decision to bury Marcos at the LNMB is in accordance with the
Constitution, the law or jurisprudence. There is no clear constitutional or legal basis to hold that
there was a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction which would
justify the Court to interpose its authority to check and override an act entrusted to the judgment
of another branch. (Ocampo v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 225973, November 08, 2016)
Examples of issues that are NOT political questions
The legality of the pork barrel system. -- The validity of the Pork Barrel System is
not a political question because it is not an issue dependent upon the wisdom of the political
branches of government but rather a legal one which the Constitution itself has commanded the
Court to act upon. (Belgica v. Executive Secretary Ochoa, G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013)
The sufficiency of the factual basis for the declaration of martial law. -- The
third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII (Executive Department) of the 1987 Constitution which
provides: The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within
thirty days from its filing. Section 18, Article VII reveals that it specifically grants authority to the
Court to determine the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The factual basis of the declaration of
martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is not a political
question but precisely within the ambit of judicial review. (Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R. No.
231658 July 4, 2017)
Doctrine of Operative Fact
Under the doctrine of operative fact, in the interest of fair play, the actions
previous to the declaration of unconstitutionality are legally recognized, because the
existence of a law or executive act prior to its invalidation is an operative fact. -- As a
general rule, an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it
affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not been passed at all. This
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rule, however, is not absolute. Under the doctrine of operative facts, actions previous to the
declaration of unconstitutionality are legally recognized. They are not nullified. This is essential
in the interest of fair play. The doctrine of operative fact nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional
law by recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a determination of unconstitutionality
is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot always be ignored. (Chavez v.
Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 202242, July 17, 2012)
Under the doctrine of operative fact, notwithstanding the finding of

unconstitutionality in the composition of the JBC, all its prior official actions are
nonetheless valid. -- The doctrine of operative fact is applicable when a declaration of
unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those who have relied on the invalid
law. Under the circumstances, the Court finds the exception applicable in this case and holds that
notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in the current composition of the JBC, all its
prior official actions are nonetheless valid. (Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 202242,
July 17, 2012)
Under the doctrine of operative fact, DAP-funded projects should not be

nullified. -- As a general rule, the nullification of an unconstitutional law or act carries with it
the illegality of its effects. However, in cases where nullification of the effects will result in inequity
and injustice, the operative fact doctrine may apply. Bearing in mind the disastrous impact of
nullifying P 144.378 Billion worth of projects by virtue alone of the invalidation of certain acts
under the DAP, the Court has upheld the efficacy of such DAP-funded projects by applying the
operative fact doctrine. (Araullo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 209287, February 3, 2015)
THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
Privilege of Speech and Debate
The "speech or debate" covered by the parliamentary immunity of Members of

Congress refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of their
official functions, such as speeches delivered, statements made, or votes cast in the
halls of Congress, while the same is in session, as well as bills introduced in Congress,
and other acts in the official discharge of their duties as members of Congress. --
Private respondent filed a Complaint for Damages against petitioner, for the latter's alleged
defamatory statements before the media, specifically his repeated accusations that private
respondent is a mere "dummy" of VP Binay. In the complaint, the plaintiff stated that the
defamatory statements were made in broadcast and print media, not during a Senate hearing. In
his answer, petitioner contended that his statements, having been made in the course of the
performance of his duties as a Senator, are covered by his parliamentary immunity under Article
VI, Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution. (Section 11. A Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be
privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No Member shall be questioned nor be
held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee
thereof.) Petitioner argued that the claim of falsity of statements made by a member of Congress
does not destroy the privilege of parliamentary immunity, and the authority to discipline said
member lies in the assembly or the voters and not the courts.
The phrase "speech or debate refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the

performance of their official functions, such as speeches delivered, statements made, or votes cast
in the halls of Congress, while the same is in session, as well as bills introduced in Congress,
whether the same is in session or not, and other acts performed by Congressmen, either in
Congress or outside the premises housing its offices, in the official discharge of their duties as
members of Congress and of Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform its functions
as such, at the time of the performance of the acts in question. (Trillanes IV v. Castillo-
Marigomen, G.R. No. 223451, March 14, 2018)
Media statements in response to media interviews during breaks in plenary and

committee hearings in the Senate fall outside the privilege of speech or debate under
Section 11, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. Such statements not part of any
speech delivered in the Senate or any of its committees, spoken in the course of any
debate in said fora, or in the official discharge or performance of petitioner's duties
as a Senator. The remarks were not part of or integral to the legislative process. To
participate in media interviews is not an official function of any lawmaker. --
Petitioner's statements in media interviews are not covered by the parliamentary “speech or
debate" privilege. Petitioner admits that he uttered the questioned statements, describing private
respondent as former VP Binay's "front" or "dummy" in connection with the so-called Hacienda
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Binay, in response to media interviews during gaps and breaks in plenary and committee hearings
in the Senate. It is evident that petitioner's remarks fall outside the privilege of speech or debate
under Section 11, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. The statements were clearly not part of any
speech delivered in the Senate or any of its committees. They were also not spoken in the course
of any debate in said fora. The remarks were not part of or integral to the legislative process.
Parliamentary non-accountability cannot be invoked when the lawmaker's speech or

utterance is made outside sessions, hearings or debates in Congress, extraneous to the "due
functioning of the (legislative) process." To participate in or respond to media interviews is not
an official function of any lawmaker; it is not demanded by his sworn duty nor is it a component
of the process of enacting laws. A lawmaker's participation in media interviews is not a legislative
act, but is "political in nature," outside the ambit of the immunity conferred under the Speech or
Debate Clause in the 1987 Constitution. Contrary to petitioner's stance, therefore, he cannot
invoke parliamentary immunity to cause the dismissal of private respondent's Complaint. The
privilege arises not because the statement is made by a lawmaker, but because it is uttered in
furtherance of legislation. (Trillanes IV v. Castillo-Marigomen, G.R. No. 223451, March 14, 2018)
Purpose of Speech or Debate Clause: Not to make Members of Congress

absolutely impervious to prosecution or civil action, and not to protect them against
prosecutions for their own benefit, but to enable them, as the people's
representatives, to perform the functions without fear of being made responsible
before the courts or other forums outside Congress. -- The Speech or Debate Clause in our
Constitution did not turn our Senators and Congressmen into "super-citizens" whose spoken
words or actions are rendered absolutely impervious to prosecution or civil action. It was intended
to protect them against government pressure and intimidation aimed at influencing their
decision-making prerogatives. Indeed, the privilege of speech or debate, which may "(enable)
reckless men to slander and even destroy others," is not a cloak of unqualified impunity; its
invocation must be "as a means of perpetuating inviolate the functioning process of the legislative
department." The parliamentary non-accountability thus granted to members of Congress is not
to protect them against prosecutions for their own benefit, but to enable them, as the people's
representatives, to perform the functions of their office without fear of being made responsible
before the courts or other forums outside the congressional hall. (Trillanes IV v. Castillo-
The legislative body and the voters, not the courts, would serve as the
disciplinary authority to correct abuses committed in the name of parliamentary
immunity, if the questionable remarks were made in the performance of legislative
functions. Statements falling outside the privilege and giving rise to civil injury or
criminal responsibility will not foreclose judicial review. -- Petitioner argues that the RTC
had no jurisdiction over the case, and asserts that the authority to discipline a member of Congress
lies in the assembly or the voters and not the courts. The questioned statements in this case,
however, were admittedly made in response to queries from the media during gaps in the Senate's
plenary and committee hearings, thus, beyond the purview of privileged speech or debate under
Section 11, Article VI of the Constitution.
Clearly, the Court's pronouncement that the legislative body and the voters, not the courts,
would serve as the disciplinary authority to correct abuses committed in the name of
parliamentary immunity, was premised on the questionable remarks being made in the
performance of legislative functions, on the legislative floor or committee rooms where the
privilege of speech or debate may be invoked. Necessarily, therefore, statements falling outside
the privilege and giving rise to civil injury or criminal responsibility will not foreclose judicial
review.
An action for damages on account of defamatory statements not constituting protected or

privileged "speech or debate" is a controversy well within the courts' authority to settle. Petitioner
cannot successfully invoke parliamentary non-accountability to insulate his statements, uttered
outside the "sphere of legislative activity," from judicial review. (Trillanes IV v. Castillo-
Prerogative to Choose its Own Officers and

Sole Authority to Determine the Rules of its Proceedings
Why the Supreme Court cannot rule on the issue of who is the validly elected
Minority Leader of the House: The House has the prerogative on the method and
manner of choosing officers other than the Speaker. The House has the sole authority
to "determine the rules of its proceedings." The Supreme Court has no authority to
interfere and intrude into this exclusive realm. -- Under Section 16 (1), Article VI of the
21
1987 Constitution, the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall be elected by a majority vote
of its entire membership. Said provision also states that the House of Representatives may decide
to have officers other than the Speaker, and that the method and manner as to how these officers
are chosen is something within its sole control. The method of choosing who will be such other
officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the constitutional
provision. Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the House of Representatives itself, not
by the Court.
Corollary thereto, Section 16 (3), Article VI of the Constitution vests in the House of
Representatives the sole authority to, inter alia, "determine the rules of its proceedings." These
"legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, do not have the imprints of permanence and
obligatoriness during their effectivity. In fact, they 'are subject to revocation, modification or
waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them.' Being merely matters of procedure, their
observance are of no concern to the courts, for said rules may be waived or disregarded by the
legislative body at will, upon the concurrence of a majority of the House of Representatives.
" Hence, as a general rule, the Court has no authority to interfere and unilaterally intrude into
that exclusive realm, without running afoul of Constitutional principles that it is bound to protect
and uphold. Constitutional respect and a becoming regard for the sovereign acts of a coequal
branch prevents the Court from prying into the internal workings of the [House of
Representatives. (Baguilat v. Alvarez, G.R. No. 227757, July 25, 2017)
Legislation
The "one title-one subject" rule does not require the Congress to employ in the
title a precise index or catalogue of all the contents of the bill. The rule is sufficiently
complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as to include the general object
which the statute seeks to effect. -- The petitioners also question the constitutionality of the
RH Law, claiming that it violates Section 26(1 ), Article VI of the Constitution, prescribing the one
subject-one title rule. According to them, being one for reproductive health with responsible
parenthood, the assailed legislation violates the constitutional standards of due process by
concealing its true intent - to act as a population control measure.
The RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule. The "one title-one subject" rule
does not require the Congress to employ in the title of the enactment language of such precision
as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. The rule is
sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as to include the general object
which the statute seeks to effect, and where, as here, the persons interested are informed of the
nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. In this case, a textual
analysis of the various provisions of the law shows that both "reproductive health" and
"responsible parenthood" are interrelated and germane to the overriding objective to control the
population growth. (Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014)
Why the Congressional Pork Barrel System (under PDAF) is void

The Court defines the Pork Barrel System as the collective body of rules and practices that
govern the manner by which lump-sum, discretionary funds, primarily intended for local projects,
are utilized through the respective participations of the Legislative and Executive branches of
government, including its members. The Pork Barrel System involves two (2) kinds of lump-sum
discretionary funds:
First, there is the Congressional Pork Barrel which is herein defined as a kind of lump-
sum, discretionary fund wherein legislators, either individually or collectively organized into
committees, are able to effectively control certain aspects of the fund’s utilization through various
post-enactment measures and/or practices. In particular, petitioners consider the PDAF, as it
appears under the 2013 GAA, as Congressional Pork Barrel since it is, inter alia, a post-enactment
measure that allows individual legislators to wield a collective power; and Second, there is the
Presidential Pork Barrel which is herein defined as a kind of lump-sum, discretionary fund which
allows the President to determine the manner of its utilization. (Belgica v. Executive Secretary,
G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013)
The PDAF/”Pork Barrel System” violates the principle of separation of powers,

as it authorizes legislators to participate in the post-enactment phases of project
implementation, such as project identification, fund release and fund realignment,
thus allowing legislators to intervene and/or assume duties that properly belong to
the sphere of budget execution. -- There is a violation of the separation of powers principle
when one branch of government unduly encroaches on the domain of another or there is
impermissible (a) interference with and/or (b) assumption of another department‘s functions.
22
The enforcement of the national budget, as primarily contained in the GAA, is indisputably
a function both constitutionally assigned and entrusted to the Executive branch. Thus, unless the
Constitution provides otherwise, the Executive department should exclusively exercise all roles
and prerogatives which go into the implementation of the national budget as provided under the
GAA as well as any other appropriation law. The Legislative branch of government, much more
any of its members, should not cross over the field of implementing the national budget since, as
earlier stated, the same is properly the domain of the Executive. Upon approval and passage of
the GAA, Congress‘ law-making role necessarily comes to an end and from there the Executive‘s
role of implementing the national budget begins.
The defining feature of all forms of Congressional Pork Barrel would be the authority of
legislators to participate in the post-enactment phases of project implementation. At its core,
legislators – may it be through project lists, prior consultations or program menus – have been
accorded post-enactment authority to identify the projects they desire to be funded through
various Congressional Pork Barrel allocations. Aside from the area of project identification,
legislators have also been accorded post-enactment authority in the areas of fund release and
realignment. Clearly, these post-enactment measures which govern the areas of project
identification, fund release and fund realignment are not related to functions of congressional
oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or assume duties that properly belong to
the sphere of budget execution. The fundamental rule [is] – from the moment the law becomes
effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in
the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of powers and
is thus unconstitutional. (Belgica v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013)
The PDAF/”Pork Barrel System” violates the principle of non-delegation of

legislative power considering that an individual legislator is given the authority to
dictate (a) how much fund would go to (b) a specific project or beneficiary that he
himself also determines, two (2) acts that comprise the exercise of the power of
appropriation, which is lodged in Congress. -- Only Congress, acting as a bicameral body,
and the people, through the process of initiative and referendum, may constitutionally wield
legislative power and no other. This premise embodies the principle of non-delegability of
legislative power, and the only recognized exceptions thereto would be: (a) delegated legislative
power to local governments which, by immemorial practice, are allowed to legislate on purely
local matters; and (b) constitutionally-grafted exceptions such as the authority of the President
to, by law, exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy in times
of war or other national emergency, or fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations
and restrictions as Congress may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and
wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development
program of the Government.
The 2013 PDAF Article, insofar as it confers post-enactment identification authority to

individual legislators, violates the principle of non-delegability since said legislators are effectively
allowed to individually exercise the power of appropriation, which is lodged in Congress. That the
power to appropriate must be exercised only through legislation is clear from Section 29(1),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which states that: "No money shall be paid out of the Treasury
except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law." The power of appropriation involves (a)
the setting apart by law of a certain sum from the public revenue for (b) a specified purpose.
Essentially, under the 2013 PDAF Article, individual legislators are given a personal lump-sum
fund from which they are able to dictate (a) how much from such fund would go to (b) a specific
project or beneficiary that they themselves also determine. As these two (2) acts comprise the
exercise of the power of appropriation and given that the 2013 PDAF Article authorizes individual
legislators to perform the same, undoubtedly, said legislators have been conferred the power to
legislate which the Constitution does not, however, allow. (Belgica v. Executive Secretary, G.R.
No. 208566, November 19, 2013)
The PDAF/”Pork Barrel System” undermines the system of checks and balance
by impairing the President’s item veto power. For the President to exercise his item-
veto power, there must be a proper "item" which may be the object of the veto.
Because PDAF is a lump-sum appropriation, the actual items of PDAF appropriation
would not have been written into the General Appropriations Bill and thus effectuated
without veto consideration. The legislator‘s identification of the projects after the
passage of the GAA denies the President the chance to veto that item later on. -- A
prime example of a constitutional check and balance would be the President’s power to veto an
item written into an appropriation, revenue or tariff bill submitted to him by Congress for
approval through a process known as "bill presentment." The President‘s item-veto power is
found in Section 27(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. For the President to exercise his item-
veto power, it necessarily follows that there exists a proper "item" which may be the object of the
veto. An item, as defined in the field of appropriations, pertains to "the particulars, the details,
23
the distinct and severable parts of the appropriation or of the bill." An item of an appropriation
bill obviously means an item which, in itself, is a specific appropriation of money, not some
general provision of law which happens to be put into an appropriation bill.
An appropriation bill, to ensure that the President may be able to exercise his power of
item veto, must contain "specific appropriations of money" and not only "general provisions"
which provide for parameters of appropriation. An item of appropriation must be an item
characterized by singular correspondence – meaning an allocation of a specified singular amount
for a specified singular purpose, otherwise known as a "line-item.
In these cases, petitioners claim that "in the current x x x system where the PDAF is a
lump-sum appropriation, the legislator‘s identification of the projects after the passage of the GAA
denies the President the chance to veto that item later on." The Court agrees with petitioners.
Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of P24.79 Billion only appears as a collective
allocation limit since the said amount would be further divided among individual legislators who
would then receive personal lump-sum allocations and could, after the GAA is passed, effectively
appropriate PDAF funds based on their own discretion. As these intermediate appropriations are
made by legislators only after the GAA is passed and hence, outside of the law, it necessarily means
that the actual items of PDAF appropriation would not have been written into the General
Appropriations Bill and thus effectuated without veto consideration. (Belgica v. Executive
Secretary Ochoa, G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013)
The PDAF/”Pork Barrel System” undermines public accountability by impairing

Congress’ oversight functions considering that legislators would, in effect, be
checking on activities in which they themselves participate. It also violates the
constitutional prohibition on legislators’ intervention on matters where he may be
called upon to act.-- Petitioners further relate that the system under which various forms of
Congressional Pork Barrel operate defies public accountability as it renders Congress incapable
of checking itself or its Members. In particular, they point out that the Congressional Pork Barrel
"gives each legislator a direct, financial interest in the smooth, speedy passing of the yearly
budget" which turns them "from fiscalizers" into "financially-interested partners."
The Court agrees with petitioners that certain features embedded in some forms of
Congressional Pork Barrel, among others the 2013 PDAF Article, has an effect on congressional
oversight. The fact that individual legislators are given post-enactment roles in the
implementation of the budget makes it difficult for them to become disinterested "observers"
when scrutinizing, investigating or monitoring the implementation of the appropriation law. To a
certain extent, the conduct of oversight would be tainted as said legislators, who are vested with
post-enactment authority, would, in effect, be checking on activities in which they themselves
participate. Also, it must be pointed out that this very same concept of post-enactment
authorization runs afoul of Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that no
Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall not intervene in any matter before any
office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to act on
account of his office.
Clearly, allowing legislators to intervene in the various phases of project implementation

– a matter before another office of government – renders them susceptible to taking undue
advantage of their own office. (Belgica v. Executive Secretary Ochoa, G.R. No. 208566,
November 19, 2013)
The PDAF/”Pork Barrel System” violates the constitutional principles on local

autonomy as it allows district representatives who are national officers to substitute
the judgement of local officials on use of public funds for local development. A
Congressman can simply bypass the local development council and initiate projects
on his own. -- Petitioners contend that the Congressional Pork Barrel goes against the
constitutional principles on local autonomy since it allows district representatives, who are
national officers, to substitute their judgments in utilizing public funds for local development. The
Court agrees with petitioners.
With PDAF, a Congressman can simply bypass the local development council and initiate
projects on his own, and even take sole credit for its execution. Indeed, this type of personality-
driven project identification has not only contributed little to the overall development of the
district, but has even contributed to "further weakening infrastructure planning and coordination
efforts of the government."
Thus, insofar as individual legislators are authorized to intervene in purely local matters
and thereby subvert genuine local autonomy, the 2013 PDAF Article as well as all other similar

24
forms of Congressional Pork Barrel is deemed unconstitutional. (Belgica v. Executive Secretary
Ochoa, G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013)
Why the Presidential Pork Barrel System is void

Failure to comply with the sufficient standard test for delegated rule-making:
The phrase "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the
President" under Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative
power insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient standard to adequately determine
the limits of the President‘s authority. -- Section 8 of PD 910 creates a Special Fund
comprised of "all fees, revenues, and receipts of the Energy Development Board from any and all
sources" (a determinable amount) "to be used to finance energy resource development and
exploitation programs and projects of the government and for such other purposes as may be
hereafter directed by the President."
There are two (2) fundamental tests to ensure that the legislative guidelines for delegated
rule-making are indeed adequate. The first test is called the "completeness test." Case law states
that a law is complete when it sets forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or
implemented by the delegate. On the other hand, the second test is called the "sufficient standard
test." A law lays down a sufficient standard when it provides adequate guidelines or limitations in
the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate‘s authority and prevent the delegation from
running riot. To be sufficient, the standard must specify the limits of the delegate‘s authority,
announce the legislative policy, and identify the conditions under which it is to be implemented.
The Court agrees with petitioners that the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be
hereafter directed by the President" under Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of
legislative power insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient standard to adequately determine the
limits of the President‘s authority with respect to the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds
may be used. As it reads, the said phrase gives the President wide latitude to use the Malampaya
Funds for any other purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows him to unilaterally appropriate
public funds beyond the purview of the law. Thus, while Section 8 of PD 910 may have passed the
completeness test since the policy of energy development is clearly deducible from its text, the
phrase "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" under the
same provision of law should nonetheless be stricken down as unconstitutional as it lies
independently unfettered by any sufficient standard of the delegating law. (Belgica v. Executive
Secretary Ochoa, G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013)
Legislative Inquiry and the Contempt Power
The Senate as an institution is "continuing", but in the conduct of its day-to-

day business, the Senate of each Congress acts separately and independently of the
Senate of the Congress before it. All pending matters and proceedings, i.e., unpassed
bills and even legislative investigations, of the Senate of a particular Congress are
considered terminated upon the expiration of that Congress. -- In Neri v. Senate, the
Court clarified the nature of the Senate as continuing body. Certainly, there is no debate that the
Senate as an institution is "continuing", as it is not dissolved as an entity with each national
election or change in the composition of its members. However, in the conduct of its day-to-day
business the Senate of each Congress acts separately and independently of the Senate of the
Congress before it. The Rules of the Senate itself confirms this when it states. All pending matters
and proceedings, i.e., unpassed bills and even legislative investigations, of the Senate of a
particular Congress are considered terminated upon the expiration of that Congress and it is
merely optional on the Senate of the succeeding Congress to take up such unfinished matters, not
in the same status, but as if presented for the first time. The logic and practicality of such a rule is
readily apparent considering that the Senate of the succeeding Congress (which will typically have
a different composition as that of the previous Congress) should not be bound by the acts and
deliberations of the Senate of which they had no part.
Based on the above-pronouncement, the Senate is a continuing institution. However, in

the conduct of its day-to-day business, the Senate of each Congress acts separately and
independently of the Senate of the Congress before it. Due to the termination of the business of
the Senate during the expiration of one (1) Congress, all pending matters and proceedings, such
as unpassed bills and even legislative investigations, of the Senate are considered terminated upon
the expiration of that Congress and it is merely optional on the Senate of the succeeding Congress
to take up such unfinished matters, not in the same status, but as if presented for the first time.
The termination of the Senate's business and proceedings after the expiration of Congress was
utilized by the Court in ruling that the Senate needs to publish its rules for its legislative inquiries
in each Congress. (Balag v. Senate of the Philippines, G.R. No. 234608, July 3, 2018)
25
The Constitution states that Congress, in conducting inquiries in aid of
legislation, must respect the rights of persons appearing in or affected therein. An
indefinite and unspecified period of detention for being cited for contempt will
amount to excessive restriction and will certainly violate any person's right to liberty.
-- Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution states that Congress, in conducting inquiries in aid of
legislation, must respect the rights of persons appearing in or affected therein. Under Arnault,
however, a witness or resource speaker cited in contempt by the Senate may be detained
indefinitely due to its characteristic as a continuing body. The said witness may be detained for a
day, a month, a year, or even for a lifetime depending on the desire of the perpetual Senate.
Certainly, in that case, the rights of persons appearing before or affected by the legislative inquiry
are in jeopardy. The constitutional right to liberty that every citizen enjoys certainly cannot be
respected when they are detained for an indefinite period of time without due process of law.
An indefinite and unspecified period of detention will amount to excessive restriction and
will certainly violate any person's right to liberty. As discussed in Lopez, Congress' power of
contempt rests solely upon the right of self-preservation and does not extend to the infliction of
punishment as such. It is a means to an end and not the end itself. Even arguendo that detention
under the legislative's inherent power of contempt is not entirely punitive in character because it
may be used by Congress only to secure information from a recalcitrant witness or to remove an
obstruction, it is still a restriction to the liberty of the said witness. It is when the restrictions
during detention are arbitrary and purposeless that courts will infer intent to punish. Courts will
also infer intent to punish even if the restriction seems to be related rationally to the alternative
purpose if the restriction appears excessive in relation to that purpose. An indefinite and
unspecified period of detention will amount to excessive restriction and will certainly violate any
person's right to liberty. (Balag v. Senate of the Philippines, G.R. No. 234608, July 3, 2018)
The importance of the power of contempt: The Senate's inherent power of

contempt is of utmost importance. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or
effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the
legislations are intended to affect or change. Some means of compulsion is essential
to obtain what is needed through the power of contempt during legislative inquiry. -
- The Senate's inherent power of contempt is of utmost importance. A legislative body cannot
legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the
legislations are intended to affect or change. Mere requests for such information are often
unavailing, and also that information which is volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so
some means of compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed through the power of contempt
during legislative inquiry. While there is a presumption of regularity that the Senate will not
gravely abuse its power of contempt, there is still a lingering and unavoidable possibility of
indefinite imprisonment of witnesses as long as there is no specific period of detention, which is
certainly not contemplated and envisioned by the Constitution. Thus, the Court must strike a
balance between the interest of the Senate and the rights of persons cited in contempt during
legislative inquiries. (Balag v. Senate of the Philippines, G.R. No. 234608, July 3, 2018)
The period of imprisonment for contempt during inquiries in aid of legislation

should only last until the termination of the legislative inquiry under which the said
power is invoked. The legislative inquiry of the Senate terminates on two instances:
First, upon the approval or disapproval of the Committee Report. At that point, the
power of contempt simultaneously ceases and the detained witness should be
released. Second, upon the expiration of one Congress. As the legislative inquiry ends
upon that expiration of one Congress, the imprisonment of the detained witnesses
likewise ends. -- The Court finds that the period of imprisonment under the inherent power of
contempt by the Senate during inquiries in aid of legislation should only last until the termination
of the legislative inquiry under which the said power is invoked. In Arnault, it was stated that
obedience to its process may be enforced by the Senate Committee if the subject of investigation
before it was within the range of legitimate legislative inquiry and the proposed testimony called
relates to that subject. Accordingly, as long as there is a legitimate legislative inquiry, then the
inherent power of contempt by the Senate may be properly exercised. Conversely, once the said
legislative inquiry concludes, the exercise of the inherent power of contempt ceases and there is
no more genuine necessity to penalize the detained witness.
Further, the Court rules that the legislative inquiry of the Senate terminates on two
instances: First, upon the approval or disapproval of the Committee Report. The Senate
Committee is required to issue a Committee Report after the conduct of the legislative inquiry.
The importance of the Committee Report is highlighted in the Senate Rules because it mandates
that the committee begin the consideration of its Report within fifteen (15) days from the
conclusion of the inquiry. Evidently, the Committee Report is the culmination of the legislative

26
inquiry. Its approval or disapproval signifies the end of such legislative inquiry and it is now up
to the Senate whether or not to act upon the said Committee Report in the succeeding order of
business. At that point, the power of contempt simultaneously ceases and the detained witness
should be released. As the legislative inquiry ends, the basis for the detention of the recalcitrant
witness likewise ends. Second, the legislative inquiry of the Senate also terminates upon the
expiration of one (1) Congress. All pending matters and proceedings, such as unpassed bills and
even legislative investigations, of the Senate are considered terminated upon the expiration of
that Congress and it is merely optional on the Senate of the succeeding Congress to take up such
unfinished matters, not in the same status, but as if presented for the first time. Again, while the
Senate is a continuing institution, its proceedings are terminated upon the expiration of that
Congress at the final adjournment of its last session. Hence, as the legislative inquiry ends upon
that expiration, the imprisonment of the detained witnesses likewise ends. (Balag v. Senate of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 234608, July 3, 2018)
What Congress can do if it wants to extend the imprisonment of a person cited

for contempt: It can enact a law or amend the existing law that penalizes the refusal
of a witness to testify or produce papers during inquiries in aid of legislation. The
charge of contempt by Congress shall be tried before the courts, where the
contumacious witness will be heard. -- If Congress believes that there is a necessity to
supplement its power of contempt by extending the period of imprisonment beyond the conduct
of its legislative inquiry or beyond its final adjournment of the last session, then it can enact a law
or amend the existing law that penalizes the refusal of a witness to testify or produce papers during
inquiries in aid of legislation. This constitutes as the statutory power of contempt, which is
different from the inherent power of contempt.
Congress' statutory power of contempt has been recognized in foreign jurisdictions.

Notably, there is an existing statutory provision under Article 150 of the Revised Penal Code,
which penalizes the refusal of a witness to answer any legal inquiry before Congress. Verily, the
said law may be another recourse for the Senate to exercise its statutory power of contempt. The
period of detention provided therein is definite and is not limited by the period of the legislative
inquiry. Of course, the enactment of a new law or the amendment of the existing law to augment
its power of contempt and to extend the period of imprisonment shall be in the sole discretion of
Congress. (Balag v. Senate of the Philippines, G.R. No. 234608, July 3, 2018)
Martial law and the Role of Congress
Congress is not constitutionally mandated to convene in joint session following

the President's proclamation of martial law, except for the specific purpose of
revoking the President's declaration. -- Under Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987
Constitution, in the event that the President proclaims a state of martial law and/or suspends the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the Philippines or any part thereof, Congress is not
constitutionally mandated to convene in joint session, except to vote jointly to revoke the
President's declaration or suspension. The provision in Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987
Constitution requiring the Congress to vote jointly in a joint session is specifically for the purpose
of revocation of the President's proclamation of martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus. Thus, when the Senate and House of Representatives already
separately adopted resolutions expressing support for President Duterte's Proclamation No. 216,
and given their already evident lack of intent to revoke the same, there is no obligation on the part
of the Congress to convene in joint session. (Padilla v. Congress of the Philippines, G.R. No.
231671, July 25, 2017)
There is no violation of the right to public information if public joint sessions

are not held, as each house may adopt its own rules and hold executive sessions in
case of confidential matters. -- The Congress did not violate the right of the public to
information when it did not convene in joint session where public viewing is allowed. Based on
their internal rules, each House has the discretion over the manner by which Congressional
proceedings are to be conducted. Sessions are generally open to the public, but each House may
decide to hold an executive session due to the confidential nature of the subject matter to be
discussed and deliberated upon. (Padilla v. Congress of the Philippines, G.R. No. 231671, July 25,
2017)
THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
Power of the President to Defend the State

27
The President as the guardian - The power to defend the State and to act as its
representative in the international sphere inheres in the person of the President. --
The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people. The duty to protect the State
and its people must be carried out earnestly and effectively throughout the whole territory of the
Philippines in accordance with the constitutional provision on national territory. Hence, the
President of the Philippines, as the sole repository of executive power, is the guardian of the
Philippine archipelago.
To carry out this important duty, the President is equipped with authority over the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP), which is the protector of the people and the state. In addition,
the Executive is constitutionally empowered to maintain peace and order; protect life, liberty, and
property; and promote the general welfare. The President also carries the mandate of being the
sole organ in the conduct of foreign relations. Clearly, the power to defend the State and to act as
its representative in the international sphere inheres in the person of the President. (Saguisag v.
Ochoa, G.R. No. 212426, January 12, 2016)
Only the President can exercise the powers of the Commander-in-Chief, which
must be exercised by him in person. -- Executive power is granted only to the President. It
is only the President, as Executive, who is authorized to exercise emergency powers as provided
under Section 23, Article VI, of the Constitution, as well as the calling-out powers under Section
7, Article VII thereof. There are certain acts which, by their very nature, may only be performed
by the president as the Head of the State. One of these acts or prerogatives is the bundle of
Commander-in-Chief powers. These powers must be exercised by him in person. Thus, the
provincial governor does not possess the same calling-out powers as the President. The calling-
out powers contemplated under the Constitution is exclusive to the President. (Kulayan v. Tan,
G.R. No. 187298, July 03, 2012)
Power to Declare Martial Law and Judicial Review of such Exercise
The power of the Supreme Court – to determine the sufficiency of the factual
basis of the proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus. -- The Constitution specifically grants authority to the Supreme Court to
determine the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The factual basis of the declaration of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is not a political question but precisely
within the ambit of judicial review. Moreover, the Constitution also relaxed the rule on standing
by allowing any citizen to question before this Court the sufficiency of the factual basis of such
proclamation or suspension. (Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017)
Supreme Court’s review of the proclamation of martial law can be simultaneous

with and independent from Congress’ power to revoke. -- The power to review by the
Court and the power to revoke by Congress are totally different and independent from each other
although concededly, they have the same trajectory, which is, the nullification of the presidential
proclamation. The Court can simultaneously exercise its power of review with, and independently
from, the power to revoke by Congress. Corollary, any perceived inaction or default on the part of
Congress does not deprive or deny the Court of its power to review. (Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R.
No. 231658, July 4, 2017)
Presidential judgment call on military powers: The power to choose, initially,

which among these extraordinary powers (calling out powers, suspension of the
privilege of the writ, proclamation of martial law) to wield in a given set of conditions
-- is a judgment call on the part of the President. The Supreme Court’s power of
judicial review does not extend to calibrating the President’s decision. -- The power
and prerogative to determine whether the situation warrants a mere exercise of the calling out
power; or whether the situation demands suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus; or whether it calls for the declaration of martial law, lies, at least initially, with the
President. The power to choose, initially, which among these extraordinary powers to wield in a
given set of conditions is a judgment call on the part of the President. The power of judicial review
does not extend to calibrating the President's decision pertaining to which extraordinary power
to avail given a set of facts or conditions. To do so would be tantamount to an incursion into the
exclusive domain of the Executive and an infringement on the prerogative that solely, at least
initially, lies with the President. (Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017)
Facial review of the proclamation of martial law on the grounds of vagueness

is unwarranted because the proclamation does not regulate speech and judicial
review does not cover the constitutionality of the implementing and/or operational
guidelines issued after the proclamation. -- Proclamation No. 216 is being facially
challenged on the ground of "vagueness" by the insertion of the phrase "other rebel groups" and
28
in its Whereas Clause and for lack of available guidelines specifying its actual operational
parameters within the entire Mindanao region, making the proclamation susceptible to broad
interpretation, misinterpretation, or confusion. Facial review of the proclamation of martial law
on the grounds of vagueness is unwarranted. The proclamation does not regulate speech, religious
freedom, and other fundamental rights that may be facially challenged. What it seeks to penalize
is conduct, not speech. Judicial review covers only the sufficiency of information or data available
to or known to the President prior to, or at the time of, the declaration or suspension. There is no
need for the Court to determine the constitutionality of the implementing and/or operational
guidelines, general orders, arrest orders and other orders issued after the proclamation for being
irrelevant to its review. (Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017)
Nullification of a proclamation of martial law declaration will not affect a

proclamation in the exercise of calling out powers because the President can exercise
one power independently of the other. -- The calling out power is in a different category
from the power to declare martial law and the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus. Nullification of a proclamation of martial law declaration will not affect a proclamation in
the exercise of calling out powers. The President may exercise the power to call out the Armed
Forces independently of the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and to
declare martial law, although, of course, it may also be a prelude to a possible future exercise of
the latter powers, as in this case. (Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017)
Scope of judicial review is limited to the sufficiency of the factual basis, not
correctness of the President’s decision. The Court does not need to satisfy itself that
the President's decision is correct, rather it only needs to determine whether the
President's decision had sufficient factual basis. -- The phrase "sufficiency of factual basis"
in Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution should be understood as the only test for judicial
review of the President's power to declare martial law and suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution. The Court does not need to
satisfy itself that the President's decision is correct, rather it only needs to determine whether the
President's decision had sufficient factual basis. (Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R. No. 231658, July 4,
2017)
Basis for determination of the sufficiency of the factual basis: Facts or

information known by or available to the President at the time he made the
declaration or suspension, which facts or information are found in the Proclamation
and the written Report to Congress. -- The determination of the Supreme Court as to
whether there is sufficient factual basis for the exercise of such, must be based only on facts or
information known by or available to the President at the time he made the declaration or
suspension, which facts or information are found in the proclamation as well as the written Report
submitted by him to Congress. (Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017)
Review is confined to the sufficiency, not accuracy, of the factual basis:

Falsities of and/or inaccuracies in some of the facts stated in the proclamation and
the written report are not enough reasons to invalidate the declaration and/or
suspension if there are other facts in the proclamation and the written Report that
support the conclusion. -- The Supreme Court's review is confined to the sufficiency, not
accuracy, of the information at hand during the declaration or suspension; subsequent events do
not have any bearing insofar as the Court's review is concerned. Falsities of and/or inaccuracies
in some of the facts stated in the proclamation and the written report are not enough reasons for
the Court to invalidate the declaration and/or suspension as long as there are other facts in the
proclamation and the written Report that support the conclusion that there is an actual invasion
or rebellion and that public safety requires the declaration and/or suspension. The court’s review
would be limited to whether the facts in his possession prior to and at the time of the declaration
or suspension are sufficient for him to declare martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus. (Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017)
No need for the Supreme Court to conduct an independent investigation. -- The

determination by the Supreme Court of the sufficiency of factual basis must be limited only to the
facts and information mentioned in the Report and Proclamation. The Supreme Court cannot
"undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings." (Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R.
No. 231658, July 4, 2017)
What the Supreme Court must determine -- only sufficiency, not accuracy, of
the factual basis. -- The purpose of judicial review is not the determination of accuracy or
veracity of the facts upon which the President anchored his declaration of martial law or
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; rather, only the sufficiency of the factual
basis as to convince the President that there is probable cause that rebellion exists. The allegation
in the Lagman Petition that the facts stated in Proclamation No. 216 and the Report are false,
inaccurate, simulated, and/or hyperbolic, does not persuade. The Supreme Court is not concerned
29
about absolute correctness, accuracy, or precision of the facts because to do so would unduly tie
the hands of the President in responding to an urgent situation. (Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R. No.
231658, July 4, 2017)
The public safety requirement: Rebellion alone does not justify the declaration
of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; the public
safety requirement must likewise be present. -- The overriding and paramount concern of
martial law is the protection of the security of the nation and the good and safety of the public.
Rebellion alone does not justify the declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus; the public safety requirement must likewise be present. (Lagman v.
Medialdea, G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017)
Parameters for determining the sufficiency of the factual basis for the
declaration of martial law: 1) actual invasion or rebellion; 2) public safety requires
the exercise of such power; and 3) there is probable cause for the President to believe
that there is actual rebellion or invasion. -- Section 18, Article VII itself sets the parameters
for determining the sufficiency of the factual basis for the declaration of martial law and/or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, "namely (1) actual invasion or rebellion,
and (2) public safety requires the exercise of such power." Without the concurrence of the two
conditions, the President's declaration of martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus must be struck down. In determining the existence of rebellion, the
President only needs to convince himself that there is probable cause or evidence showing that
more likely than not a rebellion was committed or is being committed. To require him to satisfy a
higher standard of proof would restrict the exercise of his emergency powers. Probable cause is
the most reasonable, most practical and most expedient standard by which the President can fully
ascertain the existence or non-existence of rebellion necessary for a declaration of martial law or
suspension of the writ. This is because unlike other standards of proof, which, in order to be met,
would require much from the President and therefore unduly restrain his exercise of emergency
powers, the requirement of probable cause is much simpler. To summarize, the parameters for
determining the sufficiency of factual basis are as follows: l) actual rebellion or invasion; 2) public
safety requires it; the first two requirements must concur; and 3) there is probable cause for the
President to believe that there is actual rebellion or invasion. (Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R. No.
231658, July 4, 2017)
Territorial coverage: The President's duty to maintain peace and public safety
is not limited only to the place where there is actual rebellion. It extends to other
areas where the present hostilities are in danger of spilling over. The discretion to
determine the territorial scope of martial law lies with the President. -- The 1987
Constitution grants to the President, as Commander-in-Chief, the discretion to determine the
territorial coverage or application of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus. He may put the entire Philippines or only a part thereof under martial law. The
discretion to determine the territorial scope of martial law lies with the President. The
Constitution grants him the prerogative whether to put the entire Philippines or any part thereof
under martial law. There is no constitutional edict that martial law should be confined only in the
particular place where the armed public uprising actually transpired. Moreover, the President's
duty to maintain peace and public safety is not limited only to the place where there is actual
rebellion; it extends to other areas where the present hostilities are in danger of spilling over.
Clearly, the power to determine the scope of territorial application belongs to the President.
(Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017)
Diplomatic Power
The President is the sole organ in the conduct of foreign relations. -- The
President is the sole organ in the conduct of foreign relations. The presidential role in foreign
affairs is dominant and the President is traditionally accorded a wider degree of discretion in the
conduct of foreign affairs. (Saguisag v. Executive Secretary Ochoa, G.R. No. 212426, January 12,
2016)
A treaty is required for initial entry of foreign military bases, troops and
facilities. -- The constitutional restriction on foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in the
Philippines refers solely to the initial entry of the foreign military bases, troops, or facilities. Once
entry is authorized, the subsequent acts are thereafter subject only to the limitations provided by
the rest of the Constitution and Philippine law, and not to the Section 25 requirement of validity
through a treaty. (Saguisag v. Executive Secretary Ochoa, G.R. No. 212426, January 12, 2016)
When executive agreements on foreign military bases, troops and facilities are
valid.-- The President may enter into an executive agreement on foreign military bases, troops,
30
or facilities, if (a) it is not the instrument that allows the presence of foreign military bases, troops,
or facilities; or (b) it merely aims to implement an existing law or treaty. The EDCA can be in the
form of an executive agreement, since it merely involves "adjustments in detail" in the
implementation of the Mutual Defense Treaty and the Visiting Forces Agreement. (Saguisag v.
Executive Secretary Ochoa, G.R. No. 212426, January 12, 2016)
As the sole organ of our foreign relations, the President may generally enter into executive
agreements subject to limitations defined by the Constitution and may be in furtherance of a
treaty already concurred in by the Senate. (Saguisag v. Executive Secretary Ochoa, G.R. No.
212426, January 12, 2016)
Executive agreements are international agreements embodying adjustments

of detail carrying out well-established national policies. -- Executive agreements are
international agreements embodying adjustments of detail carrying out well-established national
policies and traditions and those involving arrangements of a more or less temporary nature.
These can cover a wide array of subjects that have various scopes and purposes. (Saguisag v.
Executive Secretary Ochoa, G.R. No. 212426, January 12, 2016)
Treaties require Senate ratification, executive agreement do not.-- Treaties

are formal documents which require ratification with the approval of two-thirds of the
Senate. Executive agreements become binding through executive action without the need of a
vote by the Senate or by Congress. (Saguisag v. Executive Secretary Ochoa, G.R. No. 212426,
January 12, 2016)
An international agreement may take different forms. -- Treaty, act, protocol,

agreement, concordat, compromis d'arbitrage, convention, covenant, declaration, exchange of
notes, statute, pact, charter, agreed minute, memorandum of agreement, modus vivendi, or some
other form. Under international law, the distinction between a treaty and an international
agreement or even an executive agreement is irrelevant for purposes of determining international
rights and obligations. (Saguisag v. Executive Secretary Ochoa, G.R. No. 212426, January 12,
2016)
Distinctions between executive agreements and treaties. -- Executive agreements

must remain traceable to an express or implied authorization under the Constitution, statutes, or
treaties. Treaties are, by their very nature, considered superior to executive agreements. Treaties
are products of the acts of the Executive and the Senate unlike executive agreements, which are
solely executive actions. (Saguisag v. Executive Secretary Ochoa, G.R. No. 212426, January 12,
2016)
Constitutional limitations on the President's prerogative in concluding

international agreements. -- There are constitutional provisions that restrict or limit the
President's prerogative in concluding international agreements, such as those that involve the
following:
a. The policy of freedom from nuclear weapons within Philippine territory
b. The fixing of tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and
other duties or imposts, which must be pursuant to the authority granted by Congress
c. The grant of any tax exemption, which must be pursuant to a law concurred in by a
majority of all the Members of Congress
d. The contracting or guaranteeing, on behalf of the Philippines, of foreign loans that must
be previously concurred in by the Monetary Board
e. The authorization of the presence of foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in the
country must be in the form of a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate.
f. For agreements that do not fall under paragraph 5, the concurrence of the Senate is
required, should the form chosen be a treaty. (Saguisag v. Executive Secretary Ochoa, G.R. No.
212426, January 12, 2016)
The Court does not look into whether an international agreement should be in
the form of a treaty or an executive agreement; it is the President’s prerogative.-- The
Court does not look into whether an international agreement should be in the form of a treaty or
an executive agreement, save in cases in which the Constitution or a statute requires otherwise.
In view of the vast constitutional powers and prerogatives of the President in foreign affairs, the
task of the Court is to determine whether the international agreement is consistent with the
applicable limitations. (Saguisag v. Executive Secretary Ochoa, G.R. No. 212426, January 12,
2016)

31
Executive agreements may cover the matter of foreign military forces if it merely involves
detail adjustments. (Saguisag v. Executive Secretary Ochoa, G.R. No. 212426, January 12, 2016)
Basic requirements for the validity executive agreement. --
1. Section 25, Article XVIII of the Constitution, contains stringent requirements that must
be fulfilled by the international agreement allowing the presence of foreign military bases, troops,
or facilities in the Philippines: (a) the agreement must be in the form of a treaty, and (b) it must
be duly concurred in by the Senate.
2. If the agreement is not covered by the above situation, then the President may choose
the form of the agreement (i.e., either an executive agreement or a treaty), provided that the
agreement dealing with foreign military bases, troops, or facilities is not the principal agreement
that first allows their entry or presence in the Philippines.
3. The executive agreement must not go beyond the parameters, limitations, and
standards set by the law and/or treaty that the former purports to implement; and must not
unduly expand the international obligation expressly mentioned or necessarily implied in the law
or treaty.
4. The executive agreement must be consistent with the Constitution, as well as with
existing laws and treaties. (Saguisag v. Executive Secretary Ochoa, G.R. No. 212426, January 12,
2016)
Power to Transfer Appropriations
Constitutional requisites for a valid transfer of appropriated funds: 1) law

authorizing the transfer; 2) savings; and 3) transfer is to augment an item in the
general appropriations law for their respective offices. -- The transfer of appropriated
funds, to be valid under Section 25(5), supra, must be made upon a concurrence of the following
requisites, namely: (1) There is a law authorizing the President, the President of the Senate, the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads
of the Constitutional Commissions to transfer funds within their respective offices; (2) The funds
to be transferred are savings generated from the appropriations for their respective offices; and
(3) The purpose of the transfer is to augment an item in the general appropriations law for their
respective offices. (Araullo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014)
Why the transfer of funds under DAP is invalid
Invalid authority. --The GAAs of 2011 and 2012 authorized the transfers "to augment
any item in this Act", and the effect was that the 2011 and 2012 GAAs allowed the transfer of funds
to augment any item in the GAAs, even if the item belonged to an office outside the Executive, in
contravention of the Constitution. (Araullo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014)
Funds transferred were not necessarily savings. -- The transfer of funds under DAP
is invalid because DAP funds were not necessarily “savings.” Savings are realized only when the
purpose for which the funds had been allocated were already satisfied, or the need for such funds
had ceased to exist. Funds described as “unreleased or unallotted” are not necessarily savings.
(Araullo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014)
Transfers were made to non-existing items or non-existing provisions in the

GAA. -- The transfer of funds under DAP is invalid because DAP funds were not transferred to
augment existing items in the GAA. There must be an existing item, project or activity, purpose
or object of expenditure with an appropriation to which savings may be transferred for the
purpose of augmentation. The power to augment cannot be used to fund non-existent items in the
GAA. (Araullo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014)
The power to augment cannot be used to fund non-existent provisions in the GAA.
(Araullo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 209287, February 3, 2015)
Cross-border transfers are prohibited. -- The transfer of funds under DAP is invalid
because some of the transfers of appropriation were not made to their respective offices. Cross-
border transfers, whether as augmentation, or as aid, are prohibited. (Araullo v. Aquino, G.R. No.
209287, July 1, 2014)
Power of Appointment

32
The ban on midnight appointments under Section 15, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution. -- Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the
end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary
appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public
service or endanger public safety. (Velicaria-Garafil v. Office of the President, G.R. No. 203372,
June 16, 2015)
The concurrence of all procedural steps in the Presidential appointment

process is required for valid appointments outside the midnight appointment ban: 1)
Presidential signing of the appointment; 2) transmittal to the MRO; 3) receipt by the
appointee; 4) and acceptance by the appointee by taking oath or assumption of office.
-- Any valid appointment, including one made under the exception provided in Section 15, Article
VII of the 1987 Constitution, must consist of the following: 1) President signing an appointee's
appointment paper to a vacant office; 2) the official transmittal of the appointment paper
(preferably through the Malacañang Records Office (MRO); 3) receipt of the appointment paper
by the appointee; and 4) acceptance of the appointment by the appointee evidenced by his or her
oath of office or his or her assumption to office. The Constitution allows the President to exercise
the power of appointment during the period not covered by the appointment ban, and disallows
(subject to an exception) the President from exercising the power of appointment during the
period covered by the appointment ban. The concurrence of all steps in the appointment process
is required for appointments outside the appointment ban. (Velicaria-Garafil v. Office of the
President, G.R. No. 203372, June 16, 2015)
Elements for a valid appointment: (1) authority to appoint and evidence of the
exercise of the authority; (2) transmittal of the appointment paper and evidence of
the transmittal; (3) a vacant position at the time of appointment; and (4) receipt of
the appointment paper and acceptance of the appointment. There is no valid
appointment if the process lacks even one step. -- The following elements should always
concur in the making of a valid (which should be understood as both complete and effective)
appointment: (1) authority to appoint and evidence of the exercise of the authority; (2) transmittal
of the appointment paper and evidence of the transmittal; (3) a vacant position at the time of
appointment; and (4) receipt of the appointment paper and acceptance of the appointment by the
appointee who possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications. The concurrence
of all these elements should always apply, regardless of when the appointment is made, whether
outside, just before, or during the appointment ban. There is no valid appointment if the process
lacks even one step. (Velicaria-Garafil v. Office of the President, G.R. No. 203372, June 16, 2015)
It is not enough that the President signs the appointment paper; there should
be evidence that the President intended the appointment paper to be issued. -- It is
not enough that the President signs the appointment paper. There should be evidence that the
President intended the appointment paper to be issued. It could happen that an appointment
paper may be dated and signed by the President months before the appointment ban, but never
left his locked drawer for the entirety of his term. Release of the appointment paper through the
MRO is an unequivocal act that signifies the President's intent of its issuance. The inclusion of
acceptance by the appointee as an integral part of the entire appointment process prevents the
abuse of the Presidential power to appoint. Petitioners have failed to show compliance with all
four elements of a valid appointment. They cannot prove with certainty that their appointment
papers were transmitted before the appointment ban took effect. On the other hand, petitioners
admit that they took their oaths of office during the appointment ban. (Velicaria-Garafil v. Office
of the President, G.R. No. 203372, June 16, 2015)
The constitutional prohibition on midnight appointments only applies to

presidential appointments; it does not apply to appointments made by local chief
executives. -- A midnight appointment "refers to those appointments made within two months
immediately prior to the next presidential election." Midnight appointments are prohibited under
Article VII, Section 15 of the Constitution:
SECTION 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the
end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary
appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or
endanger public safety.
However, the constitutional prohibition on midnight appointments only applies to

presidential appointments. It does not apply to appointments made by local chief executives.
(Provincial Government of Aurora v. Marco, G.R. No. 202331, April 22, 2015)

33
Why the President can disregard the clustering of nominees by the Judicial and
Bar Council (JBC)
Clustering of nominees to the judiciary by the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC)
restricts the President’s power to choose. -- The power to recommend of the JBC cannot
be used to restrict or limit the President's power to appoint as the latter's prerogative to choose
someone whom he/she considers worth appointing to the vacancy in the Judiciary is still
paramount. As long as the President appoints someone nominated by the JBC, the appointment
is valid. (Aguinaldo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 224302, February 21, 2017)
Clustering of nominees by the JBC restricts the President’s power to determine

the seniority of members of a collegiate court. -- The President's power to appoint
members of a collegiate court, such as the Sandiganbayan, is the power to determine the seniority
or order of preference of such newly appointed members by controlling the date and order of
issuance of said members' appointment or commission papers. By already designating the
numerical order of the vacancies, the JBC would be establishing the seniority or order of
preference of the new Sandiganbayan Associate Justices even before their appointment by the
President and, thus, unduly arrogating unto itself a vital part of the President's power of
appointment. (Aguinaldo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 224302, November 29, 2016)
Clustering of nominees by the JBC can be used as a device to favor or prejudice

a qualified nominee. -- The JBC should give all qualified nominees fair and equal
opportunity to be appointed. The clustering by the JBC of nominees for simultaneous or closely
successive vacancies in collegiate courts can actually be a device to favor or prejudice a particular
nominee. (Aguinaldo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 224302, February 21, 2017)
Clustering of nominees by the JBC is arbitrary, as the JBC has no objective

criteria or guidelines for clustering. -- Without objective criteria, standards, or guidelines in
determining which nominees are to be included in which cluster, the clustering of nominees for
specific vacant posts seems to be at the very least, totally arbitrary. The lack of such criteria,
standards, or guidelines may open the clustering to manipulation to favor or prejudice a qualified
nominee. (Aguinaldo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 224302, February 21, 2017)
Power to Discipline Presidential Appointees
A presidential appointee comes under the disciplinary jurisdiction of the

President in line with the principle that the "power to remove is inherent in the power
to appoint." -- DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao brought charges against Baculi for gross
dishonesty, abuse of authority, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the service. He was immediately placed under preventive suspension for 90 days (i.e., from
September 4 to December 3, 1992) as a consequence. Eventually, DAR Secretary Garilao
dismissed Baculi from the service based on the findings and recommendations of Assistant
Secretary Hector Soliman of the DAR Legal Affairs Office. The CSC affirmed the dismissal of
Baculi with modification. It anchored its affirmance on the vesting of disciplinary jurisdiction in
the Department Secretaries, among others, as provided in Section 47(2), Chapter 7, of Book V of
the Administrative Code of 1987. Whether or not Baculi belonged to the category of officers and
employees under the DAR Secretary's disciplinary jurisdiction was a question to be determined
in conjunction with Section 38(a) of Presidential Decree No. 807 (Civil Service Decree). Section
38(a) of Presidential Decree No. 807 has drawn a definite distinction between subordinate officers
or employees who were presidential appointees, on the one hand, and subordinate officers or
employees who were non-presidential appointees, on the other. Without a doubt, substantial
distinctions that set apart presidential appointees from nonpresidential appointees truly existed.
For one, presidential appointees come under the direct disciplining authority of the President
pursuant to the well-settled principle that, in the absence of a contrary law, the power to remove
or to discipline is lodged in the same authority in whom the power to appoint is vested. Having
the power to remove or to discipline presidential appointees, therefore, the President has the
corollary authority to investigate them and look into their conduct in office. Thus, Baculi, as a
presidential appointee, came under the disciplinary jurisdiction of the President in line with the
principle that the "power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint." As such, the DAR
Secretary held no disciplinary jurisdiction over him. Verily, Presidential Decree No. 807 has
expressly specified the procedure for disciplinary actions involving presidential appointees.
(Baculi v. Office of the President, G.R. No. 188681, March 8, 2017)
Power to Create Executive Offices

or Reorganize the Government

34
Presidential power to create investigating bodies: Pursuant to his duty to
faithfully execute the law, the President has the power to conduct investigations and
create an ad hoc investigating body. -- The creation of the Philippine Truth Commission
finds justification under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution, imposing upon the President
the duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. The President’s power to conduct
investigations to aid him in ensuring the faithful execution of laws – in this case, fundamental
laws on public accountability and transparency – is inherent in the President’s powers as the Chief
Executive. As explained in the landmark case of Marcos v. Manglapus, the powers of the
President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution.
(Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission, G.R. No. 192935, December 7, 2010)
Pardoning Power
The President’s pardoning power cannot be limited by Congress. -- The

pardoning power of the President cannot be limited by legislative action. The only instances in
which the President may not extend pardon remain to be in: (1) impeachment cases; (2) cases that
have not yet resulted in a final conviction; and (3) cases involving violations of election laws, rules
and regulations in which there was no favorable recommendation coming from the COMELEC.
Any act of Congress by way of statute cannot operate to delimit the pardoning power of the
President. Under the present Constitution, "a pardon, being a presidential prerogative, should not
be circumscribed by legislative action." The exercise of the pardoning power is discretionary in
the President and may not be interfered with by Congress or the Court, except only when it
exceeds the limits provided for by the Constitution. This doctrine of non-diminution or non-
impairment of the President’s power of pardon by acts of Congress, specifically through
legislation, was strongly adhered to by an overwhelming majority of the framers of the 1987
Constitution. Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code cannot abridge or diminish the
exclusive power and prerogative of the President to pardon persons convicted of violating penal
statutes. (Risos-Vidal v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015)
Effect of presidential pardon: A presidential pardon restoring to a person his

civil and political rights, includes the restoration of the right to seek public elective
office, which is a political right. -- A close scrutiny of the text of the pardon extended to former
President Estrada shows that both the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua and its accessory
penalties are included in the pardon. The first sentence refers to the executive clemency extended
to former President Estrada who was convicted by the Sandiganbayan of plunder and imposed a
penalty of reclusion perpetua. The latter is the principal penalty pardoned which relieved him of
imprisonment. The sentence that followed, which states that "(h)e is hereby restored to his civil
and political rights," expressly remitted the accessory penalties that attached to the principal
penalty of reclusion perpetua. Hence, even if we apply Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal
Code, it is indubitable from the text of the pardon that the accessory penalties of civil interdiction
and perpetual absolute disqualification were expressly remitted together with the principal
penalty of reclusion perpetua. The right to seek public elective office is recognized by law as falling
under the whole gamut of civil and political rights. Thus, from both law and jurisprudence, the
right to seek public elective office is unequivocally considered as a political right. Hence, the Court
reiterates its earlier statement that the pardon granted to former President Estrada admits no
other interpretation other than to mean that, upon acceptance of the pardon granted to him, he
regained his FULL civil and political rights – including the right to seek elective office. The
disqualification of former President Estrada under Section 40 of the LGC in relation to Section 12
of the OEC was removed by his acceptance of the absolute pardon granted to him. (Risos-Vidal v.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015)
Power of General Supervision over Local Governments
The President’s authority over LGUs is limited to general supervision: No

Presidential approval is required for an LGU to grant additional benefits to LGU
officials and employees. -- Since LGUs are subject only to the power of general supervision of
the President, the President’s authority is limited to seeing to it that rules are followed and laws
are faithfully executed. The President may only point out that rules have not been followed but
the President cannot lay down the rules, neither does he have the discretion to modify or replace
the rules. Thus, the grant of additional compensation like hospitalization and health care
insurance benefits by the LGU to its officials and employees does not need the approval of the
President to be valid. (Province of Negros Occidental v. Commissioners, Commission on Audit,
G.R. No. 182574, September 28, 2010)

35
Presidential Immunity from Suit
The President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be
sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the
Constitution or law. -- President Duterte must be dropped as respondent in this case. The
Court's pronouncement in David v. President Macapagal-Arroyo on the non-suability of an
incumbent President cannot be any clearer: Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his
tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is
no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of the high office of
the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court litigations while serving as such.
Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from any form of harassment, hindrance or
distraction to enable him to fully attend to the performance of his official duties and functions.
Unlike the legislative and judicial branch, only one constitutes the executive branch and anything
which impairs his usefulness in the discharge of the many great and important duties imposed
upon him by the Constitution necessarily impairs the operation of the Government. (Zabal v.
Duterte, G.R. No. 238467, February 12, 2019)
Presidential immunity from suit: A non-sitting President does not enjoy

immunity from suit, even for acts committed during the latter’s tenure. Hence, former
President Arroyo cannot use the presidential immunity from suit to shield herself from
judicial scrutiny, within the context of amparo proceedings, to determine if she was
responsible or accountable for the abduction of a person. -- In Estrada v. Desierto, we
clarified the doctrine that a non-sitting President does not enjoy immunity from suit, even for acts
committed during the latter’s tenure. Further, in our Resolution in Estrada v. Desierto, we
reiterated that given the intent of the 1987 Constitution to breathe life to the policy that a public
office is a public trust, the petitioner, as a non-sitting President, cannot claim executive immunity
for his alleged criminal acts committed while a sitting President. It is clear that former President
Arroyo cannot use the presidential immunity from suit to shield herself from judicial scrutiny that
would assess whether, within the context of amparo proceedings, she was responsible or accountable
for the abduction of Rodriguez. (Rodriguez v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 193160, November 15,
2011)
Purpose of Presidential immunity: It will degrade the dignity of the high office of
the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court litigations while serving
as such. Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from any form of harassment,
hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully attend to the performance of his official
duties and functions. -- The president is the head of the executive branch, a co-equal of the
judiciary under the Constitution. His or her prerogative is entitled to respect from other branches of
government. Inter-branch courtesy is but a consequence of the doctrine of separation of powers. As
such, the president cannot be charged with any suit, civil or criminal in nature, during his or her
incumbency in office. This is in line with the doctrine of the president's immunity from suit.
In David, this Court explained why it is improper to implead the incumbent President of the
Philippines. The doctrine has both policy and practical considerations: Settled is the doctrine that the
President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal
case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of the
high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court litigations while serving
as such. Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from any form of harassment, hindrance or
distraction to enable him to fully attend to the performance of his official duties and functions. Unlike
the legislative and judicial branch, only one constitutes the executive branch and anything which
impairs his usefulness in the discharge of the many great and important duties imposed upon him by
the Constitution necessarily impairs the operation of the Government. However, this does not mean
that the President is not accountable to anyone. Like any other official, he remains accountable to the
people but he may be removed from office only in the mode provided by law and that is by
impeachment. (Kilusang Mayo Uno v. Aquino, G.R. No. 210500, April 2, 2019)
The concept of presidential immunity under our governmental and

constitutional system does not distinguish whether or not the suit pertains to an
official act of the President. Neither does immunity hinge on the nature of the suit. As
the framers of our Constitution understood it, which view has been upheld by relevant
jurisprudence, the President is immune from suit during his tenure. Unlike its American
counterpart, the concept of presidential immunity under our governmental and constitutional
system does not distinguish whether or not the suit pertains to an official act of the President.
Neither does immunity hinge on the nature of the suit. The lack of distinctions prevents us from
making any distinctions. We should still be guided by our precedents. Accordingly, the concept is

36
clear and allows no qualifications or restrictions that the President cannot be sued while holding
such office. (De Lima v. Duterte, G.R. No. 227635, October 15, 2019)
Even if the acts complained of were not done as part of the official duties and
functions of the President, presidential immunity attaches during the entire tenure of
the President. The immunity applies whether or not the acts subject matter of the suit
are part of his duties and functions as President. -- Sen. De Lima maintains that
presidential immunity does not lie because President Duterte's attacks against her are not part of
his official duties and functions; that before presidential immunity applies, there must first be a
balancing of interest; and that the balancing favors her because her right to be protected from
harassment far outweighs the dangers of intrusion on the Office of Chief Executive. Sen. De Lima
wants us to apply principles established by the US Supreme Court in the celebrated cases
of Nixon and Clinton, supra. Such decisions, though persuasive, are not binding as case law for
us. As earlier asserted, the Philippine concept of Presidential immunity from suit diverged from
its foreign roots, from the time of the amendment of the 1973 Constitution. Presidential immunity
in this jurisdiction attaches during the entire tenure of the President. The immunity makes no
distinction with regard to the subject matter of the suit; it applies whether or not the acts subject
matter of the suit are part of his duties and functions as President. Furthermore, no balancing of
interest has ever been applied to Presidential immunity under our jurisprudence. (De Lima v.
Duterte, G.R. No. 227635, October 15, 2019)
Even if the proceedings for the writ of habeas data do not involve the
determination of administrative, civil, or criminal liabilities, the Presidential immunity
applies because the immunity does not hinge on the nature of the suit. The rationale
for the of immunity from suit -- it is important that he be freed from any form of
harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully attend to the performance
of his official duties and functions. -- Sen. De Lima argues that the rationale for Presidential
immunity does not apply in her case because the proceedings for the writ of habeas data do not
involve the determination of administrative, civil, or criminal liabilities. Again, we remind that
immunity does not hinge on the nature of the suit. In short, presidential immunity is not intended
to immunize the President from liability or accountability. The rationale for the grant to the
President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the exercise of Presidential duties and
functions free from any hindrance of distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of the
Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office-holder's time, also demands
undivided attention.
The rationale has been expanded in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo: It will degrade the
dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court
litigations while serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from any form of
harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully attend to the performance of his
official duties and functions. (De Lima v. Duterte, G.R. No. 227635, October 15, 2019)
THE JUDICIARY
Rule-Making Power
The Supreme Court’s rule making power is not shared with Congress or the
Executive. -- The 1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or
supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure. The power to promulgate rules of
pleading, practice and procedure is no longer shared by the Supreme Court with Congress, more
so with the Executive. (Baguio Market Vendors Multi-Purpose Cooperative v. Cabato-Cortes,
G.R. No. 165922, February 26, 2010)
Congress cannot grant exemptions from payment of legal fees as it will infringe
on the rule-making power of the Supreme Court and impair the judiciary’s fiscal
autonomy. -- First, payment of legal fees is part of the rule-making power of the Supreme Court,
which is no longer shared with Congress. Second, any grant by Congress of exemptions from
payment of legal fees will impair the Judiciary’s fiscal autonomy and erode its independence. (Re:
in the Matter of Clarification of Exemption from Payment of all Court and Sheriff's Fees of
Cooperative etc., A.M. No. 12-2-03-0, March 13, 2012)
Court injunctions against Ombudsman investigations: The prohibition under

Section 14, RA 6770 against courts other than the Supreme Court from issuing
provisional injunctive writs to enjoin investigations conducted by the Office of the
Ombudsman encroaches upon the Supreme Court’s rule-making authority and should

37
be considered ineffective, pending deliberation on whether or not the Supreme Court
should adopt such prohibition. -- Section 14, RA 6770, or the Ombudsman Act, which reads:
“Section 14. Restrictions. – No writ of injunction shall be issued by any court to delay an
investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman under this Act, unless there is a prima facie
evidence that the subject matter of the investigation is outside the jurisdiction of the Office of the
Ombudsman. No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision or
findings of the Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court, on pure question of law.“ The first
paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 is a prohibition against any court (except the Supreme Court119)
from issuing a writ of injunction to delay an investigation being conducted by the Office of the
Ombudsman. The Court rules that when Congress passed the first paragraph of Section 14, RA
6770 and, in so doing, took away from the courts their power to issue a TRO and/or WPI to enjoin
an investigation conducted by the Ombudsman, it encroached upon this Court’s constitutional
rule-making authority. Clearly, these issuances, which are, by nature, provisional reliefs and
auxiliary writs created under the provisions of the Rules of Court, are matters of procedure which
belong exclusively within the province of this Court. Through this provision, Congress interfered
with a provisional remedy that was created by this Court under its duly promulgated rules of
procedure, which utility is both integral and inherent to every court’s exercise of judicial power.
Without the Court’s consent to the proscription, as may be manifested by an adoption of the same
as part of the rules of procedure through an administrative circular issued therefor, there thus,
stands to be a violation of the separation of powers principle. In addition, it should be pointed
out that the breach of Congress in prohibiting provisional injunctions, such as in the first
paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770, does not only undermine the constitutional allocation of
powers; it also practically dilutes a court’s ability to carry out its functions. This is so since a
particular case can easily be mooted by supervening events if no provisional injunctive relief is
extended while the court is hearing the same. To give true meaning to the judicial power
contemplated by the Framers of our Constitution, the Court’s duly promulgated rules of procedure
should therefore remain unabridged, this, even by statute. Truth be told, the policy against
provisional injunctive writs in whatever variant should only subsist under rules of procedure duly
promulgated by the Court given its sole prerogative over the same. Thus, pending deliberation
on whether or not to adopt the same, the Court, under its sole prerogative and
authority over all matters of procedure, deems it proper to declare as ineffective the
prohibition against courts other than the Supreme Court from issuing provisional
injunctive writs to enjoin investigations conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman,
until it is adopted as part of the rules of procedure through an administrative circular duly issued
therefor. Hence, with Congress interfering with matters of procedure (through passing the first
paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770) without the Court’s consent thereto, it remains that the CA had
the authority to issue the questioned injunctive writs enjoining the implementation of the
preventive suspension order against Binay, Jr. (Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos.
217126-27, November 10, 2015)
The Supreme Court’s rule-making power does not confer on it primary and
direct jurisdiction over legal education. The supervision and regulation of legal
education is an Executive function. -- Petitioners in G.R. No. 242954 maintain that the
Court exercises authority over the legal profession which includes the admission to the practice
of law, to the continuing requirements for and discipline of lawyers. According to them, the rule-
making power of the Court is plenary in all cases regarding the admission to and supervision of
the practice of law. They argue that the Court's power to admit members to the practice of law
extends to admission to legal education because the latter is a preparatory process to the
application for admission to the legal profession. Contrary to petitioner's claims, the Court has no
primary and direct jurisdiction over legal education. Neither the history of the Philippine legal
education nor the Rules of Court invoked by petitioners support their argument. The supervision
and regulation of legal education is an Executive function. Regulation and supervision of legal
education had been historically and consistently exercised by the political departments. (Pimentel
v. Legal Education Board, G.R. No. 242954, September 10, 2019)
The Court's exclusive power of admission to the Bar vests upon the Court the
authority to define the practice of law, to determine who will be admitted to the
practice of law, to hold in contempt any person found to be engaged in unauthorized
practice of law, and to exercise corollary disciplinary authority over members of the
Bar. The Court's exclusive rule-making power covers the practice of law and not the
study of law. -- The 1987 Constitution departed from the 1935 and the 1973 organic laws in the
sense that it took away from the Congress the power to repeal, alter, or supplement the rules
concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law, and the
integration of the Bar and therefore vests exclusively and beyond doubt, the power to promulgate
such rules to the Court, thereby supporting a "stronger and more independent judiciary." The
Court's exclusive power of admission to the Bar has been interpreted as vesting upon the Court
the authority to define the practice of law, to determine who will be admitted to the practice of

38
law, to hold in contempt any person found to be engaged in unauthorized practice of law, and to
exercise corollary disciplinary authority over members of the Bar.
The act of admitting, suspending, disbarring and reinstating lawyers in the practice of law
is a judicial function because it requires "(1) previously established rules and principles; (2)
concrete facts, whether past or present, affecting determinate individuals; and (3) decision as to
whether these facts are governed by the rules and principles."
Petitioners readily acknowledge that legal education or the study of law is not the practice
of law, the former being merely preparatory to the latter. The definition of the practice of law, no
matter how broad, cannot be further enlarged as to cover the study of law. (Pimentel v. Legal
Education Board, G.R. No. 242954, September 10, 2019)
The Supreme Court and its members should not and cannot be required to
exercise any power or to perform any trust or to assume any duty not pertaining to
or connected with the administering of judicial functions. Regulation and supervision
of legal education is primarily exercised by the Legislative and implemented by the
Executive, thus, it cannot be claimed by the judiciary. -- Section 12, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution clearly provides that "[t]he Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts
established by law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or
administrative functions." The Court exercises judicial power only and should not assume any
duty alien to its judicial functions, the basic postulate being the separation of powers. The
Supreme Court and its members should not and cannot be required to exercise any power or to
perform any trust or to assume any duty not pertaining to or connected with the administering of
judicial functions. Neither may the regulation and supervision of legal education be justified as
an exercise of the Court's "residual" power. A power is residual if it does not belong to either of
the two co-equal branches and which the remaining branch can, thus, exercise consistent with its
functions. Regulation and supervision of legal education is primarily exercised by the Legislative
and implemented by the Executive, thus, it cannot be claimed by the judiciary. (Pimentel v. Legal
Education Board, G.R. No. 242954, September 10, 2019)
The Court has not promulgated any rule that directly and actually regulates
legal education. -- Rules of Court do not support the argument that the Court directly and
actually regulates legal education. While the power of the Court to promulgate rules concerning
admission to the practice of law exists under the 1935 Constitution and reiterated under the 1973
and 1987 Constitutions, the Court has not promulgated any rule that directly and actually
regulates legal education. (Pimentel v. Legal Education Board, G.R. No. 242954, September 10,
2019)
The Rules of Court provide for the requisites and qualifications for admission
to the practice of law and not for admission to the study of law. -- In the exercise of its
power to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law, the Court has
prescribed the subjects covered by, as well as the qualifications of candidates to the bar
examinations. Only those bar examination candidates who are found to have obtained a passing
grade are admitted to the bar and licensed to practice law. The regulation of the admission to the
practice of law goes hand in hand with the commitment of the Court and the members of the
Philippine Bar to maintain a high standard for the legal profession. To ensure that the legal
profession is maintained at a high standard, only those who are known to be honest, possess good
moral character, and show proficiency in and knowledge of the law by the standard set by the
Court by passing the bar examinations honestly and in the regular and usual manner are admitted
to the practice of law. Thus, under the 1997 Rules of Court provide for the requisites and
qualifications for admission to the practice of law and not for admission to the study of law.
(Pimentel v. Legal Education Board, G.R. No. 242954, September 10, 2019)
The Court does not impose upon law schools what courses to teach, or the
degree to grant, but prescribes only the core academic courses which it finds essential
for an applicant to be admitted to the bar. Law schools enjoy the autonomy to teach
or not to teach these courses. -- In turn, to be admitted to the bar examinations, an applicant
must first meet the core academic qualifications prescribed under the Rules of Court. In addition
to the core courses of civil law, commercial law, remedial law, criminal law, public and private
international law, political law, labor and social legislation, medical jurisprudence, taxation, and
legal ethics, Section 5 was further amended by A.M. No. 19-03-24-SC or the Revised Law Student
Practice Rule dated June 25, 2019 to include Clinical Legal Education as a core course that must
be completed by an applicant to the bar examinations. Notably, Section 5, Rule 138 of the Rules
of Court, as amended, is not directed to law schools, but to those who would like to take the bar
examinations and enumerates the academic competencies required of them. The Court does not
impose upon law schools what courses to teach, or the degree to grant, but prescribes only the
core academic courses which it finds essential for an applicant to be admitted to the bar. Law
39
schools enjoy the autonomy to teach or not to teach these courses. In similar fashion, Section 6,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court requires that an applicant to the bar examinations must have
completed a four-year high school course and a bachelor's degree in arts or sciences. Again, this
requirement is imposed upon the applicant to the bar examinations and not to law schools. These
requirements are merely consistent with the nature of a law degree granted in the Philippines
which is a professional, as well as a post-baccalaureate degree. (Pimentel v. Legal Education
Board, G.R. No. 242954, September 10, 2019)
Compliance by law schools with the prescribed core courses is but a recognition
of the Court's exclusive jurisdiction over admissions to the practice of law. -- It is a
reality that the Rules of Court, in prescribing the qualifications in order to take the bar
examinations, had placed a considerable constraint on the courses offered by law schools.
Adjustments in the curriculum, for instance, is a compromise which law schools apparently are
willing to take in order to elevate its chances of graduating future bar examinees. It is in this regard
that the relationship between legal education and admissions to the bar becomes unmistakable.
This, however, does not mean that the Court has or exercises jurisdiction over legal education.
Compliance by law schools with the prescribed core courses is but a recognition of the Court's
exclusive jurisdiction over admissions to the practice of law - that no person shall be allowed to
take the bar examinations and thereafter, be admitted to the Philippine Bar without having taken
and completed the required core courses. (Pimentel v. Legal Education Board, G.R. No. 242954,
September 10, 2019)
The Revised Law Student Practice Rule is intended to ensure access to justice
of the marginalized sectors and to regulate the law student practitioner's limited
practice of law. In allowing the law student and in governing the conduct of the law
student practitioner, what the Court regulates and supervises is not legal education,
but the appearance and conduct of a law student before any trial court, tribunal,
board, or officer, to represent indigent clients of the legal clinic - an activity rightfully
falling under the definition of practice of law. -- The Revised Law Student Practice Rule is
primordially intended to ensure access to justice of the marginalized sectors and to regulate the
law student practitioner's limited practice of law pursuant to the Court's power to promulgate
rules on pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to
the underprivileged. In allowing the law student and in governing the conduct of the law student
practitioner, what the Court regulates and supervises is not legal education, but the appearance
and conduct of a law student before any trial court, tribunal, board, or officer, to represent
indigent clients of the legal clinic - an activity rightfully falling under the definition of practice of
law. Inasmuch as the law student is permitted to act for the legal clinic and thereby to practice
law, it is but proper that the Court exercise regulation and supervision over the law student
practitioner. Necessarily, the Court has the power to allow their appearance and plead their case,
and hereafter, to regulate their actions. To reiterate, the Rules of Court are directed not towards
legal education or law schools, but towards applicants for admission to the bar and applicants for
admission to the bar examinations - consistent with the Court's power to promulgate rules
concerning admission to the practice of law, the same being fundamentally a judicial function.
(Pimentel v. Legal Education Board, G.R. No. 242954, September 10, 2019)
Power to Execute Decisions
The execution of a decision is an integral part of the adjudicative function. --

The execution of a decision is but an integral part of the adjudicative function of the Supreme
Court. Thus, in the execution of its continuing mandamus against agencies of the Executive
Department, the Supreme Court may order such agencies to perform their assigned tasks within
specific time frames or completion periods. The imposition of such time frames or completion
periods is not an encroachment over the powers and functions of the Executive Branch. (Metro
Manila Development Authority [MMDA] v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay, G.R. Nos.
171947-48, February 15, 2011)
Quo Warranto
Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over an action for quo warranto,
including a quo warranto proceeding against an impeachable officer like the Chief
Justice. -- The petition challenges respondent's right and title to the position of Chief Justice.
The Republic avers that respondent unlawfully holds her office because in failing to regularly
declare her assets, liabilities and net worth as member of the career service prior to her
appointment as an Associate Justice, and later as Chief Justice, of the Court, she cannot be said
to possess the requirement of proven integrity demanded of every aspiring member of the
Judiciary. The Republic thus prays that respondent's appointment as Chief Justice be declared

40
void. Respondent counters that, as an impeachable officer, she may only be removed through
impeachment by the Senate sitting as an impeachment court. Supreme Court has original
jurisdiction over an action for quo warranto. Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution, in part,
provides that the Supreme Court shall exercise original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus. This Court, the Court of Appeals and
the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writs, including
quo warranto. While the hierarchy of courts serves as general determinant of the appropriate
forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs, direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original
jurisdiction to issue such writs is allowed when there are special and important reasons therefor,
clearly and specifically set out in the petition. In the instant case, direct resort to the Court is
justified considering that the action for quo warranto questions the qualification of no less than
Member of the Court. The issue of whether person usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or
exercises public office is matter of public concern over which the government takes special interest
as it obviously cannot allow an intruder or impostor to occupy public position. (Republic v.
Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018)
Mandamus
Courts cannot check the exercise of discretion of executive officials in the

determination of the means to be taken by the executive in implementing legislative
or executive policy. -- Mandamus lies to compel the performance of duties that are purely
ministerial in nature, not those that are discretionary. In the performance of an official duty or
act involving discretion, the corresponding official can only be directed by mandamus to act, but
not to act one way or the other. The Supreme Court cannot compel the Climate Change
Commission, the President, the DOTC, DPWH, or DENR to act one way to implement the Road
Sharing Principle - to bifurcate all roads in the country to devote half to sidewalk and bicycling,
and the other to Filipino-made transport - when there is nothing in EO 774, AO 254 and allied
issuances that require that specific course of action in order to implement the same. The
petitioners cannot supplant the executive department's discretion with their own through this
petition for the issuance of writs of kalikasan and continuing mandamus. There is nothing in the
executive issuances relied upon by the petitioners that specifically enjoins the bifurcation of roads
to implement the Road Sharing Principle. At its core, what the petitioners are seeking to compel
is not the performance of a ministerial act, but a discretionary act - the manner of implementation
of the Road Sharing Principle. The continuing mandamus prayed for seeks not the
implementation of an environmental law, rule or regulation, but to control the exercise of
discretion of the executive as to how the principle enunciated in an executive issuance relating to
the environment is best implemented. Clearly, the determination of the means to be taken by the
executive in implementing or actualizing any stated legislative or executive policy relating to the
environment requires the use of discretion. Absent a showing that the executive is guilty of "gross
abuse of discretion, manifest injustice or palpable excess of authority," the general rule applies
that discretion cannot be checked via this petition for continuing mandamus. Hence, the
continuing mandamus cannot issue. (Segovia v. Climate Change Commission, G.R. No. 211010,
March 7, 2017)
Judicial Privilege
Why Congress’ power to cite to in contempt and arrest and detain in the course
of a legislative inquiry cannot be exercised over members of the Judiciary
Power of supervision over judges of lower courts: The Supreme Court has the
Constitutional duty to supervise judges of lower courts in the performance of their
official duties. --The Congressional power to cite in contempt and consequently, to arrest and
detain are indeed awesome. Yet, such could not be used to deprive the Court of its Constitutional
duty to supervise judges of lower courts in the performance of their official duties. The fact
remains that the Court of Appeals Justices are non-impeachable officers. As such, authority over
them primarily belongs to this Court and to no other. To echo the Court's ruling
in Maceda v. Ombudsman Vasquez: The Supreme Court [has] administrative supervision over
all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals down to the
lowest municipal trial court clerk. By virtue of this power, it is only the Supreme Court that can
oversee the judges' and court personnel's compliance with all laws, and take the proper
administrative action against them if they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of
government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of
powers. It is this very principle of the doctrine of separation of powers as enshrined under the
Constitution that urges the Court to carefully tread on areas falling under the sole discretion of
the legislative branch of the government. In point is the power of legislative investigation which
the Congress exercises as a Constitutional prerogative. (Agcaoili v. Marcos, July 3, 2018, G.R. No.
232395)
41
Separation of powers: Because of the principle of separation of powers,
Justices, officials and employees of the Judiciary are exempt and the Judiciary's
privileged and confidential documents and information are excluded
from any compulsory processes, including the Congress' power of inquiry in aid of
legislation. -- The principle of separation of powers also serves as one of the basic postulates for
exempting the Justices, officials and employees of the Judiciary and for excluding the Judiciary's
privileged and confidential documents and information from any compulsory processes which
very well includes the Congress' power of inquiry in aid of legislation. Such exemption has been
jurisprudentially referred to as judicial privilege as implied from the exercise of judicial
power expressly vested in one Supreme Court and lower courts created by law. (Agcaoili v.
Marcos, July 3, 2018, G.R. No. 232395)
When judicial privilege is applicable: The invocation of the Court's judicial

privilege is understood to be limited to matters that are part of the internal
deliberations and actions of the Court in the exercise of the Members' adjudicatory
functions and duties: Judicial privilege is unavailing on matters external to the
Judiciary's deliberative adjudicatory functions and duties. -- However, as in all privileges,
the exercise thereof is not without limitations. The invocation of the Court's judicial privilege is
understood to be limited to matters that are part of the internal deliberations and actions of the
Court in the exercise of the Members' adjudicatory functions and duties. Judicial privilege is
unavailing on matters external to the Judiciary's deliberative adjudicatory functions and duties.
By way of example, the non-confidential matters as including those "information relating to the
commission of crimes or misconduct, or violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct, or any
violation of a law or regulation," and those outside the Justices' adjudicatory functions such as
"financial, budgetary, personnel and administrative matters relating to the operations of the
Judiciary." As a guiding principle, the purpose of judicial privilege, as a child of judicial power, is
principally for the effective discharge of such judicial power. If the matter upon which Members
of the Court, court officials and employees privy to the Court's deliberations, are called to appear
and testify do not relate to and will not impair the Court's deliberative adjudicatory judicial power,
then judicial privilege may not be successfully invoked. (Agcaoili v. Marcos, July 3, 2018, G.R.
No. 232395)
Examples of application of judicial privilege. -- The Court had occasion to illustrate

the application of the rule on judicial privilege and its qualifications to impeachment proceedings
as follows: [W]here the ground cited in an impeachment complaint is bribery, a Justice may be
called as a witness in the impeachment of another Justice, as bribery is a matter external to or is
not connected with the adjudicatory functions and duties of a magistrate. A Justice, however, may
not be called to testify on the arguments the accused Justice presented in the internal debates as
these constitute details of the deliberative process. (Agcaoili v. Marcos, July 3, 2018, G.R. No.
232395)
Judicial privilege cannot be invoked in impeachment proceedings against

Members of the Supreme Court. The matter of impeachment is of such paramount
societal importance that overrides the generalized claim of judicial privilege and as
such, the Court should extend respect to the Senate acting as an Impeachment Court
and give it wide latitude in favor of its function. -- Nevertheless, the traditional application
of judicial privilege cannot be invoked to defeat a positive Constitutional duty. Impeachment
proceedings, being sui generis, is a Constitutional process designed to ensure accountability of
impeachable officers, the seriousness and exceptional importance of which outweighs the claim
of judicial privilege. To be certain, the Court, in giving utmost importance to impeachment
proceedings even as against its own Members, recognizes not the superiority of the power of the
House of Representatives to initiate impeachment cases and the power of the Senate to try and
decide the same, but the superiority of the impeachment proceedings as a Constitutional process
intended to safeguard public office from culpable abuses. In the words of Chief Justice Maria
Lourdes P. A. Sereneo in her Concurring and Dissenting Opinion to the Per Curiam Resolution,
the matter of impeachment is of such paramount societal importance that overrides the
generalized claim of judicial privilege and as such, the Court should extend respect to the Senate
acting as an Impeachment Court and give it wide latitude in favor of its function of exacting
accountability as required by the Constitution. (Agcaoili v. Marcos, July 3, 2018, G.R. No.
232395)
The Judicial and Bar Council
Function of JBC. -- It is the function of the JBC to search, screen, and select nominees
recommended for appointment to the Judiciary. It shall prepare a list with at least three qualified
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nominees for a particular vacancy in the Judiciary to be submitted to the President, who, in turn,
shall appoint from the shortlist for said specific vacancy. (Aguinaldo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 224302,
November 29, 2016)
The President in the exercise of his discretionary power to appoint members of

the Judiciary can validly disregarded the clustering of nominees for a collegiate court
by the JBC. -- The JBC submitted six separate lists, with five to seven nominees each, for the six
vacancies in the Sandiganbayan, particularly, for the 16 th, 17th, 18th, 19th, 20th and 21st Associate
Justices. Petitioners contend that only nominees for the position of the 16 th Sandiganbayan
Associate Justice may be appointed as the 16th Sandiganbayan Associate Justice, and the same
goes for the nominees for each of the vacancies for the 17th, 18th, 19th, 20th, and 21st Sandiganbayan
Associate Justices. Petitioners insist that President Aquino could only choose one nominee from
each of the six separate shortlists submitted by the JBC for each specific vacancy, and no other;
and any appointment made in deviation of this procedure is a violation of the Constitution.
President Aquino validly exercised his discretionary power to appoint members of the Judiciary
when he disregarded the clustering of nominees into six separate shortlists for the vacancies in
the Sandiganbayan Associate Justices. (Aguinaldo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 224302, February 21,
2017)
Only one Congressional representative in the Judicial and Bar Council. -- There
should be only one (1) representative from Congress. (Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R.
No. 202242, July 17, 2012)
JBC can set standards or criteria for selection of nominees. -- JBC’s policy of
requiring five years of service as judges of first-level courts before they can qualify as applicant to
second-level courts is constitutional. The JBC has the authority to set the standards/criteria in
choosing its nominees for every vacancy in the judiciary, subject only to the minimum
qualifications required by the Constitution and law for every position. (Villanueva v. Judicial and
Bar Council, G.R. No. 211833, April 7, 2015)
COMMISSION ON AUDIT
COA’s power to prevent, and disallow irregular, unnecessary, excessive,
extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures of government funds. -- The COA is
endowed with latitude to determine, prevent, and disallow irregular, unnecessary, excessive,
extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures of government funds. The Court has accorded not
only respect but also finality to COA findings especially when their decisions are not tainted with
grave abuse of discretion. (Technical Education and Skills Development Authority v. Commission
on Audit, G.R. No. 196418, February 10, 2015)
Liquidated money claims against the government must be filed with COA. --
COA has primary jurisdiction over money claims against government agencies and
instrumentalities, including local governments. The COA and not the RTC has primary
jurisdiction to pass upon a money claim against a local government unit. (Province of Aklan v.
Jody King Construction and Development Corp., G.R. Nos. 197592 & 20262, November 27, 2013)
COA’s authority over money claims is limited to liquidated claims, or those determined or
readily determinable from vouchers, invoices, and such other papers within reach of accounting
officers. (Province of Aklan v. Jody King Construction and Development Corp., G.R. Nos. 197592
& 20262, November 27, 2013)
When money claims need not be filed first with COA: When there is
unreasonable delay or official inaction to the prejudice the complainant. -- Money
claims against the government need not be filed with COA first, and may be filed directly with the
courts directly, if the case falls under any of the exceptions to the rule on exhaustion of
administrative remedies, such as when there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will
irretrievably prejudice the complainant, or where the question involved is purely legal. Petitioners
aver that respondent should have first filed a claim before the Commission on Audit (COA) before
going to the courts. The government project contracted out to respondent was completed almost
two decades ago. To delay the proceedings by remanding the case to the relevant government
office or agency will definitely prejudice respondent. More importantly, the issues in the present
case involve the validity and the enforceability of the "Contract of Agreement" entered into by the
parties. For almost two decades, the public and the government benefitted from the work done by
respondent. The contractor should be duly compensated for services rendered, which were for the
benefit of the general public. To deny the payment to the contractor of the two buildings which
are almost fully completed and presently occupied by the university would be to allow the

43
government to unjustly enrich itself at the expense of another. Neither can petitioners escape the
obligation to compensate respondent for services rendered and work done by invoking the state’s
immunity from suit. The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an
instrument for perpetrating an injustice to a citizen. (Vigilar v. Aquino, G.R. No. 180388,
January 18, 2011)
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
Jurisdiction of the Comelec
When the COMELEC is exercising its quasi-judicial powers such as in an appeal

from an election protest decided by a trial court, the Commission must decide the
case first in division, and en banc only upon motion for reconsideration. -- When the
COMELEC is exercising its quasi-judicial powers such as in the present case, the Commission is
constitutionally mandated to decide the case first in division, and en banc only upon motion for
reconsideration. The Special Second Division of the COMELEC clearly acted with grave abuse of
discretion when it immediately transferred to the Commission en banc a case that ought to be
heard and decided by a division. Such action cannot be done without running afoul of Section 3,
Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution. It is the COMELEC division that has original appellate
jurisdiction to resolve an appeal to an election protest decided by a trial court. Conclusively, the
Commission en banc acted without jurisdiction when it heard and decided Dumpit’s appeal.
(Eriguel v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 190526, February 26, 2010)
A decision, order or resolution of a division of the Comelec must be reviewed

by the Comelec en banc via a motion for reconsideration before the final en banc
decision may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari. -- The mode by which a
decision, order or ruling of the Comelec en banc may be elevated to the Supreme Court is by the
special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court, now expressly
provided in Rule 64, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. Rule 65, Section 1, 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, as amended, requires that there be no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. A motion for reconsideration is a plain and adequate remedy
provided by law. Failure to abide by this procedural requirement constitutes a ground for
dismissal of the petition. In like manner, a decision, order or resolution of a division of the
Comelec must be reviewed by the Comelec en banc via a motion for reconsideration before the
final en banc decision may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari. The pre-requisite filing
of a motion for reconsideration is mandatory. (Cagas v. Comelec, G.R. No. 194139, January 24,
2012)
General Rule: The Supreme Court has no power to review on certiorari an

interlocutory order or even a final resolution issued by a Division of the COMELEC. --
The governing provision is Section 7, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution, which provides: Section
7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any case or matter
brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A
case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading,
brief, or memorandum required by the rules of the Commission or by the Commission itself.
Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each
Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within
thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof. This provision, although it confers on the Court the
power to review any decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC, limits such power to a final
decision or resolution of the COMELEC en banc, and does not extend to an interlocutory order
issued by a Division of the COMELEC. Otherwise stated, the Court has no power to review on
certiorari an interlocutory order or even a final resolution issued by a Division of the COMELEC.
We have interpreted this provision to mean final orders, rulings and decisions of the COMELEC
rendered in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. This decision must be a final
decision or resolution of the Comelec en banc, not of a division, certainly not an interlocutory
order of a division. The Supreme Court has no power to review via certiorari, an interlocutory
order or even a final resolution of a Division of the Commission on Elections. (Cagas v. Comelec,
G.R. No. 194139, January 24, 2012)
Jurisdiction of Electoral Tribunals v. Jurisdiction of Comelec
The jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the candidate is considered a
Member of the House of Representatives. To be considered a Member of the House of
Representatives, there must be a concurrence of the following requisites: (1) a valid
proclamation, (2) a proper oath, and (3) assumption of office. -- According to petitioner,

44
the COMELEC was ousted of its jurisdiction when she was duly proclaimed because pursuant to
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, the HRET has the exclusive jurisdiction to be the
“sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications” of the Members of
the House of Representatives. Contrary to petitioner’s claim, however, the COMELEC retains
jurisdiction for the following reasons:c First, the HRET does not acquire jurisdiction over the
issue of petitioner’s qualifications, as well as over the assailed COMELEC Resolutions, unless a
petition is duly filed with said tribunal. Petitioner has not averred that she has filed such action.
Second, the jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the candidate is considered a Member of
the House of Representatives, as stated in Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution: The
Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the
sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their
respective Members. As held in Marcos v. COMELEC, the HRET does not have jurisdiction over
a candidate who is not a member of the House of Representatives. The next inquiry, then, is when
is a candidate considered a Member of the House of Representatives? The Court has invariably
held that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed
office as a Member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election
contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction
begins. From the foregoing, it is then clear that to be considered a Member of the House of
Representatives, there must be a concurrence of the following requisites: (1) a valid proclamation,
(2) a proper oath, and (3) assumption of office. (Ongsiako Reyes v. Comelec, G.R. No. 20726,
June 25, 2013)
To be considered a Member of the House, the proclaimed candidate must have

taken the oath of office in accordance with the rules of the House, which requires that
the oath must be made (1) before the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and
(2) in open session. -- The petitioner cannot be considered a Member of the House of
Representatives because, primarily, she has not yet assumed office. To repeat what has earlier
been said, the term of office of a Member of the House of Representatives begins only “at noon on
the thirtieth day of June next following their election.” Thus, until such time, the COMELEC
retains jurisdiction. In her attempt to comply with the second requirement, petitioner attached a
purported Oath Of Office taken before Hon. Feliciano Belmonte Jr. on 5 June 2013. However, this
is not the oath of office which confers membership to the House of Representatives. Section 6,
Rule II (Membership) of the Rules of the House of Representatives provides:
Section 6. Oath or Affirmation of Members. – Members shall take their oath

or affirmation either collectively or individually before the Speaker in open
session.
Consequently, before there is a valid or official taking of the oath it must be made (1) before
the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and (2) in open session. Here, although she made
the oath before Speaker Belmonte, there is no indication that it was made during plenary or in
open session and, thus, it remains unclear whether the required oath of office was indeed
complied with. (Ongsiako Reyes v. Comelec, G.R. No. 20726, June 25, 2013)
Party-list nominees are "elected members" of the House of Representatives;

once the party or organization has been proclaimed and the nominee has taken his
oath and assumed office as member of the House, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction ends
and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins. -- Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution provides
that the HRET shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to, among other things, the
qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives. Since, xxx, party-list nominees are
"elected members" of the House of Representatives no less than the district representatives
are, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their qualifications. By analogy with the
cases of district representatives, once the party or organization of the party-list nominee has been
proclaimed and the nominee has taken his oath and assumed office as member of the House of
Representatives, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his qualifications
ends and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins. (Abayon v. House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal, G.R. No. 189466, February 11, 2010)
The COMELEC has no jurisdiction over a petition for the expulsion from a party-
list organization of an incumbent party-list Member of the House of Representatives.
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution endows the HRET with jurisdiction to
resolve questions on the qualifications of members of Congress. In the case of party-
list representatives, the HRET acquires jurisdiction over a disqualification case upon
proclamation of the winning party-list group, oath of the nominee, and assumption of
office as member of the House of Representatives. -- The instant case involves two rival
factions of the same party-list organization, the Adhikaing Tinataguyod ng Kooperatiba (Ating
Koop). One group is headed by petitioner Atty. Isidro Q. Lico (the Lico Group), who represents

45
the organization in the House of Representatives, and the other group by Amparo T. Rimas
(respondents herein, or the Rimas Group). We find that while the COMELEC correctly dismissed
the Petition to expel petitioner Lico from the House of Representatives for being beyond its
jurisdiction, it nevertheless proceeded to rule upon the validity of his expulsion from Ating Koop-
a matter beyond its purview. The COMELEC notably characterized the Petition for expulsion of
petitioner Lico from the House of Representatives and for the succession of the second nominee
as party-list representative as a disqualification case. For this reason, the COMELEC dismissed
the petition for lack of jurisdiction, insofar as it relates to the question of unseating petitioner Lico
from the House of Representatives. Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution endows the
HRET with jurisdiction to resolve questions on the qualifications of members of Congress. In the
case of party-list representatives, the HRET acquires jurisdiction over a disqualification case upon
proclamation of the winning party-list group, oath of the nominee, and assumption of office as
member of the House of Representatives. In this case, the COMELEC proclaimed Ating Koop as
a winning party-list group; petitioner Lico took his oath; and he assumed office in the House of
Representatives. Thus, it is the HRET, and not the COMELEC, that has jurisdiction over the
disqualification case. (Lico v. Commission on Elections, G. R. No. 205505, September 29, 2015)
The COMELEC also has no jurisdiction to decide on the validity of the expulsion of an
incumbent Member of the House of Representatives from the winning party-list organization that
he represents. His expulsion from the party-list organization is not a mere intra-corporate matter
because it necessarily affects his title as member of Congress. A party-list nominee must have
been, among others, a bona fide member of the party or organization for at least ninety (90) days
preceding the day of the election. It is for the HRET to interpret the meaning of the requirement
of bona fide membership in a party-list organization. Under Section 17, Article VI of the
Constitution, the HRET is the sole judge of all contests when it comes to qualifications of the
members of the House of Representatives. (Lico v. Commission on Elections, G. R. No. 205505,
September 29, 2015)
Contrary to the ruling in Poe, in a Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel COC
on the ground of false material representation, a prior judgment by a competent court
that the candidate is guilty of an election offense is not required before the said
petition can be given due course by the COMELEC: The COMELEC is fully-clothed with
authority to make factual determinations in relation to the election contests before
it. -- The COMELEC is fully-clothed with authority to make factual determinations in relation to
the election contests before it. The COMELEC, as an adjunct to its adjudicatory power, may
investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings. weigh evidence, and draw
conclusions from them as basis for their official action. The sole ground for Petitions to Deny Due
Course or to Cancel COC is false material representation compounded by intent to deceive on the
part of the candidate and that the intent to deceive or mislead will be difficult, if not impossible,
to ascertain absent an established fact that the candidate deviated from. Contrary to Poe, the
COMELEC can be the proper body to make the pronouncement against which the truth or falsity
of a material representation in a COC can be measured. (Francisco v. Comelec, G.R. No. 230249,
April 24, 2018)
Disqualification of Candidates
Petitions to question the qualifications of local candidates: 1) Petition to deny

due course or cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section 28 of the OEC; and 2)
Petition for quo warranto under Section 253 of the OEC after proclamation of the
candidate. -- The fact that the petitioner’s qualifications were not questioned when she filed
certificates of candidacy for 2007 and 2010 elections cannot operate as an estoppel to the petition
for quo warranto before the RTC. Under the Batas Pambansa Bilang 881 (Omnibus Election
Code), there are two instances where a petition questioning the qualifications of a registered
candidate to run for the office for which his certificate of candidacy was filed can be raised, to wit:
(1) Before election, pursuant to Section 78 thereof which provides that:
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of

candidacy. – A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of
candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material
representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition
may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than
fifteen days before the election; and
(2) After election, pursuant to Section 253 thereof, viz:

46
Sec. 253. Petition for quo warranto. – Any voter contesting the election of
any Member of the Batasang Pambansa, regional, provincial, or city officer on the
ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines shall file a sworn
petition for quo warranto with the Commission within ten days after the proclamation of
the results of the election.
Hence, if a person qualified to file a petition to disqualify a certain candidate fails to file
the petition within the twenty-five (25)-day period prescribed by Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code for whatever reasons, the elections laws do not leave him completely helpless as he
has another chance to raise the disqualification of the candidate by filing a petition for quo
warranto within ten (10) days from the proclamation of the results of the election, as provided
under Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code. The above remedies were both available to the
private respondents and their failure to utilize Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code cannot
serve to bar them should they opt to file, as they did so file, a quo warranto petition under Section
253. (Sobejana-Condon v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 198742, August 10, 2012)
Effect of a void certificate of candidacy - no valid candidate, no valid votes: A

void certificate of candidacy on the ground of ineligibility that existed at the time of
the filing of the certificate of candidacy can never give rise to a valid candidacy, and
much less to valid votes. -- A void certificate of candidacy on the ground of ineligibility that
existed at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy can never give rise to a valid
candidacy, and much less to valid votes. Jalosjos’ certificate of candidacy was cancelled because
he was ineligible from the start to run for Mayor. Whether his certificate of candidacy is cancelled
before or after the elections is immaterial because the cancellation on such ground means he was
never a valid candidate from the very beginning, his certificate of candidacy being void ab initio.
Jalosjos’ ineligibility existed on the day he filed his certificate of candidacy, and the cancellation
of his certificate of candidacy retroacted to the day he filed it. Thus, Cardino ran unopposed. There
was only one qualified candidate for Mayor in the May 2010 elections – Cardino – who received
the highest number of votes. (Jalosjos v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 193237, October 9,
2012)
The rule that the second-placer cannot be proclaimed winner if the first-placer
is disqualified or declared ineligible should be limited to situations where the
certificate of candidacy of the first-placer was valid at the time of filing, but
subsequently cancelled for a violation of law that took place, or a legal impediment
that took effect, after the filing of the CoC. -- Decisions of this Court holding that the
second-placer cannot be proclaimed winner if the first-placer is disqualified or declared ineligible
should be limited to situations where the certificate of candidacy of the first-placer was valid at
the time of filing but subsequently had to be cancelled because of a violation of law that took place,
or a legal impediment that took effect, after the filing of the certificate of candidacy. If the
certificate of candidacy is void ab initio, then legally the person who filed such void certificate of
candidacy was never a candidate in the elections at any time. All votes for such non-candidate are
stray votes and should not be counted. Thus, such non-candidate can never be a first-placer in the
elections. If a certificate of candidacy void ab initio is cancelled on the day, or before the day, of
the election, prevailing jurisprudence holds that all votes for that candidate are stray votes. If a
certificate of candidacy void ab initio is cancelled one day or more after the elections, all votes for
such candidate should also be stray votes because the certificate of candidacy is void from the very
beginning. This is the more equitable and logical approach on the effect of the cancellation of a
certificate of candidacy that is void ab initio. Otherwise, a certificate of candidacy void ab initio
can operate to defeat one or more valid certificates of candidacy for the same position. (Jalosjos
v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 193237, October 9, 2012)
Knowledge by the electorate of a candidate’s disqualification due to ineligibility

is not necessary before a qualified candidate who placed second can be proclaimed
as the winner. A subsequent disqualification based on a substantive ground that
existed prior to the filing of the certificate of candidacy voids not only the COC but
also the proclamation.-- We have ruled in the recent cases of Aratea v. COMELEC and Jalosjos
v. COMELEC that a void COC cannot produce any legal effect. Thus, the votes cast in favor of the
ineligible candidate are not considered at all in determining the winner of an election. Even when
the votes for the ineligible candidate are disregarded, the will of the electorate is still respected,
and even more so. The votes cast in favor of an ineligible candidate do not constitute the sole and
total expression of the sovereign voice. The votes cast in favor of eligible and legitimate candidates
form part of that voice and must also be respected. There is no need to apply the rule cited in Labo
v. COMELEC that when the voters are well aware within the realm of notoriety of a candidate’s
disqualification and still cast their votes in favor said candidate, then the eligible candidate
obtaining the next higher number of votes may be deemed elected. That rule is also a mere obiter
that further complicated the rules affecting qualified candidates who placed second to ineligible
ones. The electorate’s awareness of the candidate’s disqualification is not a prerequisite for the
disqualification to attach to the candidate. The very existence of a disqualifying circumstance
47
makes the candidate ineligible. Knowledge by the electorate of a candidate’s disqualification is
not necessary before a qualified candidate who placed second to a disqualified one can be
proclaimed as the winner. The second-placer in the vote count is actually the first-placer among
the qualified candidates. That the disqualified candidate has already been proclaimed and has
assumed office is of no moment. The subsequent disqualification based on a substantive ground
that existed prior to the filing of the certificate of candidacy voids not only the COC but also the
proclamation. (Maquiling v. Comelec, G.R. No. 195649, April 16, 2013)
If a local candidate is disqualified due to his ineligibility, his certificate is void

from the beginning, and he is not a candidate at all in the elections. The qualified
candidate who obtained the highest number of votes should be proclaimed; the rule
on succession will not apply. --The disqualifying circumstance surrounding Arnado’s
candidacy involves his citizenship. It does not involve the commission of election offenses as
provided for in the first sentence of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, the effect of which
is to disqualify the individual from continuing as a candidate, or if he has already been elected,
from holding the office. The disqualifying circumstance affecting Arnado is his citizenship. With
Arnado being barred from even becoming a candidate, his certificate of candidacy is thus rendered
void from the beginning. It could not have produced any other legal effect except that Arnado
rendered it impossible to effect his disqualification prior to the elections because he filed his
answer to the petition when the elections were conducted already and he was already proclaimed
the winner. To hold that such proclamation is valid is to negate the prohibitory character of the
disqualification which Arnado possessed even prior to the filing of the certificate of candidacy.
The affirmation of Arnado's disqualification, although made long after the elections, reaches back
to the filing of the certificate of candidacy. Arnado is declared to be not a candidate at all in the
May 2010 elections. Arnado being a non-candidate, the votes cast in his favor should not have
been counted. This leaves Maquiling as the qualified candidate who obtained the highest number
of votes. Therefore, the rule on succession under the Local Government Code will not apply.
(Maquiling v. Comelec, G.R. No. 195649, April 16, 2013)
One who is disqualified under Section 68 is still technically considered to have

been a candidate, albeit proscribed to continue as such only because of supervening
infractions. One whose CoC has been denied due course to and/or cancelled under
Section 78 is deemed to have not been a candidate at all. -- The Omnibus Election Code
(OEC) provides for certain remedies to assail a candidate's bid for public office. Among these
which obtain particular significance to this case are: (1) a petition for disqualification under
Section 68; and (2) a petition to deny due course to and/or cancel a certificate of candidacy under
Section 78. The distinctions between the two are well-perceived.
Primarily, a disqualification case under Section 68 of the OEC is hinged on either: (a) a
candidate's possession of a permanent resident status in a foreign country; or (b) his or her
commission of certain acts of disqualification. Anent the latter, the prohibited acts under Section
68 refer to election offenses under the OEC, and not to violations of other penal laws. In particular,
these are: (1) giving money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the
voters or public officials performing electoral functions; (2) committing acts of terrorism to
enhance one's candidacy; (3) spending in one's election campaign an amount in excess of that
allowed by the OEC; (4) soliciting, receiving or making any contribution prohibited under
Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104 of the OEC; and (5) violating Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261,
paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, sub-paragraph 6 of the OEC. Accordingly, the same provision
(Section 68) states that any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he or she is a party, is
declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the COMELEC to have
committed any of the foregoing acts shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate for public
office, or disallowed from holding the same, if he or she had already been elected.
One who is disqualified under Section 68 is still technically considered to have been a
candidate, albeit proscribed to continue as such only because of supervening infractions which do
not, however, deny his or her statutory eligibility. In other words, while the candidate's
compliance with the eligibility requirements as prescribed by law, such as age, residency, and
citizenship, is not in question, he or she is, however, ordered to discontinue such candidacy as a
form of penal sanction brought by the commission of the above-mentioned election offenses. On
the other hand, a denial of due course to and/or cancellation of a CoC proceeding under Section
78 of the OEC is premised on a person's misrepresentation of any of the material qualifications
required for the elective office aspired for. While a disqualified candidate under Section 68 is still
considered to have been a candidate for all intents and purposes, on the other hand, a person
whose CoC had been denied due course to and/or cancelled under Section 78 is deemed to have
not been a candidate at all. The reason being is that a cancelled CoC is considered void ab initio
and thus, cannot give rise to a valid candidacy and necessarily, to valid votes. While a person who
is disqualified under Section 68 is merely prohibited to continue as a candidate, a person who
certificate is cancelled or denied due course under Section 78 is not treated as a candidate at all,

48
as if he/she never filed a CoC. (Tagolino v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 202202, March
19, 2013)
In case a certificate of candidacy is void ab initio, the person legally entitled to

the vacant position would be the candidate who garnered the next highest number of
votes among those eligible. -- Petitioner argues that the Commission on Elections gravely
abused its discretion in proclaiming private respondent Bacani, the mere seventh placer among
the candidates for Councilor and, therefore, not the electorate’s choice. Petitioner maintains that
the vacancy left by her disqualification should be filled according to the rule on succession under
Section 45(a)(1) of the Local Government Code. The permanent vacancies referred to in Section
45 are those arising "when an elective local official fills a higher vacant office, refuses to assume
office, fails to qualify, dies, is removed from office, voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise
permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office." In these situations, the
vacancies were caused by those whose certificates of candidacy were valid at the time of the filing
"but subsequently had to be cancelled because of a violation of law that took place, or a legal
impediment that took effect, after the filing of the certificate of candidacy." The rule on succession
under Section 45, however, would not apply if the permanent vacancy was caused by one whose
certificate of candidacy was void ab initio. Specifically, with respect to dual citizens, their
certificates of candidacy are void ab initio because they possess "a substantive [disqualifying
circumstance] . . . [existing] prior to the filing of their certificate of candidacy." Legally, they
should not even be considered candidates. The votes casted for them should be considered stray
and should not be counted. In cases of vacancies caused by those with void ab initio certificates
of candidacy, the person legally entitled to the vacant position would be the candidate who
garnered the next highest number of votes among those eligible. In this case, it is private
respondent Bacani who is legally entitled to the position of Councilor, having garnered the sixth
highest number of votes among the eligible candidates. The Commission on Elections correctly
proclaimed private respondent Bacani in lieu of petitioner. (Chua v. Comelec, G.R. No. 216607,
April 5, 2016)
Effect of cancellation of or denial of due course to a CoC: No valid candidate,

no valid substitution. If a person’s CoC had been denied due course to and/or
cancelled, he or she cannot be validly substituted in the electoral process. The
existence of a valid CoC is a condition sine qua non for a disqualified candidate to be
validly substituted. -- Section 77 of the OEC provides that if an official candidate of a registered
or accredited political party dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause, a person belonging to
and certified by the same political party may file a CoC to replace the candidate who died,
withdrew or was disqualified. Evidently, Section 77 requires that there be an "official candidate"
before candidate substitution proceeds. The law requires that one must have validly filed a CoC
in order to be considered a candidate. The requirement of having a CoC obtains even greater
importance if one considers its nature. In particular, a CoC formalizes not only a person’s public
declaration to run for office but evidences as well his or her statutory eligibility to be elected for
the said post. In this regard, the CoC is the document which formally accords upon a person the
status of a candidate. In other words, absent a valid CoC one is not considered a candidate under
legal contemplation. If a person’s CoC had been denied due course to and/or cancelled, he or she
cannot be validly substituted in the electoral process. The existence of a valid CoC is therefore a
condition sine qua non for a disqualified candidate to be validly substituted. A candidate who is
disqualified under Section 68 can be validly substituted pursuant to Section 77 because he
remains a candidate until disqualified; but a person whose CoC has been denied due course to
and/or cancelled under Section 78 cannot be substituted because he is not considered a candidate.
Stated differently, since there would be no candidate to speak of under a denial of due course to
and/or cancellation of a CoC case, then there would be no candidate to be substituted; the same
does not obtain, however, in a disqualification case since there remains to be a candidate to be
substituted, although his or her candidacy is discontinued. (Tagolino v. House of
Representatives, G.R. No. 202202, March 19, 2013)
For the petition to deny due course or cancel the COC of one candidate to
prosper, the candidate must have made a material misrepresentation involving his
eligibility or qualification for the office to which he seeks election, such as the
requisite residency, age, citizenship or any other legal qualification necessary to run
for local elective office. An allegedly false nickname in the CoC is not a “material
misrepresentation” that is a ground to cancel or deny due course to a CoC under
Section 78. -- Petitioner filed the petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code
claiming that respondent committed material misrepresentation when the latter declared in his
COC that his name/nickname to be printed in the official ballot was VILLAFUERTE, LRAY JR.-
MIGZ instead of his baptismal name, VILLAFUERTE, MIGUEL-MIGZ. Section 78 states that the
false representation in the contents of the COC required under Section 74 must refer to material
matters in order to justify the cancellation of the COC. The material misrepresentation
contemplated by Section 78 of the Code refer to qualifications for elective office. Aside from the

49
requirement of materiality, a false representation under Section 78 must consist of a "deliberate
attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate
ineligible." In other words, it must be made with an intention to deceive the electorate as to one’s
qualifications for public office. The use of surname, when not intended to mislead, or deceive the
public as to one's identity is not within the scope of the provision. One who has an ineligibility to
run for elective public office is not "eligible for [the] office." As used in Section 74, the word
"eligible" means having the right to run for elective public office, that is, having all the
qualifications and none of the ineligibilities to run for the public office. The use of a name other
than that stated in the certificate of birth is not a material misrepresentation, as "material
misrepresentation" under the earlier-quoted Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code refers to
"qualifications for elective office." Clearly, for the petition to deny due course or cancel the COC
of one candidate to prosper, the candidate must have made a material misrepresentation
involving his eligibility or qualification for the office to which he seeks election, such as the
requisite residency, age, citizenship or any other legal qualification necessary to run for local
elective office as provided in the Local Government Code. Hence, petitioner’s allegation that
respondent’s nickname "LRAY JR. MIGZ" written in his COC is a material misrepresentation is
devoid of merit. Respondent's nickname written in the COC cannot be considered a material fact
which pertains to his eligibility and thus qualification to run for public office. (Villafuerte v.
Comelec, 25 February 2014)
The false representation under Section 78 must consist of a deliberate attempt

to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate
ineligible. -- The false representation under Section 78 must consist of a deliberate attempt to
mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. As we
said, respondent's nickname is not considered a material fact, and there is no substantial evidence
showing that in writing the nickname "LRAY JR. MIGZ" in his COC, respondent had the intention
to deceive the voters as to his identity which has an effect on his eligibility or qualification for the
office he seeks to assume. (Villafuerte v. Comelec, 25 February 2014)
Stating under oath in the CoC that one is eligible to run for public office, when
one is not, is a false material misrepresentation. -- Under the rules, a statement in a
certificate of candidacy claiming that a candidate is eligible to run for public office when in truth
he is not, is a false material representation, a ground for a petition under Section 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code. Section 74 requires the candidate to state under oath in his CoC "that he
is eligible for said office." A candidate is eligible if he has a right to run for the public office. If a
candidate is not actually eligible because he is not a registered voter in the municipality where he
intends to be elected, but still he states under oath in his certificate of candidacy that he is eligible
to run for public office, then the candidate clearly makes a false material representation, a ground
to support a petition under Section 78. (Hayudini v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 207900,
April 22, 2014)
COMELEC's jurisdiction to deny due course and cancel a CoC for material
misrepresentation continues even after election and proclamation, except in the
cases of congressional and senatorial candidates. -- Hayudini protests that it was a grave
error on the part of the COMELEC to have declared his proclamation null and void when no
petition for annulment of his proclamation was ever filed. However, the nullification of his
proclamation as a winning candidate is also a legitimate outcome − a necessary legal consequence
− of the cancellation of his CoC pursuant to Section 78. A CoC cancellation proceeding essentially
partakes of the nature of a disqualification case. The cancellation of a CoC essentially renders the
votes cast for the candidate whose certificate of candidacy has been cancelled as stray votes. If the
disqualification or CoC cancellation or denial case is not resolved before the election day, the
proceedings shall continue even after the election and the proclamation of the winner. Meanwhile,
the candidate may be voted for and even be proclaimed as the winner, but the COMELEC's
jurisdiction to deny due course and cancel his or her CoC continues. This rule likewise applies
even if the candidate facing disqualification has already taken his oath of office. The only
exception to this rule is in the case of congressional and senatorial candidates where the
COMELEC ipso jure loses jurisdiction in favor of either the Senate or the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal after the candidates have been proclaimed, taken the proper
oath, and also assumed office. (Hayudini v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 207900, April 22,
2014)
The duty of the Comelec to give due course to COCs filed in due form is
ministerial in character, and that while the Comelec may look into patent defects in
the COCs, it may not go into matters not appearing on their face. -- In declaring that
Kimberly, being under age, could not be considered to have filed a valid COC and, thus, could not
be validly substituted by Olivia, we find that the Comelec gravely abused its discretion. Firstly,
subject to its authority over nuisance candidates and its power to deny due course to or cancel
COCs under Sec. 78, Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 881, the Comelec has the ministerial duty to
receive and acknowledge receipt of COCs. Comelec has no discretion to give or not to give due
50
course to COCs. The duty of the Comelec to give due course to COCs filed in due form is ministerial
in character, and that while the Comelec may look into patent defects in the COCs, it may not go
into matters not appearing on their face. The question of eligibility or ineligibility of a candidate
is thus beyond the usual and proper cognizance of the Comelec. (Cerafica v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 205136, December 2, 2014)
The COMELEC may not, by itself, without the proper proceedings, deny due
course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy filed in due form. -- The COMELEC acted
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in declaring that Hans
Roger, being under age, could not be considered to have filed a valid certificate of candidacy and,
thus, could not be validly substituted by Luna. The COMELEC may not, by itself, without the
proper proceedings, deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy filed in due form. In
Sanchez vs. Del Rosario, the Court ruled that the question of eligibility or ineligibility of a
candidate for non-age is beyond the usual and proper cognizance of the COMELEC. If Hans Roger
made a material misrepresentation as to his date of birth or age in his certificate of candidacy, his
eligibility may only be impugned through a verified petition to deny due course to or cancel such
certificate of candidacy under Section 78 of the Election Code. In this case, there was no petition
to deny due course to or cancel the certificate of candidacy of Hans Roger. The COMELEC only
declared that Hans Roger did not file a valid certificate of candidacy and, thus, was not a valid
candidate in the petition to deny due course to or cancel Luna’s certificate of candidacy. In effect,
the COMELEC, without the proper proceedings, cancelled Hans Roger’s certificate of candidacy
and declared the substitution by Luna invalid. (Cerafica v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
205136, December 2, 2014)
In the exercise of it adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers, the Constitution

mandates the Comelec to hear and decide cases first by Division and, upon motion for
reconsideration, by the Comelec En Banc. – In the exercise of it adjudicatory or quasi-
judicial powers, the Constitution mandates the Comelec to hear and decide cases first by Division
and, upon motion for reconsideration, by the En Banc. As cancellation proceedings involve the
exercise of quasi-judicial functions of the Comelec, the Comelec in Division should have first
decided this case. Where the Comelec Law Department recommended the cancellation of a
candidate’s COC for lack of qualification, and which recommendation was affirmed by the
Comelec En Banc, the Court held that the Comelec En Banc cannot short cut the proceedings by
acting on the case without a prior action by a division because it denies due process to the
candidate. (Cerafica v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 205136, December 2, 2014)
Nuisance candidates: Comelec must give the candidate an opportunity to be

heard before cancellation of/denial of due course of CoC. -- To minimize the logistical
confusion caused by nuisance candidates, their certificates of candidacy may be denied due course
or cancelled by respondent. This denial or cancellation may be "motu proprio or upon a verified
petition of an interested party," "subject to an opportunity to be heard." The determination
whether a candidate is eligible for the position he is seeking involves a determination of fact where
both parties must be allowed to adduce evidence in support of their contentions. Because the
resolution of such fact may result to a deprivation of one’s right to run for public office, or, as in
this case, one’s right to hold public office, it is only proper and fair that the candidate concerned
be notified of the proceedings against him and that he be given the opportunity to refute the
allegations against him. (Timbol v. Comelec, G.R. No. 206004, February 24, 2015)
Party-List Elections
New parameters for party-list elections: Not all party-list groups must
represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors. National or regional
parties or organizations, and sectoral parties or organizations that lack "well-defined
political constituencies" (such as professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth
groups) -- do not need to represent the "marginalized and underrepresented." -- In
determining who may participate in the coming 13 May 2013 and subsequent party-list elections,
the COMELEC shall adhere to the following parameters:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or
organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to

organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any "marginalized and
underrepresented" sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the
party-list system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party,
whether major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate in
party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list

51
system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political
party through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized and underrepresented" or

lacking in "well-defined political constituencies." It is enough that their principal advocacy
pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are "marginalized
and underrepresented" include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack "well-defined
political constituencies" include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the

"marginalized and underrepresented" must belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented"
sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations
that lack "well-defined political constituencies" must belong to the sector they represent. The
nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the "marginalized and
underrepresented," or that represent those who lack "well-defined political constituencies," either
must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their respective
sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide
members of such parties or organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some
of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains
qualified.
The COMELEC excluded from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections those
that did not satisfy these two criteria: (1) all national, regional, and sectoral groups or
organizations must represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors, and (2) all
nominees must belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector they represent. As
discussed above, the disqualification of petitioners, and their nominees, under such
circumstances is contrary to the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941. (Atong Paglaum v Comelec,
G.R. No. 203766, April 2, 2013)
The disqualification for failure to garner 2% party-list votes in two preceding

elections should now be understood, in light of the Banat ruling, to mean failure to
qualify for a party-list seat in two preceding elections for the constituency in which it
has registered. -- The disqualification for failure to get 2% party-list votes in two (2) preceding
elections should therefore be understood in light of the Banat ruling that party-list groups or
organizations garnering less than 2% of the party-list votes may yet qualify for a seat in the
allocation of additional seats. To reiterate, (a) Section 6(8) of RA 7941 provides for two separate
grounds for delisting; these grounds cannot be mixed or combined to support delisting; and (b)
the disqualification for failure to garner 2% party-list votes in two preceding elections should now
be understood, in light of the Banat ruling, to mean failure to qualify for a party-list seat in two
preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered. (Philippine Guardians
Brotherhood, Inc. v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 190529, April 29, 2010)
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
Prohibition on Holding of Dual Positions by Constitutional Commissioners
Under the Constitution, no Member of a Constitutional Commission shall,

during his tenure, hold any other office or employment. Thus, the Chairman of the
Civil Service Commission (CSC) cannot hold any other office or employment in the
Government during his tenure. He cannot sit as a Director or Trustee of GSIS,
PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF, as this will allow him to exercise powers and functions
which are not anymore derived from his position as CSC Chairman. -- The underlying
principle for the resolution of the present controversy rests on the correct application of Section
1 and Section 2, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution, which provide: “Section 1. The
Constitutional Commissions, which shall be independent, are the Civil Service Commission, the
Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit. Section 2. No Member of a
Constitutional Commission shall, during his tenure, hold any other office or employment. Neither
shall he engage in the practice of any profession or in the active management or control of any
business which in any way may be affected by the functions of his office, nor shall he be financially
interested, directly or indirectly, in any contract with, or in any franchise or privilege granted by
the Government, any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-
owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. Section 1, Article IX-A of the 1987
Constitution expressly describes all the Constitutional Commissions as “independent.” To

52
safeguard the independence of these Commissions, the 1987 Constitution, among others, imposes
under Section 2, Article IX-A certain inhibitions and disqualifications upon the Chairmen and
members to strengthen their integrity, to wit: the disqualification from holding any other office
or employment. The Court finds it imperative to interpret this disqualification in relation to
Section 7, paragraph (2), Article IX-B of the Constitution and the Court’s pronouncement in Civil
Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary. Section 7, paragraph (2), Article IX-B which reads:
Unless otherwise allowed by law or the primary functions of his position, no
appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries.
In Funa v. Ermita, where petitioner challenged the concurrent appointment of Elena H.

Bautista as Undersecretary of the Department of Transportation and Communication and as
Officer-in-Charge of the Maritime Industry Authority, the Court reiterated the pronouncement in
Civil Liberties Union v. The Executive Secretary on the intent of the Framers on the foregoing
provision of the 1987 Constitution, to wit:
Thus, while all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other
office or employment in the government during their tenure when such is allowed by law or
by the primary functions of their positions, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and
assistants may do so only when expressly authorized by the Constitution itself. In other
words, Section 7, Article IX-B is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to all elective
and appointive public officials and employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the
exception applicable only to the President, the Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, their
deputies and assistants.
xxx
Since the evident purpose of the framers of the 1987 Constitution is to impose a
stricter prohibition on the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies
and assistants with respect to holding multiple offices or employment in the government
during their tenure, the exception to this prohibition must be read with equal severity. On its
face, the language of Section 13, Article VII is prohibitory so that it must be understood as
intended to be a positive and unequivocal negation of the privilege of holding multiple
government offices or employment. Verily, wherever the language used in the constitution is
prohibitory, it is to be understood as intended to be a positive and unequivocal negation. The
phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution" must be given a literal interpretation
to refer only to those particular instances cited in the Constitution itself, to wit: the Vice-
President being appointed as a member of the Cabinet under Section 3, par. (2), Article VII;
or acting as President in those instances provided under Section 7, pars. (2) and (3), Article
VII; and, the Secretary of Justice being ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by
virtue of Section 8 (1), Article VIII.
Being an appointive public official who does not occupy a Cabinet position (i.e., President,
the Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants), Duque was thus
covered by the general rule enunciated under Section 7, paragraph (2), Article IX-B. He can hold
any other office or employment in the Government during his tenure if such holding is allowed by
law or by the primary functions of his position.
Respondents insist that Duque’s ex officio designation as member of the governing Boards
of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF is allowed by the primary functions of his position
as the CSC Chairman. As to the meaning of ex officio, the Court has decreed in Civil Liberties
Union v. Executive Secretary that the term ex officio means “from office; by virtue of office.” It
refers to an “authority derived from official character merely, not expressly conferred upon the
individual character, but rather annexed to the official position.” Ex officio likewise denotes an
“act done in an official character, or as a consequence of office, and without any other appointment
or authority other than that conferred by the office.” An ex officio member of a board is one who
is a member by virtue of his title to a certain office, and without further warrant or appointment.
The ex officio position being actually and in legal contemplation part of the principal office, it
follows that the official concerned has no right to receive additional compensation for his services
in the said position. The reason is that these services are already paid for and covered by the
compensation attached to his principal office.
Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292 is clear that the CSC Chairman’s
membership in a governing body is dependent on the condition that the functions of the
government entity where he will sit as its Board member must affect the career development,
employment status, rights, privileges, and welfare of government officials and employees. Based
on this, the Court finds no irregularity in Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292
because matters affecting the career development, rights and welfare of government employees
are among the primary functions of the CSC and are consequently exercised through its Chairman.
The CSC Chairman’s membership therein must, therefore, be considered to be derived from his

53
position as such. Accordingly, the constitutionality of Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of
EO 292 is upheld.
However, there is a need to determine further whether Duque’s designation as Board

member of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF is in accordance with the 1987 Constitution
and the condition laid down in Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292. The GSIS,
PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF are vested by their respective charters with various powers and
functions to carry out the purposes for which they were created. While powers and functions
associated with appointments, compensation and benefits affect the career development,
employment status, rights, privileges, and welfare of government officials and employees, the
GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF are also tasked to perform other corporate powers and
functions that are not personnel-related. All of these powers and functions, whether personnel-
related or not, are carried out and exercised by the respective Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH,
ECC and HDMF. Hence, when the CSC Chairman sits as a member of the governing Boards of the
GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF, he may exercise these powers and functions, which are
not anymore derived from his position as CSC Chairman, such as imposing interest on unpaid or
unremitted contributions, issuing guidelines for the accreditation of health care providers, or
approving restructuring proposals in the payment of unpaid loan amortizations. The Court also
notes that Duque’s designation as member of the governing Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH,
ECC and HDMF entitles him to receive per diem, a form of additional compensation that is
disallowed by the concept of an ex officio position by virtue of its clear contravention of the
proscription set by Section 2, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution. This situation goes against
the principle behind an ex officio position, and must, therefore, be held unconstitutional. (Funa
v. Chairman, Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 191672, November 25, 2014)
Under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution, the President exercises
control over all government offices in the Executive Branch. The GSIS, PHILHEALTH,
ECC and HDMF are offices under the Executive Department, and their respective
governing Boards are under the control of the President. Thus, Chairman of the Civil
Service Commission cannot sit as a Director or Trustee of GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC
and HDMF, as this will impair the independence of the CSC. -- Apart from violating the
prohibition against holding multiple offices, Duque’s designation as member of the governing
Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF impairs the independence of the CSC. Under
Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution, the President exercises control over all government
offices in the Executive Branch. An office that is legally not under the control of the President is
not part of the Executive Branch. The Court has aptly explained in Rufino v. Endriga: The
President’s power of control applies to the acts or decisions of all officers in the Executive branch.
This is true whether such officers are appointed by the President or by heads of departments,
agencies, commissions, or boards. The power of control means the power to revise or reverse the
acts or decisions of a subordinate officer involving the exercise of discretion.
As provided in their respective charters, PHILHEALTH and ECC have the status of a
government corporation and are deemed attached to the Department of Health and the
Department of Labor, respectively. On the other hand, the GSIS and HDMF fall under the Office
of the President. The corporate powers of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF are exercised
through their governing Boards, members of which are all appointed by the President of the
Philippines. Undoubtedly, the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF and the members of their
respective governing Boards are under the control of the President. As such, the CSC Chairman
cannot be a member of a government entity that is under the control of the President without
impairing the independence vested in the CSC by the 1987 Constitution. (Funa v. Chairman, Civil
Service Commission, G.R. No. 191672, November 25, 2014)
The Civil Service Commission has jurisdiction over cases filed directly with it,
regardless of who initiated the complaint. Thus, even private individuals may file a
complaint against a member of the Civil Service with the CSC. -- The CSC, as the central
personnel agency of the government, has the power to appoint and discipline its officials and
employees and to hear and decide administrative cases instituted by or brought before it directly
or on appeal. Section 2(1), Article IX(B) of the 1987 Constitution defines the scope of the civil
service: The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of
the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters.
By virtue of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1341, PUP became a chartered state university,
thereby making it a government-owned or controlled corporation with an original charter whose
employees are part of the Civil Service and are subject to the provisions of E.O. No. 292.19 The
parties in these cases do not deny that Guevarra and Cezar are government employees and part of
the Civil Service. The controversy, however, stems from the interpretation of the disciplinary
jurisdiction of the CSC as specified in Section 47, Chapter 7, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of E.O. No.
292.
54
There is no cogent reason to differentiate between a complaint filed by a private citizen
and one filed by a member of the civil service, especially in light of Section 12(11), Chapter 3,
Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the same E.O. No. 292 which confers upon the CSC the power to "hear
and decide administrative cases instituted by or brought before it directly or on appeal" without
any qualification.
In the case of Camacho v. Gloria, the Court stated that "under E.O. No. 292, a complaint
against a state university official may be filed with either the university’s Board of Regents or
directly with the Civil Service Commission." It is important to note that the Court did not interpret
the Administrative Code as limiting such authority to exclude complaints filed directly with it by
a member of the civil service. Moreover, as early as in the case of Hilario v. Civil Service
Commission, the Court interpreted Section 47, Chapter 7, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of E.O. No.
292 as allowing the direct filing with the CSC by a public official of a complaint against a fellow
government employee. The identity of the complainant is immaterial to the acquisition of
jurisdiction over an administrative case by the CSC. The law is quite clear that the CSC may hear
and decide administrative disciplinary cases brought directly before it or it may deputize any
department or agency to conduct an investigation. (Civil Service Commission v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 176162, October 9, 2012)
CSC has concurrent original jurisdiction with the Board of Regents of a state
university over administrative cases against university officials. -- The Uniform Rules
on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (the Uniform Rules) explicitly allows the CSC to hear
and decide administrative cases directly brought before it: “Section 4. Jurisdiction of the Civil
Service Commission. – The Civil Service Commission shall hear and decide administrative cases
instituted by, or brought before it, directly or on appeal, including contested appointments, and
shall review decisions and actions of its offices and of the agencies attached to it. Except as
otherwise provided by the Constitution or by law, the Civil Service Commission shall have the
final authority to pass upon the removal, separation and suspension of all officers and employees
in the civil service and upon all matters relating to the conduct, discipline and efficiency of such
officers and employees.” The Uniform Rules did not supplant the law which provided the CSC
with original jurisdiction. While the Uniform Rules may have so provided, the Court invites
attention to the cases of Civil Service Commission v. Alfonso and Civil Service Commission v.
Sojor, both of which buttressed the pronouncement that the Board of Regents shares its authority
to discipline erring school officials and employees with the CSC. The CSC may take cognizance of
an administrative case filed directly with it against an official or employee of a chartered state
college or university. This is regardless of whether the complainant is a private citizen or a
member of the civil service and such original jurisdiction is shared with the Board of Regents of
the school. (Civil Service Commission v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 176162, October 9, 2012)
ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
Condonation Doctrine
Why the doctrine of condonation is bereft of legal bases
Inconsistent with the principles that a public office is a public trust and that
the people shall be accountable to the people at all times. -- The concept of public office
is a public trust and the corollary requirement of accountability to the people at all times, as
mandated under the 1987 Constitution, are plainly inconsistent with the idea that an elective local
official’s administrative liability for a misconduct committed during a prior term can be wiped off
by the fact that he was elected to a second term of office, or even another elective post. (Carpio-
Morales v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 217126-27, November 10, 2015)
Election is not a mode of condoning administrative an offense. (Carpio-Morales

v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 217126-27, November 10, 2015)
There is no constitutional or statutory basis for the doctrine: (Carpio-Morales v.

Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 217126-27, November 10, 2015)
If the administrative case was filed prior to the abandonment of the

condonation doctrine (on November 10, 2015), the condonation doctrine may still be
applied. -- In November 10, 2015, this Court, in Conchita Carpio Morales v. CA and Jejomar
Binay, Jr., extensively discussed the doctrine of condonation and ruled that such doctrine has no
legal authority in this jurisdiction. The Supreme Court's abandonment of the condonation
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doctrine should be prospective in application for the reason that judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the laws or the Constitution, until reversed, shall form part of the legal system of the
Philippines. Hence, while the future may ultimately uncover a doctrine’s error, it should be, as a
general rule, recognized as "good law" prior to its abandonment. Consequently, the people’s
reliance thereupon should be respected. Considering that the present case was instituted prior to
the ruling (the case was filed in June 2005), the doctrine of condonation may still be applied.
(Ombudsman v. Vergara, G.R. No. 216871, December 6, 2017,)
The application of the doctrine does not require that the official must be re-
elected to the same position. -- The application of the doctrine does not require that the
official must be re-elected to the same position in the immediately succeeding election. The
condonation doctrine applies to a public official elected to another office. The most important
consideration in the doctrine of condonation is the fact that the misconduct was done on a prior
term and that the subject public official was eventually re-elected by the same body politic. It is
inconsequential whether the said re-election be on another public office or on an election year
that is not immediately succeeding the last, as long as the electorate that re-elected the public
official be the same. (Ombudsman v. Vergara, G.R. No. 216871, December 6, 2017)
Suspension and Back Salaries
Automatic reinstatement at the end of preventive suspension: Preventive

suspension is of two kinds. The first is the preventive suspension pending
investigation, and the second is the preventive suspension pending appeal where the
penalty imposed by the disciplining authority is either suspension or dismissal but
after review the respondent official or employee is exonerated. If the proper
disciplinary authority does not finally decide the administrative case within a period
of 90 days, and the respondent is not a presidential appointee, the preventive
suspension is lifted and the respondent is "automatically reinstated in the service."
In the case of presidential appointees, the preventive suspension pending
investigation shall be "for a reasonable time as the circumstances of the case may
warrant." -- By law, Baculi should have been automatically reinstated at the end of the 90-day
period of his preventive suspension because his case was not finally decided within the said
period. We have to point out that preventive suspension is of two kinds. The first is the preventive
suspension pending investigation, and the second is the preventive suspension pending appeal
where the penalty imposed by the disciplining authority is either suspension or dismissal but after
review the respondent official or employee is exonerated. Preventive suspension pending
investigation is not a penalty. It is a measure intended to enable the disciplining authority to
investigate charges against respondent by preventing the latter from intimidating or in any way
influencing witnesses against him. If the investigation is not finished and a decision is not
rendered within that period, the suspension will be lifted and the respondent will automatically
be reinstated. If after investigation, respondent is found innocent of the charges and is exonerated,
he should be reinstated. Preventive suspension pending investigation is not violative of the
Constitution because it is not a penalty. It is authorized by law whenever the charge involves
dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct, or neglect in the performance of duty, or whenever
there are reasons to believe that the respondent is guilty of charges that would warrant removal
from the service. If the proper disciplinary authority does not finally decide the administrative
case within a period of 90 days from the start of preventive suspension pending investigation, and
the respondent is not a presidential appointee, the preventive suspension is lifted and the
respondent is "automatically reinstated in the service." In the case of presidential appointees, the
preventive suspension pending investigation shall be "for a reasonable time as the circumstances
of the case may warrant." (Baculi v. Office of the President, G.R. No. 188681, March 8, 2017)
There shall be no indefinite suspension pending investigation, whether the

respondent officials are presidential or nonpresidential appointees . It cannot be
validly argued that in the case of presidential appointees the preventive suspension
pending investigation can be indefinite. In the guise of a preventive suspension, the
official’s term of office could be shortened and he could, in effect, be removed without
a finding of a cause duly established after due hearing, in violation of the Constitution.
-- Nonetheless, there shall be no indefinite suspension pending investigation, whether the
respondent officials are presidential or nonpresidential appointees. The law abhors indefinite
preventive suspension because the indefiniteness violates the constitutional guarantees under the
due process and equal protection clauses, as well as the right of public officers and employees to
security of tenure. It cannot be validly argued that in the case of presidential appointees the
preventive suspension pending investigation can be indefinite. In the guise of a preventive
suspension, his term of office could be shortened and he could, in effect, be removed without a
finding of a cause duly established after due hearing, in violation of the Constitution. Preventive
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suspension pending investigation for an indefinite period of time, like one that would last until
the case against the incumbent official would have been finally terminated, would "outrun the
bounds of reason and result in sheer oppression," and would be a denial of due process. (Baculi
v. Office of the President, G.R. No. 188681, March 8, 2017)
A presidential appointee comes under the disciplinary jurisdiction of the

President in line with the principle that the "power to remove is inherent in the power
to appoint." -- DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao brought charges against Baculi for gross
dishonesty, abuse of authority, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the service. He was immediately placed under preventive suspension for 90 days (i.e., from
September 4 to December 3, 1992) as a consequence. Eventually, DAR Secretary Garilao
dismissed Baculi from the service based on the findings and recommendations of Assistant
Secretary Hector Soliman of the DAR Legal Affairs Office. The CSC affirmed the dismissal of
Baculi with modification. It anchored its affirmance on the vesting of disciplinary jurisdiction in
the Department Secretaries, among others, as provided in Section 47(2), Chapter 7, of Book V of
the Administrative Code of 1987. Whether or not Baculi belonged to the category of officers and
employees under the DAR Secretary's disciplinary jurisdiction was a question to be determined
in conjunction with Section 38(a) of Presidential Decree No. 807 (Civil Service Decree). Section
38(a) of Presidential Decree No. 807 has drawn a definite distinction between subordinate officers
or employees who were presidential appointees, on the one hand, and subordinate officers or
employees who were non-presidential appointees, on the other. Without a doubt, substantial
distinctions that set apart presidential appointees from nonpresidential appointees truly existed.
For one, presidential appointees come under the direct disciplining authority of the President
pursuant to the well-settled principle that, in the absence of a contrary law, the power to remove
or to discipline is lodged in the same authority in whom the power to appoint is vested. Having
the power to remove or to discipline presidential appointees, therefore, the President has the
corollary authority to investigate them and look into their conduct in office. Thus, Baculi, as a
presidential appointee, came under the disciplinary jurisdiction of the President in line with the
principle that the "power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint." As such, the DAR
Secretary held no disciplinary jurisdiction over him. Verily, Presidential Decree No. 807 has
expressly specified the procedure for disciplinary actions involving presidential appointees.
(Baculi v. Office of the President, March 8, 2017, G.R. No. 188681)
Two conditions must be met before an employee may be entitled to back

salaries during the suspension pending an appeal: 1) the employee must be found
innocent of the charges and 2) his suspension must be unjustified. -- The issue of
entitlement to back salaries, for the period of suspension pending appeal, of a government
employee who had been dismissed but was subsequently exonerated is settled in our jurisdiction.
The Courts starting point for this outcome is the no work-no pay principle public officials are only
entitled to compensation if they render service. We have excepted from this general principle and
awarded back salaries even for unworked days to illegally dismissed or unjustly suspended
employees based on the constitutional provision that no officer or employee in the civil service
shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law; to deny these employees their
back salaries amounts to unwarranted punishment after they have been exonerated from the
charge that led to their dismissal or suspension. The Court crafted two conditions before an
employee may be entitled to back salaries: a) the employee must be found innocent of the charges
and b) his suspension must be unjustified. The reasoning behind these conditions runs this way:
although an employee is considered under preventive suspension during the pendency of a
successful appeal, the law itself only authorizes preventive suspension for a fixed period; hence,
his suspension beyond this fixed period is unjustified and must be compensated. (Civil Service
Commission v. Cruz, G.R. No. 187858, August 9, 2011)
In case of an employee’s complete exoneration of the administrative charge

against him (i.e., the employee is not found guilty of any other offense), or the
employee’s acquittal of the criminal charge based on his innocence, the requirement
(for payment of back wages for the period of the suspension pending appeal) that the
suspension must be unjustified is automatically subsumed in the other requirement
of exoneration. – In case of the employee’s complete exoneration of the administrative
charge against him (i.e., the employee is not found guilty of any other offense), or the employees
acquittal of the criminal charge based on his innocence, the conditions laid down in Gonzales
become the two sides of the same coin; the requirement that the suspension must be unjustified
is automatically subsumed in the other requirement of exoneration. (Civil Service Commission v.
Cruz, G.R. No. 187858, August 9, 2011)
Meaning of exoneration: If the administrative offense found to have been

actually committed is of lesser gravity than the offense charged, the employee cannot
be considered exonerated, if the factual premise for the imposition of the lesser

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penalty remains the same. The employee found guilty of a lesser offense may only be
entitled to back salaries when the offense actually committed does not carry the
penalty of more than one month suspension or dismissal. -- The mere reduction of the
penalty on appeal does not entitle a government employee to back salaries if he was not
exonerated of the charge against him. This is the Courts teaching in City Mayor of Zamboanga v.
CA. In this case, the employee was initially found guilty of disgraceful and immoral conduct and
was given the penalty of dismissal by the City Mayor of Zamboanga. On appeal, however, the CA
limited the employee’s guilt to improper conduct and correspondingly reduced the penalty to six-
months suspension without pay with a stern warning that repetition of the same or similar offense
will be dealt with more severely." The CA also awarded him full backwages. We held that the CA
erred in awarding back salaries by reiterating the principle that back salaries may be ordered paid
to an officer or employee only if he is exonerated of the charge against him and his suspension or
dismissal is found and declared to be illegal.
Bangalisan laid down the principle that if the exoneration of the employee is relative (as
distinguished from complete exoneration), an inquiry into the factual premise of the offense
charged and of the offense committed must be made. If the administrative offense found to have
been actually committed is of lesser gravity than the offense charged, the employee cannot be
considered exonerated if the factual premise for the imposition of the lesser penalty remains the
same. The employee found guilty of a lesser offense may only be entitled to back salaries when the
offense actually committed does not carry the penalty of more than one month suspension or
dismissal.
Bangalisan reiterated that the payment of back salaries, during the period of suspension
of a member of the civil service who is subsequently ordered reinstated, may be decreed only if
the employee is found innocent of the charges which caused the suspension and when the
suspension is unjustified.
In Hon. Gloria, involving the same factual situation as Bangalisan, the CA awarded the
public school teachers back salaries - for the period beyond the allowable period of preventive
suspension - since they were ultimately exonerated. In affirming the CA, the Court distinguished
preventive suspension from suspension pending appeal for the purpose of determining the extent
of an employee’s entitlement to back salaries. The Court ruled that under Executive Order (E.O.)
No. 292, there are two kinds of preventive suspension of civil service employees who are charged
with offenses punishable by removal or suspension: (i) preventive suspension pending
investigation and (ii) preventive suspension pending appeal; compensation is due only for the
period of preventive suspension pending appeal should the employee be ultimately exonerated.
It is not enough that an employee is exonerated of the charges against him. In

addition, his suspension must be unjustified. The case of Bangalisan v. Court of Appeals itself
similarly states that "payment of salaries corresponding to the period [1] when an employee is not
allowed to work may be decreed if he is found innocent of the charges which caused his suspension
and [2] when the suspension is unjustified. A strict observance of the second condition for an
award of back salaries becomes important only if the employee is not totally innocent of any
administrative infraction. Where the employee is completely exonerated of the administrative
charge or acquitted in the criminal case arising from the same facts based on a finding of
innocence, the second requirement becomes subsumed in the first. Otherwise, a determination of
the act/s and offense/s actually committed and of the corresponding penalty imposed has to be
made. (Civil Service Commission v. Cruz, G.R. No. 187858, August 9, 2011)
Meaning of unjustified suspension: A suspension is unjustified for purposes of

payment of back salaries for the preventive suspension pending appeal when the
separation was not warranted because the government employee gave no cause for
suspension or dismissal, such as where the government employee did not commit the
offense charged, punishable by suspension or dismissal (total exoneration); or the
government employee is found guilty of another offense for an act different from that
for which he was charged. -- On the suspension/dismissal aspect, this second condition is
met upon a showing that the separation from office is not warranted under the circumstances
because the government employee gave no cause for suspension or dismissal. This squarely
applies in cases where the government employee did not commit the offense charged, punishable
by suspension or dismissal (total exoneration); or the government employee is found guilty of
another offense for an act different from that for which he was charged. (Civil Service Commission
v. Cruz, G.R. No. 187858, August 9, 2011)
Filing of Statements of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth (SALN)

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In the event authorities determine that a SALN is not properly filed, they
should inform the reporting individual and direct him to take the necessary corrective
action. The reporting individual must be given the opportunity to explain any prima
facie appearance of discrepancy. -- Navarro, at the outset, has claimed that he filled out and
accomplished the annual SALN in accordance with the prescribed format by the CSC, the details
of which, to the best of his knowledge and belief, were generally accepted in the government
service and were in substantial compliance with the provisions of law. He was never informed by
the applicable office of any incompleteness or any impropriety in the accomplishment of his
SALNs. In this regard, Navarro is correct. The appropriate office or committee should have given
him the opportunity to correct the entries to conform to the prescribed requirements at that time.
Section 10 of R.A. No. 6713 covering Review and Compliance Procedure and its Implementing
Rules and Regulations (IRR), provide that in the event the authorities determine that a statement
is not properly filed, the appropriate committee shall inform the reporting individual and direct
him to take the necessary corrective action.
Given the opportunity, Navarro could have disclosed the acquisition costs and cost of the
improvements in a more detailed way. His failure to amend his presentation, without his attention
on the matter being called, cannot be considered as indicative of an untruthful declaration of his
assets.
Evident bad faith was wanting on the part of Navarro. Although it is the duty of every
public official/employee to properly accomplish his/her SALN, it is not too much to ask for the
head of the appropriate department/office to have called his attention should there be any
incorrectness in his SALN. The DOF, which has supervision over the BIR, could have directed
Navarro to correct his SALN. This is in consonance with the above-quoted Review and Compliance
Procedure under R.A. No. 6713, as well as its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR),
providing for the procedure for review of statements to determine whether they have been
properly accomplished. It is provided in the IRR that in the event authorities determine that a
SALN is not properly filed, they should inform the reporting individual and direct him to take the
necessary corrective action.
In this case, however, Navarro was not given the chance to rectify the nebulous entries in
his SALNs. As there was only a failure to give proper attention to a task expected of an employee
because of either carelessness or indifference, Navarro should have been informed so he could
have made the necessary explanation or correction. There is nothing wrong with a generalized
SALN if the entries therein can be satisfactorily explained and verified.
The corrective action to be allowed should only refer to typographical or mathematical

rectifications and explanation of disclosed entries. It does not pertain to hidden, undisclosed or
undeclared acquired assets which the official concerned intentionally concealed by one way or
another like, for instance, the use of dummies.
The Court is mindful of the duty of public officials and employees to disclose their assets,
liabilities and net worth accurately and truthfully. Some leeway should be accorded the public
officials. They must be given the opportunity to explain any prima facie appearance of
discrepancy. To repeat, where his explanation is adequate, convincing and verifiable, his assets
cannot be considered unexplained wealth or illegally obtained. (Navarro v. Office of the
Ombudsman, G.R. No. 210128, August 17, 2016)
Mere misdeclaration in the SALN does not automatically amount to dishonesty.

Only when the accumulated wealth becomes manifestly disproportionate to the
income or other sources of income of the public officer/employee and he fails to
properly account or explain his other sources of income, does he become susceptible
to dishonesty. -- The Court has once emphasized that a mere misdeclaration in the SALN does
not automatically amount to dishonesty. Only when the accumulated wealth becomes manifestly
disproportionate to the income or other sources of income of the public officer/employee and he
fails to properly account or explain his other sources of income, does he become susceptible to
dishonesty. Although there appeared to have a prima facie evidence giving rise to the
presumption of accumulation of wealth disproportionate to his income, Navarro was able to
overcome such presumption by coming out with documentary evidence to prove his financial
capacity to make the subject acquisitions and to prove that the amounts he stated in his SALNs
were true. It should be understood that the laws on SALN aim to curtail the acquisition of
unexplained wealth. Where the source of the undisclosed wealth can be properly accounted for,
then it is "explained wealth" which the law does not penalize.
Considering that Navarro sufficiently explained his acquisitions as well as his other lawful
sources of income to show his and his wife's financial capacity to acquire the subject real
properties, he cannot be deemed to have committed dishonesty. He cannot be adjudged guilty of
59
grave misconduct either as his alleged "lumping" of real properties in his SALN did not affect the
discharge of his duties as a revenue officer. (Navarro v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No.
210128, August 17, 2016)
A public official should not be liable for inaccuracies in her Statements of

Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth if she had not first been given the opportunity to
correct the defects. – The private respondent should not be liable for inaccuracies in her
Statements of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth if she had not first been given the opportunity to
correct the defects. The laws requiring public officers to submit declarations of their assets,
liabilities, net worth, and financial and business interests recognize that defects in a statement of
assets, liabilities, and net worth may occur despite the reporting individual's lack of intent to
conceal wealth. The law clearly recognizes that a defect in the statement of assets, liabilities, and
net worth may have occurred despite the reporting individual's good faith, and despite his or her
lack of intent to conceal wealth.
Thus, in Atty. Navarro v. Office of the Ombudsman, this Court exonerated the reporting
individual for making an over-declaration in his Statements of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth,
and for lumping his properties. It pointed out that officials should be alerted to issues such as this
to give an opportunity to rectify them
In this case, there is no showing that private respondent had been given the opportunity
to correct the defects in her Statements of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth before the Complaint
was filed against her. If her or her husband's connection to Arnold L. Cruz Customs Brokerage
was too ambiguous or a cause for concern, she should have been allowed to clarify the matter-
especially since she expressly disclosed a connection with the firm.
The purpose of requiring public officials to submit statements of assets, liabilities, and net
worth is to defeat corruption. Providing an opportunity to correct a defect before being sanctioned
is aligned with this purpose. (Department of Finance Revenue Integrity Protection Service v.
Yambao, G.R. Nos. 220632 and 220634, November 06, 2019)
THE OMBUDSMAN
The independence of the Ombudsman has the following aspects: 1) It is
created by the Constitution and cannot be abolished by Congress; 2) it has fiscal
autonomy; and 3) it is insulated from executive supervision and control. -- The concept
of Ombudsman’s independence covers three (3) things: First: creation by the Constitution,
which means that the office cannot be abolished, nor its constitutionally specified functions and
privileges, be removed, altered, or modified by law, unless the Constitution itself allows, or an
amendment thereto is made; Second: fiscal autonomy, which means that the office “may not
be obstructed from [its] freedom to use or dispose of [its] funds for purposes germane to [its]
functions; hence, its budget cannot be strategically decreased by officials of the political branches
of government so as to impair said functions; and Third: insulation from executive
supervision and control, which means that those within the ranks of the office can only be
disciplined by an internal authority. (Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 217126-27,
November 10, 2015)
The independence enjoyed by the Office of the Ombudsman and by the Constitutional
Commissions shares certain characteristics – they do not owe their existence to any act of
Congress, but are created by the Constitution itself; additionally, they all enjoy fiscal autonomy.
They are not under the control of the President, even if they discharge functions that are executive
in nature. The framers of the Constitution intended that these "independent" bodies be insulated
from political pressure to the extent that the absence of "independence" would result in the
impairment of their core functions. (Gonzales v. Office of the President, G.R. No. 196231, January
28, 2014)
Vesting disciplinary authority in the President over the Deputy Ombudsman

violates the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman. -- Section 8(2) of RA No.
6770 vesting disciplinary authority in the President over the Deputy Ombudsman violates the
independence of the Office of the Ombudsman and is thus unconstitutional. Subjecting the
Deputy Ombudsman to discipline and removal by the President, whose own alter egos and
officials in the Executive Department are subject to the Ombudsman’s disciplinary authority,
cannot but seriously place at risk the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman itself. The
law directly collided not only with the independence that the Constitution guarantees to the Office
of the Ombudsman, but inevitably with the principle of checks and balances that the creation of
an Ombudsman office seeks to revitalize. (Gonzales v. Office of the President, G.R. No. 196231,
January 28, 2014)

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Ombudsman’s concurrent jurisdiction over administrative cases. -- The
Ombudsman has concurrent jurisdiction over administrative cases which are within the
jurisdiction of the regular courts or administrative agencies. In administrative cases involving the
concurrent jurisdiction of two or more disciplining authorities, the body where the complaint is
filed first, and which opts to take cognizance of the case, acquires jurisdiction to the exclusion of
other tribunals exercising concurrent jurisdiction. (Alejandrino v. Office of the Ombudsman Fact
Finding and Intelligence Bureau, G.R. No. 173121, April 3, 2013)
The power of investigation granted to the Ombudsman by the 1987

Constitution and The Ombudsman Act is not exclusive but is shared with other
similarly authorized government agencies, such as the PCGG and judges of municipal
trial courts and municipal circuit trial courts. The power to conduct preliminary
investigation on charges against public employees and officials is likewise
concurrently shared with the Department of Justice. Also, the Ombudsman retains
concurrent jurisdiction with the Office of the President and the local Sanggunians. --
Respondent argues that it is the Ombudsman who has primary jurisdiction over the
administrative complaint filed against him. Notwithstanding the consolidation of the
administrative offense (non-declaration in the SSAL) with the criminal complaints for
unexplained wealth (Section 8 of R.A. No. 3019) and also for perjury (Article 183, Revised Penal
Code, as amended) before the Office of the Ombudsman, respondents’ objection on jurisdictional
grounds cannot be sustained. Section 12 of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution mandated the
Ombudsman to act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials
or employees of the Government, or any subdivision, agency, instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations. Under Section 13, Article XI, the Ombudsman is
empowered to conduct investigations on his own or upon complaint by any person when such act
appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient. He is also given broad powers to take the
appropriate disciplinary actions against erring public officials and employees. The investigative
authority of the Ombudsman is defined in Section 15 of R.A. No. 6770: SEC. 15. Powers, Functions
and Duties. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions and duties:
(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or
omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or
omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary
jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary
jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of Government, the
investigation of such cases. Such jurisdiction over public officers and employees, however, is not
exclusive. This power of investigation granted to the Ombudsman by the 1987
Constitution and The Ombudsman Act is not exclusive but is shared with other
similarly authorized government agencies, such as the PCGG and judges of municipal trial
courts and municipal circuit trial courts. The power to conduct preliminary investigation on
charges against public employees and officials is likewise concurrently shared with the
Department of Justice. Despite the passage of the Local Government Code in 1991, the
Ombudsman retains concurrent jurisdiction with the Office of the President and the
local Sanggunians to investigate complaints against local elective officials. (Flores v.
Montemayor, G.R. No. 170146, June 8, 2011)
The initial acquisition of jurisdiction by an administrative agency of concurrent

jurisdiction divests the Ombudsman of its own jurisdiction over the same
administrative case. -- Respondent who is a presidential appointee is under
the disciplinary authority of the OP. Executive Order No. 12 dated April 16, 2001 created the
PAGC which was granted the authority to investigate presidential and also non-presidential
employees who may have acted in conspiracy or may have been involved with a presidential
appointee or ranking officer mentioned. On this score, we do not agree with respondent that the
PAGC should have deferred to the Ombudsman instead of proceeding with the administrative
complaint in view of the pendency of his petition for certiorari with the CA challenging the PAGCs
jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is a matter of law. Jurisdiction once acquired is not lost upon the
instance of the parties but continues until the case is terminated. It may be recalled that at the
time respondent was directed to submit his counter-affidavit under the Ombudsman’s Order
dated March 19, 2004, the PAGC investigation had long commenced and in fact, the PAGC issued
an order directing respondent to file his counter-affidavit/verified answer as early as May 19,
2003. The rule is that initial acquisition of jurisdiction by a court of concurrent jurisdiction divests
another of its own jurisdiction. Having already taken cognizance of the complaint against the
respondent involving non-declaration in his 2001 and 2002 SSAL, the PAGC thus retained
jurisdiction over respondents’ administrative case notwithstanding the subsequent filing of a
supplemental complaint before the Ombudsman charging him with the same violation. (Flores v.
Montemayor, G.R. No. 170146, June 8, 2011)

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The Office of the Ombudsman has the power to impose the penalty of removal,
suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of a public officer or employee,
in the exercise of its administrative disciplinary authority. It has disciplinary authority
over all elective and appointive officials of the government and its subdivisions,
instrumentalities and agencies (with the exception only of impeachable officers,
members of Congress and the Judiciary). --The Ombudsman has the power to impose the
penalty of removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of a public officer or
employee, in the exercise of its administrative disciplinary authority. The challenge to the
Ombudsman’s power to impose these penalties, on the allegation that the Constitution only grants
it recommendatory powers, had already been rejected by this Court. Under RA 6770, the
lawmakers intended to provide the Office of the Ombudsman with sufficient muscle to ensure that
it can effectively carry out its mandate as protector of the people against inept and corrupt
government officers and employees. The Office was granted the power to punish for contempt in
accordance with the Rules of Court. It was given disciplinary authority over all elective and
appointive officials of the government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies (with
the exception only of impeachable officers, members of Congress and the Judiciary). Also, it can
preventively suspend any officer under its authority pending an investigation when the case so
warrants. The Ombudsman has been statutorily granted the right to impose administrative
penalties on erring public officials. That the Constitution merely indicated a recommendatory
power in the text of Section 13(3), Article XI of the Constitution did not deprive Congress of its
plenary legislative power to vest the Ombudsman powers beyond those stated. The provisions in
R.A. No. 6770 taken together reveal the manifest intent of the lawmakers to bestow on the Office
of the Ombudsman full administrative disciplinary authority. These provisions cover the entire
gamut of administrative adjudication which entails the authority to, inter alia, receive
complaints, conduct investigations, hold hearings in accordance with its rules of procedure,
summon witnesses and require the production of documents, place under preventive suspension
public officers and employees pending an investigation, determine the appropriate penalty
imposable on erring public officers or employees as warranted by the evidence, and, necessarily,
impose the said penalty. Thus, it is settled that the Office of the Ombudsman can directly
impose administrative sanctions. (Office of the Ombudsman v. Apolonio, G.R. No. 165132, March
7, 2012)
Although the tenor of the text in Section 13(3), Article XI15 of the Constitution merely
indicates a "recommendatory" function, this does not divest Congress of its plenary legislative
power to vest the Ombudsman powers beyond those stated in the Constitutional provision.
Pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6770, otherwise known as The Ombudsman Act of 1989, the
Ombudsman is legally authorized to directly impose administrative penalties against errant
public servants. Further, the manifest intent of the lawmakers was to bestow on the Ombudsman
full administrative disciplinary authority in accord with the constitutional deliberations.
(Ombudsman v. Quimbo, G.R. No. 173277, February 25, 2015)
The Ombudsman has concurrent jurisdiction over administrative cases which

are within the jurisdiction of the regular courts or administrative agencies. In
administrative cases involving the concurrent jurisdiction of two or more disciplining
authorities, the body where the complaint is filed first, and which opts to take
cognizance of the case, acquires jurisdiction to the exclusion of other tribunals
exercising concurrent jurisdiction. -- While Section 21 of The Ombudsman Act and the
Local Government Code both provide for the procedure to discipline elective officials, the
seeming conflicts between the two laws have been resolved in cases decided by this Court. The
two statutes on the specific matter in question are not so inconsistent as to compel us to only
uphold one and strike down the other. The Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction to investigate
any act or omission of a public officer or employee who is under the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction extends only to public officials occupying
positions corresponding to salary grade 27 and higher. Consequently, as we held in Office of the
Ombudsman v. Rodriguez, any act or omission of a public officer or employee occupying a salary
grade lower than 27 is within the concurrent jurisdiction of the Ombudsman and of the regular
courts or other investigative agencies. In administrative cases involving the concurrent
jurisdiction of two or more disciplining authorities, the body where the complaint is filed first,
and which opts to take cognizance of the case, acquires jurisdiction to the exclusion of other
tribunals exercising concurrent jurisdiction. In this case, the petitioner is a Barangay Chairman,
occupying a position corresponding to salary grade 14. Under RA 7160, the sangguniang
panlungsod or sangguniang bayan has disciplinary authority over any elective barangay official.
Since the complaint against the petitioner was initially filed with the Office of the Ombudsman,
the Ombudsman's exercise of jurisdiction is to the exclusion of the sangguniang bayan whose
exercise of jurisdiction is concurrent. (Alejandrino v. Office of the Ombudsman Fact Finding
and Intelligence Bureau, G.R. No. 173121, April 3, 2013)

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The Ombudsman has jurisdiction over a complaint concerning an act of the
public official or employee that is not service-connected. Under the 1987 Constitution,
the Ombudsman can investigate on its own or on complaint by any person any act or
omission of any public official or employee when such act or omission appears to be
illegal, unjust, or improper. Under the Ombudsman Act of 1989, the jurisdiction of the
Ombudsman encompasses all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance, and nonfeasance
committed by any public officer or employee during his/her tenure. R.A. No. 6770 also
states that the Ombudsman shall act on all complaints relating, but not limited, to
acts or omissions which are unfair or irregular. -- Petitioner is a government employee,
being a department head of the Population Commission with office at the Provincial Capitol, Trece
Martirez City, Cavite. Sometime in March 2001, petitioner agreed to help her friend, respondent
Julia A. Restrivera, to have the latter’s land located in Carmona, Cavite, registered under the
Torrens System. Petitioner said that the expenses would reach P150,000 and accepted P50,000
from respondent to cover the initial expenses for the titling of respondent’s land. However,
petitioner failed to accomplish her task because it was found out that the land is government
property. When petitioner failed to return the P50,000, respondent sued her for estafa.
Respondent also filed an administrative complaint for grave misconduct or conduct unbecoming
a public officer against petitioner before the Office of the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman found
petitioner guilty of violating Section 4(b) of R.A. No. 6713 and suspended her from office for six
months without pay. Does the Ombudsman have jurisdiction over a case involving a private
dealing by a government employee or where the act complained of is not related to the
performance of official duty? The Ombudsman has jurisdiction over respondent’s complaint
against petitioner although the act complained of involves a private deal between them. Section
13(1),13 Article XI of the 1987 Constitution states that the Ombudsman can investigate on its own
or on complaint by any person any act or omission of any public official or employee when such
act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, or improper. Under Section 1614 of R.A. No. 6770,
otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman
encompasses all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance, and nonfeasance committed by any public
officer or employee during his/her tenure. Section 1915 of R.A. No. 6770 also states that the
Ombudsman shall act on all complaints relating, but not limited, to acts or omissions which are
unfair or irregular. Thus, even if the complaint concerns an act of the public official or employee
which is not service-connected, the case is within the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman. The law
does not qualify the nature of the illegal act or omission of the public official or employee that the
Ombudsman may investigate. It does not require that the act or omission be related to or be
connected with or arise from the performance of official duty. Since the law does not distinguish,
neither should we. (Samson v. Restrivera, G.R. No. 178454, March 28, 2011)
The Office of the Ombudsman is not a constitutional commission In any

vacancy for the positions of Ombudsman and the deputies, the successor shall always
be appointed for a full term of seven years. -- The Office of the Ombudsman is not a
constitutional commission. It is only as to the rank and salary that the Ombudsman and the
deputies shall be the same with the chairman and members, respectively, of the constitutional
commissions. In any vacancy for the positions of Ombudsman and the deputies, whether as a
result of the expiration of the term or death, resignation, removal, or permanent disability of the
predecessor, the successor shall always be appointed for a full term of seven years. Unlike the
constitutional commissions in Art. IX of the 1987 Constitution, the seven-year term of office of
the first appointees for Ombudsman and the deputies is not reckoned from 2 February 1987, but
shall be reckoned from their date of appointment. Accordingly, the present Ombudsman and
deputies shall serve a full term of seven years from their date of appointment unless their term is
cut short by death, resignation, removal, or permanent disability. (Ifurung v. Carpio-Morales,
G.R. No. 232131, April 24, 2018)
IMPEACHMENT V. QUO WARRANTO
Petition for Quo Warranto
The suing private individual must show a clear right to the contested office. An
acting appointee has no cause of action for quo warranto against the new appointee.
-- Quo warranto is a remedy to try disputes with respect to the title to a public office. Generally,
quo warranto proceedings are commenced by the Government as the proper party-plaintiff.
However, under Section 5, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, an individual may commence such action
if he claims to be entitled to the public office allegedly usurped by another. We stress that the
person instituting the quo warranto proceedings in his own behalf must show that he is entitled
to the office in dispute; otherwise, the action may be dismissed at any stage. Emphatically, Section

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6, Rule 66 of the same Rules requires the petitioner to state in the petition his right to the public
office and the respondent's unlawful possession of the disputed position. For a petition for quo
warranto to be successful, the suing private individual must show a clear right to the contested
office. His failure to establish this right warrants the dismissal of the suit for lack of cause of
action; it is not even necessary to pass upon the right of the defendant who, by virtue of his
appointment, continues in the undisturbed possession of his office. Since the petitioner merely
holds an acting appointment (and an expired one at that), he clearly does not have a cause of
action to maintain the present petition. The essence of an acting appointment is its temporariness
and its consequent revocability at any time by the appointing authority. The petitioner in a quo
warranto proceeding who seeks reinstatement to an office, on the ground of usurpation or illegal
deprivation, must prove his clear right to the office for his suit to succeed; otherwise, his petition
must fail. (General v. Urro, G.R. No. 191560, March 29, 2011)
Impeachment and quo warranto proceeding distinguished: Impeachment is

political in nature, quo warranto is judicial -- Impeachment is proceeding exercised
by the legislative, as representatives of the sovereign, to vindicate the breach of the
trust reposed by the people in the hands of the public officer by determining the public
officer's fitness to stay in the office. Meanwhile, an action for quo warranto, involves
judicial determination of the eligibility or validity of the election or appointment of
public official based on predetermined rules. -- Respondent, however, pounds on the fact
that as member of the Supreme Court, she is an impeachable officer. As such, respondent argues
that quo warranto proceeding, which may result in her ouster, cannot be lodged against her,
especially when there is an impending impeachment case against her. While both impeachment
and quo warranto may result in the ouster of the public official, the two proceedings materially
differ. At its most basic, impeachment proceedings are political in nature, while an action for quo
warranto is judicial or proceeding traditionally lodged in the courts. Impeachment is proceeding
exercised by the legislative, as representatives of the sovereign, to vindicate the breach of the trust
reposed by the people in the hands of the public officer by determining the public officer's fitness
to stay in the office. Meanwhile, an action for quo warranto, involves judicial determination of the
eligibility or validity of the election or appointment of public official based on predetermined
rules. (Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018)
Quo warranto and impeachment can proceed independently and

simultaneously. -- Aside from the difference in their origin and nature, quo warranto and
impeachment may proceed independently of each other as these remedies are distinct as to (1)
jurisdiction (2) grounds, (3) applicable rules pertaining to initiation, filing and dismissal, and (4)
limitations. (Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018)
Nature of a quo warranto proceeding: It determines whether an individual has

the legal right to hold the public office he or she occupies. -- The term "quo warranto" is
Latin for "by what authority." Therefore, as the name suggests, quo warranto is writ of inquiry. It
determines whether an individual has the legal right to hold the public office he or she occupies.
Quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy to determine the right or title to the contested
public office or to oust the holder from its enjoyment. In quo warranto proceedings referring to
offices filled by election, what is to be determined is the eligibility of the candidates elected, while
in quo warranto proceedings referring to offices filled by appointment, what is determined is the
legality of the appointment. (Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018)
Who may initiate a quo warranto proceeding: The Solicitor General or public
prosecutor, or by any person claiming to be entitled to the public office or position
usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another. -- An action for quo warranto may be
commenced by the Solicitor General or public prosecutor, or by any person claiming to be entitled
to the public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another. That
usurpation of public office is treated as public wrong and carries with it public interest in our
jurisdiction is clear when Section 1, Rule 66 provides that where the action is for the usurpation
of public office, position or franchise, it shall be commenced by verified petition brought in the
name of the Republic of the Philippines through the Solicitor General or public prosecutor.
Nonetheless, the Solicitor General, in the exercise of sound discretion, may suspend or turn down
the institution of an action for quo warranto where there are just and valid reasons. Upon receipt
of case certified to him, the Solicitor General may start the prosecution of the case by filing the
appropriate action in court or he may choose not to file the case at all. The Solicitor General is
given permissible latitude within his legal authority in actions for quo warranto, circumscribed
only by the national interest and the government policy on the matter at hand. (Republic v.
Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018)
For quo warranto petition filed by a private individual to be successful, he must

show a clear right to the contested office. -- The instance when an individual is allowed to
commence an action for quo warranto in his own name is when such person is claiming to be
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entitled to public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another. For quo
warranto petition to be successful, the private person suing must show no less than clear right to
the contested office.(Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018)
The judgment in a quo warranto case includes ouster and exclusion from the
office. -- In case of usurpation of public office, when the respondent is found guilty of usurping,
intruding into, or unlawfully holding or exercising public office, position or franchise, the
judgment shall include the following: (a) the respondent shall be ousted and excluded from the
office; (b) the petitioner or relator, as the case may be, shall recover his costs; and (c) such further
judgment determining the respective rights in and to the public office, position or franchise of all
the parties to the action as justice requires. The remedies available in quo warranto judgment do
not include correction or reversal of acts taken under the ostensible authority of an office or
franchise. Judgment is limited to ouster or forfeiture and may not be imposed retroactively upon
prior exercise of official or corporate duties. (Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018)
Quo warranto and impeachment are not mutually exclusive remedies. -- Quo
warranto and impeachment are not mutually exclusive remedies and may even proceed
simultaneously; the existence of other remedies against the usurper does not prevent the State
from commencing quo warranto proceeding. (Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018)
Difference in causes of action: In quo warranto, the cause of action lies on the
usurping, intruding, or unlawfully holding or exercising of public office, while in
impeachment, it is the commission of an impeachable offense . -- Essentially, respondent
points out that the inclusion of the matter on tax fraud, which will further be discussed below, is
already covered by Article of the Articles of Impeachment. Hence, respondent argues, among
others, that the petition should be dismissed on the ground of forum shopping. However, the
causes of action in the two proceedings are unequivocally different. In quo warranto, the cause of
action lies on the usurping, intruding, or unlawfully holding or exercising of public office, while
in impeachment, it is the commission of an impeachable offense. Stated in different manner, the
crux of the controversy in this quo warranto proceedings is the determination of whether or not
respondent legally holds the Chief Justice position to be considered as an impeachable officer in
the first place. On the other hand, impeachment is for respondent's prosecution for certain
impeachable offenses. To be sure, respondent is not being prosecuted herein for such impeachable
offenses enumerated in the Articles of Impeachment. Instead, the resolution of this case shall be
based on established facts and related laws. Simply put, while respondent's title to hold public
office is the issue in quo warranto proceedings, impeachment necessarily presupposes that
respondent legally holds the public office and thus, is an impeachable officer, the only issue being
whether or not she committed impeachable offenses to warrant her removal from office.(Republic
v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018)
Difference in relief sought: Quo warranto results in the ouster and exclusion
of the respondent from the office he or she is ineligible to hold, while in impeachment,
while impeachment results in the removal of the respondent from the public office
that he/she is legally holding. -- Likewise, the reliefs sought in the two proceedings are
different. Under the Rules on quo warranto, "when the respondent is found guilty of usurping,
intruding into, or unlawfully holding or exercising public office, judgment shall be rendered that
such respondent be ousted and altogether excluded therefrom." In short, respondent in quo
warranto proceeding shall be adjudged to cease from holding public office, which he/she is
ineligible to hold. On the other hand, in impeachment, conviction for the charges of impeachable
offenses shall result to the removal of the respondent from the public office that he/she is legally
holding. It is not legally possible to impeach or remove person from an office that he/she, in the
first place, does not and cannot legally hold or occupy.(Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May
11, 2018)
Impeachment proceeding v. impeachment case. -- In the said Reply/Supplement

to the Memorandum Ad Cautelam, respondent advanced the argument that the "impeachment
proceeding" is different from the "impeachment case", the former refers to the filing of the
complaint before the Committee on Justice while the latter refers to the proceedings before the
Senate. Respondent posits that the "impeachment proceeding" against her is already pending
upon the filing of the verified complaint before the House Committee on Justice albeit the
"impeachment case" has not yet started as the Articles of Impeachment has not yet been filed with
the Senate. Hence, in view of such proceeding before the Committee on Justice, the filing of the
instant petition constitutes forum shopping. The difference between the "impeachment
proceeding" and the "impeachment case" correctly cited by the respondent, bolsters the
conclusion that there can be no forum shopping. Indeed, the "impeachment proceeding" before
the House Committee on Justice is not the "impeachment case" proper. The impeachment case is
yet to be initiated by the filing of the Articles of Impeachment before the Senate. Thus, at the
moment, there is no pending impeachment case against the respondent. The House Committee
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on Justice's determination of probable cause on whether the impeachment against the respondent
should go on trial before the Senate is akin to the prosecutor's determination of probable cause
during the preliminary investigation in criminal case. In preliminary investigation, the prosecutor
does not determine the guilt or innocence of the accused; he does not exercise adjudication nor
rule-making functions. The process is merely inquisitorial and is merely means of discovering if
person may be reasonably charged with crime. It is not trial of the case on the merits and has no
purpose except that of determining whether crime has been committed and whether there is
probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof. As such, during the preliminary
investigation before the prosecutor, there is no pending case to speak of yet. In fact, jurisprudence
states that the preliminary investigation stage is not part of the trial. Thus, at the time of the filing
of this petition, there is no pending impeachment case that would bar the quo warrranto petition
on the ground of forum shopping.(Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018)
There can be no forum-shopping and litis pendentia even with the

simultaneous pendency of a quo warranto petition and impeachment proceeding. --
In fine, forum shopping and litis pendentia are not present and final decision in one will not
strictly constitute as res judicata to the other. Judgment in quo warranto case determines the
respondent's constitutional or legal authority to perform any act in, or exercise any function of
the office to which he lays claim; meanwhile judgment in an impeachment proceeding pertain to
respondent's "fitness for public office."(Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018)
Impeachment is not an exclusive remedy by which an invalidly appointed or

invalidly elected impeachable official may be removed from office. -- Respondent
anchors her position that she can be removed from office only by impeachment. Whether the
impeachable officer unlawfully held his office or whether his appointment was void was not an
issue raised before the Court. The principle laid down in said cases is to the effect that during their
incumbency, impeachable officers cannot be criminally prosecuted for an offense that carries with
it the penalty of removal, and if they are required to be members of the Philippine Bar to qualify
for their positions, they cannot be charged with disbarment. The proscription does not extend to
actions assailing the public officer's title or right to the office he or she occupies. The ruling
therefore cannot serve as authority to hold that quo warranto action can never be filed against an
impeachable officer.
Even the PET Rules expressly provide for the remedy of either an election protest or
petition for quo warranto to question the eligibility of the President and the Vice-President, both
of whom are impeachable officers. In fact, this would not be the first time the Court shall take
cognizance of quo warranto petition against an impeachable officer. In the consolidated cases of
Estrada v. Desierto, et al. and Estrada v. Macapagal-Arroyo, the Court took cognizance and
assumed jurisdiction over the quo warranto petition filed against respondent therein who, at the
time of the filing of the petition, had taken an oath and assumed the Office of the President.
(Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018)
The Constitution allows the institution of quo warranto action against an

impeachable officer. After all, quo warranto petition is predicated on grounds distinct
from those of impeachment. The former questions the validity of public officer's
appointment while the latter indicts him for the so-called impeachable offenses
without questioning his title to the office he holds. -- The language of Section 2, Article XI
of the Constitution does not foreclose quo warranto action against impeachable officers. The
provision reads: “Section 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme
Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed
from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason,
bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public
officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment.”
The provision uses the permissive term "may" which, in statutory construction, denotes discretion
and cannot be construed as having mandatory effect. We have consistently held that the term
"may" is indicative of mere possibility, an opportunity or an option. The grantee of that
opportunity is vested with right or faculty which he has the option to exercise. An option to remove
by impeachment admits of an alternative mode of effecting the removal. We hold, therefore, that
by its tenor, Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution allows the institution of quo warranto action
against an impeachable officer. After all, quo warranto petition is predicated on grounds distinct
from those of impeachment. The former questions the validity of public officer's appointment
while the latter indicts him for the so-called impeachable offenses without questioning his title to
the office he holds. Further, that the enumeration of "impeachable offenses" is made absolute,
that is, only those enumerated offenses are treated as grounds for impeachment, is not equivalent
to saying that the enumeration likewise purport to be complete statement of the causes of removal
from office. (Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018)

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The courts should be able to inquire into the validity of appointments even of
impeachable officers. To hold otherwise is to allow an absurd situation where the
appointment of an impeachable officer cannot be questioned even when, for instance,
he or she has been determined to be of foreign nationality or, in offices where Bar
membership is qualification, when he or she fraudulently represented to be member
of the Bar. -- To subscribe to the view that appointments or election of impeachable officers are
outside judicial review is to cleanse their appointments or election of any possible defect
pertaining to the Constitutionally-prescribed qualifications which cannot otherwise be raised in
an impeachment proceeding. The courts should be able to inquire into the validity of
appointments even of impeachable officers. To hold otherwise is to allow an absurd situation
where the appointment of an impeachable officer cannot be questioned even when, for instance,
he or she has been determined to be of foreign nationality or, in offices where Bar membership is
qualification, when he or she fraudulently represented to be member of the Bar. Unless such an
officer commits any of the grounds for impeachment and is actually impeached, he can continue
discharging the functions of his office even when he is clearly disqualified from holding it Such
would result in permitting unqualified and ineligible public officials to continue occupying key
positions, exercising sensitive sovereign functions until they are successfully removed from office
through impeachment. This could not have been the intent of the framers of the Constitution.
Quo warranto should be an available remedy to question the legality of

appointments especially of impeachable officers considering that they occupy some
of the highest-ranking offices in the land and can have vast power on matters of law
and policy. -- The essence of quo warranto is to protect the body politic from the usurpation of
public office and to ensure that government authority is entrusted only to qualified individuals.
Reason therefore dictates that quo warranto should be an available remedy to question the legality
of appointments especially of impeachable officers considering that they occupy some of the
highest-ranking offices in the land and are capable of wielding vast power and influence on
matters of law and policy. (Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018)
The Supreme Court's exercise of its jurisdiction over a quo warranto petition is
not violative of the doctrine of separation of powers. An action for quo warranto does
not try person's culpability of an impeachment offense, neither does writ of quo
warranto conclusively pronounce such culpability. The Court's exercise of its
jurisdiction over quo warranto proceedings does not preclude Congress from
enforcing its own prerogative of determining probable cause for impeachment, to
craft and transmit the Articles of Impeachment, nor will it preclude Senate from
exercising its constitutionally committed power of impeachment. -- Section 3(1) and
3(6), Article XI, of the Constitution respectively provides that the House of Representatives shall
have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment while the Senate shall have the sole
power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. Thus, there is no argument that the
constitutionally-defined instrumentality which is given the power to try impeachment cases is the
Senate. Nevertheless, the Court's assumption of jurisdiction over an action for quo warranto
involving person who would otherwise be an impeachable official had it not been for
disqualification, is not violative of the core constitutional provision that impeachment cases shall
be exclusively tried and decided by the Senate. Again, an action for quo warranto tests the right
of person to occupy public position. It is direct proceeding assailing the title to public office. The
issue to be resolved by the Court is whether or not the defendant is legally occupying public
position which goes into the questions of whether defendant was legally appointed, was legally
qualified and has complete legal title to the office. If defendant is found to be not qualified and
without any authority, the relief that the Court grants is the ouster and exclusion of the defendant
from office. In other words, while impeachment concerns actions that make the officer unfit to
continue exercising his or her office, quo warranto involves matters that render him or her
ineligible to hold the position to begin with. Given the nature and effect of an action for quo
warranto, such remedy is unavailing to determine whether or not an official has committed
misconduct in office nor is it the proper legal vehicle to evaluate the person's performance in the
office. Apropos, an action for quo warranto does not try person's culpability of an impeachment
offense, neither does writ of quo warranto conclusively pronounce such culpability. The Court's
exercise of its jurisdiction over quo warranto proceedings does not preclude Congress from
enforcing its own prerogative of determining probable cause for impeachment, to craft and
transmit the Articles of Impeachment, nor will it preclude Senate from exercising its
constitutionally committed power of impeachment. (Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May
11, 2018)
The filing of SALNs is a Constitutional requirement: Failure to file SALNs and to

submit the same to the JBC go into the very qualification of integrity of a Member of
the Supreme Court. -- Indeed, respondent's case is peculiar in that her omission to file her
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SALN also formed part of the allegations against her in the Verified Complaint for Impeachment.
Verily, the filing of the SALN is Constitutional requirement, and the transgression of which may,
in the wisdom of the impeachment court, be interpreted as constituting culpable violation of the
Constitution. But then, respondent, unlike the President, the Vice-President, Members of the
Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman, apart from having to comply with the
Constitutional SALN requirement, also answers to the unique Constitutional qualification of
having to be person of proven competence, integrity, probity, and independence-qualifications
not expressly required by the fundamental law for the other impeachable officers. And as will be
extensively demonstrated hereunder, respondent's failure to file her SALNs and to submit the
same to the JBC go into the very qualification of integrity. In other words, when Member of the
Supreme Court transgresses the SALN requirement prior to his or her appointment as such, he or
she commits violation of the Constitution and belies his or her qualification to hold the office.
Congress cannot rule on the validity of the appointment of the Chief Justice. --
The impeachment tribunal cannot be expected to rule on the validity or constitutionality of the
Chief Justice's appointment, nor can their ruling be of jurisprudential binding effect to this Court.
To authorize Congress to rule on public officials' eligibility would disturb the system of checks and
balances as it would dilute the judicial power of courts, upon which jurisdiction is exclusively
vested to rule on actions for quo warranto. (Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018)
An act or omission committed prior to or at the time of appointment or election

relating to an official's qualifications to hold office as to render such appointment or
election invalid is properly the subject of quo warranto petition; and acts or
omissions, even if it relates to the qualification of integrity, but nonetheless
committed during the incumbency of validly appointed and/or validly elected official,
cannot be the subject of quo warranto proceeding, but of something else, which may
either be impeachment (if the public official concerned is impeachable and the act or
omission constitutes an impeachable offense) or disciplinary, administrative or
criminal action. -- To obliviate confusion in the future as to when quo warranto as remedy to
oust an ineligible public official may be availed of, and in keeping with the Court's function of
harmonizing the laws and the rules with the Constitution, the Court herein demarcates that an act
or omission committed prior to or at the time of appointment or election relating to an official's
qualifications to hold office as to render such appointment or election invalid is properly the
subject of quo warranto petition, provided that the requisites for the commencement thereof are
present. Contrariwise, acts or omissions, even if it relates to the qualification of integrity, being
continuing requirement but nonetheless committed during the incumbency of validly appointed
and/or validly elected official, cannot be the subject of quo warranto proceeding, but of something
else, which may either be impeachment if the public official concerned is impeachable and the act
or omission constitutes an impeachable offense, or disciplinary, administrative or criminal action,
if otherwise. (Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018)
Courts may determine whether the appointee has the requisite qualifications,
absent which, his right or title thereto may be declared void. -- While an appointment is
an essentially discretionary executive power, it is subject to the limitation that the appointee
should possess none of the disqualifications but all the qualifications required by law. Where the
law prescribes certain qualifications for given office or position, courts may determine whether
the appointee has the requisite qualifications, absent which, his right or title thereto may be
declared void. Clearly, an outright dismissal of the petition based on speculation that respondent
will eventually be tried on impeachment is clear abdication of the Court's duty to settle actual
controversy squarely presented before it. (Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018)
Exercise of jurisdiction over an action for quo warranto falls within the ambit
of its judicial power to settle justiciable issues or actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable. -- Neither does the possibility of the
occurrence of constitutional crisis reason for the Court to abandon its positive constitutional duty
to take cognizance of case over which it enjoys jurisdiction and is not otherwise legally
disqualified. constitutional crisis may arise from conflict over the determination by the
independent branches of government of the nature, scope and extent of their respective
constitutional powers. Thus, there can be no constitutional crisis where the Constitution itself
provides the means and bases for the resolution of the "conflict." To reiterate, the Court's exercise
of jurisdiction over an action for quo warranto falls within the ambit of its judicial power to settle
justiciable issues or actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable. In so doing, the Court is not arrogating upon itself the Congress' power to determine
whether an impeachable officer may be removed by impeachment or not, which is political, rather
than judicial, exercise. (Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018)

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Quo warranto proceedings are essentially judicial in character it calls for the
exercise of the Supreme Court's constitutional duty and power to decide cases and
settle actual controversies. As an impeachment court, the Senate cannot rule on the
constitutionality of an appointment of Member of the Supreme Court with
jurisprudential binding effect. -- Jurisdiction is conferred by law. It cannot be waived by
stipulation, by abdication or by estoppel. Quo warranto proceedings are essentially judicial in
character it calls for the exercise of the Supreme Court's constitutional duty and power to decide
cases and settle actual controversies. This constitutional duty cannot be abdicated or transferred
in favor of, or in deference to, any other branch of the government including the Congress, even
as it acts as an impeachment court through the Senate. As an impeachment court, the Senate's
jurisdiction and the effect of its pronouncement is as limited under the Constitution it cannot rule
on the constitutionality of an appointment of Member of the Supreme Court with jurisprudential
binding effect because rulings of the impeachment court, being political rather than judicial body,
do not form part of the laws of the land. Any attempt to derogate or usurp judicial power in the
determination of whether the respondent's appointment is constitutional or not will, in point of
fact, amount to culpable violation of the Constitution. (Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May
11, 2018)
LOCAL GOVERNMENT
Local ordinances must not be inconsistent with the laws or policy of the State.
Local governments cannot regulate conduct already covered by a statute involving
the same subject matter. -- The policy of ensuring the autonomy of local governments was
not intended to create an imperium in imperio and install intra-sovereign political subdivisions
independent of the sovereign state. Local ordinances must be inconsistent with the laws or policy
of the State. Local governments are precluded from regulating conduct already covered by a
statute involving the same subject matter. Thus, an ordinance that seeks to control and regulate
the use of ground water within a City, a power that pertains solely to the NWRB under the Water
Code – is ultra vires and void. (City of Batangas v. Pilipinas Shell, G.R. No. 195003, June 7, 2017)
Under the Constitution, (1) the LGUs shall have a just share in the national
taxes; (2) the just share shall be determined by law; and (3) the just share shall be
automatically released to the LGUs. -- Section 6, Article X the 1987 Constitution textually
commands the allocation to the LGUs of a just share in the national taxes, viz.: “Section 6. Local
government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the national taxes which shall
be automatically released to them.” Section 6, when parsed, embodies three mandates, namely:
(1) the LGUs shall have a just share in the national taxes; (2) the just share shall be determined
by law; and (3) the just share shall be automatically released to the LGUs. Congress has sought to
carry out the second mandate of Section 6 by enacting Section 284, Title III (Shares of Local
Government Units in the Proceeds of National Taxes), of the LGC, which is refers to “Allotment
of Internal Revenue Taxes.” (Mandanas v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 199802, July 03, 2018)
The national taxes to be included in the base for computing the just share the
LGUs should not be limited to the national internal revenue taxes (NIRTs) but should
include other national taxes such as tariff and customs duties, excise taxes,
documentary stamp taxes, and franchise taxes. -- There is no issue as to what constitutes
the LGUs' just share expressed in percentages of the national taxes (i.e., 30%, 35% and 40%
stipulated in subparagraphs (a), (b), and (c) of Section 284). Yet, Section 6, mentions national
taxes as the source of the just share of the LGUs while Section 284 ordains that the share of the
LGUs be taken from national internal revenue taxes instead. Has not Congress thereby infringed
the constitutional provision? Garcia contends that Congress has exceeded its constitutional
boundary by limiting to the NIRTs the base from which to compute the just share of the LGUs.
We agree with Garcia's contention. The phrase national internal revenue taxes engrafted in
Section 284 is undoubtedly more restrictive than the term national taxes written in Section 6. As
such, Congress has actually departed from the letter of the 1987 Constitution stating that national
taxes should be the base from which the just share of the LGU comes. Such departure is
impermissible. Equally impermissible is that Congress has also thereby curtailed the guarantee of
fiscal autonomy in favor of the LGUs under the 1987 Constitution.
Taxes are classified into national and local. National taxes are those levied by the National
Government, while local taxes are those levied by the LGUs. What the phrase national internal
revenue taxes as used in Section 284 included are all the taxes enumerated in Section 21 of the
National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC), as amended by R.A. No. 8424, viz.: “Section 21. Sources
of Revenue. — The following taxes, fees and charges are deemed to be national internal revenue
taxes:
(a) Income tax;
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(b) Estate and donor's taxes;
(c) Value-added tax;
(d) Other percentage taxes;
(e) Excise taxes;
(f) Documentary stamp taxes; and
(g) Such other taxes as are or hereafter may be imposed and collected by the Bureau of
Internal Revenue.”
In view of the foregoing enumeration of what are the national internal revenue taxes,
Section 284 has effectively deprived the LGUs from deriving their just share from other national
taxes, like the customs duties. It is clear from the foregoing clarification that the exclusion of other
national taxes like customs duties from the base for determining the just share of the LGUs
contravened the express constitutional edict in Section 6, Article X the 1987 Constitution.
In recapitulation, the national taxes to be included in the base for computing the just share
the LGUs shall henceforth be, but shall not be limited to, the following: the national internal
revenue taxes (NIRTs) enumerated in Section 21 of the NIRC, as amended, to be inclusive of the
VATs, excise taxes, and DSTs collected by the BIR and the BOC, and their deputized agents; tariff
and customs duties collected by the BOC; 50% of the VATs collected in the ARMM, and 30% of
all other national taxes collected in the ARMM; the remaining 50% of the VATs and 70% of the
collections of the other national taxes in the ARMM shall be the exclusive share of the ARMM
pursuant to Section 9 and Section 15 of R.A. No. 9054; 60% of the national taxes collected from
the exploitation and development of the national wealth; the remaining 40% will exclusively
accrue to the host LGUs pursuant to Section 290 of the LGC; 85% of the excise taxes collected
from locally manufactured Virginia and other tobacco products; the remaining 15% shall accrue
to the special purpose funds pursuant created in R.A. No. 7171 and R.A. No. 7227; the entire 50%
of the national taxes collected under Section 106, Section 108 and Section 116 of the NIRC in
excess of the increase in collections for the immediately preceding year; and 5% of the franchise
taxes in favor of the national government paid by franchise holders in accordance with Section 6
of R.A. No. 6631 and Section 8 of R.A. No. 6632. (Mandanas v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 199802, July 03,
2018)
The criteria under the Local Government Code (LGC) for the creation of a City
may be amended, not by repeal, but by way of exemption clauses in cityhood laws. -
- Congress clearly intended that the local government units covered by the Cityhood Laws be
exempted from the coverage of R.A. No. 9009 (which expressly amended the LGC and imposed
the requirement of income of P 100 Million for 2 consecutive years for the creation of a city). The
acts of both Chambers of Congress show that the exemption clauses ultimately incorporated in
the Cityhood Laws are but the express articulations of the clear legislative intent to exempt the
subject municipalities, without exception, from the coverage of R.A. No. 9009. Thereby, R.A. No.
9009, and, by necessity, the Local Government Code (provisions on the criteria for establishment
of a city) were amended, not by repeal but by way of the express exemptions embodied in the
exemption clauses in the Cityhood laws. (League of Cities v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 176951, April
12, 2011)
LGUs' share in national wealth: The 1987 Constitution conferred on LGUs the
right to share not only in the national taxes, but also in the proceeds of the utilization
of national wealth in their respective areas. -- Under Section 25, Article II of the 1987
Constitution, "(t)he State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments." In furtherance of this
State policy, the 1987 Constitution conferred on LGUs the power to create its own sources of
revenue and the right to share not only in the national taxes, but also in the proceeds of the
utilization of national wealth in their respective areas. Thus, Sections 5, 6, and 7 of Article X of
the 1987 Constitution provides:
Section 5. Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own sources of revenues
and to levy 'taxes, fees, and charges subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may
provide, consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy. Such taxes, fees, and charges shall
accrue exclusively to the local governments.
Section 6. Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the national
taxes which shall be automatically released to them.
Section 7. Local governments shall be entitled to an equitable share in the proceeds of the
utilization and development of the national wealth within their respective areas, in
the manner provided by law, including sharing the same with the inhabitants by way of direct
benefits.
(Republic v. Provincial Government of Palawan, G.R. No. 170867, December 4, 2018)

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For purposes of sharing in the proceeds of the utilization of national wealth in
their respective areas, the territorial jurisdiction of an LGU refers to territorial
boundaries as defined in the LGU's charter. An LGU's territorial jurisdiction pertains
to its physical location or area, as identified by its boundaries.-- At the center of this
controversy is Section 7, an innovation in the 1987 Constitution aimed at giving fiscal autonomy
to local governments. None of the parties in the instant cases dispute the LGU's entitlement to an
equitable share in the proceeds of the utilization and development of national wealth within their
respective areas. The question principally raised here is whether the national wealth, in this case
the Camago-Malampaya reservoir, is within the Province of Palawan's "area" for it to be entitled
to 40% of the government's share under Service Contract No. 38. The issue, therefore, hinges on
what comprises the province's "area" which the Local Government Code has equated as its
"territorial jurisdiction." While the Republic asserts that the term pertains to the LGU's territorial
boundaries, the Province of Palawan construes it as wherever the LGU exercises jurisdiction. The
Local Government Code does not define the term "territorial jurisdiction." Provisions therein,
however, indicate that territorial jurisdiction refers to the LGU's territorial boundaries. The
intention of the Local Government Code is to consider an LGU's territorial jurisdiction as
pertaining to a physical location or area as identified by its boundaries. This is also clear from
other provisions of the Local Government Code, particularly Sections 292 and 294, on the
allocation of LGUs' shares from the utilization of national wealth, which speak of the location of
the natural resources. By definition, "area" refers to a particular extent of space or surface or
a geographic region. (Republic v. Provincial Government of Palawan, G.R. No. 170867,
December 4, 2018)
Rights of LGUs to enable it to have resources to discharge its responsibilities:

1) the right to create and broaden its own source of revenue; (2) the right to be
allocated a just share in national taxes, such share being in the form of internal
revenue allotments (IRAs); and (3) the right to be given its equitable share in the
proceeds of the utilization and development of the national wealth, if any, within
its territorial boundaries. -- With its broadened powers and increased responsibilities, a local
government unit must now operate on a much wider scale. More extensive operations, in turn,
entail more expenses. Understandably, the vesting of duty, responsibility and accountability in
every local government unit is accompanied with a provision for reasonably adequate resources
to discharge its powers and effectively carry out its functions. Availment of such resources is
effectuated through the vesting in every local government unit of (1) the right to create and
broaden its own source of revenue; (2) the right to be allocated a just share in national taxes, such
share being in the form of internal revenue allotments (IRAs); and (3) the right to be given
its equitable share in the proceeds of the utilization and development of the national wealth, if
any, within its territorial boundaries. (Republic v. Provincial Government of Palawan, G.R. No.
170867, December 4, 2018)
Area as delimited by law, and not exercise of jurisdiction, is basis of the LGU's
equitable share. Territorial jurisdiction is defined, not by the local government, but
by the law that creates it; it is delimited, not by the extent of the LGU's exercise of
authority, but by physical boundaries as fixed in its charter. -- The Court cannot subscribe
to the argument posited by the Province of Palawan that the national wealth, the proceeds from
which the State is mandated to share with the LGUs, shall be wherever the local government
exercises any degree of jurisdiction. An LGU's territorial jurisdiction is not necessarily co-
extensive with its exercise or assertion of powers. The Provincial Government of Palawan argues
that its territorial jurisdiction extends to the Camago-Malampaya reservoir considering that its
local police maintains peace and order in the area; crimes committed within the waters
surrounding the province have been prosecuted and tried in the courts of Palawan; and the
provincial government enforces environmental laws over the same area. An LGU cannot claim
territorial jurisdiction over an area simply because its government has exercised a certain degree
of authority over it. Territorial jurisdiction is defined, not by the local government, but by the law
that creates it; it is delimited, not by the extent of the LGU's exercise of authority, but by physical
boundaries as fixed in its charter. (Republic v. Provincial Government of Palawan, G.R. No.
170867, December 4, 2018)
Unless clearly expanded by Congress, the LGU's territorial jurisdiction refers

only to its land area. "Territory" refers to the land area comprising the LGU. Utilization
of natural resources found within the land area as delimited by law is subject to the
40% LGU share.-- Since it refers to a demarcated area, the term "territorial jurisdiction" is
evidently synonymous with the term "territory." In fact, "territorial jurisdiction" is defined as the
limits or territory within which authority may be exercised. Under the Local Government Code,
particularly the provisions on the creation of municipalities, cities and provinces, and LGUs in
general, territorial jurisdiction is contextually synonymous with territory and the term "territory"
is used to refer to the land area comprising the LGU. Unless Congress, with the approval of the

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political units directly affected, clearly extends an LGU's territorial boundaries beyond its land
area, to include marine waters, the seabed and the subsoil, it cannot rightfully share in the
proceeds of the utilization of national wealth found therein. (Republic v. Provincial Government
of Palawan, G.R. No. 170867, December 4, 2018)
The UNCLOS did not confer on LGUs their own continental shelf. No law has
been enacted dividing the Philippine territory, including its continental margin and
exclusive economic zones, among the LGUs. LGUs do not have territorial jurisdiction
over the different maritime zones and the continental shelf. -- Dean Pangalangan posited
that since the Constitution has incorporated into Philippine law the concepts of the UNCLOS,
including the concept of the continental shelf, Palawan's "area" could be construed as including
its own continental shelf. The Province of Palawan and Arigo, et al. accordingly assert that
Camago-Malampaya reservoir forms part of Palawan's continental shelf. The Republic was correct
in arguing that the concept of continental shelf under the UNCLOS does not, by the doctrine of
transformation, automatically apply to the LGUs. The provisions under the UNCLOS are specific
in declaring the rights and duties of a state, not a local government unit. The UNCLOS confirms
the sovereign rights of the States over the continental shelf and the maritime zones. The UNCLOS
did not confer any rights to the States' local government units. At the risk of being repetitive,
under the express terms of the UNCLOS, the rights and duties over the maritime zones and
continental shelf pertain to the State. No provision was set forth to even suggest any reference to
a local government unit. Simply put, the UNCLOS did not obligate the States to grant to, much
less automatically vest upon, their respective local government units territorial jurisdiction over
the different maritime zones and the continental shelf. Hence, no such application can be made.
The LGU's share in the proceeds of development of natural resources in their

areas under Section 7, Article X of the 1987 Constitution cannot be denied on the
basis of the Regalian Doctrine. -- The Regalian Doctrine is found in Section 2, Article XII of
the 1987 Constitution which states:
Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and
other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora
and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. x x x
It is at once evident that the foregoing doctrines find no application in this case
which involves neither a question of what comprises the Philippine territory or the
ownership of all natural resources found therein.
There is no debate that the natural resources in the Camago-Malampaya reservoir belong
to the State. Palawan's claim is anchored not on ownership of the reservoir but on a revenue-
sharing scheme, under Section 7, Article X of the 1987 Constitution and Section 290 of the Local
Government Code, that allows LGUs to share in the proceeds of the utilization of national wealth
provided they are found within their respective areas. To deny the LGU's share on the basis of the
State's ownership of all natural resources is to render Section 7 of Article X nugatory for in such
case, it will not be possible for any LGU to benefit from the utilization of national wealth.
Local autonomy does not preclude the national government from taking a
direct hand in implementing national social welfare programs that are implemented
locally and in coordination with LGUs. -- The concept of local autonomy does not imply the
conversion of local government units into "mini-states." The national government has not
completely relinquished all its powers over local governments. Only administrative powers over
local affairs are delegated to political subdivisions. Policy-setting for the entire country still lies in
the President and Congress. The national government is not precluded from taking a direct hand
in the formulation and implementation of national social welfare programs, such as the
Conditional Cash Transfer Program, especially where it is implemented locally in coordination
with the LGUs concerned. Thus, the P21 Billion CCTP Budget need not be directly allocated to the
LGUs. (Pimentel v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 195770, July 17, 2012)
LGU Participation in National Projects: National government agencies must

conduct prior public consultation and secure the approval of local government units
for national government projects affecting the ecological balance of local
communities. The lack of prior public consultation and approval is not corrected by
the subsequent endorsement. -- A reclamation project by the Philippine Reclamation
Authority project can be classified as a national project that affects the environmental and
ecological balance of local communities, and is covered by the requirements under the Local
Government Code provisions: “Section 26. Duty of National Government Agencies in the
Maintenance of Ecological Balance. - It shall be the duty of every national agency or government-
owned or controlled corporation authorizing or involved in the planning and implementation of
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any project or program that may cause pollution, climatic change, depletion of non-renewable
resources, loss of crop land, rangeland, or forest cover, and extinction of animal or plant species,
to consult with the local government units, nongovernmental organizations, and other sectors
concerned and explain the goals and objectives of the project or program, its impact upon the
people and the community in terms of environmental or ecological balance, and the measures that
will be undertaken to prevent or minimize the adverse effects thereof. Section 27. Prior
Consultations Required. - No project or program shall be implemented by government authorities
unless the consultations mentioned in Sections 2 (c) and 26 hereof are complied with, and prior
approval of the sanggunian concerned is obtained: Provided, That occupants in areas where such
projects are to be implemented shall not be evicted unless appropriate relocation sites have been
provided, in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.” Section 27 of the Local
Government Code applies only to national programs and/or projects which are to be implemented
in a particular local community and that it should be read in conjunction with Section 26. The
projects and programs mentioned in Section 27 should be interpreted to mean projects and
programs whose effects are among those enumerated in Section 26 and 27, to wit, those that:
(1) may cause pollution; (2) may bring about climatic change; (3) may cause the depletion of non-
renewable resources; (4) may result in loss of crop land, range-land, or forest cover; (5) may
eradicate certain animal or plant species from the face of the planet; and (6) other projects or
programs that may call for the eviction of a particular group of people residing in the locality
where these will be implemented. It was established that this reclamation project as described
above falls under Section 26 because the commercial establishments to be built on phase 1, as
described in the EPRMP quoted above, could cause pollution as it could generate garbage, sewage,
and possible toxic fuel discharge. Under the Local Government Code, therefore, two requisites
must be met before a national project that affects the environmental and ecological balance of
local communities can be implemented: prior consultation with the affected local communities,
and prior approval of the project by the appropriate sanggunian. Absent either of these
mandatory requirements, the projects implementation is illegal. Prior consultations
and prior approval are required by law to have been conducted and secured by the respondent
Province. Accordingly, the information dissemination conducted months after the ECC had
already been issued was insufficient to comply with this requirement under the Local Government
Code. The lack of prior public consultation and approval is not corrected by the subsequent
endorsement of the reclamation project by the Sangguniang Barangay of Caticlan on February
13, 2012, and the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Malay on February 28, 2012, which
were both undoubtedly achieved at the urging and insistence of respondent Province. As we have
established above, the respective resolutions issued by the LGUs concerned did not render this
petition moot and academic. (Boracay Foundation v. Province of Aklan, G.R. No. 196870, June
26, 2012)
Conversion of LGUs
Why conversion of a component city into a Highly Urbanized City (HUC)

requires approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite for the entire province
Conversion will lead to material change in the political and economic rights of
not only of the component city but of the entire province. -- Sec. 10, Art. X of the
Constitution states: “No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided,
merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria
established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in
a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.” The creation, division, merger, abolition or
substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units involve a material change in the
political and economic rights of the local government units directly affected as well as the people
therein. Thus, the Constitution requires the approval of the people “in the political units directly
affected.” Similarly, conversion will lead to material change in the political and economic rights
of not only of the component city but of the entire province. (Umali v. Commission on Elections,
G.R. No. 203974, April 22, 2014)
The conversion of a component city into an HUC is substantial alteration of

boundaries. -- “Substantial alteration of boundaries” involves a change in the geographical
configuration of a local government unit or units. However, “boundaries” should not be limited
to the mere physical one, but also to its political boundaries. With the city’s newfound autonomy,
it will be free from the oversight powers of the province, which, in effect, reduces the territorial
jurisdiction of the latter. What once formed part of Nueva Ecija will no longer be subject to
supervision by the province. In more concrete terms, Nueva Ecija stands to lose 282.75 sq. km. of
its territorial jurisdiction with Cabanatuan City’s severance from its mother province. This is
equivalent to carving out almost 5% of Nueva Ecija’s 5,751.3 sq. km. area. This sufficiently satisfies
the requirement that the alteration be “substantial.” Thus, the conversion to an HUC is substantial
alternation of boundaries governed by Sec. 10, Art. X and resultantly, said provision applies,

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governs and prevails over Sec. 453 of the LGC. (Umali v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
203974, April 22, 2014)
LGUs whose boundaries are to be altered and whose economy would be

affected are entitled to participate in the plebiscite to approve the conversion. -- In
identifying the LGU or LGUs that should be allowed to take part in the plebiscite, what should
primarily be determined is whether or not the unit or units that desire to participate will be
“directly affected” by the change. In Tan, involving the division of Negros Occidental for the
creation of the new province of Negros del Norte, that the LGUs whose boundaries are to be
altered and whose economy would be affected are entitled to participate in the plebiscite. The
Court ruled that two political units would be affected. The first would be the parent province of
Negros Occidental because its boundaries would be substantially altered. The other affected entity
would be composed of those in the area subtracted from the mother province to constitute the
proposed province of Negros del Norte. In the more recent case of Miranda, the interpretation
in Tan and Padilla was modified to include not only changes in economic but also political rights
in the criteria for determining whether or not an LGU shall be considered “directly affected.”
Nevertheless, the requirement that the plebiscite be participated in by the plurality of political
units directly affected remained. (Umali v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 203974, April 22,
2014)
Economic impact of conversion: The conversion of a component city into a HUC

will result in reduction of the province’s Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA), and
reduction in tax collections due to reduction of taxing jurisdiction, and loss of shares
in provincial taxes imposed in the city to be converted. With the reduction in income
upon separation, there would be less funding to finance infrastructure projects and
to defray overhead costs, and the quality of services being offered by the province
may suffer. -- Cabanatuan City’s conversion into an HUC and its severance from Nueva Ecija
will result in the reduction of the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) to the province based on Sec.
285 of the LGC. The conversion into an HUC carries the accessory of substantial alteration of
boundaries and that the province of Nueva Ecija will, without a doubt, suffer a reduction in
territory because of the severance of Cabanatuan City. The residents of the city will cease to be
political constituencies of the province, effectively reducing the latter’s population. Taking this
decrease in territory and population in connection with the above formula, it is conceded that
Nueva Ecija will indeed suffer a reduction in IRA given the decrease of its multipliers’ values.
Clear as crystal is that the province of Nueva Ecija will suffer a substantial reduction of its share
in IRA once Cabanatuan City attains autonomy. In view of the economic impact of Cabanatuan
City’s conversion, petitioner Umali’s contention, that its effect on the province is not only direct
but also adverse, deserves merit.
Moreover, his claim that the province will lose shares in provincial taxes imposed in
Cabanatuan City is well–founded. This is based on Sec. 151 of the LGC. Once converted, the taxes
imposed by the HUC will accrue to itself. Prior to this, the province enjoys the prerogative to
impose and collect taxes such as those on sand, gravel and other quarry resources, professional
taxes, and amusement taxes over the component city. This reduction in both taxing jurisdiction
and shares poses a material and substantial change to the province’s economic rights, warranting
its participation in the plebiscite. Also, with the ensuing reduction in income upon separation,
there would be less funding to finance infrastructure projects and to defray overhead costs, and
the quality of services being offered by the province may suffer. These are but a few of the social
costs of the decline in the province’s economic performance, which Nueva Ecija is bound to
experience once its most progressive city of Cabanatuan attains independence. (Umali v.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 203974, April 22, 2014)
Political impact of conversion: Administrative supervision of the province over

the city will effectively be revoked upon conversion. Thus, the provincial government
will lose the power to ensure that the local government officials of Cabanatuan City
act within the scope of its prescribed powers and functions, to review executive
orders issued by the city mayor, and to approve resolutions and ordinances enacted
by the city council. The province will also be divested of jurisdiction over disciplinary
cases concerning the elected city officials of the new HUC. Moreover, provincial
government will no longer be responsible for delivering basic services for the city
residents’ benefit. Ordinances and resolutions passed by the provincial council will no
longer cover the city. -- Aside from the alteration of economic rights, the political rights of
Nueva Ecija and those of its residents will also be affected by Cabanatuan’s conversion into an
HUC. Notably, the administrative supervision of the province over the city will effectively be
revoked upon conversion. Secs. 4 and 12, Art. X of the Constitution read:

74
Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local
governments. Provinces with respect to component cities and municipalities, and cities and
municipalities with respect to component barangays shall ensure that the acts of their
component units are within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions.
Sec 12. Cities that are highly urbanized, as determined by law, and component cities
whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for provincial elective officials, shall be
independent of the province. The voters of component cities within a province, whose
charters contain no such prohibition, shall not be deprived of their right to vote for elective
provincial officials.
If Cabanatuan City is converted into an HUC, it will be outside the general supervision of
the province and be under the direct supervision of the President. The provincial government
stands to lose the power to ensure that the local government officials of Cabanatuan City act
within the scope of its prescribed powers and functions, to review executive orders issued by the
city mayor, and to approve resolutions and ordinances enacted by the city council. The province
will also be divested of jurisdiction over disciplinary cases concerning the elected city officials of
the new HUC, and the appeal process for administrative case decisions against barangay officials
of the city will also be modified accordingly. Likewise, the registered voters of the city will no
longer be entitled to vote for and be voted upon as provincial officials. In cutting the umbilical
cord between Cabanatuan City and the province of Nueva Ecija, the city will be separated from
the territorial jurisdiction of the province, as earlier explained. The provincial government will no
longer be responsible for delivering basic services for the city residents’ benefit. Ordinances and
resolutions passed by the provincial council will no longer cover the city. In view of these changes
in the economic and political rights of the province of Nueva Ecija and its residents, the entire
province certainly stands to be directly affected by the conversion of Cabanatuan City into an
HUC. Following the doctrines in Tan and Padilla, all the qualified registered voters of Nueva Ecija
should then be allowed to participate in the plebiscite called for that purpose. (Umali v.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 203974, April 22, 2014)
Powers of Local Executives
A provincial governor has no power to call out the armed forces, a power
exclusive to the President; a provincial governor has no power to order general
searches and seizures; he has no power to organize private armed groups. -- The
provincial governor does not possess the same calling-out powers as the President. Respondent
provincial governor is not endowed with the power to call upon the armed forces at his own
bidding. In issuing the assailed proclamation, Governor Tan exceeded his authority when he
declared a state of emergency and called upon the Armed Forces, the police, and his own Civilian
Emergency Force. The calling-out powers contemplated under the Constitution is exclusive to the
President. An exercise by another official, even if he is the local chief executive, is ultra vires.
Respondent governor characterized the kidnapping of the three ICRC workers as a terroristic act,
and used this incident to justify the exercise of the powers enumerated under his Proclamation 1-
09. In fact, respondent governor has arrogated unto himself powers exceeding even the martial
law powers of the President, because as the Constitution itself declares, "A state of martial law
does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts
or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of the jurisdiction on military courts and
agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the
privilege of the writ.” There is nothing in the Local Government Code which justifies the acts
sanctioned under the said Proclamation. Respondents cannot rely on paragraph 1, subparagraph
(vii) of Article 465 of the LGC, as the said provision expressly refers to calamities and disasters,
whether man-made or natural. The governor, as local chief executive of the province, is certainly
empowered to enact and implement emergency measures during these occurrences. But the
kidnapping incident in the case at bar cannot be considered as a calamity or a disaster. Paragraph
2, subparagraph (vi) of Article 465 is equally inapplicable for two reasons. First, the Armed Forces
of the Philippines does not fall under the category of a "national law enforcement agency," to
which the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) and its departments belong. Its mandate is
to uphold the sovereignty of the Philippines, support the Constitution, and defend the Republic
against all enemies, foreign and domestic. Its aim is also to secure the integrity of the national
territory. Second, there was no evidence or even an allegation on record that the local police forces
were inadequate to cope with the situation or apprehend the violators. (Kulayan v. Tan, G.R. No.
187298, July 03, 2012)
The Local Government Code does not involve the diminution of central powers
inherently vested in the National Government, especially not the prerogatives solely
granted by the Constitution to the President in matters of security and defense. -- The
Local Government Code does not involve the diminution of central powers inherently vested in
the National Government, especially not the prerogatives solely granted by the Constitution to the
75
President in matters of security and defense. The intent behind the powers granted to local
government units is fiscal, economic, and administrative in nature. The Code is concerned only
with powers that would make the delivery of basic services more effective to the constituents, and
should not be unduly stretched to confer calling-out powers on local executives. (Kulayan v. Tan,
G.R. No. 187298, July 03, 2012)
The Constitution does not authorize the organization of private armed groups
similar to the CEF convened by the respondent Governor. -- The Constitution does not
authorize the organization of private armed groups similar to the CEF convened by the respondent
Governor. The framers of the Constitution were themselves wary of armed citizens’ groups. Thus,
with the discussions in the Constitutional Commission as guide, the creation of the Civilian
Emergency Force (CEF) in the present case, is also invalid. (Kulayan v. Tan, G.R. No. 187298,
July 03, 2012)
The Sangguniang Bayan cannot declare a particular thing as a nuisance per se

and order its condemnation. It does not have the power to find, as a fact, that a
particular thing is a nuisance when such thing is not a nuisance per se; nor can it
authorize the extrajudicial condemnation and destruction of that as a nuisance which
in its nature, situation or use is not such. -- Generally, LGUs have no power to declare a
particular thing as a nuisance unless such a thing is a nuisance per se. Under Section 447(a)(3)(i)
of R.A. No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, the Sangguniang Panglungsod
is empowered to enact ordinances declaring, preventing or abating noise and other forms of
nuisance. It bears stressing, however, that the Sangguniang Bayan cannot declare a particular
thing as a nuisance per se and order its condemnation. It does not have the power to find, as a
fact, that a particular thing is a nuisance when such thing is not a nuisance per se; nor can it
authorize the extrajudicial condemnation and destruction of that as a nuisance which in its nature,
situation or use is not such. Those things must be determined and resolved in the ordinary courts
of law. If a thing, be in fact, a nuisance due to the manner of its operation, that question cannot
be determined by a mere resolution of the Sangguniang Bayan. (Aquino v. Municipality of Malay,
Aklan, G.R. No. 211356, September 29, 2014)
A mayor has the power to order the demolition of illegal constructions after
complying with due process. -- Despite the hotel’s classification as a nuisance per accidens,
however, We still find in this case that the LGU may nevertheless properly order the hotel’s
demolition. This is because, in the exercise of police power and the general welfare
clause, property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to fulfill
the objectives of the government. Otherwise stated, the government may enact legislation that
may interfere with personal liberty, property, lawful businesses and occupations to promote the
general welfare.
One such piece of legislation is the LGC, which authorizes city and municipal governments,
acting through their local chief executives, to issue demolition orders. Under existing laws, the
office of the mayor is given powers not only relative to its function as the executive official of the
town; it has also been endowed with authority to hear issues involving property rights of
individuals and to come out with an effective order or resolution thereon. Pertinent herein is Sec.
444 (b)(3)(vi) of the LGC, which empowered the mayor to order the closure and removal of
illegally constructed establishments for failing to secure the necessary permits. In the case at bar,
petitioner admittedly failed to secure the necessary permits, clearances, and exemptions before
the construction, expansion, and operation of Boracay Wet Cove’s hotel in Malay, Aklan. This twin
violation of law and ordinance warranted the LGU’s invocation of Sec. 444 (b)(3)(vi) of the LGC,
which power is separate and distinct from the power to summarily abate nuisances per se. Under
the law, insofar as illegal constructions are concerned, the mayor can, after satisfying the
requirement of due notice and hearing, order their closure and demolition. (Aquino v.
Municipality of Malay, Aklan, G.R. No. 211356, September 29, 2014)
Three-Term Limit Rule for Local Officials
To constitute a disqualification to run for an elective local office pursuant to

the three-term limit rule, the following requisites must concur: (1) that the official
concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government
post; and (2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms. – The three-term limit
rule for elective local officials, a disqualification rule, is found in Section 8, Article X of the 1987
Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which
shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more
than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time
76
shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term
for which he was elected.
This is reiterated in Sec. 43(b) of Republic Act No. (RA) 7160, or the Local Government
Code (LGC) of 1991. To constitute a disqualification to run for an elective local office pursuant to
the constitutional and statutory provisions, the following requisites must concur: (1) that the
official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post;
and (2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms. (Abundo v. Comelec, G.R. No. 201716,
January 8, 2013)
The three-term limit rule prohibits is a consecutive fourth term. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall NOT be considered an
interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official
concerned was elected." This is to deter an elective local official intending to skirt the
three-term limit rule by merely resigning before his or her third term ends. -- As is
clearly provided in Sec. 8, Art. X of the Constitution as well as in Sec. 43(b) of the LGC, voluntary
renunciation of the office by the incumbent elective local official for any length of time shall NOT,
in determining service for three consecutive terms, be considered an interruption in the continuity
of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected. The principle
behind the three-term limit rule covers only consecutive terms and that what the Constitution
prohibits is a consecutive fourth term. There has, in fine, to be a break or interruption in the
successive terms of the official after his or her third term. An interruption usually occurs when
the official does not seek a fourth term, immediately following the third. Of course, the basic law
is unequivocal that a "voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall NOT be
considered an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective
official concerned was elected." This qualification was made as a deterrent against an elective local
official intending to skirt the three-term limit rule by merely resigning before his or her third term
ends. This is a voluntary interruption as distinguished from involuntary interruption which may
be brought about by certain events or causes. (Abundo v. Comelec, G.R. No. 201716, January 8,
2013)
A mayor -- who actually held the office and exercised his functions as mayor
only after he was declared the winner in an election protest, and thus began serving
in office only during the middle of his term -- cannot be considered to have fully
served his term for purposes of the three-term limit rule. -- For four (4) successive regular
elections, namely, the 2001, 2004, 2007 and 2010 national and local elections, Abundo vied for
the position of municipal mayor of Viga, Catanduanes. In both the 2001 and 2007 runs, he
emerged and was proclaimed as the winning mayoralty candidate and accordingly served the
corresponding terms as mayor. In the 2004 electoral derby, however, the Viga municipal board
of canvassers initially proclaimed as winner one Jose Torres (Torres), who, in due time,
performed the functions of the office of mayor. Abundo protested Torres’ election and
proclamation. Abundo was eventually declared the winner of the 2004 mayoralty electoral
contest, paving the way for his assumption of office starting May 9, 2006 until the end of the
2004-2007 term on June 30, 2007, or for a period of a little over one year and one month. Then
came the May 10, 2010 elections where Abundo and Torres again opposed each other. When
Abundo filed his certificate of candidacy for the mayoralty seat relative to this electoral contest,
Torres lost no time in seeking the former’s disqualification to run, the corresponding petition xxx,
predicated on the three-consecutive term limit rule. The pivotal determinative issue then is
whether the service of a term less than the full three years by an elected official arising from his
being declared as the duly elected official upon an election protest is considered as full service of
the term for purposes of the application of the three consecutive term limit for elective local
officials. The consecutiveness of what otherwise would have been Abundo’s three successive,
continuous mayorship was effectively broken during the 2004-2007 term when he was initially
deprived of title to, and was veritably disallowed to serve and occupy, an office to which he, after
due proceedings, was eventually declared to have been the rightful choice of the electorate.
(Abundo v. Comelec, G.R. No. 201716, January 8, 2013)
A mayor who assumed office after winning his electoral protest and with only
one a little over one year left in his term cannot be considered to have fully served his
term for purposes of the three-term limit rule. The period when his rival (who was
originally proclaimed winner) held office and assumed the functions of mayor is an
involuntary interruption of the continuity of his service. -- Abundo, for the 2004 election
for the term starting July 1, 2004 to June 30, 2007, was the duly elected mayor. Accordingly, the
first requisite for the application of the disqualification rule based on the three-term limit that the
official has been elected is satisfied. This thus brings us to the second requisite of whether or not
Abundo had served for "three consecutive terms.” The facts of the case clearly point to an
involuntary interruption during the July 2004-June 2007 term. With the enforcement of the
decision of the election protest in his favor, Abundo assumed the mayoralty post only on May 9,
77
2006 and served the term until June 30, 2007 or for a period of a little over one year and one
month. Consequently, it cannot be said that Mayor Abundo was able to serve fully the entire 2004-
2007 term to which he was otherwise entitled. During the period of one year and ten months, or
from June 30, 2004 until May 8, 2006, Abundo cannot plausibly claim, even if he wanted to, that
he could hold office of the mayor as a matter of right. Neither can he assert title to the same nor
serve the functions of the said elective office. The reason is simple: during that period, title to hold
such office and the corresponding right to assume the functions thereof still belonged to his
opponent, Das proclaimed election winner. The almost two-year period during which Abundo’s
opponent actually served as Mayor is and ought to be considered an involuntary interruption of
Abundo’s continuity of service. An involuntary interrupted term, cannot, in the context of the
disqualification rule, be considered as one term for purposes of counting the three-term
threshold. When the Constitution and the LGC of 1991 speak of interruption, the reference is to
the obstruction to the continuance of the service by the concerned elected official by effectively
cutting short the service of a term or giving a hiatus in the occupation of the elective office. Hence,
there was actual involuntary interruption in the term of Abundo and he cannot be considered to
have served the full 2004-2007 term. (Abundo v. Comelec, G.R. No. 201716, January 8, 2013)
Rules applying the three-term limit rule: To summarize, hereunder are the prevailing
jurisprudence on issues affecting consecutiveness of terms and/or involuntary interruption:
1. When a permanent vacancy occurs in an elective position and the official merely
assumed the position pursuant to the rules on succession under the LGC, then his service for the
unexpired portion of the term of the replaced official cannot be treated as one full term as
contemplated under the subject constitutional and statutory provision that service cannot be
counted in the application of any term limit (Borja, Jr.). If the official runs again for the same
position he held prior to his assumption of the higher office, then his succession to said position
is by operation of law and is considered an involuntary severance or interruption (Montebon).
2. An elective official, who has served for three consecutive terms and who did not seek
the elective position for what could be his fourth term, but later won in a recall election, had an
interruption in the continuity of the official’s service. For, he had become in the interim, i.e., from
the end of the 3rd term up to the recall election, a private citizen (Adormeo and Socrates).
3. The abolition of an elective local office due to the conversion of a municipality to a city
does not, by itself, work to interrupt the incumbent official’s continuity of service (Latasa).
4. Preventive suspension is not a term-interrupting event as the elective officer’s continued
stay and entitlement to the office remain unaffected during the period of suspension, although he
is barred from exercising the functions of his office during this period (Aldovino, Jr.).
5. When a candidate is proclaimed as winner for an elective position and assumes office,
his term is interrupted when he loses in an election protest and is ousted from office, thus
disenabling him from serving what would otherwise be the unexpired portion of his term of office
had the protest been dismissed (Lonzanida and Dizon). The break or interruption need not be for
a full term of three years or for the major part of the 3-year term; an interruption for any length
of time, provided the cause is involuntary, is sufficient to break the continuity of service (Socrates,
citing Lonzanida).
6. When an official is defeated in an election protest and said decision becomes final after
said official had served the full term for said office, then his loss in the election contest does not
constitute an interruption since he has managed to serve the term from start to finish. His full
service, despite the defeat, should be counted in the application of term limits because the
nullification of his proclamation came after the expiration of the term (Ong and Rivera). (Abundo
v. Comelec, G.R. No. 201716, January 8, 2013)
Two conditions must concur for the application of the disqualification of a

candidate based on violation of the three-term limit rule, which are: (1) that the
official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local
government post, and (2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms. A
governor who was proclaimed winner of the 2007 elections only in March 2010 and
served as such only until June 30 of the same year did not have a complete and full
service of his three-year term. -- Petitioner alleges that since respondent had already been
elected and had served as Governor of Camarines Norte for three consecutive terms, i.e., 2007,
2010, and 2013, he is proscribed from running for the same position in the 2016 elections as it
would already be his fourth consecutive term. We held that two conditions must concur for the
application of the disqualification of a candidate based on violation of the three-term limit rule,
which are: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same
local government post, and (2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms. The term means
the time during which the officer may claim to hold office as of right, and fixes the interval after
which the several incumbents shall succeed one another. In this case, while respondent ran as
78
Governor of Camarines Norte in the 2007 elections, he did not win as such. It was only after he
filed a petition for correction of manifest error that he was proclaimed as the duly-elected
Governor. He assumed the post and served the unexpired term of his opponent from March 22,
2010 until June 30, 2010. Consequently, he did not hold the office for the full term of three years
to which he was supposedly entitled to. Thus, such period of time that respondent served as
Governor did not constitute a complete and full service of his term. The period when he was out
of office involuntarily interrupted the continuity of his service as Governor. As he had not fully
served the 2007-2010 term, and had not been elected for three consecutive terms as Governor,
there was no violation of the three-term limit rule when he ran again in the 2016 elections.
Applying the foregoing in the instant case, since Respondent did not serve the full 2007-2010
term, it cannot be considered as one term for purposes of counting the three-term threshold.
Consequently, Respondent cannot be said to have continuously served as Governor for three
consecutive terms prior to the 2016 elections. (Albania v. Comelec, G.R. No. 226792, June 6,
2017)
The three-term limit rule must be strictly applied. In case of legislative
reapportionment, where the district is practically the same as the district that
previously elected the same candidate, the three-term limit rule applies. -- A provincial
board member cannot be elected and serve for more than three consecutive terms. But then, what
are the consequences to the provincial board member’s eligibility to run for the same elective
position if the legislative district, which brought him or her to office to serve the first two
consecutive terms, be reapportioned in such a way that 8 out of its 10 town constituencies are
carved out and renamed as another district? Second. Is the provincial board member’s election to
the same position for the third and fourth time, but now in representation of the renamed district,
a violation of the three-term limit rule? In Latasa, the issue arose as a result of the conversion of
a municipality into a city. The then municipal mayor attempted to evade the application upon him
of the three-term limit rule by arguing that the position of a city mayor was not the same as the
one he previously held. The Court was not convinced and, thus, declared that there was no
interruption of the incumbent mayor’s continuity of service. In Bandillo, a case decided by the
COMELEC, Gainza and Milaor were added to five of the ten towns, which used to comprise
Camarines Sur’s old First District, to form the new Second District. The COMELEC declined to
apply the three-term limit rule against the elected Provincial Board member on the ground that
the addition of Gainza and Milaor distinctively created a new district, with an altered territory and
constituency.
Reapportionment is "the realignment or change in legislative districts brought about by
changes in population and mandated by the constitutional requirement of equality of
representation." The aim of legislative apportionment is to equalize population and voting power
among districts. The basis for districting shall be the number of the inhabitants of a city or a
province and not the number of registered voters therein. As a result of the reapportionment made
by R.A. No. 9716, the old Second District of Camarines Sur, minus only the two towns of Gainza
and Milaor, is renamed as the Third District. A complete reading of R.A. No. 9716 yields no logical
conclusion other than that the lawmakers intended the old Second District to be merely renamed
as the current Third District. The actual difference in the population of the old Second District
from that of the current Third District amounts to less than 10% of the population of the latter.
This numerical fact renders the new Third District as essentially, although not literally, the same
as the old Second District. Hence, while Naval is correct in his argument that Sanggunian
members are elected by district, it does not alter the fact that the district which elected him for
the third and fourth time is the same one which brought him to office in 2004 and 2007. (Naval
v. Comelec, G.R. No. 207851, July 8, 2014)
THE NATIONAL ECONOMY

Requirements for a service contract with a foreign-owned corporation: 1) in
accordance with a general law; 2) signed by the President; and 3) reported to
Congress. -- Service contracts are still allowed under the 1987 Constitution. Agreements
involving Technical or Financial Assistance are service contracts with safeguards. Such service
contracts with foreign corporations may be entered into only with respect to minerals, petroleum
and other mineral oils. The grant thereof is subject to several safeguards, among which are these
requirements: (1) The service contract shall be crafted in accordance with a general law that will
set standard or uniform terms, conditions and requirements; (2) The President shall be the
signatory for the government because; (3) Within 30 days of the executed agreement, the
President shall report it to Congress. While the Court finds that Presidential Decree No. 87 is
sufficient to satisfy the requirement of a general law, the absence of the two other conditions, that
the President be a signatory to SC-46, and that Congress be notified of such contract, renders it
null and void. (Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape of Tañon Strait v. Secretary
Reyes, G.R. No. 180771, April 21, 2015)

79
EDUCATION, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, ARTS,
CULTURE AND SPORTS
The view, vista, or sightline of a heritage property, such as the Rizal Monument,
is not covered by the protection of the existing heritage law. -- Section 15, Article XIV of
the Constitution provides that "the State shall conserve, promote and popularize the nation's
historical and cultural heritage and resources." Since this provision is not self-executory, Congress
passed laws dealing with the preservation and conservation of our cultural heritage. One such law
is Republic Act No. 10066,59 or the National Cultural Heritage Act of 2009, which empowers the
National Commission for Culture and the Arts and other cultural agencies to issue a cease and
desist order "when the physical integrity of the national cultural treasures or important cultural
properties [is] found to be in danger of destruction or significant alteration from its original state."
This law declares that the State should protect the "physical integrity" of the heritage property or
building if there is "danger of destruction or significant alteration from its original state." Physical
integrity refers to the structure itself - how strong and sound the structure is. The same law does
not mention that another project, building, or property, not itself a heritage property or building,
may be the subject of a cease and desist order when it adversely affects the background view, vista,
or sightline of a heritage property or building. Thus, Republic Act No. 10066 cannot apply to the
Torre de Manila condominium project in relation to the Rizal Monument. (Knights of Rizal v.
DMCI Homes, G.R. No. 213948, April 18, 2017)
Academic freedom gives institutions of higher learning the right to impose

disciplinary sanctions, which includes the power to dismiss or expel students who
violate disciplinary rules. The power to discipline students is subsumed in the
academic freedom to determine what may be taught, how it shall be taught and who
may be admitted to study. -- Academic freedom is guaranteed by Section 5 (2), Article XIV of
the 1987 Constitution. Academic freedom or the institutional autonomy of universities and
institutions of higher learning, covers "four essential freedoms" of a university: To determine for
itself on academic grounds (1) who may teach, (2) what may be taught, (3) how it shall be taught,
and (4) who may be admitted to study. The schools' power to instill discipline in their students is
subsumed in their academic freedom. The right of schools to impose disciplinary sanctions, which
includes the power to dismiss or expel, on students who violate disciplinary rules. The right of the
school to discipline its students is at once apparent in the third freedom, i.e., "how it shall be
taught." Moreover, the school has an interest in teaching the student discipline, a necessary, if
not indispensable, value in any field of learning. By instilling discipline, the school teaches
discipline. Accordingly, the right to discipline the student likewise finds basis in the freedom
"what to teach." Finally, nowhere in the above formulation is the right to discipline more evident
than in "who may be admitted to study." If a school has the freedom to determine whom to admit,
logic dictates that it also has the right to determine whom to exclude or expel, as well as upon
whom to impose lesser sanctions such as suspension and the withholding of graduation privileges.
As the primary training and educational institution of the AFP, the Philippine Military Academy
certainly has the right to invoke academic freedom in the enforcement of its internal rules and
regulations, which are the Honor Code and the Honor System in particular. (Cudia v. The
Superintendent of the Philippine Military Academy, G.R. No. 211362, February 24, 2015)

80

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REVIEW NOTES IN

Selected Recent Jurisprudence (2010 to 2019) 1

The Philippine State,

Philippine internal waters under the Constitution or archipelagic waters under

The right of innocent passage is a customary international law. -- In the absence

UNCLOS has nothing to do with the acquisition (or loss) of territory as it

Atty. Alexis F. Medina CONSTITUTIONAL LAW REVIEWER - Part I Version 23 page 1

STATE POLICIES AND PRINCIPLES

Civilian Supremacy Over the Military

A civilian President is the ceremonial, legal and administrative head of the

Separation of Church and State

Why spousal consent in reproductive help procedures is required: The 1987

Atty. Alexis F. Medina CONSTITUTIONAL LAW REVIEWER - Part I Version 23 page 2

Decision-making involving a reproductive health procedure is a private matter which

Atty. Alexis F. Medina CONSTITUTIONAL LAW REVIEWER - Part I Version 23 page 3

Protecting the Life of the Unborn

Atty. Alexis F. Medina CONSTITUTIONAL LAW REVIEWER - Part I Version 23 page 4

Balanced and Healthful Ecology

Writ of Kalikasan: Remedy when the constitutional right to a balanced and

The constitutional right to health: A component to the right to life is the

Atty. Alexis F. Medina CONSTITUTIONAL LAW REVIEWER - Part I Version 23 page 5

Self-Reliant and Independent National Economy

National economy "effectively controlled" by Filipinos. -- The Constitution

Beneficial Ownership Test: Full beneficial ownership of 60 percent of the

Atty. Alexis F. Medina CONSTITUTIONAL LAW REVIEWER - Part I Version 23 page 6

Beneficial ownership: Excluded in the determination of Filipino ownership are

Beneficial ownership: Voting power or investment power must be present for

SEC Requirement: The 60 percent Filipino ownership shall be applied to BOTH

Where the 60-40 Filipino-foreign equity ownership is in doubt, the Grandfather

Autonomy of Local Governments

Local governments are precluded from regulating conduct already covered by

Atty. Alexis F. Medina CONSTITUTIONAL LAW REVIEWER - Part I Version 23 page 7

If the government agency performs proprietary, private or non-governmental

The doctrine of state immunity cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating

The doctrine of sovereign immunity cannot be invoked to defeat a valid claim

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Natural-born Filipinos, who have been naturalized as citizens of a foreign

Citizenship, being a continuing requirement for Members of the House of

Foundlings as Natural-Born Citizens

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The framers of the 1935 Constitution intended foundlings to be covered by the

The Constitution does not permit discrimination against foundlings. -- The

Foundlings are citizens under international law. -- International treaties obligate

To establish that a foundling is a natural-born citizen, sufficient evidence can

The assumption should be that foundlings are natural-born, unless there is

Concluding that foundlings are not natural-born Filipino citizens is tantamount

Other than the anonymity of their biological parents, no substantial

STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF GOVERNMENT

Judicial review and constitutional interpretation: Unless the provisions clearly

Atty. Alexis F. Medina CONSTITUTIONAL LAW REVIEWER - Part I Version 23 page

A controversy is said to be justiciable if: first, there is an actual case or controversy

Actual Case or Controversy Requirement

An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of

Actual case requirement - The conflict must not be conjectural or anticipatory;

Actual case requirement - The Court cannot render an advisory opinion. --

Actual case requirement – Courts have not authority to resolve hypothetical or

Actual case requirement – Courts cannot decide on theoretical issues; courts

Examples: No Actual Case or Controversy

A petition to declare an SEC circular void based on a hypothetical case of a

A petition challenging the constitutionality of a law on the ground that the

A petition to declare as unconstitutional peace agreements that can only be

A petition to declare a proposed bill unconstitutional does not present an actual