Article III

Bill of Rights

 A Bill of Rights is a list of the most important rights of citizens. The purpose is to
protect these rights against infringement by the state. It is a limitation on the
intrusion on these rights by the state.
These rights are directed against the state. It is a protection from the State. Because we have
learned that the state is so powerful, it even has inherent rights.
Bill of Rights- contains parts that would limit the intrusion by the state on these rights
-  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -
Bill of Rights
Establishes the relationship of the individual to the State, and
Defines the rights of the individual by limiting the lawful powers of the State
The idea of government is brought about by 2 social values: POWER and FREEDOM

The Constitution concerns itself of 2 values: POWER and FREEDOM

Governance – the delicate art of balancing the power of Government and the freedom of the
governed. It is a story of governmental power and Constitutional Limits on it found in the Bill of
Rights
England 1689- first coded Bill of Rights 
US – had its Bill of Rights only in 1776

What if there is no BoR? Would the rights of the citizens be protected to the powers of the
state? What if there is no Constitution? See Republic vs Sandiganbayan GR 104768 July 21,
2003. It poses 2 questions:

A. Is a Bill of Rights or a Constitution necessary in order that a person may exercise and
be protected by his rights?
B. Was the Bill of Rights, in general, and the right against unreasonable search and
seizure and the exclusion of illegally seized evidence, in particular, not availing from
February 25 to March 26, 1986? (the interregnum)

The interregnum is that part of our history where there is no constitution at all. The EDSA
Revolution happened so many years ago and Corazon Aquino did away with the 1973
Constitution, she did not want to be governed by the 1987 Constitution because she cannot be
declared as president if she will follow the 1973 Constitution. Because under the 1973
Constitution, Congress declared Marcos as the winner in the snap elections. “She had to turn
her back to the 1973 constitution”
There was no Constitution at all from February 25 – March 26. It is only after MArch 26, 1986
when she came up with the Freedom Constitution, an executive proclamation which essentially
contained the BoR so that from Feb 25- March 26 was called interregnum bec there was no
constitution, no BoR

Republic of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan, GR No. 104768, July 21, 2003.

Discussion is about Sec 2 and 3.

Section 2. The right of the people to be secured in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable search and seizures of whatever nature for any purpose shall be
inviolable….

Section 3 (2). Any evidence obtained in violation of this (Sec 3) or the preceding section (Sec 3)
shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

In March 3, 1986, within the interregnum, security forces raided the house of Dimaano at Los
Banos armed with a search warrant, they confiscated even items that included in the warrant.
Dollars, titles to property, although the search warrant contained the listed contraband in the
search warrant, firearms, ammunition, etc. But the raiding team confiscated more than what is
listed in the warrant. The case went to Sandigan bayan and ruled that there was an illegal
search and seizure of the items confiscated. SC, in its decision, there was a split although
concurring. 
Majority Opinion – Carpio holds that the Bill of Rights was not operative during interregnum.
Thus, Dimaano cannot invoke her right against unreasonable search and seizure and the
exclusionary right as her house was searched in the property seized on March 3, 1986.

Majority opinion issues are: 

 1. Whether the protection accorded to individuals under the International Covenant of Civil and
Political Rights and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights remain in effect during the
interregnum. - So Carpio was bringing in International treaties about human rights, civil and
political rights

The ruling was the Bill of Rights was not operative during the Interregnum. However, the
protection accorded to individuals under the Covenant and the Universal Declaration remain in
effect. Carpio says that the Constitution and the Bill of Rights were not in effect during the
interregnum. However, the covenant of civil and political rights and the universal declaration of
human rights remain in effect in its place, in place of the BoR, Constitution.
Review: It is the court that says which International laws would form part of the national law.
The Supreme Court itself says the covalent for civil and political rights as well as the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights form part of the law of the land. Which was decided in the case of
RP versus Sandiganbayan.

2. Whether the evidence seized should be excluded.

The majority opinion says clearly the raiding team exceeded its authority when it seized the
items that included in the Warrant. Dollars, money, which were not included in the list of the
contraband that they were supposed to search, as contained in the search warrant that was
unlawful. Items must be returned to Dimaano.

Separate concurring opinion of Puno - He agrees that the Bill of Rights was not operational
during the interregnum, without saying the Constitution was not operational during the
interregnum. Puno disagrees with the conclusion that Dimaano has lost and cannot invoke her
right against unreasonable search and seizures. How can Dimaano invoke her right against
unreasonable search and seizure when there is no Bill of Rights? There is no Constitution. The
issue therefore in Puno, in his concurring separate opinion, is whether Dimaano can invoke this
right even in the absence of the Constitution. Puno disagrees with the majority that the
Constitution and the Bill of Rights in particular is the only source of this rights. And therefore, in
the absence of this right, Dimaano  cannot invoke a right against unreasonable search and
seizure and the exclusionary right? If that be the case, it is as if the people lost their right to life,
liberty and property. Puno is of the view that under natural law, Dimaano has a right against
unreasonable search and seizure. Puno brings in another aspect of Constitutionalism.
Considering that the right against unreasonable search and seizure is a natural right,
government cannot claim that Dimaano, is not entitled to the right for the reason alone, that
there was no constitution granting the right at the time the search was conducted. This right of
Dimaano precedes the Constitution. It is a natural right. 

Puno also disagrees with the finding or the conclusion of the majority opinion because the
majority opinion says that the contraband seized  must be returned Dimaano for the reasons
that clearly the raiding team exceeded their authority when they seized these items which were
not included in the list. Puno brings in another reason, Puno says it must also be excluded as
evidence and the contraband returned to Dimaano based on the Freedom Constitution.
Because at the time that  Dimaano was invoking the exclusionary right to the evidence ceased.
The freedom Constitution was already in effect. In other words, it was already after March 26.

———————————
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor
shall any person be denied the equal protection of the law. 

2 mandates in Section 1:
1. Due process of law clause; - first phrase
2. Equal protection of the laws clause. – second phrase

 The Bill of Rights contain mandates against the state. Why?

-Because the BoR is a protection for the citizen. It is a restriction of the great powers of
government. It is a protection against abuse of power.
Does not govern relations between private persons
- the restrictions found in the Bill of rights are directed against the State, they do not govern
relations between private persons. However, almost all the protections against the State found
in the Bill of Rights have been made applicable as Civil Law to relations between private
persons through Article 32 of the Civil Code.

Article 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly
obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and
liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages:
…
The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be adjudicated.
The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from a judge unless his act or omission
constitutes a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.

 General rule: The Bill of Rights applies to Filipino citizens and aliens alike

Exception:
Section 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be
recognized. Access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy
development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by
law

The totality of governmental power contained in three great power: police power, the power of
eminent domain, and the power of taxation. These are Inherent powers of the State –not
granted by the Constitution; the Constitution can only define and delimit these powers and
allocate their exercise among various government agencies.

• Police power - has been characterized as the most essential insistent, and the least limitable
power, extending as it does to all public needs 

 Police power is defined in this case: (Ermita Hotel and Motel Operators v. Mayor
of Manila, GR No. L-24693, July 31, 1967). 
“Police power is that inherent and plenary power of the state which enables it to prohibit all that
is hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society. Police power rests upon public necessity
and upon the rights of the State and of the public to self-protection.
Nor may petitioners assert with plausibility that on its face the ordinance is fatally defective as
being repugnant to the due process clause of the Constitution. The mantle of protection
associated with the due process guaranty does not cover petitioners. This particular
manifestation of a police power measure being specifically aimed to safeguard public morals is
immune from such imputation of nullity resting purely on conjecture and unsupported by
anything of substance. To hold otherwise would be to unduly restrict and narrow the scope of
police power which has been properly characterized as the most essential, insistent and the
least limitable of powers,4 extending as it does "to all the great public needs."5 It would be, to
paraphrase another leading decision, to destroy the very purpose of the state if it could be
deprived or allowed itself to be deprived of its competence to promote public health, public
morals, public safety and the genera welfare.6 Negatively put, police power is "that inherent
and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all that is hurt full to the comfort,
safety, and welfare of society.

 May be delegated to local governments. 

(Legaspi vs City of Cebu, GR 15911, December 10, 2013)
- Police power is exercised by the National government through the legislative department; it
may also be delegated within limits to local governments. 
- The exercise of police power by the LGU’s
- Police power is the plenary power vested in the legislature to make statutes and ordinances.
To promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of
the people. This delegation of police power is embodied in section 16 of the local government
code of 1991 RA 7160 known as the General Welfare.

 Test of valid ordinance: 

(Fernando vs. St. Scholastica’s College, 
 GR. No. 161107, March 12, 2013)
       - is well established a long line of decisions, including sheets of Manila, has held that for an
ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government
unit to enact and pass according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the
following substantive requirements
(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; 
(2) must not be unfair or oppressive;
(3) must not be partial or discriminatory; 
(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; 
(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and 
(6) must not be unreasonable.

Police power has been used to justify service public safety measures as in building regulations,
regulations on the carrying of deadly weapons, gasoline stations and movie houses. Police
power has been used to justify health measures, as in compulsory connection to sewerage
system, regulation of cattle imports. In the field of public morals, police power has been used as
basis for judicial approval of legislation punishing vagrancy, prohibiting gambling, regulating the
operation of dance halls, motels. 

 Police power cannot go beyond mere regulation into prohibition. (De la cruz v.
Judge Paras, GR No. 42571-71, July 25, 1983)

: A municipality refused to give any permits and any license for professional dancers. 
Court: ordinance: unconstitutional as going beyond mere regulation into prohibition of
profession or calling which when properly regulated can be legitimate.

 Local governments cannot contravene the judgment of congress not to prohibit

gambling. 
(Magtajas v. Price Properties, 234 SCRA 255, 268 (1994).
-The morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se, while it is
generally inimical to the interest of the people, there is nothing in the constitution categorically
proscribing or penalizing gambling or even mentioning at all, nor local governments contravene
the congress not to prohibit gambling.

Police power has been used to justify measures for the:

GENERAL WELFARE
 regulating the slaughter of Carabao
 Laying down the rules for deportation of aliens
 ant- graft laws
LABOR
 Agricultural Tenancy and Social Legislation, there's been a significant change of
direction away from laissez faire. Police power has been used even in the face of
apparent conflict with both the freedom of contract and the sacredness of contractual
obligations.

 Rights protected under the due process clause of the constitution: Right to Life,
property, liberty (Sec 1)

 The exercise of police power is subject to judicial inquiry.

in so far as it affects the life liberty, property of any person is subject to judicial inquiry and the
principal yardstick against which the exercise of police power may be measured. US vs.
Toribio, 15 Phil. 85, 1910.
Defined in this case: “Police power must be exercised within the limits set by the Constitution.”
The Legislative determination of what is proper exercise of Police Power is not final or
conclusive but is always subject to the supervision of the Court and the principal yardstick
against which such exercise must be measured are:
1. the due process clause and
2. the equal protection clause of the constitution.

In order to regulate police power, due process clause of the Constitution and the Equal
protection clause of the Constitution comes into play. How? The measure is the due process
clause. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.
There must be due process. And likewise by the equal protection clause. Those are the
principal yardsticks by which police power may be measured. The writs of due process and
equal protection clause touch all persons: be that citizens or aliens, natural or corporate

 The extent of the right to life that is protected by the constitution.

Not confined to that right to life or the security of one’s limb against physical harm. The right to
life is also the right to a good life that is also protected by the due clause

 Extent of the right to liberty

Not simply freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to
engage in any common occupation, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home, to
bring up children, and to worship God according to the dictates of one’s conscience.

 Extent of the right to property that is protected by the constitution.

Protected property: Includes all kinds of property found in the civil code, vested rights such as
perfected mining claim, perfected homestead, or a final judgment, or a perfected lease contract

Is there hierarchy of rights protected by the constitution? 

 1971 Constitutional Convention deliberations: clearly recognized that the social
character of private property definitely placed property into a position inferior to life or
liberty
 Property: inferior to life of liberty. (#1 and #2 would be liberty and property)

Arroyo vs. De Lima

The Supreme court in granting the temporary restraining order in favor of the petitioner
adverted to the rights to life as the most important right protected by the constitution.
There was a hold order issued by De Lima. Arroyo went to the SC and the SC decided in favor
of Arroyo - They adverted to the right to life as the most important right protected by the
Constitution.

 Primacy of human rights over property rights demonstrated.

Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization v. Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc.,
50 SCRA 189, 1973. 45:29
-READ this carefully
The primacy of human rights over property rights is recognized. The superiority of these
freedoms over property rights is underscored by the fact that a mere reasonable or rational
relation between the means employed by the law and its object or purpose (that the law is
neither arbitrary nor discriminatory nor oppressive) would suffice to validate a law which
restricts or impairs property rights. It is easier to impair property rights. On the other hand, a
constitutional or valid infringement of human rights requires a more astringent or strict criterion
namely existence of a grave or imminent danger of a substantial evil which the State has the
right to prevent. (SOURCE OF LIVING OF THE EMPLOYEES)

 Two aspects of due process of law

1. procedural due process - is a guarantee of procedural fairness. As a procedural
requirement, it relates chiefly to the mode of procedures that the government must
follow before it deprives a person of life, liberty, or property. Classic procedural due
process issues are concerned with what kind of notice and what kind of hearing the
 government must provide when it takes a particular action. It is a guarantee of
procedural fairness, it is more intended the general law: the law which hears before it
condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry, and renders judgment only after trial.In the
early history of due process clause (in the American history), due process was
understood to relate chiefly to the mode of procedure which govt agencies must follow, it
was understood as a guarantee of procedural fairness.Defined by Daniel Webster (In his
arguments to the SC of the United States): “Due process is more clearly intended the
general law: the law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry, and
renders judgment only after trial.”
2. substantive due process - asks whether the government has an adequate reason for
taking away a person’s life, liberty or property. Looks to whether there is sufficient
justification for a government’s action. It is a prohibition of arbitrary laws because if all
that the due process clause required were proper procedure, then the life, liberty or
property could be destroyed arbitrarily provided proper formalities are observed.

 There are different sets of requirements of procedural due process in judicial

proceedings, in administrative proceedings and even in student discipline cases.
Why are there different set of requirements for these cases? 
- Due process of law depends upon the circumstances. It varies with the subject matter and the
necessities of the situation. If the subject matter is that of a judicial matter, that one that is tried
in court, then you have a new a different set of procedural due process.

 Requirements of procedural due process in judicial proceedings: Banco Espanol

Filipino v. Palanca, 37 Phil 921 (1918). (cited in Bernas)
This case presents what has been considered a clear delineation of the essentials of procedural
fairness in judicial proceedings.

The Court said:

As applied to judicial proceedings... it may be laid down with certainty that the requirement of
due process is satisfied if the following conditions are present, namely: 
1. There must be a court of tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter
before it 
2. The court must acquire jurisdiction over the personal property subject of the proceedings, the
defendant must be given opportunity to be heard.
3. The defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard, and
4. Judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing.

 The requirements of procedural due process of law in administrative

proceedings.  Ang Tibay v. CIR, 69 Phil 635 (1940) -enumerated in the book of
Bernas
1. The right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one’s case and submit evidence in
support thereof
2. The tribunal must consider the evidence presented
3. The decision must have something to support itself
4. The evidence must be substantial. Substantial evidence means such reasonable evidence as
a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
5. The decision must be based on evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in
the record and disclosed to the parties affected
6. The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act in its own independent consideration of the
law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate
7. The Board of body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner
that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reason for the
decision rendered.

 The requirements of procedural due process in student discipline cases. Guzman

v. National University, 142 SCRA 699 (1986).  
-Read further
1. Students must be informed in writing the nature and cause of any accusation against them.
2. They shall have the right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of counsel
if desired
3. They shall be informed of the evidence against them 
4. They shall have the right to adduce evidence on their own behalf, and
5. The evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated
by the school authorities to hear and decide the case.  
When a student commits a serious breach of discipline or fails to maintain the required
academic standards of a school, the student forfeits his rights and courts are not at liberty to
reverse the discretion of university authorities in this matter.

Magtibay vs. Garcia

Magtibay – 1st class cadet officer in UP-ROTC. For some reason, the Santiago Garcia called
his attention for some misdemeanors in the sacred garden of the P and that started it all until
Garcia dismissed Magtibay although it as already the second semester and it was already a few
weeks before graduation. Magtibay would have graduated already until it reached the Supreme
Court
SC: Courts cannot reverse the decision of the school. Decided in favor of Garcia and it said that
if the student fails to maintain the standards of the school, he forfeits his rights.

 What is considered the heart of due process.

Whether in judicial or administrative proceedings, the heart of procedural due process is the
need for notice and an opportunity to be heard. 

Notice that there are several requirements in judicial, administrative, in student discipline cases
for procedural due process… but if you comply with notice and opportunity to be heard, if those
two are given, then you have already complied substantially with procedural due process.There
must notice at all times, there must be hearing.

The due process clause must be understood to guarantee not just forms of procedure but also
the very essence of life, liberty or property. It must be interpreted both as a procedural and
substantive guarantee. Due process must be a guarantee against the exercise of arbitrary
power even when the power is exercised according to proper procedure. Although it has been
invoked as a protest against arbitrariness in legislation, substantive due process was rarely
invoked with success.

 The heart of substantive due process is the requirement of "reasonableness" or

absence of the exercise of arbitrary power.   US v. Toribio, 15 Phil 85 (1910).
The Supreme Court gave generous latitude to legislation designed to promote:
Public Health
Public Safety, or
Public Welfare

US v. Toribio, 15 Phil 85 (1910).

A statue was passed regulating the slaughter of large cattle, a measure designed to preserve
work animals needed for agriculture, was challenged as unlawful deprivation of property.

The SC sustained the statute: It Held - the state may interfere whenever the public interest
demands it. A large discretion is necessarily vested in the legislature to determine not only what
the interests of the public require, but what measures are necessary for the protection of such
interests.

Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 148 SCRA 659, 1987.

Similar with the Us vs. Toribio case – pertains to large cattle also
An executive order was issued by Marcos amending the executive order No. 626 (E.O. that was
sustained by the SC in US vs. Toribio) Not only prohibiting the slaughter of large cattle but also
the transportation of carabao or carabeef from one province to another. Any Carabao or
carabeef shall be confiscated.

SC: The amendment is not valid. Outright confiscation is not reasonably related to the purpose
of the E.O. It is unduly oppressive.

Difference between Toribio and Ynot:

US vs. Toribio - You cannot slaughter work animals and carabao
Ynot vs. IAC - it is not prohibiting slaughter, it is prohibiting the transportation of carabaos and
the confiscation of the camera being transported. So it is arbitrary.

Compare the 2 cases: Why was the statute upheld in Toribio and the executive order
invalidated in Ynot when in fact, both cases involved the same subject.

Rubi v. Prov'l Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil 660 (1919).

A law was passed creating reservations to the Mangyan tribes and prescribing penalties for
Mangyan non-conformists. It was challenged as deprivation of liberty without due process of
law.  

SC: The law was justified by the demands of general welfare and public interest.
This is hamleting. Remember: the case was a 1919 case. They hamleted the natives in one
place. The SC sustained the statute for hamleting. That cannot happen nowadays
 
Villa Vicencio vs. Lucban
The Mayor and Chief of Police of Manila shipped prostitutes of Manila to Davao.

The SC granted a writ of habeas Corpus and ordered the return of the deportees

People vs. Fajardo

A building permit was denied to an order of a piece of land on the ground that the proposed
construction would block the view from the highway towards the plaza. 

The court said the ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive in that it operates to permanently
deprive appellants of the right to use their own property.  It oversteps the bounds of police
power and amounts to taking property without just compensation.
 
 The principle of presumed validity of statutes. Ermita Malate Hotel and Motel
Operators, Inc. v. City Mayor of  Manila, 20 SCRA 849 (1967)
There was an ordinance designed to curb the rampant use of hotels and motels as places of
illicit assignation.
When the Ermita questioned the ordinance of the City of Manila, they were not able to present
enough evidence to overturn the ordinance and therefore, the SC sustained the ordinance. That
is the principle of presumed validity of statutes. The ordinance was presumed to be valid, failing
on the part of the petitioners to prove that it is unconstitutional.
 
 Publication and clarity of laws as a requirement of due process: Tanada v. Tuvera,
GR No. 63915, December 29 1986.
The central issue is the meaning to be given to the Civil Code’s requirement of publication.

Art 2 Civil Code: Laws shall take effect after 15 days following the publication in the Official
Gazette, “unless it is otherwise provided”

Court: “unless it is otherwise provided” refers not to the deed of publication but to the
requirement of 15 days. The 15 days may be lengthened or shortened, but not to the point of
allowing no publication at all. 
The phrase would mean that there can be no publication at all – SC: That is not how it should
be interpreted

 The rule requiring publication for the effectivity of laws applies not only to laws
passed by congress. (Republic v. Pilipinas Shell, GR No. 173918, April 8, 2008).
The rule requires publication for the effectivity of laws, applies not only to statutes, but also to
Presidential decrees, executive orders promulgated by the president in the exercise of
legislative powers whenever it is delegated by the legislature or are directly conferred by the
constitution – administrative rules and regulations. Administrative rules and regulations must be
must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to
a valid delegation. 

 Void for vagueness rule. (People v. Nazario, 165 SCRA 186 (1988)
A law that is utterly vague is defective because it fails to give notice of what it commands. 
This principle Is also one of the challenges to the anti-terrorism act. That many of its provisions
are vague so that if they are vague then they are void. Read this very well

 When is a law vague? (Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, GR No. 148560, November 19,

2001)
A statute is vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess as its meaning and differ to its application.

In such an instance:
The statute is repugnant to the constitution in 2 respects:
1. Violates due process or failure to accord persons of fair notice of what conduct to abide.
2. Leaves law enforcers discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary
flexing of the government muscle

A criminal statute that fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence failed notice that his
contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute or is so indefinite that it encourages arbitrary
and erratic arrests and convictions is void for vagueness. As held in People vs. Dela Piedra(?)

 
2ND PHRASE OF SECTION 1 – the equal protection clause
 The guarantee of equal protection. (Tolentino v. Board of Accountancy, 90 Phils
83 ,1951)

The guarantee of equal protection simply means that no person or class of persons shall be
deprived of the same protection of the laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes
in the same place and in “like manner”. But it just seem impossible that all times, there is
equality among persons. That is a being a spouse in the equal protection clause would be the
equality of people in the same class. 

Officers of the PNP, for example, they cannot be lump to the rules that would govern ordinary
citizens. Because they have a class among by themselves. 

Or, since it is election time, elected officials are not of the same class as appointed officials.
That is why, elective officials need not resign from their present position, if they run, even if they
will run for election into another position. However, appointed officials are not of the same class
as elected officials, so they cannot be given the same privilege. Appointed officials must resign
from the time they file their certificate of candidacy.

The guarantee of equal protection is satisfied if - People of the same class are given the same
protection. If there are substantive differences between two classes, then equal protection is not
violated. Like the obvious differences between female and male.  

 The equal protection clause recognizes the power of the state to act upon factual
differences between individuals.
The equal protection clause: Recognizes the power of the state to act upon factual differences
between individuals. It recognizes that inherent in the right to legislate is the right to classify.

Substantive differences – equal protection is not violated

Example:
Female Students and Male students: there can be instances where the equal protection clause
cannot be sustained because of the differences of the 2 classes.  

The problem, thus, in equal protection cases is one of determining the validity of the
classification made by law. 

It is a specific constitutional guarantee of the equality of the person. The equality it guarantees
is “legal equality” or the equality of all persons before the law.
The equality guaranteed however, does not deny to the state the power to recognize an act
upon factual differences between individuals and classes.
People vs. Cayat G.R. No. L-45987  
It is an established principle of Constitutional Law that the guarantee of equal protection of the
laws is not violated by the legislation based on reasonable classification.

Requirements for a reasonable classification:

(1) must rest on substantial distinction;
(2) must be germane to the purpose of the law;  
(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) must apply equally to all members of the same class. 

Farinas v. Executive Secretary, GR No. 147387, Dec. 10, 2003.

The SC decided that elective and appointed officials are not of the same class.
The Fair Elections Act provides that elective officials are not deemed resigned upon the filing of
their certificate of candidacy. This is not the case for appointive officials. It is not a violation of
the equal protection clause.  

The provision on the fair elections Acts providing that elective officials are not deemed resigned
upon the filing of certificate of candidacy was held by the Supreme Court not to be effective on
appointive officials running for public office bcause they are not of the same class.

Tiu v. CA, GR No. 127410, January 20, 1999.

RA 7227 (the law that governs the management of Subic Special Economic Zone) was
challenged as violative of the equal protection clause because it granted tax and duty incentives
to businesses and residents within secured area of the Subic Special Economic zone. And
denied them to those who live within the zone but outside such fenced in territory. Fenced-in:
those that are given tax breaks, etc. Outside fenced-in: Even if they are in Subic, they are not
entitled to tax breaks.

SC: The Constitution does not require absolute equality among residents

International School Educators v. Quisumbing, 

GR No. 128845, June 1, 2000. 
There are local hires, and foreign hires. It happened that foreign hires were given more
privileges. Higher pay than local hires. The educators went to court.

SC: There must be equal pay, equal work.

The court argued that the principle of equal pay for equal work require that persons who work
with substantially equal work, skill, effort and responsibility under similar conditions should be
paid similar salaries. Meaning, they are of the same classifications.

Smith, Bell and Co. v. Natividad, 40 Phil 136 (1919). 

Alienage as basis of classification.

Issue: Whether or not the statute which requires ownership by Filipino or American citizens in
order to obtain of Philippine registry of a vessel for trade Violates the due process and equal
protection clauses. Practical question dependent upon encourage The court conclude that the
court did not belong to the specie of (hinde diniscuss ito part)

LI SENG GIAP vs. director of Lands 

G.R. No. L-33652 February 24, 1931 -cited by Bernas
Law prohibiting aliens from acquiring certain public lands was challenged as being
discriminatory. SC rejected it.

Tiong vs. Hernandez

King v. Hernaez G.R. No. L-14859
Villegas vs. hiu Chong – also cited by Bernas

Gumabon vs director of prisons G.R. No. L-30026

• Himagan v. People, 237 SCRA 538, (1994).

-different for the accused police officers. It says that the National Police Law allows suspension to
continue beyond the 90 days until the case against them is terminated. Whereas under the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, the suspension cannot go beyond 90 days.

The equal protection clause provision doe not merely prohibit the State from institutionalizing
inequality but commands the State to take positive measures to eradicate inequalities that have arisen
not necessarily through state action.

• The doctrinal supports in the constitution to achieve a reasonable measure of equality:

• the Preamble proclaims equality as an ideal;

• the command to promote social justice in Article II, Section 10, and Art XIII.  

• the Commission on Elections is given broad powers in order to implement laws seeking to
equalize political opportunities;

• so is the command of the constitution to prohibit political dynasties;

• Article III, Section 11, expressly guarantees free access to the courts;

• and Article XIV commands the state to make quality education accessible to all.  

Section 2. The right of the people to be secured in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable search and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,

• Purpose: To protect the privacy and sanctity of the person and his house and other possessions
against the arbitrary intrusions of the state;

...and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or
things to be seized.

Purpose: To protect the privacy and the sanctity of the person and his house and other possessions
against the arbitrary intrusions of the state and provides (second part) the conditions under which a
valid intrusion may be made.

Provides for the conditions under which a valid intrusion maybe made, as it spells out the requisites of
a valid warrant.

• (1) it must be issued upon probable cause;

• (2) probable cause must be determined personally by the judge;

• (3) such judge must examine under oath or affirmation the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce;

• (4) the warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched and the person or things to
be seized.

One notable difference on the 1987 Constitution on illegal search and seizure is that in the 1987
provision, the requirements for a valid warrant of arrest and the requirements for a valid search
warrant are now the same

• May a private person or entity be held liable for illegal search under Section 2, Article III.
Silahis International v. Soluta, GR No. 163087, February 20, 2006.

-cited by Bernas

A private person or entity may be held liable for illegal search under Art 32 of the Civil Code but not
under Sec2 Art 3 BECAUSE: The Bill of rights is directed against the State
 If the Persons violating the rights is the State or the agents of the State, the BoR is violated. That
does not mean that a private person may search freely because they are liable under Art 32 of the
Civil code.

The provision is not a prohibition against all searches and seizures it is only applicable to
unreasonable searches and seizures with warrants or not.

General Rule: Searches and seizures are unreasonable unless authorized by a validly issued search
warrant.

• At what point does an inspection (say in a check point) become a search in the sense of
Section 2. Valmonte v. Villa, 185 SCRA 665 (1990); People v. Escano, GR No. 129756, January 28,
2000.

Valmonte vs. Villa: -there is as yet no cause application of the constitutional rule when what are
involved are routine checks consisting of “a brief question or two. For as longa s the vehicle is neither
searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a
visual search, said routine checks cannot be regarded as violative of an individual’s right against
unreasonable searches and seizures.”

People vs. Escano – dealing with checkpoints when a gun ban has been imposed by the Comelec.
Those which are warranted by the exigencies of public order and are conducted in a way least intrusive
to motorists are allowed. For, admittedly, routine checkpoints do intrude. Pg 169

The occupants of the vehicle are not to bring down their windows

If the inspection becomes more thorough, to the extent of becoming a search, this can be done only
when there is deemed to be a probable cause.

Sapla Case: GR 244045 June 16, 2020.

A text message from an anonymous person is not probable cause for a conduct of an intrusive
warrantless search.
Facts: A car was in a checkpoint. Somebody texted the police officer in the checkpoint and said that
there’s some contraband in the car. And because of the text message, they forced the occupant to open
the car. The SC Said: A text message from an anonymous…

A more extensive and intrusive search that goes beyond a mere visual search of the vehicle necessitates
probable cause on the part of the apprehending officers. Thus, the mere reception of a text message
from an anonymous person… Allowing that would lead to harassments and abuse.

Simply stated, the citizen's sanctified and heavilv-protected right against unreasonable search and
seizure will be at the mercy a phony tips.

Probable cause (In general).

Probable cause is such facts and circumstances antecedent to the issuance of a warrant that is in them
sufficient to induce a cautious man to rely upon them and act in pursuance thereof.

• Probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest / search warrant.

• The quantum of evidence needed to establish probable cause is probability, not absolute or
even moral certainty. Microsoft v. Maxicorp, GR No. 140946, September 13, 2004.

• Probable cause for a search warrant need not point to a specific offender.

• But it must point to some specific violation of our criminal law.

• Probable cause for a warrant of arrest must point to a specific offender.

• Webb v. De Leon, GR No. 121234, August 23, 1995.

• Stonehill v. Diokno, GRL-19550, June 19 1976. The description of the offense simply as
"violation of the Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws" made it impossible for finding
probable cause.
 First case that brought out requirements for a valid search

What was in the search warrant:

None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants. Indeed, the same were
issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical person therein named had committed a
"violation of Central Ban Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal
Code." In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in said applications. 

The establishment of the existence of probable cause presupposes the introduction of competent proof
that the party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions,
violating a given provision of our criminal laws.

The Court invalidated the search warrant issued in the case. Because of the description:  it
was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable cause

Section 3 Rule 122 Rules of Court: "a search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in
connection with one specific offense." And that "no search warrant shall issue for more than one
specific offense."

• Central Bank v. Judge Morfe, GR L-20119, June 30, 1967. The failure of the witness to mention
particular individuals did not necessarily prove that he had no personal knowledge of specific
illegal transaction.

• Under the 1987 constitution, only a judge may determine probable cause for the purpose of
issuing a warrant.

-The 1973 Constitution provides that probable cause may be determined by the judge or such other
persons as may be authorized by law.

-1935 Constitution: probable cause may be determined only by the judge and no other (same with
1987). The 1987 Constitution returned to the 1935 Rule

When a case is filed before the FISCAL, the fiscal shall determine probable cause for the purpose of
FILING AN INFORMATION. – this is another kid of determination of probable cause. It is an
administrative determination of probable cause.

• The prosecution determines probable cause for the purpose of filing an information.

• People v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 126005, January 21, 1999.

SC Held: The determination of probable cause during a preliminary investigation is a function that
belongs to the public prosecutor. It is an executive (or administractive) function

Must the Judge personally examine the complainant and his witnesses?

• Soliven v. Judge Makasiar, 167 SCRA 988) (the Luis Beltran case)

This case was originally field by president Aquino. In one of the coup that was launched against
president Aquino, Malacanang was passed by a jet plane and in the morning after, Luis Beltran said that
when the planes passed malacanang, he said that the President hid under her bed.

The president took it as an insult to her presidency. So, he sued the writer and the publishers. It reached
the courts
What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge
to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally
examine the complainant and his witnesses. 

Four instances where probable cause is needed to be determined:

(1) In Sections 1 and 3 of Rule 112: By the investigating officer;
It is the provision wherein in preliminary investigation by the investigation officers comes up with a
finding of probable cause
RULE 112
Preliminary Investigation
Section 1. Preliminary investigation defined; when required. — Preliminary investigation is an
inquiry or proceeding to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded
belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be
held for trial.
Except as provided in section 7 of this Rule, a preliminary investigation is required to be conducted
before the filing of a complaint or information for an offense where the penalty prescribed by law is
at least four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day without regard to the fine. (1a)
Section 3. Procedure. — The preliminary investigation shall be conducted in the following manner:
(a) The complaint shall state the address of the respondent and shall be accompanied by
the affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses, as well as other supporting documents
to establish probable cause…

(2) In Sections 6 and 9 of Rule 112: By the judge; it is to be determined by the judge whether a warrant
of arrest or a commitment order in the accused should be issued and that there is a necessity of placing
respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the of justice
Section 6. When warrant of arrest may issue. — (a) By the Regional Trial Court. — Within ten (10)
days from the filing of the complaint or information, the judge shall personally evaluate the resolution
of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence
on record clearly fails to establish probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a
warrant of arrest, or a commitment order if the accused has already been arrested pursuant to a
warrant issued by the judge who conducted the preliminary investigation or when the complaint or
information was filed pursuant to section 7 of this Rule. In case of doubt on the existence of
probable cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five (5)
days from notice and the issue must be resolved by the court within thirty (30) days from the filing of
the complaint of information.
(b) By the Municipal Trial Court. — When required pursuant to the second paragraph of section 1 of
this Rule, the preliminary investigation of cases falling under the original jurisdiction of the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Municipal Trial Court, or Municipal Circuit
Trial Court may be conducted by either the judge or the prosecutor. When conducted by the
prosecutor, the procedure for the issuance of a warrant or arrest by the judge shall be governed by
paragraph (a) of this section. When the investigation is conducted by the judge himself, he shall
follow the procedure provided in section 3 of this Rule. If the findings and recommendations are
affirmed by the provincial or city prosecutor, or by the Ombudsman or his deputy, and the
corresponding information is filed, he shall issue a warrant of arrest. However, without waiting for
the conclusion of the investigation, the judge may issue a warrant of arrest if he finds after an
examination in writing and under oath of the complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching
question and answers, that a probable cause exists and that there is a necessity of placing the
respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice.
Section 9. Cases not requiring a preliminary investigation nor covered by the Rule on Summary
Procedure. —
(a) If filed with the prosecutor. — If the complaint is filed directly with the prosecutor
involving an offense punishable by imprisonment of less four (4) years, two (2) months and
one (1) day, the procedure outlined in section 3(a) of this Rule shall be observed. The
prosecutor shall act on the complaint based on the affidavits and other supporting
documents submitted by the complainant within ten (10) days from its filing.
(b) If filed with the Municipal Trial Court. — If the complaint or information is filed directly
with the Municipal Trial Court or Municipal Circuit Trial Court for an offense covered by this
section, the procedure in section 3(a) of this Rule shall be observed. If within ten (10) days
after the filing of the complaint or information, the judge finds no probable cause after
personally evaluating the evidence, or after personally examining in writing and under oath
the complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching question and answers, he shall
dismiss the same. He may, however, require the submission of additional evidence, within
ten (10) days from notice, to determine further the existence of probable cause. If the judge
still finds no probable cause despite the additional evidence, he shall, within ten (10) days
from its submission or expiration of said period, dismiss the case. When he finds probable
cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order if the accused had already
been arrested, and hold him for trial. However, if the judge is satisfied that there is no
necessity for placing the accused under custody, he may issue summons instead of a
warrant of arrest. (9a)
(3) In Section 5(b) of Rule 113: By a peace officer or a private person;
This is the probable cause that must be determined when a peace officer or a private person is making a
warrantless arrest.
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
(b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based
on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it;
(4) In Section 4 of Rule 126: By the judge;
The determination of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant
Section 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. — A search warrant shall not issue except upon
probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized which may be
anywhere in the Philippines
In all of these instances, the evidence necessary to establish probable cause is based only on the
likelihood or probability of guilt.

Alvarez vs. CFI

The government agent applying for a search warrant admitted under oath that he had no personal
knowledge of the facts which were to serve as a basis for the issuance of the warrant but that he had
knowledge of them through mere information secured form a person he considered reliable.

Court said:
The oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner
or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the
individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable
cause
The true test of sufficiency of an affidavit to warrant issuance of a search warrant: is whether it has
been drawn in such a manner that perjury could be charged thereon and affiant be held liable for
damages caused  (abbreviated note in Bernas)

• ..."personally determined by the judge"

• The word "personally" defines determination of probable cause by the judge, not his
examination of witnesses.

The word “personally” is connected to the requirement of personal determination by the judge of
probable cause. Not his examination of witnesses

Soliven vs. Judge Makasiar

What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge
to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. (what is required is personal determination and
not personal examination)

In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the
judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following
established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting
documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis
thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may
disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid
him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.

Lim Sr. vs. Judge Felix – the case reiterated the ruling in Soliven vs. Makasiar
The Prosecutor can perform the same functions as a commissioner for the taking of the evidence.
However, there should be a report and necessary documents supporting the Fiscal's bare
certification. All of these should be before the Judge.

The extent of the Judge's personal examination of the report and its annexes depends on the
circumstances of each case.  We cannot determine beforehand how cursory or exhaustive the
1âwphi1

Judge's examination should be. The Judge has to exercise sound discretion for, after all, the
personal determination is vested in the Judge by the Constitution.

• Purpose of requiring particularity of description in a search warrant.

Uy Kheytin v. Villareal, 42 Phil 886 (1920).

This was mentioned in RP vs. Sandigan

The evident purpose and intent of this requirement is to limit the things to be seized to those, and
only those, particularly described in the search warrant — to leave the officers of the law with no
discretion regarding what articles they shall seize, to the end that "unreasonable searches and
seizures" may not be made, — that abuses may not be committed. That this is the correct
interpretation of this constitutional provision

Not an absolute Rule:

General Rule: in order that a search or arrest be legal, there must be a warrant (not absolute)

What the provision prohibits is unreasonable searches and seizures. A search and seizure not supported
by a warrant is not necessarily unreasonable because we have: Warrantless search and seizure.

(Instances where) Warrantless search and seizure may be allowed

(1) search incidental to an arrest;

(2) search of moving vehicles;

(3) seizure of evidence in plain view;

(4) customs searches;

(5) where there is waiver of the right;

Also rule on exigent circumstance and the stop and frisk rule.

1. Search incidental to an arrest. Moreno v. Ago Chi, 12 Phil 439 (1909).

-cited in brief by Bernas (read the original)
An officer making an arrest may take from the person arrested any money or property found upon
his person which was used in the commission of the crime or was the fruit of the crime or which
might furnish the prisoner with the means of committing violence or of escaping, or which may be
used as evidence in the trial of the cause; but there is very serious doubt whether an officer making
an arrest has the right to take from the defendant any property found upon his person, unless for
some of the reasons just mentioned. 

• Search incidental to an arrest cannot be made in a place other than where the suspect is
arrested. Nolasco v. Pano, 147 SCRA 509 (1987).

Nolasco was riding in a jeepney and he was arrested while in the jeepney. But the search was made in
her house, several blocks away from the place of arrest.

Held: the rule calls for the strict application of the exception provided in rule 126 Section 12 – to
absolutely limit a warrantless search of a person who is lawfully arrested to his or her person at the
time of an incident to the arrest and to dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of
the commission of the offense. Such warrantless search cannot be made in a place other than place of
arrest.
The exception of Rule 126, sec. 12 which allows a warrantless search of a person who is lawfully
arrested is absolutely limited to his person, at the time of and incident to his arrest and to dangerous
weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the offense." Such
warrantless search obviously cannot be made in a place other than the place of arrest. 

2. Search of moving vehicles. Papa v. Mago, GR No. L-27360, February 28, 1968.
The guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures is construed as recognizing a
necessary difference between a search of a dwelling house or other structure in respect of which a
search warrant may readily be obtained and a search of a ship, motorboat, wagon, or automobile for
contraband goods, where it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be
quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.

Warrantless search is authorized where it is not practical to secure a warrant because a vehicle can be
moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant is sought. (for practical purposes) There is
probable cause, there is evidence, that there is contraband in the vehicle.
Because it would be useless already if they would still go to the judge and secure a search warrant.

Search of moving vehicles: Extensive search without warrant could only be resorted to if
there is probable cause.

Aniag v. Commission on Elections, 237 SCRA 424 (1994).

Aniag was a member of the HoR in the elections of 1992, during the election period (where you have to
secure exception from the Comelec before bringing your firearms [even if it is in your vehicle]) Aniag was
on his way to the HoR 20m away from the entrance of the Batasan Complex, he was stopped by police
officers: that act of stopping was not justified by any earlier confidential report nor by the behavior or
appearance by the motorist.

Held: An extensive search without warrant could only be resorted to if the officers conducting the
search had reasonable or probable cause to believe before the search that either the motorist was a
law offender or that they would find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to the commission of a
crime in the vehicle to be searched. The existence of probable cause justifying the warrantless
search is determined by the facts of each case. Thus, we upheld the validity of the warrantless
search in situations where the smell of marijuana emanated from a plastic bag owned by the
accused, or where the accused was acting suspiciously, and attempted to flee. 

In the investigation report: the police officers did not allege that they had reason to believe that there is
a probability that a contraband may be in the car. There was no such allegation

Defense of Aniag: pounded on the fact that on the police report, there was no saying that there was
probable cause

Where marijuana sticks fall before the eyes of a police officer.

People vs. Tabar, 222 SCRA 144 (1993).

Where marijuana sticks fall before the eyes of a police officer - From an object a person is carrying,
seizure of the sticks would not require a warrant. And arrest the perpetrator.

3. Requirements for a warrantless search and seizure of evidence in plain view.

(One of the exceptions of a warrantless seizure, that the evidence is in plain view)

In the case of: People v. Evaristo, 216 SCRA 413,1992.

(1) there must be a valid prior intrusion in to a place;

- (The owner lets the officers in; or there is a search warrant)
(2) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where they are;
-because they were let in or they were holding a warrant. (Hindi pa sila nag se-search) They were not
poking around but the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police. (e.g. pagpasok, nasa taas ng
table sa sala kaagad yung mga baril)
(3) the illegality of the evidence must be immediately apparent;
-ex: firearm – no license when asked. (dependent on whether there is license)
(4) it is noticed without further search. – there was no poking around, and they just saw it there

The discovery must be inadvertent.

 People v. Musa, 217 SCRA 597 (1993).

The discovery must be inadvertent. (To be exempted). If an officer encounters prohibited objects only
after poking around, the discovery would not be inadvertent.

4. Customs inspections:

BoC is authorized by law to inspect goods that are brought in through the customs. Customs officers or
border officers may search incoming persons and goods to look for either good concealed to avoid duties
or other illegal materials.

5. Requirements of a warrantless search and seizure to constitute as waiver of the constitutional

right.

• De Gracia v. Locsin, 65 Phil 689, reiterated in People v. Barros, 231 SCRA 557 (1994).
Court: It is well-settled that to constitute a waiver of a constitutional right, it must appear,
first, that the right exists;
secondly, that the persons involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence of
such right; and,
lastly, that said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.

Government men went into the office and the failure of the petitioner / bookkeeper to resist or to object
to the execution of the warrant does not constituted an implied waiver of the constitutional right against
illegal search.

The peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not consent or an invitation thereto but is merely a
demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law.
They were just law-abiding officers kaya pinayagan nilang mag search yung mga government men

• Implied conformity is not consent.

People v. Compacion, GR 124442, July 20, 2001.

The act of the accused-appellant in allowing the members of the military to enter his premises and his
consequent silence during the unreasonable search and seizure could not be construed as voluntary
submission or an implied acquiescence to warrantless search and seizure especially so when members of
the raiding team were intimidatingly numerous and heavily armed. His implied acquiescence, if any,
could not have been more than mere passive conformity given under coercive or intimidating
circumstances and is, thus, considered no consent at all within the purview of the constitutional
guarantee. Consequently, herein accused-appellants lack of objection to the search and seizure is not
tantamount to a waiver of his constitutional right or a voluntary submission to the warrantless search
and seizure.

(similar to Gracia case) He did not give specific consent. It is not acquiescence merely because he did not
say anything.

Intimidating circumstances – (fully armed) the fear of the owner of the place to object to the soldier’s
presence or the search of the place was excused by the supreme court

• Spouses Veroy v. Layague, GR 95632, June 18, 1992.

The waiver must be understood to cover only what is included within the terms of the language.

A permission granted for officers to enter a house to look for rebel soldiers does not include permission
for a room to room search of firearms

Warrantless search and seizure:

 • Exigent circumstances: the raiding team had no opportunity to apply for and secure a search
warrant from the courts. Under such urgency and exigency of the moment, a search warrant
should lawfully be dispensed with.

This case happened in the EDSA Revolution where during a patrol made by government soldiers they
chanced upon a building and saw some firearms inside the building through the window. Exigent
circumstances, they had to search the building without a warrant and that act was excused.

• Warrantless search and seizure: Stop and frisk rule:

• Posadas v. CA, 188 SCRA 288 (1990).

Where an officer observes unusual l conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his
experience, that criminal activity may be __ he is entitled for the protection for himself and others in
the area to conduct a careful limited search of the outer clothing of such person in an attempt to
discover weapons which might be used to assault him, such search is reasonable (but dangerous).

(I cannot say that this is really an exception to the general rule)

What the court was saying is that because of the “experience of the Police officer”

Malacat vs. CA (another example of stop and frisk rule)

The stop and frisk rule is a limited of the outer clothing for weapons

Held: While Probable cause is not required to conduct a stop and frisk rule, it nevertheless holds that
mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a stop and frisk. A genuine reason must exist to warrantly
believe that the person detained has weapons concealed in him.

while probable cause is not required to conduct a "stop and frisk," it nevertheless holds that mere
suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop and frisk." A genuine reason must exist, in light of the
police officer's experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained
has weapons concealed about him. Finally, a "stop-and-frisk" serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general
interest of effective crime prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition that a police
officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a person for
purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the more
pressing interest of safety and self-preservation which permit the police officer to take steps to assure
himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could
unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer.

Same requirements for search warrants and warrant of arrest.

• Amarga v. Abbas, 98 Phil 739 (1956).

This provides that there is the same requirements for search warrant and warrant of arrest. Both must
satisfy the same requirements as to probable cause and the manner of its determination

1987 Constitution: The same requirements for both search warrants and warrants of Arrest

Sec 2 1987 Constitution vs. Previous Constitutions (compare)

It now generalized the requirements for both warrants of arrest and a search warrant

• A John Doe warrant of arrest is valid provided it satisfies the requirement of particularity of
description. – the police does not yet determine the identity of the person to be arrested.

People v. Veloso, 48 Phil 169, 1925.

It would be questioned on the basis on the requirement of the requirement of particularity of

description. Not so, says the court, provided, that there must be a way to describe John Doe.

Held: A John Doe warrant of Arrest satisfy the requirement of particularity of description - Only if it
contains a descriptio personae that will enable an officer to identify the accused.
 • A warrant of arrest against 50 John Does is not valid.

Pangandaman v. Casar, 159 SCRA 599, 1988.

-it is of the nature of a general warrant clearly vilative of the requirement of particularity of description.
it is of the nature of a general warrant, one of a class of writs long proscribed as unconstitutional and
once anathematized as "totally subversive of the liberty of the subject."  Clearly violative of the
constitutional injunction that warrants of arrest should particularly describe the person or persons to
be seized, the warrant must, as regards its unidentified subjects, be voided.

ARREST
• Warrantless arrest is generally illegal. (General Rule)

• The cases when a person may be arrested even without a warrant is summarized under Rule
113, Section 5, Rules of Court:
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:

• (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense; flagrante Delicto Rule (on the spot; on the act) he saw it
• (b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based
on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and (personal knowledge: may be an officer or a private person)
• (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while
his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.
• In cases falling under paragraph (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant
shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded
against in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112. (5a)
•

• 1. Flagrante delicto rule.

• People v. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1 (1968).

(Paragraph a of Section 5, Rule 113)

In this case, the person arresting a person who has just committed/committing/about to commit an
offense must have PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE of that fact.
The offense must also be committed in his presence or within his view.
Since the offense happened right before the eyes of the officer, there is no need for a warrant either for
the seizure of the goods or for the apprehension of the offender.

(Paragraph b of Section 5, Rule 113)

• – it is not enough that there is reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has
committed a crime. It must be that a crime must in fact or actually have been committed (it an
essential precondition)

Go vs. CA (briefly cited by Bernas)

- The arresting officer must have personal knowledge of the commission of the crime. A police
officer who learns about the commission of the crime merely from the report does not possess
a PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE needed to justify a warrantless arrest.

People vs. Hayson

- Upon arriving at the place where a shooting have been reported, the police saw the victim and
the bystanders pointing to the accused fleeing the scene. The court ruled that the offense has
 in fact been committed and the officers had personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the
accused had committed it.

• A warrantless arrest cannot be effected three months or even six days after the commission
of the crime.

• People v. Salvatierra, GR 104663, July 24, 1967.

- A warrantless arrest effected 3 months after the commission of the crime was invalidated; same
with offense effected even 6 days after the commission of the alleged offense.

(Ito anf palusot ng ating mga police officers. Sometimes, the police (in general) would say that they are
in hot pursuit of the perpetrator of the crime. So that after a crime has been reported, they organize a
group and now look for the alleged perpetrator. That is no longer allowed under the concept of a
warrantless arrest under the circumstance #2)

Dito ako Nagstart Magtranscribe

• Entrapment may or may not be allowed depending upon the
circumstances.
• People v. Doria, GR 125299, January 22, 1999.
The type of entrapment the law forbids is the inducing of another to violate the
law. The seduction of an otherwise innocent person into a criminal career.
It is the officer that is now inducing a private person to commit a crime. That is not
allowed.
Where the criminal intent originates in the mind of the entrapping person and
the accused is lured into the commission of the offense charged order to prosecute
him, there is entrapment. And no conviction may be had.
Where however, the criminal intent originates in the mind of the accused, and the
criminal offense is completed, the fact that the person acting as a decoy furnished the
accused the opportunity for the commission of offense, or that the accused is aided in
the commission of the crime in order to secure evidence necessary to prosecute him,
there is no entrapment and the accused must be convicted.
Persona: The Police Office- Instigator; Accused- Instigated
Q: Is entrapment legal or illegal? It depends

• A buy bust operation is a form of entrapment.

• People v. de la Cruz, GR 83260, April 18, 1990. -read
The officer posing as a buyer however neither instigates nor induces the accused to
commit a crime. In these cases, the seller has already decided to commit a crime. This
is the entrapment that is legal.
• When may the validity of an arrest be challenged?
• (People v. Cabiles, GR 112035, January 16, 1998).
In regard to this delay, this Court has consistently ruled that any objection involving a
warrant of arrest or procedure in the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the
person of an accused must be made before he enters his plea, otherwise the objection
is deemed waived 
The accused must move for the quashing of the information against him before the
arraignment otherwise he is from questioning the validity of the arrest. The accused
enters his plea before the Arraignment.
Arraignment – a process at the beginning of a trial of a case where the criminal
complaint against the accuse is read to him in a language that he understands (by the
court) and he is asked who he pleads (whether guilty or not guilty). The accused may
refuse at all to make a plea (That is still allowed). In those cases, the court will enter a
plea of not guilty for the accused.
• An application for bail is not considered a waiver of the right of an
accused to question the legality of his arrest.
• Okabe v. Judge De Leon, GR No. 150185, May 27, 2004.
Sec 26 Rule 114 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
Section 26. Bail not a bar to objections on illegal arrest, lack of or irregular
preliminary investigation. — An application for or admission to bail shall not bar the
accused from challenging the validity of his arrest or the legality of the warrant issued
therefor, or from assailing the regularity or questioning the absence of a preliminary
investigation of the charge against him, provided that he raises them before entering
his plea. The court shall resolve the matter as early as practicable but not later than
the start of the trial of the case. 
Stonehill vs, Diokno The objection to an unlawful search and seizure and to evidence
obtained thereby is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties
• The right to privacy is the right to be left alone.
• Hing vs. Choachuy, GR 179736, June 26, 2013 -read and study very well
Thus, an individual’s right to privacy under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code should not be
confined to his house or residence as it may extend to places where he has the right to
exclude the public or deny them access. The phrase "prying into the privacy of
another’s residence," therefore, covers places, locations, or even situations which an
individual considers as private. And as long as his right is recognized by society, other
individuals may not infringe on his right to privacy.
The right to privacy under Sec 26 of Civil Code does not cover only private residence
but business offices as well.
Before the case of Hing, the jurisprudence is given only in private residences. But in
this case, the court considered the right to privacy even applicable to the place of
business of the petitioner.

• Section 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be

inviolable except upon lawful orders of the court, or when public safety or order
requires otherwise as prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section
shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. -exclusionary rule
RP vs. Sandiganbayan- 2 opinions made by Carpio and then a separate
concurring opinion by Justice Puno
Exclusion of Evidence- Section 2
General Rule: The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable
Remember: The Bill of rights contains the right of a citizen and that right is
immediately stated in the provisions. It is not only an enumeration of list of the rights
of a citizen but it likewise provides exceptions on these rights. So that there will be a
structured ordering of the society, the state also must be given leeway insofar as the
implementation of its powers (like police power). 
• The privacy of communication and correspondence is not absolute.
The government must also be given a way to impose order as an exception to the
general rule which is the rights of the citizen. The State may impose its power under
certain circumstances.
Exceptions: (Where the state may come in)/ Provided in the law itself.
-upon lawful orders of the court
-when public safety or order requires otherwise as may be prescribed by law
– there must be a law
Q: Is there a way where privacy and correspondence be interfered by the government?
-YES

Invasion of Communication and Correspondence is one kind of search.

• Section 3 allows intrusion into the privacy of communication and
correspondence.
• What are the conditions for such allowable intrusion? -it is provided in the law
itself. And the court may order intrusion based on requirements of probable
cause in section 2. Section 2 and 3 are connected. The principles obtaining and
search and seizure in section 2 would be applicable likewise to intrusion in
communication and correspondence. If in Section 02 intrusion and exception to
search and seizure may be had if there is a probable cause, then it is also the
requirement in communication and correspondence. Such that in intrusion in
communication and correspondence would be allowed by the court.
• What type of privacy and communication is covered by the provision? – the
provision covers letters and messages. It also covers wiretaps and other
methods of electronic eavesdropping.
• The implementing law on the subject is RA 4200 known as the Anti Wiretapping
Law as amended by Human Security Act of 2007 (RA 9372). The RA 9372 is
deemed repealed by Anti-Terrorist Act.

• SEC. 12. Real-Time Collection of Traffic Data. — Law enforcement authorities,

with due cause, shall be authorized to collect or record by technical or electronic
means traffic data in real-time associated with specified communications
transmitted by means of a computer system.
Traffic data refer only to the communication’s origin, destination, route,
time, date, size, duration, or type of underlying service, but not content, nor
identities.
All other data to be collected or seized or disclosed will require a court
warrant.
Service providers are required to cooperate and assist law enforcement
authorities in the collection or recording of the above-stated information.
The court warrant required under this section shall only be issued or
granted upon written application and the examination under oath or affirmation
of the applicant and the witnesses he may produce and the showing: (1) that
 there are reasonable grounds to believe that any of the crimes enumerated
hereinabove has been committed, or is being committed, or is about to be
committed: (2) that there are reasonable grounds to believe that evidence that
will be obtained is essential to the conviction of any person for, or to the solution
of, or to the prevention of, any such crimes; and (3) that there are no other
means readily available for obtaining such evidence.
What are the conditions for allowable intrusion?
Intrusion is allowed upon lawful orders of the court or when public safety or order
requires it as maybe provided by law.
-Without Court order

 The court may order intrusion based on the requirements of probable cause
in Section 2 (Art. III).
-because the privacy of communication and correspondence intrusion is a kind of
search. So that the court may order intrusion only if there is a probable cause. It
must be based on probable cause (Same requirements in Section 2).
• (because the intrusion into communication and correspondence is one kind of
search)
• The implementing statute on the subject is RA 4200 known as the Anti
Wiretapping Law, as amended by the Human Security Act of 2007 (RA
9372).
-which was also again repealed by the Anti-terrorism Act. – has similar provisions
into intrusions into privacy of communication and correspondence. If the ATA repealed
RA 9372 (Human Security Act of 2007), then I am sure that they placed something
there that is similar to the provisions of the Human Security Act of 2007. Because in
HAS of 2007, it allows wiretapping with the consent of Court of Appeals only for
terrorist suspects and expressly prohibits it in the case of lawyer-client communication,
between doctor and patient, and between journalist and their sources.
(I don’t know if that is also a provision in the Anti-Terrorism Act. But we are currently
studying the ATA, so I’m sure that you will read on that)
• Meaning of the exclusionary rule under paragraph 2, Section 3.
• The exclusionary rule bars admission of illegally obtained evidence for any
purpose and in any proceeding.
•  How evidence declared inadmissible disposed of.
• RP vs. Sandiganbayan- Illegally obtained evidence must be returned.
Only those apprantely legal- money and other personal effects.
Contrabands will no longer be returned.
• (Alih v. Castro, 151 SCRA 279 (1987)
The inadmissibility of evidence does not mean it must be returned where it came from.
Pending determination of the legality of these articles however, it must remain in
custodia legis (in the court). If the object is not a prohibited object, it must be
returned. If it is contraband, it can be confiscated.
In the case of the RP vs. Sandiganbayan, the seized items which were excluded as
evidence were returned except those that are evidently illegal. Although, insofar as
the firearms was concerned, the illegal possession was also dismissed by the fiscal (so
no case for illegal possession of firearms against Dimaano) because they were able to
show that there was a memorandum of agreement issued for those firearms.
People vs. Andre Marti G.R. No. 81561 -read
Exclusionary rule: Evidence unlawfully obtained by private individuals does not
come under the exclusionary rule.
- To come under exclusionary rule, the evidence must be obtained by government
agents and not by private individuals acting on their own.
- We have stated in the beginning that the Bill of rights is applicable only against
he agents of the state
• People v. Andre Marti, 193 SCRA 57 (1991). In the absence of
governmental interference, the constitutional right against unreasonable search
and seizure cannot be invoked against the state. Why?
- Because the Bill of Rights are rights of the citizens against the State

Section 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression or

of the press, or the right of the people to peaceably assemble and petition the
government for redress of grievances.
According to Justice Carpio
Freedom of expression: The foundation of our free, open, and democratic
society. (Carpio)
• Speech, expression, and press include every form of expression, whether oral,
written, tape or disc recorded
Said Article of Carpio: The Supreme Court ruled: That even if the Constitution is
abolished by a revolutionary government, our fundamental rights which include
freedom of expression cannot be taken away. So it is not only applicable to search and
seizure. Justice Carpio expanded it to freedom of expression likewise. FOE which
includes freedom of speech and freedom of the press is the foundation of our free,
open and democratic country said Carpio.
Without Freedom of Expression, all our other freedoms, civil and political
rights, cannot exist.
Freedom of Expression is the freedom to engage in full, spirited and even contentious
discussion of our social, economic and political issues. Freedom of expression is
guaranteed under the Constitution which mandates that no law shall be passed
abridging the freedom of speech or prohibiting of speech.
A State of Martial Law- does not suspend freedom of Expression. The Supreme
Court ruled: That even if the Constitution is abolished by a revolutionary government,
our fundamental rights which include freedom of expression cannot be taken away.
Because they form part of Customary International Law under the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights which are binding on any government whether constitutional or revolutionary.
Question: Speech expression and press include every form of expression whether oral,
written, tape or disc recorded. It also includes movies as well as symbolic speech such
are wearing of armbands as a symbol of protest. Peaceful picketing is also included.
What are the 2 prohibitions on the abridgment (curtailment) of the freedom
of speech, of expression or of the press?
 • The two prohibitions on the abridgment (curtailment) of the freedom
of speech, of expression or of the press. Contained in Section 4
• 1. Prohibition of prior restraint and 2. prohibition of subsequent punishment.
• Prior restraint. -BEFORE PUBLICATION
- Official governmental restrictions on the press or other forms of expression in
advance of actual publication or dissemination. The key there is in advance.
Official government restriction on forms of expression in advance of actual publication
and dissemination. The most blatant form is the system of licensing administered by
an executive officer; movie censorship, although not placed on the same level as press
censorship, also belongs to this type of prior restraint.
Also: Judicial prior restraint- which takes the form of an injunction against publication.
Equally objectionable prior restraint are Licensing taxes measured by gross
receipts for the privilege of engaging in a business of advertising in any newspaper, or
flat license fees for the privilege of selling religious books.
• Unconstitutional prior restraint.
• (Chavez v. Gonzales, GR No. 168338, February 15, 2008).
The warning on media against airing the alleged wiretapped conversation between the
president and other personalities constitute unconstitutional prior restraint of
freedom of speech and of the press. Chavez is a good lawyer and Gonzales was
then secretary of justice during the time of Gloria.
• Subsequent punishment: (the second prohibition) -AFTER PUBLICATION
• The mere prohibition of government interference before words are spoken or
published would be an inadequate protection of the freedom of expression if the
government could punish without restraint after publication.
After publication.
The guarantee of freedom of expression also means a limitation on the power of the
State to impose subsequent punishment.

• Media and Judicial Process: When the right to free speech and of the
press collides with the right of the accused to a fair trial.
• AM 01-4-03-SC Re: Sec. of Justice v. Sandiganbayan, June 29, 2001.
The case involved a petition to allow live television coverage of the trial of former
president Estrada. It is the weighing out of the Constitutional guarantees of:
- the freedom of the press,
-right of the people to the public information on the one hand, and
-the fundamental rights of the accused on the other hand.
It is true that the Constitution guarantees freedom of the press, it guarantees also the
right of the right of the people to public information. It is likewise true that an accused
has fundamental rights as enshrined in the Constitution. With these rights raised
against one another, jurisprudence tell us that the right of the accused must be
preferred to wit.
In denying the petition, the Court said: Television coverage of judicial proceedings
involves an inherent denial of due process rights of a criminal defendant.
 • AM 10-11-5-SC Re: Petition for Radio and TV Coverage of the Maguindanao
Massacre Cases, June 14, 2011.
The indication of serious risks posed by live coverage to the accused’s right to due
process (In the case of Estrada) has left a blow to the exercise of press freedom in the
right to public information.
Apparent circumstance different from the Estrada cases: Is the impossibility of
accommodating all interested parties inside the courtroom. (There were more than 50
accused and there were more than that who are witnesses likewise) They could not be
accommodated inside the courtroom. The Court said: that the ruling is pro hac vice
(for or on this occasion only) for this one particular occasion.
On the basis of that, the court initially permitted the television coverage in the
Maguindanao massacre cases.
Original Decision: Allowed live coverage
Reconsideration: Did not allow live coverage
Court: Recognizes the freedom of the press, the right of direct parties should not be
forgotten in the clash among these competing interests. The balance should always be
weighed in favor of the accused, so, they took away the permission. There was no
television coverage.
While the court recognizes the freedom of the press and the right to public info, which
are rights belonging to the non-direct parties to the case, the rights of the direct parties
should not be forgotten in the clash of this competing interest. Jurisprudence makes it
clear that the balance always weigh in favor of the accused.

• Media and the right to privacy: Ayer Productions v. Capulong, 160 SCRA 861
(1988).
(Involves Juan Ponce Enrile)

The case involved the production of the 4-day revolution a movie of the bloodless coup where Enrile
was a principal figure. Enrile sought to enjoin the use of his name claiming his right to privacy. Petitioner
Ayer production asserted right of expression. The Court said that against the freedom of expression
must be balanced the right to privacy which is recognized by law as “the right to be left alone”. A limited
intrusion into a person’s privacy has long been regarded as permissible where that person is a public
figure and the information sought to be elicited from him or to be published about him constitute
matters of public character. The Court said: Enrile was a public figure, he had no right to prevent
publication of the story of his participation in the event.

• The freedom of speech is not absolute.

• Freedom of speech may lawfully be impinged or restrained.

Laws may be had for the impeachment of the freedom of speech.

Requirements for the lawful restraint (of freedom of speech):

• There must be standards for the lawful restraint of the freedom of speech.

• The acceptable standards for the restraint: the dangerous tendency rule, the clear and present
danger rule and the balancing of interest rule.

1. The dangerous tendency rule: -Speech can be curtailed or punished when it creates a dangerous
tendency to bring about the evil which the state has the right to prevent.
keyword: dangerous tendency. FOR AS LONG AS THERE IS TENDENCY THAT THE EVIL
SOUGHT TO BE PREVENTED CAN HAPPEN, THEN THE FREEDOM OF SPEECH CAN BE
CURTAILED. The danger is still far away from happening and you are already curtailing the speech. All
it requires for a speech to be curtailed is that there be a rational connection between the speech and the
evil sought to be apprehended. JUST A TENDENCY

2. The clear and present danger rule:

It is founded on whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such nature as to
create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the evils that congress has a right to
prevent.
keyword: clear and present danger (as against tendency). It is a question of proximity.

THE DANGER IS ALREADY PROXIMATE TO THE ACT BEING RESTRAINED AS

AGAINST THE DANGEROUS TENDENCY.

(SA DANGEROUS TENDENCY, MALAYO PA YUNG DANGER, CURTAILED NA ANG

SPEECH, WHEREAS IN CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER RULE, MALAPIT NA YUNG
DANGER BAGO MA-CURTAIL ANG FREEDOM OF SPEECH)

IT IS A QUESTION OF PROXIMITY AND DEGREE.

3. The balancing of interests test:

The function of the Court is to balance the interests served by legislation against the freedoms affected
by it.

IT IS THE COURTS THAT WILL DETERMINE ON A CASE-TO-CASE BASIS.

It rests on the theory that it is the courts function on the case before it when it finds interest served by
legislation on the one hand and amendments freedoms affected by on the other to balance the one
against the other and to arrive at a judgment where the greater weight shall be placed it outweighs the
abridgement of freedom the court will find the legislation valid

IF ON THE BALANCE, IT APPEARS THAT THE PUBLIC INTEREST SERVED BY

RESTRICTIVE LEGISLATION IS OF SUCH A CHARACTER THAT IT OUTWEIGHS THE
ABRIDGEMENT OF FREEDOM THEN THE COURT WILL FIND THE LEGISLATION
VALID.

The decision of the court will all depend on the circumstances of the case. How interests are served by
balancing the legislation against the freedoms to be affected.
"The theory of balance of interests represents a wholly pragmatic approach to the problem of First
Amendment freedom, indeed, to the whole problem of constitutional interpretation. It rests on the
theory that it is the Court's function in the case before it when it finds public interests served by
legislation on the one hand, and First Amendment freedoms affected by it on the other, to balance
the one against the other and to arrive at a judgment where the greater weight shall be placed. If on
balance it appears that the public interest served by restrictive legislation is of such a character that
it outweighs the abridgment of freedom, then the Court will find the legislation valid. In short, the
balance-of-interests theory rests on the basis that constitutional freedoms are not absolute, not even
those stated in the First Amendment, and that they may be abridged to some extent to serve
appropriate and important public interests." Gonzales vs. Comelec 27 SCRA 836

Freedom of expression is not absolute. (Justice Carpio, Inquirer., April 9,2020)

Four exceptions when the State may impose prior restraint, or subsequent punishment, on the
exercise of freedom of expression, namely:
1. pornography,
2. false or misleading advertisement,
3. advocacy of imminent lawless action, and
4. danger to national security.

The very high bar or standard to hurdle before the State can successfully invoke these exceptions.
The State must establish that the expression creates a clear and present danger of an evil that
the State has a right and duty to prevent. The danger from the expression must be extremely imminent,
and the evil must be substantive and extremely serious.

Diocese of Bacolod vs. Commission On Elections (GR No. 205728, January 21, 2015):
(could be a basis for a quiz) INVOLVES PUTTING UP OF TARPAULINE WITHIN THE PREMISES
OF DIOCESE OF BACOLOD WHICH THE COMELEC WANTED TO PUT DOWN
PRINCIPLES THAT WERE INITIATED BY THE SUPREME COURT WOULD BE:

The Comelec does not have the competence to limit expressions made by the citizens who are not
candidates during elections.

Regulation of speech in the context of electoral campaigns made by persons who are not
candidates or who do not speak as members of a political party which are, taken as a whole,
principally advocacies of a social issue that the public must consider during elections is
unconstitutional.

• The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) does not have the competence to limit expressions
made by the citizens — who are not candidates — during elections.

• Why regulation is unconstitutional:

• Regulation is inconsistent with according fullest opinion and debate by the electorate.

Question: Why is regulation unconstitutional?

(Regulation is inconsistent with according fullest opinion and debate by the

electorate. ??)

THE SUPREME COURT SAYS THAT THERE MUST BE A QUORUM IN THE DEBATE OF
ISSUES IN THE ELECTION
Such regulation is inconsistent with the guarantee of according the fullest possible range of opinions
coming from the electorate including those that can catalyze c andid, uninhibited, and robust debate
in the criteria for the choice of a candidate.

• Declarative speech is a specie of speech by a private citizen who is not a candidate that may
be validly regulated by law.

Declarative speech - is a specie of speech by a private citizen who is not a candidate that may be validly
regulated by law. (What kind of speech may be validly regulated by law? Ans: Declarative
speech)
Regulation of election paraphernalia will still be constitutionally valid if it reaches into speech of
persons who are not candidates or who do not speak as members of a political party if they are not
candidates, only if what is regulated is declarative speech that, taken as a whole, has for its principal
object the endorsement of a candidate only. The regulation (a) should be provided by law, (b)
reasonable, (c) narrowly tailored to meet the objective of enhancing the opportunity of all candidates
to be heard and considering the primacy of the guarantee of free expression, and (d) demonstrably
the least restrictive means to achieve that object.

• Requisites of a valid regulation.

• The regulation
(a) should be provided by law,
(b) reasonable,
(c) narrowly tailored to meet the objective of enhancing the opportunity of all candidates to be
heard and considering the primacy of the guarantee of free expression, and
(d) demonstrably the least restrictive means to achieve that object.
• The regulation must only be with respect to the time, place, and manner of the rendition of
the message. In no situation may the speech be prohibited or censored on the basis of its
content. For this purpose, it will not matter whether the speech is made with or on
private property.
 • This is not the situation, however, in this case for two reasons.
First, as discussed, the principal message in the twin tarpaulins of petitioners consists of a
social advocacy.

(TEAM PATAY, TEAM BUHAY – ADVOCATING PERSONAL CHOICE OF THE

INDIVIDUAL, SOCIAL ADVOCACY OF THE PRIESTS)

Second, as pointed out in the concurring opinion of Justice Antonio Carpio, the present law
— Section 3.3 of Republic Act No. 9006 and Section 6(c) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615
— if applied to this case, will not pass the test of reasonability. A fixed size for election
posters or tarpaulins without any relation to the distance from the intended average
audience will be arbitrary. At certain distances, posters measuring 2 by 3 feet could no
longer be read by the general public and, hence, would render speech meaningless. It will
amount to the abridgement of speech with political consequences.
• COMELEC may NOT order petitioners, who are private citizens, to remove the
tarpaulin from their own property.
Freedom of expression can be intimately related with the right to property.

The absurdity of the situation is in itself an indication of the unconstitutionality of COMELEC’s

interpretation of its powers.. 
There may be no expression when there is no place where the expression may be made.
COMELEC’s infringement upon petitioners’ property rights as in the present case also reaches out
to infringement on their fundamental right to speech.

• The message in the tarpaulin does not constitute religious speech the prohibition of which is a
violation of religious freedom.

• The tarpaulin does not convey any religious doctrine of the catholic church.

• The expressions on the tarpaulin is NOT an ecclesiastical matter.

• The position of the Catholic religion as regards the RH Law does not suffice to qualify the posting
as religious speech.

THE SAME MAY BE SAID OF PETITIONER’S RELIANCE ON PAPAL INSIGHT TO SUPPORT THEIR CLAIM THAT
THE EXPRESSION ON THE TARPAULIN IS AN ECCLESIASTICAL MATTER, WITH ALL DUE RESPECT TO THE
CATHOLIC FAITHFUL, THE CHURCH DOCTRINES RELIED UPON BY PETITIONERS ARE NOT BINDING UPON
THIS COURT. The position of the Catholic religion as regards the RH Law does not suffice to
qualify the posting as religious speech SOLELY ON SUCH BASIS
That the position of the Catholic church appears to coincide with the message of the tarpaulin
regarding the RH Law does not, by itself, bring the expression within the ambit of religious speech. 
On the contrary, the tarpaulin clearly refers to candidates classified under "Team Patay" and "Team
Buhay" according to their respective votes on the RH Law.

• Unprotected speech:

• Freedom of expression has never been understood to be an absolute right. Some forms of
speech are not protected.

• Two types of unprotected speech: libel and obscenity.

• A libel is a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice, or a defect, real or

imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the
dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one
who is dead.

• To be liable for libel, the following elements must be shown to exist:

(1) the allegation of a discreditable act or condition concerning another;
(2) publication of the charge;
(3) identity of the person defamed; and
(4) existence of malice.

When is a speech considered libelous?

 • The speech is libelous when the imputation is public and malicious.

• The imputation is public when the defamatory statement is made known to someone other
than the person to whom it is written.
(If you write a letter to one person alone, it is not libel because the imputation is not public, IF
SHOWN TO OTHER PEOPLE, IT BECOMES PUBLIC)

• It is malicious when the author of the imputation is prompted by ill will or spite and speaks not
in response to duty but merely to injure the reputation of the person who claims to have been
defamed.

When is it privileged?

• If a speech is not malicious, even if defamatory, it is privileged.

(Alonzo v. CA, 241 SCRA 51 (1995). -read

The Rule on privileged communication is that a communication made in good faith of any subject
matter in which the communicator has an interest or concerning which he has a duty is privileged if
made to a person having a corresponding interest although it contains incriminatory matter which
without the privilege would be libelous and actionable.

• Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be untrue, if no good

intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown.

IS GOVERNOR MAMBA GUILTY OF LIABLE? DOES HIS STATEMENTS OVER THE RADIO
EVERYDAY, COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF PUBLIC AND MALICE?

• Are pleadings privileged? Under what condition may it be privileged?

• If a speech is not malicious, even if defamatory, it is privileged.

(Alonzo v. CA, 241 SCRA 51 (1995). -read

DITO 2nd TRANSCRIBE

• (Armovit v. Judge Purisima, GR No. 39258, November 15, 1982). -cited by
Bernas
The prevailing rule is that parties, counsels, and witnesses are exempted from
liability in libel or slander for words otherwise defamatory published in the course of
judicial proceedings provided the statements are relevant to the case.

Pleadings are privileged, but to be so, they must be relevant to the matter under
investigation.

(Gutierrez vs. Avila)

Case of Borjal vs. CA- The New York Times Rule was accepted in this case. The privilege
protected under the New York Times case was conditioned upon the status of the complainant,
that he must be a public offer. Public Officials must prove actual malice in order to recover
damages for alleged libel.

People Vs. Del Rosario

• When may criticisms of a public figure constitutionally protected? When not protected?

• When the object of criticism is his strictly private life, defamatory imputations are not
constitutionally protected expression. When, however, his public acts are the object of criticism,
constitutional immunity applies.

• True criticism of person’s fitness for office is always fair and therefore privileged. False criticism
is not privileged if malicious. That is when used as a cloak for assaults on a person’s private life.

• Public Figures are not unprotected. Although a wide latitude is given to critical utterances made
against public officials in the performance of their official duties, or against public figures on
matters of public interest, such criticism does not automatically fall within the ambit of
 constitutionally protected speech. If the utterances are false, malicious or unrelated to a public
officer’s performance of his duties or irrelevant to matters of public interest involving public
figures, the same may give rise to criminal and civil liability.

• The right to assembly and petition may be impaired. What are the allowable standards for its
impairment?

• Since the right to assembly and petition is equally fundamental as freedom of expression, the
standards for allowable impairment of speech and press are also those for assembly and
petition.

• SAME AS THAT FREEDOM OF SPEECH, DANGEROUS TENDENCY RULE, CLEAR

AND PRESENT DANGER RULE, AND BALANCING OF INTEREST TEST

Cases demonstrative to the right to assembly and its impairment:

• US v. Apurado, 7 Phil 422 (1907).

Where some 500 men gathered to the ouster of the mayor of Manila. No permit was involved. In the
prosecution for sedition, the Court invoking the right of assembly and petition was willing to allow for a
certain amount of disorder.
It is rather to be expected that more or less disorder will mark the public assembly of the
people to protest against grievances whether real or imaginary, because on such occasions
feeling is always wrought to a high pitch of excitement, and the greater the grievance and
the more intense the feeling

If instances of disorderly conduct occur on such occasions, the guilty individuals should be
sought out and punished therefor, but the utmost discretion must be exercised in drawing
the line between disorderly and seditious conduct and between an essentially peaceable
assembly and a tumultuous uprising.

(The Americans has just set foot as out new masters during this time)

• Evangelista v. Earnshaw, 57 Phil 255 (1932), the dangerous tendency rule.

This case demonstrates the dangerous tendency rule. The mayor of Manila refused to grant permit
to Evangelista who was a communist leader, to hold a rally in plaza moriones. Previously meetings
were held by the Communist Party of the Philippines in which seditious speeches had been
made, urging to overthrow the government. In upholding the mayor’s refusal, the Court said
that the mayor did only the right thing to see that nothing should occur which would tend to
provoke or excite the people to disturb the peace of the community, or the safety of the
government.

Under the dangerous tendency rule, there must be a tangible specific act of the party
affected which insights or tended to insight in a substantial manner, a breach of the
peace such as advocating the overthrow of the government.

 Primicias vs. Fugoso, 80 Phil 71 (1948), one that demonstrates the clear and present
danger rule.
Just to review, we said that the three rules that are allowable standards to allow
impairment of the freedom of expression, press and the speech would be the dangerous
tendency rule, clear and present danger rule and the third one, the balancing of
interests rule. Then that is the case of Primicias vs. Fugoso.
Again, Mayor Fugoso refused to give a permit for a rally alleging that there was a
reasonable ground to believe that the speeches to be delivered, tending to undermine
the confidence of the people in government. In rejecting the mayor’s contention, the
Court said that to justify suppression of free speech, there must be reasonable ground
fear that serious evil will resolve that the danger apprehended is imminent, that there
must be reasonable grounds to believe that the evil to be prevented is a serious one.
  JBL Reyes vs. Mayor Bagatsing, GR 65366, October 25, 1983.

The Court adopted the clear and present danger test. The right of the people to peaceably
assemble a petition must be discussed in relation to Section 18 Article 2 under the
declaration of principles, Section 8, Article 3, (which we will take up in a little while), and
section 3 article 13. Likewise, sec 2 (5) B of Article 9, so far as government employees are
concerned,
section 8 refers to the right of labor certain activities.
Sec 2 (5) refers to government employees for self-organization.
Sec 18, Art II, refers to the protection by the state of the rights of workers and promotion
of their welfare.

• The right to peaceably assemble and petition must be discussed in relation to Sec. 18,
Art. II; Sec 8, Art III; Sec 3, Art XIII; and also Sec 2 (5) B, Art IX.

SECTION 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors,
to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.

Section 2 (5B), Article 9: The right to self-organization shall not be denied to government
employees

SECTION 18. Article 2: The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall
protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare.

One burning question that must be asked on section four would be;

• Question: Which rule is more in keeping with the spirit of the constitutional guarantees
of free expression, of peaceful assembly and petition, is it the dangerous tendency rule
or the clear and present danger rule?

Now among these two rules, which may allow impairment of the freedom of expression
and peaceful assembly and petition, which one would be more in keeping with the spirit
of the Constitutional guarantee that section four is protecting?

Section 5.

• No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free

exercise thereof.

THE MEAT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION IS IN THE FIRST SENTENCE.

In the first sentence alone, there are two mandates already: a non-establishment clause, that no
law shall be made to establish a religion, AND THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE.

Under the Spanish Constitution of 1876, Catholicism was a state religion in Washington State,
religion in the Philippines. one of the immediate effects of the American constitutional system in
the Philippines, was the denial of the Catholic Church of the privileged position it held under
Spanish sovereignty. Corollary to this was the recognition of the equal position of other
religions.

The free exercise of religion was guaranteed UNDER THE 1935 CONSTITUTION.
HOW DID THE GUARANTY OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM FINDS ITS WAY TO THE 1935
CONSTITUTION?
- THE FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION WAS GUARANTEED UNDER ARTICLE 10 OF THE TREATY OF
PARIS, which guarantees that the territory of the US shall be secure in the free exercise of
religion.
 - Another effect of the new system was the elimination of any institution that said word of
union of church and state; the text is the same as 1935
- The text of the section is the same in the 35, 73 and 87 constitutions.

The twin mandates of the constitutional provision: The non-establishment clause and the
free exercise clause.
- The non-establishment in Free Exercise clauses Express and the writing relates to the
concept of separation between the religion and secular government. It is related to Sec 6,
Art II is separation between church and state shall be inviolable. Because constitutional
provision is a mandate against state intervention in religious activities.

- IS IT TRUE THAT THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION IS A MANDATE AGAINST

STATE INTERVENTION? Recently, the CBCP speaking through his spokesperson,
Father Jerome Siciliana clarified that separation between church and state is actually
directed at state, PROHIBITIONS against the government favoring one church over
another by establishing A STATE religion or by allocating public funds to CATER for
one church.

POPE BENEDICT VI- THE MODERN SOCIETY, THE CHURCH CAN PARTICIPATE ONLY INDIRECTLY IN THE
QUEST FOR SOCIAL ORDER, LEAVING THIS TASK TO THE LAY THERE, TO FORM CONSCIENCES, TO BE THE
ADVOCATE OF JUSTICE OF TRUTH, TO EDUCATE IN INDIVIDUAL AND POLITICAL VIRTUES THAT IS THE
VOCATION OF THE CHURCH.

The essence of the free exercise clause is the freedom of belief. IT IS THE FREEDOM
OF BELIEF. It is based on the respect for the inviolability of the human conscience.

- WHY IS IT THAT RELIGION, PRINCIPALLY THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE, IS NOT SUBJECT TO
REGULATION? BECAUSE HUMAN CONSCIENCE AND BELIEF CANNOT BE REGULATED BY
STATE LAWS.

- Reynolds v. US, 98 US 145, the free exercise clause completely insulated the realm
of belief from state action, leaving, however, religiously motivated action, including
expression, subject to police power.

o THE JUDICIAL TASK IN FREE EXERCISE CASES IS ONE OF BALANCING THE SECULAR
INTEREST OF THE STATE WITH THE INTEREST OF RELIGION.
- The essence of the free exercise clause is the freedom of belief. It is based on the
respect or the inviolability of the human conscience. belief cannot be subject to
control, because that is the inner feeling of the human being. All decisions of the
Supreme Court, the British adopted the rule the Free Exercise Clause, completely
insulated the realm of relief from the state action, leaving however, religiously
motivated action including expression, subject, police power. The judicial task in
Free Exercise thesis is one of balancing the secular interest of the state with the
interest of the religion.

- Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 US 296. The constitutional inhibition on legislation

on the subject of religion has a double aspect. ONE, IT FORESTALLS
COMPULSION by law of the acceptance of any CREED OR the practice of any form
of worship, freedom of conscience and freedom to adhere to such religious
organization, or form of worship of the individual they choose can not be restricted
by law. On the other hand, it safeguards the free exercise of the CHOSEN form of
religion. Thus, the constitutional provision embraces two concepts, freedom to
believe, and freedom to act.

o The first, which is the freedom to believe is absolute, but in the nature of
things. The second which is the freedom to act cannot be. The absolute test of
 freedom to believe carries with it the corollary that the government, while it
may look into the good faith of a person, cannot inquire into a person's
religious pretentiousness. The moment however, the belief flows into action, it
becomes subject to the government regulations. It does not follow THAT
BECAUSE NO MODE OF worship can be established, or religious TENETS
enforced in this country. Therefore, any TENET however destructive of
society may be held AND INVOCATED IF ASSERTED TO be part of the
religious doctrine of those advocating and practicing them.

 THIS IS THE REASON WHY PRIESTS ARE FREE TO EXPRESS THEIR

BELIEFS AND TEACH OTHER THIS BELIEF, AND THE GOVERNMENT
CANNOT INQUIRE INTO THIS PERSON RELIGIOUS PRETENTIONS. THE
MOMENT, THIS BELIEF FLOWS INTO ACTION, IT BECOMES SUBJECT
TO GOVERNMENT REGULATION.

People v. Fabillar, 68 Phil. 584 (1939). Where section 34 of the old marriage law, our the
director of the first sect or religion of the applicant for licence to perform marriages,
operates in the Philippines is in good review was challenged as unconstitutional on the
grounds that the empowered effect empowered the director of the organization and doctrine
of the Church or Saint, The court defended the state as merely an instance of the exercise of
police power.

American Bible Society v. City of Manila, 101 Phil. 386 (1957). Where American Bible
Society is a religious missionary corporation with sold Bibles, and the City of Manila
tempted to compel the pain for the beloved Bible Society to obtain your license required
compulsory against the general merchandise. As it rules the constitutional guarantee of the
free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession carries that we derived to disseminate
religious information.

• Imposition of civic obligations that conflict with one’s religious beliefs.

Then there is Obiter dicta vs. ___. A court where the court said in obiter that solicitation
of contribution in general, which may include contributions for religious purposes may
be related by general law on the protection of the public.

Then we have THE TWIN cases of;

1. Gerona v. Sec. of Educ., 106 Phil. 2 (1969). This involves the imposition of civic
obligation that might conflict with a person's religious belief.
- In Gerona, it involves your weaknesses, challenging a department of education or
requiring children to attend compulsory flag ceremonies. The court said that if the
exercise of religious belief clashes with established institutions of desire to be the
law, then religious belief must yield to the law. The government steps in, set exercise
or even prosecute the one exercising it.
2. Ebralinag v. Div. Sup. Of Schools of Cebu, 219 SCRA 256 (1993). 24 years after we
have the Ebralinag v. Div. Sup. Of Schools of Cebu. Well, or both the same factual basis
also involving Jehovah's witnesses, the court reversed the Gerona case, said that the
freedom of religion requires that the PROTESTING members be exempt from the
operation of it.

THE NON-ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE simply means that the state cannot establish or
sponsor an official religion. It prohibits the state from passing laws which aid one religion,
aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another.
 o Austria v. NLRC, GR 124382, Aug 16/99. Secular authority has no jurisdiction
over ecclesiastical matters. This is the case of a pastor of a church who doesn't
account for church TITES and was dismissed by his church. His dismissal was
upheld by the National Labor Relations Commission of three when the Supreme
Court weighed the appeal. They challenge the jurisdiction of the NLRC saying that
the MATTER was an ecclesiastical affair outside the NLRC jurisdiction. The court
said that an ecclesiastical affair is one that concerns doctrine FREE OF form of
worship of the church, or the adoption and enforcement of regulations for the
government of its members and the power to exclude from such Association, those
deemed unworthy of membership.

o The court ruled that what was involved is the relationship of the church as an
employer, and the Minister as an employee. Take note that how the court defines the
ecclesiastical affair we just want that concerns doctrine, three or form of worship of
the church. If you were reading the diocese of Bacolod, this should be familiar. One
of the issues there in that case is whether the message in the tarpaulin is a religious
creed.

Aglipay v. Ruiz, 64 Phil. 206. The issue is whether the issuance and sale of postage stamps
COMMEMORATIVE of the third Eucharistic Congress of the Catholic Church is violative of
the constitutional PROHIBITION against the use of public money for religious purposes. It
was decided by former Chief Justice Laurel.

o ISSUANCE OF POSTAGE STAMPS IS INEXPLICABLE LINK TO A

RELIGIOUS EVENT, THE PROPAGANDA FOR THE CATHOLIC
CHURCH WAS NOT THE AIM AND PURPOSE OF GOVERNMENT, SUCH
IS ONLY INCIDENTAL.

There we have;

• Concession on taxes on property used for religious purposes. The condition for the
exemption is not just that the property be used exclusively for religious purposes but that
it be used actually, directly and exclusively for such purpose. This is in relation to
paragraph three, section 20 of Article six which we studied already. A property exempted
are land, buildings, and improvements. Three are actually exclusively already used for
charitable or educational purposes SHALL BE EXEMPT FROM TAXATION.

• WHAT KIND OF TAX IS EXEMPT? THE EXEMPTION CREATED IS ONLY FOR

THE PURPOSE OF TAXES ASSESSED AS PROPERTY TAXES. SUCH AS TAXES
ASSESSED ON LAND, BUILDINGS AND IMPROVEMENTS, DIRECTLY,
ACTUALLY AND EXCLUSIVELY USED FOR CHARITABLE PURPOSES.

WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF PROVISION RELIGIOUS TEST?

o To allow religious tests would have the effect of formal or practical establishment of
a particular religious faith. Actually it doesn't happen anymore. Just that it was
carried from the 1975 constitution. It is a copy from the administrative code that
found its way up in the constitution, until the 1987 constitution

Purpose of the provision prohibiting religious tests.

• to render the government powerless to restore the policy of probing religious

beliefs by test OATHS or limiting public officers, the persons who have or who
profess that belief in some kind of religious concept.

• IN A US CASE, TORCASO VS WHATKINS?

 • TO ALLOW RELIGIOUS TEST WOULD HAVE THE EFFECT OF FORMAL OR
PRACTICAL ESTABLISHMENT OF A PARTICULAR RELIGIOUS FAITH WITH
CONSEQUENT BURDENS IMPOSING THE EXERCISE OF THE FAITH OF
NON-FAVORED BELIEVERS.

• The case of conscientious objectors. Can the state compel a person to bear arms in
defense of the country even when bearing arms is contrary to the person's beliefs?

• The matter must be resolved in the light of the provision of Section four article
two, which makes it a duty of the citizen to defend its country. But when the state
exempts a person, from military service on religious grounds, is the state not in
effect, giving preferential treatment to religious affiliation which object to war
over religious affiliation, which is not such an exemption, contrary, the non-
Establishment Clause, favoring one religious.

• The state may support church social action centers.

• Church social action center, getting the same support made the state support the church
for some actions in relation to the constitutional provision, that no money of the state
may be used to support a religion. While activities of basic Christian communities and
church social action centers may not materially differ from those of Barangay actions
groups are of government with agencies in motivation and initial inspiration of this
journey. Church's related activities are arguably religious, and therefore should be
jealously protected by the free exercise loss. But since these same activities are also
arguably non-religious, but social and humanitarian, they can be the subject of STATE
support without violating the establishment clause.

So when that happens, what are the requirements for government aid to religious social action
centers. The establishment clause does not prohibit all government aid that might redound to the
benefit of religion. However, to be allowed, government

• Requirements:

• (1) must have a secular legislative purpose.

• (2) must have a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion.

• (3) must not require excessive entanglement with recipient institutions.

Estrada v. Escritor, AM No. P-02-1651, 2003, 2004. It is a case against a court stenographer.
She was found living without the benefit of marriage. If you're a government employee, that's
prohibited. Escalator was threatened with dismissal, she claims the arrangement of living in
without benefit of marriage and the pressing of religion and preaching religious freedom. The
Supreme Court remanded the case to the Office of the Courts administrators to examine the
sincerity and centrality of her claimed religious belief and practice. After reviewing, the
Supreme Court arrived at the conclusion that the proper characterization of the relation
between state and religion is one of benevolent neutrality meaning that the state will
accommodate religion provided such accommodation does not offend law in public order, on
reconsideration, the right of Escritor was upheld on the basis of benevolent neutrality.

- If religious belief would go in conflict with the law of land, then the religious belief
must yield to the laws of the land. In this case, it did not.