White Paper On The Report of The Constitution Review Commission Presented To The President
White Paper On The Report of The Constitution Review Commission Presented To The President
ON THE
REPORT OF THE CONSTITUTION REVIEW
COMMISSION
PRESENTED TO THE PRESIDENT
1
THE REPORT OF THE CONSTITUTION REVIEW COMMISSION OF
INQUIRY
INTRODUCTION.
3
3. GOVERNMENT’S RESPONSES TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF
THE CONSTITUTION REVIEW COMMISSION (CRC).
In this White Paper, no comments have been made in relation to proposals in the
CRC report where the Report accepts the constitutional or legal status quo. Such
provisions should be deemed to have been accepted by government except otherwise
expressly stated. Government has also restricted itself to a point by point response to
specific recommendations made by the CRC.
Chapter Three
4
Government however believes that the scope of the Plan should be a matter of
legislation and circumstances prevailing and not a function of constitutional
prescription.
The Government does not, however, accept the CRC recommendation that, policies,
legislation, administrative action, programmes etc., deemed to be inconsistent with
the Plan, should be considered unconstitutional. The recommendation vitiates the
Executive power of the Government.
Government accepts CRC view that the Plan should inform the annual Budget and
Economic Policy of the Government.
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Issue Five: Amendment or Adaptation of the National Development Plan
The Government does not accept CRC recommendation for Parliament’s authority to
amend the Plan. Such authorization would have followed from the proposition to
have a constitutionally entrenched process of development of the Plan which has
been rejected (see Issue One). Parliament can approve the Plan and its subsequent
reviews by the President, for the purpose of building national consensus and
ownership.
Government accepts CRC proposal for publication of reviews and adaptation to the
Plan.
Government does not accept the CRC recommendation that every citizen should
have the right to judicial enforcement of adherence to the Plan. Citizens’
dissatisfaction can be expressed via universal adult suffrage and other legitimate
means of freedom of expression.
The Government accepts the CRC recommendation for the NDPC to have a better
resourced and competent Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) and Research and
Development (R&D) units.
6
Sub Theme Two: THE NDPC.
The Minister of Finance and such other relevant Ministers of State as the
President may appoint.
The Governor of the Bank of Ghana.
The Government Statistician (or Statistician-General).
One representative from each of the Regions of Ghana, appointed by the
Regional Coordinating Council.
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President must, therefore, have the prerogative to appoint the chair and technocrats
he/she can trust to facilitate the delivery of the electoral mandate.
The Government accepts the CRC recommendation for the NDPC to have a
Technical Secretariat headed by a Director-General.
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Issue Six: What should be the Functions of the NDPC?
a) Government does not accept the Constitutional Independence of the NDPC.
b) Government does not see the need for a constitutional provision that binds
every President and Government to the terms of the long-term national
development plan, for the following reasons:
The obligation is already implied in the Directive Principles of State Policy at
Article 35(7) of the 1992 Constitution which states that, “As far as practicable,
a government shall continue and execute projects and programmes
commenced by the previous Government".
Time, changing socio-economic and political circumstances and the electoral
mandate of particular Presidents and Governments may dictate and justify
review of the terms of the national development plan.
Consequently, Government is of the view that the said Article 35 (7) should
be moved to the section of the Constitution dealing with the NDPC and
reformulated as follows: “As far as practicable, a Government shall
implement an existing national development plan and shall continue and
execute projects and programmes commenced by the previous Governments”.
c) Government does not accept the CRC recommendation for the NDPC to
develop constitutionally binding national development plans, for the same
reasons as stated in (b) above.
d) Government accepts the CRC recommendation that the NDPC should not be
burdened with the implementation of the plan but should rather concentrate on
the monitoring and evaluation of such implementation by the
MDAs/MMDAs.
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e) Government does not accept that amendments to the Plan by the NDPC
should be proposed to Parliament which does not have the power to govern or
execute development policies and programmes. Rather, it is the President
who should consider the amendment.
f) Government believes that the NDPC should present its annual M&E Reports
on the Plan to the President who in turn will incorporate it in the Annual State
of the Nation Address to Parliament.
On paragraph 200, the Government does not agree with the CRC that Parliament
should enhance the functions and powers of the NDPC by legislation beyond what
have been provided in the 1992 constitution and Acts 479 and 480.
Government takes note that the concern of the CRC for a smoother and faster
transition from one government to the other has been addressed with the enactment
of the Presidential (Transition) Act, 2012.
Issue Four: The Implication of a Sitting President Leaving the Party on whose
Ticket he is elected as President.
Government accepts the recommendation for an amendment of the Constitution to
prevent the President and Vice President from defecting from the party on whose
ticket they run for office. Government notes that the option of resignation from the
office of President is expressly provided for under Article 66(3) (b), and assumed for
the Vice-President under Article 60(13). However, Government is of the view that
there should be a specific provision requiring the Vice-President to resign, as is the
case for the President under Article 66(3) (b).
Government also accepts the recommendation that a former President should not
ordinarily be eligible for appointment to another high public office, and that Article
68(2) of the 1992 Constitution should be amended with the deletion of the phrase
“other than that of the State” which is at the end of the Article.
Government is further of the view that the emoluments of the members of the
Independent Emoluments Commission shall be determined by Parliament.
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the President acting in consultation with the Council of State appoints the District
Assemblies Common Fund Administrator, the same official is appointed by the
President with the approval of Parliament as provided for by Article 252(4).
The view of Government is that the procedure for appointing the above Independent
Constitutional Bodies should apply to the District Assemblies Common Fund
Administrator; in which case the appointment will be made by the President acting
in consultation with the Council of State and with the approval of Parliament.
Government is aware of institutional representation on the National Development
Planning Commission and, therefore, accepts the recommendation of CRC that the
appointment to the membership of this Commission shall be made by the President.
Government does not accept the recommendation that for the enhancement of
orderly transition of government, certain identified officials be classified as political
appointees who should hold office at the pleasure of the President and whose tenure
should end with that of each presidency.
Government is of the view that strict adherence to the recommendation will disrupt
the smooth administration of the country with respect to some of the positions such
as the Chief of Defense Staff, Commanders of the Army, Navy and the Air Force
and the Inspector-General of Police. In the view of Government, it might be more
appropriate for those officials to continue in office until new appointments are made
by the new President.
Government notes with satisfaction however, that the list of officers who must enter
and exit office with President has been agreed in a bi-partisan manner in the
Presidential Transition Act. The following are therefore deemed to be the political
appointees for the purposes of this section.
Persons holding office under the Presidential Office Act, 1993 (Act 463).
Ministers and Deputy Ministers of State.
Regional and Deputy Regional Ministers of State.
Special Assistants, Special Aides to the President, to the Vice-President, and
to the Ministers of State, Deputy ministers, Regional Ministers and Deputy
Regional ministers.
Non-career Ambassadors/High Commissioners.
Persons appointed by the President or a Minister of State as members of
Statutory Boards and Corporations.
13
Government further accepts the recommendation which in effect retains Article
195(1) that various governing councils of public bodies should recommend persons
to the President for appointment to offices in those public bodies in consultation
with the Public Services Commission.
Issue Eight: Determination of the Conditions of Service of Some Public
Officers by the President.
Government accepts the recommendation that an Independent Emoluments
Commission should be established to determine the salaries, allowances and
emoluments of all public officers, from the President to the lowest ranking public
officer.
Issue Nine: President’s power to exercise the Prerogative of Mercy.
Government accepts the recommendation that the provisions of the Constitution
regulating the exercise of the Prerogative of Mercy by the President should be
retained.
Issue Ten: Presidential Transitions.
Government accepts the recommendation that the Presidential and Parliamentary
elections should continue to be held on the same day.
Government also accepts the recommendation that Article 112(4) on the timing of
parliamentary elections and Article 63(2) (a) on the timing of the presidential
election be amended to ensure that both elections are held within 60days of the
installation of a new government.
14
The current constitutional provisions which allow the Vice President to act in
the absence of the President and to assume the Presidency when it becomes
vacant be retained.
As far as is practicable the President and the vice President should not both be
outside the country at the same time. Where by necessity, they are both
outside Ghana, the Speaker of Parliament should be deemed to have been
sworn into office as President.
A situation where the Speaker of Parliament and in turn the Chief Justice has
to act as President be avoided as far as it is humanly possible to do so.
Article 60(8) should be amended by the deletion of “absent from Ghana” to
enable the President or Vice president to act as such although either may be
outside Ghana.
Tenure of the Vice President.
Government also accepts the recommendation that Article 60 of the 1992
Constitution be amended by the insertion of a new clause to read as follows: “Where
the office of the Vice President becomes vacant by death, resignation or removal of
the Vice President, the President shall within a period of 14 days and with the
approval of Parliament, appoint a person qualified to hold office as Vice President;
except that no such appointment shall be made when there is a period of 30 days or
less to the holding of the Presidential election.
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Issue Three: Appointment of Majority of Ministers from Parliament
Government accepts the recommendation that the Constitution be amended to give
the President a free hand to appoint Ministers from within or without Parliament.
The related recommendation that a person appointed a Minister from Parliament
may retain his seat in Parliament is also accepted by Government.
Issue Four: Decoupling the position of Minister for Justice and Attorney-
General
The recommendation that the practice of combining the offices of Minister of Justice
and Attorney-General may be continued at the discretion of the President is noted,
but Government also notes that it does not require a constitutional amendment.
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CHAPTER FIVE – THE LEGISLATURE
Issue One: Type of Governance System
Government accepts the recommendation that the President should be given a free
hand to appoint Ministers from within or without Parliament.
Issue Two: Legislative Powers of the President and Parliament
Government accepts the following recommendations of the CRC that:
The current limitation on the introduction of bills with financial implications
by private members should be maintained but limited to “money bills”, and
what amounts to “money bills” should be clearly defined in the Constitution
or legislation.
The partial veto powers of the President should be retained.
Issue Three: Making subsidiary legislation
Government accepts the following recommendations of the CRC that:
Article 11 of the 1992 Constitution governing subsidiary legislation be
amended to clarify the type of Orders, Rules and Regulations which are
required to be approved by Parliament and those which do not need
Parliamentary approval. This distinction was drawn in Republic v. Minister
of Interior; Ex-parte Bombelli [1984-86] 1 GLR 204-219.
In particular, the Constitution should clarify that Orders, Rules and
Regulations of a legislative nature (those which lay down the law) will need to
be approved by Parliament, whilst those of an Executive and Administrative
nature do not need to be approved by Parliament.
Article 11 should be amended to require that Orders, Rules and Regulations of
a Legislative nature should be read for the first time only in Parliament and
approved by simple majority of Parliament present and voting.
Issue Nine: Effect of Vote of Censure Passed by Parliament
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Government accepts the recommendation that where a Minister of State has been
censured by Parliament, it shall no longer be discretionary but mandatory for the
President to remove the Minister from office.
20
The Chief Justice should adopt guidelines, elaborating mechanisms, including
the use of electronic methods of empanelling the Superior Courts, to ensure
transparency in that respect.
22
Government does not accept the CRC recommendation that, “Appointments by the
President should be restricted to only political appointees" whose, tenure should
terminate with that of the President because the list of political appointees defined
by the CRC excludes Judges of the Superior Courts, Chairmen and members of the
Electoral Commission, NCCE, CHRAJ, Auditor-General, Controller and
Accountant-General and the Governor of the Bank of Ghana.
Government is, however, of the opinion that the administrative action on the
SSNIT suggested by the CRC is not a constitutional matter and must, therefore, be
considered within the ambit of the law establishing the SSNIT.
24
Government is of the opinion that it would be more feasible for such verification and
monitoring of the declared assets to be done within one year of the declaration and
within three (3) months after the officers' exiting of office.
Government does not, however, accept the CRC position that the CHRAJ should be
mandated to verify and monitor declared assets without cause or complaint of
wrong-doing.
Government accepts the recommendation for extensive amendments to the Public
Office Holders (Declaration of Assets and Disqualification) Act 1998 (Act 550) to
be supported with clear Regulations on:
How assets declared can be verified.
How the public may access the declaration.
The punishment for failure to declare and/or false declaration.
Government accepts the proposal for new legislation on ethics and anti-corruption
on “gifts” and what constitutes “conflict of interest”, to assist the CHRAJ in the
determination of complaints made against public officers for breaches of the Code.
25
Government accepts the recommendation of the Constitutional Review Commission
(CRC/Commission) that the Chairman, Deputy Chairmen and members of the
Electoral Commission (EC); the Chairman and members of the National
Commission for Civic Education (NCCE), the Chairman of the Commission for
Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ) and the Deputies and the
Auditor-General be appointed by the President in consultation with the Council of
State and with the prior approval of Parliament.
Government does not accept the recommendation that the Head of the National
Media Commission (NMC) should be appointed by the President in consultation
with the Council of State. The CRC does not give any reasons against the present
method of the members of the NMC electing a Chairman from amongst them. On
the contrary, in view of the injunction in Article 162 (5) of the Constitution for the
media to “uphold the responsibility and accountability of the Government to the
people of Ghana’, Government considers that it would not be appropriate for the
President as Head of the Government to appoint the Chairman of the NMC.
Consequently, Government upholds the provision in Article 166 (2) of the
Constitution that “the NMC shall elect its own Chairman”.
Government does not accept the recommendation that the membership of the NMC
be reduced from 18 to 11. Instead, Government agrees with the participants at the
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National Constitutional Review Conference for the retention of the current
composition of the NMC as it has worked well to ensure the neutrality of the
Commission.
Government is also of the view that the proposed changes to the composition of the
ICBs should not affect the current membership of the ICBs. Consequently, a
Transitional Provision should be included in the amendments to protect the positions
of the current members of the ICBs.
Government also accepts the recommendation that the current tenure of office of
members of the NMC, Auditor-General and the Government Statistician be retained.
In view of the recommendation for the constitutional independence of the Bank of
Ghana, Government is unable to accept the recommendation that the tenure of office
of the Governor of the Bank of Ghana should end with that of the President who
appoints him.
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Government accepts the recommendation that the mode of removal from office of
the Chairmen and members of the ICBs be retained.
Government is unable to accept the recommendation that the budget estimates of the
ICBs should be submitted directly to Parliament without ministerial clearance or
approval. This is because once the recommendation for an ICB Fund is accepted
Parliament’s role should be restricted to approval of the amount that should go into
the Fund. Thereafter, it should be left to the management of the Fund and the ICBs
to determine how much each ICB should receive from the Fund. The budget
estimates of the ICBs should therefore be submitted directly to the management of
the ICB Fund and not to Parliament.
Issue One: The Overlapping Functions of the NCCE and the Functions of
Other ICBs.
Government accepts the recommendation that Article 234 of the Constitution on the
independence of the NCCE be entrenched.
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Issue Six: Annual Report of the Electoral Commission.
Government endorses the legislative change proposed by the Commission for the EC
to submit Annual Reports to Parliament as a way of informing the representatives of
the people about what the Commission has been doing.
Issue Seven: Funding of Political Parties.
Government notes the Commission’s recommendation for administrative action on
this issue.
Government does not accept the recommendation that the NMC should have the
responsibility for broadcast authorization and that the NMC should have the power
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to grant or refuse the granting of a broadcasting frequency as well as its suspension
or withdrawal. Government does not think that the composition of the NMC puts it
in a position to professionally discharge this responsibility.
In this connection, Government notes that the allocation of a frequency spectrum
goes far beyond the requirements of the broadcast media and extends to security,
intelligence, navigation and aviation matters.
Rather than vest the power of broadcast authorization in the NMC, Government is of
the view that the National Communications Authority should rather be provided for
in the Constitution as an independent National Communications Commission (NCC)
and be made responsible for the technical parameters of communications activities
including numbered frequency authorization and broadcast authorization. In
allocating broadcast frequencies, the NCC should consult with the NMC.
The composition of the NCC should be provided for in the Constitution. Its
membership must be of such a nature that it will have the necessary independence
while not compromising on the technical expertise so essential for the work of the
management of the electromagnetic spectrum and related matters.
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Sub-Theme Seven: Specific Matters Relating to the Bank of Ghana (BOG).
32
Government does not accept the recommendation that Article 248 of the
Constitution be amended to empower Parliament at any time in the future to make
provision for partisan elections at the district and sub-district levels. Government is
of the view that the arguments advanced by the Commission for a non-partisan local
government system far outweigh any arguments in favour of a partisan local
government system. Government therefore intends that Article 248 in its present
form be retained.
Government also accepts the recommendation that the 30 per cent membership of
the MMDA be retained but does not accept the recommendation that the power to
make the appointments be made by the President in accordance with the advice of
the traditional authorities only. It is the view of Government that the present
provision which allows the President to make the appointments in consultation with
the traditional authorities and other interest groups in the district is more flexible and
inclusive and therefore preferable.
Government does not accept the recommendation that the traditional authorities
develop detailed criteria for the selection of the 30 per cent appointees for
appointment by the President. Instead, Government is of the view that the detailed
criteria for the selection of the 30 per cent appointees should be included in
legislation, preferably the Local Government Act.
Government does not accept the recommendation that Parliament should determine
the number of terms MMDCEs may be in office. Once MMDCEs are approved by
popular vote and by the DAs respectively, Government is of the view that for as long
as the President nominates a person for the position of MMDCE and for as long as
the person wins the popular vote of approval or the approval of the DA as
appropriate, he may continue to be MMDCE. This will go a long way to remove the
insecurity felt by MMDCEs when coming to the end of their mandatory term and put
them at par with MPs who may be elected to Parliament for as long as their
constituents vote for them. It will also remove a major source of the conflict between
MMDCEs and MPs and the tendency for MMDCEs to undermine their MPs in order
to seek to replace them.
Government does not see the need for the Commission’s recommendation that the
Constitution should prescribe the holding of by-elections to replace an elected
member who resigns or dies because the situation is well covered by the existing
law. Section 11 (1) of the District Assembly Elections Act, 1994, Act 473, provides
that: “Except as otherwise provided in this Act, the Representation of the People
Law, 1992, PNDCL 284, shall apply to District Assembly election under this Act
with such modifications as may be necessary” And section 12 of PNDCL 284
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provides as follows: “Whenever a vacancy occurs in the membership of Parliament,
the Clerk to Parliament shall notify the Commission in writing within seven days
after the vacancy occurred, and a by-election shall be held within thirty days after
the vacancy occurred”. Sub-section (2) states that: “Notwithstanding subsection (1)
of this section, a by-election shall not be held within three months before the holding
of a general election”.
Consequently, the recommendation for the EC to legislatively determine the time
frame and related matters for holding by-elections for MMDA electoral areas
becomes otiose.
The practice has been for the Secretary to the MMDA (the District Coordinating
Director) to notify the District Electoral Office of all such vacancies to enable the
Office take appropriate action to hold the by-election.
Issue Eight: Conditions of Service for MMDCEs, PMs and Assembly Members
Government accepts the recommendation that the Independent Emoluments
Commission (IEC) recommended to be set up under the Constitution should
determine the emoluments and conditions of service of MMDCEs, PMs and
Assembly members.
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Government notes however that this recommendation does not address the issue of
whether the PM and Assembly members should be paid from the resources of the
Central Government or the MMDAs. Government is of the view that the
emoluments for PMs and Assembly members, once fixed by the IEC, should be paid
from the resources of the Consolidated Fund These should be budgeted for and
transferred to the MMDAs as Grants-in-Aid.
Government does not accept the recommendation that the DACFA should be
authorized to make proposals to Parliament for determining which additional
revenue generating functions need to be ceded to the MMDAs. Government is of the
view that such a decision should be taken by Cabinet after recommendations have
been made to that effect by the Minister of Local Government and that such a
provision is best contained in legislation (the Local Government Act) and not the
Constitution.
Government does not also accept the recommendation that two Deputy
Administrators be appointed. Government is of the view that once the quantum of
resources to be distributed among the MMDAs is determined by the Minister of
Finance and once Parliament approves the sharing formula, the only function of the
DACFA is to apply the formula to the quantum to get each MMDA’s allocation of
the Fund. This is easily done by one person using a computer. It is for this reason
that a Board for the Office of the DACFA is not considered necessary.
Government however accepts the recommendation that the Office of the DACFA be
filled with staff (for data gathering and monitoring purposes), but that does not
require a constitutional amendment.
36
Government also accepts the following recommendations of the Commission which
do not require constitutional amendments:
The DACFA should institute detailed and clear-cut procedures for accounting for
the use of the DACF;
The MPs’ share of the DACF should be abolished and a Constituency
Development Fund be established to replace it.
Issue Twelve: Urban, Town and Area Councils (UTACs) and Unit Committees.
Government accepts the Commission’s recommendation that the Ministry of Local
Government should take administrative action to make the sub-district structures
function effectively.
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CHAPTER TEN: TRADITIONAL AUTHORITIES.
Over the years the Secretary to cabinet has always been the Secretary to the National
Security Council for good reasons. There is the need to have a synergy between
security matters in cabinet and that the National Security Council. It makes
implementation reached at both fora easier and cuts back on the procedures of
bureaucracy.
The issue of a separate provision in the Constitution on the need for a National
Security policy is accepted by government as proposed in paragraph 104 of the CRC
report. The need for a national security policy should also be incorporated in the
proposed amendment in article 35A as one of the security objectives in the Directive
Principles of State Policy of the Constitution.
39
Government accepts the recommendation that stool and skin lands should continue
to be vested in the respective stools and skins, in trust for and on behalf of the people
of the communities in accordance with customary law and usage.
Government does not accept the CRC proposal for a constitutional definition of
stool/skin land to encompass family lands that have the character of Stool and Skin
lands. Rather, Government recognizes the need for a constitutional definition of
family as distinct from stool/skin land.
Government accepts the CRC recommendation for review of the Chieftaincy Act
and the Head of Family (Accountability) Act, towards the creation of specific and
detailed rules of accountability of Chiefs and Heads of Family to the ultimate
beneficiaries of lands entrusted to them.
40
Government accepts the CRC recommendation that the constitutional mandate of the
various Natural Resources Commissions be retained to manage and regulate the
national resources and ensure better utilization of the resources.
Government accepts the recommendations, for an amendment of Article 258 (i) (d)
of the Constitution, to reflect the expanded mandate of the Land Registration
Division of the Lands Commission, to advise on and execute a comprehensive
programme for the registration of land title throughout Ghana.
Government accepts the recommendation for an amendment of Article 268 and 269
of the Constitution to provide for the grant of a resource right upon the
recommendation of the relevant Commission and subject to ratification by
Parliament.
Government does not see the need to designate the Office of the Administrator of
Stool Lands as an independent constitutional body.
Issue Two: Sharing of Benefits Derived From Lands and Natural Resources.
Government accepts the CRC recommendation that the various Acts of Parliament
dealing with benefit sharing in the national resources be reviewed to ensure greater
transparency and accountability in the use of the resources.
44
Government accepts the proposal that the essence of the National Youth Policy be
contained in the Directive Principles of State Policy in the Constitution.
Issue Two: Representation and Empowerment of the Youth.
Government accepts the proposal that provision be made in the DPSP that the State
shall take measures including: affirmative action programmes; to ensure that the
Youth access relevant education and training; have opportunities to associate, be
represented and participate in political, social, economic and other spheres of life;
access employment; and are protected from harmful cultural practices and
exploitation.
Government does not, however accept the recommendation for the constitutional
establishment of the National Commission on Culture as an independent body.
46
Government accepts the recommendation on the need for stringent legislation to
criminalize ethnocentric attitudes, policies and activities/actions that engender social
conflict and potential inter-tribal and/or civil war.
Issue Six.
Government accepts the CRC recommendations in paragraphs 177 and 178, namely:
The amendment of the Constitution to provide that prosecution may follow
from the findings of Commissions of Inquiry set up under the Constitution.
The amendment of the Directive Principles of State Policy to include a
provision that enjoins the State to take effective steps to deal with corruption
and wastage in the society.
Government also accepts the CRC recommendations for the following legislative
changes.
Review of the Criminal Offences Act to define corruption to encompass all
corruption-related offences and to cover all offences that fall under the scope
of the “United Nations Convention Against Corruption” and the “African
Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption”.
The repeal of the law on wilful causation of financial loss to the State.
The serious enforcement of the Mutual Legal Assistance Act, 2010.
The passage of the Public Officers’ Liability Bill.
The amendment of the Public Procurement Act to make it more effective and
efficient.
The review of the rules of evidence to shift the burden of proof onto a person
alleged to have been bribed, where that person admits the receipt of a
monetary or other advantage but denies that what was received amounts to a
bribe.
47
Government further accepts the recommendation for the review of the Internal Audi
Agency Board towards the following objectives:
Re-composition of the Board to embrace the representation of Internal Auditors.
Amendment of the Internal Audit Agency Act, 2003 (Act 658) to create an
internal audit class of public officers who shall be part of the Internal Audit
service rather than operate under the MDAs/MMDAs and the Local Government
Service.
Statutory proscription of MMDCEs from chairing Audit Report Implementation
Committees.
Statutory re-definition of the powers and functions of the Director-General of the
Internal Audit Agency, to give him/her clear and definite courses of action
48