Los Baos vs. Pedro
Los Baos vs. Pedro
EN BANC
G.R. No. 173588
ARIEL M. LOS BAOS, on behalf
of P/Supt. Victor Arevalo, SPO2 Present:
Marcial Olympia, SPO1 Rocky
Mercene and PO1 Raul Adlawan, PUNO, C.J.,
and in his personal capacity, QUISUMBING,
Petitioner, YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
- versus - VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA, and
BERSAMIN, JJ.
Promulgated:
JOEL R. PEDRO, Respondent. April 22, 2009
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
DECISION
BRION, J.
We review in this petition for review on certiorari[1] the September
19, 2005 decision[2] and the July 6, 2006 resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 80223. The petition seeks to revive the case against
respondent Joel R. Pedro (Pedro) for election gun ban violation after the CA
declared the case permanently dismissed pursuant to Section 8, Rule 117 of
the Rules of Court.
THE ANTECEDENTS
Pedro was charged in court for carrying a loaded firearm without the
required written authorization from the Commission on Elections (Comelec)
a day before the May 14, 2001 national and local elections. The Information
reads:
That on or about the 13th day of May 2001 at about 4:00 oclock in
the afternoon, in [S]itio Bantauyan, [B]arangay Bantad, Municipality of
Boac, Province of Marinduque, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously carry a Revolver Cal. 357, Magnum
Ruger 100 loaded with six (6) ammunitions, with Serial No. 173-56836
outside his residence during the election period, without authorization in
writing from the Commission on Election[s].
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
The trial court erred in ruling that Section 8, Rule 117 does not
apply to provisional dismissals on motion of the accused. The Rule merely
provides that a case shall not be provisionally dismissed, except with the
express consent of the accused and with notice to the offended
party. Nothing in the said rule proscribes its application to dismissal on
motion of the accused.
3. the court issues an order granting the motion and dismissing the case
provisionally;
In the instant, case, the records are bereft of proof as to when the
public prosecutor was served the order of dismissal dated 22 November
2001. Absent such proof, we cannot declare that the State is barred from
reviving the case.
In his motion for reconsideration, Pedro manifested the exact date and
time of the Marinduque provincial prosecutors receipt of the quashal order to
be 2:35 p.m., December 10, 2001, and argued that based on this date, the
provisional dismissal of the case became permanent on December 10,
2002. Based on this information, the CA reversed itself, ruling as follows:
On 9 September 2005, we ruled that Section 8, Rule 117 is
applicable to a dismissal on motion of the accused. However, we did not
issue the writs of certiorari and prohibition, because it was shown that the
trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the reopening of
the case. Moreover, we stated that we cannot rule on the issue of whether
or not the State is barred from reopening the case because it was not
shown when the public prosecutor was served the order of dismissal.
xxx
On the other hand, the petitioner was able to prove that the motion
to reopen the case was filed after the lapse of more than one year from the
time the public prosecutor was served the notice of dismissal. Therefore,
the state is barred from reopening the case.
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1]
Under Rule 45 of the rules of Court
[2]
Penned by Associate Justice Santiago J. Ranada (retired), with Associate Justice Marina L. Buzon
(retired) and Associate Justice Mario L. Guarina III; rollo, pp. 32-38.
[3]
Id., pp. 60-63.
[4]
Id., pp. 65-66.
[5]
SEC. 261. Prohibited Acts. The following shall be guilty of an election offense:
x x x
(q) Carrying firearms outside residence or place of business. Any person who, although
possessing a permit to carry firearms, carries any firearms outside his residence or place of business
during the election period, unless authorized in writing by the Commission [on Elections]: Provided,
That a motor vehicle, water or air craft shall not be considered residence or place of business or extension
thereof.
This prohibition shall not apply to cashiers and disbursing officers while in the performance of
their duties or to persons who by nature of their official duties, profession, business or occupation
habitually carry large sums of money or valuables.
This section was subsequently amended under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7166, the Synchronized
Election Law of 1991, to read:
SEC. 32. Who May Bear Firearms. During the election period, no person shall
bear, carry or transport firearms or other deadly weapons in public places, including any
building, street, park, private vehicle or public conveyance, even if licensed to possess or
carry the same, unless authorized in writing by the Commission. The issuance of firearm
licenses shall be suspended during the election period. (Emphasis supplied)
[6]
Section 264 of the Code states that [a]ny person found guilty of any election offense under this Code
shall be punished with imprisonment of not less than one year but not more than six years.
[7]
Through Judge Rodolfo Dimaano of RTC Branch 94, Boac, Marinduque.
[8]
RULES OF COURT, Rule 117, Section 3(a).
[9]
Id., Section 3(h).
[10]
Through Judge Alejandro Arenas.
[11]
Order dated March 13, 2003, issued by Judge Rodolfo B. Dimaano.
[12]
SEC. 8. Provisional dismissal. A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with the express
consent of the accused and with notice to the offended party.
The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years or a
fine of any amount, or both, shall become permanent one (1) year after issuance of the order without the
case having been revived. With respect to offenses punishable by imprisonment of more than six (6)
years, their provisional dismissal shall become permanent two (2) years after issuance of the order
without the case having been revived.
[13]
Docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 80223, and titled as Joel R. Pedro v. Hon. Rodolfo B. Dimaano,
Executive/Acting Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Marinduque, Branch 38, et al.
[14]
ART. 90. Prescription of crimes. Crimes punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or reclusion
temporal shall prescribe in twenty years.
Crimes punishable by other afflictive penalties shall prescribe in fifteen years.
Those punishable by a correctional penalty shall prescribe in ten years; with the exception of those
punishable by arresto mayor, which shall prescribe in five years. xxx
[15]
An Act to Establish Periods of Prescription for Violations Penalized By Special Laws and Municipal
Ordinances, and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin to Run.
Section 2 thereof states: Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the
violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the
institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment. The prescription shall be
interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person and shall begin to run again if the
proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.
[16]
(g) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished.
[17]
(i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or the case
against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.
[18]
Rollo, p. 14.
[19]
Serapio v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148468, January 28, 2003, 396 SCRA 443, 474.
[20]
People v. Lacson, G.R. No. 149453, April 1, 2003 400 SCRA 267, 292-293.
[21]
People v. Lacson, G.R. No. 149453, April 1, 2003 400 SCRA 293.
[22]
People v. Laguio, G.R. No. 128587, March 16, 2007, 518 SCRA 393, 402-403; People v. Hon.
Hernandez, G.R. Nos. 154218 & 154372, August 28, 2006, 499 SCRA 688,706-707; Philippine Savings
Bank v. Spouses Bermoy, G.R. No. 151912, September 26, 2005, 471 SCRA 94,107-108; Sanvicente v.
People, G.R. No. 132081, November 26, 2002, 392 SCRA 610,616-617; Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. v.
Hon. Veridiano, G.R. No. 118251, June 29, 200, 360 SCRA 359, 366; People v. Velasco, G.R. No. 127444,
September 13, 2000, 340 SCRA 207, 242; Palu-ay v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112995, July 30, 1998,
293 SCRA 358, 365.
[23]
Romualdez v. Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 165510-33, July 28, 2006, 497 SCRA 89, 114; People v.
Pacificador, G.R. No. 139405, March 13, 2001, 354 SCRA 310, 319-320; Garcia v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 119063, January 27, 1997, 266 SCRA 678, 694; Cabral v. Puno, L-41692, April 30, 1976, 70 SCRA
606, 609.
[24]
People v. Hon. Hernandez, supra note 22, p. 706; Angchangco Jr. v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 122728,
February 13, 1997, 268 SCRA 301; Guerrero v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107211, June 28, 1996, 257
SCRA 703, 713-714; People v. Leviste, G.R. No. 104386, March 28, 1996, 255 SCRA 238, 248-
249; People v. Tampal, G.R. No. 102485, May 22,1995, 244 SCRA 202; Gonzales v. Sandiganbayan, G.R.
No. 94750, July 16,1991, 199 SCRA 298, 308; Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. L-72335-39, 21 March
1988, 159 SCRA 70, 83.
[25]
People v. Espinosa, G.R. Nos. 153714-20, August 15, 2003, 409 SCRA 256, 266.
[26]
In People v. Togle, (105 Phil 126, 127, [1959]), the defense moved for the provisional dismissal of the
case because of the inability of the prosecution to present important witnesses. In Baesa v. Provincial
Fiscal of Camarines Sur (G.R. No. L-30363, January 30, 1971, 37 SCRA 437), the provisional dismissal
was made by the accused via motion. Further, in People v. Oliva (G.R. No. 106826, January 18, 2001,
349 SCRA 435, 438) and People v. Hinaut (105 Phil. 303 [1959]), the case was provisionally dismissed
by the prosecution with the consent of the accused; in the later case, the accused manifested his consent
by writing with conformity in the motion.
[27]
People v. Ramos, G.R. No. 135204, April 14, 2004 427 SCRA 299, 301; People v.
Hinaut, supra note 26, p. 304; People v. Togle, supra note 26, p. 127
[28]
Rollo, pp. 65-66; for convenience, the body of the Information reads:
That on or about the 13th day of May 2001 at about 4:00 oclock in the afternoon,
in [S]itio Bantauyan, [B]arangay Bantad, Municipality of Boac, Province of Marinduque,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously carry a Revolver Cal.
357, Magnum Ruger 100 loaded with six (6) ammunitions, with Serial No. 173-56836
outside his residence during the election period without authorization in writing from the
Commission on Election[s].
CONTRARY TO LAW.
[29]
Id., p. 85.
[30]
In a long line of cases, we have ruled that a motion to quash on the ground that the allegations of the
information do not constitute the offense charged, should be resolved on the basis alone of these
allegations whose truth and veracity are hypothetically admitted. By way of exception, we held in People
v. Navarro (G.R. No. L-1 & L-2, December 4, 1945; 75 Phil. 516, 518-519) that additional facts not
alleged in the information, but admitted or not denied by the prosecution, may be invoked in support of
the motion to quash. In People v. De la Rosa(98 SCRA 190, 196-197 [1980]) we adopted a pragmatic
approach and allowed additional facts brought out through the presentation of evidence by the parties to
be considered in the determination of a motion to quash grounded on the theory that the facts charged do
not constitute an offense. We held:
Indeed, where in the hearing on a motion to quash predicated on the ground that the
allegations of the information do not charge an offense, facts have been brought out by evidence
presented by both parties which destroy the prima facie truth accorded to the allegations of the
information on the hypothetical admission thereof, as is implicit in the nature of the ground of the
motion to quash, it would be pure technicality for the court to close its eyes to said facts and still
give due course to the prosecution of the case already shown to be weak even to support possible
conviction, and hold the accused to what would clearly appear to be a merely vexatious and
expensive trial, on her part, and a wasteful expense of precious time on the part of the court, as
well as of the prosecution.
The combined application of these rules tells us where the information is allegedly defective because the
facts charged do not constitute an offense or that the averments of the Information contain a legal excuse
or justiciation, the motion will be resolved, as a rule, solely on the basis of the facts alleged in the
information which are all hypothetically admitted. These facts are to be tested against the essential
elements of the offense. Matters aliunde, as a rule, cannot considered,[30] except under the circumstances
contemplated in Navarro and De la Rosa and as permitted by Rule 117. The jurisprudential exceptions
refer to the facts brought out through the evidence adduced by the opposing parties during the hearing of
the motion to quash and those admitted or otherwise not denied by the prosecution.
[31]
Olivarez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 163866, July 29, 2005, 465 SCRA 465, 482, Reyes v. Camilon,
G.R. No. 46198, 20 December 1990, 192 SCRA 445, 453 citing People v. Mendoza, 175 SCRA 743,752.
[32]
G.R. No. 156320, February 14, 2007, 550 SCRA 690, 706.