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IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 11

Vs.

RESPONDENT:
THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT13/08/1974

BENCH:
KHANNA, HANS RAJ
BENCH:
KHANNA, HANS RAJ
CHANDRACHUD, Y.V.

CITATION:
1974 AIR 1880 1975 SCR (1) 710
1975 SCC (3) 140

ACT:
Code of Criminal Procedure, Sections 366, 367 and 537-Trial
Judge dictating judgment in open Court-Non-signing of the
judgment, whether an irregularity-Prisoner, if properly
imprisoned.

HEADNOTE:
The petitioner was tried in the City Civil and Sessions
Court, Greater Bombay for offences under ss. 392 and 397
I.P.C. The petitioner was found guilty of those offences and
was sentenced as per judgment dt. May 12, 1972 to
undergo.rigorous imprisonment for a period of 7 years. The
petitioner was undergoing his prison sentence in Nagpur jail
According to the petitioner, he asked for a copy of the
judgment when it was pronounced but he was informed that he
would get it through jail authorities. The petitioner,
thereafter, asked the jail authorities to get a copy of the
judgment so as to enable him to file an appeal. The jail
authorities informed him that despite number of
communications, a copy of the judgment was not available and
hence petitions Nos. 1523 of 1973 and 1522 of 1973 were
filed from jail.
In support of his prayer for a writ of habeas corpus, the
petitioner stated that the judgment was not pronounced by
the sessions judge and that only the clerk of the Court
apprised him of the decision of the case. No judgment,could
be pronounced till it was complete and therefore, the
petitioner could not be detained for 7 months without being
supplied with a copy of the judgment.
The trial judge, to whom notice of the petition was sent,
had stated that the judgments were ordinarily dictated by
him in open Court and only the final order was intimated to
the accused by the Sheristedar of the Court. It was further
stated that the petitioner could not be immediately supplied
with a copy of the judgment as the same had to be
transcribed from shorthand in the office.
The affidavit filed by the Superintendent of Nagpur Central
prison, discloses that a copy of the judgment was received
by the jail authorities after 9 months of the date of the
judgment and the same was immediately handed over to the
petitioner. The petitioner, thereafter, filed an appeal
before the High Court; but it was dismissed.
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It was contended by the petitioner’s Counsel that the
procedure adopted by the learned sessions judge was not in
accordance with law; because under secs. 366 and 367 of
Criminal Procedure, a judgment must be pronounced or the
substance explained in open Court and must be dated and
signed by the presiding officer at the time of pronouncing
it and under sec. 371, a copy of judgment shall be given to
the accused without delay. Further the petitioner in his
petition No 1637
of 1973 questioned the validity of the Registrar’s order
declining to place before the Court a petition received by
post from the petitioner as the same was not accompanied by
a copy of the register of petition duly filled in by the
Jail Superintendent.
Dismissing the petition,
HELD : (1) The Code of Criminal Procedure is essentially a
Code of Procedure and like all procedural law, is designed
to further the ends of justice and not to frustrate them by
the introduction of endless technicalities. At the same
time it has to be borne in mind that it is procedure that
spells much of the difference between rule of law and rule
by whim and caprice. The object of the Code is to ensure
for the accused a full and fair trial in accordance with the
principles of natural justice. If there be substantial
compliance with the requirements of law, a mere procedural
irregularity would not vitiate the trial unless the same
results in miscarriage of justice. In all procedural laws
certain things are vital. Disregard of the provisions in
respect of them would prove fatal to the trial and would
invalidate the conviction.
711
There are, however, other requirements which are not so
vital. Non-compliance with them would amount to an
irregularity which would be curable unless it has resulted
in a failure of justice. Section 537 of the Code is
designed to ensure that no order of a competent court should
in the absence of failure of justice be reversed or altered
in appeal or revision on account of a procedural
irregularity. [715C-B]
(2) In the present case, failure of the learned Sessions
Judge is not appending his signature to the judgment at the
time it was pronounced was a procedural irregularity which
would not vitiate the conviction of the accused. Further, a
copy of the judgment signed by the learned Sessions Judge
was supplied to the accused who filed an appeal before the
High Court; but it was dismissed on merits. Therefore, it
cannot be said that the procedural irregularity, mentioned
by the petitioner, occassioned failure of justice. [715H,
717E-H]
Firm Gokul v. Firm Nand Ram A.I.R. 1938 P.C. 292 and
Surendra Singh & Ors. v. The State of Uttar Pradesh [1954]
S.C.R. 330, relied on.
U.J.S. Chopra v. State of Bombay, [1955] 2 S.C.R. 94, Queen
Empress v. Hargobind Singh & Ors. I.L.R. 14 AU. 242 and
(Vellivalli) Brahmaiah & Ors. v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1930 Mad.
867, referred to.
(3) The words "without delay" in section 37 1 (1)of the Code
of Criminal Procedure emphasise the fact that there should
not be much time lag between the pronouncement of the
judgment and the supply of its copy to the accused. Where a
judgment is merely dictated and not transcribed and as such
not signed at the time of its pronouncement, it would not
normally be possible to supply its copy without delay after
pronouncement. As it is in the present case the copy of the
judgment was not supplied to the accused till February 19,
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1973. The above delay of more than nine months in the
supply of copy of the judgment of the trial court discloses
a rather depressing state of affairs. If the judgment had
been dictated by the time it was pronounced on May 12, 1972,
it should not have taken more than a few days to transcribe
the same and supply a copy of it to the accused. A delay of
more than Dine months in the supply of the copy of the
judgment is wholly unjustified.[714D-F]
(4) If the supply of the copy of the judgment is
inordinately delayed, the consequence would inevitably be
that the accused would not be able to file an appeal. and
obtain an order for his release on bail within a reasonable
time even though it be a fit case for his release on bail.
Another result of the above would be that a convicted person
who is sentenced to undergo imprisonment for a short period
would undergo the entire sentence of imprisonment by the
time the copy of the judgment is supplied to him. The right
of appeal for such a convicted person would be thus rendered
illusory even though he may have a good arguable case in
appeal. As the prompt transcription of the judgment and the
supply of its copy to the convicted person effects the
liberty of the subject, the plea of paucity of staff can
hardly provide a justification for the failure to do the
needful in this respect. Notions of petty economy should
not be allowed to override the regard that we have for the
liberty of the subject. [715A-C]
(5) The Registrar of the Bombay High Court was right in not
placing the application before the Court as under Rule 25 of
Chapter XXVI of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules.
1960 it was not accompanied by. A copy of the register of
the petition duly filled in by the Jail Superintendent. The
said provision under the appellate side rules was made with
a view to ensure the authenticity of the petition. In the
absence of such a safeguard, there is always a possibility
of someone doing mischief by sending by post a frivolous
petition purporting to be on behalf of the prisoner even
though the prisoner concerned might be unaware of such a
pettion. An adverse order on such a petition may cause
prejudice to the prisoner’s case and create other
complications. Therefore, the impugned order of the
Registrar cannot be quashed. [719C-D]
712

JUDGMENT:
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition Nos. 1522, 1523 and
1637 of 1973.
Petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.
Satish Kumar Dhingra, for the petitioner
M. N. Shroff for respondent No. 1.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
KHANNA, J.-Can a convicted person be said to be lawfully
imprisoned if at the time of his conviction the trial judge
dictates the judgment but does not sign the same because of
its having not been transcribed is one of the’ questions
which arises for determination in two petitions No. 1522 and
1523 of 1973 which have been sent from jail by Iqbal Ismail
Sodawala for issuing a writ of habeas corpus. The facts
giving rise to these two petitions are substantially the
same and,. therefore, it may be necessary to deal with only
one of them. The petitioner has also filed petition No.
1637 of 1973 questioning the validity of the order of the
Registrar of the Bombay High Court declining to place before
the court a petition received by post from the petitioner
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unless it was accompanied by a copy of the register of peti-
tion duly filled in by the Jail Superintendent. This
judgment would dispose of all the three petitions.
The petitioner was tried in the court of Shri P. K. Gupte,
Judge, City Civil and Sessions Court, Greater Bombay for
offences under sections 392 and 397 Indian Penal Code. The
petitioner was found guilty of those offences and was
sentenced as per judgment dated May 12, 1972 to undergo
rigorous imprisonment for a period of seven years. The
petitioner after his conviction was for some time kept in
Aurangabad jail and was thereafter transferred to Nagpur
Central Prison. He is now undergoing the sentence of
imprisonment in that prison. According to the petitioner, he
asked for the copy of the of the judgment at the
time it was pronounced, but he was informed that the same
would be sent to him through jail authorities. The
petitioner thereafter asked the jail authorities to get a
copy of the judgment so as to enable him to file an appeal.
The jail authorities informed the petitioner that they had
sent a number of communications and despite that, copy of
the judgment was not yet available. The petitioner
thereupon sent petition No. 1523 of 1973 from jail on
January 12, 1973 and petition No. 1522 on January 22, 1973.
In support of his prayer for a writ of habeas corpus, the
petitioner states that the judgment was not pronounced by
the Sessions Judge and that only the clerk of the court
apprised him of the decision in the case. No judgment it is
stated, could be pronounced till it was complete. It is
further the case of the petitioner that he could not be
detained for a period of seven months without being supplied
a copy of the judgment.
Shri Gupte, to whom notice of the petition was sent, has
stated that judgments were ordinarily dictated by him in
open court and only the final order was intimated to the
accused by the Sheristedar of the court. It is further
stated that the petitioner could not be immediately supplied
with a copy of the judgment as the same had to- be
transcribed from shorthand in the office.
Affidavit of Shri Baburao Madhorao Karajgikar,
Superintendent, Nagpur Central Prison has been filed in
opposition to the petition.
713
It is mentioned in the affidavit that a copy of the
requisite judgment was received by the jail authorities on
February, 19, 1973 and the same was immediately handed over
to the petitioner. The petitioner thereafter filed an
appeal on May 4, 1973 against the judgment of the learned
Sessions Judge and the said appeal was dismissed by the High
Court on September 13, 1973.
Mr. Dhingra who has argued the case amicus curiae has at the
outset referred to the allegation of the petitioner that the
judgment in the case under sections 392 and 397 Indian Penal
Code against the petitioner was not pronounced by the
Sessions Judge but by his Sheristedar. It is urged that the
procedure adopted in this respect by the learned Sessions
Judge was not in accordance with law. We are not impressed
by this submission. The report of Shri Gupte shows that he
dictated the judgment in the case against the petitioner in
open court. The ’ judgment included, as it must, the
concluding part relating to the conviction and sentence
awarded to the petitioner. The petitioner who apparently
did not know English was thereafter apprised by the
Sheristedar of the court of the concluding part of the
judgment relating to his conviction and sentence. Although
normally the trial judges should themselves convey the
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result of the trial to the accused, the fact that the
learned judge in the present case did not do so and left it
to the Sheristedar should not introduce an infirmity in the
procedure adopted by him, The Sheristedar in the very nature
of things must have translated to the petitioner what was
contained in the concluding part of the judgment. It was,
in our opinion,’the dictation of the concluding part of the
judgment in open court by the learned Sessions Judge which
should in the circumstances be taken to be tantamount to the
pronouncement of the judgment.
The main contention which has been advanced by Mr. Dhingra
is that it was essential for the learned Sessions Judge to
have signed the judgment at the time it was pronounced. The
fact that the judgment had been dictated but had not been
transcribed did not, according to Mr. Dhingra, justify a
departure from the procedural requirement of signing the
judgment at the time of its pronouncement. in this respect
we find that according to clause (1) of section 366 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, the judgment in every trial iii.
any Criminal Court of original jurisdiction shall be
pronounced or the substance of such judgment shall be
explained in open court either immediately after the
termination of the trial or at some subsequent time of which
notice shall be given to the parties or their pleaders, and
in the language of the court, or in some other language
which the accused or his pleader understands, provided that
the whole judgment shall be read out by the presiding Judge,
if he is requested so to do either by the prosecution or the
defence. Sub-section (1) of section 367 requires that every
such judgment shall, except as otherwise express provided by
this Code, be written by the presiding officer of the Court
or from the dictation of such presiding officer in the
language of the Court, or in English; and shall contain the
point or points for determination, the decision thereon and
the reasons for the decision; and shall be dated
714
and signed by the presiding officer in open court at the
time of pronouncing it and where it is not written by the
presiding officer with his own hand, every page of such
judgment shall be signed by him. It is plain from the above
provisions that the presiding officer of the trial court at
the time of the pronouncement of the judgment should date
and sign it. The judgment of the trial court represents the
final episode in the trial of an accused. The provisions of
the Code of Criminal Procedure contemplate that the judgment
should be complete in all other respects by the time it is
pronounced and all that need be done is that the presiding
officer should insert the date and append his signature to
it at the time of the pronouncement. The requirement about
the completion of the judgment and of its signing at the
time of its pronouncement is rooted in the consideration
that a copy of the judgment has to be supplied to the
accused without delay after its pronouncement. Sub-section
(1) of section 371 of the Code provides that on the
application of the accused a copy of the judgment, or, when
he so desires, a translation in his own language, if
practicable, or in the language of the Court, shall be given
to him without delay. Such copy shall, in any case other
than a summons-ease, be given free of cost. The words
"without delay" in section 371(1) emphasise the fact that
there should not be much time lag between the pronouncement
of the judgment and the supply of its copy to the accused.
Where a judgment is merely dictated and not transcribed and
as such not signed at the time of its pronouncement, it
would not normally be possible to supply its copy without
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delay after pronouncement, As it is we find that in the
present case the copy of the judgment was not supplied to
the accused till February 19, 1973. The above delay of more
than nine months in the supply of copy of the judgment of
the trial court discloses, in our opinion, a rather
depressing state of affairs. If the judgment had been
dictated by the time it was pronounced on May 12, 1972, it
should not have taken more than a few days to transcribe the
same and supply a copy of it to the accused. A delay of
more than nine months in the supply of the copy of the
judgment is wholly unjustified. We are given to understand
that paucity of staff is mainly instrumental for the delay
in the transcribing of the judgment and the supply of its
copy. If so, the sooner this situation is remedied the
better. Many an accused on being convicted and sent to jail
by the trial court go up in appeal and apply for bail.
According to section 419 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
every appeal shall be made in the form of a petition in
writing presented by the appellant or his pleader, and every
such petition shall (unless the Court to which it is
presented otherwise directs) be accompanied by a copy, of
the judgment or order appealed against. Section 420 of the
Code states that if the appellant be in jail, he may present
his petition of appeal and the copies accompanying the same
to the officer in charge of the jail, who shall thereupon
forward such petition and copies to the proper Appellate
Court. Sub-section (1) of section 426 empowers the Appel-
late Court to suspend the sentence or order appealed against
and to release the convicted person on bail during the
pendency of the appeal. It is manifest from the above that
except in cases where the Appellate Court otherwise directs,
no convicted person sent to jail can file an
715
appeal and apply for bail unless he obtains a copy of the
judgment appealed against. If the supply of the copy of the
judgment is inordinately delayed, the consequence would
inevitably be that the accused would not be able to file an
appeal and obtain an order for his release on bail within a
reasonable time even though it be a fit case for his release
on bail. Another result of the above would be that a
convicted person who is sentenced to undergo imprisonment
for a short period would undergo the entire sentence of
imprisonment by the time the copy of the judgment is
supplied to him. The right of appeal for such a convicted
person would be thus rendered illusory even though he may
have a good arguable case in appeal. As the prompt trans-
cription of the judgment and the supply of its copy to the
convicted person affects the liberty of the subject, the
plea of paucity of staff can hardly provide a justification
for the failure to do the needful in this respect. Notions
of petty economy should not be allowed to override the
regard that we have for the liberty of the subject.
Question then arises as to whether the appellant can be said
to be not properly imprisoned if the trial judge had merely
dictated the judgment but not signed it because of its not
having been transcribed at the time he pronounced it. So
far as this aspect is concerned, we find that section 537 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure provides, inter alia, that
subject to the other provisions of the Code, no finding,
sentence or order passed by a Court of competent
jurisdiction shall be reversed or altered on appeal or
revision on account of any error, omission or irregularity
in the complaint, summons, warrant, proclamation, order,
judgment or other proceedings before or during trial or in
any inquiry or other proceedings under this Code, unless
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such error, omission, irregularity has in fact occasioned a
failure of justice. This section is designed to ensure that
no order of a competent court should in the absence of
failure of justice be reversed or altered in appeal or
revision on account of a procedural irregularity. The Code’
of Criminal Procedure is essentially a Code of procedure and
like. all procedural law, is designed to further the ends of
justice and not frustrate them by the introduction of
endless technicalities. At the same time it has to be borne
in mind that it is procedure that spells much of the
difference between rule of law and rule by him and caprice.
The object of the Code is to ensure for the accused a full
and fair trial, in accordance with the principles of natural
justice. If there be substantial compliance with the
requirements of law, a mere procedural irregularity would
not vitiate the trial unless the same results in miscarriage
of justice. In all procedural laws certain things are
vital. Disregard of the provisions in respect of them would
prove fatal to the trial and would invalidate the
conviction. There are, however,other requirements which are
not so vital. Non-compliance with them would amount to an
irregularity which would be curable unless it has resulted
in a failure of justice.
Question then arises as to whether the failure of a trial
judge to sign the judgment at the time of its pronouncement
because of its having not been transcribed is a procedural
irregularity curable under section 537 of the Code. In this
respect we find that the question as to what is the effect
of a judge not signing the judgment at the time
716
it was pronounced was considered by the Judicial Committee
in the case of Firm Gokal Chand v. Firm Nand Ram. (1) The
appeal in that case in the Lahore High Court was heard by a
Division Bench consisting of Harrison and Agha Haider JJ.
The judgment in the case was actually delivered by Harrison
J. with whom Agha Haider JJ. concurred.. The judgment Was
pronounced on February 22, 1933 but Harrison J. went on
leave before signing the judgment and the same was signed by
Agha Haider J. The Deputy Registrar appended a note .that
Harrison- J. had gone on leave before signing the judgment
he delivered. Order 41, R. 31 of the Code of Civil
Procedure requires that the judgment of the Appellate Court
shall be in writing and shall at the time it is pronounced
be signed and dated by the Judge or the Judges concurring
therein. The Judicial Committee considered the question as
to whether the judgment was a nullity because of the failure
of Harrison J. to sign the same. Lord Wright speaking on
behalf of the Judicial Committee observed
"The Rule does not say that if its
requirements are not complied with the
judgment shall be a nullity.- So startling a
result would need clear and precise words.
Indeed the Rule does not even state any
definite time in which it is to be fulfilled.
The time is left to be defined by what is
reasonable. The Rule from its very nature is
not intended to effect the rights of parties
to a judgment. It is intended to secure
certainty in the ascertainment if what the
judgment was. It is a rule which judges are
required to comply with for that object. No
doubt in practice Judge do so comply as it is
their duty to do. But accidents may happen.
A Judge may die after giving judgment but
before he has a reasonable opportunity to sign
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it. The Court must have inherent jurisdiction
to supply such a defect. The case of a Judge
who has gone on leave before signing the
judgment may call for more comment, but even
so the convenience of the Court and the
interest of the litigants must prevail. The
defect is merely an irregularity."
Reference in the above context was made to the provisions of
section 99 of the Code of Civil Procedure, according to
which no decree shall be reversed or substantially varied
nor shall any case be remanded in appeal on account of any
error, defect or irregularity in any proceedings in the suit
not affecting the merits of the case or the jurisdiction of
the Court. Although the above section dealt with appeals
from original decrees, section 108 applied the same
provisions to the appeals from appellate decrees.
The’Judicial Committee came to the conclusion that the
defect mentioned above was an irregularity not affecting the
merits of the case or the jurisdiction of the court and was
no ground for setting aside the decree.
The above decision was referred to by this Court in the case
of Surendra Singh & Ors v. The State of Uttar Pradesh(2) and
it was observed that section 537 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure does as much the
(1) AIR 1938 P.C. 292.
(2) [1954] SCR 330’.
717
same thing on the criminal side as sections 99 and 108 on
the civil. This Court in that decision dealt with a
criminal case wherein death sentence had been awarded. The
case in the High Court was heard by a Bench of two judges.
The judgment was signed by both of them but it was delivered
in Court by one of them after the death of the other. It
was held that there was no valid judgment and the case
should be reheard. Arriving at that conclusion, this Court
took the view that a judgment is the final decision of the
court intimated to the parties and the world at large by
formal "pronouncement" or "delivery" in open court and until
a judgment is delivered, the judges have a right to change
their mind. In the course of discussion Bose J. who spoke
for this Court also made an observation regarding the
signing of the judgment and other similar matters in the
following words:
" Small irregularities in the manner of
pronouncement or the mode of delivery do not
matter but the substance of the thing must be
there that can neither be blurred nor left to
inference and conjecture nor can it be vague.
All the rest-the manner in which it is to be
recorded, the way in which it is to be
authenticated, the signing and the sealing,
all the rules designed to secure certainty
about its content and matter-can be cured; but
not the bard core, namely, the formal
intimation of the decision and its contents
formally declared in a judicial way in open
court. The exact way in which this is done
does not matter. In some courts the judgment
is delivered orally or read out, in some only
the operative portion is pronounced, in some
the judgment is merely signed after giving
notice to the parties and laying the draft on
the table for given number of days for-
inspection."
It would appear from the above that this Court considered
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noncompliance with the procedural requirement in the matter
of signing of the judgment to be an irregularity which could
be cured.
In view of what has been stated above, we are of the opinion
that the failure of the learned Sessions Judge in not
appending his signature to the judgment at the time it was
pronounced because of the judgment having not till then been
transcribed was a procedural irregularity which would not
vitiate the conviction of the accused.
Question next arises as to whether the above irregularity
can be said to have occasioned failure of justice. So far
as this aspect is concerned, we find that the judgment was
ultimately transcribed and was signed by the learned
Sessions Judge. The appellant was there after supplied a
copy of the judgment and he filed an appeal against the
judgment of the trial court. The appeal was dismissed by
the Bombay High Court on September 13, 1973. In case the
appellant felt aggrieved against the procedural irregularity
mentioned above, the appellant should have agitated that
point in appeal before the High Court. The fact that the
appeal of the appellant, was dismissed shows that either the
appellant did not agitate that point in appeal before the
High Court or in case he did so, the High Court found no
substance therein. It cannot in. the circumstances be said
that the procedural irregularity mentioned above has
occasioned failure of justice. As the judgment
718
of the learned Sessions Judge has been affirmed on appeal by
the High Court and the appeal of the appellant has been
dismissed, the appellant, in our opinion, cannot be said to
be kept in prison without the authority of law. The
appellant indeed is undergoing the sentence of imprisonment
which was awared to him by the learned Sessions Judge in the
case under sections 392 and 397 Indian Penal Code. The
finding of the Learned Sessions Judge in this respect was
affirmed on appeal by the High Court when that court
dismissed the appeal of the appellant on September 13, 1973.
It has been argued on behalf of the respondent-State that
the judgment of the Sessions Judge has merged in that of the
High Court when it dismissed the appeal of the appellant on
September 13,1973. As against that"Mr. Dhingra submits
that the question of merger did not arise in this case as
the High Court only summarily dismissed the appeal of the
appellant. Reliance in this context is placed upon the
majority view in the case of U.J.S. Chopra v. State of
Bombay(1). In the face of what we have held above, it is
not necessary to go into this aspect of the matter.
We may also refer to the two decisions to which our
attention has been invited by Mr. Dhingra. One of those
decisions is Queen-Empress v. Hargovind Singh & Ors.(2) In
this case the procedure adopted by the Sessions Judge
bristled with a number of illegalities and material
irregularities. He also did not write any judgment before
sentencing four persons to death. Subsequently a 20-page
judgment was found on the record. The High Court in the
circumstance set aside the conviction. The other case to
which our attention has been invited is (Velivalli)
Brahmaiah & Ors. v. Emperor(3) wherein the court observed
that mere putting of the initials on a judgment was not
sufficient compliance with law and it was necessary that it
should bear the signatures of the magistrates. Not much
help, in our opinion, can, be derived from the above two
decisions because the question involved in the two cases was
different. Apart from that we find that the matter has been
subsequently considered by the Judicial Committee in the
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case of Firm Gokal Chand (supra) and by this Court in the
case of Surendra Singh & Ors. (supra) and we have already
made a reference to those authorities.
We may now deal with writ petition No. 1637 of 1973. The
petitioner while undergoing sentence of imprisonment sent
petition under section 561A of the Code of Criminal
Procedure in June 1973 by post to the Bombay High Court.
The Registrar of the Bombay High Court declined to place it
before the High Court as the petition though it purported to
have been sent by the petitioner had been received by post
and was not accompanied by a copy of the register of
petition duly filled in by the Jail Superintendent. The
Registrar in this context relied upon Rule 1416 of Chapter
XXXIX of the Bombay Jail Manual (1955 Edition) which reads
as under :
"A petition of appeal or an application for
revision addressed or purporting to be
addressed to the High Court, Bombay
(1) [1955] 2 SCR 94. (2) ILR 14 All. 242.
(3) AIR 1930 Mad. 867.
719
or a petition of appeal or an application for
special leave to appeal so addressed to the
Supreme Court of India by a prisoner shall
together with the accompanying documents be
forwarded in a sealed envelope by the
superintendent with the utmost expedition to
the Registrar, High Court, Bombay or the
Registrar, Supreme Court of India, New Delhi,
as the case may be. The Superintendent shall
at the same time forward a copy of such
petition or application to the Inspector
General of Prisons."
It was also stated by the Registrar that Rule 25 of Chapter
XXXVI of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules, 1960
required that an application from a petitioner should be
accompanied by a copy of the register of the petition duly
filled in by the Jail Superintendent. The petitioner has
challenged the order of the Registrar whereby he declined to
place his petition before the court. We find no sufficient
ground to quash the order of the Registrar of the Bombay
High Court. It would appear that according to rules, if any
petition has lo be cent to court the same should be sent
through the Superintendent of the jail and be countersigned
by him. This provision has been made with a view to ensure
the authenticity of the petition. The rule also provides a
safeguard against the possibility of a petition being dealt
with by a court on the assumption that it has been sent by a
prisoner even, though it has in fact not been sent by him.
In the absence of the above safeguard, there is always the
risk of someone doing mischief by sending by post a
frivolous petition purporting to be on behalf of a prisoner
even though the prisoner concerned might be unaware of .such
a petition. An adverse order on such a petition may cause
prejudice to the prisoner’s case and create other
complications. We, therefore,. decline to quash the
impugned order of the Registrar.
In the result all the three petitions are dismissed.
A copy of this judgment may be sent to the Registrar of the
Bombay High Court for being placed before the learned Chief
Justice of that court for such action as may be deemed
necessary in the matter of’ prompt supply of the copies of
judgments to the accused.
Petitions dismissed.
V.M.K.
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