Cooperative Federalism Under The Constitution of India: An Analytical

Study :-

Abstract:- The constitution provides a dual system with Union at its centre and
state governments on outside. Every entity is gifted with sovereign authority to
act in sphere that the constitution has allotted to it. In this paper, we will see
how the cooperative federalism is actually impacting our nation and its working.
We will also focus the critical evaluation of federalism in this prospective and
comparison with the American Federalism.

Introduction:-

Federalism is derived from the Latin world foedus, which means agreement. In
fact federation is an agreement between two types of governments sharing
power and controlling their respective spheres. Thus a federation is a system of
national and local governments, combined under a common sovereignty with
both national as well as federating units having autonomous spheres assigned to
them by the constitution.

India opted for quasi-federal structure after independence. The term “federal”
has not been mentioned in the constitution but the working of Indian democracy
is essentially federal in structure. However, it is the practical working style of
federalism, which brought the concept of cooperative federalism and
competitive federalism in India

The present government is stressing on the need to leverage the potential of

cooperative and competitive federalism for achieving all round inclusive
development in India. In this context there is a need to examine the concepts of
cooperative and competitive federalism.

Indian System is ‘extremely Federal’ (Paul Appleby). It is a ‘bargaining

federalism’. Indian system is a federation with high tendency to centralize itself
(Ivor Jennings).1 Ivor Jennings also coined that, the Indian Constitution is
primarily federal, with one-of-a-kind safeguards for ensuring social cohesion
and development. Cooperative Federalism is necessary, because Center and
state has to work together in order to achieve welfare of country. In our
Constitution schedule 7, talks about the divisions of authorities among Union
and State via three different lists. Article 24 of 7 Schedule talks about legal
topic enacted by parliament and by state legislation(s). Other mechanisms, such
as the inter-state council and the Zonal Council, have been included into the
Indian Constitution to guarantee this interaction between the central and the
states.

Evolution of Cooperative federalism :-

In India's early years of independence, cooperative federalism did not

predominate, but after 1990, the spirit of federalism was enhanced by a coalition
at the center and the development of regional political parties in several states.
Mutual disagreements and selfish political objectives, on the other hand,
hampered India's journey to cooperative federalism, preventing a beneficial
outcome. As a result, squabbles between central government and state
government agencies have grown commonplace in the nation. Federalism is the
distribution of authorities among the federal and state governments in order to
guarantee the country's governance is stable and effective. Both units are
required to work together on matters listed in Schedule 7 of the Constitution.
Cooperative Federalism, also recognized as marble-cake federalism, is a form of
federalism whereby the federal government, state governments, and local
1
4 Ivor Jennings: Some Characteristics of the Indian Constitution,1953, P.1.
governments try to solve basic problems instead of creating policy
independently but just about similarly or conflicting over a strategy in an
awareness raising by the federal government. India’s federalism is indestructible
union of destructible state. Center government can change certain things in
states with simple majority. Whereas, U.S. have federalism which has
federalism of indestructible union of indestructible state. India follows Canadian
Federalism, as India possesses more power over center government.

Origin theory of federalism:

This theory describes circumstances favourable for establishing federalism

unlike classical theory which describes what federalism means.

It is again divided into three categories:

1. Sociological Theory: given by William s. Livingston, in which he says

that Federalism is, based on society’s approach/condition, such as diverse
territories, different religion, varied languages, etc.
2. Multiple Factor Theory : given by K C Wheare & Karl Deutsch, where
they gave two requisite for federal system:
A) Desire for union and establishing independent state governments.
B) The capacity to give reality to the desire.
3. Political Theory: by William H Ricker, where he defines federalism is a
solution of Political problem. He raised two questions:
A) What occasions the adoption of a federal government?
B) What induces society to maintain & preserve federal government
they already have?
He also gave the answers to these questions
A. May be collapsing of an empire & political leaders wanted
not to separate but still want some autonomy.
B. To ensure future safety of external threat
 4. Functional Theory of Federalism: propounded by R L Watts,
Where he talked about a new concept of ‘co-operative federalism’ means
interdependency & co-operation among general & regional government
instead of independent and co-ordination for one and the same people.

Cooperative Federalism in India:

Since from the ancient period of our Indian political history itself, kingdoms or
empires that have ruled over the Indian subcontinent have somehow or rather
practiced federal policies whereby the chieftain and their vassal states were left
very much alone in all of the internal civil affairs. Such policy of non-
intervention in the local affairs was indeed a practical necessity since the
cultural along with the natural diversities of the people, of this subcontinent,
were so vast and broad that these could only be made an integral part of a single
empire if no or meagre effort be made to impose a common set of beliefs over
them. As per Article 1(1) of the Constitution, India consists of ‘Union of States.
The Constitution of India do not use the term federal at all but the working of
Indian Constitution after Independence has been on the pattern of cooperative
federalism where by it gives amble opportunity for the states to be self reliant,
and at the same time achieve a spirit of cooperation with the Union and also in
interaction and cooperation with other states. This two way cooperation
between the Union and the States for the development and autonomy is a right
that has been given by the Drafting committee in the constitution and therefore
it is a way to dive deep into the depths of the minds of the constitution makers
and their vision of what sort of relation ‘Union of States’ and Union shall take
in the course of its journey. There are many examples to validate the vision of
the constitution makers.

Development of Cooperative Federalism Post Independence:

Basically, the changing dynamics and the varied experiences that the Indian
State has undergone with like those of one party rule, the rise of regional
parties, formation of coalition Governments, active role of the Judiciary and
alike, have shaped the trajectory of federalism herein by swinging the pendulum
from cooperative to confrontationist and vice versa.

Significantly, it has continued been a trend in the Indian political history that so
long as the central and state governments were ruled by the same political party,
the cooperative framework of polity did worked well. But when the different
political parties reign in power, either in the centre or the states and more
recently when the coalition governments are in power, there emerge the signs of
discord, stress and tensions in intergovernmental relations between the Centre
and the States inter se.

Cooperative in the 50s and 60s-

It may further be ascertained that in India, the first fifteen years after her
independence were marked by a democratically elected regime with a
comfortable majority coupled with the doctrine of political idealism and
freshness of hope for better future ahead owing to having just gained
independence.

Confrontationist from 1960s to 1980s -

During this period, the supremacy of the Centre did break the power of States
and established a new balance or rather, imbalance between the Centre and the
States.

Cooperative in the 90s -

The decade was marked by the regime of coalition government of both national
and the regional parties at the centre itself which could be regarded more or less
cooperative in nature.
In the last decade -

The current trends did emphasize cooperation and coordination, rather than
demarcation of powers between the different levels of government. The basic
themes of today remain being those of interdependence. Moreover, Sarkaria
Commission was set up in 1983 by the central government of India. The
Commission’s charter was mainly to examine the nature and extent of central-
state relationship on various portfolios and subsequently to suggest changes
within the framework of Constitution of India. The Commission was so named
as it was headed by Justice Ranjit Singh Sarkaria (Chairman of the
commission), a retired judge of the Supreme Court of India. The final report of
the same did contained 247 specific recommendations. In spite of the large size
of its reports; the Commission recommended, by and large, status quo in the
Centre-State relations, especially in the areas, relating to those of legislative
matters, role of Governors and the viable use of Article 356

CO-OPERATIVE FEDERAL AGENDA IN INDIAN CONSTITUTION

III. Federal Features of Constitution of India7:

1. Division of Powers:
Concept of federalism is based on the division of powers between the
central & the state govt. Indian Constitution provide this Division of
powers in schedule VII where powers are divided in 3 lists, Union
list, state list & concurrent list. Central govt, was created to look after
the matters of National importance, such as Defence, Foreign Affairs,
etc. which is enumerated in the union list (97), state’s govt, role is to
maintain law & order in the state, administration, etc. which are
given under the state list (67). Concurrent list (47) includes those
 matters where state & central both can make law, & if conflict arises
then central law will prevail. If it is compared with U. S. constitution
there also powers are divided between Centre & state but most of the
powers are with states unlike India. Apart from this Residuary
Powers are left to the states under US constitution but in India it is
with central.
2. Supremacy Of Constitution : Constitution is the Grundnorm of the
land. All laws derive authority from constitution. For federalism
there must be law which divide and demarcates the powers between
the Centre & the state as if authority given to a man, he might get
arbitrary. So power must come from the independent and unbiased
source. In India also constitution is supreme, as it is the only
authority which gives powers to both Centre & state. K C Wheare
had rightly said “supremacy of the constitution is essential if the
govt. to be federal; but the written constitution is essential if the
federal govt. has to work well”.
3. Written constitution: Indian constitution was enacted with 395
articles and 8 schedules and it is still one of the lengthiest written
constitutions. As in the above point K C Wheare had rightly
mentioned that if federal govt. wants to work well there must be
written constitution. It is the base for maintaining division of powers
& supremacy of the constitution. It clearly specifies the boundaries of
extent or powers with duties with which both tier has to work. U S
also has the written constitution.
4. Rigid Constitution: Constitution must be rigid as it would be
difficult for any one party (union or state) to amend it arbitrarily. It
can be amended by only 3 ways provided under Article 368 of Indian
Constitution; i) simple majority, ii) 2/3 majority of parliament with
50% members present & voting & iii) 2/3 majority of parliament
 with 50% members present & voting + 50% ratification of the states.
If the federal structure is to be amending then it can only be done
through iii) point, means states consent is required.
In U S it is ¾ of states which has to ratify the amendment bought by
& passed by the 2/3 of majority of congress. So it is more rigid to
amend constitution in US compared to India. However basic structure
such as federalism, fundamental rights, etc. can’t be amended by
Parliament as decided by apex court2.
5. Independent judiciary: Judiciary in India is completely a separate
hierarchy other than the executive and legislative, as it derives its
powers from constitution directly. If there is any dispute between
Centre & state or state & state, Supreme Court can enter into matter
& resolve it by virtue of Article 131. Not only this law made by
central or state legislative bodies can be challenged in the apex court
and can be declared invalid if it violates constitution as it got power
of judicial review under article 13(2) & 245(1). So judiciary is the
custodian of the constitution. U S also has the same judicial system
but their states also have their own supreme court.
6. Bi-cameral legislature: Parliament consists of both Lok Sabha &
Rajya Sabha, where later ensures the representation of states at the
union level in every decision of lower house. So state has very
important stake in decision making of executive. It is essential for
federalism to have equal say in every decision. U S also has the same
concept of bi-cameral.

2
Judicial trends towards federalism

Independent judiciary is one the essential feature of federalism, if any

government transgresses its limit assigned by the constitution, the Court has
power to interpret every word. The Supreme Court has delivered many
judgments on federalism, but its stand on federalism has been inconsistent.

In the Automobile Transport n. State of Rajasthan 3 case while the seven

judgesb bench of Supreme Court interpreted the impact of article 301 of the
Constitution said that Indian constitution is a federal constitution and observed:

“The evolution of a federal structure or a quasi-federal structure

necessarily involved, in the context of the conditions then prevailing, a
distribution of powers and a basic part of our constitution relates to that
distribution with the three legislative lists in the Seventh Schedule. The
constitution itself says by Art. 1 that India is a Union of States and in
interpreting the constitution one must keep in view the essential structure of a
federal or quasi-federal constitution, namely, that the units of the Union have
also certain powers as has the Union itself.”

In State of West Bengal v. Union of India,4 the Union Government enacted the
Coal Bearing Areas (Acquisition and Development) Act, 1957 and acquired
certain coal mines which vested in the state. The state government challenged
the law in the court on the ground that Parliament is not competent to make law
and to authorised the Union to acquire land which is vested in a state.

The state contended that: (i) Indian constitution is federal, (ii) states shared
sovereignty with the centre and (iii) centre has no power to acquire state

3
AIR 1962 SC 1406
4
AIR 1963 SC 1241
properties. The majority of the Supreme Court rejected all three contentions and
held that the Union was entitled to acquire the coal mines vested in the state of
West Bengal. The Chief Justice Sinha said that:

“......A truly federal form of Government envisages a compact or

agreement between independent and sovereign units to surrender partially their
authority in their common interest and vesting it in a Union and retaining the
residue of the authority in the constituent units. Ordinarily each constituent unit
has its separate constitution by which it is governed in all matters except those
surrendered to the Union, and the constitution of the Union primarily operates
upon the administration of the units. Our constitution was not the result of any
such compact or agreement: Units constituting a unitary State which were non
sovereign were transformed by abdication of power into a Union.”

“States do not have the right to secede from the Union in India. That conclusion
rested on the proposition that the States were created by the Union, as distinct
from the position in Australia and the United States where the States were the
federation’s constituent elements formed out of the pre-federation colonies
whose delegates drafted the constitution.”5

The majority judgment was disappointing with respect to federalism because the
court did not consider the Indian Constitution as a federal constitution. But
Justice Subba Rao in his dissenting opinion held that Indian constitution is a
federal Constitution. In later judgments, the Supreme Court has categorically
held that Indian Constitution is a federal constitution. In Keshavanada Bharti v.
State of Kerala.6 Sikri C.J. and other judges of the full bench considered the

5
Parthasarathy, “Federalism and constitutions Processes in India” in Copland, Rickard (eds), Federalism:
Comparative Perspectives from India and Australia. 284-285 (1999).
6
AIR 1973 SC 1461
federal character of the constitution as a basic feature of our constitution. In
State of Rajasthan n. Union of India.7 Beg, J. observed:8

In a sense, therefore, the Indian Union is federal. But, the extent of federalism in
it is largely watered down by the needs of progress and development of a
country which has to be nationally integrated, politically and economically
coordinated, and socially, intellectually and spiritually uplifted. In such a
system, the States cannot stand in the way of legitimate and comprehensively
planned development of the country in the manner directed by the Central
Government.

In State of Karnataka v. Union ofIndia,54 the majority judgment55 was not in

support of federal structure as such but Kailasam, J. (Minority View) held:9

In the distribution of powers, it is clear there is strong tilt in favour of the

Union. According to the constitution, the Union can assume powers of the State
Government by taking over the State Administration under certain
contingencies provided for in the constitution. But the Union Government
cannot claim any power which is not vested in it under the provisions of the
constitution. There is no overriding power with the Union Government. It
cannot deal with the State Government as its delegate, for the source of power
for the Union as well as the State, is the constitution and the Union Government
cannot claim any powers over the State which are not found in the Constitution.

In S.R. Bommai v. Union of India10 nine judge bench has clearly enunciated that
Indian Constitution is federal. The court held that:

....The constitution provide the more power to Central government but the state
is also supreme within its spheres”...The constitution of India is differently
described, more appropriately as ‘quasi- federal’ because it is a mixture of the
7
AIR 1977 SC 1361
8
AZ., at 1382
9
AIR 1978 SC 68
10
AIR 1994 SC 1918
federal and unitary elements, leaning more towards the latter but then what is
there in a name, what is important to bear in mind is the thrust and implications
of the various provisions of the constitution bearing on the controversy in regard
to scope and ambit of the Presidential power under Article 356 and related
provisions.

In Kuldip Nayar v. Union of India11 the Parliament in 2003 amended the

Representative of People Act, 1951 wherein it deleted the requirement of
“domicile” in the State concerned for getting elected to the Council of States.
The issue in this case was: Whether 2003 amendment Act violated the principle
of Federalism, a basic structure of the constitution? The petitioner contended
that the impugned amendment to section 3 of the Representative of People Act
1951 offended the principle of federalism. The court rejected the petitioner’s
contention and held ...India is a federal state of its kind and it is no part of
federal principle that representatives of state must belong to that state. Hence, if
Indian Parliament in its wisdom had chosen not to require residential
qualification, it would definitely not violate basic feature of federalism.

In State of West Bengal v. The Committee for Protection of Democratic Rights,

West Bengal12 in this case in exercise of power under article 226 of the
constitution, the high court handed over the investigation to CBI. Feeling
aggrieved by this order, state government filed SLP in Supreme Court. The state
questioned the jurisdiction of high court, the counsel appeared on behalf of the
state argued that it is violation of federal structure because CBI is a central
agency and cannot investigate without the consent of state. The question before
the apex court was, “whether the High Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction
under article 226 of the Constitution of India, can direct the Central Bureau of

11
AIR 2006 SC 3127
12
AIR 2010 SC 1476
Investigation (CBI), established under the Delhi Special Police Establishment
Act, 1946, to investigate a cognizable offence, which is alleged to have taken
place within the territorial jurisdiction of a State, without the consent of the
State Government”. But the contention of state was not accepted and the court
held that,

“Any direction issued by the Supreme Court or the High Court in exercise of
power under Article 32 or 226 to uphold the constitution and maintain the rule
of law cannot violate the federal structure. Being protectors of civil liberties of
the citizens, this Court and the High Courts have not only the power and
jurisdiction but also an obligation to protect the fundamental rights, guaranteed
by Part III in general and under Article 21 of the constitution in particular,
zealously and vigilantly.”

In M. C. Mehta n. Union of India,13 the Supreme Court while hearing a petition

with respect to hardship which the people living in Delhi undergo having regard
to the high pollution in the city, T.S Thakur, CJI., A.K. Sikri and R. Banumathi,
JJ. directed various measures to be undertaken by the government and local
bodies concerned. The Supreme Court asked the Central Pollution Control
Board to work in cooperation with other authorities to set up sufficient number
of control rooms in the capital to monitor the air and take action. The court has
been repeatedly asking the Centre and Kejriwal government to keep aside their
differences and devise a “common minimum programme” at least for taking
steps to deal with the pollution menace. This decision clearly indicates that both
the government at centre and state level must work for saving the life of the
people by taking proper steps for controlling pollution. It can only be possible
when both governments will work in co-operation and collaboration with each

13
(2015) SCC Online SC 1327
other along with municipal corporation. The problems of increasing pollution
are common and should be solved through a common minimum programme.

In State Bank of India n. Santosh Gupta14 the court said that:

The Constitution of India is a mosaic drawn from the experience of nations

worldwide. The federal structure of this constitution is largely reflected in Part
XI which is largely drawn from the Government of India Act, 1935. The State
of Jammu & Kashmir is a part of this federal structure. Due to historical
reasons, it is a State which is accorded special treatment within the framework
of the constitution of India. The findings of the court in this judgment now has
been diluted with respect to the special status of Jammu and Kashmir by the
Presidential order 2019.

In UCO Bank v. Dipak Debbarma,15 the court has made several observations on
the federal character of our constitution and the need to maintain the federal
balance which has been envisaged in our constitution to prevent any usurpation
of power either by the centre or the states. We reproduce the same with profit:

The federal structure under the constitutional scheme can also work
to nullify an incidental encroachment made by the Parliamentary legislation on
a subject of a State legislation where the dominant legislation is the State
legislation. An attempt to keep the aforesaid constitutional balance intact and
give a limited operation to the doctrine of federal supremacy can be discerned in
the concurring judgment of Ruma Pal, J. in ITC Ltd. n. Agricultural Produce
Market Committee, wherein after quoting the observations of this Court in the
case of S.R. Bommai n. Union of India (para. 276), the learned Judge has gone
to observe as follows (para. 94 of the report): 276. The fact that under the
scheme of our constitution, greater power is conferred upon the Centre vis-à-vis
14
Civil Appeal Nos. 12240-12246 OF 2016
15
(2017) 2 SCC 585
the States does not mean that States are mere appendages of the Centre. Within
the sphere allotted to them, tates are supreme. The Centre cannot tamper with
their powers. More particularly, the courts should not adopt an approach, an
interpretation, which has the effect of or tends to have the effect of whittling
down the powers reserved to the States. This judgment reflects that even there is
doctrine of federal supremacy but it does not mean that state have no autonomy.
The state is supreme within their allotted sphere and centre has no authority to
transgress the limits. If centre will do so, the court has to interpret the entries by
giving widest possible interpretation to each entry.

Since the AAP (Aam Admi Party) came to power in Delhi, the confrontation
with the centre started. Kejriwal alleged that LG is not allowing elected
government to work and interfering in day to day affairs, which is a violation of
federal structure. The tension between L-G and the elected government reached
to the court. The High Court of Delhi held that 16 The L-G being the
administrative head of the National Capital Territory Delhi exercised complete
control of all matters regarding (NCT) of Delhi.

The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Govt. (NCT of Delhi) v. Union
of India,17 held that “the Lieutenant-General of the Delhi had to act as per the
aid and advise of the Council of Ministers of Delhi Government except in
matters of land, police and public order.” The court further held that, “the LG
cannot interfere in each and every decision of the Delhi Government, there is no
need for the Delhi Government to seek the permission of Lt. Governor in all
matters.

16
The High Court of Delhi said that “it is mandatory under the constitutional scheme to communicate the
decision of the Council of Ministers to the Lt Governor even in relation to the matters in respect of which
power to make laws has been conferred on the Legislative Assembly of NCTD and an order thereon can be
issued only where the Lt Governor does not take a different view”, available at
https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/nation/here-s-a-brief- chronology-of-the-tug-of-war-between-aap-govt-l-
g/615084.html
17
(2018) 8 SCC 501. The court observed: “constitutional statesmanship between the two levels of governance,
the Centre and the Union Territory, ought to ensure that practical issues are resolved with a sense of political
maturity and administrative experience.”
Although decisions of the Government have to be communicated to the LG.”
The court also said that “Delhi was not a ’State’, and occupied a special status
under the constitution.”18 The Five-Judge Constitution Bench comprising of CJ
Dipak Misra, A.K Sikri J., A.M Khanwilkar J., DY Chandrachud J. and Ashok
Bhushan J., pronounced separate concurring judgments and held:19

Our constitution contemplates a meaningful orchestration of federalism

and democracy to put in place an egalitarian social order, a classical unity in a
contemporaneous diversity and a pluralistic milieu in eventual cohesiveness
without losing identity. Sincere attempts should be made to give full-fledged
effect to both these concepts.

The bench further observed20:

“The constitutional vision beckons both the Central and the State Governments
alike with the aim to have a holistic edifice. Thus, the Union and the State
Governments must embrace a collaborative federal architecture74 by
displaying harmonious coexistence and interdependence so as to avoid any
possible constitutional discord. Acceptance of pragmatic federalism75and
achieving federal balance has become a necessity requiring disciplined wisdom
on the part of the Union and the State Governments by demonstrating a
pragmatic orientation.”

This judgment is really very significant for centre and state relationship and it
focused that co operation and collaboration between two government is
required, if we want to achieve constitutional enshrined in the preamble of the

18
bid. While holding so, the court has observed that in a democracy, real power must vest in the elected
representatives and Lt. Governor cannot interfere in every decision of the Delhi Government. The court further
said that:The fundamental feature of federalism is that the legislature in each state is supreme within that
state. Therefore, in order to preserve the federal spirit of the Indian constitution it is imperative to not
interfere with the functioning of state governments by the governors or the Lt Governors who are only the
titular head of the states.
19
Id., para 284.7
20
Id., para 284.8
Constitution. The people should not suffer due to conflict between the two i.e.
the Central government and the state governments.

Critical analysis of Indian federalism:-

There is criticism that “the Indian constitution does not satisfy certain essential
tests of federalism, namely, the right of the units to make their own constitution
and provision of double citizenship76 as American constitution has. Even the
essential characteristics of federalism like duality of governments, distribution
of powers between the Union and the state governments, supremacy of the
constitution, existence of a written constitution and most importantly, authority
of the courts as final interpreters of the Constitution are all present in our
constitutional scheme.” But at the same time, the constitution has certain
features which can very well be perceived as deviations from the federal
character, due to this deviation many constitutional experts doubted on the
federal nature of the constitution. They described it as more unitary and less
federal because the Central government is more powerful than the State
governments. Distribution of power between Centre and state is done by three
lists in schedule VII, but all-important subjects either are placed in Union List
or Concurrent List and this distribution make the Centre stronger.21

Indian constitution has certain striking unitary features too. The Parliament can
alter or change the areas, boundaries or names of the States. During emergency,
the Union Parliament is empowered to make laws in relation to matters under
the State List, the Parliament shall have the power to make laws with respect to

21
Alice Jacob, “Centre-State Governmental Relations in Indian Federal System” 10 (4) Journal of Indian Law
Institute (1968).
any matter included in the State List, if the Council of States declares by a
resolution of 2/3 of its members present and voting that it is necessary in
national interest, in case of inconsistency between the Union and the State
laws, the Union Law shall prevail. If the legislature of two or more states pass a
resolution that it shall be lawful for the Parliament to make law on the subject in
State list. Parliament shall also have power for the purpose of implementation of
any International agreement, treaty and convention. If there is any repugnancy
between law made by the Parliament and the law made by the legislature of
State on the subject of Concurrent list, the law made by Parliament will occupy
the field. Additionally, the Governor of a State is empowered to reserve the Bill
passed by the State Legislature for consideration of the President and the
President is not bound to give his assent to such a bill. That apart, the executive
power of Union shall extend to give directions to the States and empower Union
officers to execute matters in the State List. Further, if the government of a state
is not carried on in accordance with the provisions of the constitution, the
President has power to impose President’s rule in such State, either on the report
of the Governor or otherwise. Fiscal federalism refers to the responsibilities
between centre and state related taxation and expenditure. Both centre and state
government can levy and collect taxes. But in our constitution more powers are
vested with the centre for imposing tax and centre has to determine the share of
state in tax revenue. The states do not have much financial resources as centre
have. In financial matters states always look for assistance to the centre. But I
think after the GST, the situation has been changed and the state governments
may tax the consumption of goods and services (SGST) and agricultural
incomes.

In our country, we have two Houses in Parliament i.e. the Lok Sabha and the
Rajya Sabha or Council of States (elected by members of state legislative
assemblies). The Fourth Schedule to the constitution provides for allocation of
seats to the States and Union Territories in Rajya Sabha. The allocation of seats
is made on the basis of the population of each state. But the election for Rajya
Sabha is merely a formality because the party can nominate any person and if
party have sufficient number of members in legislative assembly, the person
will be elected. There is also no requirement of domicile in the state concerned
getting elected. Basically, parties used to oblige to who are loyal to the party.

One of the criticisms is that the state has no role in amending process of the
constitution other than ratification by one half of the states in case of some
amendments. The power to amend lies with the centre. But I think it is not
proper to oppose the federal character on this ground because we have one
constitution for the whole country and it is considered as flexible and rigid
accordingly.

Our Constitution is considered as federal in spite of many unitary features

because almost all features of Federal Constitution exists in our constitution. In
order to be called “federal”, it is not necessary that a Constitution should adopt
the federal principle completely. It is enough if the federal principle
predominant principle in the Constitution. So the mere presence of unitary
features in a constitution, which may make a constitution quasi federal in law,
does not prevent the constitution from being predominantly federal in practice.

Conclusion:-