Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Cases For Cramming
Cases For Cramming
ALFREDO DE LEON
[G.R. No. L-2007. January 31, 1949.]
MORAN, C.J.
FACTS:
This is a petition seeking to permanently prohibit respondent Customs officials from cancelling the
registration certificates of petitioner's vessels, and respondent Philippine Shipping Administration
from rescinding the sale of three vessels to petitioner. The Philippine Shipowners' Association was
later allowed to intervene and it filed its answer against the petitioner.
1. The primary basis for respondents' and intervenor's acts is the allegation that petitioner is not a
Filipino citizen and therefore not qualified by law to operate and own vessels of Philippine
registry.
2. The Philippine Shipping Administration also alleges that petitioner violated the contract of sale
of three vessels executed between them, on the ground of misrepresentation, petitioner having
alleged in said contract that his father was a naturalized Filipino citizen.
ISSUE:
RULING:
1. YES. It is conclusive that upon the adoption of the Constitution, Victoriano Chiongbian, father of
herein petitioner, having been elected to a public office in 1925 in the Philippines before the
adoption of the Constitution, became a Filipino citizen by virtue of Article IV, section 1, subsection
2 of the Constitution. William Chiongbian, the herein petitioner, who was then a minor, also became
a Filipino citizen by reason of subsection 3 (Article IV) of the Constitution, his father having
become a Filipino citizen upon the adoption of said Constitution. This is also in conformity with the
settled rule of our jurisprudence that a legitimate minor child follows the citizenship of his father.
It may be said that the members of the Constitutional Convention could not have dedicated a
provision of our Constitution merely for the benefit of one person without considering that it could
also affect others. When they adopted subsection 2, they permitted, if not willed, that said provision
should function to the full extent of its substance and its terms, not by itself alone, but in
conjunction with all other provisions of that great document. They adopted said provision fully
cognizant of the transmissive essence of citizenship as provided in subsection 3. Had it been their
intention to curtail the transmission of citizenship in such a particular case, they would have so
clearly stated.
The mere deletion of the phrase — "and their descendants," — is not determinative of any
conclusion. It could have been done because the learned framers of our Constitution considered it
superfluous, knowing full well that the meaning of such a phrase was adequately covered by
subsection 3. Deletions in the preliminary drafts of the Convention are, at best, negative guides,
which cannot prevail over the positive provisions of the finally adopted Constitution.
2. Respondents’ allegation that the petitioner violated the contract of sale with the Philippine
Shipping Administration on the ground of misrepresentation, petitioner having alleged in said
contract that his father was a naturalized Filipino, is without merit. Such was not a deliberate
misrepresentation but an error which any person not versed in the law is prone to commit. It is clear
that petitioner merely meant that his father was a Filipino citizen by operation of law and not by
birth.
Hence, the petition for the issuance of the writ of prohibition is hereby granted and respondent
Customs officials are hereby enjoined from cancelling the registration certificates of petitioner's
vessels and respondent Philippine Shipping Administration is enjoined from rescinding the sale of
the three vessels made to petitioner.
SO VS. REPUBLIC
[G.R. No. 170603. January 29, 2007.]
CALLEJO, SR., J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Edison So filed before the RTC a Petition for Naturalization under CA No. 473, otherwise
known as the Revised Naturalization Law, as amended. He alleged the following in his petition:
He was born on February 17, 1982, in Manila; he is a Chinese citizen who has lived in No. 528
Lavezares St., Binondo, Manila, since birth; as an employee, he derives an average annual income
of around P100,000.00 with free board and lodging and other benefits; he is single, able to speak
and write English, Chinese and Tagalog; he is exempt from the filing of Declaration of Intention to
become a citizen of the Philippines pursuant to Section 6 of CA No. 473, as amended, because he
was born in the Philippines, and studied in a school recognized by the Government where
Philippine history, government and culture are taught; he is a person of good moral character; he
believes in the principles underlying the Philippine constitution; he has conducted himself in a
proper and irreproachable manner during the entire period of his residence in the Philippines in his
relation with the constituted government as well as with the community in which he is living; he has
mingled socially with the Filipinos and has evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace the
customs, traditions and ideals of the Filipino people; he has all the qualifications provided under
Section 2 and none of the disqualifications under Section 4 of C.A. No. 473, as amended; he is not
opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or group of persons who uphold
and teach doctrines opposing all organized governments; he is not defending or teaching the
necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault or assassination for the success or predominance
of men's ideas; he is not a polygamist or a believer in the practice of polygamy; he has not been
convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude; he is not suffering from any incurable contagious
diseases or from mental alienation; the nation of which he is a citizen is not at war with the
Philippines; it is his intention in good faith to become a citizen of the Philippines and to renounce
absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or
sovereignty, and particularly to China; and he will reside continuously in the Philippines from the
time of the filing of the petition up to the time of his admission as citizen of the Philippines.
Attached to the petition were the Joint Affidavit of Atty. Artemio Adasa, Jr. and Mark B. Salcedo;
and petitioner's Certificate of Live Birth, Alien Certificate of Registration, and Immigrant
Certificate of Residence.
On March 22, 2002, the RTC issued an Order8 setting the petition for hearing at 8:30 a.m. of
December 12 and 17, 2002 during which all persons concerned were enjoined to show cause, if any,
why the petition should not be granted. The entire petition and its annexes, including the order, were
ordered published once a week for three consecutive weeks in the Official Gazette and also in a
newspaper of general circulation in the City of Manila. The RTC likewise ordered that copies of the
petition and notice be posted in public and conspicuous places in the Manila City Hall Building.
Petitioner thus caused the publication of the above order, as well as the entire petition and its
annexes, in the Official Gazette and in Today, a newspaper of general circulation in the City of
Manila. No one opposed the petition.
During the hearing, petitioner presented Atty. Adasa, Jr. who testified that he came to know
petitioner in 1991 as the legal consultant and adviser of the So family's business. He would usually
attend parties and other social functions hosted by petitioner's family. He knew petitioner to be
obedient, hardworking, and possessed of good moral character, including all the qualifications and
no disqualifications mandated by law.
Another witness for petitioner, Mark Salcedo, testified that he has known petitioner for 10 years;
they first met at a birthday party in 1991. He and petitioner were classmates at the UST where they
took up Pharmacy. Petitioner was a member of some school organizations and mingled well with
friends. Salcedo further testified that he saw petitioner twice a week, and during fiestas and special
occasions when he would go to petitioner's house. He has known petitioner to have resided in
Manila since birth. Petitioner is intelligent, a person of good moral character, and believes in the
principles of the Philippine Constitution. Petitioner has a gainful occupation, has conducted himself
in a proper and irreproachable manner and has all the qualifications to become a Filipino citizen.
Petitioner also testified and attempted to prove that he has all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications to become a citizen of the Philippines.
The RTC ruled that the witnesses for petitioner had known him for the period required by law, and
they had affirmed that petitioner had all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications to
become a Filipino citizen. Thus, the court concluded that petitioner had satisfactorily supported his
petition with evidence. The OSG appealed.
1. He graduated cum laude from the UST with the degree of Bachelor of Science in Pharmacy. He
is now on his second year as a medical student at the UST Medicine and Surgery.
2. The requirements for naturalization under C.A. No. 473, as amended by LOI 270, in relation to
Presidential Decree Nos. 836 and 1379, had been relaxed after the Philippine government
entered into diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China; the requirements were
further relaxed when RA No. 9139 was signed into law.
3. Petitioner pointed out that the petition, with all its annexes, was published in the official gazette
and a newspaper of general circulation; notices were likewise sent to the National Bureau of
Investigation, DOJ, DFA, and the OSG. But none from these offices came forward to oppose
the petition before the lower court. Petitioner insisted that he has all the qualifications and none
of the disqualifications to become Filipino. This was clearly established by his witnesses.
1. Based on the evidence on record, appellee failed to prove that he possesses all the
qualifications under Section 2 and none of the disqualifications under Section 4 of C.A. No.
473.
2. It insisted that his 2 character witnesses did not know him well enough to vouch for his fitness
to become a Filipino citizen as they merely made general statements without giving specific
details about his character and moral conduct. The witnesses did not even reside in the same
place as petitioner.
3. Petitioner himself failed to prove that he is qualified to become a Filipino citizen because he
did not give any explanation or specific answers to the questions propounded by his lawyer.
He merely answered "yes" or "no" or gave general statements in answer to his counsel's
questions. Thus, petitioner was unable to prove that he had all the qualifications and none of
the disqualifications required by law to be a naturalized Filipino citizen.
4. In its Reply Brief, respondent alleged that R.A. No. 9139 applies to administrative
naturalization filed with the Special Committee on Naturalization. It insisted that even in the
absence of any opposition, a petition for naturalization may be dismissed.
The CA set aside the ruling of the RTC and dismissed the petition for naturalization without
prejudice. According to the CA, petitioner's two (2) witnesses were not credible because they failed
to mention specific details of petitioner's life or character to show how well they knew him; they
merely "parroted" the provisions of the Naturalization Act without clearly explaining their
applicability to petitioner's case. It ruled that petitioner failed to comply with the requirement of the
law that the applicant must not be less than 21 years of age on the day of the hearing of the petition;
during the first hearing on December 12, 2002, petitioner was only20 years, 9 months, and 25 days
old, falling short of the requirement. The CA stated, however, that it was not its intention to forever
close the door to any future application for naturalization which petitioner would file, and that it
believes that he would make a good Filipino citizen in due time, a decided asset to this country.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied.
ISSUES:
1. WON R.A. No. 9139 applies to petitions for naturalization by judicial act; and
2. WON the witnesses presented by petitioner are "credible" in accordance with the
jurisprudence and the definition and guidelines set forth in C.A. No. 473.
RULING:
Naturalization signifies the act of formally adopting a foreigner into the political body of a nation by
clothing him or her with the privileges of a citizen. Under current and existing laws, there are three
ways by which an alien may become a citizen by naturalization: (a) administrative naturalization
pursuant to R.A. No. 9139; (b) judicial naturalization pursuant to C.A. No. 473, as amended; and (c)
legislative naturalization in the form of a law enacted by Congress bestowing Philippine citizenship
to an alien.
Petitioner's contention that the qualifications an applicant for naturalization should possess are those
provided for in R.A. No. 9139 and not those set forth in C.A. No. 473 is barren of merit. The
qualifications and disqualifications of an applicant for naturalization by judicial act are set forth in
Sections 2 and 4 of C.A. No. 473. On the other hand, Sections 3 and 4 of R.A. No. 9139 provide for
the qualifications and disqualifications of an applicant for naturalization by administrative act.
Indeed, R.A. No. 9139 was enacted as a remedial measure intended to make the process of
acquiring Philippine citizenship less tedious, less technical and more encouraging. It likewise
addresses the concerns of degree holders who, by reason of lack of citizenship requirement, cannot
practice their profession, thus promoting "brain gain" for the Philippines. These however, do not
justify petitioner's contention that the qualifications set forth in said law apply even to applications
for naturalization by judicial act.
First. C.A. No. 473 and R.A. No. 9139 are separate and distinct laws — the former covers all aliens
regardless of class while the latter covers native-born aliens who lived here in the Philippines all
their lives, who never saw any other country and all along thought that they were Filipinos; who
have demonstrated love and loyalty to the Philippines and affinity to the customs and traditions. To
reiterate, the intention of the legislature in enacting R.A. No. 9139 was to make the process of
acquiring Philippine citizenship less tedious, less technical and more encouraging which is
administrative rather than judicial in nature. Thus, although the legislature believes that there is a
need to liberalize the naturalization law of the Philippines, there is nothing from which it can be
inferred that C.A. No. 473 was intended to be amended or repealed by R.A. No. 9139. What the
legislature had in mind was merely to prescribe another mode of acquiring Philippine citizenship
which may be availed of by native born aliens. The only implication is that, a native born alien has
the choice to apply for judicial or administrative naturalization, subject to the prescribed
qualifications and disqualifications. DHITSc
In the instant case, petitioner applied for naturalization by judicial act, though at the time of the
filing of his petition, administrative naturalization under R.A. No. 9139 was already available.
Consequently, his application should be governed by C.A. No. 473.
Second. If the qualifications prescribed in R.A. No. 9139 would be made applicable even to judicial
naturalization, the coverage of the law would be broadened since it would then apply even to aliens
who are not native born. It must be stressed that R.A. No. 9139 applies only to aliens who were
born in the Philippines and have been residing here.
Third. Applying the provisions of R.A. No. 9139 to judicial naturalization is contrary to the
intention of the legislature to liberalize the naturalization procedure in the country. One of the
qualifications set forth in R.A. No. 9139 is that the applicant was born in the Philippines and should
have been residing herein since birth. Thus, one who was born here but left the country, though
resided for more than 10 years from the filing of the application is also disqualified. On the other
hand, if we maintain the distinct qualifications under each of the two laws, an alien who is not
qualified under R.A. No. 9139 may still be naturalized under C.A. No. 473.
Thus, absent a specific provision expressly amending C.A. No. 473, the law stands and the
qualifications and disqualifications set forth therein are maintained.
In any event, petitioner failed to prove that the witnesses he presented were competent to vouch for
his good moral character, and are themselves possessed of good moral character. It must be stressed
that character witnesses in naturalization proceedings stand as insurers of the applicant's conduct
and character. Thus, they ought to testify on specific facts and events justifying the inference that
the applicant possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided by law.
Petitioner's witnesses, Atty. Adasa and Salcedo, did not testify on his specific acts; they did not
elaborate on his traits. Their testimonies do not convince the Court that they personally know
petitioner well and are therefore in a position to vouch for his qualifications. As correctly found by
the CA, the witnesses' testimonies consisted mainly of general statements in answer to the leading
questions propounded by his counsel. What they conveniently did was to enumerate the
qualifications as set forth in the law without giving specific details.
In sum, petitioner's witnesses clearly did not personally know him well enough; their testimonies do
not satisfactorily establish that petitioner has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications
prescribed by law.
In naturalization proceedings, it is the burden of the applicant to prove not only his own good moral
character but also the good moral character of his/her witnesses, who must be credible persons.
Within the purview of the naturalization law, a "credible person" is not only an individual who has
not been previously convicted of a crime; who is not a police character and has no police record;
who has not perjured in the past; or whose affidavit or testimony is not incredible. What must be
credible is not the declaration made but the person making it. This implies that such person must
have a good standing in the community; that he is known to be honest and upright; that he is
reputed to be trustworthy and reliable; and that his word may be taken on its face value, as a good
warranty of the applicant's worthiness.
The records likewise do not show that the character witnesses of petitioner are persons of good
standing in the community; that they are honest and upright, or reputed to be trustworthy and
reliable. The most that was established was the educational attainment of the witnesses; however,
this cannot be equated with their credibility. In fine, petitioner focused on presenting evidence
tending to build his own good moral character and neglected to establish the credibility and good
moral character of his witnesses.
We do not agree with petitioner's argument that respondent is precluded from questioning the RTC
decision because of its failure to oppose the petition. A naturalization proceeding is not a judicial
adversary proceeding, and the decision rendered therein does not constitute res judicata. A
certificate of naturalization may be cancelled if it is subsequently discovered that the applicant
obtained it by misleading the court upon any material fact. Law and jurisprudence even authorize
the cancellation of a certificate of naturalization upon grounds or conditions arisingsubsequent to
the granting of the certificate. If the government can challenge a final grant of citizenship, with
more reason can it appeal the decision of the RTC within the reglementary period despite its failure
to oppose the petition before the lower court.
Thus, petitioner failed to show full and complete compliance with the requirements of naturalization
law. For this reason, the Court affirmed the decision of the CA denying the petition for
naturalization without prejudice.
It must be stressed that admission to citizenship is one of the highest privileges that the Republic of
the Philippines can confer upon an alien. It is a privilege that should not be conferred except upon
persons fully qualified for it, and upon strict compliance with the law.
POE-LLAMANZARES V. COMELEC
[G.R. No. 221697. March 8, 2016.]
PEREZ, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares was found abandoned as a newborn infant in
the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo on Sept. 3, 1968. After passing the parental care and custody over
petitioner by Edgardo Militar to Emiliano Militar and his wife, she has been reported and registered
as a foundling and issued a Foundling Certificate and Certificate of Live Birth, thus was given the
name, Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar.
When the petitioner reached the age of five (5), celebrity spouses Ronal Allan Kelley (aka Fernando
Poe, Jr) and Jesusa Sonora Poe (aka Susan Roces) filed a petition foe her adoption. The trial court
granted their petition and ordered that her name be changed to Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe.
Petitioner registered as a voter in San Juan City at the age of 18 in 1986; in 1988, she applied and
was issued Philippine Passport by the DFA; in 1993 and 1998, she renewed her passport. She left
for the United States (U.S.) in 1988 to continue her studies after enrolling and pursuing a degree in
Development Studies at the University of the Philippines. She graduated in 1991 from Boston
College where she earned her Bachelor of Arts degree in Political Studies.
She married Teodoro Misael Daniel V. Llamanzares, a citizen of both the Philippines and the U.S.,
in San Juan City and decided to flew back to the U.S. after their wedding. She gave birth to her
eldest child while in the U.S.; and her two daughters in the Philippines. She became a naturalized
American citizen in 2001. She came back to the Philippines to support her father’s candidacy for
president in the May 2004 elections and gave birth to her youngest daughter. They then returned to
the U.S. in 2004 but after few months, she rushed back to the Philippines to attend to her ailing
father. After her father’s death, the petitioner and her husband decided to move and reside
permanently in the Philippines in 2005 and immediately secured a TIN, then her children followed
suit; acquired property where she and her children resided.
In 2006, She took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to RA No.
9225 or the Citizenship retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003; she filed a sworn petition to
reacquire Philippine citizenship together with petitions for derivative citizenship on behalf of her
three children which was granted. She registered as a voter; secured Philippine passport; appointed
and took her oath as Chairperson of the MTRCB after executing an affidavit of Renunciation of
American citizenship before the Vice Consul of the USA and was issued a Certificate of Loss of
Nationality of the USA in 2011.
In 2012, she filed with the COMELEC her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for Senator for the 2013
Elections wherein she answered “6 years and 6 months” to the question “Period of residence in the
Philippines before May 13, 2013.” Petitioner obtained the highest number of votes and was
proclaimed Senator on 16 May 2013.
On 15 October 2015, petitioner filed her COC for the Presidency for the May 2016 Elections. In her
COC, the petitioner declared that she is a natural-born citizen and that her residence in the
Philippines up to the day before 9 May 2016 would be 10 years and 11 months counted from 24
May 2005. The petitioner attached to her COC an “Affidavit Affirming Renunciation of U.S.A.
Citizenship” subscribed and sworn to before a notary public in Quezon City on 14 October 2015.
Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to deny or cancel her candidacy on the ground
particularly, among others, that she cannot be considered a natural-born Filipino citizen since she
cannot prove that her biological parents or either of them were Filipinos. The COMELEC en banc
cancelled her candidacy on the ground that she was in want of citizenship and residence
requirements, and that she committed material misrepresentations in her COC.
On certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed the ruling and held (9-6 votes) that Poe is qualified as a
candidate for Presidency. Three justices, however, abstained to vote on the natural-born citizenship
issue.
CONTENTION
Elamparo argued that petitioner cannot be considered as a natural-born Filipino on account of the
fact that she was a foundling. Elamparo claimed that international law does not confer natural-born
status and Filipino citizenship on foundlings. Hence, petitioner is not qualified to apply for
reacquisition of Filipino citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 for she is not a natural-born Filipino
citizen to begin with. Even assuming arguendo that petitioner was a natural-born Filipino, she is
deemed to have lost that status when she became a naturalized American citizen. According to
Elamparo, natural- born citizenship must be continuous from birth.
Elamparo pointed out that petitioner was bound by the sworn declaration she made in her 2012
COC for Senator wherein she indicated that she had resided in the country for only 6 years and 6
months as of May 2013 Elections.
Assuming arguendo that petitioner is qualified to regain her natural-born status under R.A. No.
9225, she still fell short of the 10-year residency requirement of the Constitution as her residence
could only be counted at the earliest from July 2006, when she reacquired Philippine citizenship
under the said Act. Also on the assumption that petitioner is qualified to reacquire lost Philippine
Citizenship, Elamparo is of the belief that she failed to reestablish her domicile in the Philippines.
Tatad theorized that since the Philippines adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis, persons of
unknown parentage, particularly foundlings, cannot be considered natural-born Filipino citizens
since blood relationship is determinative of natural-born status. Tatad invoked the rule of statutory
construction that what is not included is excluded. He averred that the fact that foundlings were not
expressly included in the categories of citizens in the 1935 Constitution is indicative of the framers'
intent to exclude them. Therefore, the burden lies on petitioner to prove that she is a natural-born
citizen.
Neither can petitioner seek refuge under international conventions or treaties to support her claim
that foundlings have a nationality. According to Tatad, international conventions and treaties are not
self-executory and that local legislations are necessary in order to give effect to treaty obligations
assumed by the Philippines. He also stressed that there is no standard state practice that
automatically confers natural-born status to foundlings.
Similar to Elamparo's argument, Tatad claimed that petitioner cannot avail of the option to reacquire
Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 because it only applies to former natural-born citizens
and petitioner was not as she was a foundling.
Referring to petitioner's COC for Senator, Tatad concluded that she did not comply with the ten
(10)-year residency requirement. Tatad opined that petitioner acquired her domicile in Quezon City
only from the time she renounced her American citizenship which was sometime in 2010 or 2011.
Additionally, Tatad questioned petitioner's lack of intention to abandon her U.S. domicile as evinced
by the fact that her husband stayed thereat and her frequent trips to the U.S.
In support of his petition to deny due course or cancel the COC of petitioner, docketed as SPA No.
15-139 (DC), Valdez alleged that her repatriation under R.A. No. 9225 did not bestow upon her the
status of a natural-born citizen. He advanced the view that former natural-born citizens who are
repatriated under the said Act reacquires only their Philippine citizenship and will not revert to their
original status as natural- born citizens.
He further argued that petitioner's own admission in her COC for Senator that she had only been a
resident of the Philippines for at least six (6) years and six (6) months prior to the 13 May 2013
Elections operates against her. Valdez rejected petitioner's claim that she could have validly
reestablished her domicile in the Philippines prior to her reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. In
effect, his position was that petitioner did not meet the ten (10)-year residency requirement for
President.
Contreras contended that the reckoning period for computing petitioner's residency in the
Philippines should be from 18 July 2006, the date when her petition to reacquire Philippine
citizenship was approved by the BI. He asserted that petitioner's physical presence in the country
before 18 July 2006 could not be valid evidence of reacquisition of her Philippine domicile since
she was then living here as an American citizen and as such, she was governed by the Philippine
immigration laws.
1. Tatad’s petition should be dismissed outright for failure to state a cause of action. His petition
did not invoke grounds proper for a disqualification case as enumerated under Sections 12 and
68 of the Omnibus Election Code. Instead, Tatad completely relied on the alleged lack of
residency and natural-born status of petitioner which are not among the recognized grounds for
the disqualification of a candidate to an elective office.
2. The petitions filed against her are basically petitions for quo warranto as they focus on
establishing her ineligibility for the Presidency. A petition for quo warranto falls within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the PET and not the COMELEC.
3. The burden to prove that she is not a natural-born Filipino citizen is on the respondents.
Otherwise stated, she has a presumption in her favor that she is a natural-born citizen of this
country.
4. Customary international law dictates that foundlings are entitled to a nationality and are
presumed to be citizens of the country where they are found. Consequently, the petitioner is
considered as a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.
5. She claimed that as a natural-born citizen, she has every right to be repatriated under R.A. No.
9225 or the right to reacquire her natural-born status. Moreover, the official acts of the
Philippine Government enjoy the presumption of regularity, to wit: the issuance of the 18 July
2006 Order of the BI declaring her as natural-born citizen, her appointment as MTRCB Chair
and the issuance of the decree of adoption of San Juan RTC. She believed that all these acts
reinforced her position that she is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.
6. She maintained that as early as the first quarter of 2005, she started reestablishing her domicile
of choice in the Philippines as demonstrated by her children's resettlement and schooling in the
country, purchase of a condominium unit in San Juan City and the construction of their family
home in Corinthian Hills.
7. She insisted that she could legally reestablish her domicile of choice in the Philippines even
before she renounced her American citizenship as long as the three determinants for a change of
domicile are complied with. She reasoned out that there was no requirement that renunciation of
foreign citizenship is a prerequisite for the acquisition of a new domicile of choice.
8. She reiterated that the period appearing in the residency portion of her COC for Senator was a
mistake made in good faith.
ISSUE:
RULING:
1. The fact is that petitioner's blood relationship with a Filipino citizen is DEMONSTRABLE. At
the outset, it must be noted that presumptions regarding paternity is neither unknown nor
unaccepted in Philippine Law. The Family Code of the Philippines has a whole chapter on Paternity
and Filiation. That said, there is more than sufficient evidence that petitioner has Filipino parents
and is therefore a natural-born Filipino. Parenthetically, the burden of proof was on private
respondents to show that petitioner is not a Filipino citizen. The private respondents should have
shown that both of petitioner's parents were aliens. Her admission that she is a foundling did not
shift the burden to her because such status did not exclude the possibility that her parents were
Filipinos, especially as in this case where there is a high probability, if not certainty, that her parents
are Filipinos.
Other circumstantial evidence of the nationality of petitioner's parents are the fact that she was
abandoned as an infant in a Roman Catholic Church in Iloilo City. She also has typical Filipino
features: height, flat nasal bridge, straight black hair, almond shaped eyes and an oval face.
There is a disputable presumption that things have happened according to the ordinary course of
nature and the ordinary habits of life. All of the foregoing evidence, that a person with typical
Filipino features is abandoned in Catholic Church in a municipality where the population of the
Philippines is overwhelmingly Filipinos such that there would be more than a 99% chance that a
child born in the province would be a Filipino, would indicate more than ample probability if not
statistical certainty, that petitioner's parents are Filipinos.
As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens. While the 1935 Constitution's
enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language which would definitely
exclude foundlings either. Because of silence and ambiguity in the enumeration with respect to
foundlings, there is a need to examine the intent of the framers.
Though the Rafols amendment was not carried out1, it was not because there was any objection to
the notion that persons of "unknown parentage" are not citizens but only because their number was
not enough to merit specific mention. Such was the account, cited by petitioner, of delegate and
constitution law author Jose Aruego who said:
During the debates on this provision, Delegate Rafols presented an amendment to include as
Filipino citizens the illegitimate children with a foreign father of a mother who was a citizen of the
Philippines, and also foundlings; but this amendment was defeated primarily because the
Convention believed that the cases, being too few to warrant the inclusion of a provision in the
Constitution to apply to them, should be governed by statutory legislation. Moreover, it was
believed that the rules of international law were already clear to the effect that illegitimate children
followed the citizenship of the mother, and that foundlings followed the nationality of the place
where they were found, thereby making unnecessary the inclusion in the Constitution of the
proposed amendment.
We find no such intent or language permitting discrimination against foundlings. On the contrary,
all three Constitutions guarantee the basic right to equal protection of the laws. All exhort the State
to render social justice. Of special consideration are several provisions in the present charter: Article
II, Section 11 which provides that the "State values the dignity of every human person and
guarantees full respect for human rights," Article XIII, Section 1 which mandates Congress to "give
highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all the people to
human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities . . ." and Article XV, Section 3
which requires the State to defend the "right of children to assistance, including proper care and
nutrition, and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other
conditions prejudicial to their development." Certainly, these provisions contradict an intent to
discriminate against foundlings on account of their unfortunate status.
Domestic laws on adoption also support the principle that foundlings are Filipinos. These laws do
not provide that adoption confers citizenship upon the adoptee. Rather, the adoptee must be a
Filipino in the first place to be adopted. The most basic of such laws is Article 15 of the Civil Code
which provides that "[l]aws relating to family rights, duties, status, conditions, legal capacity of
1 It was not carried out because during the deliberations, Sr. Roxas opined that these cases (foundlings) are few and far
in between, that the constitution need [not] refer to them. By international law the principle that children or people born
in a country of unknown parents are citizens in this nation is recognized, and it is not necessary to include a provision
on the subject exhaustively.
persons are binding on citizens of the Philippines even though living abroad." Adoption deals with
status, and a Philippine adoption court will have jurisdiction only if the adoptee is a Filipino.
It has been argued that the process to determine that the child is a foundling leading to the issuance
of a foundling certificate under these laws and the issuance of said certificate are acts to acquire or
perfect Philippine citizenship which make the foundling a naturalized Filipino at best. This is
erroneous. Under Article IV, Section 2 "Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the
Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine
citizenship." In the first place, "having to perform an act" means that the act must be personally
done by the citizen. In this instance, the determination of foundling status is done not by the child
but by the authorities. Secondly, the object of the process is the determination of the whereabouts of
the parents, not the citizenship of the child. Lastly, the process is certainly not analogous to
naturalization proceedings to acquire Philippine citizenship, or the election of such citizenship by
one born of an alien father and a Filipino mother under the 1935 Constitution, which is an act to
perfect it.
In this instance, such issue is moot because there is no dispute that petitioner is a foundling, as
evidenced by a Foundling Certificate issued in her favor. The Decree of Adoption issued on 13 May
1974, which approved petitioner's adoption by Jesusa Sonora Poe and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe,
expressly refers to Emiliano and his wife, Rosario Militar, as her "foundling parents," hence
effectively affirming petitioner's status as a foundling.
Foundlings are likewise citizens under international law. Under the 1987 Constitution, an
international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either by transformation or
incorporation. The transformation method requires that an international law be transformed into a
domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. On the other hand,
generally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the incorporation clause of the
Constitution, form part of the laws of the land even if they do not derive from treaty obligations.
Generally accepted principles of international law include international custom as evidence of a
general practice accepted as law, and general principles of law recognized by civilized nations.
International customary rules are accepted as binding as a result from the combination of two
elements: the established, widespread, and consistent practice on the part of States; and a
psychological element known as the opinion juris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity).
Implicit in the latter element is a belief that the practice in question is rendered obligatory by the
existence of a rule of law requiring it. "General principles of law recognized by civilized nations"
are principles "established by a process of reasoning" or judicial logic, based on principles which
are "basic to legal systems generally," such as "general principles of equity, i.e., the general
principles of fairness and justice," and the "general principle against discrimination" which is
embodied in the UDHR, ECOSOC, etc.
The common thread of the UDHR, UNCRC and ICCPR is to obligate the Philippines to grant
nationality from birth and ensure that no child is stateless. This grant of nationality must be at the
time of birth, and it cannot be accomplished by the application of our present naturalization laws,
Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended, and R.A. No. 9139, both of which require the applicant
to be at least 18 years old.
That the Philippines is not a party to the 1930 Hague Convention nor to the 1961 Convention on the
Reduction of Statelessness does not mean that their principles are not binding. While the
Philippines is not a party to the 1930 Hague Convention, it is a signatory to the Universal
Declaration on Human Rights, Article 15 (1) of which effectively affirms Article 14 of the 1930
Hague Convention. Article 2 of the 1961 "United Nations Convention on the Reduction of
Statelessness" merely "gives effect" to Article 15 (1) of the UDHR.
2. Petitioner's claim that she will have been a resident for 10 years and 11 months on the day before
the 2016 elections, is true.
The Constitution requires presidential candidates to have 10 years' residence in the Philippines
before the day of the elections. Since the forthcoming elections will be held on 9 May 2016,
petitioner must have been a resident of the Philippines prior to 9 May 2016 for ten (10) years. In
answer to the requested information of "Period of Residence in the Philippines up to the day before
May 09, 2016," she put in "10 years 11 months" which according to her pleadings in these cases
corresponds to a beginning date of 25 May 2005 when she returned for good from the U.S.
When petitioner immigrated to the U.S. in 1991, she lost her original domicile, which is the
Philippines. There are three requisites to acquire a new domicile: 1. Residence or bodily presence in
a new locality; 2. an intention to remain there; and 3. an intention to abandon the old domicile. To
successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate an actual removal or an actual
change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and
establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose. In other words, there
must basically be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or
at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence must be
voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual.
Petitioner presented voluminous evidence showing that she and her family abandoned their U.S.
domicile and relocated to the Philippines for good. These evidence include petitioner's former U.S.
passport showing her arrival on 24 May 2005 and her return to the Philippines every time she
travelled abroad; e-mail correspondences starting in March 2005 to September 2006 with a freight
company to arrange for the shipment of their household items weighing about 28,000 pounds to the
Philippines; e-mail with the Philippine Bureau of Animal Industry inquiring how to ship their dog to
the Philippines; school records of her children showing enrollment in Philippine schools starting
June 2005 and for succeeding years; tax identification card for petitioner issued on July 2005; titles
for condominium and parking slot issued in February 2006 and their corresponding tax declarations
issued in April 2006; receipts dated 23 February 2005 from the Salvation Army in the U.S.
acknowledging donation of items from petitioner's family; March 2006 e-mail to the U.S. Postal
Service confirming request for change of address; final statement from the First American Title
Insurance Company showing sale of their U.S. home on 27 April 2006; 12 July 2011 filled-up
questionnaire submitted to the U.S. Embassy where petitioner indicated that she had been a
Philippine resident since May 2005; affidavit from Jesusa Sonora Poe (attesting to the return of
petitioner on 24 May 2005 and that she and her family stayed with affiant until the condominium
was purchased); and Affidavit from petitioner's husband (confirming that the spouses jointly
decided to relocate to the Philippines in 2005 and that he stayed behind in the U.S. only to finish
some work and to sell the family home).
It is obvious that because of the sparse evidence on residence in the four cases cited by the
respondents, the Court had no choice but to hold that residence could be counted only from
acquisition of a permanent resident visa or from reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. In contrast,
the evidence of petitioner is overwhelming and taken together leads to no other conclusion that she
decided to permanently abandon her U.S. residence (selling the house, taking the children from U.S.
schools, getting quotes from the freight company, notifying the U.S. Post Office of the abandonment
of their address in the U.S., donating excess items to the Salvation Army, her husband resigning
from U.S. employment right after selling the U.S. house) and permanently relocate to the
Philippines and actually re-established her residence here on 24 May 2005 (securing T.I.N.,
enrolling her children in Philippine schools, buying property here, constructing a residence here,
returning to the Philippines after all trips abroad, her husband getting employed here). Indeed,
coupled with her eventual application to reacquire Philippine citizenship and her family's actual
continuous stay in the Philippines over the years, it is clear that when petitioner returned on 24 May
2005 it was for good.
COMMONWEALTH ACT No. 625
AN ACT PROVIDING THE MANNER IN WHICH THE OPTION TO ELECT PHILIPPINE
CITIZENSHIP SHALL BE DECLARED BY A PERSON WHOSE MOTHER IS A FILIPINO
CITIZEN
Section 1. The option to elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with subsection (4), section 1,
Article IV, of the Constitution shall be expressed in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the
party concerned before any officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest
civil registry. The said party shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to
the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines.
Section 2. If the party concerned is absent from the Philippines, he may make the statement herein
authorized before any officer of the Government of the United States authorized to administer oaths,
and he shall forward such statement together with his oath of allegiance, to the Civil Registry of
Manila.
Section 3. The civil registrar shall collect as filing fees of the statement, the amount of ten pesos.
Section 4. The penalty of prision correccional, or a fine not exceeding ten thousand pesos, or both,
shall be imposed on anyone found guilty of fraud or falsehood in making the statement herein
prescribed.
Section 1. Short Title. - This Act shall be known as "The Administrative Naturalization Law of
2000.”
Section 2. Declaration of Policy. - The State shall control and regulate the admission and
integration of aliens into its territory and body politic including the grant of citizenship to aliens.
Towards this end, aliens born and residing in the Philippines may be granted Philippine citizenship
by administrative proceedings subject to certain requirements dictated by national security and
interest.
Section 3. Qualifications. - Subject to the provisions of the succeeding section, any person desiring
to avail of the benefits of this Act must meet the following qualifications:
(a) The applicant must be born in the Philippines and residing therein since birth;
(b) The applicant must not be less than eighteen (18) years of age, at the time of filing of his/her
petition;
(c) The applicant must be of good moral character and believes in the underlying principles of the
Constitution, and must have conducted himself/herself in a proper and irreproachable manner
during his/her entire period of residence in the Philippines in his relation with the duly constituted
government as well as with the community in which he/she is living;
(d) The applicant must have received his/her primary and secondary education in any public school
or private educational institution dully recognized by the Department of Education, Culture and
Sports, where Philippine history, government and civics are taught and prescribed as part of the
school curriculum and where enrollment is not limited to any race or nationality: Provided, That
should he/she have minor children of school age, he/she must have enrolled them in similar schools;
(e) The applicant must have a known trade, business, profession or lawful occupation, from which
he/she derives income sufficient for his/her support and if he/she is married and/or has dependents,
also that of his/her family: Provided, however, That this shall not apply to applicants who are
college degree holders but are unable to practice their profession because they are disqualified to do
so by reason of their citizenship;
(f) The applicant must be able to read, write and speak Filipino or any of the dialects of the
Philippines; and
(g) The applicant must have mingled with the Filipinos and evinced a sincere desire to learn and
embrace the customs, traditions and ideals of the Filipino people.
Section 4. Disqualifications, - The following are not qualified to be naturalized as Filipino citizens
under this Act:
(a) Those opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association of group of persons
who uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organized governments;
(b) Those defending or teaching the necessity of or propriety of violence, personal assault or
assassination for the success or predominance of their ideas;
(c) Polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy;
(d) Those convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude;
(e) Those suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases;
(f) Those who, during the period of their residence in the Philippines, have not mingled socially
with Filipinos, or who have not evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace the customs,
traditions and ideals of the Filipinos;
(g) Citizens or subjects with whom the Philippines is at war, during the period of such war; and
(h) Citizens or subjects of a foreign country whose laws do not grant Filipinos the right to be
naturalized citizens or subjects thereof.
Section 5. Petition for Citizenship. - (1) Any person desiring to acquire Philippine citizenship under
this Act shall file with the Special Committee on Naturalization created under Section 6 hereof, a
petition of five (5) copies legibly typed and signed, thumbmarked and verified by him/her, with the
latter's passport-sized photograph attached to each copy of the petition, and setting forth the
following:
(a) The petitioner's name and surname, and any other name he/she has used or by which he/she is
known;
(b) The petitioner's present and former places of residence;
(c) The petitioner's place and date of birth, the names and citizenship of his/her parents and their
residences;
(d) The petitioner's trade, business, profession or occupation, and if married, also that of his/her
spouse;
(e) Whether the petitioner is single or married or his/her marriage is annulled. If married, petitioner
shall state the date and place of his/her marriage, and the name, date of birth, birthplace, citizenship
and residence of his/her spouse; and if his marriage is annulled, the date of decree of annulment of
marriage and the court which granted the same;
(f) If the petitioner has children, the name, date and birthplace and residences of his/her children ;
(g) A declaration that the petitioner possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications
under this Act;
(h) A declaration that the petitioner shall never be a public charge; and
(i) A declaration that it is the petitioner's true and honest intention to acquire Philippine citizenship
and to renounce absolutely and forever any prince, potentate, State or sovereign, and particularly
the country of which the applicant is a citizen or subject.
If the petition is found by the Committee to be wanting in substance and form, the petition shall be
dismissed without prejudice.
Section 8. Approval or Disapproval of the Petition. - Within sixty (60) days from receipt of the
report of the agencies which were furnished a copy of the petition or the date of the last publication
of the petition, whichever comes in later, the Committee shall consider and review all relevant and
material information it has received pertaining to the petition, and may, for the purpose call the
petitioner for interview to ascertain his/her identity, the authenticity of the petition and its annexes,
and to determine the truthfulness of the statements and declarations made in the petition and its
annexes.
If the Committee shall have received any information adverse to the petition, the Committee shall
allow the petitioner to answer, explain or refute the information.
Thereafter, if the Committee believes, in view of the facts before it, that the petitioner has all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications required for Philippine citizenship under this Act, it
shall approve the petition and henceforth, notify the petitioner of the fact of such approval.
Otherwise, the Committee shall disapprove the same.
Section 9. Decree of Naturalization and Naturalization Processing Fee. -Within thirty (30) days
from the receipt of the notice of the approval of his/her petition, the applicant shall pay to the
Committee a naturalization fee of One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) payable as follows:
Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) upon the approval of the petition and Fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) upon the taking of the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, forthwith,
a certificate of naturalization shall be issued. Within sixty (60) days from the issuance of the
certificate, the petitioner shall take an oath of allegiance in the proper forum upon proof of payment
of the required naturalization processing fee and certificate of naturalization. Should the applicant
fail to take the abovementioned oath of allegiance within said period of time, the approval of the
petition shall be deemed abandoned.
Section 10. Duty of the Bureau of Immigration. - Within five (5) days after the applicant has taken
his oath of allegiance as required in the preceding section, the BI shall forward a copy of the
petitioner's oath to the proper local civil registrar. Thereafter, the BI shall cancel the alien
certificates of registration of the applicant.
Section 11. Status of Alien Wife and Minor Children. - After the approval of the petition for
administrative naturalization in cancellation of applicant's alien certificate of registration, applicant's
alien lawful wife and minor children may file a petition for cancellation of their alien certificates of
registration with the Committee subject to the payment of the filing fee of Twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000.00) and naturalization fee of Forty thousand pesos (P40,000.00) payable as follows:
Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) upon the approval of the petition and Twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000.00) upon the taking of the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.
Section 12. Status of Alien Husband and Minor Children. - If the applicant is a married woman, the
approval of her petition for administrative naturalization will not benefit her alien husband but her
minor children may file a petition for cancellation of their alien certificates of registration with the
BI subject to the requirements of existing laws.
Section 13. Cancellation of the Certificate of Naturalization. - The Special Committee may cancel
certificates of naturalization issued under this Act in the following cases:
(a) If it finds that the naturalized person or his duly authorized representative made any false
statement or misrepresentation or committed any violation of law, rules and regulations in
connection with the petition for naturalization, or if he otherwise obtains Philippine citizenship
fraudulently or illegally, the certificate of naturalization shall be cancelled;
(b) If the naturalized person or his wife, or any or his minor children who acquire Filipino
citizenship by virtue of his naturalization shall, within five (5) years next following the grant of
Philippine citizenship, establish permanent residence in a foreign country, that individual's
certificate of naturalization or acquired citizenship shall be cancelled or revoked: Provided, That the
fact of such person's remaining for more than one (1) year in his country of origin, or two (2) years
in any foreign country, shall be considered prima facie evidence of intent to permanently reside
therein;
(c) If the naturalized person or his wife or child with acquired citizenship allows himself or herself
to be used as a dummy in violation of any constitutional or legal provision requiring Philippine
citizenship as a condition for the exercise, use or enjoyment of a right, franchise or privilege, the
certificate of naturalization or acquired citizenship shall be cancelled or revoked; and
(d) If the naturalized person or his wife or child with acquired citizenship commits any act inimical
to national security, the certificate of naturalization or acquired citizenship shall be cancelled or
revoked.
In case the naturalized person holds any hereditary title, or belong to any order of nobility, he shall
make an express renunciation of his title or membership in this order of nobility before the Special
Committee or its duly authorized representative, and such renunciation shall be included in the
records of his application for citizenship.
Section 14. Penalties. - Any person who shall fraudulently make, falsify, forge, change, alter, or
cause or aid any person to do the same, or who shall purposely aid and assist in falsely making,
forging, falsifying, changing or altering a naturalization certificate issued under this proceeding for
the purpose of making use thereof, or in order that the same may be used by another person or
persons, and any person who shall purposely aid and assist another in obtaining a naturalization
certificate in violation of this Act, shall be punished by a fine of not more than Five hundred
thousand pesos (P500,OOO.OO) and by imprisonment for not more than five (5) years, and in the
case that the person convicted is a naturalized citizen, his certificate of naturalization shall, if not
earlier cancelled by the Special Committee, be ordered cancelled.
Section 15. Any person who failed to register his/her birth with the concerned city or municipal
civil registrar may, within two (2) years from the effectivity of this Act, file a petition for the
acquisition of the Philippine citizenship: Provided, That the applicant possesses all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications under this Act and subject to the requirements of
existing laws.
Section 16. Special Disposition of the Filing Fee. - An amount equivalent to twenty five percent
(25%) of the filing fee to be paid by the applicants pursuant to Section 7 hereof shall accrue to the
University of the Philippines Law Center and another twenty-five percent (25%) shall be allotted for
the publication of the Journal of the House of Representatives. Said amount shall be treated as
receipts automatically appropriated.
Section 17. Implementing Rules and Regulations. - The Special Committee on Naturalization is
hereby authorized to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be needed for the proper
implementation of the provisions of this Act.
Section 18. Repealing Clause. -All provisions of existing laws, orders, decrees, rules and
regulations contrary to or inconsistent with this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
Section 19. Separability CIause. - If any part, section or provision of this Act is declared invalid or
unconstitutional, the part, section or provision not affected thereby shall continue to be in force and
effect.
Section 20. Effectivity Clause. - This Act shall take effect after 15 days following its publication in
at least 2 newspapers of general circulation.