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EN BANC

G.R. No. L-33672 September 28, 1973

VICENTE MUÑOZ, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents, DELIA T.
SUTTON, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

FERNANDO, J.:

We have before us a task far from pleasant. Respondent, Delia T.

Sutton, a member of the Philippine Bar, connected with the law firm
of Salonga, Ordoñ ez, Yap, Parlade, and Associates, must be held
accountable for failure to live up to that exacting standard expected
of counsel, more specifically with reference to a duty owing this
Tribunal. She failed to meet the test of candor and honesty required
of pleaders when, in a petition for certiorari prepared by her to
review a Court of Appeals decision, she attributed to it a finding of
facts in reckless disregard, to say the least, of what in truth was its
version as to what transpired. When given an opportunity to make
proper amends, both in her appearance before us and thereafter in
her memorandum, there was lacking any showing of regret for a
misconduct so obvious and so inexcusable. Such an attitude of
intransigence hardly commends itself. Her liability is clear. Only her
relative inexperience in the ways of the law did save her from a
penalty graver than severe censure. So we rule.

The background of the incident before us was set forth in our

resolution of July 12, 1971. It reads as follows: "Acting upon the
petition for review in G.R. No. L-33672, Vicente Muñoz v. People of
the Philippines and the Court of Appeals, and considering that the
main issue therein is whether petitioner Muñ oz is guilty of homicide
through reckless negligence, as charged in the information; that - in
the language of the decision of the Court of Appeals - "the
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prosecution and the defense offered two conflicting versions of the

incident that gave rise to the case"; that, upon examination of the
evidence, the Court of Appeals found, as did the trial court, that the
version of the prosecution is the true one and that of the defense is
unbelievable; that this finding of the Court of Appeals is borne out
by substantial evidence, whereas the version of the defense is
inconsistent with some established facts, for: (a) petitioner's theory,
to the effect that his boat had been rammed by that of the
complainant, is refuted by the fact that after hitting the left frontal
outrigger of the latter's boat, the prow and front outrigger of
petitioner's motorboat hit also the left front portion of
complainant's boat - where the complainant was seated, thereby
hitting him on the back and inflicting the injury that cause his death
- so that, immediately after the collision - part of petitioner's boat
was on top of that of the complainant; (b) these circumstances,
likewise, indicate the considerable speed at which petitioner's
motorboat was cruising, (c) petitioner's motorboat had suffered
very little damage, which would have been considerable had it been
rammed by the offended party's boat, the latter being bigger than, as
well as provided with an engine twice as powerful as, that of the
petitioner; and (d) although appellant's boat carried several
passengers, including children, and was, in fact, overloaded,
appellant acted as pilot and, at the same time, as its machinist,
thereby rendering it difficult for him to manuever it properly; the
Court resolved to [deny] the petition upon the ground that it is
mainly factual and for lack of merit. Considering further, that the
petition quotes, on page 5 thereof a portion of the decision appealed
from, summing up evidence for the defense, and makes reference
thereto "findings" of the Court of Appeals, which is not true; that, on
page 6 of the petition, petitioner states, referring to a portion of the
same quotation, that the same "are the established uncontroverted
facts recognized by the Court of Appeals," which is, likewise, untrue;
that, on page 8 of the petition, it is averred - "It being conceded that
the two versions recounted above are by themselves credible,
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although they are conflicting the same cannot be binding on, and is
therefore, reviewable by the Honorable Supreme Court. Where the
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals [are conflicting], the same
[are not binding] on the Supreme Court. (Cesica v. Villaseca, G.R. L-
9590, April 30, 1957)" although, in fact, no conflicting findings of
fact are made in the decision appealed from; and that, on page 9 of
the petition, it is alleged that the Court of Appeals had"affirmed the
minimum penalty of one (1) year and one (1) day imposed by the
lower court," although, in fact, minimum penalty imposed by the
trial court was "four(4) months of arresto mayor"; the Court
resolved to require counsel for the petitioner to show cause, within
ten (10) days from notice, why they should not be dealt with for
contempt of court [or] otherwise subjected to disciplinary action for
making aforementioned misrepresentations." " 1chanrobles virtual
law library

A pleading entitled "Compliance with Resolution" by the aforesaid

law firm was filed on August 14, 1971. There was no attempt at
justification, because in law there is none, but it did offer what was
hoped to be a satisfactory explanation. If so, such optimism was
misplaced. It betrayed on its face more than just a hint of lack of
candor, of minimizing the effects of grave inaccuracies in the
attribution to the Court of Appeals certain alleged facts not so
considered as such. It was then to say that the least a far from
meticulous appraisal of the matter in issue. Much of what was
therein contained did not ring true.

Under the circumstances, we set the matter for hearing on

September 14 of the same year, requiring all lawyers-partners in
said firm to be present. At such a hearing, respondent Delia T. Sutton
appeared. While her demeanor was respectful, it was obvious that
she was far from contrite. On the contrary, the impression she gave
the Court was that what was done by her was hardly deserving of
any reproach. Even when subjected to intensive questioning by
several members of the Court, she was not to be budged from such
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an untenable position. It was as if she was serenely unconcerned,

oblivious of the unfavorable reaction to, which her evasive answers
gave rise. There certainly was lack of awareness of the serious
character of her misdeed. The act of unruffled assurance under the
circumstances was hard to understand. Perhaps realizing that the
Court was not disposed to look at the matter as a minor peccadillo,
Attorney Sedfrey A. Ordoñ ez of the law firm expressly
acknowledged that what appeared in its petition
for certiorari prepared by respondent Delia T. Sutton insofar as it
did misrepresent what is set forth in the Court of Appeals decision
sought to be reviewed was reprehensible, and did make with the
proper spirit of humility the necessary expression of
regret.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

What is more, the law firm in a pleading entitled "Joint Apology to

the Supreme Court" filed on December 1, 1971, signed jointly by
Sedfrey A. Ordoñ ez and Delia Sutton, did seek to make amends thus:
"1. That undersigned attorney, Delia T. Sutton, together with Messrs.
Sedfrey A. Ordoñ ez, Pedro L. Yap and Custodio O. Parlade, partners
in the firm of Salonga, Ordoñ ez, Yap, Parlade & Associates, appeared
before this Honorable Court on November 22, 1971, pursuant to an
order dated October 18, 1971; 2. That with all the sincerity and
candor at the command of undersigned attorney, the circumstances
surrounding her preparation of the pleading which gave rise to the
instant citation to show cause why she should not be punished for
contempt of court were explained by her, with the assistance of Atty.
Sedfrey A. Ordoñ ez; 3. That the undersigned Delia T. Sutton had no
intention to misrepresent any question of fact before this Honorable
Court for her personal gain or benefit, and that it was her lack of
adequate extensive experience in preparing petitions
for certiorari which may have caused the inaccurate statements in
the said petition which were enumerated in the order of this
Honorable Court; 4. That undersigned Delia T. Sutton contritely
realizes the errors which she committed in the preparation of the
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said petition for certiorari and that the same will not recur in the
future as she will always abide by the provisions on candor and
fairness in the Canons of Professional Ethics, which reads: "22.
[Candor and Fairness]. - The conduct of the lawyer before the court
and with other lawyers should be characterized by candor and
fairness. It is not candid or fair for the lawyer knowingly to
misquote the contents of a paper, the testimony of a witness, the
language or the argument of opposing counsel, or the language of a
decision or a textbook or; with knowledge of its invalidity, to cite as
authority a decision that has been overruled, or a statute that has
been repealed; or in argument to assert as fact that which has not
been proved, or in those jurisdictions where a side has the opening
and closing arguments to mislead his opponent by concealing or
withholding positions in his opening argument upon which his side
then intends to rely. ..." 5. That undersigned Atty. Sedfrey A. Ordoñ ez
joins Atty. Delia T. Sutton in expressing his own apologies to the
Honorable Court for not having thoroughly supervised the
preparation by Atty. Delia T. Sutton of a type of pleading with which
she was not thoroughly familiar." 2chanrobles virtual law library

The "Joint Apology" thus offered did mitigate to some extent the
liability of respondent Sutton. Some members of the Court feel,
however, that it does not go far enough. While expressing regret and
offering apology, there was lacking that free admission that what
was done by her should not characterized merely as "errors"
consisting as they do of "inaccurate statements." If there were a
greater sincerity on her part, the offense should have been
acknowledged as the submission of deliberate misstatements. There
ought to be, for the apology to gain significance, no further attempt
at minimizing the enormity of the misdeed. It is then as if there was
hardly any retreat from the untenable stand originally taken. The
mood, even at this stage, seems to be that she could brazen it out as
long as the words indicative of an apology were offered. This Court
does not view matters thus. To purge herself of the contempt, she
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ought to have displayed the proper spirit of contrition and humility.

The burden cast on the judiciary would be intolerable if it could not
take at face value what is asserted by counsel. The time that will
have to be devoted just to the task of verification of allegations
submitted could easily be imagined. Even with due recognition then
that counsel is expected to display the utmost zeal in defense of a
client's cause, it must never be at the expense of deviation from the
truth. As set forth in the applicable Canon of Legal Ethics: "Nothing
operates more certainly to create or to foster popular prejudice
against lawyers as a class, and to deprive the profession of that full
measure of public esteem and confidence which belongs to the
proper discharge of its duties than does the false claim, often set up
by the unscrupulous in defense of questionable transactions, that it
is the duty of the lawyer to do whatever may enable him to succeed
in winning his client's cause." 3 What is more, the obligation to the
bench, especially to this Court, for candor and honesty takes
precedence. It is by virtue of such considerations that punishment
that must fit the offense has to be meted out to respondent Delia T.
Sutton.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

At the same time, the attitude displayed by one of the senior

partners, Attorney Sedfrey A. Ordoñ ez, both in the appearances
before the Court and in the pleadings submitted, must be
commended. He has made manifest that his awareness of the role
properly incumbent on counsel, especially in his relationship to this
Court, is deep-seated. It must be stated, however, that in the future
he, as well as the other senior partners, should exercise greater care
in the supervision of the attorneys connected with their law firm,
perhaps inexperienced as yet but nonetheless called upon to comply
with the peremptory tenets of ethical
conduct.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

WHEREFORE, respondent Delia T. Sutton is severely censured. Let a

copy of this resolution be spread on her record.
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