628 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Alawi vs. Alauya

*
A.M. SDC-97-2-P. February 24, 1997.
(Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 96-1-SDC(P)

SOPHIA ALAWI, complainant,  vs.  ASHARY M. ALAUYA, Clerk of Court VI, Shari’a District
Court, Marawi City, respondent.

Civil Service Law;  Public Officers;  Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees [RA 6713] inter alia enunciates the State policy of promoting a high standard of ethics and utmost
responsibility in the public service.—The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees (RA 6713)  inter alia  enunciates the State policy of promoting a high standard of ethics and
utmost responsibility in the public service. Section 4 of the Code commands that “(p)ublic officials and
employees ** at all times respect the rights of others, and ** refrain from doing acts

_______________

* THIRD DIVISION.

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VOL. 268, FEBRUARY 24, 1997 629

Alawi vs. Alauya

contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy, public order, public safety and public
interest.” More than once has this Court emphasized that “the conduct and behavior of every official and
employee of an agency involved in the administration of justice, from the presiding judge to the most junior
clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. Their conduct must at all times be
characterized by, among others, strict propriety and decorum so as to earn and keep the respect of the public
for the judiciary.
Same;  Same;  As a man of the law, he may not use language which is abusive, offensive, scandalous,
menacing, or otherwise improper.—Now, it does not appear to the Court consistent with good morals, good
customs or public policy, or respect for the rights of others, to couch denunciations of acts believed—however
sincerely—to be deceitful, fraudulent or malicious, in excessively intemperate, insulting or virulent
language, Alauya is evidently convinced that he has a right of action against Sophia Alawi. The law requires
that he exercise that right with propriety, without malice or vindictiveness, or undue harm to anyone; in a
manner consistent with good morals, good customs, public policy, public order, supra; or otherwise stated,
that he “act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.” Righteous indignation,
or vindication of right cannot justify resort to vituperative language, or downright name-calling. As a
member of the Shari’a Bar and an officer of a Court, Alawi is subject to a standard of conduct more stringent
than for most other government workers. As a man of the law, he may not use language which is abusive,
offensive, scandalous, menacing, or otherwise improper. As a judicial employee, it is expected that his accord
respect for the person and the rights of others at all times, and that his every act and word should be
characterized by prudence, restraint, courtesy, dignity. His radical deviation from these salutary norms
might perhaps be mitigated, but cannot be excused, by his strongly held conviction that he had been
grievously wronged.
Attorneys;  Integrated Bar of the Philippines;  The title of “attorney” is reserved to those who, having
obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been
admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members thereof in good standing, and it is
they only who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction.—As regards Alauya’s use of the title of
“Attorney,” this Court has already had occasion to

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630 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

ANNOTATED

Alawi vs. Alauya

declare that persons who pass the Shari’a Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence
may only practice law before Shari’a courts. While one who has been admitted to the Shari’a Bar, and one
who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered “counsellors,” in the sense that they
give counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the latter is an “attorney.” The title of “attorney” is
reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken the
Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members
thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction.

ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

NARVASA, C.J.:

Sophia Alawi was (and presumably still is) a sales representative (or coordinator) of E.B.
Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd. of Davao City, a real estate and housing company. Ashary M.
Alauya is the incumbent executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Shari’a District in Marawi
City. They were classmates, and used to be friends.
It appears that through Alawi’s agency, a contract was executed for the purchase on
installments by Alauya of one of the housing units belonging to the above mentioned firm
(hereafter, simply Villarosa & Co.); and in connection therewith, a housing loan was also granted
to Alauya by the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC).
Not long afterwards, or more precisely on December 15, 1995, Alauya addressed a letter to the
President of Villarosa & Co. advising of the termination of his contract with the company. He
wrote:
“** I am formally and officially withdrawing from and notifying you of my intent to terminate the
Contract/Agreement entered into between me and your company, as represented by your Sales
Agent/Coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, of your company’s branch office here in Cagayan de Oro City, on the
grounds that my consent

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Alawi vs. Alauya
was vitiated by gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence by the aforesaid
sales agent which made said contract void ab initio. Said sales agent acting in bad faith perpetrated such
illegal and unauthorized acts which made said contract an Onerous Contract prejudicial to my rights and
interests.”

He then proceeded to expound in considerable detail and quite acerbic language on the “grounds
which could evidence the bad faith, deceit, fraud, misrepresentation, dishonesty and abuse of
confidence by the unscrupulous sales agent **;” and closed with the plea that Villarosa & Co.
“agree for the mutual rescission of our contract, even as I inform you that I categorically state on
record that I am terminating the contract **. I hope I do not have to resort to any legal action
before said onerous and manipulated contract against my interest be annulled. I was actually
fooled by your sales agent, hence the need to annul the controversial contract.”
Alauya sent a copy of the letter to the Vice-President of Villarosa & Co. at San Pedro, Gusa,
Cagayan de Oro City. The envelope containing it, and which actually went through the post, bore
no stamps. Instead at the right hand corner above the description of the addressee, the
words, “Free Postage-PD 26,” had been typed.
On the same date, December 15, 1995, Alauya also wrote to Mr. Fermin T. Arzaga, Vice-
President, Credit & Collection Group of the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation
(NHMFC) at Salcedo Village, Makati City, repudiating as fraudulent and void his contract with
Villarosa & Co.; and asking for cancellation of his housing loan in connection therewith, which
was payable from salary deductions at the rate of P4,338.00 a month. Among other things, he
said:

“** (T)hrough this written notice, I am terminating, as I hereby annul, cancel, rescind and voided, the
‘manipulated contract’ entered into between me and the E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd., as represented
by its sales agent/coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, who maliciously and fraudulently manipulated said
contract and unlawfully secured and pursued the housing loan without any authority and against my will.
Thus, the contract itself is deemed to be void  ab initio  in view of the attending circumstances, that my
consent was

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Alawi vs. Alauya

vitiated by misrepresentation, fraud, deceit, dishonesty, and abuse of confidence; and that there was no
meeting of the minds between me and the swindling sales agent who concealed the real facts from me.”

And, as in his letter to Villarosa & Co., he narrated in some detail what he took to be the
anomalous actuations of Sophia Alawi.
Alauya wrote three other letters to Mr. Arzaga of the NHMFC, dated February 21,1996, April
15, 1996, and May 3, 1996, in all of which, for the same reasons already cited, he insisted on the
cancellation
a
of his housing loan and discontinuance of deductions from his salary on account
thereof.   He also wrote on January 18, 1996 to Ms. Corazon M. Ordoñez, Head of the Fiscal
Management & Budget Office, and to the Chief, Finance Division, both of this Court, to stop
deductions from his salary in relation to the loan in question, again asserting the anomalous
mannerb by which he was allegedly duped into entering into the contracts by “the scheming sales
agent.”
The upshot was that in May, 1996, the NHMFC wrote to the Supreme Court requesting it to
stop deductions on Alauya’s UHLP loan “effective May 1996,” and began negotiating with
Villarosa &c Co. “for the buy-back of ** (Alauya’s) mortgage, and ** the refund of ** (his)
payments.”
On learning of Alauya’s letter to Villarosa & Co. of December 15, 1995, Sophia Alawi filed with
this Court a verified complaint dated January 25, 1996—to which she appended a copy of the
letter,
1
and of the above mentioned envelope bearing the typewritten words,  ”Free Postage-PD
26.”  In that complaint, she accused Alauya of:

_______________
a Annexes B, B-1, B-3 of Alauya’s Comment dated June 5, 1996.
b Annexes F and G, id.
c Annex C-2, id.
1 Annexes A and A-1 of complaint; Rollo at p. 14; copies of the letter were also furnished the National Home Mortgage

Finance

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Alawi vs. Alauya

1. “Imputation of malicious and libelous charges with no solid grounds through manifest
ignorance and evident bad faith;”
2. “Causing undue injury to, and blemishing her honor and established reputation;”
3. “Unauthorized enjoyment of the privilege of free postage **;” and
4. Usurpation of the title of “attorney,” which only regular members of the Philippine Bar
may properly use.

She deplored Alauya’s references to her as “unscrupulous, swindler, forger, manipulator, etc.”
without “even a bit of evidence to cloth (sic) his allegations with the essence of truth,” denouncing
his imputations as irresponsible, “all concoctions, lies, baseless and coupled with manifest
ignorance and evident bad faith,” and asserting that all her dealings with Alauya had been
regular and completely transparent. She closed with the plea that Alauya “be dismissed from the
service, or be appropriately desciplined (sic) **.”
The Court resolved to order Alauya to comment on the complaint. Conformably with
established usage that notices of resolutions emanate from the corresponding Office of the Clerk
of Court, the notice of resolution in
2
this case was signed by Atty. Alfredo P. Marasigan, Assistant
Division Clerk of Court. 3
Alauya first submitted a “Preliminary Comment”   in which he questioned the authority of
Atty. Marasigan to require an explanation of him, this power pertaining, according to him, not to
“a mere Asst. Div. Clerk of Court investigating an Executive Clerk of Court,” but only to the
District Judge, the Court Administrator or the Chief Justice, and voiced the suspicion that the
Resolution was the result of a “strong link” between Ms. Alawi and Atty. Marasigan’s office. He
also averred that the complaint had no factual basis; Alawi was envious of him for being not only
“the Executive Clerk of

_______________

Corporation. The Finance Management and Budget Office and the Financial Division of the Supreme Court.
2 Resolution dated March 25, 1996.
3 Dated April 19, 1996.
 634

634 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Alawi vs. Alauya

Court
4
and ex-officio Provincial Sheriff and District Registrar,” but also “a scion of a Royal Family
**.”
In a subsequent 5
letter to Atty. Marasigan, but this time in much less aggressive, even
obsequious tones,  Alauya requested
6
the former to give him a copy of the complaint in order that
he might comment thereon.  He stated that his acts as clerk of court were done in good faith and
within the confines of the law; and that Sophia Alawi, as sales agent of Villarosa & Co. had, by
falsifying his signature, fraudulently bound him to a housing loan contract entailing monthly
deductions of P4,333.10 from his salary.
And in his comment thereafter submitted under date of June 5, 1996, Alauya contended that it
was he who had suffered “undue injury, mental anguish, sleepless nights, wounded feelings and
untold financial suffering,” 7 considering that in six months, a total of P26,028.60 had been
deducted from his salary.   He declared that there was no basis for the complaint; in
communicating with Villarosa & Co. he had merely acted in defense of his rights. He denied any
abuse of the franking privilege, saying that he gave P20.00 plus transportation fare to a
subordinate whom he entrusted with the mailing of certain letters; that the words: “Free Postage-
PD 26,” were typewritten on the envelope by some other person, an averment corroborated by the
affidavit of Absamen C. Domocao, Clerk IV8 (subscribed and sworn to before respondent himself,
and attached to the comment as Annex J);   and as far as he knew, his subordinate mailed the
letters with the

_______________
4 Rollo at p. 23.
5 Evidently, he had since become aware of the immemorial practice that NOTICES (or communications informing) of
Resolutions adopted by the Court  En Banc  or any of its three (3) Divisions are sent to the parties by and over the
signature of the corresponding Clerk of Court or his Assistant, the Court’s Resolutions being incorporated verbatim  in
said notices.
6 Dated April 22, 1996.
7 Rollo at p. 28.
8 Id. at p. 60.

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Alawi vs. Alauya

use of the money he had given for postage, and if those letters were indeed mixed with9
the official
mail of the court, this had occurred inadvertently and because of an honest mistake.
Alauya justified his use of the title, “attorney,” by the assertion that it is “lexically
synonymous” with “Counsellors-at-law,” a title to which Shari’a lawyers have a rightful claim,
adding that he prefers the title of “attorney” because “counsellor” is often mistaken for
“councilor,” “konsehal” or the Maranao term “consial,” connoting a local legislator beholden to the
mayor. Withal, he does not consider himself a lawyer.
He pleads for the Court’s compassion,
10
alleging that what he did “is expected of any man
unduly prejudiced and injured.”  He claims he was manipulated into reposing his trust in Alawi,
11
 11
a classmate and friend.  He was induced to sign a blank contract on Alawi’s assurance that she
would show the completed document to him later for correction, but she had since avoided him;
despite “numerous letters and follow-ups” he still does not know where the property—subject
12
of
his supposed agreement with Alawi’s principal, Villarosa & Co.—is situated;   He says Alawi
somehow got his GSIS policy from his wife, and although she promised to return it the next day,
she did not do so until after several months. He also claims that in connection with his contract
with Villarosa & Co., Alawi forged his signature on such pertinent documents as those regarding
the down payment,13 clearance, lay-out, receipt of the key of the house, salary deduction, none of
which he ever saw.
Averring in fine that his acts in question were done without malice, Alauya prays for the
dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit, it consisting of “fallacious, malicious and baseless
allegations,” and complainant Alawi having come to the

_______________
9 Id. at p. 32.
10 Id. at p. 34.
11 Id. at p. 35, et seq.
12 Id. at p. 35.
13 Id.

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Alawi vs. Alauya

Court with unclean hands, her complicity in the fraudulent housing loan being apparent and
demonstrable.
It may be mentioned that in contrast to his two (2) letters to Assistant Clerk of Court
Marasigan (dated April 19, 1996 and April 22, 1996), and his two (2) earlier letters both dated
December 15, 1996—all of which he signed as “Atty. Ashary M. Alauya”—in his Comment of June
5, 1996, he does not use the title but refers to himself as “DATU ASHARY M. ALAUYA.”
The Court referred
14
the case to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report and
recommendation.
The first accusation against Alauya is that in his aforesaid letters, he made “malicious and
libelous charges (against Alawi) with no solid grounds through manifest ignorance and evident
bad faith,” resulting in “undue injury to (her) and blemishing her honor and established
reputation.” In those letters, Alauya had written inter alia that:

1) Alawi obtained his consent to the contracts in question “by gross misrepresentation,
deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence;”
2) Alawi acted in bad faith and perpetrated ** illegal and unauthorized acts ** ** prejudicial
to ** (his) rights and interests;”
3) Alawi was an “unscrupulous (and “swindling”) sales agent” who had fooled him by “deceit,
fraud misrepresentation, dishonesty and abuse of confidence;” and
4) Alawi had maliciously and fraudulently manipulated the contract with Villarosa & Co.,
and unlawfully secured and pursued the housing loan without ** (his) authority and
against ** (his) will,” and “concealed the real facts **.”
Alauya’s defense essentially is that in making these statements, he was merely acting in defense
of his rights, and doing only what “is expected of any man unduly prejudiced

_______________
14 See Resolution of the Court en banc dated August 21, 1996; Rollo at p. 61 et seq.

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Alawi vs. Alauya

and injured,” who had suffered “mental anguish, sleepless nights, wounded feelings and untold
financial suffering,”
15
considering that in six months, a total of P26,028.60 had been deducted from
his salary.
The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (RA 6713) inter
alia enunciates the State
16
policy of promoting a high standard of ethics and utmost responsibility
in the public service.  Section 4 of the Code commands that “(p)ublic officials and employees ** at
all times respect the rights of others, and ** refrain from doing acts contrary17
to law, good morals,
good customs, public policy, public order, public safety and public interest.”  More than once has
this Court emphasized that “the conduct and behavior of every official and employee of an agency
involved in the administration of justice, from the presiding judge to the most junior clerk, should
be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. Their conduct must at all times be
characterized by, among others, 18
strict propriety and decorum so as to earn and keep the respect
of the public for the judiciary.”
Now, it does not appear to the Court consistent with good morals, good customs or public
policy, or respect for the rights of others, to couch denunciations of acts believed—however
sincerely—to be deceitful, fraudulent or malicious, in excessively intemperate, insulting or
virulent language, Alauya is evidently convinced that he has a right of action against So-

_______________
15 SEE footnote No. 7, supra.
16 Policarpio v. Fortus, 248 SCRA 272, 275.
17  R.A. No. 6713. Section 11 of the same law punishes any violation of the Act with (1) a fine not exceeding the

equivalent of six (6) months’ salary, or (2) suspension not exceeding one (1) year, or (3) removal, depending on the gravity
of the offense, after due notice and hearing by the appropriate body or agency, and even if no criminal prosecution is
instituted against him.
18 Apaga v. Ponce, 245 SCRA 233, 240, citing Callejo, Jr. v. Garcia, etc., 206 SCRA 491; Angeles v. Bantug, et al., 209

SCRA 413;  Icasiano, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, et al.,  209 SCRA 377;  Medilo, et al. v. Asodisen, etc.,  233 SCRA 68; SEE
also Policarpio v. Fortus, 248 SCRA 272, 275.

638

638 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Alawi vs. Alauya

phia Alawi. The law requires that he exercise that right with propriety, without malice or
vindictiveness, or undue harm to anyone; in a manner consistent with good morals, good customs,
public policy, public order, supra; or otherwise
19
stated, that he “act with justice, give everyone his
due, and observe honesty and good faith.”  Righteous indignation, or vindication of right cannot
justify resort to vituperative language, or downright name-calling. As a member of the Shari’a
Bar and an officer of a Court, Alawi is subject to a standard of conduct more stringent tan for
most other government workers. As a man of the law, he 20may not use language which is abusive,
offensive, scandalous, menacing, or otherwise improper.   As a judicial employee, it is expected
that his accord respect for the person and the rights of others at all times, and that his every act
and word should be characterized by prudence, restraint, courtesy, dignity. His radical deviation
from these salutary norms might perhaps be mitigated, but cannot be excused, by his strongly
held conviction that he had been grievously wronged.
As regards Alauya’s use of the title of “Attorney,” this Court has already had occasion to
declare that persons who pass the Shari’a Bar are not21 full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar,
hence may only practice law before Shari’a courts.   While one who has been admitted to the
Shari’a Bar, and one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered
“counsellors,” in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the
latter is an “attorney.” The title of “attorney” is reserved to those who,

_______________
19 ART. 19, Civil Code.
20 Rules 8.01 and 11.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which should apply by analogy to Members of the
Shari’a Bar. The Code also proscribes behavior in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession (Rule 7.03).
21 Resolution of the Court En Banc dated August 5, 1993 in Bar Matter No. 681, entitled  “Petition to allow Shari’a

lawyers to exercise their profession at the regular courts;.” SEE Rule 138 (secs. 1, 4), Rules of Court.

639

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Alawi vs. Alauya

having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken the Bar
Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members
thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in this
jurisdiction.
Alauya says he does not wish to use the title, “counsellor” or “counsellor-at-law,” because in his
region, there are pejorative connotations to the term, or it is confusingly similar to that given to
local legislators. The ratiocination, valid or not, is of no moment. His disincilination to use the
title of “counsellor” does not warrant his use of the title of attorney. Finally, respecting Alauya’s
alleged unauthorized use of the franking privilege, the record contains no evidence adequately
establishing the accusation.
WHEREFORE, respondent Ashary M. Alauya is hereby REPRIMANDED for the use of
excessively intemperate, insulting or virulent language, i.e., language unbecoming a judicial
officer, and for usurping the title of attorney; and he is warned that any similar or other
impropriety or misconduct in the future will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

     Davide, Jr., Melo, Francisco and Panganiban, JJ., concur.

Respondent Ashari M. Alauya reprimanded.

Notes.—Every employee of the judiciary should be an example of integrity, honesty and

uprightness and sheriffs, in particular, musts show a high degree of professionalism in the
performance of their duties given the delicate task they’re reposed with. (Bora, Sr. vs.
Angeles, 244 SCRA 706 [1995])
The court has reiterated time and again the rule that the conduct of every employee of the
judiciary must be at all times characterized with propriety and decorum and above all else,
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640 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Cañiza vs. Court of Appeals

it must be above and beyond suspicion. (Bilag-Rivera vs. Flora, 245 SCRA 603 [1995]).

——o0o——