117 (In Person) Packet #1

Class #1 Voting: Plurality & Borda Methods Sections 1.1 & 1.2 & 1.
Daily Summary: In this lesson we introduce the mathematics of voting by exploring the Plurality
Method and the Borda Method.
Demo
1) Our first major topic of the year is voting. We introduce the mathematics of voting with a tasty
example. Rank the following flavors of ice cream: strawberry (S), vanilla (V), chocolate (C).
1st choice
2nd choice
3rd choice
2) When you ranked the flavors of ice cream, you created a preference ballot. Now we tally
everyone's preference ballots in this preference schedule:
# of voters
1st choice C C V V S S
2nd choice V S C S C V
3rd choice S V S C V C
3) Now our job is to determine which of the flavors wins according to our class vote. The first
method is called the plurality method where the winner is the candidate with the most first
place votes. This candidate is called the plurality candidate.
4) Let's count how many first place votes each flavor got:
S = _______ V = _______ C = _______
5) Who is our winner by using the plurality method?
6) Let's list the complete ranking of the candidates according to the plurality method.
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7) If one candidate gets more than half of the first place votes, then that candidate is called the
majority candidate.
a. Did we have a majority candidate with our ice cream example?
b. How many votes are required to have a majority in this class?
c. How many votes are required to have a majority in a class with 50 students? With 17
students?
8) We'll now look at a completely different method for determining the winner of an election. It's
called the Borda Count Method (it's used in the AP college football poll to rank the top 25
teams in the country) where each candidate receives points for each vote they receive. We
will give a candidate 1 point for a last place vote, 2 points for a next to last place vote, and so
forth.
For example, with 4 candidates, a 4th place vote is worth 1 point, a 3rd place vote is worth 2
points, a 2nd place vote is worth 3 points and a 1st place vote is worth 4 points.
9) Here's a preference schedule for electing the president of the Math Club. The candidates are
Alisha, Boris, Carmen, and Dave (A, B, C, and D).
Number of Voters 14 10 8 4 1
st
1 Choice A C D B C
2nd Choice B B C D D
rd
3 Choice C D B C B
4th Choice D A A A A
a. Let's use the Borda count method to determine the winner.
b. Here's a little check you can do to make sure you didn't make an error using Borda:
c. Let's list the complete ranking of the candidates according to the Borda method.
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10) Here's some information about the projects. You will submit three projects for this course (see
the calendar in the syllabus for specific due dates). For the first one, you will conduct an
election, draw up a preference schedule summarizing the votes, and figure out the winner of
the vote according to each of four voting methods (we discussed two of the four voting
methods today; the other two will be covered next class).
The first part of this first project involves coming up with a topic and four options for your
classmates to rank. Your teacher is willing to print out your ballots, give a few minutes of class
time having your classmates fill out ballots for your questions, collect your ballots, and give you
your ballots in an envelope. In order to take advantage of this offer, you must e-mail your
teacher your topic and four options within the next 24 hours (see the syllabus for your
teacher's e-mail address).
If you don't e-mail your teacher before the deadline, you'll need to print your own ballots and
find at least 20 people who will fill out your ballots outside of class time.
Here's a sample topic with four options just so you know what kind of thing I'm expecting you
to e-mail me:
Rank the following flavors of ice cream from best to worst:
A. vanilla B. chocolate C. strawberry D. cookies and cream
Try to construct the ballots so that you don't expect any one choice to receive a majority of
first-place votes (otherwise determining the winner becomes much less interesting).
***You will receive more information about project #1 in the following 2 classes.
11) Work your way through the Activities that follow. We'll come back together at the end of class
to make sure everyone is clear on the homework assignment.
Take 20 seconds to introduce yourself to your tablemates and then work through the problems
below.
Write their names here: ________________ ________________ ________________
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Class Activity #1 (Voting)
Note: Working (and struggling!) through the Activities with your tablemates will increase your
understanding of the material immensely. An answer key usually follows the Activities but check
your answers with your neighbors before checking with the answer key. If you or your group gets
stuck, raise a flag!
1) The results of a sample election are given below.
Number of voters 6 5 9 2 3 3 3 2 3
1st choice A A A B B B C C D
2nd choice B B C A C D B B C
3rd choice C D B D D C A D B
4th choice D C D C A A D A A
a. How many voters were there in total?
b. How many first-place votes would be needed for a majority?
c. What would be the outcome if the election were conducted by the plurality method? Show
all calculations!
d. What is the complete ranking of the candidates using the plurality method?
e. What would be the outcome if the election were conducted by the Borda count method?
Show all calculations!
f. What is the complete ranking of the candidates using the Borda count method?
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2) Below gives a preference schedule for the results of a Math Club election for president.
st
1 Choice A C D B C
rd
3 Choice C D B C B
4th Choice D A A A A
a. How many voters are there in total?
b. How many first-place votes are needed to get a majority?
c. Who wins the election using the plurality method? Show all of the calculations!
d. Let's list the complete ranking of the candidates according to the plurality method.
e. Did the same person who won using Borda also win using Plurality? How did the Plurality
winner do when the vote was counted using the Borda Method? (Hint: check page 2 for the
winner using the Borda Method.)
3) The plurality method seems easy enough to implement but a major flaw of the plurality method
is the ease with which the results can be manipulated by a voter or block of voters through
insincere voting (also known as tactical voting).
In insincere voting, if we know that the candidate we really want has no chance of winning,
then rather than "waste" our vote on our favorite candidate we can cast it for a lesser choice
that has a better chance of winning the election.
In the Math club election above, how might some members have changed their vote to create
a result more to their liking? Be specific by picking a specific column of voters and explicitly
stating how they could change their ballot to change the outcome of the election.
Note that this generic answer would get no points on the test: "Some voters could change
their vote to try to get a better outcome."
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Note: Another problem with the plurality method is that it strongly encourages compromise
voting, where you vote for the most acceptable (or least unacceptable) candidate who you feel
has a chance of winning. Because of this, the plurality method tends to lead to a two party
system.
Class Activity #1 Answers:
1) a. 36 b. 19 c. A wins with 20 first place votes.
d. 1st – A (20) 2nd – B (8) 3rd – C (5) 4th – D (3)
e. B wins with 104 points (103 for A, 90 for C, 63 for D).
f. 1st – B (104) 2nd – A (103) 3rd – C (90) 4th – D (63)
2) a. 37 b. 19 c. A = 14, B = 4, C = 11, D = 8 so A wins
d. A, C, D, B
e. Not only did the Plurality winner (candidate A) not win using the Borda Method, candidate A finished in
last place using the Borda Method!
3) Answers vary but your answer should follow this format: If the 8 voters who voted D, C, B, A had instead
voted C, D, B, A then candidate C would have won the election. This would be better for these 8 voters since
candidate C was their second favorite choice and candidate A (the winner of the election) was their least
favorite choice.
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Even More Practice
Note: The Even More Practice problems are OPTIONAL! Do them if you want more practice with
the material.
1) The following problem is from your book:
A math class votes among four possible times for the final exam – A (December 15, 8:00 AM),
B (December 20, 9:00 AM), C (December 21, 7:00 AM), and D (December 23, 11:00 AM). The
following is the class preference schedule.
2nd choice B B C C A C D A C
3rd choice C D B D C A B D A
4th choice D C D A D D A B B
a. How many students in the class voted?
b. How many first-place votes would be needed for a majority?
c. What would be the outcome if the election were conducted by the plurality method? Show
all calculations!
d. What would be the outcome if the election were conducted by the Borda method? Show all
calculations!
e. What's surprising about your answers to parts c and d?
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2) A group of people are all going to take a vacation together and they vote to decide on their
vacation destination. A record of their votes is in the cartoon below.
a. How many voters are there?
b. How many votes is needed for a majority in this election?
c. Did any destination get a majority of the votes?
d. Which destination is the winner according to the Plurality Method?
e. In your opinion, does the winning destination reflect the will of the people? Explain.
f. How could some of the voters change their vote to get an outcome that they would like
better? Be specific!
g. Can we calculate the winner of this election using the Borda Method? Why or why not?
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Even More Practice Answers:
1) a. 55 b. 28 votes c. A & B would tie.
d. C would win, with 163 points (to 134 for B, 130 for A, and 123 for D).
e. C was (comfortably) the winner of the election using the Borda method but using the plurality method, not
only did C not win, C actually had the fewest number of first place votes (11).
2) a. 10 b. 6 c. no d. South Pole
e. More than half (six of the ten people) want to go someplace warm so it doesn’t seem fair that they are going
to go to the South Pole.
f. If two of the Florida voters changed their vote to Hawaii, then Hawaii would win. The Florida voters would
probably prefer Hawaii to the South Pole.
g. No…in order to do a Borda election, we need the voters to rank all of the vacation destinations.
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Learning Objectives after Class #1
After watching the class video, doing the class activity and the homework problems, and getting
help as necessary, you should be able to:
1. Create a preference schedule from preference ballots or a description of voters'

preferences.
2. Determine how many first-place votes are needed for a majority in an election.
3. Find the winner of an election using the plurality method and the Borda count method.
4. Determine the total number of points available in an election using the Borda count method.
Homework:
• Finish Class Activity #1 (Voting); you do not need to turn it in, but it will be checked for
completeness in our next class.
• Send an e-mail to your teacher about the first project (see the syllabus for your teacher's e-
mail address). Include a topic and four options. Be sure to include your name! Send this e-
mail within 24 hours of our first class.
Here's a sample topic with four options just so you know what kind of thing I'm expecting you to
e-mail me: Rank the following flavors of ice cream from best to worst:
A. vanilla B. chocolate C. strawberry D. cookies and cream
Try to construct the ballots so that you don't expect any one choice to receive a majority of
first-place votes (otherwise determining the winner becomes much less interesting).
• MyMathLab Assignment: Do the assignment titled Getting Started with MML. Do the
assignment titled HW 1.1, 1.2, 1.3. Be sure to always write down your work for the
MyMathLab problems!
• Reading and Class Preparation: Read Sections 1.1-1.3 in the textbook (these sections were
covered in the class #1 video). Read Sections 1.4-1.5 in the textbook (this material will be
covered in the next class video).
Other Things to Do:
• Read the course syllabus. Be sure to make a note of any questions and ask me about them!
• If you haven't already, buy an access code for MyMathLab (information about your options is in
the syllabus).
• If you don't have one already, obtain a scientific calculator or app (it does not need to be a
graphing calculator!). Please talk to me if you have questions about whether a given calculator
is appropriate.
• Visit the class Moodle site (accessed from https://online.gcc.mass.edu/login/) and check that
you can view the information there. If you have trouble logging in to Moodle, go here:
http://web.gcc.mass.edu/instructional-technology/
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Class #2 Voting: Plurality with Elimination & Pairwise Comparisons Methods
Sections 1.4 & 1.5
Daily Summary: In this lesson we explore two more voting methods: Plurality with Elimination
and the Method of Pairwise Comparisons.
Demo
0) The expectation is that you will work diligently on math for the entirety of each class period that
we have together. You are expected to get through all of the Demo and all of the Activities
(which will sometimes mean finishing up the Activities outside of class time). The Even More
Practice section is optional. It's there for folks who want additional practice and for those
students who finish the Activities early. If you finish the Activities during class, continue
working and get through as much of the Even More Practice as you can during class!
1) Our third voting method is the Plurality with Elimination Method. It's also known as Instant
Runoff Voting (IRV) or the Hare Method.
Voters fill out a preference ballot once.
• Round 1: If one candidate has a majority of 1st place votes, they have won and the election
is over.
• Round 2: Otherwise, eliminate the candidate with the least number of 1st place votes
(thereby moving all candidates ranked below that candidate up one rank) and recount the
number of 1st place votes. If one candidate has a majority of 1st place votes, they have won
and the election is over.
• Round 3: Eliminate the candidate with the least number of 1st place votes and repeat this
process until one candidate has a majority of 1st place votes.
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2) Let's use the Plurality with Elimination method on the math club election from last class. The
preference schedule is given below.
1st Choice A C D B C
nd
2 Choice B B C D D
3rd Choice C D B C B
th
4 Choice D A A A A
• Round 1: Tally the first place votes for each candidate and eliminate the candidate with the
fewest.
• Round 2: Recount the first place votes now that a candidate has been eliminated. Does
anyone have a majority? If not, who should be eliminated?
• Round 3: Recount the first place votes now that another candidate has been eliminated.
Do we have a majority candidate yet? Who?
3) Let's list the complete ranking of the candidates using the plurality with elimination method.
4) Let's write down the winner of the Math Club election using each of our three vote counting
methods (we did two of these methods last class):
Plurality - Borda - Plurality with Elimination -
5) Our fourth election method is called the Method of Pairwise Comparisons (sometimes called
Copeland's Method).
Each voter fills out a preference ballot (just once) and, as the name suggests, we compare
every pair of candidates.
For each head-to-head comparison, the winning candidate gets 1 point and the losing
candidate gets 0 points (they each get ½ point if there's a tie). All of the points are tallied up
and the candidate with the most points is declared the winner.
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6) Here's the math club preference schedule (yet again!).
st
1 Choice A C D B C
rd
3 Choice C D B C B
th
4 Choice D A A A A
a. How many voters were there in total?
b. Let's determine the election of math club president using the method of pairwise
comparisons.
i) We begin by listing all of the possible match-ups.
ii) Now let's examine our first match-up: A vs. B. Every voter has a preference between A
& B so let's figure out who the voters in each column prefer.
iii) Now tally the results for A vs. B and write the scores above.
iv) As a quick check, the total of the scores for each match-up should always equal the
total number of voters.
v) Now we calculate the scores for each of the other match-ups.
vi) Once we've got all the scores tallied, it's time to award points based on the winners of
the match-ups. Remember, for each head-to-head comparison, the winning candidate
gets 1 point and the losing candidate gets 0 points (they each get ½ point if there's a
tie).
vii) Who is the winner using the method of pairwise comparisons?
viii)Let's list the complete ranking of the candidates using the method of pairwise
comparisons.
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7) One downside to the method of pairwise comparisons: this method can lead to a lot of ties
(sometimes many candidates tie for the most points) and every new candidate adds a lot of
comparing that we have to do!
If there are N candidates, this simple formula tells us how many comparisons we'll have to do:
!(!#$)
# of comparisons =
&
How many comparisons are required if there are
a) 4 candidates? b) 10 candidates?
8) In case you're interested in seeing a real-life preference ballot, below you'll find an image of
part of an actual ballot from a Burlington, VT mayoral election. Note that Burlington used
Plurality with Elimination for a couple of elections but the city voted to go back to using the
Plurality method!
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9) Before you work on the group activity that follows, spend a few minutes filling out your
classmates' ballots. When you're done ranking all of the choices, put your completed ballots in
the folder on your table and dive in to the class activity below!
Note: Working (and struggling!) through the Activities with your tablemates will increase your
understanding of the material immensely. An answer key usually follows the Activities but check
your answers with your neighbors before checking with the answer key. If you or your group gets
stuck, raise a flag!
Re-introduce yourself to your tablemates.
Write their names here: _____________ _____________ _____________ _____________
1) The results of a sample election are given below.
a. What would be the outcome if the election were conducted by the plurality with elimination
method?
b. What is the complete ranking of the candidates using the plurality with elimination method?
c. What would be the outcome if the election were conducted by the method of pairwise
comparisons?
d. What is the complete ranking of the candidates using the method of pairwise comparisons?
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2) Here's an example from your book that we've seen before: A math class is asked by the
instructor to vote among four possible times for the final exam – A (December 15, 8:00 AM), B
(December 20, 9:00 AM), C (December 21, 7:00 AM), and D (December 23, 11:00 AM). The
following is the class preference schedule.
method?
comparisons?
d. What is the complete ranking of the candidates using the method of pairwise comparisons?
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1. a. A wins right away since they have a majority (20 out of 36) of the first place votes.
b. To rank the candidates, we need to do more work. Even though A wins outright, we eliminate D for the
purposes of obtaining the ranking. The new tally is A = 20, B = 8, C = 8. B and C are now tied for last and
are eliminated simultaneously leaving only A.
The ranking is: 1st – A 2nd – B & C (tie) 3rd – D
c. A would win: A beats B 20-16, A beats C 22-14, A beats D 25-11, B beats C 19-17, B beats D 33-3, C beats
D 23-13
d. The point distribution is A = 3, B = 2, C = 1, D = 0 so the ranking is: 1st – A 2nd – B 3rd – C 4th – D
2. a. D eventually wins (with a score of 29-26 over A in the last round).
b. Based on the order in which the candidates were eliminated, the ranking is: 1st – D 2nd – A 3rd – B 4th – C
c. C (December 21, 7:00 AM) would win. (A beats B 31-24, C beats A 37-18, C beats B 32-23, C beats D 39-
16, D beats A 29-26, B beats D 32-23)
d. The point distribution is A = 1, B = 1, C = 3, D = 1 so the ranking is: 1st – C, 2nd – A, B, D all tie for 2nd!
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Even More Practice
Note: The Even More Practice problems are OPTIONAL! Do them if you want more practice with
the material.
1) The following preference schedule gives the results of another (fictional) election.
Percentage of voters 30% 3% 16% 15% 36%

1st choice A A B B C
2nd choice B C A C A
3rd choice C B C A B
method?
comparisons? (This situation is referred to as the Condorcet paradox.)
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2) Consider the preference schedule below.
# of voters 8 4 9 2 12 1
1st choice C C V V S S
2nd choice V S C S C V
3rd choice S V S C V C
a. Find the complete ranking using the Borda Method. Show all calculations!
b. Find the complete ranking using the Plurality Method. Show all calculations!
c. Find the complete ranking using the Method of Pairwise Comparisons. Show all
calculations!
d. Find the complete ranking using the Plurality with Elimination Method. Show all
calculations!
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1)a. C wins (by a score of 51%-49% over A in the final round)
b. Based on the order in which the candidates were eliminated, the ranking is: 1st – C 2nd – A 3rd – B
c. There is a three-way tie. (A beats B 69%-31%, B beats C 61%-39%, C beats A 51%-49%)
2) a. C = 81, S = 68, V = 67
b. S = 13, C = 12, V = 11
c. C beats V (24-12), C beats S (21-15), V beats S (19-17) so the ranking is C (2 points), V (1 point), S (0
points)
d. Round 1: S = 13, C = 12, V = 11 à Eliminate V à Round 2: S = 15, C = 21 so the ranking is C, S, V.
1. Find the winner of an election using the plurality with elimination method and the method of
pairwise comparisons.
2. Draw conclusions about the winner of an election using pairwise comparisons, given partial
information about the results.
Homework:
• Finish the Class Activity #2 (Voting); you do not need to turn it in, but it will be checked for
• MyMathLab Assignment: Do the assignment titled HW 1.4, 1.5.
***Be sure to always keep a written record of your work for the MyMathLab problems!
• Reading and Class Preparation: Read Section 1.6 in the textbook (you can ignore
references to Arrow's Impossibility Theorem for now).
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Class #3 Voting: Logic & the Fairness Criteria Section 1.6
Daily Summary: In this lesson we see four Fairness Criteria. These criteria look at who won an
already completed election and decide if the outcome was unfair.
Demo
0) Before we begin we should note that the first project is now officially assigned. If you got your
ballot to me on time, then you should have received your ballots back today. The project is
due at the start of class #7. Be sure to take a copy of the project assignment from your table.
Let's have a look at it now.
1) The material in this section is tough so be patient with yourself and expect to struggle with the
new vocabulary and ideas!
We start by making sure we have a clear understanding of if-then statements.
2) Suppose I want to stick to an exercise regimen and I plan to follow this rule:
If the weather's okay, then I will go for a run in the morning.
3) Either the weather's okay or it's not. Either I run or I don't. Let's look at each of the four
possibilities below and decide whether or not we broke our rule in each scenario.
a. The weather is okay. I go for a run.
b. The weather is okay. I don't go for a run.
c. The weather is not okay. I go for a run.
d. The weather is not okay. I don't go for a run.
4) To summarize, the only way an if-then statement is false is if the if-part is true and the then-
part is false. Now let's get back to our analysis of elections.
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5) For a completed election to be considered fair, it must meet certain criteria. The first and most
basic expectation is the following:
Majority Criterion: If candidate X has a majority of the first-place votes, then candidate X
should be the winner of the election.
6) Let's analyze the Majority Criterion by considering the following preference schedule:
# of voters 4 2 1
1st A C C
2nd C B D
3rd B D B
4th D A A
a. Does any candidate have a majority of first place votes?
b. Who is the winner using the Borda method?
7) Thus, A had a majority of first place votes (the if part of the Majority Criterion) but A didn't win
using the Borda method (the then part of the Majority Criterion). According to the Majority
Criterion, this isn't fair!
We say that, in this election, the Borda method violates the Majority Criterion.
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8) Another criterion for fairness is the Condorcet Criterion:
Condorcet Criterion: If candidate X is preferred by the voters over each of the other
candidates in a head-to-head comparison, then candidate X (the Condorcet candidate)
9) Consider the preference schedule below.
# of voters 49 48 3
1st R H F
2nd H S H
3rd F O S
4th O F O
5th S R R
a. Who wins according to the plurality method?
b. Is there a candidate who beats every other candidate in a head-to-head comparison?
c. Thus, in this election, the _________________ method violates/does not violate the
_________________ Criterion.
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10) Our third fairness criterion is hard to pronounce. It's the Monotonicity Criterion.
Monotonicity Criterion: If candidate X is the winner of an election and, in a reelection, the

only changes in the ballots are changes involving some voters ranking X higher on their ballot
and not changing the order of any other candidates, then candidate X should still be the winner
of the election.
11) Three cities (Athens, Barcelona, and Calgary) are competing to host the Summer Olympic
Games. The final choice is made by a vote of the IOC (International Olympic Committee) and
the winner is chosen using plurality with elimination. Two days before the actual election is to
be held, an unofficial poll of the members of the IOC is conducted just to see how things stand.
The results are in the table below.
Number of Voters 7 8 10 4
1st A B C A
2nd B C A C
3rd C A B B
a. Using plurality with elimination, who is expected to win the election?
b. The results of the unofficial poll are supposed to be secret, but the results leaked out. The
delegates in the 4th column decide that they want to be able to say that they helped elect
the winner so they put Calgary first and move Athens to second. Create a new preference
schedule and determine the winner of the election using plurality with elimination.
Number of Voters
1st
2nd
3rd
c. To summarize, Calgary was the winner of the unofficial vote. Then a re-vote happened and
everyone kept their votes exactly the same except some voters who moved Calgary higher
on their ballots. Surprisingly, Calgary did not win the re-vote.
d. Thus, in this election, the _________________ method violates/does not violate the
_________________ Criterion.
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12) Our final fairness criterion involves a candidate dropping out of an election. It's known by a
few different names.
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives Criterion (also known as IIA or the Dropout

Criterion): If candidate X is the winner of an election and in a recount one of the nonwinning
candidates withdraws or is disqualified, then X should still be the winner of the election.
13) It's time to elect a mayor in Greenfield! There is a very small turnout at the polls as indicated
by this preference schedule:
# of voters 3 2 2
1st A C B
2nd C B C
3rd B D D
4th D A A
a. Who is the winner of the election using the plurality method?
b. After the votes were all cast but before the votes had been counted (the people doing the
counts are very slow!), a scandal involving candidate B comes to light. Candidate B
decides to immediately withdraw from the race.
Since the votes have already been cast, the election is officially completed. It wouldn't be
fair to the candidates or to the voters to ask people to re-vote.
Once B has been crossed off of all of the ballots, who is the winner of the election using the
plurality method?
c. Thus, in this election, the _________________ method violates/does not violate the
_________________ Criterion.
14) Before you do today's Class Activity, let's have a look at the summary of violations of the
Fairness Criteria on pages 36-37 of this packet.
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1) For each of the scenarios described below,
i) determine which of the four fairness criteria the scenario relates to and
ii) determine whether or not the scenario demonstrates a violation of the fairness criterion you
named in part i and
iii) write a summarizing sentence of this form:
"In this scenario, the __________ method __________ the __________ Criterion."
In the first blank, fill in a vote counting method. In the second blank, write 'violates' or 'does
not violate'. In the third blank, write one of the fairness criteria.
Here's an example sentence: "In this scenario, the plurality method does not violate the
Condorcet Criterion."
a. No candidate gets a majority of the first place votes. Using the plurality method, candidate
A wins the election.
In this scenario, the __________ method __________ the __________ Criterion.
b. Candidate A beats every other candidate in a head-to-head comparison. Using the Borda
method, candidate A does not win the election.
c. Candidate A wins the election using the plurality method. Candidate B drops out and the
votes are recounted. Candidate A wins the recount.
d. Candidate A wins the election using the method of pairwise comparisons. There is a new
election and everyone votes exactly the same except some people rank candidate A lower
on their ballots. Candidate A does not win the new election.
e. Candidate A wins the election using the plurality with elimination method. There is a new
election and everyone votes exactly the same except some people rank candidate A higher
on their ballots. Candidate A does not win the new election.
f. No candidate beat every other candidate in a head-to-head comparison. Using the plurality
with elimination method, candidate A wins the election.
26
2) Consider the following preference schedule.
a. Does this example illustrate that the plurality method violates the Majority Criterion?
Why?
b. Does this example illustrate that the plurality method violates the Condorcet Criterion?
Why?
27
3) Consider the following preference schedule.
a. Does this example illustrate that the plurality method violates the Majority Criterion?
Why?
b. Does this example illustrate that the plurality method violates the Condorcet Criterion?
Why?
1)
a. In this scenario, the plurality method does not violate the Majority Criterion.
b. In this scenario, the Borda method violates the Condorcet Criterion.
c. In this scenario, the plurality method does not violate the IIA (or Dropout) Criterion.
d. In this scenario, the method of pairwise comparisons does not violate the Monotonicity Criterion.
e. In this scenario, the plurality with elimination violates the Monotonicity Criterion.
f. In this scenario, the plurality with elimination does not violate the Condorcet Criterion.
2)
a. No. A has a majority of first-place votes, and A does win.
b. No. A beats everyone head-to-head (A is therefore the Condorcet candidate), and A does win.
3)
a. No. No candidate has a majority of first-place votes.
b. Yes. C is the Condorcet candidate, but C did not win (A & B tied for the win).
28
Even More Practice
1) Below are the four possibilities for the "truthiness" of the if and then statements of the Majority
Criterion. One of the four statements below should feel unfair. Circle the statement that would
indicate a violation of the Majority Criterion and make sure you see that the ones that you
didn't circle don't feel unfair!
a. No candidate had a majority of first place votes and candidate X did not win the election.
b. No candidate had a majority of first place votes and candidate X won the election.
c. Candidate X had a majority of first place votes and candidate X won the election.
d. Candidate X had a majority of first place votes and candidate X did not win the election.
2) Below are the four possibilities for the "truthiness" of the if and then statements of the
Condorcet Criterion. One of the four statements below should feel unfair. Circle the
statement(s) that would indicate a violation of the Condorcet Criterion and make sure you see
that the ones that you didn't circle don't feel unfair!
a. No candidate beat every other candidate in a head-to-head comparison and candidate X

did not win the election.
b. No candidate beat every other candidate in a head-to-head comparison and candidate X

won the election.
c. Candidate X beat every other candidate in a head-to-head comparison and candidate X did
not win the election.
d. Candidate X beat every other candidate in a head-to-head comparison and candidate X

won the election.
29
Monotonicity Criterion. One of the four statements below should feel unfair. Circle the
statement that would indicate a violation of the Monotonicity Criterion and make sure you see
that the ones that you didn't circle don't feel unfair!
a. Candidate X is not the winner of an election and, in a reelection, the only changes in the
ballots are changes involving some voters ranking X higher on their ballot and not changing
the order of any other candidates. Candidate X wins the reelection.
b. Candidate X is the winner of an election and, in a reelection, the only changes in the ballots
are changes involving some voters ranking X higher on their ballot and not changing the
order of any other candidates. Candidate X wins the reelection.
c. Candidate X is the winner of an election and, in a reelection, the only changes in the ballots
are changes involving some voters ranking X higher on their ballot and not changing the
order of any other candidates. Candidate X does not win the reelection.
d. Candidate X is not the winner of an election and, in a reelection, the only changes in the
ballots are changes involving some voters ranking X higher on their ballot and not changing
the order of any other candidates. Candidate X does not win the reelection.
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives Criterion. One of the four statements below should
feel unfair. Circle the statement that would indicate a violation of the Independence of
Irrelevant Alternatives Criterion and make sure you see that the ones that you didn't circle don't
feel unfair!
a. Candidate X is the winner of an election and in a recount one of the nonwinning candidates
withdraws or is disqualified. X is no longer the winner of the election.
b. Candidate X is not the winner of an election and in a recount one of the nonwinning
candidates withdraws or is disqualified. X is still not the winner of the election.
c. Candidate X is the winner of an election and in a recount one of the nonwinning candidates
withdraws or is disqualified. X is still the winner of the election.
d. Candidate X is not the winner of an election and in a recount one of the nonwinning
candidates withdraws or is disqualified. X is now the winner of the election.
1) d 2) c 3) c 4) a
30
1. Evaluate whether a given election result violates the Majority, Condorcet, Monotonicity, or
IIA criterion.
Homework:
• Finish Class Activity #3 (Voting); you do not need to turn it in, but it will be checked for
• MyMathLab Assignment: Do the assignment titled HW 1.6 – Part I. (Note: the questions
listed below will appear in this MyMathLab assignment.) Be sure to always show your work on
the MyMathLab problems.
• Reading and Class Preparation: Read Section 1.6 (again) but this time try to understand
what Arrow's Impossibility Theorem is saying.
• Begin working on project #1! You'll find the specifics of the assignment in a separate handout.
The project is due at the start of class #7.
Additional MyMathLab questions for HW 1.6 – Part I (these are listed here so that you can try
them before starting the homework in MyMathLab). For each of the scenarios described below,
i) determine which of the four fairness criteria the scenario relates to and
ii) determine whether or not the scenario demonstrates a violation of the fairness criterion you
named in part i and
iii) write a summarizing sentence of this form:
"In this scenario, the method the Criterion."
In the first blank, fill in a vote counting method. In the second blank, write 'violates' or 'does
not violate'. In the third blank, write one of the fairness criteria.
a. Candidate A wins the election using the plurality with elimination method. There is a new
election and everyone votes exactly the same except some people rank candidate A higher
on their ballots. Candidate A wins the new election.
b. Candidate A wins the election using the method of pairwise comparisons. Candidate A
drops out and the votes are recounted. Candidate A does not win the recount.
c. Candidate A gets a majority of the first place votes. Using the Borda method, candidate A
does not win the election.
d. Candidate A beats every other candidate in a head-to-head comparison. Using the Borda
method, candidate A wins the election.
e. Candidate A wins the election using the Borda method. Candidate B drops out and the
votes are recounted. Candidate A does not win the recount.
f. Candidate A gets a majority of the first place votes. Using the method of pairwise
comparisons, candidate A wins the election.
31
Class #4 Voting: Arrow's Impossibility Theorem Section 1.6
Daily Summary: In this lesson we see the heart-breaking result that is Arrow's Impossibility
Theorem. L
Demo
1) To summarize, we've seen four different methods to count the votes (plurality, Borda, plurality
with elimination, pairwise comparisons) and four different criteria to decide if a vote counting
method is fair (Majority Criterion, Condorcet Criterion, Monotonicity Criterion, Independence-
of-Irrelevant-Alternatives Criterion).
Make sure you understand these 8 things! They are summarized on pages 36-37 of this
packet.
2) Even though some vote counting methods violate some fairness criteria, our vote counting
methods don't violate all of the fairness criteria.
3) Remember, the only way the Majority Criterion is violated is if there is a candidate who has a
majority of first place votes but doesn't win the election.
Is it possible for the plurality method to violate the Majority Criterion?
4) Is it possible for the method of pairwise comparisons to violate the Condorcet Criterion?
5) Here's our complete fairness table. 'Violates' means the voting method violates the fairness
criteria in some elections (not in every election). 'Satisfies' means the voting method never
violates the fairness criteria.
6) As we can see from the table, none of our four voting methods satisfy the
Criterion. Is there a voting method out there that satisfies the Dropout Criterion? There is
but…
32
7) Arrow's Impossibility Theorem: There is no voting method (using preference ballots) that
will always satisfy all four of the fairness criteria.
8) This is surprising (and possibly very upsetting)! Here's a great quote about Arrow's
Impossibility Theorem from our book:
"No matter how hard we try democracy will never have a perfectly fair voting method and the
potential for unfairness is built into every election. This does not mean that every election is
unfair or that every voting method is equally bad, nor does it mean that we should stop trying
to improve the quality of our voting experience."
9) It does mean that we will have to accept tradeoffs in choosing one election method over
another. For example, we might try to pick a voting method which would eliminate tactical
(insincere) voting.
A system in which tactical voting is impossible – that is, you never get a better result by voting
insincerely – would be desirable. More bad news ahead…
10) The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem says that this is basically impossible, because there are
only two kinds of systems that aren't vulnerable to tactical voting: dictatorship and random
systems.
We can still look for a system that's less vulnerable to tactical voting.
11) Other Criteria: A number of other fairness criteria have been proposed and discussed. Some
are below:
a. Condorcet loser criterion: If a candidate loses to every other candidate in a one-on-one

race, then that candidate should not win.
b. Clone independence criterion: If two identical candidates run in the same race, the outcome
of the race should not be affected.
c. Participation criterion: Not voting should not help your preferred choice win. (Example: A
meeting requiring a quorum.)
12) Here are some overall conclusions of our study of election methods:
• No voting method is perfect.
• Pairwise comparisons may be the "fairest."
• A number of voting methods are improvements on the plurality system (the one we use to
elect most officials in the US!).
33
13) Note that the mathematics of voting is a relatively new field in mathematics. Kenneth J. Arrow
(pictured below right) was born in 1921 and passed away in February 2017. Condorcet is
pictured below left.
http://homepage.newschool.edu/het//profiles/arrow.htm
14) Let's take a quick look at the homework assignment on the next page. Know that you'll
need to have the next page in front of you when you do some of the MyMath Lab
homework.
15) With the remaining class time, work on your project! If you have any questions, ask a
classmate or ask me.
34
After watching the class video, doing the homework problems, and getting help as necessary, you
should be able to:
1. Explain and interpret Arrow's Impossibility Theorem.
Homework:
• MyMath Lab Assignment: Do the assignment titled HW 1.6 – Part II. (Note: you will need
the preference schedules shown below when doing this MyMathLab assignment.)
***Be sure to always show your work on the MyMathLab problems.
• Reading and Class Preparation: Read Sections 2.1 and 2.3 (that's not a typo…skip section
2.2 for now). Be able to answer the following questions:
o What distinguishes a weighted voting system from the types of voting that we have been
considering? What are some examples of weighted voting systems?
o How is a dictator different from a player with veto power in a weighted voting system?
• Continue working on project #1! The project is due at the start of class #7.
Use the following preference schedule in part A of the 1st problem in MyMathLab:
Percentage of voters 30% 3% 16% 15% 36%

1st choice A A B B C
2nd choice B C A C A
3rd choice C B C A B
Use the following preference schedule in part B of the 1st problem in MyMathLab:
Percentage of voters 30% 16% 15% 39%

1st choice A B B C
2nd choice B A C A
3rd choice C C A B
Use the following preference schedule in part A of the 2nd problem in MyMathLab:
Number of voters 7 6 3 4
1st choice B C D E
2nd choice C A C D
3rd choice A D B B
4th choice D E A C
5th choice E B E A
35
Voting Method Summary
The Plurality Method is where the winner is the candidate with the most first place votes.
This candidate is called the plurality candidate.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Borda count method gives each candidate points for each vote they receive. Our
textbook's system gives 1 point for a last place vote, 2 points for a next to last place vote, and
so forth.
For example, with 4 candidates, a 4th place vote is worth 1 point, a 3rd place vote is worth 2
points, a 2nd place vote is worth 3 points and a 1st place vote is worth 4 points.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Here are the steps for Plurality with Elimination Method or Instant Runoff Voting (IRV).
Voters fill out a preference ballot once.
Round 1: If one candidate has a majority of 1st place votes, they have won and the election is
over.
Round 2: Eliminate the candidate with the least number of 1st place votes (thereby moving all
candidates ranked below that candidate up one rank) and recount the number of 1st place
votes. If one candidate has a majority of 1st place votes, they have won and the election is
over.
Round 3: Eliminate the candidate with the least number of 1st place votes…
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
For the Method of Pairwise Comparisons (sometimes called Copeland's Method), each voter
fills out a preference ballot (just once) and, as the name suggests, we compare every pair of
candidates.
For each head-to-head comparison, the winning candidate gets 1 point and the losing
candidate gets 0 points (they each get ½ point if there's a tie). All of the points are tallied up
and the candidate with the most points is declared the winner.
36
The Fairness Criteria
Majority Criterion: If candidate X has a majority of the first-place votes, then candidate X
Condorcet Criterion: If candidate X is preferred by the voters over each of the other
candidates in a head-to-head comparison, then candidate X (the Condorcet candidate)
Monotonicity Criterion: If candidate X is the winner of an election and, in a reelection, the

only changes in the ballots are changes involving some voters ranking X higher on their ballot
and not changing the order of any other candidates, then candidate X should still be the winner
of the election.
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives Criterion (also known as IIA or the Dropout

Criterion): If candidate X is the winner of an election and in a recount one of the nonwinning
candidates withdraws or is disqualified, then X should still be the winner of the election.
How to determine that there is a violation of each of our fairness criteria
a) Majority Criterion: Find a candidate who has a majority of first place votes but doesn't win
the election.
b) Condorcet Criterion: Find a candidate who beats every other candidate in a head-to-head
comparison but doesn't win the election.
c) Monotonicity Criterion: Find a candidate who wins the election but doesn't win in a
reelection with exactly the same votes as in the original election except for some voters
who ranked the candidate higher.
d) Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives Criterion: Find a candidate who wins the election
but then doesn't win when the votes are counted again after some other candidate dropped
out.
37
Class #5 Weighted Voting: Shapley-Shubik Power Index Sections 2.1 & 2.3
Daily Summary: In this lesson we introduce the concept of weighted voting systems and we
study the SSPI.
Demo
1) The Electoral College is used to determine the winner of our presidential elections.
From Wikipedia: Critics argue that the Electoral College is archaic, inherently undemocratic
and gives certain swing states disproportionate influence in selecting the President and Vice
President. Proponents argue that the Electoral College is an important, distinguishing feature
of federalism in the United States and that it protects the rights of smaller states.
http://www.worldatlas.com/webimage/countrys/namerica/usstates/electorl.htm
2) The Electoral College is an example of a weighted voting system since the different states
have different numbers of votes (from California's 55 electoral votes down to Montana's 3
electoral votes). Today we introduce weighted voting systems and look at a concrete way to
measure power in these systems. For example, is California (with its 55 electoral votes) five
times as powerful as Indiana (with its 11 electoral votes)? This is the kind of question we will
be able to answer soon.
3) Another example of a weighted voting system is three stockholders who own 10, 9, and 3
shares of stock. The stockholders vote 'yes' or 'no' on motions with each share counting as a
vote. Suppose that a motion needs at least 12 votes to pass (12 is called the quota). Note
that this also means 12 votes are enough to defeat a motion.
4) We introduce notation to represent a weighted voting system concisely. For our stockholder
example, we can capture all of the information given by writing [12: 10, 9, 3].
In general, we denote a weighted voting system as [q:w1, w2, w3, …, wN] where q is the quota
and w1, w2, w3, …, wN are the number of votes owned by each of the players (in decreasing
order).
38
5) There is some vocabulary you should know so look up these words in your book: dictator, veto
power, dummy. We'll use these words in the examples below.
a. Consider the weighted voting system [q: 8, 7, 3, 2]. What happens if the quota is 10 votes?
19 votes? 21 votes?
b. Consider the weighted voting system [11: 12, 5, 4]. What can we say about this
partnership?
c. If we want to avoid anarchy and gridlock, what are the possible values of the quota in a
weighted voting system?
6) Suppose there is a king who can be overruled if all 4 of his advisors disagree with his ruling.
What voting system (in standard form [q:w1, w2, w3, …, wN]) is this equivalent to?
7) There's some vocabulary you'll read about in the book (a sequential coalition, a pivotal player).
We'll do an example of a way to measure power using markers and three people to represent
[5: 3, 2, 1].
8) We use P1 , P2 , P3 to represent a sequential coalition. Note the use of the word sequential
which means the order in which the players vote matters. Next class we'll use different
notation for unordered coalitions: {P1 , P2 , P3 }.
39
9) How many sequential coalitions are there with 2 players? 3 players? N players?
10) Here's the method for finding the Shapley-Shubik Power Index (SSPI):
a. List all the sequential coalitions.
b. Find the pivotal player in each sequential coalition.
c. To find a player's Shapley-Shubik Power Index, count the total number of times that player
is pivotal, then divide that by the total number of times all players are pivotal.
11) Let's find the SSPI for [5: 4, 2, 1, 1]. We'll use the table below to save some time. Note that
there are several copies of this table at the end of this section for your use on the homework.
All Sequential Coalitions with 4 Players:
P1 , P2 , P3 , P4 P2 , P1 , P3 , P4 P3 , P1 , P2 , P4 P4 , P1 , P2 , P3
40
Class Activity #5 (Frontier Power – Part 1)
Frontier High School has a school board made up from 3 members from Deerfield, 2 from
Sunderland, 2 from Whately, and 2 from Conway. For a motion to pass, a majority of the board
must vote "yes."
1) Represent this situation using our notation for weighted voting systems.
2) Calculate the SSPI for each town.
3) After a controversial decision to change the high school's team name in 1998, complaints were
raised that the school board membership was not representative of the relative populations of
the 4 towns. The following table shows the population of each town as of the 2000 Census:
Town Population Percentage of Total Population
Deerfield 4,750
Sunderland 3,777
Whately 1,573
Conway 1,809
Find each town's percentage of the total population of all the towns.
4) Compare your answers to #2 and #3. Which towns, if any, do you think have a legitimate
complaint about their representation on the school board?
41
5) A significant portion of the population of Sunderland is made up of transient residents (mostly
U. Mass students) without children in the school system. Does considering this change your
answer to #4?
6) What other assumptions did you have to make in answering questions 1-4? For example,
what are you assuming about how the school board members from a particular town voted
relative to the other board members from their own town? Does considering any of these
make you want to change your answer to #4?
7) Another response to the school board's decision was an attempt to amend the school's
constitution to prohibit changes to the team name. This required a majority vote in each of the
4 towns. It passed in 3 of the 4 but was narrowly defeated in Conway. Can you represent this
situation as a weighted voting system?
1) [5: 3, 2, 2, 2]
2) Deerfield is pivotal 12 times. Each of the other towns is pivotal 4 times. The total number of pivotal players is 24
12 1 4 1
so Deerfield has = = 50% of the power and each other town has = » 16.67% of the power.
24 2 24 6
3) Deerfield 39.9%; Sunderland 31.71%; Whately 13.2%; Conway 15.2%
4) Sunderland seems to have a legitimate complaint. They have about 31.71% of the population but only about
16.67% of the voting power. The other three towns seem to have more power than their populations warrant.
5) Answers vary. Do you think U. Mass students who likely don't have any children going to Frontier High School
should have a say in the decisions about Frontier?
6) Again answers vary. If your answer to number 1 was [5: 3, 2, 2, 2] then you are assuming that all board members
from a particular town will vote the same way.
7) One possible answer is [4: 1, 1, 1, 1].
42
Even More Practice
1) Four friends decide to start a company. It will take $200,000 of capital to get the business off
the ground. P1 puts in $80,000, P2 contributes $70,000, P3 contributes $30,000, and P4 puts in
$20,000. The friends decide that those who contributed more money should have more of a say
in business decisions, so they decide that every $10,000 contributed is equal to one vote in all
business decisions and the quota is set at 2/3 of the total votes.
a. What is the total number of votes in the partnership?
b. What is the quota, q? Note that the quota has to be a whole number so carefully decide
whether to round up or down.
c. Using our new notation, describe the partnership mathematically by filling in the blank
spaces below.
[ _____ : _____ , _____ , _____ , _____ ]
d. Calculate the SSPI for each friend.
e. Using your answers to part d, use one of the following phrases to describe each player:
dictator, veto power, dummy.
43
1) a. 20
1
b. Technically the quota is 13 but the quota has to be a whole number so we round up to get 14.
3
c. [14: 8, 7, 3, 2]
d. Player 1 is pivotal 12 times. Player 2 is also pivotal 12 times. Players 3 and 4 are not pivotal any time. The total
12 1
number of pivotal players is 24 so Players 1 and 2 each have = = 50% of the power and Players 3 and 4
24 2
have 0% of the power.
e. No player is a dictator. Players 1 and 2 have veto power. Players 3 and 4 are dummies.
1. Determine the number of players, number of votes, weight of votes, and quota in a
weighted voting system.
2. Compare the results of using different values for the quota in a weighted voting system.
3. Identify players who are dictators, have veto power, or are dummies in a weighted voting
system.
4. Determine the number of sequential coalitions for a given number of players, and list them.
5. Find the Shapley-Shubik power distribution of a weighted voting system.
Homework:
• Finish Class Activity #5 (Frontier Power – Part 1); you do not need to turn it in, but it will be
checked for completeness in our next class.
• MyMathLab Assignment: Do the assignment titled HW 2.1, 2.3. (Note: the questions listed
below will appear in this MyMathLab assignment.)

***You'll find some blank copies of the table of all sequential coalitions of four players on the
next 2 pages. Feel free to use them when doing your homework.
• Reading and Class Preparation: Read Sections 2.2 and 2.4.
• Continue working on project #1! The project is due at the start of class #7.
Additional MyMathLab questions for HW 2.1, 2.3 (these are listed here so that you can try them
before starting the homework in MyMathLab).
1. Using the table on page 54 of your text, identify the four most powerful and eight least
powerful states in the Electoral College as measured by the SSPI. Note that we are
counting Washington, DC as a "state" here.
2. Is Massachusetts more or less powerful than the average of all 51 "states." Hint: If all 51
"states" had equal power, what percent of the power would each "state" have?
44
For Homework #5:
45
For Homework #5:
46
Class #6 Weighted Voting: Banzhaf Power Index Sections 2.2 & 2.4
Daily Summary: In this lesson we continue to explore weighted voting systems and we learn
about the BPI.
Demo
1) Here are urls to two YouTube videos on weighted voting systems. Hearing another person
explain how to do SSPI and BPI might help lock in the concepts for you. Check them out if you
have a chance!
4 minute video on SSPI:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=e_4NViQCmEw or tinyurl.com/p83rxgc
13 minute video on BPI:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VIoXDFST-qY
2) In our last class we saw the Shapley -Shubik Power Index as a way to measure distribution of
power in a weighted voting system. Today we see another way to measure power in weighted
voting systems: the Banzhaf Power Index.
3) The Parliament of Icelandia has 200 members. The Red Party has 99 seats, the Blue Party
has 98 seats, and the Green Party has 3 seats. Decisions are made by majority vote; that is,
the quota is 101. Write this weighted voting system using our standard notation.
Let's fill in the table below (some of the definitions are below the table but we'll figure things out
together as we go!). We'll represent the players with the letters R, B, and G.
Winning Critical
Weight
Coalition Players
47
4) Unordered Coalition: Any set of players who might join forces and vote the same way. Since
coalitions are sets of players, we'll use set notation to describe them. For example a coalition
of P1, P2, and P3 would be written as {P1, P2, P3}. A coalition consisting of all the players is
called the grand coalition.
Winning Coalition: A coalition that has enough votes to win is called a winning coalition. Any
other coalition is called a losing coalition.
Critical Players: A member of a coalition is said to be a critical player if the coalition must
have that player's votes to win.
5) We now define a precise way to measure each player's power using the Banzhaf Power Index
(BPI):
a. Make a list of all possible coalitions and determine which ones are winning coalitions.
b. Find the critical players in each winning coalition.
c. To find a player's Banzhaf power index, count the total number of times that player is
critical, then divide that by the total number of times all players are critical.
6) Note that the procedure for finding the BPI and the procedure for finding the SSPI are at the
end of this section of the packet.
7) Let's calculate the BPI for the Icelandia example.
8) Computing the BPI and SSPI by hand becomes very time-consuming as the number of players
increases but we can let technology help us with the dirty work. Let's use the following
webpage to confirm the BPI for the Icelandia example. Then we'll find the BPI and SSPI for
the king example [4: 3, 1, 1, 1, 1].
https://math.temple.edu/~conrad/cgi-bin/PowerIndex.py
48
9) Let’s take a closer look at how many coalitions there are for a weighted voting system with
different numbers of players. Instead of using P1, P2, P3, P4 to represent the players, we'll use
the letters a, b, c, d.
a. two players
b. three players
c. four players
d. five players
e. N players
10) FYI: Part of tonight's homework (listed in the Other Things to Do section of the Learning
Objectives below) asks you to cut up part of this packet. Make a note to yourself to do this
before our next class!
49
Class Activity #6 (Frontier Power - Part 2)
Recall that Frontier High School has a school board made up from 3 members from Deerfield, 2
from Sunderland, 2 from Whately, and 2 from Conway. For a motion to pass, a majority of the
board must vote "yes".
1) Represent this situation using our notation for weighted voting systems.
2) Determine the Banzhaf power index for each town. Begin by filling in the table below. Use the
letters D, S, W, and C to represent the players. Don't forget to cross off any non-winning
coalition!
Winning Critical
Weight
Coalition Players
3) For these towns is the BPI the same as the SSPI? You'll want to look at your notes for last
class where you calculated the SSPI for the towns.
50
4) Consider the weighted voting system [18: 16, 8, 4, 1]. Find BOTH the SSPI and BPI for this
system. Are they the same?
Don't forget to cross off any non-winning coalition!
Winning Critical
Weight
Coalition Players
51
5) Consider the weighted voting system [q: 25, 20, 18, 14, 11].
a. Find the total number of unordered coalitions (both winning and losing).
b. Find the total number of sequential coalitions.
c. Find the following:
!!
7! = _____________ = ____________
#!
$! %$!
= _____________ = ___________
#! %!!
1) [5 : 3,2,2,2]
2) Deerfield has ½, or 50%, of the power; each other town has 1/6, or about 16.67%, of the power.
3) The SSPI and the BPI are exactly the same.
4) The SSPI and BPI are different! See calculations below.
16 2 4 1 4 1
SSPI: P1 = = » 66.67%, P2 = = » 16.67%, P3 = = » 16.67% ,
24 3 24 6 24 6
0
P4 = = 0 = 0%
24
6 3 2 1 2 1 0
BPI: P1 = = = 60%, P2 = = = 20% , P3 = = = 20%, P4 = = 0 = 0%
10 5 10 5 10 5 10
5) a. 2! − 1 = 31 unordered coalitions b. 5! = 120 sequential coalitions
c. 7! = 5040 7!/6! = 7 8!/6! = 56 98!/97! = 98
52
Even More Practice
1) In a simplified version of the Celtics draft system, the head coach (P1) has 4 votes, the general
manager (P2) has 3 votes, the director of scouting (P3) has 2 votes, and the team psychiatrist
(P4) has 1 vote. Of the 10 votes, a simple majority is required for a yes vote on a player to be
drafted.
a. Write the voting system using our standard notation.
b. Find BOTH the SSPI and BPI for this system.
Winning Critical
Weight
Coalition Players
53
c. Who has the most power? Who has the least?
d. Were there any surprising results?
1) a. [6: 4, 3, 2, 1]
10 5 6 1 6 1 2 1
b. SSPI: P1 = = » 41.67% , P2 = = = 25%, P3 = = = 25% , P4 = = » 8.33%
24 12 24 4 24 4 24 12
5 3 1 3 1 1
BPI: P1 = » 41.67% , P2 = = = 25% , P3 = = = 25%, P4 = » 8.33%
12 12 4 12 4 12
c. head coach, team psychiatrist
d. The GM and the director of scouting had the same amount of power despite having a different number of votes.
54
1. Find the Banzhaf power distribution of a weighted voting system.
Homework:
• Finish Class Activity #6 (Frontier Power – Part 2); you do not need to turn it in, but it will be
checked for completeness in our next class.
• MyMathLab Assignment: Do the assignment titled HW 2.2, 2.4. (Note: the questions listed
below will appear in this MyMathLab assignment.)
• Reading and Class Preparation: Go to Wikipedia and search for 'cryptography' (or just go
here: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cryptography). Read the beginning parts of that page – stop
when you get to the Contents. There is also a link to this page on our Moodle site.
• Finish up project #1! The project is due at the start of class #7.
• Cut out the long rectangle (which contains two copies of the alphabet) and the short rectangle
(which contains the letters A through Z) on the last page of this packet – you will need these
two cut outs in the next class.
Additional MyMathLab questions for HW 2.2, 2.4 (these are listed here so that you can try them
before starting the homework in MyMathLab).
1. According to the reading, what is cryptography?
2. In the last century, what invention completely changed the field of cryptography?
3. What kinds of data do you send/receive on a regular basis that is encrypted?
55
Summary: Finding the Shapley-Shubik Power Index
1. Make a list of all possible sequential coalitions (ordered lists of the players).
2. In each sequential coalition, determine the pivotal player. (The player who contributes the
votes that make the coalition a winning coalition is pivotal. There is exactly one pivotal
player for each sequential coalition.)
3. Count the total number of times that each player is pivotal.
4. Divide the number of times each player is pivotal by the total number of times all players
are pivotal to obtain that player's Shapley-Shubik power index.
P1 , P2 , P3 P2 , P1 , P3 P3 , P1 , P2
P1 , P3 , P2 P2 , P3 , P1 P3 , P2 , P1
All Sequential Coalitions with 4 Players (extra copy):
56
Summary: Finding the Banzhaf Power Index
1. Make a list of all possible coalitions (sets of one or more players).

2. Identify all of the coalitions that are winning coalitions (with at least as many votes as the
quota).
3. Identify the critical players on each winning coalition. (A player is critical if the coalition
would no longer win without that player.)
4. Count the total number of times that each player is critical.
5. Divide the number of times each player is critical by the total number of times all players
are critical to obtain that player's Banzhaf power index.
The following lists may be helpful for reference.
All Coalitions with 3 Players:
{P1 } {P1 , P2 } {P1 , P2 , P3 }

{P2 } {P1 , P3 }
{P3} {P2 , P3 }
{P1 } {P1 , P2 } {P1 , P2 , P3 } {P1 , P2 , P3 , P4 }

{P2 } {P1 , P3 } {P1 , P2 , P4 }
{P3} {P1 , P4 } {P1 , P3 , P4 }
{P4 } {P2 , P3 } {P2 , P3 , P4 }
{P2 , P4 }
{P3 , P4 }
All Coalitions with 4 Players (extra copy):
{P1 } {P1 , P2 } {P1 , P2 , P3 } {P1 , P2 , P3 , P4 }

{P2 } {P1 , P3 } {P1 , P2 , P4 }
{P3} {P1 , P4 } {P1 , P3 , P4 }
{P4 } {P2 , P3 } {P2 , P3 , P4 }
{P2 , P4 }
{P3 , P4 }
57
Class #7 Cryptography (Day 1) - Introduction, Substitution, and Bifid Supplement
Daily Summary: In this lesson we introduce cryptography and we tackle substitution and bifid
ciphers.
Demo
1) In this section and the next, we will discuss cryptography. These materials have been adapted
with permission from James Hamblin.
2) How do we protect the security of the messages we send? This is a very important issue in
the information age. Name some instances where we transmit information on-line that we
hope is secure.
3) It is largely impossible to prevent messages from being intercepted. Since we can't keep
people from reading our messages, we should try to disguise them so that the messages only
make sense to the intended recipient.
This process is called "encryption".
4) Here's some vocabulary:
• Cryptography is the study of processes by which information is disguised so that

unintended recipients cannot understand it.
• Encryption is the process of disguising the message. Decryption is the reverse process.
• A cipher is a reversible rule for disguising a message. What does reversible mean in this
context?
5) We want ciphers that are simple enough to use regularly, but complex enough so that the
messages cannot be easily decrypted by someone who does not know the rule.
6) One of the simplest ciphers is called the Caesar cipher. It is named after Julius Caesar (100 –
44 BCE) who used it to communicate with his generals.
Take the letters of your message and change them according to this rule: Each letter is
replaced by the letter that is three places later in the alphabet. What happens when we get to
the end of the alphabet? We simply wrap around back to the beginning.
58
7) We will typically omit spaces and other punctuation when we encode messages since knowing
the lengths of the words in our message could give the enemy a clue about the contents of our
message.
8) To help us do problems involving the Caesar cipher (and other shift ciphers where you just
shift the alphabet a certain number of places), we will use the cutouts you made. If you haven't
done so already, go to the last page of this packet and cut out the short rectangle (which
contains the letters A through Z) and the long rectangle (which contains two copies of the
alphabet).
9) When you're ready with your cutouts, encode the message "OATMEAL" using the Caesar
cipher. As you get it, write your answer below!
10) To decode a message from the Caesar cipher, we simply go backwards 3 steps in the
alphabet.
This message was encoded using the Caesar cipher: "EUHD NIDV W". Decode it and write
your answer below! Note that we will often split the message into "blocks" of equal length to
make the message more readable. The encoded phrase in this example was written out using
blocks of length 4 even though it's a single word.
11) The Caesar cipher is an example of a substitution cipher since each letter of the message is
replaced by another letter according to a consistent rule. The cryptoquote puzzle in the
newspaper is another example of a substitution cipher.
Substitution ciphers have a big weakness. The rule for substituting letters is always the same
throughout the entire message. This makes encoding messages relatively easy, but
messages can be deciphered if they are long enough.
59
12) One method that can be used to break these ciphers is frequency analysis. According to the
histogram below, what are the three most common letters in English?
Using trial and error it is possible to decode many messages by replacing the most common
letters that appear in the message with E, A, or T and looking for common words or prefixes or
suffixes.
You'll have a chance to try cracking a substitution cypher with an optional cryptoquote in the
homework.
13) The main problem with substitution ciphers is that the order of the letters does not change.
More advanced ciphers can involve rearranging letters to try to avoid this problem.
14) We now learn about the bifid cipher which uses a device called a Polybius square.
Let’s fill in the alphabet, in order, in this grid by going across the rows (skip the letter J since
there are only 25 spaces). If our message has any J's then we will replace the J’s with the
letter I.
60
15) We can also create a square based on a keyword of our choosing. We start by filling in the
letters of the keyword across the rows, leaving out duplicates.
Let's use the keyword "CONFIDENTIAL". Fill in the letters of the keyword "CONFIDENTIAL"
(in the grid below) going across the rows but skipping any letter that you've already written (for
example, we won't write the second N)!
16) Now fill in the rest of the alphabet, again going across the rows and never duplicating a letter.
Process to encode using a bifid cipher:
a) Create a Polybius square using a keyword.
b) "Look up" each letter of our message and write the numbers with the row on top of the
column.
c) Group the numbers in pairs reading across from left to right.
d) Look up these new pairs of numbers in our Polybius square. Remember, the first number
in the pair is the row number and the second number is the column number.
61
17) Let's do an example where we encode a short message: "RETREAT". As we will see, the bifid
cipher requires messages to have an even number of letters. Since "RETREAT" has 7 letters,
we will add a dummy character to the end.
C O N F I
D E T A L
B G H K M
P Q R S U
V W X Y Z
Letter R E T R E A T X
Row
Column
18) Is bifid a substitution cipher? That is, does each letter always get encoded to the same letter?
19) To decode a message, simply reverse this process: Look up each letter in the Polybius
square, writing down the row, then the column (but write the numbers from left to right). Then
split the message in half and put the second half below the first half. Finally, decode the
message by looking up each letter in the Polybius square.
Let’s try decoding our result from above:
Letter
R C
62
Class Activity #7 (Tales From the Cryptography)
Note that there are blank copies of the Polybius square at the end of this section so feel free to
use those on this class activity and on the homework if you wish. (Several problems in this class
activity were created by Caitlin Worth.)
1) Encode the following message using a shift cipher where each letter is replaced by the letter
that is 5 places later in the alphabet:
THE EAGLE HAS LANDED
2) Decipher the following message that was encoded using the Caesar cipher:
ZKH QSL JVI OB
3) Encode the following word using a shift cipher where each letter is replaced by the letter that is
10 places later in the alphabet:
HAPPY
4) Decode the following word that was encoded with a shift cipher where each letter was replaced
by the letter that is 4 places after it:
TIRG MP
5) Encode this phrase by replacing each letter with the letter that is at the opposite end of the
alphabet (that is, A becomes Z, B becomes Y, C becomes X, …, Z becomes A):
HOMEWORK
6) Decipher this phrase where each letter has been replaced with the letter that is at the opposite
end of the alphabet (that is, A becomes Z, B becomes Y, C becomes X, …, Z becomes A):
YIFRMH
63
7) Encode the following message using the bifid cipher with the keyword SECRET:
CODES ARE FUN
Letter C O D E S A R E F U N X
Row
Column
8) Decipher the following message that was encoded using the bifid cipher with the keyword
SECURITY.
APUTK SMTMO
Letter A P U T K S M T M O
R C
64
9) The message "EXPT NGFG YD" was encoded with the bifid cipher using a Polybius square
based on the keyword "MISSISSIPPI". Decode the message.
Letter E X P T N G F G Y D
R C
Answers
1. YMJJ FLQJ MFXQ FSIJ I
2. You're on your own here! (You should recognize the phrase!)
3. RKZZ I
5. SLNV DLIP
7. RAES FUII SOUC
65
Even More Practice
Reminder: The Even More Practice problems are OPTIONAL! Do them if you want more
practice with the material.
1) Encode the message "ATTACK AT DAYBREAK" using the Caesar cipher.
2) This message was encoded using the Caesar cipher: "DOOZR UNDQG QRSOD B". Decode
it.
3) Encode the message "EVERYONE LOVES IT" with the bifid cipher using a Polybius square
based on the keyword "MATHEMATICS". Don't forget to tack on an X at the end of the
message before you encode it. Why do we need to do this in this example?
4) The message "SAWA BTBK KSTV LAAA" was encoded with the bifid cipher using a Polybius
square based on the keyword "SCHWARZENEGGER". Decode the message.
CAUTION: Exercises #5, 6, 7, and 8 are a bit unusual!
CHEER
TIGER
OUI
ALOHAS
66
1) DWWD FNDW GDBE UHDN

2) You're on your own here! (You should recognize the phrase!)
3) The original message has an odd number of letters which is why we need to tack on an X.
The encoded message is EHYF LVCE VYOZ OEFK.
5) JOLLY (surprise!)
6) PECAN (surprise!)
7) YES (surprise!)
8) GRUNGY (surprise!)
1. Encode a word or phrase using Caesar, substitution, or Bifid ciphers.

2. Decode a word or phrase using any of the above ciphers.
3. Decode a substitution cipher using frequency analysis.
4. Encode or decode a word using a newly explained cipher.
Homework:
• Finish Class Activity #7 (Tales from the Cryptography); you do not need to turn it in, but it
will be checked for completeness in our next class.
• MyMath Lab Assignment: Do the assignment titled HW: Cryptography #1. (Note: the
questions listed on the next page will appear in this MyMathLab assignment.) This assignment
includes review questions from chapters 1 & 2.
• Reading and Class Preparation: Go to Wikipedia and type in 'Vigenere cipher' (or just go
here: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vigenere_cipher) and read the opening paragraphs (above the
contents) as well as the section titled 'Description'
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vigenere_cipher#Description)
***These links are also available in Moodle.
Additional MyMathLab questions for HW Cryptography #1 (these are listed here so that you can
try them before starting the homework in MyMathLab).
1) According to the reading, who should have been given credit for inventing the Vigenère
cipher?
2) Encode this phrase using the Caesar cipher: "THIS MESSAGE IS NOT SECURE"
67
3) Decipher this phrase where each letter has been replaced with the letter that is at the opposite
end of the alphabet (that is, A becomes Z, B becomes Y, C becomes X, …, Z becomes A):
"HSVH VOOH HVZH SVOO HYBG SVHV ZHSL IV"
4) Encode this message using the bifid cipher with the keyword LINCOLN: "ABE WAS TALL".
You will find some blank grids at the end of this section to use when doing your homework.
5) Decipher the following message that was encoded using the bifid cipher with the keyword
EGGFOOYUNG: QZAM BMAZ IZEY. You will find some blank grids at the end of this section
to use when doing your homework.
6) (Optional – Not in MyMathLab!) See if you can break the following substitution cipher using
frequency analysis. Be patient with yourself as there will be much trial and error here. Also,
use a pencil with a good eraser! This problem is more for fun than for preparing for our
upcoming test so if you find yourself getting too frustrated, just skip it.
68
For Homework #7:
69
For Homework #7:
70
Class #8 Cryptography (Day 2) – Vigenère and Autokey Supplement
Daily Summary: In this lesson we wrap up our study of cryptography by examining our most
complex ciphers: Vigenère and Autokey.
Demo
0) Be sure to look over your graded project. If you made any mistakes, figure out what went
wrong before our upcoming test (class #10)! Get help from classmates, your teacher, or folks
in the Math Studio.
1) Last class we discussed the importance of being able to send data securely. We looked at the
Caesar cipher (where you encode a message by shifting all the letters three steps forward in
the alphabet). We also looked at a non-substitution cipher called the bifid cipher. This kind of
encryption involved a keyword and a 5x5 grid where we filled in (most of) the alphabet. Today
we discuss two more encryption methods: the Vigenère and the Autokey ciphers.
Just like last class, these materials have been adapted with permission from James Hamblin.
2) Before we tackle those ciphers, we need to take a quick detour into the arithmetic of the clock.
If it's 11 o'clock now, what time will it be in 5 hours? In 50 hours?
3) These equations look funny but they're exactly the kinds of calculations we do naturally when
we are dealing with time:
11 + 5 = 4 11 + 50 = 1
The equations above aren't true in normal arithmetic so we have notation to let people know
that the arithmetic is being performed on a clock: 11 + 5 º 4 mod12 . In this equation, 'mod'
stands for modulus and it captures the fact that we are working on a clock which has 12
numbers on it.
4) Fill in the blank: 7 + 19 º mod12
5) Let's list all the possible answers when we are doing arithmetic on the clock. Then we'll
rename one of our answers.
6) Fill in the blank: 4 + 8 º mod12
71
7) As we've seen, when we're working mod 12, we can subtract as many 12s as we need to in
order to get an answer that's in this list: {0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11}. We can also add as many
12s as we need to.
We may have to add 12s if we have a subtraction problem: 7 - 28 º mod12
8) This new arithmetic is called modular arithmetic and it works with any modulus greater than 1.
We are going to be encoding all the letters of the alphabet so what modulus will we use?
9) Each letter of the alphabet will be represented by a number from 0 to 25 starting with A which
is 0 and going up to Z which is 25.
We will use this table to help us with our calculations (note that there is another copy of this
table at the end of this packet – make sure you have a copy of this table handy for the first
test!).
A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
10) Recall that the Caesar cipher adds 3 to each letter of a message. We can think of this as
"adding D" to each letter.
Let's encode "DAY" using the Caesar cipher and modular arithmetic.
phrase D A Y
numbers
keyword
numbers
add or subtract
mod 26
phrase
Notice that you can add or subtract 26 (not 25!) to get a number between 0 and 25.
72
11) To decode the Caesar cipher, we subtract D from each letter. Using modular arithmetic,
decode “VQRZ"
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
phrase V Q R Z
numbers
keyword
numbers
add or subtract
mod 26
phrase
12) Now we discuss the Vigenère Cipher. It's based on a keyword. We encode our message by
adding our keyword repeatedly.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
For example, let's encode the message "RACCOON" with the keyword "WAX".
phrase R A C C O O N
numbers 17 0 2 2 14 14 13
keyword
numbers
add or subtract
mod 26
phrase
Notice that you can add or subtract 26 (not 25!) to get a number between 0 and 25.
13) Looking back at that last example, decide whether or not Vigenère is a substitution cipher
(where one letter always stands for another letter).
73
14) To decode a message in Vigenère, we simply subtract the repeated code word.
Decode the following message using Vigenère with a keyword of TRIX: "TIMC HISF WJ"
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
phrase T I M C H I S F W J
numbers 19 8 12 2 7 8 18 5 22 9
keyword
numbers
add or subtract
mod 26
phrase
Again, notice that you can add or subtract 26 (not 25!) to get a number between 0 and 25.
15) Since Vigenère is not a substitution cipher, it is not possible to use simple frequency analysis
to try to break the code. However, since the keyword is repeated, it is possible to use a
modified form of frequency analysis if the message is long enough.
16) We now take a look at our final (and most complex!) encryption method, the Autokey Cipher.
This cipher is a variation on Vigenère. It also uses modular arithmetic and a keyword.
However, this time we simply write down the code word once. For the rest of the "keyword",
we write the original message.
17) For example, let's use Autokey to encode the message "BRUCE WILLIS" with the keyword
"TUX".
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
phrase B R U C E W I L L I S
numbers 1 17 20 2 4 22 8 11 11 8 18
keyword
numbers
add or subtract
mod 26
phrase
74
18) Decoding using the Autokey cipher is trickier. Why?
19) Let's decode this message using Autokey with the keyword "PATRIOTS": "HUIV ZPHO
DQXR EFFD." (Note: if you are watching the video at home, then jump down to the optional
problem below.)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
phrase H U I V Z P H O D Q X R E F F O
numbers 7 20 8 21 25 15 7 14 3 16 23 17 4 5 5 14
keyword
numbers
add or subtract
mod 26
phrase
(Optional!) If you are not a Patriot’s Fan, then let's decode this message using Autokey with
the keyword "PATRIOTS": "HUIV ZPHO DFDW VSG."
phrase H U I V Z P H O D F D W V S G
numbers 7 20 8 21 25 15 7 14 3 5 3 22 21 18 6
keyword
numbers
add or subtract
mod 26
phrase
20) Note that for both directions (encoding and decoding) of Autokey, the keyword should be a
meaningful phrase!
75
Class Activity #8 (Code Breakers)
***This activity was created by Caitlin Worth.
1) Use modular arithmetic to answer the following questions:
a) Fill in the blank: 3 - 8 º mod 12 b) Fill in the blank: 5 + 18 º mod 3
2) Encode the message "EXAM ONE SOON" using the Vigenère cipher with a keyword of
"STUDY".
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
phrase
numbers
keyword
numbers
add or subtract
mod 26
phrase
3) Decode the message "AGYH BKEY HN". It was encoded using the Vigenère cipher with a
keyword of "STUDY".
phrase
numbers
keyword
numbers
add or subtract
mod 26
phrase
76
4) Encode the message "LONG WEEKEND" using the Autokey cipher with a keyword of "YIPEE".
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
phrase
numbers
keyword
numbers
add or subtract
mod 26
phrase
5) Decode the message "ZIF EYD FMD X". It was encoded using the Autokey cipher with a
keyword of "HOT".
phrase
numbers
keyword
numbers
add or subtract
mod 26
phrase
1) a) 7 b) 2
2) WQUP MFXM RMF
4) JWCK APSX KJH
77
Even More Practice
1) Encode the message "RAINBOWS" using the Vigenère cipher with a keyword of "VIEW".
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
phrase
numbers
keyword
numbers
add or subtract
mod 26
phrase
2) Decode the message "PWZO VRZG VFXY AOBN X". It was encoded using the Vigenère
cipher with a keyword of "WINNER".
phrase
numbers
keyword
numbers
add or subtract
mod 26
phrase
3) Encode the message "LAWNMOWER" using the Autokey cipher with a keyword of "TRUCK".
phrase
numbers
keyword
numbers
add or subtract
mod 26
phrase
78
4) Decode the message "SMJH OMKY EPHW LP". It was encoded using the Autokey cipher
with a keyword of "BIGPAPI".
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
phrase
numbers
keyword
numbers
add or subtract
mod 26
phrase
79
1) MIMJ WWAO
3) ERQP WZWA E
80
1. Do modular arithmetic.
2. Encode or decode a word or phrase using a Vigenère or Autokey cipher.
Homework:
• Finish Class Activity #8 (Code Breakers); you do not need to turn it in, but it will be checked
for completeness in our next class.
• My Math Lab Assignment: Do the assignment titled HW: Cryptography #2. (Note: the
questions listed below will appear in this MyMathLab assignment.) This assignment includes
review questions from chapters 1 & 2.
• Reading and Class Preparation: There is no reading for next class. However, you may wish
to begin preparing for the first test (class #10).
Additional MyMathLab questions for HW Cryptography #2 (these are listed here so that you can
try them before starting the homework in MyMathLab).
1) Use modular arithmetic to fill in the following blanks:
a) Fill in the blank: 3 - 8 º mod 7 b) Fill in the blank: 5 + 18 º mod 4
2) Encode the message "RED SOX NATION" using the Vigenère cipher with a keyword of
"FANS". You will find some blank grids at the end of this section to use when doing your
homework.
3) Decode the message "ZAFO TBPL USGB". It was encoded using the Vigenère cipher with a
keyword of "BASEBALL". You will find some blank grids at the end of this section to use when
doing your homework.
4) Encode the message "PATRIOTS NATION" using the Autokey cipher with a keyword of "NFL".
You will find some blank grids at the end of this section to use when doing your homework.
5) Decode the message "UOHK JOED AOLV BCH". It was encoded using the Autokey cipher
with a keyword of "FOOTBALL". You will find some blank grids at the end of this section to
use when doing your homework.
81
Cryptography Summary
How to encode using:
Shift cipher – Shift all the letters in the message forwards or backwards according to a fixed
rule. The Cesar cipher is an example of a shift cipher that shifts all the letters in the message
forward three letters.
Bifid – The bifid cipher uses a 5x5 Polybius square. Fill in the square with a keyword followed by
the remainder of the alphabet, leaving out the letter J. Next, make sure your message has an
even number of letters. If it doesn’t, simply add an X or a Z to the end. Look up each letter in the
message in the Polybius square and write down its row and column in columns of two numbers.
Then take the bottom row of your numbers and write it after the first row of numbers in a long
horizontal line. Finally, use your Polybius square to look up each pair of numbers in your long
horizontal line where the first number in each pair represents the row and the second number in
each pair represents the column.
Vigenère - The Vigenère cipher uses a keyword. Start by converting your message to numbers
using A = 0, B = 1, …, Z = 25. Also convert your keyword. Write out the message horizontally
using the numbers instead of letters. On the next line write out the numbers of the keyword over
and over until the length matches your message. Add the numbers from the two lines of
numbers. If any number is greater than 25, subtract 26. Convert the resulting numbers back to
letters.
Autokey – Autokey works very similarly to Vigenère, but instead of writing the numbers of the
keyword over and over under the message, you only write it once. Fill the rest of the line with the
message itself. Proceed as in Vigenère.
Remember that to decode you must do each of the processes described above in reverse.
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For Homework #8:
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
phrase
numbers
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83
For Homework #8:
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
phrase
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For Homework #8:
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
phrase
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85
Class #9 Review Day for Test #1
***Caitlin Worth & Ian Winokor
1) Preparing for the test - Subjects covered:
Voting:
• 4 different methods and 4 fairness criteria (let's take a quick peek at Packet #1 – Part I)
• Vocabulary of voting (majority, Condorcet candidate, etc.)
• Tactical voting, Arrow's Impossibility Theorem
Weighted voting:
• Vocabulary of weighted voting (veto power, dictator, coalition, sequential coalition, etc.)
• Weighted voting notation: [6: 4, 2, 2, 1] What does this mean?
• Finding the two power indices, BPI and SSPI (let's take a quick peek at Packet #1 – Part II)
Cryptography:
• Decoding and encoding with all of our ciphers (Caeser, shift, Bifid, Vigenère, Autokey),
Modular arithmetic
2) Resources: You can use a calculator, your two alphabet cutouts, and one index card
containing hand-written notes of your own creation.
This index card should be no larger than 5" by 8", and you may write on both sides of it. It can
contain any material written by you, but should not be a photocopy of pages from the textbook
or this packet (or from someone else).
On the test, I will provide you with several copies of the blank grids that are located within this
packet, but they will all be on the same piece of paper, not sprinkled throughout the test.
3) Advice: Get a good night's sleep; show your work; pace yourself; read the questions carefully.
4) You have one hour and fifteen minutes for the test which is written to be a one hour test. If you
have accommodations or other special test needs, please send me an email ASAP!
5) There are no Learning Objectives for next class (study!!!). The assignment for the class after
the test follows.
86
Homework (due the class after the test - Class #11):
Reading and Class Preparation: Read sections 4.1 and 4.2 in the textbook. Be able to
answer the following questions:
o According to the reading, what is an apportionment problem?
o According to the reading, how does the Hamilton Method solve an apportionment problem?
Study Guide for Test #1 (the test will be on class #10)
To be prepared for this test, you should be able to:
1. Understand the following terms: plurality, majority, preference ballot, preference schedule,
tactical (or insincere) voting, Condorcet candidate, fairness criteria, Arrow's impossibility
theorem, weighted voting system, quota, dictator, cryptography, encryption, decryption, cipher,
Caesar cipher, substitution cipher, Bifid cipher, frequency analysis, Vigenère cipher, Autokey
cipher, modular arithmetic.
2. Given a preference schedule for an election, determine the number of votes cast and the
number needed for a majority.
3. Create a preference schedule from preference ballots or a description of voters' preferences.
4. Given a preference schedule for an election, find the winner using the plurality, plurality-with-
elimination, Borda count, and/or pairwise comparison methods.
5. Given a preference schedule for an election, find the complete ranking of the candidates using
any of the above methods.
6. Given a preference schedule for an election, determine whether any methods would violate
one or more of the fairness criteria.
7. Given a description of a situation, describe whether any fairness criteria were violated, and
which one(s).
8. Determine the number of players, number of votes, weight of votes, and quota in a weighted
voting system.
9. Compare the results of using different values for the quota in a weighted voting system.
10. Identify players who are dictators, have veto power, or are dummies in a weighted voting
system.
11. Find the Banzhaf and/or Shapley-Shubik power distributions of a weighted voting system.
12. Encode a word or phrase using Caesar, shift, Bifid, Vigenère, or Autokey ciphers.
87
13. Decode a word or phrase using any of the above ciphers.
14. Encode or decode a word using a newly explained cipher.
15. Find equivalent numbers in modular arithmetic.
16. Do modular arithmetic.
Resources for the test:
• Look over Chapters 1 and 2 in the textbook, as well as the material on cryptography in the
packet.
• Review past homework problems and class activities. The book has a number of problems
similar to the homework which you can use for additional review. MyMathLab also allows you
to do similar problems (without lowering your homework score).
• The "Sample Test Problems" (next page) may also be helpful.
Sample Test #1 Problems
These are an assortment of problems which require the skills and knowledge which will be
evaluated by the first test. These problems do not represent all the skills or types of problems
that will appear on the test. However, they should help give you a sense of the flavor of
questions I will be asking and of how well prepared you are for the test.
1. A recent mayoral race pitted the candidates Abel, Banach, and Cauchy against each other.
When polled, 60% of the voters said they preferred Abel to Banach in a two-way race, and
55% of the voters said they preferred Abel to Cauchy in a two-way race. These polls were
completely accurate, but Cauchy won the election.
a. What fairness criterion has been violated?
b. What voting method was definitely not used in this race?
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2. Consider the following preference schedule.
1st choice A A B C C D
2nd choice B D C D B C
3rd choice C B A B D B
4th choice D C D A A A
Number of 6 4 4 4 4 3
voters
a. Find the winner using the plurality method.
b. Find the winner using the plurality-with-elimination method.
c. Find the winner using the Borda count method.
d. Find the winner using the method of pairwise comparisons.
e. Give the complete rank of the candidates using the plurality method.
f. Is there a Condorcet candidate in this election? If so, who? Does this example illustrate
that any election methods violate the Condorcet criterion?
g. Explain why, in this election, the plurality method violates the "Dropout Criterion" (also
known as the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives Criterion).
h. Choose one of the voting methods and give an example of how, under that method, voters
could manipulate this election by voting tactically.
89
3. A certain four-member mathematics department makes all its decisions by voting. The
department chair receives 7 votes, the former department chair (who's about to retire) receives
4 votes, the professor who just got tenure receives 2 votes, and the professor who was just
hired last year receives 1 vote. The department requires 9 votes in favor of a motion for it to
pass.
a. Express this situation using our notation for weighted voting systems.
b. How many coalitions are possible in this weighted voting system? How many sequential
coalitions are possible in this weighted voting system?
c. Find the Banzhaf power distribution for the mathematics department.
d. Find the Shapley-Shubik power distribution for the mathematics department.
e. Name any dictators, dummies, and players with veto power in the department.
f. Give another conclusion about the department which you can draw from looking at the
Banzhaf power distribution, but was not obvious from the vote totals.
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4. Encode the phrase TEST DAY using each of the following ciphers:
a. Caesar
b. A substitution cipher where each letter is replaced by the letter 2 before it.
c. Bifid with keyword CAUTION
d. Vigenère with keyword FUN
e. Autokey with keyword BEE
5. Decode the following messages:
a. JRSKHU (encoded using Caesar)
b. CKLDAN (encoded using substitution where each letter was replaced by the letter 4 before
it)
c. GQDOBY (encoded using Bifid with keyword CAUTION)
d. LICMYE (encoded using Vigenère with keyword FUN)
e. HSTNSG (encoded using Autokey with keyword BEE)

91
Answers to Sample Test #1 Problems:
1. a) The Condorcet Criterion b) Pairwise comparisons
2. a) A (10 votes) b) C c) C (69 points) d) B
e) 1st place: A (10 votes), 2nd place: C (8 votes), 3rd place: B (4 votes), 4th place: D (3 votes)
f) Yes, B. Yes, all methods except for Pairwise Comparisons (since B doesn't win any of the
others).
g) Candidate A wins using the plurality method. However, if candidate B had dropped out of
the election, their votes would have gone to candidate C, who would then have won.
Since the "Dropout Criterion" says that a losing candidate dropping out shouldn't change
who won, it is violated.
h) There are many possibilities. For example, under the plurality method, D's 3 supporters
could vote for C instead, thus giving victory to C (their 2nd choice) instead of A (their 4th
choice).
3. a) [9: 7, 4, 2, 1]
b) There are 24 - 1 = 15 coalitions and 4! = 24 sequential coalitions.
c) The chair has 6/10, or 60%, of the power. The former chair and newly tenured professor
each have 2/10, or 20%, of the power. The newly hired faculty member has no power.
d) The chair has 2/3, or about 66.7%, of the power. The former chair and newly tenured
professor each have 1/6, or about 16.7%, of the power. The newly hired faculty member
has no power.
e) There are no dictators. The chair has veto power, and the new hire is a dummy J.
f) Several answers are possible. For example, the former chair and newly tenured professor
have the same amount of power, even though the former chair has twice as many votes.
4. a) WHVWGDB b) RCQRBYW c) AMOZSYPQ d) YYFYXND e) UIWMHSR
5. All parts decode to the word GOPHER.
92
P1 , P2 , P3 P2 , P1 , P3 P3 , P1 , P2
P1 , P3 , P2 P2 , P3 , P1 P3 , P2 , P1
P1 , P2 , P3 P2 , P1 , P3 P3 , P1 , P2
P1 , P3 , P2 P2 , P3 , P1 P3 , P2 , P1
93
{P1 } {P1 , P2 } {P1 , P2 , P3 }

{P2 } {P1 , P3 }
{P3 } {P2 , P3 }
{P1 } {P1 , P2 } {P1 , P2 , P3 }

{P2 } {P1 , P3 }
{P3 } {P2 , P3 }
{P1 } {P1 , P2 } {P1 , P2 , P3 } {P1 , P2 , P3 , P4 }

{P2 } {P1 , P3 } {P1 , P2 , P4 }
{P3 } {P1 , P4 } {P1 , P3 , P4 }
{P4 } {P2 , P3 } {P2 , P3 , P4 }
{P2 , P4 }
{P3 , P4 }
All Coalitions with 4 Players (extra copy):
{P1 } {P1 , P2 } {P1 , P2 , P3 } {P1 , P2 , P3 , P4 }

{P2 } {P1 , P3 } {P1 , P2 , P4 }
{P3 } {P1 , P4 } {P1 , P3 , P4 }
{P4 } {P2 , P3 } {P2 , P3 , P4 }
{P2 , P4 }
{P3 , P4 }
94
95
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
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97
A
A B
B C
C D
D E
E F
F G
G H
H I
I J
J
K
K
L
L
M
M
N
N
O
O
P P
Q Q
R R
S S
T T
U U
V V
W W
X X
Y Y
Z Z
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I
J
K
L
M
N
O
P
Q
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U
V
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X
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117 (In Person) Packet #1

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Class #1 Voting: Plurality & Borda Methods Sections 1.1 & 1.2 & 1.

S = _______ V = _______ C = _______

5) Who is our winner by using the plurality method?

a. Did we have a majority candidate with our ice cream example?

b. How many votes are required to have a majority in this class?

a. Let's use the Borda count method to determine the winner.

Rank the following flavors of ice cream from best to worst:

A. vanilla B. chocolate C. strawberry D. cookies and cream

Write their names here: ________________ ________________ ________________

1) The results of a sample election are given below.

a. How many voters were there in total?

b. How many first-place votes would be needed for a majority?

a. How many voters are there in total?

b. How many first-place votes are needed to get a majority?

Class Activity #1 Answers:

1) a. 36 b. 19 c. A wins with 20 first place votes.

d. 1st – A (20) 2nd – B (8) 3rd – C (5) 4th – D (3)

e. B wins with 104 points (103 for A, 90 for C, 63 for D).

f. 1st – B (104) 2nd – A (103) 3rd – C (90) 4th – D (63)

2) a. 37 b. 19 c. A = 14, B = 4, C = 11, D = 8 so A wins

1) The following problem is from your book:

a. How many students in the class voted?

b. How many first-place votes would be needed for a majority?

e. What's surprising about your answers to parts c and d?

a. How many voters are there?

b. How many votes is needed for a majority in this election?

c. Did any destination get a majority of the votes?

d. Which destination is the winner according to the Plurality Method?

1) a. 55 b. 28 votes c. A & B would tie.

1. Create a preference schedule from preference ballots or a description of voters'

Other Things to Do:

Voters fill out a preference ballot once.

Plurality - Borda - Plurality with Elimination -

a. How many voters were there in total?

i) We begin by listing all of the possible match-ups.

v) Now we calculate the scores for each of the other match-ups.

vii) Who is the winner using the method of pairwise comparisons?

How many comparisons are required if there are

Class Activity #2 (Voting)

Re-introduce yourself to your tablemates.

Write their names here: _____________ _____________ _____________ _____________

1) The results of a sample election are given below.

The ranking is: 1st – A 2nd – B & C (tie) 3rd – D

2. a. D eventually wins (with a score of 29-26 over A in the last round).

Percentage of voters 30% 3% 16% 15% 36%

1)a. C wins (by a score of 51%-49% over A in the final round)

c. There is a three-way tie. (A beats B 69%-31%, B beats C 61%-39%, C beats A 51%-49%)

d. Round 1: S = 13, C = 12, V = 11 à Eliminate V à Round 2: S = 15, C = 21 so the ranking is C, S, V.

Learning Objectives after Class #2

• MyMathLab Assignment: Do the assignment titled HW 1.4, 1.5.

We start by making sure we have a clear understanding of if-then statements.

If the weather's okay, then I will go for a run in the morning.

a. The weather is okay. I go for a run.

b. The weather is okay. I don't go for a run.

c. The weather is not okay. I go for a run.

d. The weather is not okay. I don't go for a run.

a. Does any candidate have a majority of first place votes?

b. Who is the winner using the Borda method?

S = ___ V = _ C = _____

Write their names here:

Write their names here: _______ _ _ _______

In this scenario, the method the __ Criterion.

[ ___ : _ , _ , _ , ___ ]