G.R. No. 89606 August 30, 1990 enforcement of the civil liability adjudged in his favor in the
AGUSTIN SALGADO, petitioner, criminal case. The motion was opposed by the petitioner.
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, (Fourteenth Division) and
On November 18, 1987, the trial court issued an order granting
HON. ANTONIO SOLANO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge
the motion for issuance of a writ of execution. A motion for
of the RTC-Quezon City (Branch 86) and FRANCISCO
reconsideration was filed by petitioner but it was denied on
LUKBAN, respondents.
December 22, 1987. After the denial of his motion for
reconsideration, the petitioner filed directly with this Court a
MEDIALDEA, J.: petition for review of the trial court's order granting the motion
for issuance of a writ of execution. We referred the petition to the
Court of Appeals in a resolution dated April 13, 1988 (p. 18,
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to set aside the
Rollo).
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 15493 entitled,
"Agustin Salgado v. Hon. Antonio P. Solano, et al.," which
affirmed the Order dated December 22, 1987 of the Regional Trial On March 16, 1989, respondent Court of Appeals rendered a
Court of Quezon City (Branch 86) sustaining its previous order decision affirming the order of the trial court granting the motion
dated November 18, 1987 directing the issuance of a writ of for the issuance of a writ of execution. A motion for
execution to enforce the civil liability of herein petitioner in reconsideration was filed by petitioner but respondent Court of
Criminal Case No. 0-33798. Appeals denied the motion in a resolution dated August 3, 1989
(pp. 9-10, Rollo).
The facts are as follows:
The petitioner went to this Court via a petition for review which
was filed on September 26, 1989 and raised the following
Petitioner was charged with the crime of serious physical injuries
assignment of errors:
in Criminal Case No. 0-33798 entitled, "People of the Philippines
v. Agustin Salgado," before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City (Branch 86). After trial, judgment was rendered on October ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
16, 1986 finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged. The dispositive portion of the decision, states:
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ORDER
DATED APRIL 15, 1987 HAS NOT MODIFIED THE DECISION OF
WHEREFORE, the court finds the accused AGUSTIN P. SALGADO, OCTOBER 16, 1986 AS FAR AS THE CIVIL ASPECT IS
JR., guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of serious CONCERNED.
physical injuries, defined and penalized under paragraph 3 Article
263 of the Revised Penal Code, and appreciating in his favor the
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
following mitigating circumstances:
CONDITION IN THE PROBATION ORDER MODIFYING OR
ALTERING THE CIVIL LIABILITY OF THE OFFENDER IS
1) voluntary surrender; and UNAUTHORIZED AND NOT SANCTIONED BY LAW. (p. 10, Rollo)

2) No intention to commit so grave a wrong hereby sentence (sic) In its decision affirming the order of the trial court granting
said accused to suffer imprisonment for a period of four (4) private respondent's motion for the issuance of a writ of
months and twenty (20) days, with the accessories provided for execution, respondent Court of Appeals advanced three (3)
by law, and to indemnify the victim, Francisco Lukban, Jr., in the reasons: 1) that the decision dated October 16, 1986 had become
sum of P126,633.50 as actual or compensatory damages, and the final and executory and the judge who rendered the decision
sum of P50,000.00 as damages for the incapacity of Francisco cannot lawfully alter or modify it; 2) that it is clear that the
Lukban to pursue and engage in his poultry business. probation law provides only for the suspension of sentence
imposed on the accused; that it has absolutely no beating on his
civil liability and that none of the conditions listed under Section
SO ORDERED. (p. 19, Rollo)
10 of the Probation Law relates to civil liability; and 3) that
private respondent is not estopped because he had nothing to do
On October 17, 1986, petitioner filed an application for probation with the filing and the granting of the probation.
with the trial court. The application was granted in an Order dated
April 15, 1987. The order contained, among others, the following
There is no question that the decision of October 16, 1986 in
condition:
Criminal Case No. Q-33798 finding petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of serious physical injuries had
xxx xxx xxx become final and executory because the filing by respondent of an
application for probation is deemed a waiver of his right to appeal
(See Section 4 of P.D. 968). Likewise, the judgment finding
4. Indemnify the victim FRANCISCO LUKBAN, JR., in a monthly petitioner liable to private respondent for P126,633.50 as actual
installment of P2,000.00 (TWO THOUSAND PESOS) every month damages and P50,000.00 as consequential damages had also
during the entire period of his probation. (p. 15, Rollo) become final because no appeal was taken therefrom. Hence, it is
beyond the power of the trial court to alter or modify. In the case
For the months of May, June, July, August, September and of Samson v. Hon. Montejo, L-18605, October 31, 1963, 9 SCRA
October, 1987, petitioner complied with the above condition by 419, 422-423 cited by respondent appellate court, it was held:
paying in checks the said sum of P2,000.00 monthly, through the
City Probation Officer, Perla Diaz Alonzo. Private respondent . . . , once a decision becomes final, even the court which
Francisco Lukban, Jr. voluntarily accepted the checks and rendered it cannot lawfully alter or modify the same (Rili, et al. v.
subsequently encashed them (p. 19, Rollo). Chunaco, et al., G.R. No. L-6630, Feb. 29, 1956), especially,
considering the fact that, as in the instant case, the alteration or
On September 19, 1987, private respondent Francisco Lukban, Jr. modification is material and substantial (Ablaza v. Sycip, et al., L-
filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution for the 12125, Nov. 23, 1960). In the case of Behn, Meyer & Co., v. J.
Mcmicking et al., 11 Phil. 276, (cited by respondents), it was held

1
that "where a final judgment of an executory character had been with the end that these conditions would help the probationer
rendered in a suit the mission of the court is limited to the develop into a law-abiding individual. Thus,
execution and enforcement of the said final judgment in all of its
parts and in accordance with its express orders." The judgment in
The conditions which trial courts may impose on a probationer
question is clear, and with the amended writ of execution, the
may be classified into general or mandatory and special or
liability of petitioner is greatly augmented, without the benefit of
discretionary. The mandatory conditions, enumerated in Section
proper proceeding. (Emphasis ours)
10 of the Probation Law, require that probationer should a)
present himself to the probation officer designated to undertake
We do not believe, however, that the order dated April 15, 1987 his supervision at such place as may be specified in the order
granting the application for probation and imposing some within 72 hours from receipt of said order, and b) report to the
conditions therein altered or modified the decision dated October probation officer at least once a month at such time and place as
16, 1986. The April 15, 1987 Order of the trial court granting the specified by said officer. Special or discretionary conditions are
application for probation and providing as one of the conditions those additional conditions, listed in the same Section 10 of the
therein that petitioner indemnify private respondent P2,000.00 Probation Law, which the courts may additionally impose on the
monthly during the period of probation did not increase or probationer towards his correction and rehabilitation outside of
decrease the civil liability adjudged against petitioner but merely prison. The enumeration, however, is not inclusive. Probation
provided for the manner of payment by the accused of his civil statutes are liberal in character and enable courts to designate
liability during the period of probation. practically any term it chooses as long as the probationer's
constitutional rights are not jeopardized. There are innumerable
conditions which may be relevant to the rehabilitation of the
It is the submission of private respondent that in the case of
probationer when viewed in their specific individual context. It
Budlong v. Apalisok, No. 60151, June 24, 1983, 122 SCRA 935.
should, however, be borne in mind that the special or
We already ruled that "(T)he 'conviction and sentence' clause of
discretionary conditions of probation should be realistic, purposive
the statutory definition clearly signifies that probation affects only
and geared to help the probationer develop into a law-abiding and
the criminal aspect of the case."
self-respecting individual. Conditions should be interpreted with
flexibility in their application, and each case should be judged on
The pronouncement in Apalisok that "probation affects only the its own merits — on the basis of the problems, needs and capacity
criminal aspect of the case" should not be given a literal meaning. of the probationer. . . . .
Interpreting the phrase within the context of that case, it means
that although the execution of sentence is suspended by the grant
The primary consideration in granting probation is the reformation
of probation, it does not follow that the civil liability of the
of the probationer. That is why, under the law, a post sentence
offender, if any, is extinguished. This can be inferred from a
investigation, which is mandatory, has to be conducted before a
reading of the text of the Apalisok case where the issue that was
person can be granted probation to help the court in determining
involved therein was whether a grant of probation carries with it
whether the ends of justice and the best interest of the public as
the extinction of the civil liability of the offender. The reason for
well as the defendant will be served by the granting of the
ruling that the grant of probation does not extinguish the civil
probation (Alvin Lee Koenig, Post Sentence Investigation, Its
liability of the offender is clear, "(T)he extinction or survival of
Importance and Utility, IBP Journal, Special Issue on Probation,
civil liability are governed by Chapter III, Title V, Book I of the
Vol. 5, No. 5, pp. 381-387). In the case of People v. Lippner, 219
Revised Penal Code where under Article 113 thereof provides
Cal. 395, 26 p. 2d, 457, 458 (1933), among those which has to
that: '. . . , the offender shall continue to be obliged to satisfy the
be ascertained is the financial condition and capacity of the
civil liability resulting from the crime committed by him,
offender to meet his obligations:
notwithstanding the fact that he has served his sentence
consisting of deprivation of liberty or other lights, or has not been
required to serve the same by reason of amnesty, pardon, . . . there can be no real reformation of a wrong-doer unless there
commutation of sentence, or any other reason.'" In the instant is at least a willingness on his part to right the wrong committed,
case, the issue is not the survival or extinction of the civil liability and the effect of such an act upon the individual is of inestimable
of a probationer but, whether or not the trial court may impose as value, and to a large extent, determines whether there has been
a condition of probation the manner in which a probationer may any real reformation. To be clearly consonant with such a
settle his civil liability against the offended party during the period purpose, the post sentence investigation must include a financial
of probation. examination of the offender's capability in order to work out a
system of payment which can effectively accomplish
reimbursement without interfering with the defendant's family
Respondent appellate court ruled that Section 10 of the Probation
and other financial responsibilities, according to U.S. Model Penal
Law enumerates thirteen (13) conditions of probation not one of
Code of the American Law Institute. . . . (Sec. 301.1 Comments
which relates to the civil liability of the offender (p. 22, Rollo).
(Tentative Draft No. 2, 1954; Also 2 U.S. Dept. of Justice,
Attorney General's Survey of Release Procedures 38 (1939) cited
Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 968 (Probation Law of 1976) in The Period and Conditions of Probation by Sergio F. Go, IBP
provides: Journal Special Issue on Probation, Vol. 5, No. 5, pp. 406-420).
(Emphasis ours)
Sec. 4. Grant of Probation. — Subject to the provisions of this
Decree, the court may, after it shall have convicted and The trial court is given the discretion to impose conditions in the
sentenced a defendant but before he begins to serve his sentence order granting probation "as it may deem best." As already
and upon his application, suspend the execution of said sentence stated, it is not only limited to those listed under Section 10 of the
and place the defendant on probation for such period and upon Probation Law. Thus, under Section 26, paragraph (d) of the
such terms and conditions as it may deem best. Rules on Probation Methods and Procedures, among the
conditions which may be imposed in the order granting probation
is:
In the case of Florentino L. Baclayon v. Hon. Pacito G. Mutia, et
al., G.R. No. 59298, April 30, 1984, 129 SCRA 148, We ruled that
the conditions listed under Section 10 of the Probation Law are Sec. 26. Other conditions of Probation. The Probation Order may
not exclusive. Courts are allowed to impose practically any term it also require the probationer in appropriate cases, to:
chooses, the only limitation being that it does not jeopardize the
constitutional rights of the accused. Courts may impose conditions
xxx xxx xxx

2
(d) comply with a program of payment of civil liability to the
victim or his heirs . . . .

However, this is not to say that the manner by which the

probationer should satisfy the payment of his civil liability in a
criminal case during the probation period may be demanded at
will by him. It is necessary that the condition which provides for a
program of payment of his civil liability will address the offender's
needs and capacity. Such need may be ascertained from the
findings and recommendations in the post-sentence investigation
report submitted by the Probation Officer after investigation of the
financial capacity of the offender and that such condition is to the
end that the interest of the state and the reformation of the
probationer is best served.

In the instant case, in the absence of any showing to the

contrary, it is presumed that when the trial court issued the order
of April 15, 1987, the condition that the petitioner has to pay
private respondent P2,000.00 a month for the satisfaction of the
civil liability adjudged against him was recommended by the
probation officer who prepared the post-sentence investigation
and that such condition is, in the judgment of the trial court,
"deemed best" under the circumstances.

Counting from April 15, 1987, the date of issuance of the order
granting probation which under the law is also the date of its
effectivity (Sec. 11, P.D. 968), the probation period must have
lapsed by now. Hence, the order for petitioner to indemnify the
private respondent in the amount of P2,000.00 monthly during
the period of probation must have also lapsed. If such were the
case, there would therefore, be no more obstacle for the private
respondent to enforce the execution of the balance of the civil
liability of the petitioner. However, the records are bereft of
allegations to this effect.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED. The decision dated

March 16, 1989 of respondent Court of Appeals affirming the
order of the trial court granting the motion for the issuance of a
writ of execution as well as the resolution dated August 3, 1989 of
the same court are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

3
G.R. No. 168546               July 23, 2008 No subsidiary imprisonment, however, shall be imposed should
MICHAEL PADUA, Petitioner, [the] accused fail to pay the fine pursuant to Art. 39 par. 3 of the
vs. Revised Penal Code.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
SO ORDERED.14
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review assails the Decision1 dated April 19, 2005 Padua subsequently filed a Petition for Probation15 dated February
and Resolution2 dated June 14, 2005, of the Court of Appeals in 10, 2004 alleging that he is a minor and a first-time offender who
CA-G.R. SP No. 86977 which had respectively dismissed Michael desires to avail of the benefits of probation under Presidential
Padua’s petition for certiorari and denied his motion for Decree No. 96816 (P.D. No. 968), otherwise known as "The
reconsideration. Padua’s petition for certiorari before the Court of Probation Law of 1976" and Section 70 of Rep. Act No. 9165. He
Appeals assailed the Orders dated May 11, 2004 3 and July 28, further alleged that he possesses all the qualifications and none of
20044 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 168, Pasig City, the disqualifications under the said laws.
which had denied his petition for probation.
The RTC in an Order17 dated February 10, 2004 directed the
The facts, culled from the records, are as follows: Probation Officer of Pasig City to conduct a Post-Sentence
Investigation and submit a report and recommendation within 60
days from receipt of the order. The City Prosecutor was also
On June 16, 2003, petitioner Michael Padua and Edgar Allan
directed to submit his comment on the said petition within five
Ubalde were charged before the RTC, Branch 168, Pasig City of
days from receipt of the order.
violating Section 5,5 Article II of Republic Act No. 9165,6 otherwise
known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002," for
selling dangerous drugs.7 The Information reads: On April 6, 2004, Chief Probation and Parole Officer Josefina J.
Pasana submitted a Post-Sentence Investigation Report to the
RTC recommending that Padua be placed on probation.18
The Prosecution, through the undersigned Public Prosecutor,
charges Edgar Allan Ubalde y Velchez a.k.a. "Allan" and
Michael Padua y Tordel a.k.a. "Mike", with the crime of However, on May 11, 2004, public respondent Pairing Judge
violation of Sec. 5, Art. II, Republic Act No. 9165 in relation to Agnes Reyes-Carpio issued an Order denying the Petition for
R.A. [No.] 8369, Sec. 5 par. (a) and (i), committed as follows: Probation on the ground that under Section 2419 of Rep. Act No.
9165, any person convicted of drug trafficking cannot avail of the
privilege granted by the Probation Law. The court ruled thus:
On or about June 6, 2003, in Pasig City, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, Edgar Allan
Ubalde y Velchez and Michael Padua y Tordel, a minor, seventeen Before this Court now is the Post-Sentence Investigation Report
(17) years old, conspiring and confederating together and both of (PSIR) on minor Michael Padua y Tordel prepared by Senior Parole
them mutually helping and aiding one another, not being lawfully and Probation Officer Teodoro Villaverde and submitted by the
authorized to sell any dangerous drug, did then and there Chief of the Pasig City Parole and Probation Office, Josefina J.
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver and give away to Pasana.
PO1 Roland A. Panis, a police poseur-buyer, one (1) folded
newsprint containing 4.86 grams of dried marijuana fruiting tops,
which was found positive to the tests for marijuana, a dangerous In the aforesaid PSIR, Senior PPO Teodoro Villaverde
drug, in violation of the said law. recommended that minor Michael Padua y Tordel be placed on
probation, anchoring his recommendation on Articles 189 and 192
of P.D. 603, otherwise known as the Child and Welfare Code, as
Contrary to law.8 amended, which deal with the suspension of sentence and
commitment of youthful offender. Such articles, therefore, do not
find application in this case, the matter before the Court being an
When arraigned on October 13, 2003, Padua, assisted by his
application for probation by minor Michael Padua y Tordel and not
counsel de oficio, entered a plea of not guilty.9
the suspension of his sentence.

During the pre-trial conference on February 2, 2004, however,

On the other hand, Section 70 is under Article VIII of R.A. 9165
Padua’s counsel manifested that his client was willing to withdraw
which deals with the Program for Treatment and Rehabilitation of
his plea of not guilty and enter a plea of guilty to avail of the
Drug Dependents. Sections 54 to 76, all under Article VIII of R.A.
benefits granted to first-time offenders under Section 7010 of Rep.
9165 specifically refer to violations of either Section 15 or Section
Act No. 9165. The prosecutor interposed no objection.11 Thus, the
11. Nowhere in Article VIII was [v]iolation of Section 5 ever
RTC on the same date issued an Order12 stating that the former
mentioned.
plea of Padua of not guilty was considered withdrawn. Padua was
re-arraigned and pleaded guilty. Hence, in a Decision13 dated
February 6, 2004, the RTC found Padua guilty of the crime More importantly, while the provisions of R.A. 9165, particularly
charged: Section 70 thereof deals with Probation or Community Service for
First- Time Minor Offender in Lieu of Imprisonment, the Court is
of the view and so holds that minor Michael Padua y Tordel who
In view of the foregoing, the Court finds accused Michael Padua y
was charged and convicted of violating Section 5, Article II, R.A.
Tordel guilty of [v]iolation of Sec. 5 Art. II of R.A. No. 9165 in
9165, cannot avail of probation under said section in view of the
relation to R.A. No. 8369 Sec. 5 par. (a) and (i) thereof, and
provision of Section 24 which is hereunder quoted:
therefore, sentences him to suffer an indeterminate sentence of
six (6) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor as minimum to
seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal "Sec. 24. Non-Applicability of the Probation Law for Drug
as maximum and a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos Traffickers and Pushers. – Any person convicted for drug
(₱500,000.00). trafficking or pushing under this Act, regardless of the penalty
imposed by the Court, cannot avail of the privilege granted by the
Probation Law or Presidential Decree No. 968, as amended."
(underlining supplied)

4
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Probation For certiorari to prosper, the following requisites must concur: (1)
filed by Michael Padua y Tord[e]l should be, as it is hereby the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board or any officer
DENIED. exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) such tribunal,
board or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
SO ORDERED.20
jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.27
Padua filed a motion for reconsideration of the order but the same
was denied on July 28, 2004. He filed a petition for certiorari
"Without jurisdiction" means that the court acted with absolute
under Rule 65 with the Court of Appeals assailing the order, but
lack of authority. There is "excess of jurisdiction" when the court
the Court of Appeals, in a Decision dated April 19, 2005,
transcends its power or acts without any statutory authority.
dismissed his petition. The dispositive portion of the decision
"Grave abuse of discretion" implies such capricious and whimsical
reads:
exercise of judgment as to be equivalent to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. In other words, power is exercised in an arbitrary or
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal
DENIED for lack of merit and ordered DISMISSED. hostility, and such exercise is so patent or so gross as to amount
to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal either to
perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of
SO ORDERED.21 law.28

Padua filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals A review of the orders of the RTC denying Padua’s petition for
decision but it was denied. Hence, this petition where he raises probation shows that the RTC neither acted without jurisdiction
the following issues: nor with grave abuse of discretion because it merely applied the
law and adhered to principles of statutory construction in denying
I. Padua’s petition for probation.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING Padua was charged and convicted for violation of Section 5,
THE DENIAL OF THE PETITION FOR PROBATION WHICH Article II of Rep. Act No. 9165 for selling dangerous drugs. It is
DEPRIVED PETITIONER’S RIGHT AS A MINOR UNDER clear under Section 24 of Rep. Act No. 9165 that any person
ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. [02-1-18-SC] OTHERWISE KNOWN convicted of drug trafficking cannot avail of the privilege of
AS [THE] RULE ON JUVENILES IN CONFLICT WITH THE LAW. probation, to wit:

II. SEC. 24. Non-Applicability of the Probation Law for Drug

Traffickers and Pushers. – Any person convicted for drug
trafficking or pushing under this Act, regardless of the
WHETHER OR NOT [THE] ACCUSED[’S] RIGHT [TO BE RELEASED penalty imposed by the Court, cannot avail of the privilege
UNDER RECOGNIZANCE] HAS BEEN VIOLATED OR DEPRIVED IN granted by the Probation Law or Presidential Decree No.
THE LIGHT OF R.A. 9344 OTHERWISE KNOWN AS AN ACT 968, as amended. (Emphasis supplied.)
ESTABLISHING A COMPREHENSIVE JUVENILE JUSTICE AND
WELFARE SYSTEM, CREATING THE JUVENILE JUSTICE AND
WELFARE COUNCIL UNDER DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE The law is clear and leaves no room for interpretation. Any person
APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR AND OTHER PURPOSES.22 convicted for drug trafficking or pushing, regardless of the penalty
imposed, cannot avail of the privilege granted by the Probation
Law or P.D. No. 968. The elementary rule in statutory
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing public construction is that when the words and phrases of the statute
respondent, opted to adopt its Comment23 as its Memorandum. In are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be determined
its Comment, the OSG countered that from the language employed and the statute must be taken to
mean exactly what it says.29 If a statute is clear, plain and free
I. from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied
without attempted interpretation. This is what is known as the
plain-meaning rule or verba legis. It is expressed in the maxim,
The trial court and the Court of Appeals have legal basis in index animi sermo, or speech is the index of intention. 30
applying Section 24, Article II of R.A. 9165 instead of Section 70, Furthermore, there is the maxim verba legis non est recedendum,
Article VIII of the same law. or from the words of a statute there should be no departure.31

II. Moreover, the Court of Appeals correctly pointed out that the
intention of the legislators in Section 24 of Rep. Act No. 9165 is to
Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC otherwise known as the "Rule provide stiffer and harsher punishment for those persons
on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law" has no application to the convicted of drug trafficking or pushing while extending a
instant case.24 sympathetic and magnanimous hand in Section 70 to drug
dependents who are found guilty of violation of Sections 1132 and
1533 of the Act. The law considers the users and possessors of
Simply, the issues are: (1) Did the Court of Appeals err in illegal drugs as victims while the drug traffickers and pushers as
dismissing Padua’s petition for certiorari assailing the trial court’s predators. Hence, while drug traffickers and pushers, like Padua,
order denying his petition for probation? (2) Was Padua’s right are categorically disqualified from availing the law on probation,
under Rep. Act No. 9344,25 the "Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act youthful drug dependents, users and possessors alike, are given
of 2006," violated? and (3) Does Section 3226 of A.M. No. 02-1- the chance to mend their ways.34 The Court of Appeals also
18-SC otherwise known as the "Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with correctly stated that had it been the intention of the legislators to
the Law" have application in this case? exempt from the application of Section 24 the drug traffickers and
pushers who are minors and first time offenders, the law could
As to the first issue, we rule that the Court of Appeals did not err have easily declared so.35
in dismissing Padua’s petition for certiorari.
5
The law indeed appears strict and harsh against drug traffickers
and drug pushers while protective of drug users. To illustrate, a
person arrested for using illegal or dangerous drugs is meted only
a penalty of six months rehabilitation in a government center, as
minimum, for the first offense under Section 15 of Rep. Act No.
9165, while a person charged and convicted of selling dangerous
drugs shall suffer life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging
from Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱500,000.00) to Ten Million
Pesos (₱10,000,000.00) under Section 5, Rep. Act No. 9165.

As for the second and third issues, Padua cannot argue that his
right under Rep. Act No. 9344, the "Juvenile Justice and Welfare
Act of 2006" was violated. Nor can he argue that Section 32 of
A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC otherwise known as the "Rule on Juveniles
in Conflict with the Law" has application in this case. Section 6836
of Rep. Act No. 9344 and Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC both
pertain to suspension of sentence and not probation.

Furthermore, suspension of sentence under Section 3837 of Rep.

Act No. 9344 could no longer be retroactively applied for
petitioner’s benefit. Section 38 of Rep. Act No. 9344 provides that
once a child under 18 years of age is found guilty of the offense
charged, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the
court shall place the child in conflict with the law under suspended
sentence. Section 4038 of Rep. Act No. 9344, however, provides
that once the child reaches 18 years of age, the court shall
determine whether to discharge the child, order execution of
sentence, or extend the suspended sentence for a certain
specified period or until the child reaches the maximum age
of 21 years. Petitioner has already reached 21 years of age or
over and thus, could no longer be considered a child 39 for
purposes of applying Rep. Act 9344. Thus, the application of
Sections 38 and 40 appears moot and academic as far as his case
is concerned.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision

dated April 19, 2005 and the Resolution dated June 14, 2005 of
the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

6
G.R. No. 102007 September 2, 1994 final judgment. Saddled upon us is the task of ascertaining the
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, legal import of the term "final judgment." Is it final judgment as
vs. contradistinguished from an interlocutory order? Or, is it a
ROGELIO BAYOTAS y CORDOVA, accused-appellant. judgment which is final and executory?

ROMERO, J.: We go to the genesis of the law. The legal precept contained in
Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code heretofore transcribed is
lifted from Article 132 of the Spanish El Codigo Penal de 1870
In Criminal Case No. C-3217 filed before Branch 16, RTC Roxas
which, in part, recites:
City, Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova was charged with Rape and
eventually convicted thereof on June 19, 1991 in a decision
penned by Judge Manuel E. Autajay. Pending appeal of his La responsabilidad penal se extingue.
conviction, Bayotas died on February 4, 1992 at
the National Bilibid Hospital due to cardio respiratory arrest
1. Por la muerte del reo en cuanto a las penas personales
secondary to hepatic encephalopathy secondary to hipato
siempre, y respecto a las pecuniarias, solo cuando a su
carcinoma gastric malingering. Consequently, the Supreme Court
fallecimiento no hubiere recaido sentencia firme.
in its Resolution of May 20, 1992 dismissed the criminal aspect of
the appeal. However, it required the Solicitor General to file its
comment with regard to Bayotas' civil liability arising from his The code of 1870 . . . it will be observed employs the term
commission of the offense charged. "sentencia firme." What is "sentencia firme" under the old
statute?
In his comment, the Solicitor General expressed his view that the
death of accused-appellant did not extinguish his civil liability as a XXVIII Enciclopedia Juridica Española, p. 473, furnishes the ready
result of his commission of the offense charged. The Solicitor answer: It says:
General, relying on the case of People v. Sendaydiego 1 insists
that the appeal should still be resolved for the purpose of
reviewing his conviction by the lower court on which the civil SENTENCIA FIRME. La sentencia que adquiere la fuerza de las
liability is based. definitivas por no haberse utilizado por las partes litigantes
recurso alguno contra ella dentro de los terminos y plazos legales
concedidos al efecto.
Counsel for the accused-appellant, on the other hand, opposed
the view of the Solicitor General arguing that the death of the
accused while judgment of conviction is pending appeal "Sentencia firme" really should be understood as one which is
extinguishes both his criminal and civil penalties. In support of his definite. Because, it is only when judgment is such that, as
position, said counsel invoked the ruling of the Court of Appeals in Medina y Maranon puts it, the crime is confirmed — "en condena
People v. Castillo and Ocfemia 2 which held that the civil determinada;" or, in the words of Groizard, the guilt of the
obligation in a criminal case takes root in the criminal liability and, accused becomes — "una verdad legal." Prior thereto, should the
therefore, civil liability is extinguished if accused should die before accused die, according to Viada, "no hay legalmente, en tal caso,
final judgment is rendered. ni reo, ni delito, ni responsabilidad criminal de ninguna clase."
And, as Judge Kapunan well explained, when a defendant dies
before judgment becomes executory, "there cannot be any
We are thus confronted with a single issue: Does death of the determination by final judgment whether or not the felony upon
accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguish his civil which the civil action might arise exists," for the simple reason
liability? that "there is no party defendant." (I Kapunan, Revised Penal
Code, Annotated, p. 421. Senator Francisco holds the same view.
Francisco, Revised Penal Code, Book One, 2nd ed., pp. 859-860)
In the aforementioned case of People v. Castillo, this issue was
settled in the affirmative. This same issue posed therein was
phrased thus: Does the death of Alfredo Castillo affect both his The legal import of the term "final judgment" is similarly reflected
criminal responsibility and his civil liability as a consequence of in the Revised Penal Code. Articles 72 and 78 of that legal body
the alleged crime? mention the term "final judgment" in the sense that it is already
enforceable. This also brings to mind Section 7, Rule 116 of the
Rules of Court which states that a judgment in a criminal case
It resolved this issue thru the following disquisition:
becomes final "after the lapse of the period for perfecting an
appeal or when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied
Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is the controlling statute. It or served, or the defendant has expressly waived in writing his
reads, in part: right to appeal."

Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. — Criminal By fair intendment, the legal precepts and opinions here collected
liability is totally extinguished: funnel down to one positive conclusion: The term final judgment
employed in the Revised Penal Code means judgment beyond
recall. Really, as long as a judgment has not become executory, it
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and
cannot be truthfully said that defendant is definitely guilty of the
as to the pecuniary penalties liability therefor is extinguished only
felony charged against him.
when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment;

Not that the meaning thus given to final judgment is without

With reference to Castillo's criminal liability, there is no question.
reason. For where, as in this case, the right to institute a separate
The law is plain. Statutory construction is unnecessary. Said
civil action is not reserved, the decision to be rendered must, of
liability is extinguished.
necessity, cover "both the criminal and the civil aspects of the
case." People vs. Yusico (November 9, 1942), 2 O.G., No. 100, p.
The civil liability, however, poses a problem. Such liability is 964. See also: People vs. Moll, 68 Phil., 626, 634; Francisco,
extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before Criminal Procedure, 1958 ed., Vol. I, pp. 234, 236. Correctly,

7
Judge Kapunan observed that as "the civil action is based solely It should be stressed that the extinction of civil liability follows the
on the felony committed and of which the offender might be extinction of the criminal liability under Article 89, only when the
found guilty, the death of the offender extinguishes the civil civil liability arises from the criminal act as its only basis. Stated
liability." I Kapunan, Revised Penal Code, Annotated, supra. differently, where the civil liability does not exist independently of
the criminal responsibility, the extinction of the latter by death,
ipso facto extinguishes the former, provided, of course, that death
Here is the situation obtaining in the present case: Castillo's
supervenes before final judgment. The said principle does not
criminal liability is out. His civil liability is sought to be enforced
apply in instant case wherein the civil liability springs neither
by reason of that criminal liability. But then, if we dismiss, as we
solely nor originally from the crime itself but from a civil contract
must, the criminal action and let the civil aspect remain, we will
of purchase and sale. (Emphasis ours)
be faced with the anomalous situation whereby we will be called
upon to clamp civil liability in a case where the source thereof —
criminal liability — does not exist. And, as was well stated in In the above case, the court was convinced that the civil liability
Bautista, et al. vs. Estrella, et al., CA-G.R. of the accused who was charged with estafa could likewise trace
No. 19226-R, September 1, 1958, "no party can be found and its genesis to Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code since said
held criminally liable in a civil suit," which solely would remain if accused had swindled the first and second vendees of the
we are to divorce it from the criminal proceeding." property subject matter of the contract of sale. It therefore
concluded: "Consequently, while the death of the accused herein
extinguished his criminal liability including fine, his civil liability
This ruling of the Court of Appeals in the Castillo case 3 was
based on the laws of human relations remains."
adopted by the Supreme Court in the cases of People of the
Philippines v. Bonifacio Alison, et al., 4 People of the Philippines v.
Jaime Jose, et al. 5 and People of the Philippines v. Satorre 6 by Thus it allowed the appeal to proceed with respect to the civil
dismissing the appeal in view of the death of the accused pending liability of the accused, notwithstanding the extinction of his
appeal of said cases. criminal liability due to his death pending appeal of his conviction.

As held by then Supreme Court Justice Fernando in the Alison To further justify its decision to allow the civil liability to survive,
case: the court relied on the following ratiocination: Since Section 21,
Rule 3 of the Rules of Court 9 requires the dismissal of all money
claims against the defendant whose death occurred prior to the
The death of accused-appellant Bonifacio Alison having been
final judgment of the Court of First Instance (CFI), then it can be
established, and considering that there is as yet no final judgment
inferred that actions for recovery of money may continue to be
in view of the pendency of the appeal, the criminal and civil
heard on appeal, when the death of the defendant supervenes
liability of the said accused-appellant Alison was extinguished by
after the CFI had rendered its judgment. In such case, explained
his death (Art. 89, Revised Penal Code; Reyes' Criminal Law,
this tribunal, "the name of the offended party shall be included in
1971 Rev. Ed., p. 717, citing People v. Castillo and Ofemia C.A.,
the title of the case as plaintiff-appellee and the legal
56 O.G. 4045); consequently, the case against him should be
representative or the heirs of the deceased-accused should be
dismissed.
substituted as defendants-appellants."

On the other hand, this Court in the subsequent cases of

It is, thus, evident that as jurisprudence evolved from Castillo to
Buenaventura Belamala v. Marcelino Polinar 7 and Lamberto
Torrijos, the rule established was that the survival of the civil
Torrijos v. The Honorable Court of Appeals 8 ruled differently. In
liability depends on whether the same can be predicated on
the former, the issue decided by this court was: Whether the civil
sources of obligations other than delict. Stated differently, the
liability of one accused of physical injuries who died before final
claim for civil liability is also extinguished together with the
judgment is extinguished by his demise to the extent of barring
criminal action if it were solely based thereon, i.e., civil liability ex
any claim therefore against his estate. It was the contention of
delicto.
the administrator-appellant therein that the death of the accused
prior to final judgment extinguished all criminal and civil liabilities
resulting from the offense, in view of Article 89, paragraph 1 of However, the Supreme Court in People v. Sendaydiego, et al. 10
the Revised Penal Code. However, this court ruled therein: departed from this long-established principle of law. In this case,
accused Sendaydiego was charged with and convicted by the
lower court of malversation thru falsification of public documents.
We see no merit in the plea that the civil liability has been
Sendaydiego's death supervened during the pendency of the
extinguished, in view of the provisions of the Civil Code of the
appeal of his conviction.
Philippines of 1950 (Rep. Act No. 386) that became operative
eighteen years after the revised Penal Code. As pointed out by the
Court below, Article 33 of the Civil Code establishes a civil action This court in an unprecedented move resolved to dismiss
for damages on account of physical injuries, entirely separate and Sendaydiego's appeal but only to the extent of his criminal
distinct from the criminal action. liability. His civil liability was allowed to survive although it was
clear that such claim thereon was exclusively dependent on the
criminal action already extinguished. The legal import of such
Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a
decision was for the court to continue exercising appellate
civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the
jurisdiction over the entire appeal, passing upon the correctness
criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil
of Sendaydiego's conviction despite dismissal of the criminal
action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution,
action, for the purpose of determining if he is civilly liable. In
and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
doing so, this Court issued a Resolution of July 8, 1977 stating
thus:
Assuming that for lack of express reservation, Belamala's civil
action for damages was to be considered instituted together with
the criminal action still, since both proceedings were terminated
without final adjudication, the civil action of the offended party
under Article 33 may yet be enforced separately.

In Torrijos, the Supreme Court held that:

8
The claim of complainant Province of Pangasinan for the civil instituted during the pendency of the civil case, a preponderance
liability survived Sendaydiego because his death occurred after of evidence shall likewise be sufficient to prove the act
final judgment was rendered by the Court of First Instance of complained of.
Pangasinan, which convicted him of three complex crimes of
malversation through falsification and ordered him to indemnify
Clearly, the text of Article 30 could not possibly lend support to
the Province in the total sum of P61,048.23 (should be
the ruling in Sendaydiego. Nowhere in its text is there a grant of
P57,048.23).
authority to continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over the
accused's civil liability ex delicto when his death supervenes
The civil action for the civil liability is deemed impliedly instituted during appeal. What Article 30 recognizes is an alternative and
with the criminal action in the absence of express waiver or its separate civil action which may be brought to demand civil
reservation in a separate action (Sec. 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of liability arising from a criminal offense independently of any
Court). The civil action for the civil liability is separate and distinct criminal action. In the event that no criminal proceedings are
from the criminal action (People and Manuel vs. Coloma, 105 Phil. instituted during the pendency of said civil case, the quantum of
1287; Roa vs. De la Cruz, 107 Phil. 8). evidence needed to prove the criminal act will have to be that
which is compatible with civil liability and that is, preponderance
of evidence and not proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Citing
When the action is for the recovery of money and the defendant
or invoking Article 30 to justify the survival of the civil action
dies before final judgment in the Court of First Instance, it shall
despite extinction of the criminal would in effect merely beg the
be dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner especially provided
question of whether civil liability ex delicto survives upon
in Rule 87 of the Rules of Court (Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of
extinction of the criminal action due to death of the accused
Court).
during appeal of his conviction. This is because whether asserted
in
The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money the criminal action or in a separate civil action, civil liability ex
judgment had been rendered against him by the Court of First delicto is extinguished by the death of the accused while his
Instance, the action survives him. It may be continued on appeal conviction is on appeal. Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is
(Torrijos vs. Court of Appeals, L-40336, October 24, 1975; 67 clear on this matter:
SCRA 394).
Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. — Criminal
The accountable public officer may still be civilly liable for the liability is totally extinguished:
funds improperly disbursed although he has no criminal liability
(U.S. vs. Elvina, 24 Phil. 230; Philippine National Bank vs. Tugab,
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and
66 Phil. 583).
as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only
when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment;
In view of the foregoing, notwithstanding the dismissal of the However, the ruling in Sendaydiego deviated from the expressed
appeal of the deceased Sendaydiego insofar as his criminal intent of Article 89. It allowed claims for civil liability ex delicto to
liability is concerned, the Court Resolved to continue exercising survive by ipso facto treating the civil action impliedly instituted
appellate jurisdiction over his possible civil liability for the money with the criminal, as one filed under Article 30, as though no
claims of the Province of Pangasinan arising from the alleged criminal proceedings had been filed but merely a separate civil
criminal acts complained of, as if no criminal case had been action. This had the effect of converting such claims from one
instituted against him, thus making applicable, in determining his which is dependent on the outcome of the criminal action to an
civil liability, Article 30 of the Civil Code . . . and, for that purpose, entirely new and separate one, the prosecution of which does not
his counsel is directed to inform this Court within ten (10) days of even necessitate the filing of criminal proceedings. 12 One would
the names and addresses of the decedent's heirs or whether or be hard put to pinpoint the statutory authority for such a
not his estate is under administration and has a duly appointed transformation. It is to be borne in mind that in recovering civil
judicial administrator. Said heirs or administrator will be liability ex delicto, the same has perforce to be determined in the
substituted for the deceased insofar as the civil action for the civil criminal action, rooted as it is in the court's pronouncement of the
liability is concerned (Secs. 16 and 17, Rule 3, Rules of Court). guilt or innocence of the accused. This is but to render fealty to
the intendment of Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code which
provides that "every person criminally liable for a felony is also
Succeeding cases 11 raising the identical issue have maintained civilly liable." In such cases, extinction of the criminal action due
adherence to our ruling in Sendaydiego; in other words, they to death of the accused pending appeal inevitably signifies the
were a reaffirmance of our abandonment of the settled rule that a concomitant extinction of the civil liability. Mors Omnia Solvi.
civil liability solely anchored on the criminal (civil liability ex Death dissolves all things.
delicto) is extinguished upon dismissal of the entire appeal due to
the demise of the accused.

But was it judicious to have abandoned this old ruling? A re-

examination of our decision in Sendaydiego impels us to revert to
the old ruling.

To restate our resolution of July 8, 1977 in Sendaydiego: The

resolution of the civil action impliedly instituted in the criminal
action can proceed irrespective of the latter's extinction due to
death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, pursuant to
Article 30 of the Civil Code and Section 21, Rule 3 of the Revised
Rules of Court.

Article 30 of the Civil Code provides:

When a separate civil action is brought to demand civil liability

arising from a criminal offense, and no criminal proceedings are

9
In sum, in pursuing recovery of civil liability arising from crime, together with the criminal liabilities had already passed beyond
the final determination of the criminal liability is a condition the judgment of the then Court of First Instance (now the
precedent to the prosecution of the civil action, such that when Regional Trial Court), the Court of Appeals can continue to
the criminal action is extinguished by the demise of accused- exercise appellate jurisdiction thereover despite the
appellant pending appeal thereof, said civil action cannot survive. extinguishment of the component criminal liability of the
The claim for civil liability springs out of and is dependent upon deceased. This pronouncement, which has been followed in the
facts which, if true, would constitute a crime. Such civil liability is Court's judgments subsequent and consonant to Torrijos and
an inevitable consequence of the criminal liability and is to be Sendaydiego, should be set aside and abandoned as being clearly
declared and enforced in the criminal proceeding. This is to be erroneous and unjustifiable.
distinguished from that which is contemplated under Article 30 of
the Civil Code which refers to the institution of a separate civil
Said Section 21 of Rule 3 is a rule of civil procedure in ordinary
action that does not draw its life from a criminal proceeding. The
civil actions. There is neither authority nor justification for its
Sendaydiego resolution of July 8, 1977, however, failed to take
application in criminal procedure to civil actions instituted
note of this fundamental distinction when it allowed the survival
together with and as part of criminal actions. Nor is there any
of the civil action for the recovery of civil liability ex delicto by
authority in law for the summary conversion from the latter
treating the same as a separate civil action referred to under
category of an ordinary civil action upon the death of the
Article 30. Surely, it will take more than just a summary judicial
offender. . . .
pronouncement to authorize the conversion of said civil action to
an independent one such as that contemplated under Article 30.
Moreover, the civil action impliedly instituted in a criminal
proceeding for recovery of civil liability ex delicto can hardly be
Ironically however, the main decision in Sendaydiego did not
categorized as an ordinary money claim such as that referred to
apply Article 30, the resolution of July 8, 1977 notwithstanding.
in Sec. 21, Rule 3 enforceable before the estate of the deceased
Thus, it was held in the main decision:
accused.

Sendaydiego's appeal will be resolved only for the purpose of

Ordinary money claims referred to in Section 21, Rule 3 must be
showing his criminal liability which is the basis of the civil liability
viewed in light of the provisions of Section 5, Rule 86 involving
for which his estate would be liable. 13
claims against the estate, which in Sendaydiego was held liable
for Sendaydiego's civil liability. "What are contemplated in Section
In other words, the Court, in resolving the issue of his civil 21 of Rule 3, in relation to Section 5 of Rule 86, 14 are
liability, concomitantly made a determination on whether contractual money claims while the claims involved in civil liability
Sendaydiego, on the basis of evidenced adduced, was indeed ex delicto may include even the restitution of personal or real
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of committing the offense property." 15 Section 5, Rule 86 provides an exclusive
charged. Thus, it upheld Sendaydiego's conviction and enumeration of what claims may be filed against the estate.
pronounced the same as the source of his civil liability. These are: funeral expenses, expenses for the last illness,
Consequently, although Article 30 was not applied in the final judgments for money and claim arising from contracts, expressed
determination of Sendaydiego's civil liability, there was a or implied. It is clear that money claims arising from delict do not
reopening of the criminal action already extinguished which form part of this exclusive enumeration. Hence, there could be no
served as basis for Sendaydiego's civil liability. We reiterate: legal basis in (1) treating a civil action ex delicto as an ordinary
Upon death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, the contractual money claim referred to in Section 21, Rule 3 of the
criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a Rules of Court and (2) allowing it to survive by filing a claim
defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action instituted therefor before the estate of the deceased accused. Rather, it
therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto should be extinguished upon extinction of the criminal action
extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal. engendered by the death of the accused pending finality of his
conviction.
Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court was also invoked to serve
as another basis for the Sendaydiego resolution of July 8, 1977. Accordingly, we rule: if the private offended party, upon
In citing Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the Court made the extinction of the civil liability ex delicto desires to recover
inference that civil actions of the type involved in Sendaydiego damages from the same act or omission complained of, he must
consist of money claims, the recovery of which may be continued subject to Section 1, Rule 111 16 (1985 Rules on Criminal
on appeal if defendant dies pending appeal of his conviction by Procedure as amended) file a separate civil action, this time
holding his estate liable therefor. Hence, the Court's conclusion: predicated not on the felony previously charged but on other
sources of obligation. The source of obligation upon which the
separate civil action is premised determines against whom the
"When the action is for the recovery of money" "and the
same shall be enforced.
defendant dies before final judgment in the court of First
Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner
especially provided" in Rule 87 of the Rules of Court (Sec. 21, If the same act or omission complained of also arises from quasi-
Rule 3 of the Rules of Court). delict or may, by provision of law, result in an injury to person or
property (real or personal), the separate civil action must be filed
against the executor or administrator 17 of the estate of the
The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money
accused pursuant to Sec. 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court:
judgment had been rendered against him by the Court of First
Instance, the action survives him. It may be continued on appeal.
Sec. 1. Actions which may and which may not be brought against
executor or administrator. — No action upon a claim for the
Sadly, reliance on this provision of law is misplaced. From the
recovery of money or debt or interest thereon shall be
standpoint of procedural law, this course taken in Sendaydiego
commenced against the executor or administrator; but actions to
cannot be sanctioned. As correctly observed by Justice Regalado:
recover real or personal property, or an interest therein, from the
estate, or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover
I do not, however, agree with the justification advanced in both damages for an injury to person or property, real or personal,
Torrijos and Sendaydiego which, relying on the provisions of may be commenced against him.
Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, drew the strained
implication therefrom that where the civil liability instituted

10
This is in consonance with our ruling in Belamala 18 where we
held that, in recovering damages for injury to persons thru an
independent civil action based on Article 33 of the Civil Code, the
same must be filed against the executor or administrator of the
estate of deceased accused and not against the estate under Sec.
5, Rule 86 because this rule explicitly limits the claim to those for
funeral expenses, expenses for the last sickness of the decedent,
judgment for money and claims arising from contract, express or
implied. Contractual money claims, we stressed, refers only to
purely personal obligations other than those which have their
source in delict or tort.

Conversely, if the same act or omission complained of also arises

from contract, the separate civil action must be filed against the
estate of the accused, pursuant to Sec. 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of
Court.

From this lengthy disquisition, we summarize our ruling herein:

1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction

extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based
solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the
death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his
criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and
based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto
in senso strictiore."

2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding

the death of accused, if the same may also be predicated on a
source of obligation other than delict. 19 Article 1157 of the Civil
Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which
the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission:

a) Law 20
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) . . .
e) Quasi-delicts

3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2

above, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only
by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1,
Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended.
This separate civil action may be enforced either against the
executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on
the source of obligation upon which the same is based as
explained above.

4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of

his right to file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases
where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to
its extinction, the private-offended party instituted together
therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations
on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of
the criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 21
of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on
a possible privation of right by prescription. 22

Applying this set of rules to the case at bench, we hold that the
death of appellant Bayotas extinguished his criminal liability and
the civil liability based solely on the act complained of, i.e., rape.
Consequently, the appeal is hereby dismissed without
qualification.

WHEREFORE, the appeal of the late Rogelio Bayotas is

DISMISSED with costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

11
G.R. No. 190610               April 25, 2012 The RTC held that the prosecution successfully discharged the
burden of proof in the cases of illegal sale and illegal possession
of dangerous drugs, in this case methamphetamine hydrochloride
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff and Appellee, otherwise known as "shabu." The trial court relied on the
vs. presumption of regularity in the performance of duty of the police
SATURNINO DE LA CRUZ AND JOSE BRILLANTES y LOPEZ, officials who conducted the buy-bust operation. The dispositive
Accused. portion reads:
JOSE BRILLANTES y LOPEZ, Accused-Appellant.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding [the] accused

RESOLUTION Saturnino De la Cruz GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as charged
in Criminal Case No. 11556 for illegal possession of shabu with a
PEREZ, J.: weight of 0.0619 gram and is therefore sentenced to serve the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from TWELVE (12)
YEARS AND ONE (1) DAY as minimum to FIFTEEN (15) YEARS as
Before the Court is an Appeal1 filed by accused-appellant Jose maximum and to pay a fine of P300,000.00.
Brillantes y Lopez (Brillantes) assailing the Decision2 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) dated 8 July 2009 in CA-G.R. CR No. 30897.
Accused Jose Brillantes is also found GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt as charged in Criminal Case No.11557 for illegal sale of
The decision of the Court of Appeals is an affirmance of the shabu and is therefore sentenced to suffer the penalty of life
Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag City, Branch imprisonment and to pay a fine of P2,000,000.00. Said accused is
13 in Criminal Case Nos. 11556, 11557 and 11558 convicting likewise found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as charged in
accused Brillantes and Saturnino de la Cruz (De la Cruz) for Criminal Case No. 11558 for illegal possession of shabu with an
violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165 entitled "An aggregate weight of 0.2351 gram and is therefore further
Act Instituting the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act Of sentenced to serve the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment
2002."3 ranging from TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY as minimum
to FIFTEEN (15) YEARS as maximum and to pay a fine of
In the Criminal Case No. 11556, De la Cruz y Valdez was charged P300,000.00.
as follows:
The contraband subject of these cases are hereby forfeited, the
Criminal Case No. 11556 same to be disposed of as the law prescribes. 7

That on or about the 1st day of December 2004, in the city of The appellate court found no reason to depart from the ruling of
Laoag, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable the trial court. It upheld that all the elements of the offense of
Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, illegal sale of drugs were present and the finding against
unlawfully and feloniously, have in his possession, control and Brillantes well established by the prosecution. Further, it also
custody one (1) plastic sachet containing shabu weighing more or found that all the elements constituting illegal possession of
less 0.1 gram including plastic container without prescription or prohibited or regulated drugs were established beyond reasonable
authority to possess the same in violation of the aforecited law.4 doubt to convict De la Cruz and Brillantes. On all the three
charges, great weight was given to the testimonies of the
members of the buy-bust team and arresting officers SPO3
On the other hand, Jose Brillantes y Lopez was charged in Rovimanuel Balolong and PO2 Celso Pang-ag, who also acted as
Criminal Case Nos. 11557 and 11558 with illegal sale of shabu the poseur-buyer.
and illegal possession of dangerous drug of shabu. The two
separate Informations follow:
On 29 July 2009, a Notice of Appeal8 was filed by Brillantes
through counsel before the Supreme Court. His co-accused De la
Criminal Case No. 11557 Cruz, did not appeal his conviction.

That on or about the 1st day of December 2004, in the city of While this case is pending appeal, Prisons and Security Division
Laoag, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Officer-in-Charge Romeo F. Fajardo9 informed the Court that
Court, the above-named accused, did then and there wilfully, accused-appellant Brillantes died while committed at the Bureau
unlawfully and feloniously, sell and deliver to a Public Officer, who of Corrections on 3 January 2012 as evidenced by a copy of death
acted as poseur buyer 0.1 gram including plastic container of report10 signed by New Bilibid Prison Hospital’s Medical Officer
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, popularly known as "shabu", a Benevito A. Fontanilla, III.
dangerous drug, without any license or authority to do so, in
violation of the aforecited law.5
Hence, we resolve the effect of death pending appeal of his
conviction of accused-appellant Brillantes with regard to his
Criminal Case No. 11558 criminal and pecuniary liabilities.

That on or about the 1st day of December 2004, in the City of The Revised Penal Code is instructive on the matter. It provides in
Laoag, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Article 89(1) that:
Court, the above-named accused, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, have in his possession, control and
custody two (2) big plastic sachet containing shabu weighing Criminal liability is totally extinguished:
more or less 2.6 grams including plastic container without being
authorized and permitted by law to possess the same in violation 1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and
of the aforecited law.6 as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only
when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment.
When arraigned, both the accused pleaded not guilty of the
crimes charged.

12
It is plain that both the personal penalty of imprisonment and
pecuniary penalty of fine of Brillantes were extinguished upon his
death pending appeal of his conviction by the lower courts.

We recite the rules laid down in People v. Bayotas,11 to wit:

1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction

extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based
solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the
death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his
criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and
based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto
in senso strictiore."

2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding

the death of accused, if the same may also be predicated on a
source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil
Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which
the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission:

a) Law
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) . . .
e) Quasi-delicts
xxx
There is no civil liability involved in violations of the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.12 No private
offended party is involved as there is in fact no reference to civil
liability in the decision of the trial court.

The appeal of Brillantes culminating in the extinguishment of his

criminal liability does not have any effect on his co- accused De la
Cruz who did not file a notice of appeal. The Rules on Criminal
Procedure on the matter states:

RULE 122 - Appeal

Section 11. Effect of appeal by any of several accused. —

(a) An appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not

affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of
the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter;
(emphasis ours)

xxx

The extinguishment of Brillantes’ criminal and pecuniary liabilities

is predicated on his death and not on his acquittal. Following the
provision, the appeal taken by Brillantes and subsequent
extinguishment of his liabilities is not applicable to De la
Cruz.1âwphi1

WHEREFORE, in view of his death on 3 January 2012, the appeal

of accused-appellant Jose Brillantes y Lopez from the Decision of
the Court of Appeals dated 8 July 2009 in CA-G.R. CR No. 30897
affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City,
Branch 13 in Criminal Case Nos. 11557 and 11558 convicting him
of violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165 is hereby
declared MOOT and ACADEMIC, his criminal and pecuniary
liabilities having been extinguished. No cost.

SO ORDERED.

13
[G.R. No. 135382. September 29, 2000.] police operatives waiting outside the building that the marked
money had been delivered. 6 Accused Lourdes Gamboa and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Teresita Reyoberos were thus apprehended, but the rest of their
LOURDES GAMBOA alias Des or Lourdes Gamboa y Golfe, cohorts eluded arrest and remained at large.
BONIFACIO MINOZA (at large), MELBA MINOZA alias
Melba, Eva Minoza (at large) and GLORIA SARMIENTO (at Later, however, Teresita Reyoberos was not included in the
large), Accused. criminal information after State Prosecutor Zenaida M. Lim found
that she was also a job applicant at the office of the accused who
LOURDES GAMBOA alias Des or Lourdes Gamboa y Golfe, merely acceded to the request of accused Melba Miñoza to
Accused-Appellant. temporarily man the office in her absence. 7 Consequently, only
Lourdes Gamboa was hailed to court and indicted for Illegal
DECISION Recruitment in Large Scale.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

In convicting accused-appellant Lourdes Gamboa of the crime

BELLOSILLO, J.: charged, the trial court held —

. . . . the proofs adduced by the prosecution have clearly and

conclusively demonstrated that the accused, conspiring and
This is an appeal from the Partial Decision of the Regional Trial confederating with three others, has offered, enlisted and
Court finding accused LOURDES GAMBOA alias Des or Lourdes promised overseas employment to [complainants]. Against the
Gamboa y Golfe guilty of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale under mass of evidence arrayed by the prosecution, all that the accused
RA 8042, otherwise known as The Migrant Workers and Overseas could offer was her bare and unconfirmed denials and explanation
Filipinos Act of 1995, and imposing upon her life imprisonment . . . . The court, however, is not inclined to uphold and sustain the
and a fine of P500,000.00. 1chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary denials and explanations of the accused, which are negative in
character and self-serving in nature. Her unconfirmed version
From March 1996 to August 1997 the four (4) accused led by cannot, certainly, outweigh and command greater evidentiary
Bonifacio Minoza and Melba Minoza promised overseas measure than the overwhelming testimonies of the People’s
employment for a fee to complaining witnesses Marissa Balina, principal witnesses, who narrated in vivid and clear-cut details the
Anna Marie Pili, Romulo Macaraeg, Ernesto Magadan, Domingo various aspects of her recruitment and placement activities.
Magadan, Jr., Roger Castro and Nemia Beri. The accused were
then holding office at Room 302, Ermita Building, Arquiza St., . . . . the evidence for the People has likewise conclusively
Ermita, Manila, where they conducted most of their recruitment established that the accused is neither personally licensed nor
activities. To entice complainants the accused represented to authorized by the POEA to recruit workers for overseas
them that they were affiliated with Bemil Management Trading employment (Exhibit B). Although the defense has shown that the
and Manpower Services, a duly licensed recruitment agency, and license and authority of the Bemil Management Trading and
that they had the capacity to send workers to Taiwan, Brunei and Manpower Services to recruit, process and deploy land-based
Japan. Thus, on different dates, complainants went to the office of workers had been renewed and validated for the period from
the accused and filed their applications together with their NBI October 26, 1995 to October 25, 1997 (Exhibit 11), the evidence
Clearances, pictures and other supporting documents. The clearly indicates that the accused was neither an employee of, nor
accused then collected from them placement fees: (a) Marissa was she connected with, the said management and manpower
Balina, P40,000.00, (b) Anna Marie Pili, P40,000.00, (c) Romulo services. It was not also proved that any of her cohorts from
Macaraeg, P25,000.00, (d) Ernesto Magadan, P20,000.00, (e) whom the accused derived her authority to recruit workers were
Domingo Magadan, Jr., P20,000.00, (f) Roger Castro, P24,000.00, authorized personnel of Bemil, notwithstanding the fact that the
and (g) Nemia Beri, P10,000.00, in addition to P900.00 for POEA has records of the officers and employees of Bemil from the
medicare and P70.00 for Pre-Departure Orientation Seminar highest to the lowest.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
(PREDOS).
In this appeal, Accused-appellant faults the court a quo in finding
However, despite the promises and assurances made by the her guilty of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale. The centerpiece of
accused, not one of the complainants was deployed for her defense is three-fold: first, the prosecution failed to prove
employment abroad, nor were they able to recover the money conspiracy between her and the other accused; second, she was
they paid to the accused. Hence, complainants lodged separate not responsible for the recruitment of the complaining witnesses
complaints against the accused before the Philippine Overseas nor for their non-deployment abroad since she was also a job
Employment Administration (POEA). 2 applicant herself at the office of the other accused and was
merely utilized as a worker thereat while waiting for her
On 15 August 1997 PNP Senior Inspector Ligaya Cabal of the deployment abroad, just like Teresita Reyoberos; and third, she
POEA-CIG Task Force Anti-Illegal Recruitment spearheaded a cannot be held liable for illegal recruitment since she never
police operation to entrap the accused. Elements of the PNP represented to the complainants that she had the capacity to send
together with some members of the media proceeded to Ermita them abroad for employment.
Building and placed it under surveillance. Police Officer Cabal, who
was in civilian clothes, went alone to the office of the accused in We find no reason to reverse accused-appellant’s conviction,
the third floor and posed as a job applicant. The accused inquired hence, we affirm.
if she was applying as there was a vacancy for chambermaid in
Brunei. When Officer Cabal answered yes, the accused forthwith Preliminarily, the proliferation of illegal job recruiters and
furnished her bio-data and visa application forms and instructed syndicates preying on innocent people anxious to obtain
her to fill them up. 3 employment abroad is one of the primary considerations that led
to the enactment of The Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos
Officer Cabal promptly accomplished the bio-data and application Act of 1995. 8 Aimed at affording greater protection to overseas
forms. To obviate any suspicion on the part of the accused as to Filipino workers, it is a significant improvement on existing laws in
her true identity, she used the assumed name "Joy S. Garcia." 4 the recruitment and placement of workers for overseas
The accused then required Officer Cabal to pay the initial amount employment. Otherwise known as the Magna Carta of OFWs, it
of P21,500.00 for medical and processing fees. At the instruction broadened the concept of illegal recruitment under i.e., Labor
of the accused, a certain Teresita Reyoberos received the marked Code 9 and provided stiffer penalties thereto, especially those
money from Officer Cabal and issued the corresponding receipt that constitute economic sabotage, i.e., Illegal Recruitment in
therefor. 5 The police dragnet having been laid, Officer Cabal with Large Scale and Illegal Recruitment Committed by a Syndicate. 10
the use of her cellular phone made the pre-arranged signal to the
14
 A: The application form, madam.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

In a litany of cases we held that to constitute Illegal Recruitment Q: After filling up the application form, what did you do?
in Large Scale three (3) elements must concur: (a) the offender
has no valid license or authority required by law to enable him to A: . . . Lourdes asked me if I have the money to pay, madam.
lawfully engage in recruitment and placement of workers; (b) the
offender undertakes any of the activities within the meaning of Q: And what did you tell her? . . . .
"recruitment and placement" under Art. 13, par. (b), of the Labor
Code, or any of the prohibited practices enumerated under Art. 34 A: I was told that on the 29th after I have paid in a months time I
of the same Code (now Sec. 6 of RA 8042); and, (c) the offender will be able to leave, madam.
committed the same against three (3) or more persons,
individually or as a group. 11chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary Q: And who was telling you these things?

In the case at bar, there can be no question that the foregoing A: It was Lourdes Gamboa who told me that, madam . . . .
elements were sufficiently proved by the prosecution. The POEA
certified that accused Melba Miñoza and her group, which included Q: . . . . but what were those documents being required of you to
accused-appellant Lourdes Gamboa, were neither licensed nor submit?
authorized to recruit workers for overseas employment. 12 That
they recruited seven (7) persons - herein complaining witnesses A: NBI Clearance, my passport and we have (sic) to undergo
Marissa Balina, Anna Marie Pili, Romulo Macaraeg, Ernesto training as a bell boy, madam.
Magadan, Domingo Magadan, Jr., Roger Castro and Nemia Beri —
not to mention Police Officer Ligaya Cabal, who disguised herself Q: Who told you to submit these documents?
as a job applicant, whom accused-appellant likewise attempted to
recruit. Evidently, the illegal recruiters gave complainants the A: Lourdes Gamboa, madam. 15
impression that they had the power and ability to send the latter
to work in various foreign destinations, when in fact they had Complaining witness Nemia Beri testified —
none. Relying on their assurances and promises of employment
abroad, complainants, with much hope and expectation for Q: What did Lourdes Gamboa tell you?
immediate deployment, agreed to part with their hard-earned
money to expedite the processing and approval of their A: She told me just to apply with them because if I will apply for
applications. Taiwan, it will take a long time, while in their office just 2 to 3
weeks, [after] I submit the papers.
We find no cogent reason likewise to disturb the lower court’s
findings on the existence of a conspiracy since each accused Q: Why, was she in what country?
played a part in the recruitment of complainants. 13 Indeed, the
testimonies of the complaining witnesses indubitably show a A: In Brunei.
delineation of roles among the accused. Bonifacio Miñoza and
Melva Miñoza were the managers/heads of the illegal recruitment Q: As what?
office. Gloria Sarmiento was the field recruiter actively enlisting
prospective job applicants together with Bonifacio and Melba A: Chambermaid.
Miñoza. Accused appellant Lourdes Gamboa was the office
assistant who answered the queries of applicants and performed Q: What else did she tell you as to your employment as
clerical work. Conspiracy to defraud aspiring overseas contract chambermaid?
workers was evident from the acts of the malefactors whose
conduct before, during and after the commission of the crime A: What I have to do is to submit all the necessary requirements
clearly indicated that they were one in purpose and united in its to her and pay the amount . . . .chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
execution. Direct proof of previous agreement to commit a crime
is not necessary as it may be deduced from the mode and manner Q: So you submitted those documents, to whom did you say?
in which the offense was perpetrated or inferred from the acts of
the accused pointing to a joint purpose and design, concerted A: To Lourdes Gamboa.
action and community of interest. 14 As such, all the accused,
including accused-appellant, are equally guilty of the crime of Q: Who required you to undergo training?
illegal recruitment since in a conspiracy the act of one is the act of
all. A: Lourdes Gamboa, everytime I called her up when I am in Bicol,
she always told me to come over in order to train.
Accused-appellant assails the factual basis of the trial court in
ruling that she engaged in illegal recruitment, arguing that she Q: Apart from the documents and training, were you required to
was just an applicant herself whom accused Melba Minoza utilized pay additional fees?
to help in the office work while waiting for deployment abroad.
Her active participation however in the illegal recruitment process A: There is a need for me to pay P900.00 for medicare and
belies her profession of innocence. Complainant Roger Castro P70.00 for PREDOS?
testified —
PROSECUTOR LIM:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Q: What else happened?
Where did you undergo training of PREDOS?
A: . . . Melba Minoza told Lourdes to prepare the application form,
madam. A: The PREDOS did not push through, I just paid the amount.

Q: And what happened next? Q: To whom did you pay the amount?

A: I was taught by Lourdes how to fill up, madam? A: To Lourdes Gamboa.

Q: What? Q: How much did you pay to Lourdes Gamboa?

15
A: I paid her P70.00 . . . . cannot prevail over the positive assertions of Officer Cabal and
the complainants who had no ill motive to testify falsely against
Q: How much did you pay for the medicare? her.

A: I paid P900.00. At any rate, the lack of criminal intent on the part of an accused
— assuming ex-gratia argumenti that accused-appellant was
Q: To whom did you pay P900.00? indeed unaware of the illegal nature of the recruitment business
of her co-accused — is hardly a defense in the prosecution for
A: I gave it to Lourdes Gamboa and in turn she gave it to Melba illegal recruitment. It must be emphasized that Illegal
Miñoza. 16 Recruitment in Large Scale penalized under The Migrant Workers
and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, a special law, is malum
Furthermore, during the police entrapment operation it was prohibitum and not malum in se. The criminal intent of the
accused-appellant who actually recruited the poseur applicant, accused is not necessary and the fact alone that the accused
Officer Cabal — violated the law warrants her conviction. 18

Q: Now, you said you were met by Lourdes Gamboa at the office, Accused-appellant next insists that she did not represent to
what did she tell you, if any?chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary complainants or to Officer Cabal that she has the capacity to send
them for overseas employment. That when she asked Officer
A: She told me if I’m applying in that agency, the vacancy is as Cabal, then disguised as a job applicant, "if she was applying, the
chambermaid in Brunei, madam. vacancy is for chambermaid in Brunei," she was merely echoing
some facts known to her but was not in any way giving Officer
Q: What else did she tell you? Cabal any false representation. We are not persuaded. Suffice it
to say that an illegal recruiter need not expressly represent to the
A: So, she [asked] me if I’m interested and I said yes, victim that she has the ability to send workers abroad. It is
madam . . . . enough that she gives the impression of her ability to enlist
workers for job placement abroad in order to induce them to
Q: What else did she tell you? tender payment of fees, as what accused-appellant had done to
the complainants in this case. 191aw 1ibrary
A: She told me to fill up the bio-data form and visa application,
madam . . . . Finally, it is doctrinal that the trial court’s evaluation of the
testimony of witnesses is accorded the highest respect, for the
Q: Apart from these documents, these visa application form and trial court has an untrammeled opportunity to observe directly the
bio-data, were you asked to fill up any document? demeanor of a witness on the stand and, thus, to determine
whether he or she is telling the truth. Such assessment is
A: Upon payment, madam. generally binding on this Court, except when the same has been
reached arbitrarily; or when the trial court has overlooked,
Q: Which payment? misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of
weight and substance which could have affected the result of the
A: The P1,500.00 marked money, madam. case.

Q: Who told you to pay? Considering therefore the evidence extant on record, we fully
agree with the trial court that accused-appellant, in conspiracy
A: Lourdes Gamboa, madam . . . . with the other accused in this case, engaged in a recruitment
business which, as herein discussed, was illegal and in large scale.
Q: Now, did you actually pay the P1,500? Section 7 of RA 8042 prescribes the penalty of life imprisonment
and a fine of not less than P500,000.00 nor more than
A: Yes, madam. P1,000,000.00 in cases where the illegal recruitment constitutes
an offense involving economic sabotage. 20 Indeed, the alarming
Q: To whom did you pay? incidents of such nefarious crime rationalizes the imposition of
severe penalties under the axiom that extreme situations require
A: I paid to Ms. Lourdes Gamboa, madam. extreme remedies.

Q: Who received the amount? WHEREFORE, the assailed Partial Decision of the trial court dated
18 August 1998 convicting accused-appellant Lourdes Gamboa
A: It was Teresita Reyoberos, madam. alias Des or Lourdes Gamboa y Golfe of Illegal Recruitment in
Large Scale, sentencing her to life imprisonment and to pay a fine
Q: Upon whose instruction? of P500,000.00, and ordering her to restitute the sums of money
collected from the complainants in this case in the total amount of
A: Lourdes Gamboa, madam. 17chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary P179,970.00, is AFFIRMED. As for accused Bonifacio Miñoza,
Melba Miñoza and Gloria Sarmiento, who until now have remained
The precise degree of participation of accused-appellant Lourdes at large, let this case be ARCHIVED without prejudice to its
Gamboa in the illegal recruitment scheme is very clear from the reinstatement as soon as the accused shall have been
foregoing testimonies. She was present when the complainants apprehended and brought to the jurisdiction of the court
were being recruited and in fact personally recruited some of SO ORDERED.
them, providing and assisting them in filling up the application
forms, answering their queries, receiving documents and
payments, and repeatedly assuring them that they would be able
to leave for their respective jobs abroad. These acts demonstrated
beyond any cavil of doubt that she was a knowing and willing
participant in the recruitment activities of Melba Miñoza and her
group.

Moreover, Accused-appellant’s bare denials and self-serving

assertion that she was a mere job applicant herself certainly

16
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
WILLIAM O. CASIDO @ "MARIO," and FRANKLIN A. RESOLUTION
ALCORIN @ "ARMAN," Accused-Appellants. DAVIDE, JR., J.:
In our Resolution of 30 July 1996, we ruled that "the conditional
The Solicitor General for Plaintiff-Appellee. pardons granted in this case to accused-appellants William Casido
and Franklin Alcorin are void for having been extended on 19
PAO for Accused-Appellants. January 1996 during the pendency of their instant appeal," and
SYLLABUS disposed of the incident as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. CRIMINAL LAW; CRIMINAL LIABILITY; EXTINGUISHMENT;
PARDON DIFFERENTIATED FROM AMNESTY. — Pardon is granted WHEREFORE, the accused-appellants’ Urgent Motion To Withdraw
by the Chief Executive and as such it is a private act which must Appeal is hereby DENIED and the Bureau of Corrections is
be pleaded and proved by the person pardoned, because the DIRECTED to effect, with the support and assistance of the
courts take no notice thereof; while amnesty is by Proclamation of Philippine National Police, the re-arrest of accused- appellants
the Chief Executive with the concurrence of Congress, and it is a William Casido and Franklin Alcorin who shall then, forthwith, be
public act of which the courts should take judicial notice. Pardon is reconfined at the New Bilibid Prisons in Muntinlupa, Metro Manila,
granted to one after conviction; while amnesty is granted to both within sixty (60) days from notice hereof, and to submit a
classes of persons or communities who may be guilty of political report thereon within the same period. In the meantime, further
offenses, generally before or after the institution of the criminal action on the appeal is suspended until the re- arrest of the
prosecution and sometimes after conviction. Pardon looks forward Accused-Appellants.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
and relieves the offender from the consequences of an offense of
which he has been convicted, that is, it abolishes or forgives the The Court further resolves to REQUIRE the officers of the
punishment, and for that reason it does "nor work the restoration Presidential Committee for the Grant of Bail, Release, and Pardon
of the rights to hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless to SHOW CAUSE, within thirty (30) days from notice hereof, why
such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon," they should not be held in contempt of court for acting on and
and it "in no case exempts the culprit from the payment of the favorably recommending approval of the applications for the
civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence" (Article 36, pardon of the accused-appellants despite the pendency of their
Revised Penal Code). While amnesty looks backward and appeal.
abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks
and obliterates the offense with which he is charged that the In a Comment for the members of the Presidential Committee for
person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as the Grant of Bail, Release or Pardon (hereinafter Committee),
though he had committed no offense.chanroblesvirtual|awlibrary dated 28 August 1996, two members of the Committee’s
Secretariat, namely, Nilo C . Mariano (Assistant Chief Prosecutor)
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; AMNESTY; RENDERS MOOT AND ACADEMIC and Nestor J. Ballacillo (Solicitor in the Office of the Solicitor
APPEALS. — While the pardon in this case was void for having General), submitted the following explanation in compliance with
been extended during the pendency of the appeal or before the above mentioned resolution:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
conviction by final judgment and, therefore, in violation of the
first paragraph of Section 19, Article VII of the Constitution, the 1. In line with the confidence building measures of government,
grant of the amnesty, for which accused-appellants William the President on August 11, 1992 constituted the Presidential
Casido and Franklin Alcorin voluntarily applied under Proclamation Committee for the Grant of Bail, Release or Pardon with the
No. 347, was valid. This Proclamation was concurred in by both Secretary of Justice as the Chairman and Secretary of National
Houses of Congress in Concurrent Resolution No. 12 adopted on 2 Defense and the Secretary of the Interior and Local Government
June, 1994. The release then of accused-appellants William as members with the directive to establish guidelines for the grant
Casido and Franklin Alcorin can only be justified by the amnesty, of bail, release or pardon of persons detained or convicted of
but not by the "pardon."cralaw virtua1aw library crimes against national security and public order and violations of
the Articles of War. Subsequently, membership to the Committee
3. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION FOR THE was expanded to include the Chairman of the Commission on
GRANT OF BAIL, RELEASE OR PARDON; ADMONISHED FOR Human Rights and a member of the defunct National Unification
FAILURE TO REQUIRE APPLICANTS OF PROOF OF WITHDRAWAL Commission who was later on replaced by the Presidential Adviser
OF APPEAL. — As to the "pardon," we find unsatisfactory the on the Peace Process.
Explanation of the Secretariat of the Committee. It borders on the
absurb that its members were unaware of the resolutions of this 2. On 9 December 1992, the President issued an amendment to
Court in People v. Hinlo and People v. Salle. As early as 1991, this the guidelines incorporating therein a provision which reads:
Court, in People v. Sepada, cited in our Resolution of 30 July, "Those charged, detained or convicted of common crimes but who
1996 in this case, already stressed in no uncertain terms the can establish by sufficient evidence that they have actually
necessity of a final judgment before parole or pardon could be committed any of the crimes/offenses enumerated above may
extended. Even in their Comment of 28 August, 1996, the apply for possible grant of bail, release or pardon under these
Members of the Secretariat implied that they were all the time guidelines."cralaw virtua1aw library
aware that a pardon could only be granted after conviction by
final judgment; hence, they required from the lawyers Of the 3. Corollary to the constitution of the Committee, a Secretariat
applicants the filing with this Court of "motions for the withdrawal was also constituted which was tasked to process and evaluate
of the applicants’ appeals." Thus, they cannot plead ignorance of the applications of those desiring to be granted pardon or
this condition sine qua non to the grant of pardon. They should recommended for release or bail under the aforementioned
have demanded from the applicants the submission of proof of guidelines and which will recommend to the Committee those who
their compliance of the requirement before submitting to the qualify under the guidelines.
President a favorable recommendation. That alone, at the very
least, could have been the basis of a finding of good faith. In 4. The members of the Secretariat are representatives of the
failing to observe due care in the performance of their duties, the Office of the Chief State Prosecutor, the Board of Pardons and
Members of the Committee caused the President serious Parole, the Office of the Chief State Counsel, the Bureau of
embarrassment and thus deserve an admonition. The Members of Corrections, the Philippine National Police Legal Service, the Judge
the Presidential Committee for the Grant of Bail, Release or Advocate’s Office-Armed Forces of the Philippines, the Office of
Pardon and of its Secretariat are admonished to exercise utmost the Solicitor General, and the Commission on Human Rights
care and diligence in the performance of their duty to save the (Legal Services).
President from any embarrassment in the exercise of his power to
grant pardon or parole. 5. In the processing and evaluation of the applications for the

17
grant of pardon, release or bail, it was the agreement between were:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
the Secretariat and counsels for the applicants who are usually
the lawyers of non-government organizations (NGOs), such as the Undersecretary Ramon S. Esquerra — DOJ
Task Force Detainees of the Philippines (TFDP), the Free Legal
Assistance Group (FLAG), the KAPATID, PAHRA, among others, Assistant Chief State Nilo C. Mariano — DOJ
that simultaneous with the processing of the applications, motions
for the withdrawal of the applicant’s appeals must be filed by Executive Director Artemio C. Aspiras — DOJ
them with this Honorable Court.
State Counsel Teresita L. de Castro — DOJ
6. With the arrangement, the processing and evaluation of the
applications for the grant of pardon, release or bail by the Director Eriberto Misa, Jr. — Bureau of Pardon
committee resulted in the grant of conditional pardon to 123
applicants and absolute pardon to eight (8) applicants as of June Corrections
27, 1994.
Edgardo Dayao — JAGO
7. The applications for conditional pardon of the aforenamed
prisoners were recommended by the Committee to the President Pedro Abella — PNP
for the grant of Conditional Pardon (after the Secretariat had
evaluated that the former committed the crimes for which they Samuel M. Soriano, Jr. — CHR
had been charged in pursuit of their political belief) per
Memorandum dated May 25, 1995 and approved by the President Imelda B. Devila — National Unification
on December 29, 1995. The Conditional Pardon paper was signed
by the President on January 19, 1996 and the subject prisoners Commission
(accused-appellants) were released by the Bureau of Corrections
on January 25, 199 6. Nestor J. Ballacillo — OSG

8. Prior to their release, subject prisoners filed an "Urgent Motion 3. On February 9-11, 1995, a Working Group was constituted "to
to Withdraw Appeal" which was received by the Supreme Court on conduct an expeditious review of the cases of prisoners in the
January 11, 1996. Unfortunately, the Committee failed to verify New Bilibid Prison who are alleged to have committed crime in
first whether the counsel of the accused had also withdrawn their pursuit of political objectives" (Resolution No. 1, of the Secretariat
appeal or that the NGO lawyers had filed in their behalf a motion Working Group).chanrobles virtuallawlibrary
to Withdraw their Appeal. It was upon the honest belief of the
Secretariat that the NGO lawyers would perform their agreed 4. For this purpose, the Working Group consisting of State
undertaking, that the Secretariat indorsed the applications for Prosecutor Alberto Vizcocho of the Department of Justice (DOJ),
conditional pardon of subject prisoners for favorable action by the Commissioner Mercedes V. Contreras of the Commission on
Committee, and thereafter by the President. Human Rights (CHR) and Andrei Bon C. Tagum of the Office of the
Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP) convened for
9. There was no intention on the part of the Secretariat and the three days or February 9-11, 1995 to review the cases of the
Presidential Committee to violate Section 19, Article VII, of the political prisoners.
Constitution, but that what happened was a clear misappreciation
of fact. 5. Among the cases reviewed by the Working Group were those of
appellants Franklin Alcorin y Alparo and William Casido y
10. The Secretariat/Committee was only prompted to act, as they Balcasay.
did, in their sincere and zealous effort to take part in the
government’s confidence building measure geared towards 6. After the review of the cases, the Working Group issued
achieving peace and national reconciliation. To avoid repetition of Resolution No. 1, which states among others that the "prisoners
grant of presidential clemency under similar circumstances, the [including Alcorin and Casido] be recommended to the Secretariat
Secretariat/Committee will require applicants for any executive of the Presidential Committee for the Grant of Conditional Pardon
relief to show proof that their appeal, if any, has been withdrawn in view of a determination that they were charged or convicted of
and the withdrawal thereof has been also approved before acting crimes that may have been committed in pursuit of political
on their applications as directed by President Fidel V. Ramos in his objectives." (A copy of Resolution No. 1 is attached hereto as
handwritten instructions to the Presidential Committee, thru the Annex "1").
Executive Secretary, and upon recommendation of Chief
Presidential Legal Counsel Rene Cayetano, for the Presidential 7. The recommendations on the political prisoners listed in
Committee" to exercise better diligence." (See Annex "1", and its Resolution No. 1 by the Working Group as well as the
attachments). recommendations made by the Secretariat were based on the
undertaking of those representing the political prisoners,
11. The undersigned most respectfully pray for the kind particularly the Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) such as,
indulgence and understanding of this Honorable Court on the among others, the Task Force Detainees of the Philippines (TFDP),
matter. the Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG), KAPATID and PAHRA
who promised that the corresponding withdrawals of appeal would
On 18 September 1996, the Court required Hon. Nilo C. Mariano be filed with this Honorable Court and other Courts concerned.
and Hon. Nestor J. Ballacillo to submit to this Court a list of the This undertaking of the NGOs was however verbal and not made
members of the Secretariat who participated in the deliberations in writing.
on the accused-appellants’ application for pardon and
recommended the grant thereof, together with a certified true 8. In recommending the grant of conditional pardon to Alcorin and
copy of the agreement between the Secretariat and the counsel Casido, the members of the Secretariat Working Group acted in
for the applicants for pardon regarding the filing with the good faith and did not disregard the Resolutions of this Honorable
appropriate courts of motions for the withdrawal of appeals Court in People v. Hino, Jr., G.R. No. 110035, January 31, 1995
pending therein. Their Compliance, dated 23 October 1996, stated and People v. Salle, (250 SCRA 582, December 4, 1995). At the
as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library time they made the recommendations or the Working Group
issued Resolution No. 1, the members of the Secretariat and the
2. A review of the records of the Secretariat indicates that initially Working Group were not aware of the Hino and Salle rulings.
or as of January, 1993, the members of the Secretariat Moreover, at the time the cases were being reviewed, the

18
members of the Secretariat, were pressed on by members of the
NGOs to act on certain applications for pardon or provisional Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a
release with dispatch. In turn, they made it clear to those private act which must be pleaded and proved by the person
following up the applications that the appropriate withdrawal of pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof; while
appeals should be filed so that the applications could be acted amnesty by Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the
upon. concurrence of Congress, and it is a public act of which the courts
should take judicial notice. Pardon is granted to one after
9. Believing in good faith that the promise or undertaking of those conviction; while amnesty is granted to classes of persons or
who followed up the applications for pardon of Alcorin and Casido communities who may be guilty of political offenses, generally
would be complied with as promised, the members of the before or after the institution of the criminal prosecution and
Secretariat Working Group did not secure the written commitment sometimes after conviction. Pardon looks forward and relieves the
for the withdrawal of the appeal by accused Alcorin and Casido offender from the consequences of an offense of which he has
before their applications for pardon were reviewed. been convicted, that is, it abolishes or forgives the punishment,
and for that reason it does "nor work the restoration of the rights
Earlier, or on 1 October 1996, the Court received from Hon. to hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be
Manuel C. Herrera, Chairman of the National Amnesty expressly restored by the terms of the pardon," and it "in no case
Commission, a letter, dated 26 September 1996 addressed to Mr. exempts the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., wherein the former informed the imposed upon him by the sentence" (article 36, Revised Penal
Court that the applications for amnesty of accused- appellants Code). While amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into
Franklin A. Alcorin and William O. Casido were "favorably acted" oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the
upon by the National Amnesty Commission on 22 February 1996. offense with which he is charged that the person released by
The body of the letter reads:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had
committed no offense. (Emphasis supplied)
We refer to a newspaper article found in the Philippine Daily
Inquirer’s August 1, 1996 issue. Please be informed that on Accordingly, while the pardon in this case was void for having
February 22, 1996, the National Amnesty Commission been extended during the pendency of the appeal or before
(hereinafter the "NAC") favorably acted on the applications for conviction by final judgment and, therefore, in violation of the
amnesty of Franklin A. Alcorin and William O. Casido. first paragraph of Section 19, Article VII of the Constitution, the
grant of the amnesty, for which accused appellants William Casido
The NAC was created under Proclamation No. 347 by President and Franklin Alcorin voluntarily applied under Proclamation No.
Fidel V. Ramos on March 25, 1994, to receive, process, and 347, 3 was valid. This Proclamation was concurred in by both
decide on applications for amnesty. Under Proclamation No. 347 a Houses of Congress in Concurrent Resolution No. 12 adopted on 2
grant of amnesty shall carry with it the extinguishment of any June 1994.
criminal liability for acts committed by the grantee in pursuit of
his or her political beliefs. It also carries with it the restoration of The release then of accused appellants William Casido and
civil or political rights that may have been suspended or lost by Franklin Alcorin can only be justified by the amnesty, but not by
virtue of a criminal conviction. the "pardon."cralaw virtua1aw library

In the course of our deliberations, the NAC found that the As to the "pardon," we find unsatisfactory the Explanation of the
applicants are indeed confirmed members of the CPP/NPA/NDF Secretariat of the Committee. It borders on the absurd that its
whose killing of Victoriano Mapa was committed in pursuit of their members were unaware of the resolutions of this Court in People
political beliefs. v. Hinlo 4 and People v. Salle. 5 As early as 1991, this Court, in
People v. Sepada, 6 cited in our Resolution of 30 July 1996 in this
We enclose, for ready reference, copies of the following case, already stressed in no uncertain terms the necessity of a
documents:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library final judgment before parole or pardon could be extended. Even in
their Comment of 28 August 1996, the Members of the
1. Notice of Resolution for Franklin A. Alcorin and William O. Secretariat implied that they were all the time aware that a
Casido pardon could only be granted after conviction by final judgment;
hence, they required from the lawyers of the applicants the filing
2. Proclamation No. 347 with this Court of "motions for the withdrawal of the applicants’
appeals." Thus, they cannot plead ignorance of this condition sine
3. Primer on Amnesty under Proclamation Nos. 347 and 348. qua non to the grant of pardon. They should have demanded from
the applicants the submission of proof of their compliance of the
In its Comment to the aforesaid letter (submitted in compliance requirement before submitting to the President a favorable
with our Resolution of 7 October 1996), the Office of the Solicitor recommendation. That alone, at the very least, could have been
General alleged that the accused-appellants in this case, "in an the basis of a finding of good faith. In failing to observe due care
effort to seek their release at the soonest possible time, applied in the performance of their duties, the Members of the Committee
for pardon before the Presidential Committee on the Grant of Bail, caused the resident serious embarrassment and thus deserve an
Release or Pardon (PCGBRP), as well as for amnesty before the admonition.
National Amnesty Commission (NAC)" ; then contended that since
amnesty, unlike pardon, may be granted before or after the IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby resolved that the
institution of the criminal prosecution and sometimes even after release of accused-appellants William O. Casido and Franklin A.
conviction, as held in Barrioquinto v. Fernandez, 1 the amnesty Alcorin was valid solely on the ground of the amnesty granted
then granted accused-appellants William Casido and Franklin them and this case is dismissed with costs de oficio.
Alcorin "rendered moot and academic the question of the
premature pardon granted to them."cralaw virtua1aw library The Members of the Presidential Committee for the Grant of Bail,
Release or Pardon and of its Secretariat are admonished to
We agree with the Office of the Solicitor General. In Barrioquinto, exercise utmost care and diligence in the performance of their
2 we stated as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library duty to save the President from any embarrassment in the
exercise of his power to grant pardon or
The theory of the respondents, supported by the dissenting parole.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary:red
opinion, is predicated on a wrong contention of the nature or
character of an amnesty. Amnesty must be distinguished from
pardon.

19
20
G.R. No. L-1278             January 21, 1949 WHEREAS, the fact that such acts were committed in furtherance
of the resistance to the enemy is not a valid defense under the
laws of the Philippines;
LORETO BARRIOQUINTO and NORBERTO JIMENEZ,
petitioners,
vs. WHEREAS, the persons so accused should not be regarded as
ENRIQUE A. FERNANDEZ, ANTONIO BELMONTE and criminals but rather as patriots and heroes who have rendered
FELICISIMO OCAMPO, as Commissioners of the Fourteenth invaluable service to the nation; and
Guerrilla Amnesty Commission, respondents.
WHEREAS, it is desirable that without the least possible delay,
FERIA, J.: these persons be freed form the indignity and the jeopardy to
which they are now being subjected;
This is a special action of mandamus instituted by the petitioners
against the respondents who composed the 14th Guerrilla NOW, THEREFORE, I Manuel Roxas, President of the Philippines in
Amnesty Commission, to compel the latter to act and decide accordance with the provisions of Article VII, section 10,
whether or not the petitioners are entitled to the benefits of paragraph 6 of the Constitution, do hereby declare and proclaim
amnesty. an amnesty inn favor of al persons who committed any act
penalized under the Revised Penal Code in furtherance of the
resistance to the enemy or against persons aiding in the war
Petitioners Norberto Jimenez and Loreto Barrioquinto were
effort of the enemy, and committed during the period from
charged with the crime of murder. As the latter had not yet been
December 8, 1941 to the date when each particular area of the
arrested the case proceeded against the former, and after trial
Philippines was actually liberated from the enemy control and
Court of First Instance of Zamboanga sentenced Jimenez to life
occupation. This amnesty shall not apply to crimes against
imprisonment. Before the period for perfecting an appeal had
chastity or to acts committed from purely personal motives.
expired, the defendant Jimenez became aware of the
Proclamation No. 8, dated September 7, 1946, which grants
amnesty in favor of all persons who may be charged with an act It is further proclaimed and declared that in order to determine
penalized under the Revised Penal Code in furtherance of the who among those against whom charges have been filed before
resistance to the enemy or against persons aiding in the war the courts of the Philippines or against whom charges may be
efforts of the enemy, and committed during the period from filed in the future, come within the terms of this amnesty,
December 8, 1941, to the date when particular area of the Guerrilla Amnesty Commissions, simultaneously to be
Philippines where the offense was actually committed was established , shall examine the facts and circumstance
liberated from enemy control and occupation, and said Jimenez surrounding each case and, if necessary, conduct summary
decided to submit his case to the Guerrilla Amnesty Commission hearings of witnesses both for the complainant and the accused.
presided by the respondents herein, and the other petitioner These Commissions shall decided each case and, upon finding
Loreto Barrioquinto, who had then been already apprehended, did that it falls within the terms of this proclamation, the
the same. Commissions shall so declare and this amnesty shall immediately
be effective as to the accused, who shall forthwith be released or
discharged.
After a preliminary hearing had started, the Amnesty Commission,
prescribed by the respondents, issued on January 9, 1947, an
order returning the cases of the petitioners to the Court of First The theory of the respondents, supported by the dissenting
Instance of Zamboanga, without deciding whether or not they are opinion, is predicated on a wrong conception of the nature or
entitled to the benefits of he said Amnesty Proclamation, on the character of an amnesty. Amnesty must be distinguished from
ground that inasmuch as neither Barrioquinto nor Jimenez have pardon.
admitted having committed the offense, because Barrioquinto
alleged that it was Hipolito Tolentino who shot and killed the
Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a
victim, they cannot invoke the benefits of amnesty.
private act which must be pleaded and proved by the person
pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof; while
The Amnesty Proclamation of September 7, 1946, issued by the amnesty by Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the
President with the concurrence of Congress of the Philippines, concurrence of Congress, and it is a public act of which the courts
reads in part as follows: should take judicial notice. Pardon is granted to one after
conviction; while amnesty is granted to classes of persons or
communities who may be guilty of political offenses, generally
WHEREAS, since the inception of the war until the liberation of the
before or after the institution of the criminal prosecution and
different areas comprising the territory of the Philippines,
sometimes after conviction. Pardon looks forward and relieves the
volunteer armed forces of Filipinos and for of other nationalities
offender from the consequences of an offense of which he has
operated as guerrillas and other patriotic individuals and groups
been convicted, that is, it abolished or forgives the punishment,
pursued activities in opposition to the forces and agents of the
and for that reason it does ""nor work the restoration of the rights
Japanese Empire in the invasion and occupation of the
to hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be
Philippines;
expressly restored by the terms of the pardon," and it "in no case
exempts the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity
WHEREAS, members of such forces, in their determined efforts to imposed upon him by the sentence" article 36, Revised Penal
resist the enemy, and to bring about his ultimate defeat, Code). while amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into
committed acts penalized under the Revised Penal Code; oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the
offense with which he is charged that the person released by
amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had
WHEREAS, charges have been presented in the courts against committed no offense. (section 10[6], Article VII, Philippine
many members of these resistance forces, for such acts; Constitution; State vs. Blalock, 62 N.C., 242, 247; In re Briggs,
135 N.C., 118; 47 S.E. 402., 403; Ex parte Law, 35 GA., 285,
296; State ex rel Anheuser—Busch Brewing Ass'n. vs. Eby, 170

21
Mo., 497; 71 S.W 52, 61; Burdick vs United States, N.Y., 35 S. enemy, and not for purely personal motive, it is impossible for the
Ct., 267; 271; 236 U.S., 79; 59 Law. ed., 476.) court of Commission to verify the motive for the commission of
the offense, because only the accused could explain of the
offense, because only the accused could explain his belief and
In view of the foregoing, we are of the opinion and so hold that,
intention or the motive of committing the offense.
in order to entitle a person to the benefits of the Amnesty
Proclamation of September 7, 1946, it is not necessary that he
should, as a condition precedent or sine qua non, admit having There is no necessity for an accused to admit his responsibility for
committed the criminal act or offense with which he is charged the commission of a criminal act before a court of Amnesty
and allege the amnesty as a defense; it is sufficient that the Commission may investigate and extend or not to him the
evidence either of the complainant or the accused, shows that the benefits of amnesty. The fact that he pleads not guilty or that he
offense committed comes within the terms of said Amnesty has not committed the act with which he is charged, does not
Proclamation. Hence, it is not correct to say that "invocation of necessarily prove that he is not guilty thereof. Notwithstanding
the benefits of amnesty is in the nature of a plea of confession his denial, the evidence for the prosecution or complainant may
and avoidance." Although the accused does not confess the show the contrary, as it is generally the case in criminal
imputation against him, he may be declared by the courts or the proceedings, and what should in such a case be determined is
Amnesty Commissions entitled to the benefits. For, whether or whether or not the offense committed is of political character. The
not he admits or confesses having committed the offense with plea of not having committed the offense made by an accused
which he is charged, the Commissions should, if necessary or simply means that he can not be convicted of the offense charged
requested by the interested party, conduct summary hearing of because he is not guilty thereof, and, even if the evidence would
the witnesses both for the complainants and the accused, on show that he is, because he has committed it in furtherance of
whether he has committed the offense in furtherance of the the resistance to the enemy or against persons a ding in the war
resistance to the enemy, or against persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy, and not for purely political motives.
efforts of the enemy, and decide whether he is entitled to the
benefits of amnesty and to be "regarded as a patriot or hero who
According to Administrative Order No. 11 of October 2, 1946,
have rendered invaluable services to the nation,," or not, in
creating the Amnesty Commissions, issued by the President of the
accordance with the terms of the Amnesty Proclamation. since the
Philippines, cases pending in the Courts of First Instance of the
Amnesty Proclamation is a public act, the courts as well as the
province in which the accused claims the benefits of Amnesty
Amnesty Commissions created thereby should take notice of the
Proclamation, and cases already decided by said courts but not
terms of said Proclamation and apply the benefits granted therein
yet elevated on appeal to the appellate courts, shall be passed
to cases coming within their province or jurisdiction, whether
upon and decided by the respective Amnesty Commission, and
pleaded or claimed by the person charged with such offenses or
cases pending appeal shall be passed upon by the Seventh
not, if the evidence presented show that the accused is entitled to
Amnesty Commission. Under the theory of the respondents and
said benefits.
the writer oft he dissenting opinion, the Commissions should
refuse to comply with the directive of said Administrative Order,
The right to the benefits of amnesty, once established by the because is almost all cases pending in the Court of First Instance,
evidence presented either by the complainant or prosecution, or and all those pending appeal form the sentence of said courts, the
by the defense, can not be waived, because it is of public interest defendants must not have pleaded guilty or admitted having
that a person who is regarded by the Amnesty Proclamation which committed the offense charged for otherwise, they would not or
has the force of a law, not only as innocent, for he stands in the could not have appealed from the judgment of the Courts of First
eyes of the law as if he had never committed any punishable Instance. To hold that a Amnesty Commission should not proceed
offense because of the amnesty, but as a patriot or hero, can not to the investigation and act and decide whether the offense with
be punishment as a criminal. Just as the courts of justice can not which an accused was charged comes within the Amnesty
convict a person who, according to the evidence, has committed Proclamation if he does not admit or confess having committed it
an act not punishable by law, although he confesses being guilty would be to defeat the purpose for which the Amnesty
thereof, so also and a fortiori they can not convict a person Proclamation was issued and the Amnesty Commission were
considered by law not a criminal, but as a patriot and hero, for established. If the courts have to proceed to the trail or hearing of
having rendered invaluable services to the nation inn committing a case and decide whether the offense committed by the
such an act. defendant comes within the terms of the Amnesty Proclamation
although the defendant has plead not guilty, there is no reason
why the Amnesty Commissions can not do so. Where a defendant
While it is true that the evidence must show that the offense
to admit or confess having committed the offense or being
charged was against chastity and was committed in furtherance of
responsible therefor before he can invoke the benefit of amnesty,
the resistance against the enemy, for otherwise, it is to be
as there is no law which makes such admission or confession not
naturally presumed that is has been committed for purely
admissible as evidence against him in the courts of justices in
personal motive, it is nonetheless true that though the motive as
case the Amnesty Commission finds that the offense does not
a mental impulse is state of mind or subjective, it need not be
come within the terms of the Amnesty Proclamation, nobody or
testified to be the defendant himself at his arraignment or hearing
few would take the risk of submitting their case to said
of the case. Generally the motive for the commission of an
Commission.
offense is established by the testimony of witnesses on the acts or
statements of the accused before or immediately after the
commission of the offense, deeds or words hat may express it or Besides, in the present case, the allegation of Loreto Barrioquinto
from which his motive or reason for committing it may be that the offended party or victim was shot and killed by Agapito
inferred. The statement of testimony of a defendant at the time of Hipolito , does not necessarily bar the respondents from finding,
arraignment or the hearing of the case about said motive, can not after the summary hearing of the witnesses for the complaints
generally be considered and relied on, specially if there is and the accused, directed in the said Amnesty Proclamation and
evidence to the contrary, as the true expression of the reason o Administrative Order No. 11, that the petitioners are responsible
motive he had at the time of committing the offense. Because for the killing of the victim, either as principals by cooperation,
such statements or testimony may be an afterthought or colored inducement or conspiration, or as accessories before as well as
by the interest he may have to suit his defense or the purpose for after the fact, but that they are entitled to the benefits of
which he intends to achieve with such declaration. Hence it does amnesty, because they were members of the same group of
not stand to reason and logic to say, as the dissenting opinion guerrilleros who killed the victim in furtherance of the resistance
avers, that unless the defendant admits at the investigation or to the enemy or against persons aiding in the war efforts of the
hearing having committed the offense with which he is charged, enemy.
and states that he did it in furtherance of the resistance to the
22
Wherefore, the respondents are hereby ordered to immediately Arcadio Talavera, Tagumpay Nanadiego and Paulino Bayran alias
proceed to hear and decide the application for amnesty of Enong, together with Jaime Garcia and 92 other John Does who
petitioners Barrioquinto and Jimenez, unless amnesty of are still at large armed with high power rifles such as .50 caliber
petitioners Barrioquinto and Jimenez, unless the courts have in machinegun, .30 caliber machinegun, Browning automatic rifles,
the meantime already decided, expressly and finally, the question carbines, Garrands, Springfield rifles, pistols and Revolver of
whether or not they are entitled to the benefits of the Amnesty different calibers, and by means of force, threats and intimidation,
Proclamation No. 8 of September 7, 1946. So ordered. conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping each
other, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
kidnap one Amadeo Lozanes in his residence at said municipality
of Unisan, Quezon, with both hands tied together, detain and
carry him to Vera's Headquarters located at Lalaguna, Municipality
G.R. No. L-26539 February 28, 1990 of Lopez, Quezon, and while he (Amadeo Lozanes) was under
their custody and control, in pursuance of their conspiracy, taking
advantage of their superior strength, with intent to kill and with
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,
evident premeditation, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously boxed,
vs.
kicked, tortured and later on executed on March 14, 1945, in the
GAUDENCIO VERA, ET AL., defendants. TAGUMPAY A.
said barrio of Lalaguna, Lopez, Quezon.
NANADIEGO, defendant-appellee.

Contrary to law.
BIDIN, J.:

On May 11, 1955, an Urgent Petition was filed by Provincial Fiscal

This is an appeal interposed by the People of the Philippines from
Lardizabal praying that the case be referred to the Amnesty
the Order * of the then Court of First Instance of Quezon, Ninth
Commission (Record, Vol. I, p. 158). On the same date, the AFP
Judicial District, Branch II, in Criminal Case No. 12145 dated
Amnesty Commission requested the Provincial Fiscal to furnish
January 23, 1965, dismissing the case as against defendant-
said Commission with a true copy of the records of Criminal Case
appellee Tagumpay A. Nanadiego with cost de oficio.
No. 12145. The records requested were forwarded to the
Commission on July 15, 1955 (Brief for the Appellant, p. 3, Rollo,
The dispositive portion of the said order reads: p. 27).

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant case is Ordered On June 22, 1955, the Provincial Fiscal filed an amended
dismissed as against this defendant Tagumpay A. Nanadiego, with information against the same accused (including accused-appellee
cost de oficio. The bail bond posted by said defendant for his Tagumpay Nanadiego) for the same offense in the Court of First
provisional liberty is hereby cancelled and declared of no further Instance of Quezon (Record, Vol. I, p. 207).
force and effect.
On August 12, 1955, the above case was referred to the 8th
SO ORDERED. Guerilla Amnesty Commission (Record, Vol. I, p. 229). Few days
thereafter, Hon. Vicente del Rosario of the Court First Instance of
Quezon, acting upon authority from the Department of Justice,
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
convoked the 8th Guerilla Amnesty Commission composed of
different judges of Laguna, Mindoro, Batangas and Quezon (Brief
On July 23, 1954, a complaint for kidnapping with murder for the Appellant, p. 3; Rollo, p. 27).
docketed as Criminal Case No. 2454 was filed in the Justice of the
Peace Court of Unisan, Quezon by Sgt. Francisco G. de Asis, P.C.
On June 12, 1956, after a continuous trial of the case, in which
of Lucena City against the following: Gaudencio Vera, Restitute
Tagumpay Nanadiego was one of the accused, the 8th Guerilla
Figueras, Lorenzo Ambas, Justo Florida Arcadio Talavera, Sr.,
Amnesty Commission held that none of the defendants admitted
Tagumpay Nanadiego, Paulino Bayran, Jaime Garcia and 92
having committed the crime charged. Such being the case,
others (Record, Vol. I, p. 1).
defendants have no use for amnesty as amnesty presupposes the
commission of a crime; hence, the 8th Guerilla Amnesty
On December 20,1954, a manifestation and motion was filed by Commission has no jurisdiction, thereby remanding the case to
the accused Gaudencio Vera, Restituto Figueras, Lorenzo Ambas the court a quo (Record, Vol. II, p. 156).
and Tagumpay Nanadiego through counsel de Mesa and de Mesa
where the above-named accused entered a plea of not guilty and
On July 20, 1956, accused filed a motion for reconsideration
further renounced their rights to the second stage of the
(Record, Vol. I, p. 167) which the 8th Guerilla Amnesty
preliminary investigation by the justice of the peace, and finally
Commission denied in its order dated January 11, 1957, and
prayed that the case be elevated to the Court of First Instance of
maintained its order to return the case to the Court of First
Quezon (Record, Vol. 1, p. 231) which was granted in an order
Instance of Quezon for lack of jurisdiction (Record, Vol. II, p.
dated December 22, 1954 by the aforesaid court (Record, Vol. 1,
175).
pp. 24-25).

Thereafter, the accused interposed an appeal to the Court of

In February 23, 1955, an information (Record, Vol. I, p. 94) was
Appeals from the decision and order of the 8th Guerilla Amnesty
filed by the then Provincial Fiscal Jose O. Lardizabal in the Court
Commission under date of June 12,1956 and January 11, 1957,
of First Instance of Quezon charging the accused (including
respectively (Record, Vol. II, pp. 185-186) for which reason the
Tagumpay Nanadiego) with the complex crime of Kidnapping with
entire record was elevated to the Court of Appeals as per order
murder, defined and punished under Articles 48, 267 and 248 of
dated February 12, 1957 (Record, Vol. II, p. 187). On appeal, the
the Revised Penal Code committed as follows:
case was docketed as CA-G.R. No. 2004-R.

That on or about the 13th day of February, 1945, in the

On November 16, 1960, the Court of Appeals, in its decision
Municipality of Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the
affirmed the decision and order appealed from (Record, Vol. II, p.
jurisdiction of His Hon. Court, the above-named accused
191). Later, a petition for review was filed in the Supreme Court,
Gaudencio Vera, Restituto Figueras, Lorenzo Ambas, Justo Florido,
docketed as G.R. No. L-18184.

23
In a decision dated January 31, 1963, this Court affirmed the 412) which seeks to set aside the order dated August 28, 1965
decision and order of the Court of Appeals sought to be reviewed, and approval of the Petition and Counter Petition dated August
and ruled that a previous admission of guilt is necessary in 27, 1965 (Record, Vol. II, p. 410). Accordingly, on September 10,
amnesty since the invocation of amnesty is in the nature of a plea 1965, the Court of First Instance of Quezon issued an Order
of confession and avoidance, which means that the pleader denying the Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit (Record,
admits the allegations against him but disclaims liability therefor Vol. II, p. 414).
on account of intervening facts which, if proved, would bring the
crime charged within the scope of the amnesty proclamation
A petition to elevate the case was filed by Special Prosecutor
(Record, Vol. II, p. 198). The above decision became final and
Artemio T. Asuncion on November 5, 1965 (Record, Vol. II, p.
executory on November 6, 1963 as per Entry of Judgment
429) in connection with the appealed case against defendant-
(Record, Vol. II, p. 204).
appellee Tagumpay Nanadiego. Likewise, said Special Prosecutor
filed a 4th Motion to set arraignment and trial in the Court of First
On December 21, 1963, Special Prosecutor Artemio T. Asuncion Instance of Quezon against the other defendants on January 24,
filed a petition ex parte in the Court of First Instance of Quezon 1966 (Record, Vol. II, p. 432) which was granted in an order of
praying that a trial on the merits of the case be continued for the Court a quo dated February 26, 1966 and the arraignment
which reason the case was set for arraignment and trial sometime and trial was set on June 21, 1966 (Record, Vol. II, p. 436).
in January, 1964 (Record, Vol. II, p. 205).
The lower court not having elevated the case to this Court,
On January 11, 1965, defendant-appellee Tagumpay Nanadiego Special Prosecutor Artemio T. Asuncion filed on February 28, 1966
filed an "Urgent Motion to Quash the Information" (Record, Vol. another Petition to elevate the case to the Supreme Court
II, p. 357) in the above entitled case on the ground that the (Record, Vol. II, p. 456) which was granted by the a quo in its
criminal action or liability has been extinguished by virtue of the order dated March 5, 1966 (Rollo, p. 6).
amnesty extended him by the Amnesty Commission, Armed
Forces of the Philippines in Resolution No. 1-F 859 (Record, Vol.
On July 11, 1966, the Court a quo acting on the Manifestation of
II, p. 360) dated July 7, 1959 in accordance with Proclamation
the Special Prosecutor, ordered the cancellation and
No. 8, series of 1946 of the President of the Philippines, and that
postponement of the arraignment and trial scheduled on that day
the defendant-appellee Tagumpay Nanadiego, claimed that he
until the special prosecutor shall have terminated the
applied before the Amnesty Commission; Armed Forces of the
reinvestigation of the case with respect to some of the defendants
Philippines on July 26, 1954 for amnesty under Proclamation No.
or until such time that he (the Special Prosecutor) has filed an
8, s. 46 of the President of the Philippines in connection with the
amended information. In the same order, the court a quo
charge filed against him on July 23, 1954 before the Justice of the
reiterating its order dated March 5, 1966, ordered the elevation of
Peace Court of Unisan, Quezon. However, on January 22, 1965,
the record of the case to the Supreme Court (Rollo, p. 7). Thus,
an opposition to the urgent motion to quash was filed by special
on August 15, 1966 (Rollo, p. 1; p. 40), the records of the case
prosecutor Artemio T. Asuncion although the latter in his
was elevated to this Court. Said records, however, show that the
opposition admits that "on July 7, 1959, the AFP Amnesty
trial has not been finished as regards the other accused (Rollo, p.
Commission cleared the petitioner Tagumpay Nanadiego in its
82).
decision" (Record, Vol. II, p. 371).

On March 13, 1967, the Solicitor General, representating the

Subsequently, the Court of First Instance of Quezon, in an order
People of the Philippines, appellant, filed its Brief (Rollo, p. 27).
dated January 23, 1965 ordered that the aforesaid case against
Meanwhile, in the Court a quo, the Special Prosecutor filed a
Tagumpay Nanadiego be dismissed (Record, Vol. II, p. 375) on
Motion to Dismiss dated October 18, 1967 against the defendants
the ground that "the crime for which the accused was charged in
for lack of sufficient evidence and loss of interest of the
the Armed Forces Amnesty Commission is the same charge in the
prosecution witnesses, whose testimony is indispensable without
criminal case No. 12145" which was "admitted by the Special
which the prosecution cannot prosecute the same (Rollo, p. 41).
Prosecutor of the Department of Justice in open court"
On November 20, 1967, the court a quo acting on the Motion to
manifesting that the accused was granted amnesty on July 7,
Dismiss, ruled that it can act on said motion, when the special
1959. Further, the lower court ruled that "to try the accused
prosecutor has withdrawn his appeal in order that the record of
under the information in criminal case No. 12145 would be
the case be returned to the court a quo (Rollo, p. 48).
tantamount to trying him for an offense where he has been
granted amnesty long time ago, and to try him again would
constitute double jeopardy." However, a motion for On the other hand, this Court, in its resolution dated February 19,
reconsideration dated January 31, 1965 was filed by special 1980 (Rollo, p. 37) considered this case submitted for decision
prosecutor Artemio T. Asuncion (Record, Vol. II, p. 377) which without Appellee's Brief, while defendants filed in this Court on
was denied by the trial court in its order dated February 6, 1965 February 20, 1980 a Motion for Remand of Record to the Court of
(Record, Vol. II, p. 401). First Instance of Quezon in order that the pending motion to
dismiss before the Court a quo may be acted upon (Rollo, p. 38).
Hence, this appeal.
In its resolution dated March 4, 1980, this Court required the
Solicitor General to comment on the motion filed by the counsel
On February 11, 1965, the special prosecutor filed a notice of
for accused-appellee dated February 9,1980 (Rollo, p. 50,) which
appeal from the order dated January 23, 1965 dismissing the case
was complied with by the Solicitor General in a comment filed on
against Tagumpay Nanadiego (Record, Vol. II, p. 400).
June 5, 1980 (Rollo, p. 81).
Meanwhile, on May 24,1965, a Motion to Set Arraignment and
Trial and Manifestation was filed by the special prosecutor in the
trial court (Record, Vol. II, pp. 402-403) which was granted in an In the resolution of June 17, 1980, this Court granted the motion
order dated August 28, 1965 and the arraignment and trial was to remand the case to the Court of First Instance of Quezon
set on September 4,1965 (Record, Vol. II, p. 411). (Rollo, p. 86).

On the other hand, defendants filed through their counsel a On August 25, 1980, the court a quo, in resolving the Motion to
Petition and Counter Petition in the Court of First Instance of Dismiss dated October 18, 1967 filed by Special Prosecutor
Quezon dated August 27, 1965 followed by their Motion for Artemio T. Asuncion, ordered the dismissal of the case against all
Reconsideration dated September 3, 1965 (Record, Vol. II, p. the accused, with the exception of accused Tagumpay Nanadiego

24
and further ordered the return of the record of this case to this the 8th Guerilla Amnesty Commission. Furthermore, it appears
Court where the appeal of the State Prosecutor in connection with that appellee Tagumpay Nanadiego did not participate in the
the case as against the accused-appellee Tagumpay Nanadiego is proceedings before the 8th Guerilla Amnesty Commission. Be that
still pending (Record, Vol. IV, p. 189). as it may, in cases of concurrent jurisdiction, the court first
acquiring jurisdiction excludes the other courts (Lee v. Presiding
Judge, G.R. No. 68789, November 10, 1986, 145 SCRA 408).
On April 11, 1988, this Court in its Resolution required the parties
Jurisdiction once acquired is not lost upon the instance of the
to manifest whether or not they are still interested in prosecuting
parties but continues until the case is terminated (Abadilla v.
this case or if supervening events have transpired which render
Ramos, G.R. No. 71973, December 1, 1987, 156 SCRA 92; Lat v.
the case moot and academic or otherwise substantially affect the
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co., 69 SCRA 425 [1975];
same (Rollo, p. 102).
Republic v. Central Surety & Insurance Co., 25 SCRA 641 [1968];
Rizal Surety & Insurance Co. v. Manila Railroad Company, 16
On July 11, 1988, the Solicitor General filed a manifestation SCRA 908 [1966]; Tuvera v. de Guzman, 13 SCRA 729 [1965]).
stating that he is still interested in prosecuting the case (Rollo,
111).
On July 7, 1959, the criminal liability of the appellee had been
completely extinguished by virtue of the amnesty extended him
In its brief, appellant assigned the following errors: by the Amnesty Commission, Armed Forces of the Philippines in
Resolution No. 1-F 859. It has been consistently ruled by this
Court that amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into
I oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the
offense with which he is charged; that the person released by
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT DEFENDANT- amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had
APPELLEE WAS VALIDLY GRANTED AMNESTY ON JULY 7, 1959 BY committed no offense (Barrioquinto et al. vs. Fernandez, et al., 82
THE ARMED FORCES COMMISSION DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE Phil. 642 [1949]). Amnesty is a public act of which the court
8TH GUERILLA AMNESTY COMMISSION IN ITS DECISION DATED should take judicial notice. Thus, the light to the benefits of
JUNE 12, 1956 HAS ALREADY DENIED AMNESTY TO DEFENDANTS amnesty, once established by the evidence presented, either by
IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 12145 AND SUSTAINED BY THE the complainant or prosecution or by the defense, can not be
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE SUPREME COURT IN waived, because it is of public interest that a person who is
ITS DECISIONS DATED NOVEMBER 16, 1960 AND JANUARY 21, regarded by the Amnesty Proclamation, which has the force of
1963. law, not only as innocent, for he stands ill the eyes of the law as
of the had never committed any punishable offense because of
the amnesty, but as a patriot or hero, and not be punished as
II criminal (Barrioquinto et al. v. Fernandez, et al., supra). Moreover
when the Court a quo dismissed the case upon motion of
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT TO TRY THE defendant-appellee based on the resolution of the Armed Forces
DEFENDANT-APPELLEE UNDER THE INFORMATION IN CRIMINAL of the Philippines Amnesty Commission granting him amnesty,
CASE 12145 WOULD CONSTITUTE DOUBLE JEOPARDY. said court did not commit grave abuse of discretion.

III One of the grounds for a motion to quash a criminal case is when
the criminal action or liability has been extinguished (Sec. 2[f],
Rule 117). Criminal action or liability is totally extinguished by,
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASE AS AGAINST among others, amnesty. Thus, Art. 89 of the Revised Penal Code
DEFENDANT-APPELLEE TAGUMPAY NANADIEGO. provides:

The pivotal issue of the case is whether or not the trial court erred Article 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. Criminal
in dismissing the case against Tagumpay Nanadiego. liability is totally extinguished:

In Its Brief, appellant People of the Philippines contends that the xxx xxx xxx
trial court erred in dismissing the case against herein appellee
Tagumpay Nanadiego. Appellant averred that the 8th Guerilla
Amnesty Commission and the Armed Forces of the Philippines (3) By amnesty, which completely extinguishes the penalty and
Amnesty Commission both derived authorities from Proclamation all its effects;
Not 8, series of 1946 by the President of the Philippines. In this
connection, as creations of the said proclamation, both xxx xxx xxx
commissions have concurrent jurisdiction over the case at bar and
the first body that acquires jurisdiction retains it to the exclusion
of the other. Appellant further claimed that the decision of the 8th Furthermore, it must be remembered that the Court a quo, acting
Guerilla Amnesty Commission dated June 12, 1956 was issued or on the motion to dismiss dated October 18, 1967 filed by Special
rendered earlier than that of the Armed Forces of the Philippines Prosecutor Artemio T. Asuncion in Criminal Case No. 12145
Amnesty Commission dated July 7, 1959. Hence, the decision of alleging as grounds therefor, among others, insufficiency of
the former is the controlling decision in the case at bar. evidence to warrant the prosecution of the case, issued an order
dated August 20, 1980 dismissing the case against all the accused
except appellee Tagumpay Nanadiego. The latter was excluded
The records, however, show that the appellee Tagumpay from the order of dismissal because of the pendency of this
Nanadiego applied for Amnesty before the Armed Forces of the appeal. To remand the case for further proceedings before the
Philippines Amnesty Commission on July 26, 1954 right after the trial court at this late hour when as early as October 18, 1967,
case was filed in the Justice of the Peace Court of Unisan, Quezon. the prosecution has admittedly no evidence sufficient to warrant
On the other hand, the Court of First Instance of Quezon, upon its prosecution, is a useless ritual which would not serve the ends
motion of the Provincial Fiscal, referred the case (Criminal Case of justice. At the ask of being repetitious, nothing would be
No. 12145) to the 8th Guerilla Amnesty Commission, on August gained by remanding the case to the court a quo for further
12, 1955. Therefore, insofar as appellee Tagumpay Nanadiego is proceedings since there is no offense to prosecute.
concerned, jurisdiction was properly acquired by the Armed
Forces of the Philippines Amnesty Commission earlier than that of
25
WHEREFORE, the Order of the trial court dated January 23, 1965
dismissing Criminal Case No. 12145 as against appellee
Tagumpay A. Nanadiego with cost de oficio is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

26
[G.R. No. L-19745. January 31, 1964.]
Section 17(e) of Republic Act 875 provides as
ELISEO FLORA, ET AL., Petitioners, v. VICENTE OXIMANA, follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
ET AL., Respondents.
"No person who has been convicted of a crime involving moral
turpitude shall be eligible for election to any office in a legitimate
SYLLABUS
labor organization or for appointment to any position involving the
collection, custody, management, control or disbursement of its
funds and any such person shall be disqualified from continuing to
1. LABOR RELATIONS; LABOR UNIONS; DISQUALIFICATIONS OF hold any office or such position in the organization."cralaw
OFFICERS; COMMISSION OF CRIME; EFFECT OF ABSOLUTE virtua1aw library
PARDON. — An absolute pardon restores a person to his civil and
political rights, one of which is the right to hold any office in any If the case of respondent Oximana should be considered in the
legitimate labor organization. In the case at bar, the conviction in light of what is provided for in the section abovequoted there
1926 of the crime of abusos deshonestos for which he served time would be no doubt that he would be disqualified from holding the
in jail until 1930, cannot after his full and absolute pardon in 1961 position of president which is now being disputed by complainants
serve to disqualify the respondent president of a labor union from for the crime for which he was convicted in 1926 is one which
such office under Section 17(e) of Republic Act 875. involves moral turpitude because the purpose of the law is indeed
to disqualify one who, because of gross misconduct, has rendered
DECISION himself unfit to hold any office in a legitimate labor organization.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.: But here the situation of respondent Oximana has changed since
Vicente Oximana is the president of the Benquet-Balatoc Workers’ his conviction. It appears that since the time of his conviction in
Union (BBWU), having been elected to said position on June 20, 1926 up to the time the complaint for disqualification was lodged
1960, pursuant to the provisions of the constitution and by-laws against him in 1961, a long period of time has passed, and, in the
of said union. Since 1948, when the union was organized, meantime, he may have reformed himself and become a new and
Oximana has been elected continuously as such president and has repentant man. In fact, when he organized the Benguet-Balatoc
performed the duties and functions of said office without Worker’s Union in 1948, he became its president and had been
interruption in accordance with the provisions of said constitution re-elected as such continuously up to the present time without
and by-laws. any indication that throughout his actuation as such official he has
ever committed any misconduct or act unbecoming his office that
In 1926, Oximana was convicted of the crime of abusos may disqualify him to continue deserving the confidence of the
deshonestos for which he was sentenced to 3 years 6 months and union and its members. It is perhaps for this reason that on April
25 days of imprisonment which he served until December 4, 1, 1961 the President of the Philippines granted him full, absolute
1930. As a consequence, a complaint was lodged against him and plenary pardon which restored to him the full enjoyment of
before the Court of Industrial Relations on February 2, 1961 by a his civil and political rights, one of which is the right to hold any
prosecutor of said court seeking to disqualify him as president of office in any legitimate labor organization. We believe that the
the union on the strength of the provisions of Section 17(e) of effect of this pardon is as the President of the Philippines has
Republic Act 875. In this complaint, the union was made party stated: the restoration in full of Oximana’s civil and political
respondent because of complainant’s desire to restrain Oximana rights, the effect of which is to blot out any evil consequence of
from performing the duties and functions of his office as president the crime he has committed. Authorities abound supporting this
and to have a new election held for the purpose of electing a new view.
qualified president.
Thus, it has been held that "A full and complete pardon, granted
In answer to the complaint, respondents alleged that it fails to after conviction, removes all penalties and legal disabilities, and
state a cause of action for it does not show that it bears the restores the defendant to all his civil rights." Continuing, the court
sanction of at least 10% of the entire membership of the union of went on to say that "pardon completely destroys the effect of the
which Oximana was president, and that assuming that it does and judgment . . . (and) `obliterates, in legal contemplation, the
Oximana was convicted of the offense which involves moral offense itself; and hence its effect is to make the offender a new
turpitude, the same is not however one of the offenses man’" (Stephens v. State of ex rel. Goldsberry, 11 Okl. 262, 239
contemplated by Section 17 (e) of Republic Act 875. In any event, P. 450). In a similar vein, this Court, thru Mr. Justice Laurel,
respondent contend that the aforesaid legal provision, being penal stated that "an absolute pardon not only blots out the crime
in character, does not apply to Oximana for he has been an committed but removes all disabilities resulting from the
official of good standing long before the effectivity of Republic Act conviction; and that when granted after the term of imprisonment
875. has expired, absolute pardon removes all that is left of the
consequences of the conviction" (Pelobello v. Palatino, 72 Phil.,
When the case was called for hearing, the parties submitted a 441). And in an earlier case, this Court, thru the same Justice,
stipulation of facts wherein, among other things, it was agreed also stated:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
that on April 1, 1961 the President of the Philippines granted
Oximana full, absolute and plenary pardon for the crime he had ". . . An absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed,
committed in 1926, thereby restoring him to the full enjoyment of but removes all disabilities resulting from the conviction. In the
his civil and political rights, one of which is the holding of the present case, the disability is the result of conviction without
position now disputed by complainants. which there would be no basis for disqualification from voting.
Imprisonment is not the only punishment which the law imposes
On November 29, 1961, Judge Amado C. Bugayong who heard upon those who violate its command. There are accessory and
the case, issued an order dismissing the complaint for lack of resultant disabilities, and the pardoning power likewise extends to
merit. He said that were it not for the absolute pardon granted to such disabilities. When granted after the term of imprisonment
Oximana he would have been disqualified. But said pardon has has expired, absolute pardon removes all that is left of the
erased all the ill effects of his conviction and had restored to him consequences of conviction. In the present case, while the pardon
all his rights and privileges as a citizen as if he had not committed extended to respondent Santos is conditional in the sense that
the crime at all. One of such rights is to hold an office in any labor `he will be eligible for appointment only to positions which are
organization as the one now being held by respondent Oximana. clerical or manual in nature involving no money, or property
responsibility,’ it is absolute insofar as it `restores the respondent
This order was affirmed by the court en banc. Hence the present to full civil and political rights.’" (Cristobal v. Labrador, Et Al., 71
petition for review. Phil., 34, 38).

27
We are, therefore, persuaded to affirm the views expressed by
the court a quo in its order of November 29, 1961.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is affirmed. No costs.

28
G.R. No. L-1278  January 21, 1949 WHEREAS, the persons so accused should not be regarded as
criminals but rather as patriots and heroes who have rendered
invaluable service to the nation; and
LORETO BARRIOQUINTO and NORBERTO JIMENEZ,
petitioners,
vs. WHEREAS, it is desirable that without the least possible delay,
ENRIQUE A. FERNANDEZ, ANTONIO BELMONTE and these persons be freed form the indignity and the jeopardy to
FELICISIMO OCAMPO, as Commissioners of the Fourteenth which they are now being subjected;
Guerrilla Amnesty Commission, respondents.
NOW, THEREFORE, I Manuel Roxas, President of the Philippines in
FERIA, J.: accordance with the provisions of Article VII, section 10,
paragraph 6 of the Constitution, do hereby declare and proclaim
an amnesty inn favor of al persons who committed any act
This is a special action of mandamus instituted by the petitioners
penalized under the Revised Penal Code in furtherance of the
against the respondents who composed the 14th Guerrilla
resistance to the enemy or against persons aiding in the war
Amnesty Commission, to compel the latter to act and decide
effort of the enemy, and committed during the period from
whether or not the petitioners are entitled to the benefits of
December 8, 1941 to the date when each particular area of the
amnesty.
Philippines was actually liberated from the enemy control and
occupation. This amnesty shall not apply to crimes against
Petitioners Norberto Jimenez and Loreto Barrioquinto were chastity or to acts committed from purely personal motives.
charged with the crime of murder. As the latter had not yet been
arrested the case proceeded against the former, and after trial
It is further proclaimed and declared that in order to determine
Court of First Instance of Zamboanga sentenced Jimenez to life
who among those against whom charges have been filed before
imprisonment. Before the period for perfecting an appeal had
the courts of the Philippines or against whom charges may be
expired, the defendant Jimenez became aware of the
filed in the future, come within the terms of this amnesty,
Proclamation No. 8, dated September 7, 1946, which grants
Guerrilla Amnesty Commissions, simultaneously to be
amnesty in favor of all persons who may be charged with an act
established , shall examine the facts and circumstance
penalized under the Revised Penal Code in furtherance of the
surrounding each case and, if necessary, conduct summary
resistance to the enemy or against persons aiding in the war
hearings of witnesses both for the complainant and the accused.
efforts of the enemy, and committed during the period from
These Commissions shall decided each case and, upon finding
December 8, 1941, to the date when particular area of the
that it falls within the terms of this proclamation, the
Philippines where the offense was actually committed was
Commissions shall so declare and this amnesty shall immediately
liberated from enemy control and occupation, and said Jimenez
be effective as to the accused, who shall forthwith be released or
decided to submit his case to the Guerrilla Amnesty Commission
discharged.
presided by the respondents herein, and the other petitioner
Loreto Barrioquinto, who had then been already apprehended, did
the same. The theory of the respondents, supported by the dissenting
opinion, is predicated on a wrong conception of the nature or
character of an amnesty. Amnesty must be distinguished from
After a preliminary hearing had started, the Amnesty Commission,
pardon.
prescribed by the respondents, issued on January 9, 1947, an
order returning the cases of the petitioners to the Court of First
Instance of Zamboanga, without deciding whether or not they are Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a
entitled to the benefits of he said Amnesty Proclamation, on the private act which must be pleaded and proved by the person
ground that inasmuch as neither Barrioquinto nor Jimenez have pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof; while
admitted having committed the offense, because Barrioquinto amnesty by Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the
alleged that it was Hipolito Tolentino who shot and killed the concurrence of Congress, and it is a public act of which the courts
victim, they cannot invoke the benefits of amnesty. should take judicial notice. Pardon is granted to one after
conviction; while amnesty is granted to classes of persons or
communities who may be guilty of political offenses, generally
The Amnesty Proclamation of September 7, 1946, issued by the
before or after the institution of the criminal prosecution and
President with the concurrence of Congress of the Philippines,
sometimes after conviction. Pardon looks forward and relieves the
reads in part as follows:
offender from the consequences of an offense of which he has
been convicted, that is, it abolished or forgives the punishment,
WHEREAS, since the inception of the war until the liberation of the and for that reason it does ""nor work the restoration of the rights
different areas comprising the territory of the Philippines, to hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be
volunteer armed forces of Filipinos and for of other nationalities expressly restored by the terms of the pardon," and it "in no case
operated as guerrillas and other patriotic individuals and groups exempts the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity
pursued activities in opposition to the forces and agents of the imposed upon him by the sentence" article 36, Revised Penal
Japanese Empire in the invasion and occupation of the Code). while amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into
Philippines; oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the
offense with which he is charged that the person released by
amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had
WHEREAS, members of such forces, in their determined efforts to committed no offense. (section 10[6], Article VII, Philippine
resist the enemy, and to bring about his ultimate defeat, Constitution; State vs. Blalock, 62 N.C., 242, 247; In re Briggs,
committed acts penalized under the Revised Penal Code; 135 N.C., 118; 47 S.E. 402., 403; Ex parte Law, 35 GA., 285,
296; State ex rel Anheuser—Busch Brewing Ass'n. vs. Eby, 170
WHEREAS, charges have been presented in the courts against Mo., 497; 71 S.W 52, 61; Burdick vs United States, N.Y., 35 S.
many members of these resistance forces, for such acts; Ct., 267; 271; 236 U.S., 79; 59 Law. ed., 476.)

WHEREAS, the fact that such acts were committed in furtherance In view of the foregoing, we are of the opinion and so hold that,
of the resistance to the enemy is not a valid defense under the in order to entitle a person to the benefits of the Amnesty
laws of the Philippines; Proclamation of September 7, 1946, it is not necessary that he
should, as a condition precedent or sine qua non, admit having

29
committed the criminal act or offense with which he is charged There is no necessity for an accused to admit his responsibility for
and allege the amnesty as a defense; it is sufficient that the the commission of a criminal act before a court of Amnesty
evidence either of the complainant or the accused, shows that the Commission may investigate and extend or not to him the
offense committed comes within the terms of said Amnesty benefits of amnesty. The fact that he pleads not guilty or that he
Proclamation. Hence, it is not correct to say that "invocation of has not committed the act with which he is charged, does not
the benefits of amnesty is in the nature of a plea of confession necessarily prove that he is not guilty thereof. Notwithstanding
and avoidance." Although the accused does not confess the his denial, the evidence for the prosecution or complainant may
imputation against him, he may be declared by the courts or the show the contrary, as it is generally the case in criminal
Amnesty Commissions entitled to the benefits. For, whether or proceedings, and what should in such a case be determined is
not he admits or confesses having committed the offense with whether or not the offense committed is of political character. The
which he is charged, the Commissions should, if necessary or plea of not having committed the offense made by an accused
requested by the interested party, conduct summary hearing of simply means that he can not be convicted of the offense charged
the witnesses both for the complainants and the accused, on because he is not guilty thereof, and, even if the evidence would
whether he has committed the offense in furtherance of the show that he is, because he has committed it in furtherance of
resistance to the enemy, or against persons aiding in the war the resistance to the enemy or against persons a ding in the war
efforts of the enemy, and decide whether he is entitled to the efforts of the enemy, and not for purely political motives.
benefits of amnesty and to be "regarded as a patriot or hero who
have rendered invaluable services to the nation,," or not, in
According to Administrative Order No. 11 of October 2, 1946,
accordance with the terms of the Amnesty Proclamation. since the
creating the Amnesty Commissions, issued by the President of the
Amnesty Proclamation is a public act, the courts as well as the
Philippines, cases pending in the Courts of First Instance of the
Amnesty Commissions created thereby should take notice of the
province in which the accused claims the benefits of Amnesty
terms of said Proclamation and apply the benefits granted therein
Proclamation, and cases already decided by said courts but not
to cases coming within their province or jurisdiction, whether
yet elevated on appeal to the appellate courts, shall be passed
pleaded or claimed by the person charged with such offenses or
upon and decided by the respective Amnesty Commission, and
not, if the evidence presented show that the accused is entitled to
cases pending appeal shall be passed upon by the Seventh
said benefits.
Amnesty Commission. Under the theory of the respondents and
the writer oft he dissenting opinion, the Commissions should
The right to the benefits of amnesty, once established by the refuse to comply with the directive of said Administrative Order,
evidence presented either by the complainant or prosecution, or because is almost all cases pending in the Court of First Instance,
by the defense, can not be waived, because it is of public interest and all those pending appeal form the sentence of said courts, the
that a person who is regarded by the Amnesty Proclamation which defendants must not have pleaded guilty or admitted having
has the force of a law, not only as innocent, for he stands in the committed the offense charged for otherwise, they would not or
eyes of the law as if he had never committed any punishable could not have appealed from the judgment of the Courts of First
offense because of the amnesty, but as a patriot or hero, can not Instance. To hold that a Amnesty Commission should not proceed
be punishment as a criminal. Just as the courts of justice can not to the investigation and act and decide whether the offense with
convict a person who, according to the evidence, has committed which an accused was charged comes within the Amnesty
an act not punishable by law, although he confesses being guilty Proclamation if he does not admit or confess having committed it
thereof, so also and a fortiori they can not convict a person would be to defeat the purpose for which the Amnesty
considered by law not a criminal, but as a patriot and hero, for Proclamation was issued and the Amnesty Commission were
having rendered invaluable services to the nation inn committing established. If the courts have to proceed to the trail or hearing of
such an act. a case and decide whether the offense committed by the
defendant comes within the terms of the Amnesty Proclamation
although the defendant has plead not guilty, there is no reason
While it is true that the evidence must show that the offense
why the Amnesty Commissions can not do so. Where a defendant
charged was against chastity and was committed in furtherance of
to admit or confess having committed the offense or being
the resistance against the enemy, for otherwise, it is to be
responsible therefor before he can invoke the benefit of amnesty,
naturally presumed that is has been committed for purely
as there is no law which makes such admission or confession not
personal motive, it is nonetheless true that though the motive as
admissible as evidence against him in the courts of justices in
a mental impulse is state of mind or subjective, it need not be
case the Amnesty Commission finds that the offense does not
testified to be the defendant himself at his arraignment or hearing
come within the terms of the Amnesty Proclamation, nobody or
of the case. Generally the motive for the commission of an
few would take the risk of submitting their case to said
offense is established by the testimony of witnesses on the acts or
Commission.
statements of the accused before or immediately after the
commission of the offense, deeds or words hat may express it or
from which his motive or reason for committing it may be Besides, in the present case, the allegation of Loreto Barrioquinto
inferred. The statement of testimony of a defendant at the time of that the offended party or victim was shot and killed by Agapito
arraignment or the hearing of the case about said motive, can not Hipolito , does not necessarily bar the respondents from finding,
generally be considered and relied on, specially if there is after the summary hearing of the witnesses for the complaints
evidence to the contrary, as the true expression of the reason o and the accused, directed in the said Amnesty Proclamation and
motive he had at the time of committing the offense. Because Administrative Order No. 11, that the petitioners are responsible
such statements or testimony may be an afterthought or colored for the killing of the victim, either as principals by cooperation,
by the interest he may have to suit his defense or the purpose for inducement or conspiration, or as accessories before as well as
which he intends to achieve with such declaration. Hence it does after the fact, but that they are entitled to the benefits of
not stand to reason and logic to say, as the dissenting opinion amnesty, because they were members of the same group of
avers, that unless the defendant admits at the investigation or guerrilleros who killed the victim in furtherance of the resistance
hearing having committed the offense with which he is charged, to the enemy or against persons aiding in the war efforts of the
and states that he did it in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy.
enemy, and not for purely personal motive, it is impossible for the
court of Commission to verify the motive for the commission of
Wherefore, the respondents are hereby ordered to immediately
the offense, because only the accused could explain of the
proceed to hear and decide the application for amnesty of
offense, because only the accused could explain his belief and
petitioners Barrioquinto and Jimenez, unless amnesty of
intention or the motive of committing the offense.
petitioners Barrioquinto and Jimenez, unless the courts have in
the meantime already decided, expressly and finally, the question

30
whether or not they are entitled to the benefits of the Amnesty
Proclamation No. 8 of September 7, 1946. So ordered.

31
[G.R. No. 48100. June 20, 1941.] Without the necessity of inquiring into the historical background
of the benign prerogative of mercy, we adopt the broad view
FLORENCIO PELOBELLO, Petitioner-Appellant, v. expressed in Cristobal v. Labrador, G. R. No. 47941, promulgated
GREGORIO PALATINO, Respondent-Appellee. December 7, 1940, that subject to the limitations imposed by the
Constitution, the pardoning power cannot be restricted or
controlled by legislative action; that an absolute pardon not only
SYLLABUS blots out the crime committed but removes all disabilities
resulting from the conviction; and that when granted after the
1. PARDON; SCOPE AND EXTENT. — The pardoning power cannot term of imprisonment has expired, absolute pardon removes all
be restricted or controlled by legislative action; an absolute that is left of the consequences of conviction. While there may be
pardon not only blots out the crime committed but removes all force in the argument which finds support in well considered cases
disabilities resulting from the conviction; and that when granted that the effect of absolute pardon should not be extended to cases
after the term of imprisonment has expired, absolute pardon of this kind, we are of the opinion that the better view in the light
removes all that is left of the consequences of conviction. While of the constitutional grant in this jurisdiction is not to
there may be force in the argument which finds support in well unnecessarily restrict or impair the power of the Chief Executive
considered cases that the effect of absolute pardon should not be who, after inquiry into the environmental facts, should be at
extended to cases of this kind, we are of the opinion that the liberty to atone the rigidity of the law to the extent of relieving
better view in the light of the constitutional grant in this completely the party or parties concerned from the accessory and
jurisdiction is not to unnecessarily restrict or impair the power of resultant disabilities of criminal conviction. In the case at bar, it is
the Chief Executive who, after inquiry into the environmental admitted that the respondent mayor-elect committed the offense
facts, should be at liberty to atone the rigidity of the law to the more than 25 years ago; that he had already merited conditional
extent of relieving completely the party or parties concerned from pardon from the Governor-General in 1915; that thereafter he
the accessory and resultant disabilities of criminal conviction. had exercised the right of suffrage, was elected councilor of
Torrijos, Marinduque, for the period 1918 to 1921; was elected
2. ID.; ID.; EFFECT ON RIGHT OF SUFFRAGE. — In the case at municipal president of that municipality three times in succession
bar, it is admitted that the respondent mayor-elect committed the (1922-1931); and finally elected mayor of the municipality in the
offense more than twenty-five years ago; that he had already election for local officials in December, 1940. Under these
merited conditional pardon from the Governor-General in 1915; circumstances, it is evident that the purpose in granting him
that thereafter he had exercise the right of suffrage, was elected absolute pardon was to enable him to assume the position in
councilor of Torrijos, Marinduque, for the period 1918 to 1921; deference to the popular will; and the pardon was thus extended
was elected municipal president of that municipality three times in on the date mentioned hereinabove and before the date fixed in
succession (1922-1931); and finally elected mayor of the section 4 of the Election Code for assuming office. We see no
municipality in the election for local officials in December, 1940. reason for defeating this wholesome purpose by a restrictive
Under these circumstances, it is evident that the purpose in judicial interpretation of the constitutional grant to the Chief
granting him absolute pardon was to enable him to assume the Executive. We, therefore, give efficacy to executive action and
position in deference to the popular will; and the pardon was thus disregard what at bottom is a technical objection.
extended on the date mentioned hereinabove and before the date
fixed in section 4 of the Election Code for assuming office. We see The judgment of the lower court is affirmed, with costs against
no reason for defeating this wholesome purpose by a restrictive the petitioner-appellant. So ordered.
judicial interpretation of the constitutional grant to the Chief
Executive.

DECISION
LAUREL, J.:
The petitioner-appellant, Florencio Pelobello, instituted quo
warranto proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Tayabas
against the respondent-appellee, Gregorio Palatino, the mayor-
elect of the municipality of Torrijos, Province of Marinduque. The
proceedings were had pursuant to the provisions of section 167,
in relation with section 94 (a), of the Election Code
(Commonwealth Act No. 357). It was alleged that the respondent-
appellee, having been convicted by final judgment in 1912 of
atentado cointra la autoridad y sus agentes and sentenced to
imprisonment for two years, four months and one day of prision
correccional, was disqualified from voting and being voted upon
for the contested municipal office, such disqualification not having
been removed by plenary pardon.

The fact of conviction as above set forth is admitted; so is the

election and consequent proclamation of the respondent-appellee
for the office of municipal mayor. It is also admitted that the
respondent-appellee was granted by the Governor-General a
conditional pardon back in 1915; and it has been proven (Vide
Exhibit 1, admitted by the lower court, rec. of ap., p. 20) that on
December 25, 1940, His Excellency, the President of the
Philippines, granted the respondent- appellee absolute pardon and
restored him to the enjoyment of full civil and political rights.

The question presented is whether or not the absolute pardon had

the effect of removing the disqualification incident to criminal
conviction under paragraph (a) of section 94 of the Election Code,
the pardon having been granted after the election but before the
date fixed by law for assuming office (sec. 4, Election Code).
32
G.R. No. L-7234             May 21, 1955 Code of the Philippines). And in the case of Surbano vs. Gloria, 51
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, Phil., 415, where the question involved was whether an offense
vs. had prescribed, we held that from February 18 to March 15, 1927
PAZ M. DEL ROSARIO, defendant-appellee. only a period of 25 days elapsed, because we excluded the first
day (February 18) and included the last day (March 15). The
above method of computation was in force in this jurisdiction even
LABRADOR, J.:
before the advent of the American regime (Article 7, Spanish Civil
Code). It is logical to presume, therefore, that the Legislature in
On July 27, 1953, an information was filed in the Municipal Court enacting Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code meant or intended
of Pasay City charging Paz M. del Rosario with slight physical to mean that in the computation of the period provided for
injuries committed on the 28th day of May, 1953. The accused therein, the first day is to be excluded and the last one to be
thereupon presented a motion to quash the information on the included, in accord with existing laws.
ground that the offense charged had already prescribed in
accordance with the provisions of Articles 90 and 91 of the
We find much sense in the argument of the Solicitor General that
Revised Penal Code. The municipal court sustained this motion
if the Civil Code of the Philippines is to be resorted to in the
and dismissed the case. Against the order of dismissal appeal is
interpretation of the length of the month, so should it be resorted
made directly to this Court under the provisions of section 17,
to in the computation of the period of prescription. Besides,
sub-paragraph 6 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 as only questions of
Article 18 of the Civil Code (Article 16 of the old Civil Code)
law are involved in the appeal.
expressly directs that any deficiency in any special law (such as
the Revised Penal Code) must be supplied by its provisions. As
The pertinent provisions of Articles 90 and 91 of the Revised Penal the Revised Penal Code is deficient in that it does not explicitly
Code are as follows: define how the period is to be computed, resort must be had to its
Article 13, which contains in detail the manner of computing a
period. We find, therefore, that the trial court committed error in
ART. 90. Prescription of crimes.— . . . . not excluding the first day in the computation of the period of
prescription of the offense.
The offenses of oral defamation and slander by deed shall
prescribe in six months. The other question is whether a month mentioned in Article 90
should be considered as the calendar month and not the 30-day
Light offenses prescribe in two months. month. It is to be noted that no provision of the Revised Penal
Code defines the length of the month. Article 7 of the old Civil
Code provided that a month shall be understood as containing 30
ART. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses.— The period of days; but this concept was modified by section 13 of the Revised
prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the Administrative Code which provides that a month means the civil
crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities or their or calendar month and not the regular 30-day month (Gutierrez
agents, . . . .. vs. Carpio, 53 Phil., 334). With the approval of the Civil Code of
the Philippines (R.A. No. 386), however, we have reverted to the
The court a quo held that in accordance with Article 13 of the new provisions of the Spanish Civil Code in accordance with which a
Civil Code the "month" mentioned in Article 90 of the Revised month is to be considered as the regular 30-day month (Article
Penal Code should be one of 30 days, and since the period of 13). This provision of the new Civil Code has been intended for
prescription commences to run from the day "on which the crime general application in the interpretation of the laws. As the
is discovered by the offended party," i.e., in this case on May 28, offense charged in the information in the case at bar took place
1953 when it was committed, the two months period provided for on May 28, 1953, after the new Civil Code had come to effect,
the prescription of the offense already expired when the this new provision should apply, and in accordance therewith the
information was filed, because the filing was on the 61st day. The month in Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code should be
Solicitor General in this appeal argues that in the same manner understood to mean the regular 30 — day month.
that Article 13 of the new Civil Code is applied to determine the
length of the two months period required for the prescription of In our conclusion that the term "month" used in the Revised Penal
the offense, its provision (of the said Article 13) contained in Code should be interpreted in the sense that the new Civil Code
paragraph 3 which reads "In computing a period, the first day defines the said term, we find persuasive authority in a decision
shall be excluded, and the last day included" should also be of the Supreme Court of Spain. In a case decided by it in the year
applied, so that the information should be considered as filed on 1887 (S. de 30 de Marzo de 1887), prior to the approval of the
the 60th day and not on the 61st day after the offense has been Civil Code of Spain, it had declared that when the law spoke of
committed. The resolution of the appeal involves the months, it meant the natural month or the solar month, in the
determination of two legal issues, first, whether the prescriptive absence of express provisions to the contrary. But after the
period should commence from the very day on which the crime promulgation of the Civil Code of Spain, which provided in its
was committed, or from the day following that in which it was Article 7 a general rule for the interpretation of the laws, and with
committed, in accordance with the third paragraph of Article 13 of particular respect to months, that a month shall be understood as
the Civil Code of the Philippines, and second, whether the term a 30-day month, said court held that the two months period for
"month" in the Revised Penal Code should be understood to be a the prescription of a light offense should be understood to mean
month of 30 days, instead of the civil calendar or calendar month. 60 days, a month being a 30-day month. (S. de 6 de abril de
1895, 3 Viada, p. 45). Similarly, we hold that in view of the
As to the first question, we note that Article 91 of the Revised express provisions of Article 13 of the new Civil Code the term
Penal Code provides that the period shall commence to run from "month" used in Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code should be
the day on which the offense is committed or discovered. The title understood to mean the 30-day month and not the solar or civil
indicates that the provision merely purports to prescribe the month.
manner of computing the period of prescription. In the
computation of a period of time within which an act is to be done, We hold, therefore, that the offense charged in the information
the law in this jurisdiction has always directed the first day be prescribed in 60 days, said period to be counted by excluding May
excluded and the last included (See section 1, Rule 28 of the 28, the commission of the offense, and we find that when the
Rules of Court; section 13, Rev. Adm. Code and Art. 13, Civil

33
information was filed on July 27, 1953 the offense had not yet Commissioner may, even without a claim therefor, refund or
been prescribed because July 27 is the sixtieth day from May 29. credit any tax, where on the face of the return upon which
payment was made, such payment appears clearly to have been
erroneously paid. (emphasis supplied)
The order of dismissal appealed from is hereby reversed and the
case ordered reinstated. Without costs.
The CTA found that respondent filed its final adjusted return on
April 14, 1998. Thus, its right to claim a refund or credit
G.R. No. 162155               August 28, 2007
commenced on that date.13

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE and ARTURO V.

The tax court applied Article 13 of the Civil Code which states:
PARCERO in his official capacity as Revenue District Officer
of Revenue District No. 049 (Makati), Petitioners,
vs. Art. 13. When the law speaks of years, months, days or nights, it
PRIMETOWN PROPERTY GROUP, INC., Respondent. shall be understood that years are of three hundred sixty-five
days each; months, of thirty days; days, of twenty-four hours,
and nights from sunset to sunrise.
DECISION

If the months are designated by their name, they shall be

CORONA, J.:
computed by the number of days which they respectively have.

This petition for review on certiorari1 seeks to set aside the

In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the
August 1, 2003 decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
last included. (emphasis supplied)
SP No. 64782 and its February 9, 2004 resolution denying
reconsideration.3
Thus, according to the CTA, the two-year prescriptive period
under Section 229 of the NIRC for the filing of judicial claims was
On March 11, 1999, Gilbert Yap, vice chair of respondent
equivalent to 730 days. Because the year 2000 was a leap year,
Primetown Property Group, Inc., applied for the refund or credit of
respondent's petition, which was filed 731 days14 after respondent
income tax respondent paid in 1997. In Yap's letter to petitioner
filed its final adjusted return, was filed beyond the reglementary
revenue district officer Arturo V. Parcero of Revenue District No.
period.15
049 (Makati) of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR),4 he
explained that the increase in the cost of labor and materials and
difficulty in obtaining financing for projects and collecting Respondent moved for reconsideration but it was denied.16 Hence,
receivables caused the real estate industry to slowdown.5 As a it filed an appeal in the CA.17
consequence, while business was good during the first quarter of
1997, respondent suffered losses amounting to ₱71,879,228 that
On August 1, 2003, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of
year.6
the CTA.18 It ruled that Article 13 of the Civil Code did not
distinguish between a regular year and a leap year. According to
According to Yap, because respondent suffered losses, it was not the CA:
liable for income taxes.7 Nevertheless, respondent paid its
quarterly corporate income tax and remitted creditable
The rule that a year has 365 days applies, notwithstanding the
withholding tax from real estate sales to the BIR in the total
fact that a particular year is a leap year.19
amount of ₱26,318,398.32.8 Therefore, respondent was entitled
to tax refund or tax credit.9
In other words, even if the year 2000 was a leap year, the periods
covered by April 15, 1998 to April 14, 1999 and April 15, 1999 to
On May 13, 1999, revenue officer Elizabeth Y. Santos required
April 14, 2000 should still be counted as 365 days each or a total
respondent to submit additional documents to support its claim.10
of 730 days. A statute which is clear and explicit shall be neither
Respondent complied but its claim was not acted upon. Thus, on
interpreted nor construed.20
April 14, 2000, it filed a petition for review 11 in the Court of Tax
Appeals (CTA).
Petitioners moved for reconsideration but it was denied. 21 Thus,
this appeal.
On December 15, 2000, the CTA dismissed the petition as it was
filed beyond the two-year prescriptive period for filing a judicial
claim for tax refund or tax credit. 12 It invoked Section 229 of the Petitioners contend that tax refunds, being in the nature of an
National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC): exemption, should be strictly construed against claimants.22
Section 229 of the NIRC should be strictly applied against
respondent inasmuch as it has been consistently held that the
Sec. 229. Recovery of Taxes Erroneously or Illegally Collected. --
prescriptive period (for the filing of tax refunds and tax credits)
No suit or proceeding shall be maintained in any court for the
begins to run on the day claimants file their final adjusted
recovery of any national internal revenue tax hereafter alleged to
returns.23 Hence, the claim should have been filed on or before
have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, or of any
April 13, 2000 or within 730 days, reckoned from the time
penalty claimed to have been collected without authority, or of
respondent filed its final adjusted return.
any sum alleged to have been excessively or in any manner
wrongfully collected, until a claim for refund or credit has been
duly filed with the Commissioner; but such suit or proceeding may The conclusion of the CA that respondent filed its petition for
be maintained, whether or not such tax, penalty, or sum has been review in the CTA within the two-year prescriptive period provided
paid under protest or duress. in Section 229 of the NIRC is correct. Its basis, however, is not.

In any case, no such suit or proceeding shall be filed after The rule is that the two-year prescriptive period is reckoned from
the expiration of two (2) years from the date of payment of the filing of the final adjusted return. 24 But how should the two-
the tax or penalty regardless of any supervening cause that year prescriptive period be computed?
may arise after payment: Provided, however, That the
34
As already quoted, Article 13 of the Civil Code provides that when Year 1st calendar April 15, to May 14,
the law speaks of a year, it is understood to be equivalent to 365 1 month 1998 1998
days. In National Marketing Corporation v. Tecson, 25 we ruled that
a year is equivalent to 365 days regardless of whether it is a 2nd calendar May 15, to June 14,
regular year or a leap year.26 month 1998 1998

3rd calendar June 15, to July 14,

However, in 1987, EO27 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987
month 1998 1998
was enacted. Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I thereof provides:
4th calendar July 15, to August 14,
Sec. 31. Legal Periods. — "Year" shall be understood to be month 1998 1998
twelve calendar months; "month" of thirty days, unless it
refers to a specific calendar month in which case it shall be 5th calendar August 15, to September
computed according to the number of days the specific month month 1998 14, 1998
contains; "day", to a day of twenty-four hours and; "night" from
6th calendar September to October 14,
sunrise to sunset. (emphasis supplied)
month 15, 1998 1998

A calendar month is "a month designated in the calendar without 7th calendar October 15, to November
regard to the number of days it may contain." 28 It is the "period of month 1998 14, 1998
time running from the beginning of a certain numbered day up to,
8th calendar November to December
but not including, the corresponding numbered day of the next
month 15, 1998 14, 1998
month, and if there is not a sufficient number of days in the next
month, then up to and including the last day of that month." 29 To 9th calendar December to January 14,
illustrate, one calendar month from December 31, 2007 will be month 15, 1998 1999
from January 1, 2008 to January 31, 2008; one calendar month
from January 31, 2008 will be from February 1, 2008 until 10th calendar January 15, to February 14,
February 29, 2008.30 month 1999 1999

11th calendar February 15, to March 14,

A law may be repealed expressly (by a categorical declaration
month 1999 1999
that the law is revoked and abrogated by another) or impliedly
(when the provisions of a more recent law cannot be reasonably 12th calendar March 15, to April 14,
reconciled with the previous one).31 Section 27, Book VII (Final month 1999 1999
Provisions) of the Administrative Code of 1987 states:
Year 13th calendar April 15, to May 14,
Sec. 27. Repealing clause. — All laws, decrees, orders, rules and 2 month 1999 1999
regulation, or portions thereof, inconsistent with this Code are
14th calendar May 15, to June 14,
hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
month 1999 1999

A repealing clause like Sec. 27 above is not an express repealing 15th calendar June 15, to July 14,
clause because it fails to identify or designate the laws to be month 1999 1999
abolished.32 Thus, the provision above only impliedly repealed all
16th calendar July 15, to August 14,
laws inconsistent with the Administrative Code of 1987.1avvphi1
month 1999 1999

Implied repeals, however, are not favored. An implied repeal must 17th calendar August 15, to September
have been clearly and unmistakably intended by the legislature. month 1999 14, 1999
The test is whether the subsequent law encompasses entirely the
subject matter of the former law and they cannot be logically or 18th calendar September to October 14,
reasonably reconciled.33 month 15, 1999 1999

19th calendar October 15, to November

Both Article 13 of the Civil Code and Section 31, Chapter VIII, month 1999 14, 1999
Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987 deal with the same
subject matter — the computation of legal periods. Under the Civil 20th calendar November to December
Code, a year is equivalent to 365 days whether it be a regular month 15, 1999 14, 1999
year or a leap year. Under the Administrative Code of 1987,
21st calendar December to January 14,
however, a year is composed of 12 calendar months. Needless to
month 15, 1999 2000
state, under the Administrative Code of 1987, the number of days
is irrelevant. 22nd calendar January 15, to February 14,
month 2000 2000
There obviously exists a manifest incompatibility in the manner of
computing legal periods under the Civil Code and the 23rd calendar February 15, to March 14,
Administrative Code of 1987. For this reason, we hold that month 2000 2000
Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of
24th calendar March 15, to April 14,
1987, being the more recent law, governs the computation of
month 2000 2000
legal periods. Lex posteriori derogat priori.

Applying Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative We therefore hold that respondent's petition (filed on April 14,
Code of 1987 to this case, the two-year prescriptive period 2000) was filed on the last day of the 24th calendar month from
(reckoned from the time respondent filed its final adjusted the day respondent filed its final adjusted return. Hence, it was
return34 on April 14, 1998) consisted of 24 calendar months, filed within the reglementary period.
computed as follows:

35
Accordingly, the petition is hereby DENIED. The case is
REMANDED to the Court of Tax Appeals which is ordered to
expeditiously proceed to hear C.T.A. Case No. 6113 entitled
Primetown Property Group, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue and Arturo V. Parcero. No costs.SO ORDERED.

36
G.R. No. 185843               March 3, 2010 Article 344 of this Code.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, Article 344 of the same Code also provides –
vs.
RONIE DE GUZMAN, Appellant.
ART. 344. Prosecution of the crimes of adultery, concubinage,
seduction, abduction, rape, and acts of lasciviousness. – x x x.
RESOLUTION
In cases of seduction, abduction, acts of lasciviousness, and rape,
NACHURA, J.: the marriage of the offender with the offended party shall
extinguish the criminal action or remit the penalty already
imposed upon him. x x x.
This resolves the motion for extinguishment of the criminal action
and reconsideration of our Resolution dated July 20, 2009 filed by
appellant Ronie de Guzman. On several occasions, we applied these provisions to marriages
contracted between the offender and the offended party in the
crime of rape,5 as well as in the crime of abuse of chastity, 6 to
Appellant was indicted before the Regional Trial Court, Branch
totally extinguish the criminal liability of and the corresponding
163, Pasig City, for two counts of rape. He pled "not guilty" when
penalty that may have been imposed upon those found guilty of
arraigned. After pretrial and trial, the trial court found him guilty
the felony. Parenthetically, we would like to mention here that
as charged and imposed on him the penalty of reclusion perpetua
prior to the case at bar, the last case bearing similar
for each count. The trial court further ordered him to indemnify
circumstances was decided by this Court in 1974, or around 36
the victim ₱50,000.00 in each case or a total amount of
years ago.1avvphi1
₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity.

Based on the documents, including copies of pictures7 taken after

On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed, in its Decision
the ceremony and attached to the motion, we find the marriage
dated March 27, 2008, appellant’s conviction, but modified it with
between appellant and private complainant to have been
an additional award of ₱50,000.00 for each case, or an aggregate
contracted validly, legally, and in good faith, as an expression of
amount of ₱100,000.00, as moral damages.
their mutual love for each other and their desire to establish a
family of their own. Given public policy considerations of respect
Appellant elevated the case to this Court on appeal. for the sanctity of marriage and the highest regard for the
solidarity of the family, we must accord appellant the full benefits
of Article 89, in relation to Article 344 and Article 266-C of the
In a Resolution dated July 20, 2009, we dismissed the appeal for RPC.
failure of appellant to sufficiently show reversible error in the
challenged decision as would warrant the exercise of the Court’s
appellate jurisdiction. Accordingly, the March 27, 2008 Decision of WHEREFORE, the motion is GRANTED. Appellant Ronie de
the CA was affirmed in toto. Guzman is ABSOLVED of the two (2) counts of rape against
private complainant Juvilyn Velasco, on account of their
subsequent marriage, and is ordered RELEASED from
In the instant motion, appellant alleges that he and private imprisonment.
complainant contracted marriage on August 19, 2009, solemnized
by Reverend Lucas R. Dangatan of Jeruel Christ-Centered
Ministries, Inc. at the Amazing Grace Christian Ministries, Inc., Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Bureau of
Bldg. XI-A, Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City. Attached to Corrections for appropriate action. No costs.
the motion is the pertinent Certificate of Marriage 1 and a joint
sworn statement ("Magkasamang Sinumpaang Salaysay") 2
SO ORDERED.
executed by appellant and private complainant, attesting to the
existence of a valid and legal marriage between them. Appellant,
thus, prays that he be absolved of his conviction for the two
counts of rape and be released from imprisonment, pursuant to
Article 266-C3 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).

In its Comment/Manifestation,4 appellee, through the Office of the

Solicitor General, interposed no objection to the motion, finding
the marriage to have been contracted in good faith, and the
motion to be legally in order.

The motion should be granted.

In relation to Article 266-C of the RPC, Article 89 of the same

Code reads –

ART. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. – Criminal

liability is totally extinguished:

xxxx

7. By the marriage of the offended woman, as provided in

37
[G.R. Nos. 136899-904. October 9, 2002.] her mother was out, appellant called Irene in the room and
stripped her naked. Appellant ordered Irene to lie down and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. mounted on top of her. Appellant inserted his penis into her
ERNESTO DELA CERNA, Accused-Appellant. vagina and performed the push and pull movement. Irene tried to
shake appellant off but he was too heavy for her. Irene did not
DECISION shout for help because of fear that appellant might harm her and
her siblings. Irene had witnessed appellant punched her mother
on the stomach during a quarrel (pp. 12-13, id.). After the rape,
CORONA, J.:
appellant warned her not to tell anybody of what transpired
between them (p. 13, id.).
Irene dela Cerna did not experience and enjoy the natural love
and affection of a father. Instead, at fifteen, she went through an On August 25, 1996, when Irene was fourteen (14) years old,
ordeal, characterized by suffering and torment perpetrated by the appellant called her from the room. Irene was already reluctant to
very person who was supposed to protect and shield her from go alone near appellant as she knew what appellant would do to
harm — her own father. her. Irene was constrained to go to appellant when her other
sister told her to go to him as beckoned. Inside the room,
Six separate complaints were filed on May 16, 1997 against appellant undressed her (p. 7, id.). Irene did not utter a word
accused-appellant charging him with rape committed on January while she was being undressed because she was afraid that
15, 1989, December 26, 1993, March 3, 1996, August 25, 1996, appellant might get angry and she and her siblings will again be
February 10, 1997 and March 5, 1997. The first complaint subjected to physical abuse as they used to be (p. 8, id.). Irene
alleged:chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary tried to resist appellant but he was too strong for her (p. 7, id.).
Appellant mounted on top of Irene, inserted his penis into her
That on or about the 5th day of March, 1997, in the City of Cebu, vagina, and performed the sexual act of push and pull. After the
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the sexual act, Irene was ordered to leave the room. On the same
said accused, who is her father, by means of force and day, her mother delivered the dresses she had sewn to her
intimidation upon undersigned complainant, then only fifteen (15) customers. Irene did not report the sexual abuse to the police
years old to wit: by carrying her to a room and forcibly lie down authorities because she was afraid of appellant and she pitied her
on bed and removed her panty and short, placed himself on top of mother who was suffering from tension (p. 9, id.).
her, did then and there have carnal knowledge with the
undersigned against her will. On February 10, 1997 while her mother was out, appellant
dragged Irene up the stairs of their new house towards the room.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 1 Appellant pushed her on the bed, inserted his penis into her
vagina and performed the push and pull movement. The sexual
The five other complaints were identically worded except for the act lasted for just a short time as her mother was expected to
dates of the commission of the crime and the age of private arrive any time. Irene hated appellant for raping her. After the
complainant. rape, appellant warned her not to tell anybody what happened
(pp. 18-19, id.).
Upon arraignment, Accused-appellant pleaded not guilty.
Thereafter, the cases were jointly tried. On March 5, 1997, appellant forced Irene inside the room and
stripped her naked. Appellant made her lie down on the bed,
As principal witness for the prosecution, Irene recounted her inserted his penis into her vagina and performed the push and
harrowing experience at the hands of her father, which began pull movement for about ten (10) minutes. Irene initially resisted
when she was only seven years old. Her testimony was faithfully appellant but she was no match for him. After the rape, appellant
summarized by the Solicitor General as follows:chanrob1es virtual warned her not to tell anybody what happened. Irene cried
1aw library thereafter (pp. 20-22, id.).

Irene dela Cerna was born on August 26, 1982 at Negros Irene described appellant as a mean person. She was afraid to tell
Occidental, San Carlos City (p. 2, TSN, March 25, 1998). She anyone about the rape as she believed appellant is capable of
recalled that one afternoon when she was only seven (7) years killing her and her siblings (p. 24, id.).
old, her father, appellant herein, beckoned her to come inside the
room. At the time, her mother was not at home. When she went Irene eventually revealed the rapes to her two (2) best friends in
inside the room, appellant undressed her and made her lie down. school, namely, Cheryl Quano and Bernadette Comita.
Appellant then played with her private parts and touched her Bernadette, in turn, told her own mother what Irene divulged (p.
vagina with his penis which lasted for about fourteen (14) 27, id.). Bernadette’s mother talked with Irene regarding the rape
minutes (p. 4, TSN, ibid.). Thereafter, appellant instructed her to incidents after which the former brought her to the office of the
put on her clothes as her mother was due to arrive any time. Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) at the
Appellant did the same act to Irene many times (p. 5, id.) City Hall where she was interviewed by a social worker (pp. 28-
28, id.). 2
On January 15, 1989 at about 5:00 o’clock in the afternoon,
appellant called Irene from inside the room. Once Irene was Emma Patalinghug, a social worker at the Department of Social
inside the room, appellant undressed her and made her lie down. Welfare and Development (DSWD) Center for Women and
Appellant played with her vagina for about ten (10) minutes (p. 5, Children, declared that private complainant, accompanied by her
id.) and "pushed" his penis into the lips of her vagina (p. 16, id.). mother, was referred to her office on March 21, 1997. She
testified that the victim told her that she had been sexually
On December 26, 1993 at about 5:00 o’clock in the afternoon abused by her father since she was seven years old. 3
while her mother was out taking up dressmaking, appellant forced
Irene to enter the room. Appellant stripped her naked, forced his Dra. Aster Khusravibabadi of the Cebu City Medical Center
penis into her vagina (pp. 14-15, id.) and performed the push and examined the victim on March 21, 1997 and found "old healed
pull movement for about ten (10) minutes. Irene did not shout for hymenal lacerations at 5:00 and 6:00 o’clock positions, and the
help because of fear. In one occasion, Irene saw appellant with a introitus admits two fingers with ease." 4
gun. After the rape, appellant cautioned Irene not to report to
anybody what happened (p. 16, id.). Accused-appellant opted not to testify invoking his constitutional
right to remain silent.
On March 3, 1996, at about 5:00 o’clock in the afternoon while

38
On September 15, 1998, the defense presented private as she had already forgiven her father and she wanted peace and
complainant to prove that she voluntarily executed an affidavit of happiness for her family. Rather than contradict, this affidavit
desistance. Private complainant explained that she decided to reinforces complainant’s testimony that accused-appellant raped
forgive her father for the sake of her mother and her younger her on several occasions.
siblings who experienced pain and difficulty in sustaining their
daily needs as their whole family was dependent upon their father Likewise, when asked on the witness stand what prompted her to
for support. 5 sign the affidavit, Irene answered:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

The affidavit of desistance, dated July 3, 1998, was made in the Q: What prompted you to write that letter?
vernacular and was offered in evidence for the defense. Pertinent
portions thereof stated that "complainant was no longer A: I was already staying with the DSWD and my condition there
interested in pursuing the cases against her father; the was all right but the problem was my mother, whenever she
complaints filed with the Prosecutor’s Office and in Court were not visited me, she told me that they were really hard in their daily
her voluntary acts as she was only influenced and forced by the existence. They were just staying in the house of a friend and
people who came to support and intercede in her action; the they have no means to support themselves. My brothers and
testimony she made in court on March 25, 1998 was not of her sister at times cannot even go to school because of lack of money
own free will as she was only forced to do so; there were false and they cannot eat properly. 9
statements she made during the hearing of the case; she had
truly forgiven her father; she wanted harmony and happiness; But, in her earlier testimony for the prosecution, Irene
nobody influenced her to execute the said affidavit of desistance demonstrated a firm resolve to have accused-appellant punished
to end the cases she filed against her father . . ." 6 for his crime, as can be gleaned from the following:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
On November 29, 1998, the trial court rendered judgment finding
accused-appellant Ernesto dela Cerna guilty of six counts of rape, Prosecutor Solima
as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Q: Are you aware that your father would be penalized the
WHEREFORE, premises all considered, judgment is hereby moment he would be convicted for the crime of rape?
rendered finding the accused, ERNESTO DELA CERNA, GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE committed against A: Yes, sir.
complainant, IRENE DELA CERNA, his minor daughter, in the
aforequoted six (6) charges and consequently, he is hereby Court
imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua in the aforesaid Third
and Sixth Complaints in accordance with the Revised Penal Code Q: And you would want him to die?
and the supreme penalty of DEATH in the First, Second, Fourth,
and Fifth Complaints, conformably with the provisions of the A: Although I have forgiven him for what he did to me considering
Death Penalty Law (R.A. No. 7659) and ordered to pay the that he is my father, but I will not also agree that he will not be
complainant Irene dela Cerna, the sums of FIFTY THOUSAND penalized of imprisonment for what he did to me. 10
(P50,000.00) PESOS in each of the six (6) cases as damages,
with all the accessory penalties provided for by law and to pay the Also, during cross-examination, Irene testified:chanrob1es virtual
costs. 1aw library

The entire records of these cases must be forwarded to the Atty. Porio
Honorable Supreme Court for automatic review.
Q: And you earlier testified that you pity your mother and that
SO ORDERED. 7 you have forgiven your father for what he had done to you, do
you know that if it is proven that your father is guilty he would be
Accused-appellant assails said decision and contends that the trial sentenced to a death penalty?
court erred in convicting him despite the insufficiency of evidence
to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. A: Yes, sir.

Accused-appellant mainly relies on the affidavit of desistance Q: Are you not bothered by your conscience if your father would
executed by private complainant, claiming that said affidavit be sentenced to death?
created a reasonable doubt as to his guilt.
A: Yes I would surely be bothered but that is his fault. 11
An affidavit of desistance is a sworn statement, executed by a
complainant in a criminal or administrative case, that he or she is A comparison of Irene’s previous and subsequent testimonies
discontinuing or disavowing the action filed upon his or her leads to the inference that the affidavit of desistance was
complaint for whatever reason he or she may cite. A survey of our executed merely as an afterthought. As such, it has no persuasive
jurisprudence reveals that the court attaches no persuasive value effect.
to a desistance, especially when executed as an afterthought. The
unreliable character of this document is shown by the fact that it Accused-appellant cannot capitalize on Irene’s affidavit of
is quite incredible that a victim, after going through the trouble of desistance. Such an affidavit, by and of itself, does not mean that
having the accused-appellant arrested by the police, positively what she previously said was false or the recitals of the affidavit
identifying him as the person who raped her, enduring the itself are true. On the contrary, the Court has invariably regarded
humiliation of a physical examination of her private parts, such affidavits as exceedingly unreliable. The reason is because
repeating her accusations in open court and recounting her affidavits of retraction can all too easily be secured from poor and
anguish in detail, will suddenly turn around and declare that she ignorant witnesses, usually through intimidation or monetary
is no longer interested in pursuing the case. 8 consideration. Thus, there is always the probability that they will
later be repudiated and there will never be an end to criminal
A careful scrutiny of the affidavit of desistance in this case reveals litigation. 12 It is also a dangerous rule for courts to reject
that private complainant never retracted her allegation that she testimony solemnly taken before courts of justice simply because
was raped by her father. Neither did she give any exculpatory fact the witness who gave it later changed his or her mind for one
that would raise doubts about her rape. Plainly, all the affidavit reason or another. This will make a mockery of solemn trials and
really stated was that she had decided to withdraw the complaints put the investigation of crimes at the mercy of unscrupulous

39
witnesses. 13 even recognized by law. 17

It is worthy to note that the rape incidents in this case occurred Considering all these premises, we are impelled to affirm the trial
prior to the effectivity of RA 8353, "The Anti-Rape Law of 1997" court’s conviction of accused-appellant for the six counts of rape
which took effect on October 22, 1997 and classified the crime of committed upon Irene dela Cerna.
rape as a crime against persons. Such being the case, we shall
apply the old law and treat the acts of rape herein committed as Certain facets of this case, however, need to be carefully threshed
private crimes. Thus, their institution, prosecution and extinction out in order to fully administer justice to all parties concerned.
should still be governed by Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code Conformably, it is a well-established procedure that an appeal in a
(RPC):jgc:chanrobles.com.ph criminal proceeding throws the whole case open for review and it
becomes the duty of the appellate court to correct an error in the
"Art. 344. Prosecution of the crimes of adultery, concubinage, appealed judgment, whether this is assigned as an error or not.
seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness. — The 18 In the case at bar, two of the six instances of rape — on
crimes of adultery and concubinage shall not be prosecuted January 15, 1989 and December 26, 1993 — occurred before the
except upon a complaint filed by the offended spouse. effectivity of RA 7659 (Death Penalty Law) which took effect only
on December 31, 1993. As correctly held by the trial court, the
The offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution without imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua for each of these two
including both the guilty parties, if they are both alive, nor in any crimes of rape.
case, if he shall have consented or pardoned the offenders.
However, with respect to the four other incidents of rape which
The offenses of seduction, abduction, rape, or acts of were committed after the effectivity of RA 7659 and in each of
lasciviousness, shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint which the trial court imposed the extreme penalty of death, an
filed by the offended party or her parents, grandparents, or exhaustive discussion is called for.
guardian, nor in any case, the offender has been expressly
pardoned by the above-named persons, as the case may be. Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11
of RA 7659, was already the pertinent statutory provision
In cases of seduction, abduction, acts of lasciviousness and rape, prevailing at the time of the latter four rape incidents. It
the marriage of the offender with the offended party shall categorized as a "heinous" offense punishable by death the rape
extinguish the criminal action or remit the penalty already of a minor by her own father. Said provision
imposed upon him. The provisions of this paragraph shall also be reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
applicable to the co-principals, accomplices and accessories after
the fact of the above-mentioned crimes."cralaw virtua1aw library "Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. —

The aforequoted article provides for the extinction of criminal x       x       x

liability in private crimes. For the crimes of adultery and
concubinage, the pardon extended by the offended spouse results The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is
in the extinction of the liability of the offender. On the other hand, committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
in seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, two 1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the
modes are recognized for extinguishing criminal liability — pardon offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
and marriage. In all cases, however, the pardon must come prior consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the
to the institution of the criminal action. After the case has been common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.
filed in court, any pardon made by the private complainant,
whether by sworn statement or on the witness stand, cannot
extinguish criminal liability. 14 x       x       x

It must be stressed that private complainant in this case filed her In a number of cases, this Court ruled that both the age of the
complaint on May 16, 1997 and even testified against accused- offended party and her relationship with the accused must be
appellant on March 25, 1998. On the other hand, she executed alleged in the information as part of the constitutional right of the
her affidavit of desistance only on July 3, 1998. Clearly, the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
pardon extended by the victim to her father was made after the against him. Failure to specifically state these attendant
institution of the criminal action. Consequently, it cannot be a circumstances of minority and relationship in the information will
ground to dismiss the action in these cases. The reason for this bar the imposition of the death penalty. 19
rule is that the true aggrieved party in a criminal prosecution is
the People of the Philippines whose collective sense of morality, In the instant case, the trial court, pursuant to Section 11 of RA
decency and justice has been outraged. In such a case, the 7659, imposed the penalty of death on accused-appellant Ernesto
offended party becomes merely a complaining witness. The dela Cerna after taking into account the minority of Irene as well
complaint required by Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code is but as the relationship of father and daughter between them. Both
a condition precedent to the exercise by the proper authorities of circumstances of minority and relationship were alleged in the
the power to prosecute the guilty parties in the name of the informations. However, jurisprudence requires that the victim’s
People of the Philippines. Such condition is imposed out of minority must not only be specifically alleged in the information
consideration for the offended woman and her family who might but must likewise be established beyond reasonable doubt during
prefer to suffer the outrage in silence rather than go through with trial. The leading case on this point is People v. Javier, 20 where
the scandal of a public trial. Hence, once filed, control of the this Court unanimously held:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
prosecution is removed from the offended party’s hands 15 and
any change of heart by the victim will not affect the state’s right However, it is significant to note that the prosecution failed to
to vindicate the atrocity committed against itself. present the birth certificate of the complainant. Although the
victim’s age was not contested by the defense, proof of age of the
At any rate, there is hardly any doubt about the truthfulness and victim is particularly necessary in this case considering that the
reliability of Irene’s initial testimony in the trial court which we victim’s age which was then 16 years old is just two years less
find to be positive, credible and convincing. To be sure, she would than the majority age of 18. . . . In a criminal prosecution
not have accused her own father of a serious offense like rape especially of cases involving the extreme penalty of death,
had she really not been aggrieved. 16 Likewise, a rape victim’s nothing but proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact
testimony against her father is entitled to much credibility since necessary to constitute the crime with which an accused is
respect for elders is deeply ingrained in Filipino children and is charged must be established by the prosecution in order for said
penalty to be upheld . . . Verily, the minority of the victim must
40
be proved with equal certainty and clearness as the crime itself. following: (1) P50,000 as civil indemnity; (2) P50,000 as moral
Otherwise, failure to sufficiently establish the victim’s age is fatal damages and (3) P25,000 as exemplary damages. Costs de
and consequently bars conviction for rape in its qualified form. officio.

This doctrine has since been reiterated in a plethora of cases with

the Court consistently holding that proof of the victim’s age must
be indubitable in order to justify the imposition of the death
penalty.

In People v. Cula, 21 this Court lowered the penalty from death to

reclusion perpetua in a case of rape committed on a 16-year-old
victim by her father on the ground that the prosecution did not
present any independent proof of age, such as a birth certificate,
and the trial court failed to render a categorical finding on the
matter.

In People v. Liban, 22 we held that the birth certificate of the

victim, or in lieu thereof, any other documentary evidence, like a
baptismal certificate or school record, that can help establish the
age of the victim beyond reasonable doubt should be presented.
While the declaration of a victim as to her age, being an exception
to the hearsay proscription, would be admissible under the rule on
pedigree, the question of the relative weight that may tie
accorded to it is an entirely different matter. Corroborative
evidence would be most desirable or even essential when
circumstances call for it.

The case of People v. Pecayo, Sr. 23 reiterated the

pronouncement in Liban that a duly certified certificate of live
birth accurately showing the complainant’s age, or some other
authentic document such as a baptismal certificate or school
record, is competent evidence. Even the lack of objection on the
part of appellant does not excuse the prosecution from proving
such fact beyond reasonable doubt.

In this case, the prosecution utterly failed to discharge its burden

of proving the minority of the victim beyond reasonable doubt. No
single independent proof was offered in court to establish the fact
that complainant was below 18 years old at the time of the
incidents. Irene merely stated during her direct examination that
she was born on August 26, 1982. We find Irene’s casual
testimony as to her age insufficient.

Once again, we need to emphasize that the penalty of death is an

extreme sanction as it carries with it the forfeiture of life. Which
makes it imperative for this Court to carefully weigh every piece
of evidence presented by all parties. We cannot presume that the
victim is a minor simply because she claims to be one.

In sum, the Court upholds the decision of the trial court convicting
accused-appellant of the crime of rape in the latter four instances
but must reduce the penalty of death to reclusion perpetua on
account of the prosecution’s failure to satisfactorily prove the
qualifying circumstance of minority of the victim.

Finally, the award of damages made by the trial court should

likewise be modified. In accordance with current case
law, Accused-appellant should be ordered to pay complainant the
amount of P50,000 as civil indemnity for each of the six counts of
rape. 24 In addition, the victim should be awarded moral
damages in the amount of P50,000 for each of the six counts of
rape without need of pleading or proof. This Court has held many
times that a rape victim’s injury is inherently concomitant to and
results from the odiousness of the crime. 25 Lastly, Accused-
appellant is also liable to pay the sum of P25,000 as exemplary
damages to deter other fathers with perverse tendencies or
aberrant sexual behavior from sexually abusing their own
daughters. 26

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed is hereby AFFIRMED with

the MODIFICATION that accused-appellant Ernesto dela Cerna is
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of six counts of simple rape
and is sentenced in each count to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to indemnify the victim Irene dela Cerna the

41
G.R. No. 76872               July 23, 1987 5. On 8 September 1986, the President cancelled the conditional
WILFREDO TORRES Y SUMULONG, petitioner, pardon of the petitioner.
vs.
HON. NEPTALI A. GONZALES, THE CHAIRMAN, BOARD OF
6. On 10 October 1986, the respondent Minister of Justice issued
PARDONS AND PAROLE, and THE DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF
"by authority of the President" an Order of Arrest and
PRISONS, respondents.
Recommitment against petitioner. The petitioner was accordingly
arrested and confined in Muntinlupa to serve the unexpired
FELICIANO, J.: portion of his sentence.

This is an original petition for habeas corpus filed on behalf of Petitioner now impugns the validity of the Order of Arrest and
petitioner Wilfredo S. Torres, presently confined at the National Recommitment. He claims that he did not violate his conditional
Penitentiary in Muntinlupa. We issued the writ and during the pardon since he has not been convicted by final judgment of the
hearing and from the return filed by the respondents through the twenty (20) counts of estafa charged in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-
Solicitor General, and other pleadings in this case, the following 19672 and Q-20756 nor of the crime of sedition in Criminal Case
facts emerged: No. Q-22926.3 Petitioner also contends that he was not given an
opportunity to be heard before he was arrested and recommitted
to prison, and accordingly claims he has been deprived of his
1. Sometime before 1979 (no more specific date appears in the
rights under the due process clause of the Constitution.
records before this Court), petitioner was convicted by the Court
of First Instance of Manila of the crime of estafa (two counts) and
was sentenced to an aggregate prison term of from eleven (11) The issue that confronts us therefore is whether or not conviction
years, ten (10) months and twenty-two (22) days to thirty-eight of a crime by final judgment of a court is necessary before the
(38) years, nine (9) months and one (1) day, and to pay an petitioner can be validly rearrested and recommitted for violation
indemnity of P127,728.75 (Criminal Cases Nos. 68810, 91041 and of the terms of his conditional pardon and accordingly to serve
F-138107). These convictions were affirmed by the Court of the balance of his original sentence.
Appeals (CA-G.R. Nos. 14773-CR and 17694-CR). The maximum
sentence would expire on 2 November 2000.1
This issue is not novel. It has been raised before this Court three
times in the past. This Court was first faced with this issue in
2. On 18 April 1979, a conditional pardon was granted to the Tesoro Director of Prison.4 Tesoro, who had been convicted of the
petitioner by the President of the Philippines on condition that crime of falsification of public documents, was granted a parole by
petitioner would "not again violate any of the penal laws of the the then Governor-General. One of the conditions of the parole
Philippines. Should this condition be violated, he will be proceeded required the parolee "not [to] commit any other crime and [to]
against in the manner prescribed by law."2 Petitioner accepted conduct himself in an orderly manner."5 Two years after the grant
the conditional pardon and was consequently released from of parole, Tesoro was charged before the Justice of the Peace
confinement. Court of San Juan, Rizal, with the crime of adultery said to have
been committed with the wife of Tesoro's brother-in-law. The
fiscal filed with the Court of First Instance the corresponding
3. On 21 May 1986, the Board of Pardons and Parole (the
information which, however, was dismissed for non-appearance of
"Board") resolved to recommend to the President the cancellation
the complainant. The complainant then went before the Board of
of the conditional pardon granted to the petitioner. In making its
Indeterminate Sentence and charged Tesoro with violation of the
recommendation to the President, the Board relied upon the
conditions of his parole. After investigation by the parole officer,
decisions of this Court in Tesoro vs. Director of Prisons (68 Phil.
and on the basis of his report, the Board recommended to the
154 [1939]) and Espuelas vs. Provincial Warden of Bohol (108
President of the Philippines the arrest and recommitment of the
Phil. 356 [1960]). The evidence before the Board showed that on
petitioner. Tesoro contended, among other things, that a "judicial
22 March 1982 and 24 June 1982, petitioner had been charged
pronouncement to the effect that he has committed a crime" is
with twenty counts of estafa in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-19672 and
necessary before he could properly be adjudged as having
Q-20756, which cases were then (on 21 May 1986) pending trial
violated his conditional parole.
before the Regional Trial Court of Rizal (Quezon City). The record
before the Board also showed that on 26 June 1985, petitioner
had been convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Rizal (Quezon Addressing this point, this Court, speaking through then Mr.
City) of the crime of sedition in Criminal Case No. Q-22926; this Justice Moran, held that the determination of whether the
conviction was then pending appeal before the Intermediate conditions of Tesoro's parole had been breached rested
Appellate Court. The Board also had before it a letter report dated exclusively in the sound judgment of the Governor-General and
14 January 1986 from the National Bureau of Investigation that such determination would not be reviewed by the courts. As
("NBI"), addressed to the Board, on the petitioner. Per this letter, Tesoro had consented to place his liberty on parole upon the
the records of the NBI showed that a long list of charges had been judgment of the power that had granted it, we held that "he
brought against the petitioner during the last twenty years for a [could not] invoke the aid of the courts, however erroneous the
wide assortment of crimes including estafa, other forms of findings may be upon which his recommitment was ordered."6
swindling, grave threats, grave coercion, illegal possession of Thus, this Court held that by accepting the terms under which the
firearms, ammunition and explosives, malicious mischief, violation parole had been granted, Tesoro had in effect agreed that the
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, and violation of Presidential Decree Governor-General's determination (rather than that of the regular
No. 772 (interfering with police functions). Some of these charges courts of law) that he had breached one of the conditions of his
were Identified in the NBI report as having been dismissed. The parole by committing adultery while he was conditionally at
NBI report did not purport to be a status report on each of the liberty, was binding and conclusive upon him. In reaching this
charges there listed and Identified. conclusion, this Court relied upon Section 64 (i) of the Revised
Administrative Code which empowered the Governor-General
4. On 4 June 1986, the respondent Minister of Justice wrote to the
President of the Philippines informing her of the Resolution of the to grant to convicted prisoners reprieves or pardons, either
Board recommending cancellation of the conditional pardon plenary or partial, conditional or unconditional; to suspend
previously granted to petitioner. sentences without parole, remit fines, and order the discharge of
any convicted person upon parole, subject to such conditions as

42
he may impose; and to authorize the arrest and recommitment of The Court in Espuelas reaffirmed the continuing force and effect
any such person who, in his judgment, shall fail to comply with of Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code. This Court,
the condition or conditions, of his pardon, parole or suspension of quoting Tesoro and Sales, ruled that:
sentence. (Emphasis supplied)
Due process is not necessarily judicial The appellee had had his
In Sales vs. Director of Prisons,7 the petitioner had been day in court and been afforded the opportunity to defend himself
convicted of the crime of frustrated murder. After serving a little during his trial for the crime of inciting to sedition, with which he
more than two years of his sentence, he was given a conditional was charged, that brought about or resulted in his conviction,
pardon by the President of the Philippines, "the condition being sentence and confinement in the penitentiary. When he was
that he shall not again violate any of the penal laws of the conditionally pardoned it was a generous exercise by the Chief
Philippines and that, should this condition be violated, he shall be Executive of his constitutional prerogative. The acceptance
proceeded against in the manner prescribed by law."8 Eight years thereof by the convict or prisoner carrie[d] with it the authority or
after the grant of his conditional pardon, Sales was convicted of power of the Executive to determine whether a condition or
estafa and sentenced to three months and eleven days of arresto conditions of the pardon has or have been violated. To no other
mayor. He was thereupon recommitted to prison to serve the department of the Government [has] such power been intrusted.
unexpired portion of his original sentence. Sales raised before this 12
Court two principal contentions. Firstly, he argued that Section 64
(i) of the Revised Administrative Code had been repealed by
The status of our case law on the matter under consideration may
Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code. He contended, secondly,
be summed up in the following propositions:
that Section 64 (i) was in any case repugnant to the due process
clause of the Constitution (Article III [1], 1935 Constitution). This
Court, through Mr. Justice Ozaeta speaking for the majority, 1. The grant of pardon and the determination of the terms and
rejected both contentions of Sales. conditions of a conditional pardon are purely executive acts which
are not subject to judicial scrutiny.
2. The determination of the occurrence of a breach of a condition
Sales held, firstly, that Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code did
of a pardon, and the proper consequences of such breach, may be
not repeal Section 64 (i) Revised Administrative Code. It was
either a purely executive act, not subject to judicial scrutiny under
pointed out that Act No. 4103, the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code; or it may be a
which was enacted subsequent to the Revised Penal Code,
judicial act consisting of trial for and conviction of violation of a
expressly preserved the authority conferred upon the President by
conditional pardon under Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code.
Section 64. The Court also held that Article 159 and Section 64 (i)
Where the President opts to proceed under Section 64 (i) of the
could stand together and that the proceeding under one provision
Revised Administrative Code, no judicial pronouncement of guilt
did not necessarily preclude action under the other. Sales held,
of a subsequent crime is necessary, much less conviction therefor
secondly, that Section 64 (i) was not repugnant to the
by final judgment of a court, in order that a convict may be
constitutional guarantee of due process. This Court in effect held
recommended for the violation of his conditional pardon.
that since the petitioner was a convict "who had already been
3. Because due process is not semper et unique judicial process,
seized in a constitutional was been confronted by his accusers and
and because the conditionally pardoned convict had already been
the witnesses against him-, been convicted of crime and been
accorded judicial due process in his trial and conviction for the
sentenced to punishment therefor," he was not constitutionally
offense for which he was conditionally pardoned, Section 64 (i) of
entitled to another judicial determination of whether he had
the Revised Administrative Code is not afflicted with a
breached the condition of his parole by committing a subsequent
constitutional vice.
offense. Thus:

We do not believe we should depart from the clear and well

[a] statute [like Section 64 (i)] supervenes to avoid the necessity
understood rules and doctrine on this matter.
for any action by the courts in the premises. The executive
clemency under it is extended upon the conditions named in it,
and he accepts it upon those conditions. One of these is that the It may be emphasized that what is involved in the instant case is
governor may withdraw his grace in a certain contingency, and not the prosecution of the parolee for a subsequent offense in the
another is that the governor shall himself determine when that regular course of administration of the criminal law. What is
contingency has arisen. It is as if the convict, with full involved is rather the ascertainment of whether the convict has
competency to bind himself in the premises, had expressly breached his undertaking that he would "not again violate any of
contracted and agreed, that, whenever the governor should the penal laws of the Philippines" for purposes of reimposition
conclude that he had violated the conditions of his parole, an upon him of the remitted portion of his original sentence. The
executive order for his arrest and remandment to prison should at consequences that we here deal with are the consequences of an
once issue, and be conclusive upon him. 9 ascertained breach of the conditions of a pardon. A convict
granted conditional pardon, like the petitioner herein, who is
recommitted must of course be convicted by final judgment of a
In Espuelas vs. Provincial Warden of Bohol,10 the petitioner had
court of the subsequent crime or crimes with which he was
been convicted of the crime of inciting to sedition. While serving
charged before the criminal penalty for such subsequent
his sentence, he was granted by the President a conditional
offense(s) can be imposed upon him. Again, since Article 159 of
pardon "on condition that he shall not again violate any of the
the Revised Penal Code defines a distinct, substantive, felony, the
penal laws of the Philippines."11 Espuelas accepted the
parolee or convict who is regarded as having violated the
conditional pardon and was released from confinement. Sometime
provisions thereof must be charged, prosecuted and convicted by
thereafter, he was convicted by the Justice of the Peace Court in
final judgment before he can be made to suffer the penalty
Tagbilaran, Bohol, of the crime of usurpation of authority. He
prescribed in Article 159.1avvphi1
appealed to the Court of First Instance. Upon motion of the
provincial fiscal, the Court of First Instance dismissed the case
provisionally, an important prosecution witness not having been Succinctly put, in proceeding against a convict who has been
available on the day set for trial. A few months later, upon conditionally pardoned and who is alleged to have breached the
recommendation of the Board of Pardons and Parole, the conditions of his pardon, the Executive Department has two
President ordered his recommitment to prison to serve the options: (i) to proceed against him under Section 64 (i) of the
unexpired period of his original sentence. Revised Administrative Code; or (ii) to proceed against him under
Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code which imposes the penalty
of prision correccional, minimum period, upon a convict who

43
"having been granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive, During the trial in the MeTC, private prosecutors Atty. Evelyn
shall violate any of the conditions of such pardon." Here, the Sua-Kho and Atty. Ariel Bruno Rivera appeared as private
President has chosen to proceed against the petitioner under prosecutors and presented Hao as their first witness.
Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code. That choice is
an exercise of the President's executive prerogative and is not
After Hao's testimony, Chua moved to exclude complainant's
subject to judicial scrutiny.
counsels as private prosecutors in the case on the ground that
Hao failed to allege and prove any civil liability in the case.
WHEREFORE, this Petition is hereby DISMISSED. No
pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
In an Order, dated April 26, 1999, the MeTC granted Chua's
motion and ordered the complainant's counsels to be excluded
G.R. No. 150793             November 19, 2004 from actively prosecuting Criminal Case No. 285721. Hao moved
for reconsideration but it was denied.
FRANCIS CHUA, petitioner,
vs. Hence, Hao filed a petition for certiorari docketed as SCA No. 99-
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and LYDIA C. HAO, respondents. 94846,7 entitled Lydia C. Hao, in her own behalf and for the
benefit of Siena Realty Corporation v. Francis Chua, and the
Honorable Hipolito dela Vega, Presiding Judge, Branch 22,
DECISION
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Manila, Branch 19.
QUISUMBING, J.:
The RTC gave due course to the petition and on October 5, 1999,
Petitioner assails the Decision,1 dated June 14, 2001, of the Court the RTC in an order reversed the MeTC Order. The dispositive
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 57070, affirming the Order, dated portion reads:
October 5, 1999, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila,
Branch 19. The RTC reversed the Order, dated April 26, 1999, of
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The respondent Court is
the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila, Branch 22. Also
ordered to allow the intervention of the private prosecutors in
challenged by herein petitioner is the CA Resolution,2 dated
behalf of petitioner Lydia C. Hao in the prosecution of the civil
November 20, 2001, denying his Motion for Reconsideration.
aspect of Crim. Case No. 285721, before Br. 22 [MeTC], Manila,
allowing Attys. Evelyn Sua-Kho and Ariel Bruno Rivera to actively
The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows: participate in the proceedings.

On February 28, 1996, private respondent Lydia Hao, treasurer of SO ORDERED.8

Siena Realty Corporation, filed a complaint-affidavit with the City
Prosecutor of Manila charging Francis Chua and his wife, Elsa
Chua moved for reconsideration which was denied.
Chua, of four counts of falsification of public documents pursuant
to Article 1723 in relation to Article 1714 of the Revised Penal
Code. The charge reads: Dissatisfied, Chua filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for
certiorari. The petition alleged that the lower court acted with
grave abuse of discretion in: (1) refusing to consider material
That on or about May 13, 1994, in the City of Manila, Philippines,
facts; (2) allowing Siena Realty Corporation to be impleaded as
the said accused, being then a private individual, did then and
co-petitioner in SCA No. 99-94846 although it was not a party to
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit acts of
the criminal complaint in Criminal Case No. 285721; and (3)
falsification upon a public document, to wit: the said accused
effectively amending the information against the accused in
prepared, certified, and falsified the Minutes of the Annual
violation of his constitutional rights.
Stockholders meeting of the Board of Directors of the Siena
Realty Corporation, duly notarized before a Notary Public, Atty.
Juanito G. Garcia and entered in his Notarial Registry as Doc No. On June 14, 2001, the appellate court promulgated its assailed
109, Page 22, Book No. IV and Series of 1994, and therefore, a Decision denying the petition, thus:
public document, by making or causing it to appear in said
Minutes of the Annual Stockholders Meeting that one LYDIA HAO
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED
CHUA was present and has participated in said proceedings, when
DUE COURSE and DISMISSED. The Order, dated October 5, 1999
in truth and in fact, as the said accused fully well knew that said
as well as the Order, dated December 3, 1999, are hereby
Lydia C. Hao was never present during the Annual Stockholders
AFFIRMED in toto.
Meeting held on April 30, 1994 and neither has participated in the
proceedings thereof to the prejudice of public interest and in
violation of public faith and destruction of truth as therein SO ORDERED.9
proclaimed.
Petitioner had argued before the Court of Appeals that respondent
CONTRARY TO LAW.5 had no authority whatsoever to bring a suit in behalf of the
Corporation since there was no Board Resolution authorizing her
to file the suit.
Thereafter, the City Prosecutor filed the Information docketed as
Criminal Case No. 2857216 for falsification of public document,
before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila, Branch 22, For her part, respondent Hao claimed that the suit was brought
against Francis Chua but dismissed the accusation against Elsa under the concept of a derivative suit. Respondent maintained
Chua. that when the directors or trustees refused to file a suit even
when there was a demand from stockholders, a derivative suit
was allowed.
Herein petitioner, Francis Chua, was arraigned and trial ensued
thereafter.
The Court of Appeals held that the action was indeed a derivative
suit, for it alleged that petitioner falsified documents pertaining to
44
projects of the corporation and made it appear that the petitioner 37097 and 37098" since the trial court's judgment of acquittal
was a stockholder and a director of the corporation. According to failed to impose civil liability against the private respondents. By
the appellate court, the corporation was a necessary party to the no amount of equity considerations, if at all deserved, can a mere
petition filed with the RTC and even if private respondent filed the appeal on the civil aspect of a criminal case be treated as a
criminal case, her act should not divest the Corporation of its right derivative suit.12
to be a party and present its own claim for damages.
Moreover, in Western Institute, we said that a mere appeal in the
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied in a civil aspect cannot be treated as a derivative suit because the
Resolution dated November 20, 2001. appeal lacked the basic requirement that it must be alleged in the
complaint that the shareholder is suing on a derivative cause of
action for and in behalf of the corporation and other shareholders
Hence, this petition alleging that the Court of Appeals committed
who wish to join.
reversible errors:

Under Section 3613 of the Corporation Code, read in relation to

I. … IN RULING THAT LYDIA HAO'S FILING OF CRIMINAL CASE
Section 23,14 where a corporation is an injured party, its power
NO. 285721 WAS IN THE NATURE OF A DERIVATIVE SUIT
to sue is lodged with its board of directors or trustees.15 An
individual stockholder is permitted to institute a derivative suit on
II. … IN UPHOLDING THE RULING OF JUDGE DAGUNA THAT behalf of the corporation wherein he holds stocks in order to
SIENA REALTY WAS A PROPER PETITIONER IN SCA NO. [99- protect or vindicate corporate rights, whenever the officials of the
94846] corporation refuse to sue, or are the ones to be sued, or hold the
control of the corporation. In such actions, the suing stockholder
is regarded as a nominal party, with the corporation as the real
III. … IN UPHOLDING JUDGE DAGUNA'S DECISION ALLOWING party in interest.16
LYDIA HAO'S COUNSEL TO CONTINUE AS PRIVATE
PROSECUTORS IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 285721
A derivative action is a suit by a shareholder to enforce a
corporate cause of action. The corporation is a necessary party to
IV. … IN [OMITTING] TO CONSIDER AND RULE UPON THE ISSUE the suit. And the relief which is granted is a judgment against a
THAT JUDGE DAGUNA ACTED IN GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION third person in favor of the corporation. Similarly, if a corporation
IN NOT DISMISSING THE PETITION IN SCA NO. [99-94846] FOR has a defense to an action against it and is not asserting it, a
BEING A SHAM PLEADING.10 stockholder may intervene and defend on behalf of the
corporation.17
The pertinent issues in this petition are the following: (1) Is the
criminal complaint in the nature of a derivative suit? (2) Is Siena Under the Revised Penal Code, every person criminally liable for a
Realty Corporation a proper petitioner in SCA No. 99-94846? and felony is also civilly liable.18 When a criminal action is instituted,
(3) Should private prosecutors be allowed to actively participate the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the
in the trial of Criminal Case No. 285721. offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal
action, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves
On the first issue, petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior
erred when (1) it sustained the lower court in giving due course to to the criminal action.19
respondent's petition in SCA No. 99-94846 despite the fact that
the Corporation was not the private complainant in Criminal Case In Criminal Case No. 285721, the complaint was instituted by
No. 285721, and (2) when it ruled that Criminal Case No. 285721 respondent against petitioner for falsifying corporate documents
was in the nature of a derivative suit. whose subject concerns corporate projects of Siena Realty
Corporation. Clearly, Siena Realty Corporation is an offended
Petitioner avers that a derivative suit is by nature peculiar only to party. Hence, Siena Realty Corporation has a cause of action. And
intra-corporate proceedings and cannot be made part of a the civil case for the corporate cause of action is deemed
criminal action. He cites the case of Western Institute of instituted in the criminal action.
Technology, Inc. v. Salas,11 where the court said that an appeal
on the civil aspect of a criminal case cannot be treated as a However, the board of directors of the corporation in this case did
derivative suit. Petitioner asserts that in this case, the civil aspect not institute the action against petitioner. Private respondent was
of a criminal case cannot be treated as a derivative suit, the one who instituted the action. Private respondent asserts that
considering that Siena Realty Corporation was not the private she filed a derivative suit in behalf of the corporation. This
complainant. assertion is inaccurate. Not every suit filed in behalf of the
corporation is a derivative suit. For a derivative suit to prosper, it
Petitioner misapprehends our ruling in Western Institute. In that is required that the minority stockholder suing for and on behalf
case, we said: of the corporation must allege in his complaint that he is suing on
a derivative cause of action on behalf of the corporation and all
other stockholders similarly situated who may wish to join him in
Here, however, the case is not a derivative suit but is merely an the suit.20 It is a condition sine qua non that the corporation be
appeal on the civil aspect of Criminal Cases Nos. 37097 and impleaded as a party because not only is the corporation an
37098 filed with the RTC of Iloilo for estafa and falsification of indispensable party, but it is also the present rule that it must be
public document. Among the basic requirements for a derivative served with process. The judgment must be made binding upon
suit to prosper is that the minority shareholder who is suing for the corporation in order that the corporation may get the benefit
and on behalf of the corporation must allege in his complaint of the suit and may not bring subsequent suit against the same
before the proper forum that he is suing on a derivative cause of defendants for the same cause of action. In other words, the
action on behalf of the corporation and all other shareholders corporation must be joined as party because it is its cause of
similarly situated who wish to join. . . .This was not complied with action that is being litigated and because judgment must be a res
by the petitioners either in their complaint before the court a quo adjudicata against it.21
nor in the instant petition which, in part, merely states that "this
is a petition for review on certiorari on pure questions of law to
set aside a portion of the RTC decision in Criminal Cases Nos.

45
In the criminal complaint filed by herein respondent, nowhere is it Petitioner cites the case of Tan, Jr. v. Gallardo,28 holding that
stated that she is filing the same in behalf and for the benefit of where from the nature of the offense or where the law defining
the corporation. Thus, the criminal complaint including the civil and punishing the offense charged does not provide for an
aspect thereof could not be deemed in the nature of a derivative indemnity, the offended party may not intervene in the
suit. prosecution of the offense.

We turn now to the second issue, is the corporation a proper Petitioner's contention lacks merit. Generally, the basis of civil
party in the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the RTC? liability arising from crime is the fundamental postulate that every
Note that the case was titled "Lydia C. Hao, in her own behalf and man criminally liable is also civilly liable. When a person commits
for the benefit of Siena Realty Corporation v. Francis Chua, and a crime he offends two entities namely (1) the society in which he
the Honorable Hipolito dela Vega, Presiding Judge, Branch 22, lives in or the political entity called the State whose law he has
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila." Petitioner before us now violated; and (2) the individual member of the society whose
claims that the corporation is not a private complainant in person, right, honor, chastity or property has been actually or
Criminal Case No. 285721, and thus cannot be included as directly injured or damaged by the same punishable act or
appellant in SCA No. 99-94846. omission. An act or omission is felonious because it is punishable
by law, it gives rise to civil liability not so much because it is a
crime but because it caused damage to another. Additionally,
Petitioner invokes the case of Ciudad Real & Dev't. Corporation v.
what gives rise to the civil liability is really the obligation and the
Court of Appeals.22 In Ciudad Real, it was ruled that the Court of
moral duty of everyone to repair or make whole the damage
Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion when it upheld the
caused to another by reason of his own act or omission, whether
standing of Magdiwang Realty Corporation as a party to the
done intentionally or negligently. The indemnity which a person is
petition for certiorari, even though it was not a party-in-interest in
sentenced to pay forms an integral part of the penalty imposed by
the civil case before the lower court.
law for the commission of the crime.29 The civil action involves
the civil liability arising from the offense charged which includes
In the present case, respondent claims that the complaint was restitution, reparation of the damage caused, and indemnification
filed by her not only in her personal capacity, but likewise for the for consequential damages.30
benefit of the corporation. Additionally, she avers that she has
exhausted all remedies available to her before she instituted the
Under the Rules, where the civil action for recovery of civil liability
case, not only to claim damages for herself but also to recover the
is instituted in the criminal action pursuant to Rule 111, the
damages caused to the company.
offended party may intervene by counsel in the prosecution of the
offense.31 Rule 111(a) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure
Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure,23 when a trial court provides that, "[w]hen a criminal action is instituted, the civil
commits a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess action arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted
of jurisdiction, the person aggrieved can file a special civil action with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil
for certiorari. The aggrieved parties in such a case are the State action, reserves the right to institute it separately, or institutes
and the private offended party or complainant.24 the civil action prior to the criminal action."

In a string of cases, we consistently ruled that only a party-in- Private respondent did not waive the civil action, nor did she
interest or those aggrieved may file certiorari cases. It is settled reserve the right to institute it separately, nor institute the civil
that the offended parties in criminal cases have sufficient interest action for damages arising from the offense charged. Thus, we
and personality as "person(s) aggrieved" to file special civil action find that the private prosecutors can intervene in the trial of the
of prohibition and certiorari.25 criminal action.

In Ciudad Real, cited by petitioner, we held that the appellate Petitioner avers, however, that respondent's testimony in the
court committed grave abuse of discretion when it sanctioned the inferior court did not establish nor prove any damages personally
standing of a corporation to join said petition for certiorari, sustained by her as a result of petitioner's alleged acts of
despite the finality of the trial court's denial of its Motion for falsification. Petitioner adds that since no personal damages were
Intervention and the subsequent Motion to Substitute and/or Join proven therein, then the participation of her counsel as private
as Party/Plaintiff. prosecutors, who were supposed to pursue the civil aspect of a
criminal case, is not necessary and is without basis.
Note, however, that in Pastor, Jr. v. Court of Appeals26 we held
that if aggrieved, even a non-party may institute a petition for When the civil action is instituted with the criminal action,
certiorari. In that case, petitioner was the holder in her own right evidence should be taken of the damages claimed and the court
of three mining claims and could file a petition for certiorari, the should determine who are the persons entitled to such indemnity.
fastest and most feasible remedy since she could not intervene in The civil liability arising from the crime may be determined in the
the probate of her father-in-law's estate.27 criminal proceedings if the offended party does not waive to have
it adjudged or does not reserve the right to institute a separate
civil action against the defendant. Accordingly, if there is no
In the instant case, we find that the recourse of the complainant waiver or reservation of civil liability, evidence should be allowed
to the respondent Court of Appeals was proper. The petition was to establish the extent of injuries suffered.32
brought in her own name and in behalf of the Corporation.
Although, the corporation was not a complainant in the criminal
action, the subject of the falsification was the corporation's In the case before us, there was neither a waiver nor a
project and the falsified documents were corporate documents. reservation made; nor did the offended party institute a separate
Therefore, the corporation is a proper party in the petition for civil action. It follows that evidence should be allowed in the
certiorari because the proceedings in the criminal case directly criminal proceedings to establish the civil liability arising from the
and adversely affected the corporation. offense committed, and the private offended party has the right
to intervene through the private prosecutors.
We turn now to the third issue. Did the Court of Appeals and the
lower court err in allowing private prosecutors to actively WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision, dated
participate in the trial of Criminal Case No. 285721? June 14, 2001, and the Resolution, dated November 20, 2001, of

46
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 57070, affirming the
Order, dated October 5, 1999, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila, Branch 19, are AFFIRMED. Accordingly, the private
prosecutors are hereby allowed to intervene in behalf of private
respondent Lydia Hao in the prosecution of the civil aspect of
Criminal Case No. 285721 before Branch 22, of Metropolitan Trial
Court (MeTC) of Manila. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

47
G.R. No. 84516 December 5, 1989 Thereafter, a writ of execution dated March 10, 1988 was duly
served upon the accused but was, however, returned unsatisfied
due to the insolvency of the accused as shown by the sheriffs
DIONISIO CARPIO, petitioner,
return. Thus, complainant moved for a subsidiary writ of
vs.
execution against the subsidiary liability of the owner-operator of
HON. SERGIO DOROJA, (Presiding Judge, MTC, Branch IV,
the vehicle. The same was denied by the trial court on two
Zamboanga City) and EDWIN RAMIREZ Y WEE, respondents.
grounds, namely, the decision of the appellate court made no
mention of the subsidiary liability of Eduardo Toribio, and the
PARAS, J.: nature of the accident falls under "culpa-aquiliana" and not culpa-
contractual." A motion for reconsideration of the said order was
disallowed for the reason that complainant having failed to raise
Before us is a petition to review by certiorari the decision of the the matter of subsidiary liability with the appellate court, said
Municipal Trial Court of Zamboanga City, Branch IV, which denied court rendered its decision which has become final and executory
petitioner's motion for subsidiary writ of execution against the and the trial court has no power to alter or modify such decision.
owner-operator of the vehicle which figured in the accident.

Hence, the instant petition.

The facts of the case are undisputed.

Petitioner relies heavily on the case of Pajarito v. Seneris, 87

Sometime on October 23, 1985, accused-respondent Edwin SCRA 275, which enunciates that "the subsidiary liability of the
Ramirez, while driving a passenger Fuso Jitney owned and owner-operator is fixed by the judgment, because if a case were
operated by Eduardo Toribio, bumped Dionisio Carpio, a to be filed against said operator, the court called upon to act
pedestrian crossing the street, as a consequence of which the thereto has no other function than to render a decision based on
latter suffered from a fractured left clavicle as reflected in the the indemnity award in the criminal case without power to amend
medico-legal certificate and sustained injuries which required or modify it even if in his opinion an error has been committed in
medical attention for a period of (3) three months. the decision." Petitioner maintains that the tenor of the aforesaid
decision implies that the subsidiary liability of the owner-operator
An information for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Serious may be enforced in the same proceeding and a separate action is
Physical Injuries was filed against Edwin Ramirez with the no longer necessary in order to avoid undue delay,
Municipal Trial Court of Zamboanga City, Branch IV. On January notwithstanding the fact that said employer was not made a party
14, 1987, the accused voluntarily pleaded guilty to a lesser in the criminal action.
offense and was accordingly convicted for Reckless Imprudence
Resulting to Less Serious Physical Injuries under an amended It is the theory of respondent that the owner-operator cannot be
information punishable under Article 365 of the Revised Penal validly held subsidiarily liable for the following reasons, namely:
Code. The dispositive portion of the decision handed down on May (a) the matter of subsidiary liability was not raised on appeal; (b)
27, 1987 reads as follows: contrary to the case of Pajarito v. Seneris, the injuries sustained
by the complainant did not arise from the so-called "culpa-
WHEREFORE, finding the accused EDWIN RAMIREZ y WEE guilty contractual" but from "culpa-aquiliana"; (c) the judgments of
as a principal beyond reasonable doubt of the Amended appellate courts may not be altered, modified, or changed by the
Information to which he voluntarily pleaded guilty and court of origin; and (d) said owner was never made a party to the
appreciating this mitigating circumstance in his favor, hereby criminal proceedings.
sentences him to suffer the penalty of One (1) month and One (1)
day to Two (2) months of Arresto Mayor in its minimum period. Thus, the underlying issue raised in this case is; whether or not
The accused is likewise ordered to indemnify the complainant the subsidiary liability of the owner-operator may be enforced in
Dionisio A. Carpio the amount of P45.00 representing the value of the same criminal proceeding against the driver where the award
the 1/2 can of tomatoes lost; the amount of P200.00 which was given, or in a separate civil action.
complainant paid to the Zamboanga General Hospital, to pay
complainant the amount of Pl,500.00 as attorney's fees and to
pay the cost of this suit. SO ORDERED. (p. 7, Rollo) The law involved in the instant case is Article 103 in relation to
Article 100, both of the Revised Penal Code, which reads thus:
Thereafter, the accused filed an application for probation.
Art. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. The subsidiary
liability established in the next preceding article shall apply to
At the early stage of the trial, the private prosecutor manifested employers, teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any
his desire to present evidence to establish the civil liability of kind of industry for felonies committed by their servants, pupils,
either the accused driver or the owner-operator of the vehicle. workmen, apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their
Accused's counsel moved that the court summon the owner of the duties.
vehicle to afford the latter a day in court, on the ground that the
accused is not only indigent but also jobless and thus cannot
answer any civil liability that may be imposed upon him by the Respondent contends that the case of Pajarito v. Seneris cannot
court. The private prosecutor, however, did not move for the be applied to the present case, the former being an action
appearance of Eduardo Toribio. involving culpa-contractual, while the latter being one of culpa-
aquiliana. Such a declaration is erroneous. The subsidiary liability
in Art. 103 should be distinguished from the primary liability of
The civil aspect of the above-quoted decision was appealed by the employers, which is quasi-delictual in character as provided in Art.
private prosecutor to the Regional Trial Court Branch XVI, 2180 of the New Civil Code. Under Art. 103, the liability emanated
appellant praying for moral damages in the amount of P from a delict. On the other hand, the liability under Art. 2180 is
10,000.00, compensatory damages at P6,186.40, and attorney's founded on culpa-aquiliana. The present case is neither an action
fees of P 5,000.00. The appellate court, on January 20, 1988, for culpa-contractual nor for culpa-aquiliana. This is basically an
modified the trial court's decision, granting the appellant moral action to enforce the civil liability arising from crime under Art.
damages in the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P 5,000.00), 100 of the Revised Penal Code. In no case can this be regarded as
while affirming all other civil liabilities.

48
a civil action for the primary liability of the employer under Art. the decision. It becomes incumbent upon the court to grant a
2180 of the New Civil Code, i.e., action for culpa-aquiliana. motion for subsidiary writ of execution (but only after the
employer has been heard), upon conviction of the employee and
after execution is returned unsatisfied due to the employee's
In order that an employer may be held subsidiarily liable for the
insolvency.
employee's civil liability in the criminal action, it should be shown
(1) that the employer, etc. is engaged in any kind of industry, (2)
that the employee committed the offense in the discharge of his WHEREFORE, the order of respondent court disallowing the
duties and (3) that he is insolvent (Basa Marketing Corp. v. motion for subsidiary writ of execution is hereby SET ASIDE. The
Bolinao, 117 SCRA 156). The subsidiary liability of the employer, Court a quo is directed to hear and decide in the same proceeding
however, arises only after conviction of the employee in the the subsidiary liability of the alleged owner-operator of the
criminal action. All these requisites present, the employer passenger jitney. Costs against private respondent.
becomes ipso facto subsidiarily liable upon the employee's
conviction and upon proof of the latter's insolvency. Needless to
SO ORDERED.
say, the case at bar satisfies all these requirements.

Furthermore, we are not convinced that the owner-operator has

been deprived of his day in court, because the case before us is
not one wherein the operator is sued for a primary liability under
the Civil Code but one in which the subsidiary civil liability incident
to and dependent upon his employee's criminal negligence is
sought to be enforced. Considering the subsidiary liability imposed
upon the employer by law, he is in substance and in effect a party
to the criminal case. Ergo, the employer's subsidiary liability may
be determined and enforced in the criminal case as part of the
execution proceedings against the employee. This Court held in
the earlier case of Pajarito v. Seneris, supra, that "The proceeding
for the enforcement of the subsidiary civil liability may be
considered as part of the proceeding for the execution of the
judgment. A case in which an execution has been issued is
regarded as still pending so that all proceedings on the execution
are proceedings in the suit. There is no question that the court
which rendered the judgment has a general supervisory control
over its process of execution, and this power carries with it the
right to determine every question of fact and law which may be
involved in the execution."

The argument that the owner-operator cannot be held subsidiarily

liable because the matter of subsidiary liability was not raised on
appeal and in like manner, the appellate court's decision made no
mention of such subsidiary liability is of no moment. As already
discussed, the filing of a separate complaint against the operator
for recovery of subsidiary liability is not necessary since his
liability is clear from the decision against the accused. Such being
the case, it is not indispensable for the question of subsidiary
liability to be passed upon by the appellate court. Such subsidiary
liability is already implied from the appellate court's decision. In
the recent case of Vda. de Paman v. Seneris, 115 SCRA 709, this
Court reiterated the following pronouncement: "A judgment of
conviction sentencing a defendant employer to pay an indemnity
in the absence of any collusion between the defendant and the
offended party, is conclusive upon the employer in an action for
the enforcement of the latter's subsidiary liability not only with
regard to the civil liability, but also with regard to its amount."
This being the case, this Court stated in Rotea v. Halili, 109 Phil.
495, "that the court has no other function than to render decision
based upon the indemnity awarded in the criminal case and has
no power to amend or modify it even if in its opinion an error has
been committed in the decision. A separate and independent
action is, therefore, unnecessary and would only unduly prolong
the agony of the heirs of the victim."

Finally, the position taken by the respondent appellate court that

to grant the motion for subsidiary writ of execution would in effect
be to amend its decision which has already become final and
executory cannot be sustained. Compelling the owner-operator to
pay on the basis of his subsidiary liability does not constitute an
amendment of the judgment because in an action under Art. 103
of the Revised Penal Code, once all the requisites as earlier
discussed are met, the employer becomes ipso facto subsidiarily
liable, without need of a separate action. Such being the case, the
subsidiary liability can be enforced in the same case where the
award was given, and this does not constitute an act of amending

49
[G.R. No. 113433. March 17, 2000.]
"WHEREFORE, the court finds accused Simplicio Pronebo y Cruz
LUISITO P. BASILIO, Petitioner, v. THE COURT OF guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Reckless Imprudence resulting
APPEALS, HON. JESUS G. BERSAMIRA, and FE ADVINCULA, in the death of Danilo Advincula and is hereby sentenced to suffer
Respondents. the indeterminate penalty of two (2) years and four (4) months,
as minimum to six (6) years of prision correccional, as maximum,
DECISION and to indemnify the heirs of Danilo Advincula P30,000.00 for the
latter’s death, P31,614.00, as actual and compensatory damages.
P2,000,000.00 for the loss of his earning capacity. P150,000.00,
QUISUMBING, J.: as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as attorney’s fees, plus the
This is a petition for review 1 under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules costs of suit." 5
of Court which seeks to annul and set aside the Decision 2 and
Resolution 3 of the Court of Appeals dated October 27, 1992 and Thereafter, the accused filed an application for probation, so that
January 5, 1994, respectively. The decision sustained the Order the above judgment became final and executory.
dated April 7, 1992 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City,
Branch 166, denying due course to petitioner’s appeal from the Pertinently, the trial court also found that at the time of the
Judgment in Criminal Case No. 70278 and allowing execution vehicular accident accused Simplicio Pronebo was employed as
against the petitioner of the subsidiary indemnity arising from the the driver of the dump truck owned by petitioner Luisito Basilio.
offense committed by his truck driver.
On March 27, 1991, petitioner Luisito Basilio filed with the trial
The relevant facts as gleaned from the records are as court a "Special Appearance and Motion for Reconsideration" 6
follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library praying that the judgment dated February 4, 1991, be
reconsidered and set aside insofar as it affected him and
On July 23, 1987, Simplicio Pronebo was charged by the subjected him to a subsidiary liability for the civil aspect of the
Provincial Fiscal of Rizal with the crime of reckless imprudence criminal case. The motion was denied for lack of merit on
resulting in damage to property with double homicide and double September 16, 1991. 7 Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal 8 on
physical injuries. 4 The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. September 25, 1991.
70278.chanrobles.com.ph : red
On September 23, 1991, private respondent filed a Motion for
The information against him reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph Execution of the subsidiary civil liability 9 of petitioner Basilio.

"The undersigned Assistant Fiscal accused Simplicio Pronebo y On April 7, 1992, the trial court issued two separate Orders. One
Cruz of the crime of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to denied due course and dismissed Basilio’s appeal for having been
Property with Double Homicide and Double Physical Injuries, filed beyond the reglementary period. 10 The other directed the
committed as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph issuance of a writ of execution against him for the enforcement
and satisfaction of the award of civil indemnity decreed in
"That on or about the 15th day of July, 1987 in the municipality of judgment on February 4, 1991. 11
Marikina, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the said accused, being then the driver and Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari 12 under Rule
person in charge of a dump truck with plate no. NMW-609 owned 65 of the Revised Rules of Court with the Court of Appeals,
and registered in the name of Luisito Basilio, without due regard alleging that respondent judge acted without jurisdiction or with
to traffic laws, rules and regulations and without taking the grave abuse of discretion in issuing: (1) the Order dated
necessary care and precaution to prevent damage to property and September 16, 1991, denying the petitioner’s motion for
avoid injuries to persons, did then and there willfully, unlawfully reconsideration of the judgment dated February 4, 1991 insofar
and feloniously drive, manage and operate said dump truck in a as the subsidiary liability of the petitioner was concerned, and (2)
careless, reckless, negligent and imprudent manner as a result of the Order dated April 7, 1992, directing the issuance of a writ of
which said dump truck being then driven by him hit/bumped and execution against the petitioner. Before the appellate court,
sideswiped the following vehicles, to wit: a) a motorized tricycle petitioner claimed he was not afforded due process when he was
with plate no. NF-2457 driven by Benedicto Abuel thereby causing found subsidiarily liable for the civil liability of the accused
damage in the amount of P1,100.00; b) an automobile Toyota Pronebo in the criminal case.chanrobles.com : virtuallawlibrary
Corona with plate no. NAL-138 driven by Virgilio Hipolito thereby
causing damage in the amount of P2,190.50 c) a motorized The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition in its Decision dated
tricycle with plate no. NW-9018 driven by Ricardo Sese y Julian October 27, 1992, disposing as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
thereby causing damage of an undetermined amount d) an
automobile Mitsubishi Lancer with plate no. PHE-283 driven by "ACCORDINGLY, in view of the foregoing disquisitions, the instant
Angelito Carranto thereby causing damage of an undetermined petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction is
amount and e) a Ford Econo Van with plate no. NFR-898 driven DENIED DUE COURSE and should be, as it is hereby, DISMISSED
by Ernesto Aseron thereby causing damage of an undetermined for lack of persuasive force and effect." 13
amount; that due to the strong impact caused by the collision, the
driver Ricardo Sese y Julian and his 3 passengers including Danilo A motion for reconsideration 14 was filed by the petitioner on
Advincula y Poblete were hit/bumped which directly caused their November 24, 1992. This was denied in a Resolution 15 dated
death; while the other 2 passengers, namely; Cirilo Bangot January 5, 1994. Hence this petition for review.
sustained serious physical injuries which required medical
attendance for a period of more than 30 days which incapacitated Now, Petitioner, in his assignment of errors, avers that
him from performing his customary labor for the same period of respondent Court of Appeals erred:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
time and Dominador Legaspi Jr. sustained physical injuries which
required medical attendance for a period of less than nine days I. . . . IN SUSTAINING THE RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT
and incapacitated him from performing his customary labor for THE JUDGMENT OF 4 FEBRUARY 1991 HAD BECOME FINAL AND
the same period of time. EXECUTORY AS REGARDS BOTH THE CIVIL AND CRIMINAL
ASPECTS WHEN THE ACCUSED APPLIED FOR PROBATION AT THE
Contrary to law."cralaw virtua1aw library PROMULGATION.

After arraignment and trial, the court rendered its judgment dated II. . . . IN HOLDING THAT AS PETITIONER IS NEITHER AN
February 4, 1991, which reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph ACCUSED OR A PARTY IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 70278, HE IS NOT

50
ENTITLED TO FILE A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE opportunity to be heard, which is the essence of due process. 21
JUDGMENT OF SUBSIDIARY CIVIL LIABILITY AGAINST HIM.
Petitioner knew of the criminal case that was filed against accused
III. . . . IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER WAS NOT DEPRIVED OF because it was his truck that was involved in the incident. 22
HIS DAY IN COURT IN VIOLATION OF PROCEDURAL DUE Further, it was the insurance company, with which his truck was
PROCESS. insured, that provided the counsel for the accused, pursuant to
the stipulations in their contract. 23 Petitioner did not intervene in
IV. . . . IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER WAS NOT ENTITLED TO the criminal proceedings, despite knowledge, through counsel,
THE AUXILIARY RELIEF OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION BECAUSE that the prosecution adduced evidence to show employer-
THE JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION "IS CONCLUSIVE UPON THE employee relationship. 24 With the convict’s application for
EMPLOYER" . probation, the trial court’s judgment became final and executory.
All told, it is our view that the lower court did not err when it
V. . . . IN RULING THAT THE RESPONDENT JUDGE DID NOT ACT found that petitioner was not denied due process. He had all his
IN ABUSE OF AND/OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION. 16 chances to intervene in the criminal proceedings, and prove that
he was not the employer of the accused, but he chooses not to
The issue before us is whether respondent Court of Appeals erred intervene at the appropriate time.
and committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the special
civil action under Rule 65 filed by petitioner against the trial court. Petitioner was also given the opportunity during the proceedings
To resolve it, we must, however, also pass upon the for the enforcement of judgment. Even assuming that he was not
following:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library properly notified of the hearing on the motion for execution of
subsidiary liability, he was asked by the trial court to make an
(1) Had the judgment of February 4, 1991 of the trial court opposition thereto, which he did on October 17, 1991, where he
become final and executory when accused applied for probation at properly alleged that there was no employer-employee
the promulgation? relationship between him and accused and that the latter was not
discharging any function in relation to his work at the time of the
(2) May the petitioner as employer file a Motion for incident. 25 In addition, counsel for private respondent filed and
Reconsideration concerning civil liability decreed in the judgment duly served on December 3, 1991, and December 9, 1991,
if he is not a party to the criminal case? respectively, a manifestation praying for the grant of the motion
for execution. 26 This was set for hearing on December 13, 1991.
(3) May petitioner, as employer, be granted relief by way of a writ However, counsel for petitioner did not appear. Consequently, the
of preliminary injunction? court ordered in open court that the matter be submitted for
resolution. It was only on January 6, 1992, that the petitioner’s
Petitioner asserts that he was not given the opportunity to be counsel filed a counter-manifestation 27 that belatedly attempted
heard by the trial court to prove the absence of an employer- to contest the move of the private prosecutor for the execution of
employee relationship between him and accused. Nor that, the civil liability. Thus, on April 7, 1992, the trial court issued the
alternatively, the accused was not lawfully discharging duties as Order granting the motion for execution of the subsidiary liability.
an employee at the time of the incident. While these assertions Given the foregoing circumstances, we cannot agree with
are not moved, we shall give them due consideration. petitioner that the trial court denied him due process of law.
Neither can we fault respondent appellate court for sustaining the
The statutory basis for an employer’s subsidiary liability is found judgment and orders of the trial court.
in Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. 17 This liability is
enforceable in the same criminal proceeding where the award is Accordingly, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The
made. 18 However, before execution against an employer ensues, Decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 27, 1992, in CA-
there must be a determination, in a hearing set for the purpose of G.R. SP No. 27850 is AFFIRMED. Costs against
1) the existence of an employer-employee relationship; 2) that petitioner.chanrobles.com : chanrobles.com.ph
the employer is engaged in some kind of industry; 3) that the
employee is adjudged guilty of the wrongful act and found to have SO ORDERED.
committed the offense in the discharge of his duties (not
necessarily any offense he commits "while" in the discharge of
such duties; and 4) that said employee is insolvent. 19

In Vda. De Paman v. Señeris, 115 SCRA 709, 714 (1982), the

Court observed that the drawback in the enforcement of the
subsidiary liability in the same criminal proceeding is that the
alleged employer is not afforded due process. Not being a party to
the case, he is not heard as to whether he is indeed the employer.
Hence, we held:

"To remedy the situation and thereby afford due process to the
alleged employer, this Court directed the court a quo in Pajarito v.
Señeris (supra) to hear and decide in the same proceeding the
subsidiary liability of the alleged owner and operator of the
passenger bus. It was explained therein that the proceeding for
the enforcement of the subsidiary liability may be considered as
part of the proceeding for the execution of the judgment. A case
in which an execution has been issued is regarded as still pending
so that all proceedings on the execution are proceedings in the
suit." 20

There are two instances when the existence of an employer-

employee relationship of an accused driver and the alleged vehicle
owner may be determined. One, during the criminal proceeding,
and the other, during the proceeding for the execution of the
judgment. In both instances, petitioner should be given the

51
G.R. Nos. 66102-04 August 30, 1990 jeepney passengers sustained physical injuries. What could have
been a festive Christmas turned out to be tragic.
PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., petitioner,
vs. The causes of the death of the three jeepney passengers were as
THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND follows (p. 101, Record on Appeal):
CASIANO PASCUA, ET AL., respondents.
The deceased Catalina Pascua suffered the following injuries, to
MEDIALDEA, J.: wit: fracture of the left parietal and temporal regions of the skull;
fracture of the left mandible; fracture of the right humenous;
compound fracture of the left radious and ullma middle third and
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the
lower third; fracture of the upper third of the right tibia and
Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) dated July
fillnea; avulsion of the head, left internal; and multiple abrasions.
29, 1983 in AC-G.R. Nos. CV-65885, CV-65886 and CV-65887
The cause of her death was shock, secondary to fracture and
which reversed the decision of the Court of First Instance (now
multiple hemorrhage. The fractures were produced as a result of
Regional Trial Court) of Pangasinan dated December 27, 1978;
the hitting of the victim by a strong force. The abrasions could be
and its resolution dated November 28, 1983 denying the motion
produced when a person falls from a moving vehicles (sic) and
for reconsideration.
rubs parts of her body against a cement road pavement. . . .

It is an established principle that the factual findings of the Court

Erlinda Mariles (sic) sustained external lesions such as contusion
of Appeals are final and may not be reviewed by this Court on
on the left parietal region of the skull; hematoma on the right
appeal. However, this principle is subject to certain exceptions.
upper lid; and abrasions (sic) on the left knee. Her internal lesions
One of these is when the findings of the appellate court are
were: hematoma on the left thorax; multiple lacerations of the
contrary to those of the trial court (see Sabinosa v. The Honorable
left lower lobe of the lungs; contusions on the left lower lobe of
Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. L-47981, July 24, 1989) in
the lungs; and simple fractures of the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th,
which case, a re-examination of the facts and evidence may be
and 8th ribs, left. The forcible impact of the jeep caused the
undertaken. This is Our task now.
above injuries which resulted in her death. . . .

The antecedent facts are as follows:

The cause of death of Erlinda or Florida Estomo (also called as per
autopsy of Dr. Panlasiqui was due to shock due to internal
About 11:00 o'clock in the morning on December 24, 1966, hemorrhage, ruptured spleen and trauma. . . .
Catalina Pascua, Caridad Pascua, Adelaida Estomo, Erlinda
Meriales, Mercedes Lorenzo, Alejandro Morales and Zenaida
Caridad Pascua suffered physical injuries as follows (p. 101,
Parejas boarded the jeepney owned by spouses Isidro Mangune
Record on Appeal):
and Guillerma Carreon and driven by Tranquilino Manalo at Dau,
Mabalacat, Pampanga bound for Carmen, Rosales, Pangasinan to
spend Christmas at their respective homes. Although they usually . . . lacerated wound on the forehead and occipital region,
ride in buses, they had to ride in a jeepney that day because the hematoma on the forehead, multiple abrasions on the forearm,
buses were full. Their contract with Manalo was for them to pay right upper arm, back and right leg. . . .
P24.00 for the trip. The private respondents' testimonial evidence
on this contractual relationship was not controverted by Mangune,
The police investigators of Tacpal and policemen of San Manuel,
Carreon and Manalo, nor by Filriters Guaranty Assurance
Tarlac, Tarlac, upon arrival at the scene of the mishap, prepared a
Corporation, Inc., the insurer of the jeepney, with contrary
sketch (common exhibit "K" for private respondents "19" for
evidence. Purportedly riding on the front seat with Manalo was
Rabbit) showing the relative positions of the two vehicles as well
Mercedes Lorenzo. On the left rear passenger seat were Caridad
as the alleged point of impact (p. 100, Record on Appeal):
Pascua, Alejandro Morales and Zenaida Parejas. On the right rear
passenger seat were Catalina Pascua, Adelaida Estomo, and
Erlinda Meriales. After a brief stopover at Moncada, Tarlac for . . . The point of collision was a cement pave-portion of the
refreshment, the jeepney proceeded towards Carmen, Rosales, Highway, about six (6) meters wide, with narrow shoulders with
Pangasinan. grasses beyond which are canals on both sides. The road was
straight and points 200 meters north and south of the point of
collision are visible and unobstructed. Purportedly, the point of
Upon reaching barrio Sinayoan, San Manuel, Tarlac, the right rear
impact or collision (Exh. "K-4", Pascua on the sketch Exh. "K"-
wheel of the jeepney was detached, so it was running in an
Pascua) was on the western lane of the highway about 3 feet (or
unbalanced position. Manalo stepped on the brake, as a result of
one yard) from the center line as shown by the bedris (sic), dirt
which, the jeepney which was then running on the eastern lane
and soil (obviously from the undercarriage of both vehicles) as
(its right of way) made a U-turn, invading and eventually stopping
well as paint, marron (sic) from the Rabbit bus and greenish from
on the western lane of the road in such a manner that the
the jeepney. The point of impact encircled and marked with the
jeepney's front faced the south (from where it came) and its rear
letter "X" in Exh. "K"-4 Pascua, had a diameter of two meters, the
faced the north (towards where it was going). The jeepney
center of which was about two meters from the western edge of
practically occupied and blocked the greater portion of the
cement pavement of the roadway. Pictures taken by witness
western lane, which is the right of way of vehicles coming from
Bisquera in the course of the investigation showed the relative
the north, among which was Bus No. 753 of petitioner Philippine
positions of the point of impact and center line (Exh. "P"-Pascua)
Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. (Rabbit) driven by Tomas delos Reyes.
the back of the Rabbit bus (Exh. "P"-1-Pascua"), the lifeless body
Almost at the time when the jeepney made a sudden U-turn and
of Catalina Pascua (Exh. "P-2 Pascua"), and the damaged front
encroached on the western lane of the highway as claimed by
part of the Rabbit bus (Exh. "P-3 Pascua"). No skid marks of the
Rabbit and delos Reyes, or after stopping for a couple of minutes
Rabbit bus was found in the vicinity of the collision, before or
as claimed by Mangune, Carreon and Manalo, the bus bumped
after the point of impact. On the other hand, there was a skid
from behind the right rear portion of the jeepney. As a result of
mark about 45 meters long purportedly of the jeepney from the
the collision, three passengers of the jeepney (Catalina Pascua,
eastern shoulder of the road south of, and extending up to the
Erlinda Meriales and Adelaida Estomo) died while the other
point of impact.

52
At the time and in the vicinity of the accident, there were no carriage with their passengers the plaintiffs' and/or their heirs,
vehicles following the jeepney, neither were there oncoming and this Court renders judgment ordering said defendants, jointly
vehicles except the bus. The weather condition of that day was and severally, to pay the plaintiffs —
fair.
a) In Civil Case No. 1136, for the death of Catalina Pascua, to pay
After conducting the investigation, the police filed with the her heirs the amounts of P12,000.00 for indemnity for loss of her
Municipal Court of San Manuel, Tarlac, a criminal complaint life; P41,760.00 for loss of earnings; P324.40 for actual expenses
against the two drivers for Multiple Homicide. At the preliminary and P2,000.00 for moral damages;
investigation, a probable cause was found with respect to the case
of Manalo, thus, his case was elevated to the Court of First
b) In the same Civil Case No.1136 for the injuries of Caridad
Instance. However, finding no sufficiency of evidence as regards
Pascua, to pay her the amounts of P240.00 for loss of wages,
the case of delos Reyes, the Court dismissed it. Manalo was
P328.20 for actual expenses and P500.00 for moral damages;
convicted and sentenced to suffer imprisonment. Not having
appealed, he served his sentence.
c) In Civil Case No.1139 for the death of Erlinda Meriales, to pay
her heirs (the plaintiffs) the amount of P12,000.00 — for
Complaints for recovery of damages were then filed before the
indemnity for loss of her life; P622.00 for actual expenses,
Court of First Instance of Pangasinan. In Civil Case No. 1136,
P60,480.00 for loss of wages or income and P2,000.00 for moral
spouses Casiano Pascua and Juana Valdez sued as heirs of
damages;
Catalina Pascua while Caridad Pascua sued in her behalf. In Civil
Case No. 1139, spouses Manuel Millares and Fidencia Arcica sued
as heirs of Erlinda Meriales. In Civil Case No. 1140, spouses d) In Civil Case No. 1140, for the death of Erlinda (also called
Mariano Estomo and Dionisia Sarmiento also sued as heirs of Florida or Adelaida Estomo), to pay her heirs (the plaintiff the
Adelaida Estomo. amount of P12,000.00 for indemnity for the loss of her life;
P580.00 for actual expenses; P53,160.00 for loss of wages or
income and P2,000.00 for moral damages.
In all three cases, spouses Mangune and Carreon, Manalo, Rabbit
and delos Reyes were all impleaded as defendants. Plaintiffs
anchored their suits against spouses Mangune and Carreon and 2) The defendant Filriters Guaranty Insurance Co., having
Manalo on their contractual liability. As against Rabbit and delos contracted to ensure and answer for the obligations of defendants
Reyes, plaintiffs based their suits on their culpability for a quasi- Mangune and Carreon for damages due their passengers, this
delict. Filriters Guaranty Assurance Corporation, Inc. was also Court renders judgment against the said defendants Filriters
impleaded as additional defendant in Civil Case No. 1136 only. Guaranty Insurance Co., jointly and severally with said
defendants (Mangune and Carreon) to pay the plaintiffs the
amount herein above adjudicated in their favor in Civil Case No.
For the death of Catalina Pascua, plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 1136
1136 only. All the amounts awarded said plaintiff, as set forth in
sought to collect the aggregate amount of P70,060.00 in
paragraph one (1) hereinabove;
damages, itemized as follows: P500.00 for burial expenses;
P12,000.00 for loss of wages for 24 years; P10,000.00 for
exemplary damages; P10,000.00 for moral damages; and 3) On the cross claim of Phil. Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. ordering the
P3,000.00 for attorney's fees. In the same case, plaintiff Caridad defendant, Isidro Mangune, Guillerma Carreon and Tranquilino
Pascua claimed P550.00 for medical expenses; P240.00 for loss of Manalo, to pay jointly and severally, cross-claimant Phil. Rabbit
wages for two months; P2,000.00 for disfigurement of her face; Bus Lines, Inc., the amounts of P216.27 as actual damages to its
P3,000.00 for physical pain and suffering; P2,500.00 as Bus No. 753 and P2,173.60 for loss of its earning.
exemplary damages and P2,000.00 for attorney's fees and
expenses of litigation.
All of the above amount, shall bear legal interest from the filing of
the complaints.
In Civil Case No. 1139, plaintiffs demanded P500.00 for burial
expenses; P6,000.00 for the death of Erlinda, P63,000.00 for loss
of income; P10,000.00 for moral damages and P3,000.00 for Costs are adjudged against defendants Mangune, Carreon and
attorney's fees or total of P80,000.00. Manalo and Filriters Guaranty.

In Civil Case No. 1140, plaintiffs claimed P500.00 for burial SO ORDERED
expenses; P6,000.00 for the death of Adelaide, P56,160.00 for
loss of her income or earning capacity; P10,000.00 for moral On appeal, the Intermediate Appellate Court reversed the above-
damages; and P3,000.00 for attorney's fees. quoted decision by finding delos Reyes negligent, the dispositive
portion of which reads (pp. 55-57, Rollo):
Rabbit filed a cross-claim in the amount of P15,000.00 for
attorney's fees and expenses of litigation. On the other hand, WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the lower court's decision
spouses Mangune and Carreon filed a cross-claim in the amount is hereby REVERSED as to item No. 3 of the decision which reads:
of P6,168.00 for the repair of the jeepney and P3,000.00 for its
non-use during the period of repairs.
3) On the cross claim of Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. ordering
the defendants Isidro Mangune, Guillerma Carreon and
On December 27, 1978, the trial court rendered its decision Tranquilino Manalo, to pay jointly and severally, the amounts of
finding Manalo negligent, the dispositive portion of which reads P216.27 as actual damages to its Bus No. 753 and P2,173.60 for
(pp. 113-114, Record on Appeal): loss of its earnings.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court is of the opinion and so and another judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs-
holds: appellants Casiana Pascua, Juan Valdez and Caridad Pascua,
ordering the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. and its driver Tomas
1) That defendants Isidro Mangune, Guillerma Carreon and delos Reyes to pay the former jointly and severally damages in
Tranquilino Manalo thru their negligence, breached contract of amounts awarded as follows:

53
For the death of Catalina Pascua, the parents and/or heirs are Civil Case No. 1140
awarded
a) Indemnity for loss of life — P12,000.00
Civil Case No. 1136 —
b) Loss of Salary or Earning capacity — 20,000.00
a) Indemnity for the loss of life — P12,000.00
c) Actual damages (burial expenses) — 500.00
b) Loss of Salaries or earning capacity — 14,000.00
d) Moral damages — 3,000.00
c) Actual damages (burial expenses) — 800.00
e) Exemplary damages — 3,000.00
d) For moral damages — 10,000.00
f) Attorney's fees — 3,000.00
e) Exemplary damages — 3,000.00
—————
f) For attorney's fees — 3,000.00
Total — P41,500.00
—————
With costs against the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc.
Total — P38,200.00 (sic)
SO ORDERED.
For the physical injuries suffered by Caridad Pascua:
The motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, the present
Civil Case No. 1136 petition.

a) Actual damages (hospitalization expenses) — P550.00 The issue is who is liable for the death and physical injuries
suffered by the passengers of the jeepney?
b) Moral damages (disfigurement of the
The trial court, in declaring that Manalo was negligent, considered
the following (p. 106, Record on Appeal):
face and physical suffering — 8,000.00

(1) That the unrebutted testimony of his passenger plaintiff

c) Exemplary damages — 2,000.00
Caridad Pascua that a long ways (sic) before reaching the point of
collision, the Mangune jeepney was "running fast" that his
————— passengers cautioned driver Manalo to slow down but did not
heed the warning: that the right rear wheel was detached causing
the jeepney to run to the eastern shoulder of the road then back
Total — P10,550.00 to the concrete pavement; that driver Manalo applied the brakes
after which the jeepney made a U-turn (half-turn) in such a
For the death of Erlinda Arcega Meriales. the parents and/or manner that it inverted its direction making it face South instead
heirs: of north; that the jeepney stopped on the western lane of the
road on the right of way of the oncoming Phil. Rabbit Bus where it
was bumped by the latter;
Civil Case No. 1139

(2) The likewise unrebutted testimony of Police Investigator

a) Indemnity for loss of life — P12,000.00 Tacpal of the San Manuel (Tarlac) Police who, upon responding to
the reported collission, found the real evidence thereat indicate in
b) Loss of Salary or Earning Capacity — 20,000.00 his sketch (Exh. K, Pascua ), the tracks of the jeepney of
defendant Mangune and Carreon running on the Eastern shoulder
(outside the concrete paved road) until it returned to the concrete
c) Actual damages (burial expenses) — 500.00 road at a sharp angle, crossing the Eastern lane and the
(imaginary) center line and encroaching fully into the western
d) Moral damages — 15,000.00 lane where the collision took place as evidenced by the point of
impact;

e) Exemplary damages — 15,000.00

(3) The observation of witness Police Corporal Cacalda also of the
San Manuel Police that the path of the jeepney they found on the
f) Attorney's fees — 3,000.00 road and indicated in the sketch (Exh. K-Pascua) was shown by
skid marks which he described as "scratches on the road caused
————— by the iron of the jeep, after its wheel was removed;"

Total — P65,500.00 (4) His conviction for the crime of Multiple Homicide and Multiple
Serious Physical Injuries with Damage to Property thru Reckless
Imprudence by the Court of First Instance of Tarlac (Exh. 24-
For the death of Florida Sarmiento Estomo: Rabbit) upon the criminal Information by the Provincial Fiscal of

54
Tarlac (Exh. 23-Rabbit), as a result of the collision, and his effort to avoid the accident, . . . . The bus driver's conduct is thus
commitment to prison and service of his sentence (Exh. 25- a substantial factor in bringing about harm to the passengers of
Rabbit) upon the finality of the decision and his failure to appeal the jeepney, not only because he was driving fast and did not
therefrom; and even attempt to avoid the mishap but also because it was the bus
which was the physical force which brought about the injury and
death to the passengers of the jeepney.
(5) The application of the doctrine of res-ipsa loquitar (sic)
attesting to the circumstance that the collision occured (sic) on
the right of way of the Phil. Rabbit Bus. The speed of the bus was calculated by respondent court as
follows (pp. 54-55, Rollo):
The respondent court had a contrary opinion. Applying primarily
(1) the doctrine of last clear chance, (2) the presumption that According to the record of the case, the bus departed from Laoag,
drivers who bump the rear of another vehicle guilty and the cause Ilocos Norte, at 4:00 o'clock A.M. and the accident took place at
of the accident unless contradicted by other evidence, and (3) the approximately around 12:30 P.M., after travelling roughly for 8
substantial factor test. concluded that delos Reyes was negligent. hours and 30 minutes. Deduct from this the actual stopover time
of two Hours (computed from the testimony of the driver that he
made three 40-minute stop-overs), We will have an actual
The misappreciation of the facts and evidence and the
travelling time of 6 hours and 30 minutes.
misapplication of the laws by the respondent court warrant a
reversal of its questioned decision and resolution.
Under the circumstances, We calculate that the Laoag-Tarlac
route (365 kms.) driving at an average of 56 km. per hour would
We reiterate that "[t]he principle about "the last clear" chance,
take 6 hours and 30 minutes. Therefore, the average speed of the
would call for application in a suit between the owners and drivers
bus, give and take 10 minutes, from the point of impact on the
of the two colliding vehicles. It does not arise where a passenger
highway with excellent visibility factor would be 80 to 90 kms. per
demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual
hour, as this is the place where buses would make up for lost time
obligations. For it would be inequitable to exempt the negligent
in traversing busy city streets.
driver of the jeepney and its owners on the ground that the other
driver was likewise guilty of negligence." This was Our ruling in
Anuran, et al. v. Buño et al., G.R. Nos. L-21353 and L-21354, May Still, We are not convinced. It cannot be said that the bus was
20, 1966, 17 SCRA 224. 1 Thus, the respondent court erred in travelling at a fast speed when the accident occurred because the
applying said doctrine. speed of 80 to 90 kilometers per hour, assuming such calculation
to be correct, is yet within the speed limit allowed in highways.
We cannot even fault delos Reyes for not having avoided the
On the presumption that drivers who bump the rear of another
collision. As aforestated, the jeepney left a skid mark of about 45
vehicle guilty and the cause of the accident, unless contradicted
meters, measured from the time its right rear wheel was
by other evidence, the respondent court said (p. 49, Rollo):
detached up to the point of collision. Delos Reyes must have
noticed the perilous condition of the jeepney from the time its
. . . the jeepney had already executed a complete turnabout and right rear wheel was detached or some 90 meters away,
at the time of impact was already facing the western side of the considering that the road was straight and points 200 meters
road. Thus the jeepney assumed a new frontal position vis a vis, north and south of the point of collision, visible and unobstructed.
the bus, and the bus assumed a new role of defensive driving. Delos Reyes admitted that he was running more or less 50
The spirit behind the presumption of guilt on one who bumps the kilometers per hour at the time of the accident. Using this speed,
rear end of another vehicle is for the driver following a vehicle to delos Reyes covered the distance of 45 meters in 3.24 seconds. If
be at all times prepared of a pending accident should the driver in We adopt the speed of 80 kilometers per hour, delos Reyes would
front suddenly come to a full stop, or change its course either have covered that distance in only 2.025 seconds. Verily, he had
through change of mind of the front driver, mechanical trouble, or little time to react to the situation. To require delos Reyes to
to avoid an accident. The rear vehicle is given the responsibility of avoid the collision is to ask too much from him. Aside from the
avoiding a collision with the front vehicle for it is the rear vehicle time element involved, there were no options available to him. As
who has full control of the situation as it is in a position to the trial court remarked (pp. 107-108, Record on Appeal):
observe the vehicle in front of it.
. . . They (plaintiffs) tried to impress this Court that defendant de
The above discussion would have been correct were it not for the los Reyes, could have taken either of two options: (1) to swerve
undisputed fact that the U-turn made by the jeepney was abrupt to its right (western shoulder) or (2) to swerve to its left (eastern
(Exhibit "K," Pascua). The jeepney, which was then traveling on lane), and thus steer clear of the Mangune jeepney. This Court
the eastern shoulder, making a straight, skid mark of does not so believe, considering the existing exigencies of space
approximately 35 meters, crossed the eastern lane at a sharp and time.
angle, making a skid mark of approximately 15 meters from the
eastern shoulder to the point of impact (Exhibit "K" Pascua).
As to the first option, Phil. Rabbit's evidence is convincing and
Hence, delos Reyes could not have anticipated the sudden U-turn
unrebutted that the Western shoulder of the road was narrow and
executed by Manalo. The respondent court did not realize that the
had tall grasses which would indicate that it was not passable.
presumption was rebutted by this piece of evidence.
Even plaintiffs own evidence, the pictures (Exhs. P and P-2,
Pascua) are mute confirmation of such fact. Indeed, it can be
With regard to the substantial factor test, it was the opinion of the noticed in the picture (Exh. P-2, Pascua) after the Rabbit bus
respondent court that (p. 52, Rollo): came to a full stop, it was tilted to right front side, its front
wheels resting most probably on a canal on a much lower
elevation that of the shoulder or paved road. It too shows that all
. . . It is the rule under the substantial factor test that if the of the wheels of the Rabbit bus were clear of the roadway except
actor's conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about harm to the outer left rear wheel. These observation appearing in said
another, the fact that the actor neither foresaw nor should have picture (Exh P-2, Pascua) clearly shows coupled with the finding
foreseen the extent of the harm or the manner in which it the Rabbit bus came to a full stop only five meters from the point
occurred does not prevent him from being liable (Restatement, of impact (see sketch, Exh. K-Pascua) clearly show that driver de
Torts, 2d). Here, We find defendant bus running at a fast speed los Reyes veered his Rabbit bus to the right attempt to avoid
when the accident occurred and did not even make the slightest hitting the Mangune's jeepney. That it was not successful in fully

55
clearing the Mangune jeepney as its (Rabbit's) left front hit said the contract to his driver nor share it with him, for his driver's
jeepney (see picture Exh. 10-A-Rabbit) must have been due to negligence is his. 4 Secondly, if We make the driver jointly and
limitations of space and time. severally liable with the carrier, that would make the carrier's
liability personal instead of merely vicarious and consequently,
entitled to recover only the share which corresponds to the driver,
Plaintiffs alternatively claim that defendant delos Reyes of the
5 contradictory to the explicit provision of Article 2181 of the New
Rabbit bus could also have swerved to its left (eastern lane) to
Civil Code. 6
avoid bumping the Mangune jeepney which was then on the
western lane. Such a claim is premised on the hypothesis (sic)
that the eastern lane was then empty. This claim would appear to We affirm the amount of damages adjudged by the trial court,
be good copy of it were based alone on the sketch made after the except with respect to the indemnity for loss of life. Under Article
collision. Nonetheless, it loses force it one were to consider the 1764 in relation to Article 2206 of the New Civil Code, the amount
time element involved, for moments before that, the Mangune of damages for the death of a passenger is at least three
jeepney was crossing that very eastern lane at a sharp angle. thousand pesos (P3,000.00). The prevailing jurisprudence has
Under such a situation then, for driver delos Reyes to swerve to increased the amount of P3,000.00 to P30,000.00 (see Heirs of
the eastern lane, he would run the greater risk of running smack Amparo delos Santos, et al. v. Honorable Court of Appeals, et al.,
in the Mangune jeepney either head on or broadside. G.R. No. 51165, June 21, 1990 citing De Lima v. Laguna Tayabas
Co., G.R. Nos. L-35697-99, April 15, 1988, 160 SCRA 70).
After a minute scrutiny of the factual matters and duly proven
evidence, We find that the proximate cause of the accident was ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of
the negligence of Manalo and spouses Mangune and Carreon. the Intermediate Appellate Court dated July 29, 1983 and its
They all failed to exercise the precautions that are needed resolution dated November 28, 1983 are SET ASIDE. The decision
precisely pro hac vice. of the Court of First Instance dated December 27, 1978 is
REINSTATED MODIFICATION that only Isidro Mangune, Guillerma
Carreon and Filriters Guaranty Assurance Corporation, Inc. are
In culpa contractual, the moment a passenger dies or is injured,
liable to the victims or their heirs and that the amount of
the carrier is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
indemnity for loss of life is increased to thirty thousand pesos
negligently, and this disputable presumption may only be
(P30,000.00).
overcome by evidence that he had observed extra-ordinary
diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733, 1755 and 1756 of the
New Civil Code 2 or that the death or injury of the passenger was SO ORDERED.
due to a fortuitous event 3 (Lasam v. Smith, Jr., 45 Phil. 657).

The negligence of Manalo was proven during the trial by the

unrebutted testimonies of Caridad Pascua, Police Investigator
Tacpal, Police Corporal Cacalda, his (Manalo's) conviction for the
crime of Multiple Homicide and Multiple Serious Injuries with
Damage to Property thru Reckless Imprudence, and the
application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur supra. The
negligence of spouses Mangune and Carreon was likewise proven
during the trial (p. 110, Record on Appeal):

To escape liability, defendants Mangune and Carreon offered to

show thru their witness Natalio Navarro, an alleged mechanic,
that he periodically checks and maintains the jeepney of said
defendants, the last on Dec. 23, the day before the collision,
which included the tightening of the bolts. This notwithstanding
the right rear wheel of the vehicle was detached while in transit.
As to the cause thereof no evidence was offered. Said defendant
did not even attempt to explain, much less establish, it to be one
caused by a caso fortuito. . . .

In any event, "[i]n an action for damages against the carrier for
his failure to safely carry his passenger to his destination, an
accident caused either by defects in the automobile or through
the negligence of its driver, is not a caso fortuito which would
avoid the carriers liability for damages (Son v. Cebu Autobus
Company, 94 Phil. 892 citing Lasam, et al. v. Smith, Jr., 45 Phil.
657; Necesito, etc. v. Paras, et al., 104 Phil. 75).

The trial court was therefore right in finding that Manalo and
spouses Mangune and Carreon were negligent. However, its ruling
that spouses Mangune and Carreon are jointly and severally liable
with Manalo is erroneous The driver cannot be held jointly and
severally liable with the carrier in case of breach of the contract of
carriage. The rationale behind this is readily discernible. Firstly,
the contract of carriage is between the carrier and the passenger,
and in the event of contractual liability, the carrier is exclusively
responsible therefore to the passenger, even if such breach be
due to the negligence of his driver (see Viluan v. The Court of
Appeals, et al., G.R. Nos. L-21477-81, April 29, 1966, 16 SCRA
742). In other words, the carrier can neither shift his liability on

56
G.R. No. 155791. March 16, 2005 Lungs – hyperinflated, heavy and readily pits on pressure; section
contains bloody froth.
MELBA QUINTO, Petitioners,
vs. Brain – autolyzed and liquefied.
DANTE ANDRES and RANDYVER PACHECO, Respondents.
Stomach – partly autolyzed.
DECISION
CAUSE OF DEATH: Asphyxia by drowning; traumatic head
CALLEJO, SR., J.: injuries, contributory.9

At around 7:30 a.m. on November 13, 1995, eleven-year-old The NBI filed a criminal complaint for homicide against
Edison Garcia, a Grade 4 elementary school pupil, and his respondents Andres and Pacheco in the Office of the Provincial
playmate, Wilson Quinto, who was also about eleven years old, Prosecutor, which found probable cause for homicide by dolo
were at Barangay San Rafael, Tarlac, Tarlac. They saw against the two.
respondents Dante Andres and Randyver Pacheco by the mouth of
a drainage culvert. Andres and Pacheco invited Wilson to go
An Information was later filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
fishing with them inside the drainage culvert.1 Wilson assented.
of Tarlac, Tarlac, charging the respondents with homicide. The
When Garcia saw that it was dark inside, he opted to remain
accusatory portion reads:
seated in a grassy area about two meters from the entrance of
the drainage system.2
That at around 8 o’clock in the morning of November 13, 1995, in
the Municipality of Tarlac, Province of Tarlac, Philippines, and
Respondent Pacheco had a flashlight. He, along with respondent
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused
Andres and Wilson, entered the drainage system which was
Dante Andres and Randyver Pacheco y Suliven @ Randy,
covered by concrete culvert about a meter high and a meter wide,
conspiring, confederating, and helping one another, did then and
with water about a foot deep.3 After a while, respondent Pacheco,
there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault, and
who was holding a fish, came out of the drainage system and left4
maul Wilson Quinto inside a culvert where the three were fishing,
without saying a word. Respondent Andres also came out, went
causing Wilson Quinto to drown and die.
back inside, and emerged again, this time, carrying Wilson who
was already dead. Respondent Andres laid the boy’s lifeless body
down in the grassy area.5 Shocked at the sudden turn of events, CONTRARY TO LAW.10
Garcia fled from the scene.6 For his part, respondent Andres went
to the house of petitioner Melba Quinto, Wilson’s mother, and
informed her that her son had died. Melba Quinto rushed to the After presenting Garcia, the prosecution presented Dr. Dominic
drainage culvert while respondent Andres followed her.7 Aguda, who testified on direct examination that the hematoma at
the back of the victim’s head and the abrasion on the latter’s left
forearm could have been caused by a strong force coming from a
The cadaver of Wilson was buried without any autopsy thereon blunt instrument or object. The injuries in the larynx and trachea
having been conducted. The police authorities of Tarlac, Tarlac, also indicated that the victim died of drowning, as some muddy
did not file any criminal complaint against the respondents for particles were also found on the lumina of the larynx and trachea
Wilson’s death. ("Nakahigop ng putik"). Dr. Aguda stated that such injury could
be caused when a person is put under water by pressure or by
force.11 On cross-examination, Dr. Aguda declared that the
Two weeks thereafter, or on November 28, 1995, National Bureau
hematoma on the scalp was caused by a strong pressure or a
of Investigation (NBI) investigators took the sworn statements of
strong force applied to the scalp coming from a blunt instrument.
respondent Pacheco, Garcia and petitioner Quinto.8 Respondent
He also stated that the victim could have fallen, and that the
Pacheco alleged that he had never been to the drainage system
occipital portion of his head could have hit a blunt object.
catching fish with respondent Andres and Wilson. He also declared
that he saw Wilson already dead when he passed by the drainage
system while riding on his carabao. Dr. Aguda also declared that the 14x7-centimeter hematoma at
the back of Wilson’s head could have rendered the latter
unconscious, and, if he was thrown in a body of water, the boy
On February 29, 1996, the cadaver of Wilson was exhumed. Dr.
could have died by drowning.
Dominic Aguda of the NBI performed an autopsy thereon at the
cemetery and submitted his autopsy report containing the
following postmortem findings: In answer to clarificatory questions made by the court, the doctor
declared that the 4x3-centimeter abrasion on the right side of
Wilson’s face could have also been caused by rubbing against a
POSTMORTEM FINDINGS
concrete wall or pavement, or by contact with a rough surface. He
also stated that the trachea region was full of mud, but that there
Body in previously embalmed, early stage of decomposition, was no sign of strangulation.12
attired with white long sleeves and dark pants and placed inside a
wooden coffin in a niche-apartment style.
After the prosecution had presented its witnesses and the
respondents had admitted the pictures showing the drainage
Hematoma, 14.0 x 7.0 cms., scalp, occipital region. system including the inside portions thereof,13 the prosecution
rested its case.
Abrasion, 4.0 x 3.0 cms., right face, 5.0 x 3.0 cms., left forearm.

Laryngo – tracheal lumina – congested and edematous containing

muddy particles with bloody path.

57
The respondents filed a demurer to evidence which the trial court death of her son and, as such, are jointly and severally liable
granted on the ground of insufficiency of evidence, per its Order therefor.
dated January 28, 1998. It also held that it could not hold the
respondents liable for damages because of the absence of
In their comment on the petition, the respondents aver that since
preponderant evidence to prove their liability for Wilson’s death.
the prosecution failed to adduce any evidence to prove that they
committed the crime of homicide and caused the death of Wilson,
The petitioner appealed the order to the Court of Appeals (CA) they are not criminally and civilly liable for the latter’s death.
insofar as the civil aspect of the case was concerned. In her brief,
she averred that –
The petition has no merit.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASE AND IN

Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. 17
RULING THAT NO PREPONDERANT EVIDENCE EXISTS TO HOLD
The civil liability of such person established in Articles 100, 102
ACCUSED-APPELLEES CIVILLY LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF THE
and 103 of the Revised Penal Code includes restitution, reparation
VICTIM WILSON QUINTO.14
of the damage caused, and indemnification for consequential
damages.18 When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for
The CA rendered judgment affirming the assailed order of the RTC the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall
on December 21, 2001. It ruled as follows: be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended
party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it
separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal
The acquittal in this case is not merely based on reasonable doubt
action.19 With the implied institution of the civil action in the
but rather on a finding that the accused-appellees did not commit
criminal action, the two actions are merged into one composite
the criminal acts complained of. Thus, pursuant to the above rule
proceeding, with the criminal action predominating the civil.20
and settled jurisprudence, any civil action ex delicto cannot
prosper. Acquittal in a criminal action bars the civil action arising
therefrom where the judgment of acquittal holds that the accused The prime purpose of the criminal action is to punish the offender
did not commit the criminal acts imputed to them. (Tan v. in order to deter him and others from committing the same or
Standard Vacuum Oil Co., 91 Phil. 672)15 similar offense, to isolate him from society, to reform and
rehabilitate him or, in general, to maintain social order.21 The sole
purpose of the civil action is the restitution, reparation or
The petitioner filed the instant petition for review and raised the
indemnification of the private offended party for the damage or
following issues:
injury he sustained by reason of the delictual or felonious act of
the accused.22 While the prosecution must prove the guilt of the
I accused beyond reasonable doubt for the crime charged, it is
required to prove the cause of action of the private complainant
against the accused for damages and/or restitution.
WHETHER OR NOT THE EXTINCTION OF RESPONDENTS’
CRIMINAL LIABILITY, LIKEWISE, CARRIES WITH IT THE
EXTINCTION OF THEIR CIVIL LIABILITY. The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the
extinction of the civil action. However, the civil action based on
delict shall be deemed extinguished if there is a finding in a final
II judgment in the civil action that the act or omission from where
the civil liability may arise does not exist.23
WHETHER OR NOT PREPONDERANT EVIDENCE EXISTS TO HOLD
RESPONDENTS CIVILLY LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF WILSON Moreover, a person committing a felony is criminally liable for all
QUINTO.16 the natural and logical consequences resulting therefrom although
the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.24
The petitioner avers that the trial court indulged in mere "Natural" refers to an occurrence in the ordinary course of human
possibilities, surmises and speculations when it held that Wilson life or events, while "logical" means that there is a rational
died because (a) he could have fallen, his head hitting the stones connection between the act of the accused and the resulting
in the drainage system since the culvert was slippery; or (b) he injury or damage. The felony committed must be the proximate
might have been bitten by a snake which he thought was the cause of the resulting injury. Proximate cause is that cause which
prick of a fish fin, causing his head to hit hard on the top of the in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an efficient
culvert; or (c) he could have lost consciousness due to some intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the
ailment, such as epilepsy. The petitioner also alleges that the trial result would not have occurred. The proximate legal cause is that
court erred in ruling that the prosecution failed to prove any ill acting first and producing the injury, either immediately, or by
motive on the part of the respondents to kill the victim, and in setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and
considering that respondent Andres even informed her of Wilson’s continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection
death. with its immediate predecessor.25

The petitioner posits that the trial court ignored the testimony of There must be a relation of "cause and effect," the cause being
the Medico-Legal Expert, Dr. Aguda; the nature, location and the felonious act of the offender, the effect being the resultant
number of the injuries sustained by the victim which caused his injuries and/or death of the victim. The "cause and effect"
death; as well as the locus criminis. The petitioner insists that the relationship is not altered or changed because of the pre-existing
behavior of the respondents after the commission of the crime conditions, such as the pathological condition of the victim (las
betrayed their guilt, considering that respondent Pacheco left the condiciones patologica del lesionado); the predisposition of the
scene, leaving respondent Andres to bring out Wilson’s cadaver, offended party (la predisposicion del ofendido); the physical
while respondent Andres returned inside the drainage system only condition of the offended party (la constitucion fisica del herido);
when he saw Garcia seated in the grassy area waiting for his or the concomitant or concurrent conditions, such as the
friend Wilson to come out. negligence or fault of the doctors (la falta de medicos para sister
al herido); or the conditions supervening the felonious act such as
tetanus, pulmonary infection or gangrene.26
The petitioner contends that there is preponderant evidence on
record to show that either or both the respondents caused the
58
The felony committed is not the proximate cause of the resulting preponderance of evidence or superior weight of evidence.
injury when: Although the evidence adduced by the plaintiff is stronger than
that presented by the defendant, he is not entitled to a judgment
if his evidence is not sufficient to sustain his cause of action. The
(a) there is an active force that intervened between the felony
plaintiff must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not
committed and the resulting injury, and the active force is a
upon the weakness of that of the defendants’.35
distinct act or fact absolutely foreign from the felonious act of the
accused; or
Section 1, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Evidence provides
how preponderance of evidence is determined:
(b) the resulting injury is due to the intentional act of the victim.27

Section 1. Preponderance of evidence, how determined. – In civil

If a person inflicts a wound with a deadly weapon in such a
cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his
manner as to put life in jeopardy and death follows as a
case by a preponderance of evidence. In determining where the
consequence of their felonious act, it does not alter its nature or
preponderance or superior weight of evidence on the issues
diminish its criminality to prove that other causes cooperated in
involved lies, the court may consider all the facts and
producing the factual result. The offender is criminally liable for
circumstance of the case, the witnesses’ manner of testifying,
the death of the victim if his delictual act caused, accelerated or
their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the
contributed to the death of the victim.28 A different doctrine would
facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which
tend to give immunity to crime and to take away from human life
they testify, the probability of their testimony, their interest or
a salutary and essential safeguard.29 This Court has emphasized
want of interest, and also their personal credibility so far as the
that:
same may legitimately appear upon the trial. The court may also
consider the number of witnesses, though the preponderance is
… Amid the conflicting theories of medical men, and the not necessarily with the greater number.36
uncertainties attendant upon the treatment of bodily ailments and
injuries, it would be easy in many cases of homicide to raise a
In the present case, we rule that, as held by the trial court and
doubt as to the immediate cause of death, and thereby to open a
the CA, the prosecution failed to adduce preponderant evidence to
wide door by which persons guilty of the highest crime might
prove the facts on which the civil liability of the respondents rest,
escape conviction and punishment. …30
i.e., that the petitioner has a cause of action against the
respondents for damages.
In People v. Quianzon,31 the Supreme Court held:
It bears stressing that the prosecution relied solely on the
… The Supreme Court of Spain, in a Decision of April 3, 1879, said collective testimonies of Garcia, who was not an eyewitness, and
in a case similar to the present, the following: Inasmuch as a man Dr. Aguda.
is responsible for the consequences of his act – and in this case,
the physical condition and temperament of the offended party
We agree with the petitioner that, as evidenced by the Necropsy
nowise lessen the evil, the seriousness whereof is to be judged,
Report of Dr. Dominic Aguda, the deceased sustained a 14x7-
not by the violence of the means employed, but by the result
centimeter hematoma on the scalp. But as to how the deceased
actually produced; and as the wound which the appellant inflicted
sustained the injury, Dr. Aguda was equivocal. He presented two
upon the deceased was the cause which determined his death,
possibilities: (a) that the deceased could have been hit by a blunt
without his being able to counteract its effects, it is evident that
object or instrument applied with full force; or (b) the deceased
the act in question should be qualified as homicide, etc.32
could have slipped, fell hard and his head hit a hard object:

In the present case, the respondents were charged with homicide

COURT:
by dolo. In People v. Delim,33 the Court delineated the burden of
the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused for homicide or
murder: The Court would ask questions.

In the case at bar, the prosecution was burdened to prove the Q So it is possible that the injury, that is – the hematoma, caused
corpus delicti which consists of two things: first, the criminal act on the back of the head might be due to the victim’s falling on his
and second, defendant’s agency in the commission of the act. back and his head hitting a pavement?
Wharton says that corpus delicti includes two things: first, the
objective; second, the subjective element of crimes. In homicide
A Well, the 14x7-centimeter hematoma is quite extensive, so if
(by dolo) and in murder cases, the prosecution is burdened to
the fall is strong enough and would fall from a high place and hit a
prove: (a) the death of the party alleged to be dead; (b) that the
concrete pavement, then it is possible.
death was produced by the criminal act of some other than the
deceased and was not the result of accident, natural cause or
suicide; and (c) that defendant committed the criminal act or was Q Is it possible that if the victim slipped on a concrete pavement
in some way criminally responsible for the act which produced the and the head hit the pavement, the injury might be caused by
death. To prove the felony of homicide or murder, there must be that slipping?
incontrovertible evidence, direct or circumstantial, that the victim
was deliberately killed (with malice); in other words, that there
was intent to kill. Such evidence may consist inter alia in the use A It is also possible.
of weapons by the malefactors, the nature, location and number
of wounds sustained by the victim and the words uttered by the Q So when the victim was submerged under water while
malefactors before, at the time or immediately after the killing of unconscious, it is possible that he might have taken in some mud
the victim. If the victim dies because of a deliberate act of the or what?
malefactor, intent to kill is conclusively presumed.34

A Yes, Sir.
Insofar as the civil aspect of the case is concerned, the
prosecution or the private complainant is burdened to adduce

59
Q So it is your finding that the victim was submerged while still respondents Andres and Pacheco inside.41 Respondent Andres had
breathing? no flashlight; only respondent Pacheco had one.

A Yes, Your Honor, considering that the finding on the lung also Moreover, Dr. Aguda failed to testify and explain what might have
would indicate that the victim was still alive when he was placed caused the abrasion on the left forearm of the deceased. He,
under water.37 likewise, failed to testify whether the abrasions on the face and
left forearm of the victim were made ante mortem or post
mortem.
The doctor also admitted that the abrasion on the right side of the
victim’s face could have been caused by rubbing against a
concrete wall or pavement: The petitioner even failed to adduce preponderance of evidence
that either or both the respondents hit the deceased with a blunt
object or instrument, and, consequently, any blunt object or
Q The abrasion 4x3 centimeters on the right [side of the] face,
instrument that might have been used by any or both of the
would it be caused by the face rubbing against a concrete wall or
respondents in hitting the deceased.
pavement?

It is of judicial notice that nowadays persons have killed or

A Yes, Sir. Abrasion is usually caused by a contact of a skin to a
committed serious crimes for no reason at all. 42 However, the
rough surface.
absence of any ill-motive to kill the deceased is relevant and
admissible in evidence to prove that no violence was perpetrated
Q Rough surface? on the person of the deceased. In this case, the petitioner failed
to adduce proof of any ill-motive on the part of either respondent
to kill the deceased before or after the latter was invited to join
A Yes, Your Honor. them in fishing. Indeed, the petitioner testified that respondent
Andres used to go to their house and play with her son before the
Q When you say that the trachea region was full of mud, were latter’s death:
there no signs that the victim was strangled?
Q Do you know this Dante Andres personally?
A There was no sign of strangulation, Your Honor.38
A Not much but he used to go to our house and play with my son
The trial court gave credence to the testimony of Dr. Aguda that after going from her mother who is gambling, Sir.
the deceased might have slipped, causing the latter to fall hard
and hit his head on the pavement, thus: Q But you are acquainted with him, you know his face?

Q -Could it be possible, Doctor, that this injury might have been A Yes, Sir.
caused when the victim fell down and that portion of the body or
occipital portion hit a blunt object and might have been inflicted
as a result of falling down? Q Will you please look around this courtroom and see if he is
around?
A - If the fall … if the victim fell and he hit a hard object, well, it is
also possible.39 A (Witness is pointing to Dante Andres, who is inside the
courtroom.)43
The trial court took into account the following facts:
When the petitioner’s son died inside the drainage culvert, it was
respondent Andres who brought out the deceased. He then
Again, it could be seen from the pictures presented by the informed the petitioner of her son’s death. Even after informing
prosecution that there were stones inside the culvert. (See Exhibit the petitioner of the death of her son, respondent Andres followed
"D" to "D-3"). The stones could have caused the victim to slip and the petitioner on her way to the grassy area where the deceased
hit his head on the pavement. Since there was water on the was:
culvert, the portion soaked with water must be very slippery,
aside from the fact that the culvert is round. If the victim hit his
head and lost consciousness, he will naturally take in some Q Did not Dante Andres follow you?
amount of water and drown.40
A He went with me, Sir.
The CA affirmed on appeal the findings of the trial court, as well
as its conclusion based on the said findings.
Q So when you went to the place where your son was lying,
Dante Andres was with you?
We agree with the trial and appellate courts. The general rule is
that the findings of facts of the trial court, its assessment of
A No, Sir. When I was informed by Dante Andres that my son was
probative weight of the evidence of the parties, and its conclusion
there at the culvert, I ran immediately. He [was] just left behind
anchored on such findings, affirmed no less by the CA, are given
and he just followed, Sir.
conclusive effect by this Court, unless the trial court ignored,
misapplied or misconstrued cogent facts and circumstances which,
if considered, would change the outcome of the case. The Q So when you reached the place where your son was lying down,
petitioner failed to show any justification to warrant a reversal of Dante Andres also came or arrived?
the findings or conclusions of the trial and appellate courts.
A It was only when we boarded the jeep that he arrived, Sir.44
That the deceased fell or slipped cannot be totally foreclosed
because even Garcia testified that the drainage culvert was dark,
and that he himself was so afraid that he refused to join
60
In sum, the petitioner failed to adduce preponderance of evidence
to prove a cause of action for damages based on the deliberate
acts alleged in the Information.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for

lack of merit. No costs.

SO ORDERED

61
G.R. No. L-25913             February 29, 1969 From this amended decision, only petitioners have appealed to
Us. The prayer in their petition for certiorari asks for nothing more
than that the amended decision of the Court of Appeals be
HEIRS OF RAYMUNDO CASTRO, petitioners,
revoked and reversed, and its original decision be affirmed in toto
vs.
insofar as the award of indemnity and damages is concerned.
APOLONIO BUSTOS, respondent.
Since We find the grounds of the appeal meritorious, We grant
fully the prayer in the petition.
BARREDO, J.:
This case affords this Court as appropriate an opportunity, as any
Appeal from the Court of Appeals. other, to restate, in a more comprehensive way, the law
regarding the items of damages that are recoverable in cases of
death caused by a crime, whether the claim therefor is made in
Respondent Apolonio Bustos was charged in the Court of First the criminal proceedings itself or in a separate civil action. In the
Instance of Pampanga on October 26, 1962 with the crime of instant case, recovery of such damages is being sought in the
murder for the killing of Raymundo Castro whose heirs are now criminal proceedings but even if it were claimed otherwise, the
the petitioners. The trial court found Bustos guilty only of indemnity and damages would be the same, for generally, the
homicide and, crediting him with two mitigating circumstances, items of damages are identical in both procedures, except with
namely, passion or obfuscation and voluntary surrender, respect to attorney's fees and expenses of litigation which can be
sentenced him to an indeterminate prison term of 2 years, 4 awarded only when a separate civil action is instituted. (Art.
months and 1 day of prision correccional, as minimum, to 8 years 2208, Civil Code) With the clarifications We are making herein, at
and 1 day of prision mayor, as maximum, and to indemnify the least the writer of this opinion expects that litigations regarding
petitioners, who were represented in the case by a private the aspects of the law herein passed upon may be minimized.
prosecutor, in the sum of six thousand pesos (P6,000) "without
prejudice to whatever the accused (respondent) is entitled from
the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) for his services As a start, it is to be noted that in the matter of damages, the
of around twenty-six (26) years as a public school teacher, prior original decision of the Court of Appeals, while correct in making a
to October 20, 1962." Both respondent and petitioners appealed particularization in the award of indemnity and damages,
to the Court of Appeals, respondent asking that appellate, court nonetheless, still failed to comply strictly with the constitutional
acquit him and petitioners praying, on the other hand, that requirement that all decisions of courts of record must state both
respondent be convicted of murder, that the portion regarding the facts and the law on which they are based. (Sec. 12, Art. VIII,
what said respondent will receive from the GSIS be deleted and Constitution) In said original decision, the Court of Appeals held:
that he be ordered to pay petitioners "the aggregate sum of
P50,764.00 as indemnity and actual, moral, temperate and
Coming now to the damages asked by the heirs of the deceased:
exemplary damages." For the purposes of their appeal, petitioners
Aside from the P6,000.00 indemnity awarded by the trial court
even filed unnecessarily a printed record on appeal. On October
which we uphold, we feel justified, in the exercise of our
18, 1965, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment modifying that
discretion, to award to the heirs of the deceased moral damages
of the trial court insofar as it concerned (1) the amount of
in the amount of P6,000 plus P13,380.00 to compensate for the
damages to be awarded petitioners thus:
loss of earning of the decedent at the annual salary of P2,676.00
(Exh. V; p. 42 t.s.n. Vergara).
... Aside from the P6,000 indemnity awarded by the trial court,
which we uphold, we feel justified, in the exercise of our
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is modified as above
discretion, to award to the heirs of the deceased moral damages
indicated in so far as it concerns the amount of indemnity and
in the amount of P6,000 plus P13,380.00 to compensate for the
damages to be awarded to the heirs of the deceased, and the
loss of earning of the decedent at the annual salary of
mitigating circumstance of vindication of a grave offense which
P2,676.00 ....
takes the place of the circumstance of obfuscation appreciated by
the trial court; and affirmed in all other respects. Costs against
and (2) the mitigating circumstance of "obfuscation", appreciated the appellant.
as such by the trial court, which was changed to "vindication of a
grave offense", but affirming it in all other respects. Upon motion,
As can be seen, no legal or factual basis is stated therein for the
however, of respondent for the reconsideration of said decision,
award of indemnity and damages to petitioners; worse, the
reiterating his plea for acquittal, or, in the alternative, praying for
impression is given that the said award is purely a matter of
the elimination of the award of moral and compensatory
discretion on the part of the court. Clearly, this is not in
damages, the Court of Appeals promulgated on November 13,
accordance with the law. Indeed, it must have been this failure to
1965, an amended decision, the pertinent portions of which are:
refer to the pertinent legal provisions which induced the appellate
court, at the mere invocation by respondent of Art. 2204 of the
The arguments interposed by the appellant in his Motion for Civil Code, to commit the error of readily eliminating in the
consideration to support the complete reversal of the judgment amended decision the items on moral damages and compensation
appealed from, have been considered and passed upon in our for loss of earning of the decedent which its original decision had
decision, and we see no reason to alter the same in so far as the correctly contained. Having held that it had discretion in the
appellant's guilt of the crime is concerned. On the other hand, we premises, the court easily yielded to the argument that simply
agree with the appellant that in the interest of justice and equity because it had credited the respondent with two mitigating
and in view of the presence of two mitigating circumstances, circumstances, it was already justified in eliminating the items of
without any aggravating one to offset them, the award of moral damages already adverted to, presumably having in mind said
and compensatory damages should be eliminated. Art. 2204 which provides that:

WHEREFORE, the decision promulgated October 18, 1965, is In crimes, the damages to be adjudicated may be respectively
hereby amended by eliminating therefrom the award of P6,000.00 increased or lessened according to the aggravating or mitigating
representing moral damages, and of P13,380.00 representing the circumstances.
decedent's loss of earnings.

62
Of course, this was clear error, inasmuch as construed literally or distinct from fines and shall be paid to the offended party," (Art.
otherwise, the quoted provision does not warrant a complete 2230). Exemplary damages cannot however be recovered as a
deletion of said items of damages. In any event the court matter of right; the court will decide whether or not they should
evidently failed to take into account that several other provisions be given. (Art. 2233)
can come into play considering the circumstances in this case.
In any event, save as expressly provided in connection with the
When the commission of a crime results in death, the civil indemnity for the sole fact of death (1st par., Art. 2206) and in
obligations arising therefrom are governed by the penal laws, "... cases wherein exemplary damages are awarded precisely because
subject to the provisions of Art. 2177, and of the pertinent of the attendance of aggravating circumstances, (Art. 2230) "...
provisions of Chapter 2, Preliminary Title on Human Relations, damages to be adjudicated may be respectively increased or
and of Title XVIII of this Book (Book IV) regulating damages." lessened according to the aggravating or mitigating
(Art. 1161, Civil Code) circumstances," (Art. 2204) but "the party suffering the loss or
injury must exercise the diligence of a good father of a family to
minimize the damages resulting from the act or omisson in
Thus, "every person criminally liable for a felony is also civily
question." (Art. 2203) "Interest as a part of the damages, may, in
liable." (Art. 100, Revised Penal Code). This civil liability, in case
a proper case, be adjudicated in the discretion of the Court." (Art.
the felony involves death, includes indemnification for
2211) As to attorneys' fees and expenses of litigation, the same
consequential damages (Art. 104, id.) and said consequential
may be recovered only when exemplary damages have been
damages in turn include "... those suffered by his family or by a
granted (Art. 2208, par. 1) or, as We have already stated, when
third person by reason of the crime." (Art. 107, id.) Since these
there is a separate civil action.
provisions are subject, however, as above indicated, to certain
provisions of the Civil Code, We will now turn to said provisions.
Stated differently, when death occurs as a result of a crime, the
heirs of the deceased are entitled to the following items of
The general rule in the Civil Code is that:
damages:

In crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant shall be liable for all

1. As indemnity for the death of the victim of the offense —
damages which are the natural and probable consequences of the
P12,000.00, without the need of any evidence or proof of
act or omission complained of. It is not necessary that such
damages, and even though there may have been mitigating
damages have been foreseen or could have reasonably been
circumstances attending the commission of the offense.
foreseen by the defendant. (Art. 2202)

2. As indemnity for loss of earning capacity of the deceased — an

When, however, the crime committed involves death, there is Art.
amount to be fixed by the Court according to the circumstances of
2206 which provides thus:
the deceased related to his actual income at the time of death
and his probable life expectancy, the said indemnity to be
The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi- assessed and awarded by the court as a matter of duty, unless
delict shall be at least three thousand pesos, even though there the deceased had no earning capacity at said time on account of
may have been mitigating circumstances. In addition: permanent disability not caused by the accused. If the deceased
was obliged to give support, under Art. 291, Civil Code, the
recipient who is not an heir, may demand support from the
(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning accused for not more than five years, the exact duration to be
capacity of the deceased, and the indemnity shall be paid to the fixed by the court.
heirs of the latter; such indemnity shall in every case be assessed
and awarded by the court, unless the deceased on account of
permanent physical disability not caused by the defendant, had 3. As moral damages for mental anguish, — an amount to be
no earning capacity at the time of his death; fixed by the court. This may be recovered even by the illegitimate
descendants and ascendants of the deceased.
(2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according to the
provisions of article 291, the recipient who is not an heir called to 4. As exemplary damages, when the crime is attended by one or
the decedent's inheritance by law of testate or intestate more aggravating circumstances, — an amount to be fixed in the
succession may demand support from the person causing the discretion of the court, the same to be considered separate from
death, for a period not exceeding five years, the exact duration to fines.
be fixed by the court;
5. As attorney's fees and expresses of litigation, — the actual
(3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and amount thereof, (but only when a separate civil action to recover
ascendants of the deceased may demand moral damages for civil liability has been filed or when exemplary damages are
mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased. awarded).

The amount of P3,000 referred to in the above article has already 6. Interests in the proper cases.
been increased by this Court first, to P6,000.00 in People v.
Amansec, 80 Phil. 426, and lately to P12,000.00 in the case of
7. It must be emphasized that the indemnities for loss of earning
People v. Pantoja, G. R. No. L-18793, promulgated October 11,
capacity of the deceased and for moral damages are recoverable
1968, and it must be stressed that this amount, as well as the
separately from and in addition to the fixed sum of P12,000.00
amount of moral damages, may be adjudicated even without
corresponding to the indemnity for the sole fact of death, and that
proof of pecuniary loss, the assessment of the moral damages
these damages may, however, be respectively increased or
being "left to the discretion of the court, according to the
lessened according to the mitigating or aggravating
circumstances of each case." (Art. 2216)
circumstances, except items 1 and 4 above, for obvious reasons.

Exemplary damages may also be imposed as a part of this civil

In the light of the foregoing discussion, it is clear that the Court of
liability when the crime has been committed with one or more
Appeals erred in eliminating in its amended decision, the items of
aggravating circumstances, such damages being "separate and
moral damages and compensation for loss of earning capacity of

63
the deceased. Indeed, as to the award of moral damages in case whether death results from a crime or a quasi-delict or a breach
of death, this Court has already held in Mercado v. Lira, etc., G. of the contract of common carriage.
R. Nos. L-13328-29, September 29, 1961, that once the heirs of
the deceased claim moral damages and are able to prove they are
As to the amount of the indemnity for moral damages and loss of
entitled thereto, it becomes the duty of the court to make the
earning capacity of the deceased in the present case, the original
award. We held:
decision of the Court of Appeals awarding them, does not afford
sufficient basis for Us to increase the amounts fixed by said court,
Art. 2206 states further that "In addition" to the amount of at as prayed for by appellants. As has already been stated, the said
least P3,000.00 to be awarded for the death of a passenger, the decision failed to follow the Constitution, not only in not stating
spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the law on which it is based but also in not making the necessary
the deceased may demand moral damages as a consequence of findings of fact on which it based its discretion in fixing the
the death of their deceased kin, which simply means that once respective amounts it awarded for moral and compensatory
the above-mentioned heirs of the deceased claim compensation damages. Legally, therefore, We can, if We wish to, return this
for moral damages and are able to prove that they are entitled to case to that court for it to supply these constitutional omissions.
such award, it becomes the duty of the court to award moral We opt however, to save time and further difficulties for and
damages to the claimant in an amount commensurate with the damages to, the petitioners. Extant in the records before Us is the
mental anguish suffered by them. fact that the respondent has never disputed that petitioners are
the widow and seven children of the deceased, three of whom
were still minors at the time of his death, nor that the said
This doctrine was reiterated in Maranan v. Perez, G. R. No. L-
deceased was a public school teacher, 56 years old, and earning
22272, June 26, 1967:
P2,276.00 a year. These facts appear to have been repeatedly
asserted in the briefs of petitioners in the Court of Appeals and in
In connection with the award of damages, the court a quo granted this Court. No denial was ever made by the respondent. When
only P3,000 to plaintiff-appellant. This is the minimum respondent moved for the reconsideration of the original decision
compensatory damages amount recoverable under Art. 1764 in of the Court of Appeals, (Annex E of Petition for Certiorari) he
connection with Art. 2206 of the Civil Code when a breach of only argued that in view of the mitigating circumstances credited
contract results in the passenger's death. As has been the policy to him by said court, petitioners were not entitled to moral
followed by this Court, this minimal award should be increased to damages and to indemnity for loss of earning capacity of the
P6,000 .... Still, Art. 2206 and 1764 award moral damages in deceased; the amounts fixed therefor by said court — he never
addition to compensatory damages, to the parents of the questioned. When petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration
passenger killed to compensate for the mental anguish they of the amended decision of the Court of Appeals, these facts
suffered. A claim therefor, having been properly made, it becomes (relationship, earnings, etc.) were reiterated. (Annex G, id.)
the court's duty to award moral damages. Plaintiff demands Respondent did not file any answer to said motion despite the
P5,000 as moral damages; however, in the circumstances, We resolution requiring him to do so. (Par. 12, Petition for Certiorari)
consider P3,000 moral damages, in addition to the P6,000 Neither has respondent filed any brief in the present instance,
damages aforestated, as sufficient. Interest upon such damages notwithstanding repeated requests on his part for extension to file
are also due to plaintiff-appellant. the same, which, incidentally, were all granted. Under these
circumstances, We feel justified in brushing aside strict
technicalities of procedure in order to accomplish substantial
Likewise, in the matter of the compensatory damages for the loss justice more expeditiously. Anyway, as We said at the outset,
of earning capacity of the deceased, We also held in the case of petitioners are asking Us, in the prayer of their petition for
Daniel Bulante v. Chu Liante, G.R. Nos. L- 21583 and L-21591-92, certiorari, for nothing more than to affirm "in toto" the original
May 20, 1968 that: decision of the Court of Appeals, and in their lone assignment of
error in the present instance, their only claim is that "the Court of
The next item objected to refers to the damages awarded to the Appeals erred when it issued the amended decision eliminating
heirs of the deceased passengers for loss of earning capacity, the award of P6,000 moral damages and the award of P13,380.00
separately from the indemnities by reason of death. The ground loss of earnings of the deceased Raymundo Castro." In these
for the objection is that loss of earning capacity was not circumstances, even if We should award the amounts of damages
specifically pleaded or claimed in the complaint. This item, just mentioned, inspite of the absence of the pertinent findings of
however, may be considered included in the prayer for "actual fact by the Court of Appeals, We would not have to reach beyond
damages" and for other "just and equitable reliefs", especially if amounts that are undisputed by the respondent.
taken in the light of Art. 2206, in connection with Art. 1764, of
the Civil Code, which allows, in addition to an indemnity of at We, therefore, overrule the prayer for additional damages in
least P3,000 by reason of death, recovery for loss of earning petitioners' brief and We hold that, on the basis of the facts not
capacity on the part of the deceased, the same to be paid to his questioned by respondent, they are entitled only to the P6,000.00
heirs "in every case ... unless the deceased on account of as moral damages and the P13,380.00 as compensatory damages
permanent physical disability not caused by the defendant, had for the loss of earning capacity of the deceased awarded in the
no earning capacity at the time of his death." original decision of the Court of Appeals in addition, of course, to
the indemnity for death fixed also by said court at P6,000.00. This
To be sure, these cases of Mercado v. Lira, Maranan v. Perez and amount of P6,000.00 We cannot increase to P12,000.00, as
Bulante v. Chu Liante from which We have quoted, were actions allowed in People v. Pantoja, supra, and the subsequent cases,
based on contracts of common carriers. But the above-mentioned (People v. Mongaya G. R. No. L-23708, October 31, 1968, and
doctrines are equally applicable to civil liability ex delicto because, People v. Ramos, G. R. No. L-19143, November 29, 1968)
after all, Art. 2206 of the Civil Code which was applied in said because in the instant suit, neither party has appealed in relation
cases is precisely the provision pertinent to liability arising from thereto. This case is now before Us on appeal by the offended
crimes (and quasi-delicts). No doubt, said Article must have been party only as to specific portions of the civil indemnity to be paid
relied upon by the court in the above cases only because Art. by the respondent. It would have been different if the whole
1764 of the Civil Code provides that said "Art. 2206 shall also criminal case were up for our review because then, even without
apply to the death of a passenger caused by the breach of any appeal on the part of the offended party, We could have still
contract of a common carrier." Accordingly, the interpretation increased the said liability of the accused, here-in respondent.
given to said article in those cases are applicable to the case at (See Mercado v. Lira, supra.)
bar. In other words, this must be so because under the Civil
Code, the same rules on damages are generally to be observed,

64
At this juncture, for the guidance of parties similarly situated as
petitioners herein, and so that there may be no useless expenses
in appeals by offended parties in regard to the civil aspect of a
criminal case when no separate civil action has been filed by
them, it should be made clear that when there is no such
separate civil action and the claim for civil indemnity is joined
with the criminal case, no record on appeal, whether printed,
typewritten or mimeographed, is necessary, except perhaps when
formal pleading raising complicated questions are filed in
connection therewith, and still, this would be purely optional on
the appellant because anyway the whole original record of the
case is elevated in appeals in criminal cases. It is already settled
that appeals relating to the civil aspects of a criminal case should
follow the procedure for appeal required by rules of criminal
procedure. (People vs. Lorredo, 50 Phil. 209, 220-221; People v.
ViIlanueva, G.R. No. L-18769, May 27, 1966)lawphi1.nêt

WHEREFORE, the amended decision of the Court of Appeals is

modified as hereinabove indicated, in so far as the civil liability of
respondent is concerned, with costs against him in this instance.

65
G.R. No. 102007 September 2, 1994 The civil liability, however, poses a problem. Such liability is
extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before
final judgment. Saddled upon us is the task of ascertaining the
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
legal import of the term "final judgment." Is it final judgment as
vs.
contradistinguished from an interlocutory order? Or, is it a
ROGELIO BAYOTAS y CORDOVA, accused-appellant.
judgment which is final and executory?

ROMERO, J.:
We go to the genesis of the law. The legal precept contained in
Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code heretofore transcribed is
In Criminal Case No. C-3217 filed before Branch 16, RTC Roxas lifted from Article 132 of the Spanish El Codigo Penal de 1870
City, Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova was charged with Rape and which, in part, recites:
eventually convicted thereof on June 19, 1991 in a decision
penned by Judge Manuel E. Autajay. Pending appeal of his
La responsabilidad penal se extingue.
conviction, Bayotas died on February 4, 1992 at
the National Bilibid Hospital due to cardio respiratory arrest
secondary to hepatic encephalopathy secondary to hipato 1. Por la muerte del reo en cuanto a las penas personales
carcinoma gastric malingering. Consequently, the Supreme Court siempre, y respecto a las pecuniarias, solo cuando a su
in its Resolution of May 20, 1992 dismissed the criminal aspect of fallecimiento no hubiere recaido sentencia firme.
the appeal. However, it required the Solicitor General to file its
comment with regard to Bayotas' civil liability arising from his
xxx xxx xxx
commission of the offense charged.

The code of 1870 . . . it will be observed employs the term

In his comment, the Solicitor General expressed his view that the
"sentencia firme." What is "sentencia firme" under the old
death of accused-appellant did not extinguish his civil liability as a
statute?
result of his commission of the offense charged. The Solicitor
General, relying on the case of People v. Sendaydiego 1 insists
that the appeal should still be resolved for the purpose of XXVIII Enciclopedia Juridica Española, p. 473, furnishes the ready
reviewing his conviction by the lower court on which the civil answer: It says:
liability is based.
SENTENCIA FIRME. La sentencia que adquiere la fuerza de las
Counsel for the accused-appellant, on the other hand, opposed definitivas por no haberse utilizado por las partes litigantes
the view of the Solicitor General arguing that the death of the recurso alguno contra ella dentro de los terminos y plazos legales
accused while judgment of conviction is pending appeal concedidos al efecto.
extinguishes both his criminal and civil penalties. In support of his
position, said counsel invoked the ruling of the Court of Appeals in
People v. Castillo and Ocfemia 2 which held that the civil "Sentencia firme" really should be understood as one which is
obligation in a criminal case takes root in the criminal liability and, definite. Because, it is only when judgment is such that, as
therefore, civil liability is extinguished if accused should die before Medina y Maranon puts it, the crime is confirmed — "en condena
final judgment is rendered. determinada;" or, in the words of Groizard, the guilt of the
accused becomes — "una verdad legal." Prior thereto, should the
accused die, according to Viada, "no hay legalmente, en tal caso,
We are thus confronted with a single issue: Does death of the ni reo, ni delito, ni responsabilidad criminal de ninguna clase."
accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguish his civil And, as Judge Kapunan well explained, when a defendant dies
liability? before judgment becomes executory, "there cannot be any
determination by final judgment whether or not the felony upon
which the civil action might arise exists," for the simple reason
In the aforementioned case of People v. Castillo, this issue was
that "there is no party defendant." (I Kapunan, Revised Penal
settled in the affirmative. This same issue posed therein was
Code, Annotated, p. 421. Senator Francisco holds the same view.
phrased thus: Does the death of Alfredo Castillo affect both his
Francisco, Revised Penal Code, Book One, 2nd ed., pp. 859-860)
criminal responsibility and his civil liability as a consequence of
the alleged crime?
The legal import of the term "final judgment" is similarly reflected
in the Revised Penal Code. Articles 72 and 78 of that legal body
It resolved this issue thru the following disquisition:
mention the term "final judgment" in the sense that it is already
enforceable. This also brings to mind Section 7, Rule 116 of the
Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is the controlling statute. It Rules of Court which states that a judgment in a criminal case
reads, in part: becomes final "after the lapse of the period for perfecting an
appeal or when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied
or served, or the defendant has expressly waived in writing his
Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. — Criminal
right to appeal."
liability is totally extinguished:

By fair intendment, the legal precepts and opinions here collected

1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and
funnel down to one positive conclusion: The term final judgment
as to the pecuniary penalties liability therefor is extinguished only
employed in the Revised Penal Code means judgment beyond
when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment;
recall. Really, as long as a judgment has not become executory, it
cannot be truthfully said that defendant is definitely guilty of the
With reference to Castillo's criminal liability, there is no question. felony charged against him.
The law is plain. Statutory construction is unnecessary. Said
liability is extinguished.
Not that the meaning thus given to final judgment is without
reason. For where, as in this case, the right to institute a separate
civil action is not reserved, the decision to be rendered must, of
66
necessity, cover "both the criminal and the civil aspects of the without final adjudication, the civil action of the offended party
case." People vs. Yusico (November 9, 1942), 2 O.G., No. 100, p. under Article 33 may yet be enforced separately.
964. See also: People vs. Moll, 68 Phil., 626, 634; Francisco,
Criminal Procedure, 1958 ed., Vol. I, pp. 234, 236. Correctly,
In Torrijos, the Supreme Court held that:
Judge Kapunan observed that as "the civil action is based solely
on the felony committed and of which the offender might be
found guilty, the death of the offender extinguishes the civil xxx xxx xxx
liability." I Kapunan, Revised Penal Code, Annotated, supra.
It should be stressed that the extinction of civil liability follows the
Here is the situation obtaining in the present case: Castillo's extinction of the criminal liability under Article 89, only when the
criminal liability is out. His civil liability is sought to be enforced civil liability arises from the criminal act as its only basis. Stated
by reason of that criminal liability. But then, if we dismiss, as we differently, where the civil liability does not exist independently of
must, the criminal action and let the civil aspect remain, we will the criminal responsibility, the extinction of the latter by death,
be faced with the anomalous situation whereby we will be called ipso facto extinguishes the former, provided, of course, that death
upon to clamp civil liability in a case where the source thereof — supervenes before final judgment. The said principle does not
criminal liability — does not exist. And, as was well stated in apply in instant case wherein the civil liability springs neither
Bautista, et al. vs. Estrella, et al., CA-G.R. solely nor originally from the crime itself but from a civil contract
No. 19226-R, September 1, 1958, "no party can be found and of purchase and sale. (Emphasis ours)
held criminally liable in a civil suit," which solely would remain if
we are to divorce it from the criminal proceeding."
x x x           x x x          x x x

This ruling of the Court of Appeals in the Castillo case 3 was

adopted by the Supreme Court in the cases of People of the In the above case, the court was convinced that the civil liability
Philippines v. Bonifacio Alison, et al., 4 People of the Philippines v. of the accused who was charged with estafa could likewise trace
Jaime Jose, et al. 5 and People of the Philippines v. Satorre 6 by its genesis to Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code since said
dismissing the appeal in view of the death of the accused pending accused had swindled the first and second vendees of the
appeal of said cases. property subject matter of the contract of sale. It therefore
concluded: "Consequently, while the death of the accused herein
extinguished his criminal liability including fine, his civil liability
As held by then Supreme Court Justice Fernando in the Alison based on the laws of human relations remains."
case:
Thus it allowed the appeal to proceed with respect to the civil
The death of accused-appellant Bonifacio Alison having been liability of the accused, notwithstanding the extinction of his
established, and considering that there is as yet no final judgment criminal liability due to his death pending appeal of his conviction.
in view of the pendency of the appeal, the criminal and civil
liability of the said accused-appellant Alison was extinguished by
his death (Art. 89, Revised Penal Code; Reyes' Criminal Law, To further justify its decision to allow the civil liability to survive,
1971 Rev. Ed., p. 717, citing People v. Castillo and Ofemia C.A., the court relied on the following ratiocination: Since Section 21,
56 O.G. 4045); consequently, the case against him should be Rule 3 of the Rules of Court 9 requires the dismissal of all money
dismissed. claims against the defendant whose death occurred prior to the
final judgment of the Court of First Instance (CFI), then it can be
inferred that actions for recovery of money may continue to be
On the other hand, this Court in the subsequent cases of heard on appeal, when the death of the defendant supervenes
Buenaventura Belamala v. Marcelino Polinar 7 and Lamberto after the CFI had rendered its judgment. In such case, explained
Torrijos v. The Honorable Court of Appeals 8 ruled differently. In this tribunal, "the name of the offended party shall be included in
the former, the issue decided by this court was: Whether the civil the title of the case as plaintiff-appellee and the legal
liability of one accused of physical injuries who died before final representative or the heirs of the deceased-accused should be
judgment is extinguished by his demise to the extent of barring substituted as defendants-appellants."
any claim therefore against his estate. It was the contention of
the administrator-appellant therein that the death of the accused
prior to final judgment extinguished all criminal and civil liabilities It is, thus, evident that as jurisprudence evolved from Castillo to
resulting from the offense, in view of Article 89, paragraph 1 of Torrijos, the rule established was that the survival of the civil
the Revised Penal Code. However, this court ruled therein: liability depends on whether the same can be predicated on
sources of obligations other than delict. Stated differently, the
claim for civil liability is also extinguished together with the
We see no merit in the plea that the civil liability has been criminal action if it were solely based thereon, i.e., civil liability ex
extinguished, in view of the provisions of the Civil Code of the delicto.
Philippines of 1950 (Rep. Act No. 386) that became operative
eighteen years after the revised Penal Code. As pointed out by the
Court below, Article 33 of the Civil Code establishes a civil action However, the Supreme Court in People v. Sendaydiego, et al. 10
for damages on account of physical injuries, entirely separate and departed from this long-established principle of law. In this case,
distinct from the criminal action. accused Sendaydiego was charged with and convicted by the
lower court of malversation thru falsification of public documents.
Sendaydiego's death supervened during the pendency of the
Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a appeal of his conviction.
civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the
criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil
action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, This court in an unprecedented move resolved to dismiss
and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. Sendaydiego's appeal but only to the extent of his criminal
liability. His civil liability was allowed to survive although it was
clear that such claim thereon was exclusively dependent on the
Assuming that for lack of express reservation, Belamala's civil criminal action already extinguished. The legal import of such
action for damages was to be considered instituted together with decision was for the court to continue exercising appellate
the criminal action still, since both proceedings were terminated jurisdiction over the entire appeal, passing upon the correctness
of Sendaydiego's conviction despite dismissal of the criminal

67
action, for the purpose of determining if he is civilly liable. In Article 30 of the Civil Code provides:
doing so, this Court issued a Resolution of July 8, 1977 stating
thus:
When a separate civil action is brought to demand civil liability
arising from a criminal offense, and no criminal proceedings are
The claim of complainant Province of Pangasinan for the civil instituted during the pendency of the civil case, a preponderance
liability survived Sendaydiego because his death occurred after of evidence shall likewise be sufficient to prove the act
final judgment was rendered by the Court of First Instance of complained of.
Pangasinan, which convicted him of three complex crimes of
malversation through falsification and ordered him to indemnify
Clearly, the text of Article 30 could not possibly lend support to
the Province in the total sum of P61,048.23 (should be
the ruling in Sendaydiego. Nowhere in its text is there a grant of
P57,048.23).
authority to continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over the
accused's civil liability ex delicto when his death supervenes
The civil action for the civil liability is deemed impliedly instituted during appeal. What Article 30 recognizes is an alternative and
with the criminal action in the absence of express waiver or its separate civil action which may be brought to demand civil
reservation in a separate action (Sec. 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of liability arising from a criminal offense independently of any
Court). The civil action for the civil liability is separate and distinct criminal action. In the event that no criminal proceedings are
from the criminal action (People and Manuel vs. Coloma, 105 Phil. instituted during the pendency of said civil case, the quantum of
1287; Roa vs. De la Cruz, 107 Phil. 8). evidence needed to prove the criminal act will have to be that
which is compatible with civil liability and that is, preponderance
of evidence and not proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Citing
When the action is for the recovery of money and the defendant
or invoking Article 30 to justify the survival of the civil action
dies before final judgment in the Court of First Instance, it shall
despite extinction of the criminal would in effect merely beg the
be dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner especially provided
question of whether civil liability ex delicto survives upon
in Rule 87 of the Rules of Court (Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of
extinction of the criminal action due to death of the accused
Court).
during appeal of his conviction. This is because whether asserted
in
The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money the criminal action or in a separate civil action, civil liability ex
judgment had been rendered against him by the Court of First delicto is extinguished by the death of the accused while his
Instance, the action survives him. It may be continued on appeal conviction is on appeal. Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is
(Torrijos vs. Court of Appeals, L-40336, October 24, 1975; 67 clear on this matter:
SCRA 394).
Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. — Criminal
The accountable public officer may still be civilly liable for the liability is totally extinguished:
funds improperly disbursed although he has no criminal liability
(U.S. vs. Elvina, 24 Phil. 230; Philippine National Bank vs. Tugab,
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and
66 Phil. 583).
as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only
when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment;
In view of the foregoing, notwithstanding the dismissal of the
appeal of the deceased Sendaydiego insofar as his criminal
x x x           x x x          x x x
liability is concerned, the Court Resolved to continue exercising
appellate jurisdiction over his possible civil liability for the money
claims of the Province of Pangasinan arising from the alleged However, the ruling in Sendaydiego deviated from the expressed
criminal acts complained of, as if no criminal case had been intent of Article 89. It allowed claims for civil liability ex delicto to
instituted against him, thus making applicable, in determining his survive by ipso facto treating the civil action impliedly instituted
civil liability, Article 30 of the Civil Code . . . and, for that purpose, with the criminal, as one filed under Article 30, as though no
his counsel is directed to inform this Court within ten (10) days of criminal proceedings had been filed but merely a separate civil
the names and addresses of the decedent's heirs or whether or action. This had the effect of converting such claims from one
not his estate is under administration and has a duly appointed which is dependent on the outcome of the criminal action to an
judicial administrator. Said heirs or administrator will be entirely new and separate one, the prosecution of which does not
substituted for the deceased insofar as the civil action for the civil even necessitate the filing of criminal proceedings. 12 One would
liability is concerned (Secs. 16 and 17, Rule 3, Rules of Court). be hard put to pinpoint the statutory authority for such a
transformation. It is to be borne in mind that in recovering civil
liability ex delicto, the same has perforce to be determined in the
Succeeding cases 11 raising the identical issue have maintained
criminal action, rooted as it is in the court's pronouncement of the
adherence to our ruling in Sendaydiego; in other words, they
guilt or innocence of the accused. This is but to render fealty to
were a reaffirmance of our abandonment of the settled rule that a
the intendment of Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code which
civil liability solely anchored on the criminal (civil liability ex
provides that "every person criminally liable for a felony is also
delicto) is extinguished upon dismissal of the entire appeal due to
civilly liable." In such cases, extinction of the criminal action due
the demise of the accused.
to death of the accused pending appeal inevitably signifies the
concomitant extinction of the civil liability. Mors Omnia Solvi.
But was it judicious to have abandoned this old ruling? A re- Death dissolves all things.
examination of our decision in Sendaydiego impels us to revert to
the old ruling.
In sum, in pursuing recovery of civil liability arising from crime,
the final determination of the criminal liability is a condition
To restate our resolution of July 8, 1977 in Sendaydiego: The precedent to the prosecution of the civil action, such that when
resolution of the civil action impliedly instituted in the criminal the criminal action is extinguished by the demise of accused-
action can proceed irrespective of the latter's extinction due to appellant pending appeal thereof, said civil action cannot survive.
death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, pursuant to The claim for civil liability springs out of and is dependent upon
Article 30 of the Civil Code and Section 21, Rule 3 of the Revised facts which, if true, would constitute a crime. Such civil liability is
Rules of Court. an inevitable consequence of the criminal liability and is to be
declared and enforced in the criminal proceeding. This is to be

68
distinguished from that which is contemplated under Article 30 of Court's judgments subsequent and consonant to Torrijos and
the Civil Code which refers to the institution of a separate civil Sendaydiego, should be set aside and abandoned as being clearly
action that does not draw its life from a criminal proceeding. The erroneous and unjustifiable.
Sendaydiego resolution of July 8, 1977, however, failed to take
note of this fundamental distinction when it allowed the survival
Said Section 21 of Rule 3 is a rule of civil procedure in ordinary
of the civil action for the recovery of civil liability ex delicto by
civil actions. There is neither authority nor justification for its
treating the same as a separate civil action referred to under
application in criminal procedure to civil actions instituted
Article 30. Surely, it will take more than just a summary judicial
together with and as part of criminal actions. Nor is there any
pronouncement to authorize the conversion of said civil action to
authority in law for the summary conversion from the latter
an independent one such as that contemplated under Article 30.
category of an ordinary civil action upon the death of the
offender. . . .
Ironically however, the main decision in Sendaydiego did not
apply Article 30, the resolution of July 8, 1977 notwithstanding.
Moreover, the civil action impliedly instituted in a criminal
Thus, it was held in the main decision:
proceeding for recovery of civil liability ex delicto can hardly be
categorized as an ordinary money claim such as that referred to
Sendaydiego's appeal will be resolved only for the purpose of in Sec. 21, Rule 3 enforceable before the estate of the deceased
showing his criminal liability which is the basis of the civil liability accused.
for which his estate would be liable. 13
Ordinary money claims referred to in Section 21, Rule 3 must be
In other words, the Court, in resolving the issue of his civil viewed in light of the provisions of Section 5, Rule 86 involving
liability, concomitantly made a determination on whether claims against the estate, which in Sendaydiego was held liable
Sendaydiego, on the basis of evidenced adduced, was indeed for Sendaydiego's civil liability. "What are contemplated in Section
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of committing the offense 21 of Rule 3, in relation to Section 5 of Rule 86, 14 are
charged. Thus, it upheld Sendaydiego's conviction and contractual money claims while the claims involved in civil liability
pronounced the same as the source of his civil liability. ex delicto may include even the restitution of personal or real
Consequently, although Article 30 was not applied in the final property." 15 Section 5, Rule 86 provides an exclusive
determination of Sendaydiego's civil liability, there was a enumeration of what claims may be filed against the estate.
reopening of the criminal action already extinguished which These are: funeral expenses, expenses for the last illness,
served as basis for Sendaydiego's civil liability. We reiterate: judgments for money and claim arising from contracts, expressed
Upon death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, the or implied. It is clear that money claims arising from delict do not
criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a form part of this exclusive enumeration. Hence, there could be no
defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action instituted legal basis in (1) treating a civil action ex delicto as an ordinary
therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto contractual money claim referred to in Section 21, Rule 3 of the
extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal. Rules of Court and (2) allowing it to survive by filing a claim
therefor before the estate of the deceased accused. Rather, it
should be extinguished upon extinction of the criminal action
Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court was also invoked to serve
engendered by the death of the accused pending finality of his
as another basis for the Sendaydiego resolution of July 8, 1977.
conviction.
In citing Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the Court made the
inference that civil actions of the type involved in Sendaydiego
consist of money claims, the recovery of which may be continued Accordingly, we rule: if the private offended party, upon
on appeal if defendant dies pending appeal of his conviction by extinction of the civil liability ex delicto desires to recover
holding his estate liable therefor. Hence, the Court's conclusion: damages from the same act or omission complained of, he must
subject to Section 1, Rule 111 16 (1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure as amended) file a separate civil action, this time
"When the action is for the recovery of money" "and the
predicated not on the felony previously charged but on other
defendant dies before final judgment in the court of First
sources of obligation. The source of obligation upon which the
Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner
separate civil action is premised determines against whom the
especially provided" in Rule 87 of the Rules of Court (Sec. 21,
same shall be enforced.
Rule 3 of the Rules of Court).

If the same act or omission complained of also arises from quasi-

The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money
delict or may, by provision of law, result in an injury to person or
judgment had been rendered against him by the Court of First
property (real or personal), the separate civil action must be filed
Instance, the action survives him. It may be continued on appeal.
against the executor or administrator 17 of the estate of the
accused pursuant to Sec. 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court:
Sadly, reliance on this provision of law is misplaced. From the
standpoint of procedural law, this course taken in Sendaydiego
Sec. 1. Actions which may and which may not be brought against
cannot be sanctioned. As correctly observed by Justice Regalado:
executor or administrator. — No action upon a claim for the
recovery of money or debt or interest thereon shall be
xxx xxx xxx commenced against the executor or administrator; but actions to
recover real or personal property, or an interest therein, from the
estate, or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover
I do not, however, agree with the justification advanced in both damages for an injury to person or property, real or personal,
Torrijos and Sendaydiego which, relying on the provisions of may be commenced against him.
Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, drew the strained
implication therefrom that where the civil liability instituted
together with the criminal liabilities had already passed beyond This is in consonance with our ruling in Belamala 18 where we
the judgment of the then Court of First Instance (now the held that, in recovering damages for injury to persons thru an
Regional Trial Court), the Court of Appeals can continue to independent civil action based on Article 33 of the Civil Code, the
exercise appellate jurisdiction thereover despite the same must be filed against the executor or administrator of the
extinguishment of the component criminal liability of the estate of deceased accused and not against the estate under Sec.
deceased. This pronouncement, which has been followed in the 5, Rule 86 because this rule explicitly limits the claim to those for

69
funeral expenses, expenses for the last sickness of the decedent,
judgment for money and claims arising from contract, express or
implied. Contractual money claims, we stressed, refers only to
purely personal obligations other than those which have their
source in delict or tort.

Conversely, if the same act or omission complained of also arises

from contract, the separate civil action must be filed against the
estate of the accused, pursuant to Sec. 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of
Court.

From this lengthy disquisition, we summarize our ruling herein:

1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction

extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based
solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the
death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his
criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and
based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto
in senso strictiore."

2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding

the death of accused, if the same may also be predicated on a
source of obligation other than delict. 19 Article 1157 of the Civil
Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which
the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission:

a) Law 20
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) . . .
e) Quasi-delicts

3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2

above, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only
by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1,
Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended.
This separate civil action may be enforced either against the
executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on
the source of obligation upon which the same is based as
explained above.

4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of

his right to file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases
where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to
its extinction, the private-offended party instituted together
therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations
on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of
the criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 21
of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on
a possible privation of right by prescription. 22

Applying this set of rules to the case at bench, we hold that the
death of appellant Bayotas extinguished his criminal liability and
the civil liability based solely on the act complained of, i.e., rape.
Consequently, the appeal is hereby dismissed without
qualification.

WHEREFORE, the appeal of the late Rogelio Bayotas is

DISMISSED with costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

70