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2020 Almonte - v. - People20210708 12 1p9k2gg
2020 Almonte - v. - People20210708 12 1p9k2gg
Antecedents
On April 6, 2020, Dionisio S. Almonte, Ireneo O. Atadero, Jr., Alexander
Ramonita K. Birondo, Winona Marie O. Birondo, Rey Claro Casambre, Ferdinand T.
Castillo, Francisco Fernandez, Jr., Renante Gamara, Vicente P. Ladlad, Ediesel R.
Legaspi, Cleofe Lagtapon, Ge-Ann Perez, Adelberto A. Silva, Alberto L. Villamor,
Virginia B. Villamor, Oscar Belleza, Norberto A. Murillo, Reina Mae A. Nasino, Dario
Tomada, Emmanuel Bacarra, Oliver B. Rosales, and Lilia Bucatcat (petitioners)
filed a petition before this Court entitled "In the Matter of the Urgent Petition for
the Release of Prisoners on Humanitarian Grounds in the Midst of the COVID-19 1
Pandemic." Here, petitioners allege that they are prisoners and are among the
elderly, sick, and pregnant population of inmates exposed to the danger of
contracting COVID-19 where social distancing and self-isolation measures are
purportedly impossible. 2 As such, they are invoking this Court's power to exercise
"equity jurisdiction" and are seeking "temporary liberty on humanitarian grounds"
either on recognizance or on bail. 3 Moreover, they are also asking the Court to
order the creation of a "Prisoner Release Committee" similar to those set up in
other countries to conduct a study and implement the release of prisoners in
congested penal facilities. In seeking their provisional release on recognizance or
bail, petitioners essentially argue that: (a) their continued confinement which
poses a high risk of contracting COVID-19 is tantamount to cruel and unusual
punishment proscribed under the Constitution; 4 (b) the United Nations (UN)
standards, particularly the UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of
Prisoners (Nelson Mandela Rules), imposes a duty on the part of the State to
protect the health and safety of prisoners consistent with the guarantees of the
right to life; 5 (c) the government's response to the pandemic is not enough to
protect the safety of the inmates; 6 (d) the government should take a cue from
other countries which undertook measures to decongest their jails by releasing
eligible prisoners; 7 (e) the Court may brush aside procedural rules and grant
temporary liberty based on humanitarian reasons and equity jurisdiction; 8 and (f)
it is not feasible for them to file petitions for certiorari with the trial courts due to
the Luzon-wide enhanced community quarantine (ECQ). 9
For respondents' part who are represented by the Office of the Solicitor
General, they filed their comment opposing petitioners' plea for their temporary
release and for the creation of a Prisoner Release Committee and argued that: (a)
petitioners are valuable members of the Communist Party of the Philippines-New
People's Army-National Democratic Front (CPP-NPA-NDF) who have committed
heinous crimes and are merely taking advantage of the current public health as
well as the "fickle arena of public opinion" situation in seeking for their temporary
release based on humanitarian reasons; 10 (b) the government has adequate
medical facilities, personnel and measures to address the threat of COVID-19 in
jails and other detention facilities; 11 (c) petitioners have ample remedies under
this Court's several circulars which addressed the needs to decongest the jails in
response to the COVID-19 pandemic; 12 (d) petitioners violated the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts; 13 (e) the grant or denial of bail, the evaluation of petitioners'
respective medical conditions, and the determination of whether or not the
evidence of guilt is strong are questions of fact which should be determined by
the trial courts; 14 (f) petitioners cannot be temporarily released on recognizance
because they were charged with capital offenses; 15 (g) petitioners cannot be
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granted provisional liberty based on equity because governing laws exist; 16 (h)
the doctrine espoused in Enrile v. Sandiganbayan 17 is inapplicable because
petitioners present a threat to public safety due to their supposed membership in
the CPP-NPA-NDF; 18 (i) releasing petitioners violates the equal protection clause
as there is no substantial difference between them and the rest of the detainees
as everyone is equally vulnerable to COVID-19; 19 and (j) the Philippines is not
bound to adopt the manner of decongesting jails undertaken by other countries as
they operate under their own set of laws. 20 HTcADC
Issues
-I-
Whether or not the instant petition filed directly before this Court may be
given due course. . .
-II-
Whether or not the Nelson Mandela Rules are enforceable in Philippine
courts. . .
-III-
Whether or not petitioners may be given provisional liberty on the ground
of equity. . .
-IV-
Whether or not the Court has the power to pass upon the State's
prerogative of selecting appropriate police power measures in times of
emergency. . .
Ruling
The Supreme Court is a collegiate judicial body whose rulings and binding
opinions are the results of its members' collective and majoritarian consensus.
The doctrines it establishes do not depend on the judgment or will of a sole
magistrate as such is the spirit of collegiality. Thus, after initial deliberations and
exchanges of ideas, it was collectively realized that the instant case presents
several complex issues making the interaction of applicable principles ridden with
far-reaching implications. Nonetheless, the members of this Court have
unanimously arrived at the conclusion to treat the petition as petitioners'
application for bail or recognizance, as well as their motions for other practicable
and suitable confinement arrangements relative to the alleged serious threats to
their health and lives.
At the outset, it is a settled rule that the Supreme Court is not a trier of
facts. 21 Relatedly, a direct invocation of this Court's original jurisdiction is
generally proscribed to prevent inordinate demands upon its time and attention
which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction as well
as to prevent further over-crowding of its docket. 22
Concomitantly, the Constitution guarantees the right to bail of all the
accused except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua
when the evidence of guilt is strong. 23 However, in cases where the offense is
punishable by reclusion perpetua and where the evidence of guilt is strong, bail is
a matter of discretion. 24 Here, trial courts are granted the discretion to determine
in bail applications whether there is strong evidence of guilt on the part of the
accused. 25 A summary hearing is conducted merely for the purpose of
determining the weight of evidence. 26 Only after weighing the pieces of evidence
as contained in the summary will the judge formulate his own conclusion as to
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whether the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong based on his
discretion. 27 Therefore, the entitlement to bail is a question of fact.
In this case, petitioners have been charged with offenses punishable by
reclusion perpetua. As such, they are not entitled to bail as a matter of right.
Consequently, there is a need to conduct summary hearings for the purpose of
weighing the strength of the prosecution's evidence as to petitioners' guilt. This
process entails a reception and an evaluation of evidence which the trial courts
are competent to handle. The foregoing holds true with respect to the motions for
other confinement arrangements which also necessitate reception and evaluation
of evidence by a trial court. Hence, being a court of last resort, this Court
ingeminates and reminds the Bench and the Bar that it is not the proper avenue or
forum to ventilate factual questions especially if they are presented for
adjudication on the first instance.
Like the case of Versoza v. People, et al. 28 and Cruz, et al. v.
Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, et al., 29 the Court deems
it fitting to have the other remaining issues threshed out in the separate opinions
of its members that are attached to and made integral parts of this Decision.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing reasons, the Court TREATS the
present petition as petitioners' applications for bail or recognizance as well as
their motions for other confinement arrangements, and REFERS the same to the
respective trial courts where their criminal cases are pending, which courts are
hereby DIRECTED to conduct the necessary proceedings and consequently,
resolve these incidents with utmost dispatch. Accordingly, the proceedings before
this Court are considered CLOSED and TERMINATED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. DETACa
Separate Opinions
PERALTA, C.J:
I join the majority in treating the instant petition as petitioners' application
for bail or recognizance. I submit this opinion, however, in order to articulate my
views on some salient points.
The instant Petition 1 calls for the release of prisoners on humanitarian
grounds in the midst of the pandemic created by the 2019 Novel Corona Virus
Disease (COVID-19) that now grips the world at the neck.
Petitioners, who deem themselves as political prisoners detained in various
penal institutions in the country, profess that they are most vulnerable to COVID-
19 as they are either elderly, pregnant, or afflicted with hypertension and/or
diabetes. Believing that an outbreak of the disease in their respective places of
confinement is not unlikely owing to what they perceive to be hellish conditions in
highly-congested local prisons, they fear that they stand to be the most
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susceptible to infection if and when such outbreak does occur. 2
In support of this bid, petitioners cite a number of medical reports and
abstracts tending to demonstrate that the elderly, sickly and those already
afflicted with certain ailments, are the easiest victims of the novel disease. 3 Thus,
they plead for their release from confinement either on bail or recognizance, as
well as for the creation, by directive of the Court, of a Prisoner Release Committee
with accompanying ground rules for the conditional release of similarly situated
prisoners. 4 They invoke humanitarian considerations based on international law
principles, specifically those embodied in the Revised United Nations Standard
Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (The Mandela Rule of 2015) and
Article 9.1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). 5
By way of Comment, 6 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) advocates for
the dismissal of the petition based on outright violation of judicial hierarchy. It
explains that the plea should be offered before the courts where petitioners'
respective cases are being heard, and not directly with the High Court. It also calls
attention to the fact that petitioners have all been charged and, except for one 7
who has already met conviction and is currently serving sentence, are under
prosecution for non-bailable offenses in relation to their alleged membership in
the CPP-NPA-NDF. More than half of them are in custody at Camp Bagong Diwa,
Taguig City and none of them has yet been reported to exhibit signs of infection.
As said, the Petition must be treated as petitioners' application for bail or
recognizance.
I
The release of petitioners on bail is restricted by twin fundamental
provisions of the Constitution and the Rules of Court. Section 7 of Rule 114 of the
Rules of Court instructs that a person charged with a capital offense or with an
offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment shall not be entitled
to bail when the evidence of guilt is strong. 8 The rule echoes from Section 13,
Article III of the Constitution which stresses that bail, while ordinarily a right of an
accused, is not available to those charged of a capital offense or an offense
punishable by life imprisonment or reclusion perpetua when the evidence of guilt
is strong. 9
Here, petitioners are all charged with crimes or offenses that are punishable
by death, life imprisonment or reclusion perpetua. Worse, one of them was
already convicted by the trial court. Hence, none of the petitioners can claim to be
entitled to bail as a matter of right. Their entitlement to bail is a matter reposed to
judicial discretion — particularly, to the discretion of the court where their cases
are pending.
The question of whether petitioners are deserving of provisional liberty,
much more of whether the evidence of guilt against them are strong, are certainly
questions of fact. Resolving such questions in the first instance is not, and has
never been, the province of this Court. It is not difficult to see the merit in the
OSG's argument, therefore, that the instant petition suffers from infirmity — for
the same not only ignores the doctrine of hierarchy of courts — but also implores
this Court to act on a matter that lies outside its competence as it is not ordinarily
legally equipped to evaluate evidence respecting the right to bail.
Indeed, judicial discretion in granting bail may be exercised only after
pertinent evidence is submitted to a court during a bail hearing after due notice to
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the prosecution. 10 The necessity, if not indispensability, of a bail hearing under
the circumstances is all the more revealed if we consider that certain factors in
the fixing of a bail bond — such as the nature and circumstances of the crime,
character and reputation of the accused, the weight of the evidence against him,
the probability of the accused appearing at the trial, whether or not the accused is
a fugitive from justice, and whether or not the accused is under bond in other
cases — unequivocally require the presentation of evidence and a reasonable
opportunity for the prosecution to refute it. 11
Yet, petitioners argue that it would be unreasonable to require them to
follow the usual procedure in applying for bail given the threat of the COVID-19
pandemic and the fact that the whole Luzon has been placed under enhanced
community quarantine.
The argument fails to convince.
We remind petitioners that neither the pandemic nor the executive
declaration of a Luzon-wide lockdown has the effect of suspending our laws and
rules, much less of shutting down the Judiciary.
Contrary to petitioners' insinuation, applying for bail before trial courts has
not been rendered infeasible even amidst the COVID-19 pandemic and the Luzon-
wide lockdown. In Administrative Circular (AC) No. 31-2020, issued on March 16,
2020, this Court explicitly assured that court hearings on urgent matters —
including that of "petitions, motions or pleadings related to bail" — will continue
during the entire period of the community quarantine.
In addition, the Court has issued several circulars specifically aimed at
facilitating and expediting the release of certain persons deprived of liberty (PDL)
at the height of the present COVID-19 pandemic. Thus:
1.) In AC No. 33-2020, 12 the Court specifically allowed the electronic
filing of applications for bail and granted trial court judges a wider
latitude of discretion for a lowered bail amount effective during the
period of the present public health emergency. The Circular also
sanctioned the electronic transmission of bail application approvals
and directed the consequent release order to be issued within the
same day to the proper law enforcement authority or detention facility
to enable the release of the accused.
2.) In AC No. 34-2020, 13 on the other hand, the Court expanded the
efficacy of electronic filing of criminal complaints and informations,
together with bail applications, to keep up with the executive
determination of the need to extend the period of the enhanced
community quarantine in critical regions of the country.
3.) In AC No. 37-2020, 14 the Court ordered the pilot-testing of
videoconference hearings on urgent matters in criminal cases,
including bail applications, in critical regions where the risk of viral
transmission is high.
4.) Finally, in AC No. 38-2020, 15 the Court authorized the grant of
reduced bail and recognizance to indigent PDLs pending the
continuation of the proceedings and the resolution of their cases.
These issuances, accompanied by pertinent circulars 16 emanating from the
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), had, in fact, facilitated the gradual and
incremental release of 33,790 detention prisoners from March 17 to June 22, 2020
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as follows: 17
Number of PDLs
Period
Released Nationwide
II
An examination of the substance of the instant Petition would further reveal
its inaptness.
Invoking equity considerations, petitioners allude to the doctrines inEnrile v.
Sandiganbayan, et al. 18 and De la Rama v. The People's Court 19 where the
accused were allowed temporary liberty on account of proven medical condition
as their continued incarceration was shown to be further injurious to their health
and would endanger their lives. 20 The OSG, on the other hand, rebuffs this
allusion by positing that Enrile cannot be relied upon as a precedent because it is
a pro hac vice ruling.
While I believe that petitioners' invocation of Enrile is misplaced, I take
exception to the OSG's characterization of the ruling in that case as pro hac vice.
Pro hac vice is a Latin term meaning "for this one particular occasion. " 21
Similarly, a pro hac vice ruling is one "expressly qualified as x x x cannot be
relied upon as a precedent to govern other cases. " 22 The Court never
expressly qualified the Enrile ruling as having only a pro hac vice application. In
fact, the Court, even if it minded to, could not have validly made such
qualification, considering that the promulgation of pro hac vice decisions has
already been declared as illegal in our jurisdiction. In the 2017 en banc case of
Knights of Rizal v. DMCI Homes, Inc., 23 we held:
Pro hac vice means a specific decision does not constitute a precedent
because the decision is for the specific case only, not to be followed in
other cases. A pro hac vice decision violates statutory law — Article
8 of the Civil Code — which states that "judicial decisions applying
or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form part of the
legal system of the Philippines." The decision of the Court in this case
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cannot be pro hac vice because by mandate of the law every decision of
the Court forms part of the legal system of the Philippines. If another case
comes up with the same facts as the present case, that case must
be decided in the same way as this case to comply with the
constitutional mandate of equal protection of the law. Thus, a pro
hac vice decision also violates the equal protection clause of the
Constitution. (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioners err in their invocation of Enrile simply because the circumstances
in that case are different from the circumstances herein.
First, the petitioner in Enrile — the Senator Juan Ponce Enrile — underwent
bail hearing with the Sandiganbayan prior to his resort to this Court. What Senator
Enrile assailed before this Court then was the Sandiganbayan's denial of his
Motion to Fix Bail and its Motion for Reconsideration. In the instant case, however,
petitioners are asking the Court to grant their provisional liberty by way of bail or
recognizance without filing a motion before the trial courts having jurisdiction over
their respective cases.
Second , in his bail hearing for the Sandiganbayan, Senator Enrile was able to
present evidence of his current fragile state of health. Based on that, the Court
was able to infer that Senator Enrile's advanced age and ill health required special
medical attention. On the other hand, to prove their medical conditions,
petitioners herein attached medical certificates and other documents in their
petition. However, the Court cannot simply take judicial notice of petitioners' age
and health conditions. Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts that judges
may properly take and act on without proof because these facts are already
known to them; it is the duty of the court to assume something as matters of fact
without need of further evidentiary support. 24 Age and health conditions
necessitate the presentation of evidence. This further emphasizes the need to
conduct a bail hearing.
Lastly, Senator Enrile's medical condition was not the only consideration why
he was afforded the benefit of bail. In Enrile, the Court affirmed the right to bail
because Senator Enrile was likewise not shown to be a danger to the community
and his risk of flight was nil — a conclusion that was impelled not only by his
social and political standing, but also by his voluntary surrender to the authorities.
Thus —
In our view, his social and political standing and his having immediately
surrendered to the authorities upon his being charged in court indicate that
the risk of his flight or escape from this jurisdiction is highly unlikely. His
personal disposition from the onset of his indictment for plunder, formal or
otherwise, has demonstrated his utter respect for the legal processes of
this country. We also do not ignore that at an earlier time many years ago
when he had been charged with rebellion with murder and multiple
frustrated murder, he already evinced a similar personal disposition of
respect for the legal processes, and was granted bail during the pendency
of his trial because he was not seen as a flight risk. With his solid reputation
in both his public and his private lives, his long years of public service, and
history's judgment of him being at stake, he should be granted bail. 25
(Citations omitted) aDSIHc
The Court is mindful that a contagion within the country's penal institutions
is neither unlikely nor impossible. Yet, we take judicial notice of the fact that
following the executive declaration of a public health emergency in March, the
Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP) and the Bureau of Corrections,
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under a joint mandate to protect the health and safety of all PDLs and detention
prisoners, have implemented preventive and precautionary measures against a
potential COVID-19 outbreak in detention and correctional facilities. The measures
include the total lockdown of penal institutions, the designation of isolation
facilities within premises, the procurement of personal protective equipment, as
well as nutrition and on-site education campaigns. Only recently, the Bureau of
Corrections has also put in place necessary infrastructure to provide inmates
facility for online visits/video conference with their relatives.
Be that as it may, petitioners would now have the Court follow the global
trend of late, whereby various governments have taken swift unprecedented
measures in decongesting prison facilities by allowing an exodus of prisoners on
conditional or temporary liberty to mitigate the effects of an on-site community
transmission of COVID-19 or otherwise curb that possibility. It bears to stress,
however, that these initiatives were based on laws and rules prevailing in those
jurisdictions. For instance, the directive for the release of prisoners in the
territories of India applies only to those convicted or charged with offenses
punishable with less than seven years of jail term. 26
At any rate, the Philippines did not lag behind in this respect. As I have
already pointed out, this Court — mindful of the circumstantial vulnerabilities
present in detention and correctional facilities across the country, as well as of the
limits of its own power and competence — has already caused, through its various
issuances in response to the pandemic, the seamless release of 33,790 27
detention prisoners in a most expeditious way but in line with existing
fundamental laws, rules and legal processes. Such issuances, in turn, complement
on-going efforts by executive agencies to expedite the release of PDLs via parole,
pardon and executive clemency. Indeed, the latest figures from the Department of
Justice indicate that, as a direct result of implementing its Interim Rules on Parole
and Executive Clemency 28 which took effect last May 15, 2020, the Board of
Pardons and Parole (BPP) was already ble to grant parole to 221 PDLs, recommend
the release on conditional pardon of 56 others, and endorse the commutation of
sentence of 56 more from May 18, 2020 to June 10, 2020 — a period of only less
than a month. 29 These, in addition to the earlier reported release by the BJMP of
some 4,188 PDLs from March 17 to April 30, 2020. 30 Undeniably, such parallel
efforts by the Judiciary and executive show the government's commitment in
maximizing, nay, in exhausting, every available legal means in order to decongest
the country's detention and correction facilities amidst the current national health
crisis.
III
At this juncture, we stress that unless there is clear showing that petitioners
are actually suffering from a medical condition that requires immediate and
specialized attention outside of their current confinement — as, for instance, an
actual and proven exposure to or infection with the novel corona virus — they
must remain in custody and isolation incidental to the crimes with which they
were charged, or for which they are being tried or serving sentence. Only then
can there be an actual controversy and a proper invocation of humanitarian and
equity considerations that is ripe for this Court to determine.
We come to the conclusion that petitioners are probably seeking
administrative — not judicial — remedies that would genuinely address their
concerns in regard to which this Court, as overseer of the Judiciary, could exercise
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no other prerogative than to: (a) treat the instant petition as petitioners'
application for bail or recognizance, (b) refer the same to the respective trial
courts where their criminal cases are bending for resolution and (c) direct said
courts to resolve such incidents with deliberate dispatch. That judicial remedy is
unavailable to the reliefs prayed for, is all the more apparent from their collective
sentiment that the government-imposed quarantine and lockdown measures,
which in the interim necessarily denied them of supervised access to their families
and friends, have negatively affected their mental well-being. As they hereby
complain about languishing in isolation, they fail to see that in truth, the rest of
the outside world is likewise socially isolating as a basic precautionary measure in
response to a pandemic of this kind. They lament the lingering fear of a potential
infection within their confinement on account of their respective physical
vulnerabilities and hereby plead that they be indefinitely set free, without
realizing it is that same exact fear which looms outside of prison walls. aScITE
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
I concur in the result. As I have proposed from the inception of this case, the
instant petition should be treated as petitioners' respective applications for
bail/recognizance, as well as their motions for suitable and practicable
confinement arrangements, and consequently, be referred to the proper trial
courts for the conduct of further proceedings. However, due to the collective
decision of the membership to confine the ponencia to this unanimous disposition
subject to separate opinions on some significant constitutional issues, I am
impelled to submit this Separate Opinion to explain the reasons and justifications
for my concurrence.
I. Prayer for Release on Bail/Recognizance.
Primarily, petitioners seek direct recourse to the Court for their temporary
release on recognizance or, in the alternative, bail, "for the duration of the state of
public health emergency, national calamity, lockdown[,] and community
quarantine due to the threats of x x x [Corona Virus Disease 2019 (COVID-19)]." 1
At its core, bail "acts as a reconciling mechanism to accommodate both the
accused's interest in pretrial liberty and society's interest in assuring the
accused's presence at trial." 2 Its purpose is "to guarantee the appearance of the
accused at the trial, or whenever so required by the trial court." 3 Similarly, "
[r]ecognizance is a mode of securing the release of any person in custody or
detention for the commission of an offense" but is made available to those who
are "unable to post bail due to abject poverty." 4
Our Constitution and statutes prescribe a legal framework in granting bail or
recognizance to persons deprived of liberty (PDLs) pending final conviction. The
Constitution denies bail, as a matter of right, to "those charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong." 5 In the same
vein, Republic Act No. (RA) 10389, known as the "Recognizance Act of 2012,"
provides that recognizance is not a matter of right when the offense is punishable
by "death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment" 6 and as per its implementing
rules, "when the evidence of guilt is strong," 7 consistent with the Constitution.
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When the accused is charged with an offense punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua, or life imprisonment, the usual procedure is for the accused to apply for
bail with notice to the prosecutor. Thereafter, the judge is mandated to conduct a
hearing to primarily determine the existence of strong evidence of guilt or lack of
it, against the accused. When the evidence of guilt is not strong, the judge is then
tasked to fix the amount of bail taking into account the guidelines set forth in
Section 9, Rule 114 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. In Cortes v. Catral, 8 the
Court explained:
[W]hether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, reasonable notice of
hearing is required to be given to the prosecutor or fiscal or at least he
must be asked for his recommendation because in fixing the amount of
bail, the judge is required to take into account a number of factors such as
the applicant's character and reputation, forfeiture of other bonds or
whether he is a fugitive from justice.
When a person is charged with an offense punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua[,] or life imprisonment, bail is a matter of discretion.
Rule 114, Section 7 of the Rules of Court states: "No person charged with a
capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment when the evidence of guilt is strong, shall be admitted to bail
regardless of the stage of the criminal action." Consequently, when the
accused is charged with an offense punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua[,] or life imprisonment, the judge is mandated to conduct a
hearing, whether summary or otherwise in the discretion of the court, not
only to take into account the guidelines set forth in Section 9, Rule 114 of
the Rules of Court, but primarily to determine the existence of strong
evidence of guilt or lack of it, against the accused. 9 (Underscoring
supplied)
Pursuant to procedural rules, the accused may also seek a reduction of the
recommended bail amount, 10 or seek a release through recognizance upon
satisfaction of the conditions set forth by law. 11
In this case, petitioners are all charged with offenses that are punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment. 12 In fact, one of them had
already been convicted by the trial court and her appeal is pending resolution. 13
Petitioners have not shown that any of them has filed the necessary bail
applications. It was neither shown that bail hearings were conducted in their
respective cases in order to determine whether or not there exists strong
evidence of guilt against them, which would, in turn, determine their qualification
or disqualification for the reliefs prayed for.
"Strong evidence of guilt" entails the submission of evidence by the parties,
and consequently, a circumspect factual determination. The Court is not a trier
of facts, and hence, is not competent to engage itself in such a laborious
endeavor. Institutionally, the Court does not function like a trial court
where hearings are conducted for the presentation of evidence by the
litigants involved. Accordingly, it is incapable of determining whether or not
any of the petitioners may be released on bail or recognizance pursuant to the
provisions of law and the Constitution.
This notwithstanding, petitioners seek temporary liberty — specifically,
through bail or recognizance — on humanitarian grounds, invoking this Court's
equity jurisdiction. It is hornbook doctrine, however, that equity comes into play
only in the absence of law. "Equity is justice outside legal provisions, and must be
exercised in the absence of law, not against it." 14 As mentioned, there is a
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prescribed legal framework in granting bail or recognizance to PDLs pending final
conviction. Bail or recognizance cannot be granted to persons who are charged
with capital offenses when the evidence of guilt against them is strong. Hence,
the Court would be betraying its mandate to apply the law and the
Constitution should it prematurely order the release of petitioners on
bail or recognizance absent the requisite hearing to determine whether
or not the evidence of guilt against them is strong. While it is noted that
this was done in the past in the case of Enrile v. Sandiganbayan (Enrile), 15 the
majority ruling in that case should be deemed as "pro hac vice" in light of the past
Senator's "solid reputation in both his private and public lives" 16 and "his fragile
state of health" 17 which deserved immediate medical attention.
To understand the peculiarity of Enrile, one may simply consult the majority
Decision therein which would readily show, on its face, that no bail hearing to
determine the existence of "strong evidence of guilt" against Enrile was
conducted. In fact, the absence of this requisite hearing was precisely
the reason why the Sandiganbayan denied Enrile's motion to fix bail on
the ground of prematurity:
On June 5, 2014, the Office of the Ombudsman charged Enrile and
several others with plunder in the Sandiganbayan on the basis of their
purported involvement in the diversion and misuse of appropriations under
the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF). On June 10, 2014 and
June 16, 2014, Enrile respectively filed his Omnibus Motion and
Supplemental Opposition, praying, among others, that he be allowed to
post bail should probable cause be found against him. The motions were
heard by the Sandiganbayan after the Prosecution filed its Consolidated
Opposition.
On July 3, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued its resolution denying
Enrile's motion, particularly on the matter of bail, on the ground of its
prematurity[,] considering that Enrile had not yet then voluntarily
surrendered or been placed under the custody of the law. Accordingly, the
Sandiganbayan ordered the arrest of Enrile.
On the same day that the warrant for his arrest was issued, Enrile
voluntarily surrendered to Director Benjamin Magalong of the Criminal
Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) in Camp Crame, Quezon City,
and was later on confined at the Philippine National Police (PNP) General
Hospital following his medical examination.
Thereafter, Enrile filed his Motion for Detention at the PNP General
Hospital, and his Motion to Fix Bail, both dated July 7, 2014, which were
heard by the Sandiganbayan on July 8, 2014. In support of the motions,
Enrile argued that he should be allowed to post bail because: (a) the
Prosecution had not yet established that the evidence of his guilt was
strong; (b) although he was charged with plunder, the penalty as to him
would only be reclusion temporal, not reclusion perpetua; and (c) he was
not a flight risk, and his age and physical condition must further be
seriously considered.
On July 14, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued its first assailed
resolution denying Enrile's Motion to Fix Bail, disposing thusly:
. . . [I]t is only after the prosecution shall have
presented its evidence and the Court shall have made a
determination that the evidence of guilt is not strong
against accused Enrile can he demand bail as a matter
of right. Then and only then will the Court be duty-
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bound to fix the amount of his bail.
To be sure, no such determination has been made
by the Court. In fact, accused Enrile has not filed an
application for bail. Necessarily, no bail hearing can
even commence. It is thus exceedingly premature for
accused Enrile to ask the Court to fix his bail. 18
(Emphases and underscoring supplied)
To my mind, the majority ruling in Enrile, which in turn, cited De La Rama v.
The People's Court , 19 is an unusual judicial precedent which strays from the
prescribed legal course on bail or recognizance. For a person charged with a
capital offense, a bail hearing is necessary to determine whether or not the
accused may nonetheless be released on account of the established finding that
the evidence against him or her is not strong. This requirement finds force in none
other than our Constitution. At any rate, the foregoing special considerations
taken into account by the majority therein were not shown to attend in this case.
Hence, petitioners cannot invoke the Enrile ruling to successfully obtain their
desired relief.
Petitioners, however, should not be completely barren of any relief from this
Court. In the interest of substantial justice , and considering that the
present petition is the first of its kind in the context of this novel public
health situation, the Court may relax the usual procedure requiring that
bail applications be first filed before the trial courts, and instead, treat
the instant petition as petitioners' respective bail applications and refer
the same to the proper trial courts. Thereafter, the trial courts having
jurisdiction over petitioners' respective cases must determine the merits of the
bail applications. However, before proceeding, they must first ascertain
whether or not previous bail applications have been filed by petitioners
and their status. This preliminary determination upon referral to the
respective trial courts would result into the following possible scenarios:
(1) If a bail application had already been previously filed and
consequently denied by the trial court, then the denial must stand on
the ground that there is already a determination that the evidence of
guilt against the accused-petitioner charged with a capital offense is
strong and hence, need not be re-litigated further;
(2) If a bail application had already been previously filed but had yet to
be resolved by the trial court, the bail hearings should just continue,
taking into account the submissions in the present petition; or
(3) If no bail application was previously filed and bail hearings have yet
to be conducted to determine whether or not the evidence of guilt
against an accused-petitioner charged with a capital offense is strong,
then the trial court must, with notice to the prosecutor, conduct the
necessary proceedings to make such determination.
Once it is determined that the evidence against an accused-petitioner (or
any accused for that matter) is not strong and hence, qualified for bail or
recognizance, he or she should then be given an opportunity to present evidence
showing, inter alia, his or her age and medical condition. As per our Rules of
Criminal Procedure, these factors must be taken into account in determining the
reasonable amount of bail to be imposed. 20 ETHIDa
To reiterate, this petition is the first of its kind in the context of this novel
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public health situation. It is apt to mention that the petition was filed back on April
8, 2020. 21 Judicial notice may be taken of the fact that at that time, the COVID-19
pandemic was at its unnerving onset. Public uncertainty, confusion, and paranoia
were at their peak, and the government, as a whole, was just beginning to reckon
the proper policy approach in dealing with a pandemic of historical and global
proportions. Therefore, with the life-concerning threat of the COVID-19 pandemic
hanging above their heads, petitioners directly resorted to this Court to seek their
temporary release. Verily, humanitarian considerations juxtaposed against the
novelty of the public health situation, especially with the emerging public
perception at that time, dictate that instead of denying the petition outright,
partial relief be accorded to them.
It deserves highlighting that there would be no harm in treating the petition
as petitioners' respective bail applications, and referring them to the proper trial
courts. The procedure for referral as herein proposed is not some
groundbreaking innovation; it is but analogous to remand directives
which have been customarily done by the Court. Needless to state, non-
traditional procedures such as this are clearly within the powers of the Court 22
and are permissible when there are compelling. reasons to further the higher
interests of substantial justice, as in this case. While this may not be the ordinary
procedure, the circumstances so warrant the discretionary relaxation of our rules.
A caveat, however, must be made: the unique situation of petitioners as
being the first litigants to file such petition before the Court only obtains as to
them. Henceforth, it is my view that PDLs similarly situated as petitioners should
follow the existing rules of procedure and Court issuances on filing
bail/recognizance applications before the proper inferior courts having jurisdiction
over their respective cases.
II. Prayer for "Other Non-Custodial Measures."
Our laws on bail or recognizance do not account for prison conditions as a
ground for provisional liberty under these specific legal modes. Under our existing
legal framework, the right to be released on bail or recognizance is anchored only
on the nature of the charge and on whether or not there exists strong evidence of
guilt against the accused. Nevertheless, nothing prevents an accused from
seeking a different imprisonment arrangement if he or she is able to prove that
his or her life is greatly prejudiced by his or her continued confinement. Neither
are courts prohibited from granting an accused such practicable alternative
confinement arrangements to protect his or her life, although not considered as
bail or recognizance in the traditional sense of our laws. After all, our statutes
command that "[n]o judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of
the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the laws," 23 and "[i]n case of doubt in the
interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body
intended right and justice to prevail." 24
As our current legal framework does not specify the parameters for these
reliefs, it is submitted that they be adjudged according to the deliberate
indifference standard adopted in foreign jurisprudence. However, before delving
into this topic, I find it imperative to discuss some fundamental principles relative
to the right to life in light of the subhuman conditions of our prison system. This
springs from the insinuations during the deliberations on this case that it is the
legislative's task to remedy our subhuman prison conditions, and that the right to
life does not include the right against cruel and unusual punishment under Section
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19, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
There is no quibbling that courts are duty-bound to recognize a person's
right to life, and grant permissible reliefs despite, and to reiterate, the silence,
obscurity or insufficiency of our laws. This command is founded on none other
than the fundamental law, particularly in our Bill of Rights enshrined in the
Constitution. A person's right to life — whether accused of a crime or not
— is inalienable and does not take a back seat nor become dormant just
because of the lack of necessary legislation to address our subhuman
prison conditions. When the right to life is at stake, the Bill of Rights operates;
making a fair and just ruling to preserve the right to life is not entirely dependent
on some unpassed legislation that directs the structural improvement of our jails
or allocates budget to improve our penal institutions. It must be borne in mind
that Section 4 (a) of RA 10575 25 expressly states that:
Section 4. The Mandates of the Bureau of Corrections. — x x x
(a) Safekeeping of National Inmates — The safekeeping of inmates shall
include decent provision of quarters, food, water and clothing in
compliance with established United Nations standards. The security
of the inmates shall be undertaken by the Custodial Force consisting of
Corrections Officers with a ranking system and salary grades similar to its
counterpart in the [Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP)].
(Emphasis supplied)
This is in accord with the State's policy expressed in Section 2 of the same
law:
Section 2. Declaration of Policy . — It is the policy of the State
to promote the general welfare and safeguard the basic rights of
every prisoner incarcerated in our national penitentiary. It also
recognizes the responsibility of the State to strengthen government
capability aimed towards the institutionalization of highly efficient and
competent correctional services.
Towards this end, the State shall provide for the modernization,
professionalization and restructuring of the Bureau of Corrections (BuCor)
by upgrading its facilities, increasing the number of its personnel,
upgrading the level of qualifications of their personnel and standardizing
their base pay, retirement and other benefits, making it at par with that of
the [BJMP]. (Emphasis supplied)
These United Nations standards pertain to the Nelson Mandela Rules issued
by the UN General Assembly:
The Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners,
originally adopted by the First UN Congress on the Prevention of Crime and
the Treatment of Offenders in 1955, constitute the universally
acknowledged minimum standards for the management of prison
facilities and the treatment of prisoners, and have been of
tremendous value and influence in the development of prison laws, policies
and practices in Member States all over the world. 26 (Emphasis supplied)
The Nelson Mandela Rules pertinently provide:
1. PRISONER'S INHERENT DIGNITY AND VALUE AS HUMAN BEINGS 27
• Treat all prisoners with the respect due to their inherent dignity
and value as human beings.
• Prohibit and protect prisoners from torture and other forms of ill-
treatment.
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• Ensure the safety and security of prisoners, staff, service
providers and visitors at all times.
2. VULNERABLE GROUPS OF PRISONERS 28
LEONEN, J.:
Our country's perennial jail congestion has made persons deprived of liberty
all the more vulnerable to the most virulent of infectious diseases, including
COVID-19. Thus, in view of the Petition's factual assertions and broad arguments, I
concur with the unanimous decision of this Court to refer this case to the trial
courts to determine, upon the parties' proper motion or petition, whether there
are factual bases to support their temporary release.
Nonetheless, consistent with our constitutional duty to recognize the
intrinsic value of every human being, as well as our power to provide guidance to
the Bench and Bar, we should clarify the following:
First, the traditional mode of securing the release of any accused on trial or
on appeal is through bail or recognizance. As Chief Justice Diosdado Peralta (Chief
Justice Peralta) said, trial courts should conscientiously and consistently
implement all of this Court's applicable guidelines on fixing the amount of bail to
plea bargaining. 1 I reiterate my opinion in Enrile v. Sandiganbayan 2 that a
release on bail or recognizance should comply with the Constitution, laws, and
rules and regulations. Any release contrary to these cannot be countenanced.
Thus, in seeking release on bail or recognizance, petitioners should go to the trial
courts to determine the facts that would entitle them to the relief.
Second, persons deprived of liberty should be able to file an action for
violations of their constitutional right against cruel, inhuman, and degrading
punishment, and their rights to life, health, and security. As proposed by Senior
Associate Justice Estela Perlas-Bernabe (Justice Perlas-Bernabe), we should not
diminish the possibility that they may avail of these rights. 3 This Court is not
powerless to ensure that these fundamental rights are respected and
implemented. It is why this Court exists. This aspect of judicial review, to measure
the constitutionality of a government act or inaction vis-à-vis a legal right, is even
more established than the expanded jurisdiction now contained in Article VIII,
Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution.
Thus, I opine that Article III, Section 19 of the Bill of Rights, which addresses
the conditions of detention and service of sentence, may be invoked by a
detainee or a convict through either mode: (1) a motion for release when the case
is still on trial or on appeal; or (2) a petition for habeas corpus as a post-
conviction remedy, consistent with Gumabon v. Director of Prisons. 4
Nonetheless, mere invocation of the violation of constitutional rights is not
enough for the courts to afford relief. One must allege and provide factual basis
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showing: (a) the existing inhuman, degrading, or cruel conditions not organic or
consistent with the statutory punishment imposed; (b) the violation of a clear,
enforceable statutory or constitutional provision, including those which may refer
to judicially discernable international standards adopted in this jurisdiction; (c) a
clear demand on the relevant agencies of government to address the grievance;
and (d) the intentional or persistent refusal or negligence on the part of the
government agency — whether the warden, director of prisons, local government
unit, or Congress — to address the proven situation and statutory or constitutional
provisions.
We should emphasize that all provisions in the Bill of Rights are justiciable.
However, in deference to the other constitutional organs, a violation of the
constitutional rights of persons deprived of liberty anchored on existing jail or
health conditions should first be addressed by the executive and legislative
branches. Thus, before a court may give due course to such a cause of action,
there must be a showing that the movant or petitioner has made a clear demand
on the relevant agencies, and that there has been a denial or unreasonable
negligence on their part.
Finally, as a distinguishing initiative of the Peralta Court, I suggest a
measure that is grounded on social justice: a writ of kalayaan. This will be similar
to the writ of kalikasan or the writ of continuing mandamus in environmental
cases, but geared toward addressing jail congestion. It shall be issued when all
the requirements to establish cruel, inhuman, and degrading punishment are
present. It shall also provide an order of precedence to bring the occupation of
jails to a more humane level. Upon constant supervision by an executive judge,
the order of release will prioritize those whose penalties are the lowest and whose
crimes are brought about not by extreme malice but by the indignities of poverty.
Jail congestion affects so many individuals, most of them poor and invisible.
The dawn of the COVID-19 pandemic has made this a more urgent concern. It is
time that we, as the Supreme Court, address this through the clearest guidance to
our lower courts.
Indeed, this case is unprecedented, for we are given the opportunity to
define the limitations of the expanded executive power during a pandemic, as
well as to address jail congestion — a longstanding problem that has pervaded
our justice system. The issues involved here bear upon not only the role of the
Judiciary, but also our collective humanity, as we adapt to the unique
circumstances brought upon by the pandemic. AIDSTE
In this case, petitioners are detainees who pray for their temporary release
on recognizance or on bail, invoking humanitarian considerations on account of
their advanced age and compromised health conditions, as well as the spread of
COVID-19 in congested jails. They ask that their release be allowed while the
country is in the state of public health emergency, national calamity, lockdown,
and community quarantine. They also pray for the creation of a "prisoner release
committee" that shall issue ground rules and implement the release of all those
similarly situated. 5
With many of them sick, elderly, and pregnant — those most vulnerable to
the disease — petitioners maintain that their continuing detention threatens their
life and health. This, they assert, transgresses their right against cruel, degrading,
and inhuman punishment under Article III, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution. 6
Petitioners likewise invoke their rights under international law principles and
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conventions, including: (1) the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;
(2) the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment; (3) the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the
Treatment of Prisoners (the Nelson Mandela Rules); 7 (4) the United Nations Rules
for the Treatment of Women Prisoners and Non-custodial Measures for Women
Offenders (the Bangkok Rules); and (5) the United Nations Principles for Older
Persons. 8
Petitioners also point out that the United Nations High Commissioner for
Human Rights has recommended the decongestion of jails by releasing the most
vulnerable prisoners. They point out how the governments of Ethiopia, Sudan,
Germany, Canada, India, Iran, Afghanistan, Turkey, Australia, and New Jersey in
the United States have begun releasing prisoners upon acknowledging the gravity
of the pandemic. 9
As such, petitioners pray that this Court apply equity in their situation. They
assert that their release will not prejudice the State or the prosecution, and will
lessen state costs and health risks to jail personnel. They insist that they are not
flight risks, citing the quarantine and their advanced age, physical conditions, and
lack of resources to avoid trial. 10 They further point out that they are not
hardened criminals, as the charges against them are due to political beliefs. 11
They likewise stress that they have not yet been convicted, and are thus
presumed innocent. 12
Furthermore, petitioners cite the Implementing Rules and Regulations of
Republic Act No. 10575, which states that this Court may order the release or
transfer of any inmate, especially if not yet convicted. 13
Petitioners maintain prisoners' vulnerability to COVID-19. 14 They point out
that social distancing is impossible in jails, with some housing up to 534%
capacity. 15 They assert that the national government has not provided adequate
health measures in detention facilities. 16 While recognizing some measures set
up in jails, they insist that these are not sufficient to prevent the disease's spread.
17 They also raise mental health issues, their contact with the outside world
Bail is the security given for the temporary release of a person who
has been arrested and detained but "whose guilt has not yet been proven"
in court beyond reasonable doubt. The right to bail is cognate to the
fundamental right to be presumed innocent. In People v. Fitzgerald:
The right to bail emanates from the [accused's constitutional]
right to be presumed innocent. It is accorded to a person in the
custody of the law who may, by reason of the presumption of
innocence he [or she] enjoys, be allowed provisional liberty
upon filing of a security to guarantee his [or her] appearance
before any court, as required under specified conditions. . . .
(Citations omitted)
Bail may be a matter of right or judicial discretion. The accused has
the right to bail if the offense charged is "not punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment" before conviction by the Regional
Trial Court. However, if the accused is charged with an offense the penalty
of which is death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment — "regardless of
the stage of the criminal prosecution" — and when evidence of one's guilt
is not strong, then the accused's prayer for bail is subject to the discretion
of the trial court. 46 (Citations omitted)
There are instances when posting bail is no longer required, but these must
be provided in the law or in the Rules of Court. Rule 114, Section 16 of the Rules
of Court provides such instances:
When a person has been in custody for a period equal to or more
than the possible maximum imprisonment prescribed for the offense
charged, he shall be released immediately, without prejudice to the
continuation of the trial or the proceedings on appeal. If the maximum
penalty to which the accused may be sentenced is destierro, he shall be
released after thirty (30) days of preventive imprisonment.
A person in custody for a period equal to or more than the minimum
of the principal penalty prescribed for the offense charged, without
application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law or any modifying
circumstance, shall be released on a reduced bail or on his own
recognizance, at the discretion of the court. (16a)
In 2014, this Court, through A.M. No. 12-11-2-SC, issued guidelines to
enforce the accused's rights to bail and speedy trial to decongest holding jails and
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to humanize the conditions of detainees. 47 Section 5 provides:
SECTION 5. Release After Service of Minimum Imposable Penalty .
— The accused who has been detained for a period at least equal to the
minimum of the penalty for the offense charged against him shall be
ordered released, motu proprio or on motion and after notice and hearing,
on his own recognizance without prejudice to the continuation of the
proceedings against him. [Sec. 16, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court and Sec.
5(b) of R.A. 10389]
Meanwhile, release on recognizance is generally allowed if it is provided by
law or the Rules of Court. 48 Rule 114, Section 15 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure states:
SECTION 15. Recognizance. — Whenever allowed by law or these
Rules, the court may release a person in custody on his own recognizance
or that of a responsible person.
In People v. Abner , 49 this Court defined recognizance as a record entered in
court allowing for the release of an accused subject to the condition that they will
appear for trial:
Section 1, Rule 110, of the Rules of Court, provides that "bail is the security
required and given for the release of a person who is in the custody of the
law, that he will appear before any court in which his appearance may be
required as stipulated in the bail bond or recognizance." Under this, there
are two methods of taking bail: (1) by bail bond and (2) by recognizance. A
bail bond is an obligation given by the accused with one or more sureties,
with the condition to be void upon the performance by the accused of such
acts as he may legally be required to perform. A recognizance is an
obligation of record, entered into before some court or magistrate duly
authorized to take it, with the condition to do some particular act, the most
usual condition in criminal cases being the appearance of the accused for
trial . (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 2d ed., Vol. II, page 592.) In
U.S. vs. Sunico, et al., 48 Phil. 826, 834, this court, citing Lamphire vs.
State, 73 N. H., 462; 62 Atl., 786; 6 Am. & Eng. Ann. Cas., 615, defined a
recognizance as "a contract between the sureties and the State for the
production of the principal at the required time." 50 (Emphasis supplied)
Under Republic Act No. 10389, or the Recognizance Act of 2012, release on
recognizance is allowed if any person in custody or detention "is unable to post
bail due to abject poverty." 51 It is a matter of right when the offense is not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, so long as the
application is timely filed. 52
Republic Act No. 10389 further enumerates the procedure, requirements,
and disqualifications for release on recognizance. 53
I n Espiritu v. Jovellanos, 54 this Court enumerated the instances when
release on recognizance is allowed under Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure:
Under Rule 114, §15 of the Rules of Court, the release on recognizance of
any person under detention may be ordered only by a court and only in the
following cases: (a) when the offense charged is for violation of an
ordinance, a light felony, or a criminal offense, the imposable penalty for
which does not exceed 6 months imprisonment and/or P2,000 fine, under
the circumstances provided in R.A. No. 6036; (b) where a person has been
in custody for a period equal to or more than the minimum of the
imposable principal penalty, without application of the Indeterminate
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Sentence Law or any modifying circumstance, in which case the court, in
its discretion, may allow his release on his own recognizance; (c) where the
accused has applied for probation, pending resolution of the case but no
bail was filed or the accused is incapable of filing one; and (d) in case of a
youthful offender held for physical and mental examination, trial, or appeal,
if he is unable to furnish bail and under the circumstances envisaged in
P.D. No. 603, as amended (Art. 191). 55 (Citation omitted)
The other modes of release are reflected in the Bureau of Corrections
Operating Manual, which provides the following:
SECTION 1. Basis for Release of an Inmate. — An inmate may be
released from prison:
a. upon the expiration of his sentence;
b. by order of the Court or of competent authority; or
c. after being granted parole, pardon or amnesty.
SECTION 2. Who May Authorize Release . — The following are
authorized to order or approve the release of inmates:
a. the Supreme Court or lower courts, in cases of acquittal or grant
of bail;
b. the President of the Philippines, in cases of executive clemency
or amnesty;
c. the Board of Pardons and Parole, in parole cases; and
d. the Director, upon the expiration of the sentence of the inmate.
Similarly, the Revised Bureau of Jail Management and Penology
Comprehensive Operations Manual provides the modes and guidelines for the
release of inmates. Section 31 states in part:
SECTION 31. Modes and Guidelines for Release. — The following
modes and guidelines shall be observed when inmates are to be released
from detention:
1. An inmate may be released through:
a. Service of sentence;
b. Order of the Court;
c. Parole;
d. Pardon; and
e. Amnesty.
xxx xxx xxx
3. No inmate shall be released on a mere verbal order or an order
relayed via telephone. The release of an inmate by reason of acquittal,
dismissal of case, payment of fines and/or indemnity, or filing of bond, shall
take effect only upon receipt of the release order served by the court
process server. The court order shall bear the full name of the inmate, the
crime he/she was charged with, the criminal case number and such other
details that will enable the officer in charge to properly identify the inmate
to be released;
4. Upon proper verification from the court of the authenticity of
the order, an inmate shall be released promptly and without unreasonable
delay.
Incidentally, alternative custodial arrangements are in place for specific
instances. Case in point, temporary leave from jail for serious illness is allowed;
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however, this leave is not a release on bail, but a hospitalization leave that
requires court approval:
SECTION 65. Leave from Jail. — Leave from jail shall be allowed in
very meritorious cases, like the following:
1. Death or serious illness of spouse, father, mother, brother,
sister, or children.
2. Inmates who are seriously ill or injured may, under proper
escort, be allowed hospitalization leave or medical attendance. However,
such leave shall require prior approval of the Courts having jurisdiction over
them.
Provided, however, that in life and death cases where immediate
medical attention is imperative, the warden, at his/her own discretion, may
allow an inmate to be hospitalized or moved out of jail for medical
treatment; Provided further, that when the emergency has ceased as
certified by the attending physician, the warden shall cause the inmate's
immediate transfer back to the jail, except when there is a court order
directing him to continue the inmates confinement in a hospital until
his/her recovery or upon order of the Court for his/her immediate return to
the jail. 56
I n Trillanes v. Pimentel , 57 this Court acknowledged that prisoners may be
granted temporary leaves from imprisonment upon a court order. However, a
prisoner must first establish an emergency or compelling reason.
Here, petitioners pray for their temporary release on recognizance or on
bail, invoking humanitarian considerations and this Court's exercise of its equity
jurisdiction, on account of their advanced age, compromised health conditions,
the nature of COVID-19, and our current jail conditions.
However, there are no legal provisions that provide for the release of
detainees based on humanitarian grounds. Neither does the Constitution nor any
statute allow for the automatic grant of bail or release on recognizance for
inmates who are of vulnerable health.
Petitioners know this. They themselves concede that humanitarian
considerations are not grounds for bail. 58 This is precisely why they invoke this
Court's discretion on the ground of compassion, 59 filing their Petition as an
exception to the rules on bail or recognizance. 60 They pray that this Court
exercise its equity jurisdiction on account of a gap in the law that it can
legitimately remedy. 61 Petitioners rely on Enrile v. Sandiganbayan, 62 where the
majority of this Court allowed the petitioner's bail for humanitarian considerations.
63
In his opinion, Justice Delos Santos points out that courts cannot grant
reliefs, invent remedies, or recognize implied rights without a law providing for it.
64 He holds that to allow petitioners' release will intrude into the powers of the
legislature, and is contrary to the civil law tradition of deciding cases based on
express provisions of law.
He and Justice Jose Reyes, Jr. (Justice Reyes) both opine that this Court
cannot grant the release of petitioners on the ground of equity, especially if it
contravenes law. They add that the case presents several questions of facts that
must be lodged with the trial courts. To allow the automatic release of detainees
on a single factor, without evaluating other factors, will create a substantive right
and predetermine an entitlement to a provisional liberty, which courts have no
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power to do. 65 Justice Reyes also notes that petitioners' allegations are not
sufficient to justify a direct recourse to this Court. 66
I agree with my colleagues that this Court cannot exercise its equity
jurisdiction to supplant the express provisions on bail and recognizance.
A court's exercise of equity jurisdiction often comes into play when special
circumstances reveal an inflexibility in its statutory or legal jurisdiction, or an
inadequacy in available laws, such that it is unable to render substantive justice.
In Reyes v. Lim: 67
Equity jurisdiction aims to do complete justice in cases where a court of law
is unable to adapt its judgments to the special circumstances of a case
because of the inflexibility of its statutory or legal jurisdiction. Equity is the
principle by which substantial justice may be attained in cases where the
prescribed or customary forms of ordinary law are inadequate. 68 (Citations
omitted)
Equity jurisdiction finds basis in Article 9 of the Civil Code, which states that
"[n]o judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence,
obscurity or insufficiency of the laws." 69 Essentially, equity "fills the open spaces
in the law." 70
This Court's equity jurisdiction has been exercised in cases where the
absence or insufficiency of an express provision or procedural rule will result in
unjust enrichment or prevent rightful restitution. 71 It has also been applied where
a strict application of procedural rules will overrule "strong considerations of
substantial justice[.]" 72 In Orata v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 73 this Court
held:
Be that as it may, this Court has in a number of cases, in the exercise
of equity jurisdiction decided to disregard technicalities in order to resolve
the case on its merits based on the evidence.
Furthermore, it is well settled that litigations should, as much as
possible, be decided on their merits and not on technicalities; that every
party-litigant must be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and
just determination of his case, free from unacceptable plea of technicalities.
This Court has ruled further that being a few days late in the filing of the
petition for review does not merit automatic dismissal thereof. And even
assuming that a petition for review is filed a few days late, where strong
considerations of substantial justice are manifest in the petition, this Court
may relax the stringent application of technical rules in the exercise of its
equity jurisdiction. In addition to the basic merits of the main case, such a
petition usually embodies justifying circumstances which warrant Our
heeding the petitioner's cry for justice, inspite of the earlier negligence of
counsel. 74 (Citations omitted)
However, this Court has repeatedly clarified that equity only applies when
there is an absence in the law. It cannot overrule, infringe, or disregard express
provisions of law. In Heirs of Soriano v. Court of Appeals: 75
As often held by this Court, equity is available only in the absence of law
and not as its replacement. All abstract arguments based only on equity
should yield to positive rules, (judicial rules of procedure) which pre-empt
and prevail over such persuasions. Moreover, a court acting without
jurisdiction cannot justify its assumption thereof by invoking its equity
jurisdiction. 76 (Citations omitted)
In Samedra v. Court of Appeals: 77
I disagree. In fact, Enrile's release raised several questions that reveal the
lack of clear guidelines: Is his release because of his advanced age? Is it because
he suffers from medical conditions or because those conditions were aggravated
by incarceration? Is it due to a medical emergency? Can the release on bail be
shortened once the medical emergency has been addressed? What medical
conditions allow for the release on bail? Does it apply only to those on trial for
plunder, or to others with crimes punished by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment? Does it apply only to senators or those of similar stature?
Incidentally, these are the very questions that the Petition now before this Court
seeks to test.
Third, I noted that, when hospital treatment is necessary, courts usually do
not grant bail, but only modify the conditions for one's detention. The accused's
release should also not be longer than the time needed to address the medical
condition. Yet, the majority in Enrile granted bail even if the Sandiganbayan did
not find Enrile suffering from a unique and debilitating disease. The majority even
permitted him to undergo hospital arrest.
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Finally, I discussed that alternative custodial arrangements should not favor
only wealthy, powerful, and networked detainees. The right to liberty applies to all
individuals. Special privileges should be granted only under clear, transparent,
and reasoned circumstances. The majority's grant of bail was clearly a special
accommodation for Enrile. It lacked neutrality and impartiality as it found a better
argument for the petitioner, at the expense of the prosecution.
I note Chief Justice Peralta's opinion that the ruling in Enrile is not a pro hac
vice ruling since pro hac vice rulings have been declared illegal in Knights of Rizal
v. DMCI Homes, Inc. 93 I also note Justice Lazaro-Javier's opinion that Enrile forms
part of the law of the land as a legally binding decision, and her refusal to treat it
as pro hac vice ruling to avoid the notion that this Court lays down doctrines that
solely serve the powerful and privileged. 94
I, however, join Justices Caguioa and Perlas-Bernabe in reaffirming that
Enrile is a pro hac vice ruling, applicable only to the unique considerations
accorded to Enrile. 95 I agree that the ruling in Enrile does not support the
Constitution, the rules, and jurisprudence. It is a stray decision 96 that cannot be a
binding precedent, because there was no hearing to determine whether the
evidence of his guilt was not strong.
I maintain my opinion in Enrile here. Release on bail for humanitarian
considerations or medical conditions is not found in the Constitution, in any local
or international law, or in any rule of procedure. While petitioners enjoy the
constitutional rights to life and health, these rights do not result in the automatic
grant of bail for those who are of advanced age and frail health.
Detainees cannot be allowed temporary release without following the law. If
petitioners or any other detainees seek to be released on bail, a hearing is
necessary to determine the amount of bail. If they are charged with a crime
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, a hearing is necessary to
determine whether the evidence of guilt is strong.
Should a new ground for temporary release be allowed or an alternative
custodial arrangement be provided, the rule must be clear as to who are qualified:
What age? What medical conditions or health concerns? What crimes? For how
long? In any case, the right to equal protection of the laws must always be kept in
mind, so that no special privilege or accommodation would be extended to
anyone else, as what happened in Enrile. Alternative custodial arrangements
should be granted only under clear, transparent, and reasoned circumstances.
They must always bow to the relevant laws and rules of procedure, subject to
continuous review by the trial court.
Thus, this Petition should be referred to the proper trial courts to determine
whether there is basis for their release on bail or recognizance. Before petitioners
may be released, they must first establish before the trial courts the facts,
circumstances, and qualifications that will warrant their release on bail or
recognizance. EcTCAD
I (B)
Justices Perlas-Bernabe and Delos Santos both hold that there is wisdom in
depriving the accused of liberty pending trial. Their continued detention ensures
the court's jurisdiction over them, secures their participation in the proceedings,
and prevents them from committing another crime. 97
However, Justice Delos Santos concludes that detaining the criminally
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accused pending the determination of their guilt is part of police power. 98 I
qualify his conclusion.
The State's "capacity to prosecute and punish crimes" is part of its police
power. In Tawahig v. Hon. Lapinid: 99
A crime is "an offense against society." It "is a breach of the security
and peace of the people at large[.]"
A criminal action, where "the State prosecutes a person for an act or
omission punishable by law," is thus pursued "to maintain social order." It
"punish[es] the offender in order to deter him [or her] and others from
committing the same or similar offense, . . . isolate[s] him [or her] from
society, reform[s] and rehabilitate[s] him [or her]." One who commits a
crime commits an offense against all the citizens of the state penalizing a
given act or omission: "a criminal offense is an outrage to the very
sovereignty of the State[.]" Accordingly, a criminal action is prosecuted in
the name of the "People" as plaintiff. Likewise, a representative of the
State, the public prosecutor, "direct[s] and control[s] the prosecution of [an]
offense." As such, a public prosecutor is:
[T]he representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy,
but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as
compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest,
therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a
case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he [or she] is in a
peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the
twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence
suffer.
The capacity to prosecute and punish crimes is an attribute of the
State's police power. It inheres in "the sovereign power instinctively
charged by the common will of the members of society to look after, guard
and defend the interests of the community, the individual and social rights
and the liberties of every citizen and the guaranty of the exercise of his
rights." 100 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Police power cannot justify denying a person's right to provisional liberty.
The Constitution provides that all persons, except those punished with reclusion
perpetua whose evidence of guilt is strong, have a right to provisional liberty. 101
What justifies the accused's deprivation of liberty is the determination that the
evidence of guilt is strong:
In the present case, it is uncontroverted that petitioner's application
for bail and for release on recognizance was denied. The determination
that the evidence of guilt is strong, whether ascertained in a hearing of an
application for bail or imported from a trial court's judgment of conviction,
justifies the detention of an accused as a valid curtailment of his right to
provisional liberty. This accentuates the proviso that the denial of the right
to bail in such cases is "regardless of the stage of the criminal action." Such
justification for confinement with its underlying rationale of public self
defense applies equally to detention prisoners like petitioner or convicted
prisoners appellants like Jalosjos. As the Court observed in Alejano v.
Cabuay , it is impractical to draw a line between convicted prisoners and
pre-trial detainees for the purpose of maintaining jail security; and while
pre-trial detainees do not forfeit their constitutional rights upon
confinement, the fact of their detention makes their rights more limited
than those of the public. The Court was more emphatic in People v. Hon.
Maceda:
As a matter of law, when a person indicted for an offense
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is arrested, he is deemed placed under the custody of the law.
He is placed in actual restraint of liberty in jail so that he may
be bound to answer for the commission of the offense. He must
be detained in jail during the pendency of the case against him
unless he is authorized by the court to be released on bail or on
recognizance. Let it be stressed that all prisoners whether
under preventive detention or serving final sentence cannot
practice their profession nor engage in any business or
occupation, or hold office, elective or appointive, while in
detention. This is a necessary consequence of arrest and
detention.
These inherent limitations, however, must be taken into account only
to the extent that confinement restrains the power of locomotion or actual
physical movement. It bears noting that in Jalosjos, which was decided en
banc one month after Maceda, the Court recognized that the accused could
somehow accomplish legislative results. The trial court thus correctly
concluded that the presumption of innocence does not carry with it the full
enjoyment of civil and political rights. 102 (Emphasis supplied)
Justice Delos Santos even advances the following parameters in determining
whether the State's police power should be exercised during an emergency:
(1) Such encroachment shall be incidental to public safety and shall not
enter the bounds of arbitrariness;
(2) Measures pursued or concerns protected by the State should be
reasonably related or linked to the attainment of its legitimate
objectives consistent with general welfare; and
(3) The measure undertaken or concern addressed for the benefit of the
majority pursuant to an exercise of police power must not be
unnecessarily oppressive on the minority. 103
Thus, Justice Delos Santos justifies petitioners' continued detention by
invoking public safety. He claims that the serious nature of the crimes charged
against them, being related to their alleged membership in the CPP-NPA-NDF,
makes their continued confinement "a legitimate and vital concern of national
security." 104
He is ready to make a pronouncement on petitioners' participation as
alleged key members of CPP-NPA-NDF and declare them as terrorists, 105 albeit
limited to determining "a reasonable link or relation between the assailed
government measures or concerns and the legitimate objectives regarding
general welfare in times of emergency." 106 From this, he infers that petitioners'
continued detention is justified because releasing them without bail hearings
would endanger national security.
I cannot find the reasonable link that Justice Delos Santos claims to exist
between the continued detention of petitioners as alleged members of CPP-NPA-
NDF and the State's objective of suppressing the pandemic. We cannot take
judicial notice of the news reports of alleged armed attacks against the military
and police distributing relief goods. 107 Simply, these are not proper matters of
judicial notice, whether mandatory or discretionary.
Rather, as Justice Reyes notes, this Court must refrain from making
conclusions on the merits of petitioners' pending cases, 108 as it is premature to
make pronouncements based on unverified information. 109 Both he and Justice
Lazaro-Javier share the opinion that petitioners' membership in the CPP-NPA-NDF
is an allegation that is still being litigated. 110
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I echo their sentiments. There being no bail hearings, the evidence of
petitioners' guilt has not yet been established.
To use the nature of the alleged crimes to justify petitioners' continued
confinement denies them not only of due process, but also of their right to be
presumed innocent until proven guilty. As Justice Perlas-Bernabe states, "an
accused cannot just be left to perish and die in the midst of a devastating global
pandemic, without any recourse whatsoever." 111 National security and public
safety are no blanket excuses to violate the accused's constitutional rights.
Thus, without the appropriate hearing in the trial courts, this Court should
not conclude if petitioners are entitled to release on bail or recognizance based on
the crimes charged against them.
II
Persons deprived of liberty ought to be able to file a case for violations of
their right against cruel, inhuman, and degrading punishment and other related
constitutional rights.
In keeping with our constitutional duty to recognize the intrinsic value of
every human being, as well as our power to provide guidance to Bench and Bar, I
discuss the following causes of action submitted by petitioners: (1) the right
against cruel, degrading, and inhuman punishment; (2) the right to life and health;
and (3) the rights of prisoners and detainees under international law principles
and conventions and our own local laws, rules, and procedures.
II (A)
The 1987 Constitution guards against the infliction of any cruel, degrading,
or inhuman punishment. Its Article III, Section 19 states:
SECTION 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel,
degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be
imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the
Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall
be reduced to reclusion perpetua.
(2) The employment of physical, psychological, or degrading
punishment against any prisoner or detainee or the use of substandard or
inadequate penal facilities under subhuman conditions shall be dealt with
by law.
I n Alejano v. Cabuay, 112 this Court defined punishment as a chastisement
that causes suffering through harm or incapacitation that is more severe than the
discomfort of detention:
An action constitutes a punishment when (1) that action causes the
inmate to suffer some harm or "disability," and (2) the purpose of the
action is to punish the inmate. Punishment also requires that the harm or
disability be significantly greater than, or be independent of, the inherent
discomforts of confinement. 113 (Citations omitted)
Despite a few statutes and rules promoting the rehabilitation of offenders,
our criminal justice system is primarily punitive, seeking to deter and penalize
felonies and crimes through imprisonment and fines. Thus, the Constitution does
not prohibit retributive justice in itself. What it prohibits is cruel, degrading, or
inhuman punishment.
The previous constitutions did not include punishment that is "degrading or
inhuman." Both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions respectively read:
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SECTION 1 (19). Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel
and unusual punishment inflicted. 114
SECTION 21. Excessive fines shall not be imposed nor cruel or
unusual punishment inflicted. 115
With the enactment of the 1987 Constitution, the words "degrading or
inhuman punishment" were added to the prohibition.
I n David v. Senate Electoral Tribunal , 116 this Court discussed that
interpreting the text of the Constitution involves reviewing how the text has
evolved from its previous iterations. The formulation of provisions usually involves
a reassessment of old ones in order to better address any shortcomings the old
rules failed to account for:
Interpretation grounded on textual primacy likewise looks into how
the text has evolved. Unless completely novel, legal provisions are the
result of the re-adoption — often with accompanying re-calibration — of
previously existing rules. Even when seemingly novel, provisions are often
introduced as a means of addressing the inadequacies and excesses of
previously existing rules.
One may trace the historical development of text: by comparing its
current iteration with prior counterpart provisions, keenly taking note of
changes in syntax, along with accounting for more conspicuous substantive
changes such as the addition and deletion of provisos or items in
enumerations, shifting terminologies, the use of more emphatic or more
moderate qualifiers, and the imposition of heavier penalties. The tension
between consistency and change galvanizes meaning. 117
The adding of "inhuman" and "degrading" to the prohibited punishment
reveals that these words are meant to be treated separately from cruel or unusual
punishment, and meant to address different circumstances.
I n People v. Dionisio , 118 this Court explained that punishment is cruel and
unusual when the penalties imposed are inhuman, barbarous, and shocking to the
conscience:
Neither fines nor imprisonment constitute in themselves cruel and
unusual punishment, for the constitutional stricture has been interpreted as
referring to penalties that are inhuman and barbarous, or shocking to the
conscience and fines or imprisonment are definitely not in this category.
Nor does mere severity constitute cruel and unusual punishment. In
People vs. Estoista, 93 Phil. 655, this Court ruled:
"It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of
proportion, or severe for a penalty to be obnoxious to the
Constitution. 'The fact that the punishment authorized by the
statute is severe does not make it cruel and unusual.'
Expressed in other terms, it has been held that to come under
the ban, the punishment must be 'flagrantly and plainly
oppressive,' 'wholly disproportionate to the nature of the
offense as to shock the moral sense of the community.' ( Idem.)
Having in mind the necessity for a radical measure and the
public interest at stake, we do not believe that five years'
confinement for possessing firearms, even as applied to
appellant's and similar cases, can be said to be cruel and
unusual, barbarous, or excessive to the extent of being
shocking to public conscience. It is of interest to note that the
validity on constitutional grounds of the Act in question was
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contested neither at the trial nor in the elaborate printed brief
for the appellant; it was raised for the first time in the course of
the oral argument in the Court of Appeals. It is also noteworthy,
as possible gauge of popular and judicial reaction the duration
of the imprisonment stipulated in the statute, that some
members of the court at first expressed opposition to any
recommendation for executive clemency for the appellant,
believing that he deserved imprisonment within the prescribed
range." 119 (Citations omitted)
In Maturan v. Commission on Elections, 120 this Court reiterated that it is the
punishment's character, not its severity, that makes it cruel and inhuman. It
would have to be an infliction of "corporeal or psychological punishment that
strips the individual of [their] humanity":
We have already settled that the constitutional proscription under the
Bill of Rights extends only to situations of extreme corporeal or
psychological punishment that strips the individual of his humanity. The
proscription is aimed more at the form or character of the punishment
rather than at its severity, as the Court has elucidated in Lim v. People , to
wit:
Settled is the rule that a punishment authorized by statute is
not cruel, degrading or disproportionate to the nature of the
offense unless it is flagrantly and plainly oppressive and wholly
disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the
moral sense of the community. It takes more than merely
being harsh, excessive, out of proportion or severe for a
penalty to be obnoxious to the Constitution. Based on this
principle, the Court has consistently overruled contentions of
the defense that the penalty of fine or imprisonment authorized
by the statute involved is cruel and degrading.
I n People vs. Tongko , this Court held that the prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment is generally
aimed at the form or character of the punishment rather
than its severity in respect of its duration or amount,
and applies to punishments which never existed in
America or which public sentiment regards as cruel or
obsolete. This refers, for instance, to those inflicted at
the whipping post or in the pillory, to burning at the
stake, breaking on the wheel, disemboweling and the
like. The fact that the penalty is severe provides
insufficient basis to declare a law unconstitutional and
does not, by that circumstance alone, make it cruel and
inhuman. 121 (Emphasis in the original, citation omitted)
The constitutional right thus necessarily ensures that all persons are
protected against all forms of torture. Republic Act No. 9745, 122 otherwise known
as the Anti-Torture Act, outlines what constitutes torture and other types of cruel
and degrading treatment or punishment:
SECTION 3. Definitions. — For purposes of this Act, the following
terms shall mean:
(a) "Torture" refers to an act by which severe pain or
suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted
on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him/her or a
third person information or a confession; punishing him/her for
an act he/she or a third person has committed or is suspected
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of having committed; or intimidating or coercing him/her or a
third person; or for any reason based on discrimination of any
kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the
instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a person in
authority or agent of a person in authority. It does not include
pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to
lawful sanctions.
(b) "Other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or
punishment" refers to a deliberate and aggravated treatment
or punishment not enumerated under Section 4 of this Act,
inflicted by a person in authority or agent of a person in
authority against a person under his/her custody, which attains
a level of severity causing suffering, gross humiliation or
debasement to the latter. 123
xxx xxx xxx
SECTION 4. Acts of Torture . — For purposes of this Act, torture
shall include, but not be limited to, the following:
(a) Physical torture is a form of treatment or punishment
inflicted by a person in authority or agent of a person in
authority upon another in his/her custody that causes severe
pain, exhaustion, disability or dysfunction of one or more parts
of the body, such as:
(1) Systematic beating, head banging, punching,
kicking, striking with truncheon or rifle butt or other
similar objects, and jumping on the stomach;
(2) Food deprivation or forcible feeding with spoiled
food, animal or human excreta and other stuff or
substances not normally eaten;
(3) Electric shock;
(4) Cigarette burning; burning by electrically heated
rods, hot oil, acid; by the rubbing of pepper or other
chemical substances on mucous membranes, or acids or
spices directly on the wound(s);
(5) The submersion of the head in water or water
polluted with excrement, urine, vomit and/or blood until
the brink of suffocation;
(6) Being tied or forced to assume fixed and stressful
bodily position;
(7) Rape and sexual abuse, including the insertion of
foreign objects into the sex organ or rectum, or electrical
torture of the genitals;
(8) Mutilation or amputation of the essential parts of
the body such as the genitalia, ear, tongue, etc.;
(9) Dental torture or the forced extraction of the
teeth;
(10) Pulling out of fingernails;
(11) Harmful exposure to the elements such as
sunlight and extreme cold;
(12) The use of plastic bag and other materials placed
over the head to the point of asphyxiation;
(13) The use of psychoactive drugs to change the
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perception, memory, alertness or will of a person, such
as:
(i) The administration of drugs to induce
confession and/or reduce mental competency; or
(ii) The use of drugs to induce extreme pain or
certain symptoms of a disease; and
(14) Other analogous acts of physical torture; and
(b) "Mental/Psychological Torture" refers to acts committed
by a person in authority or agent of a person in authority which
are calculated to affect or confuse the mind and/or undermine
a person's dignity and morale, such as:
(1) Blindfolding; AScHCD
Provincial prisoner six (6) months and one (1) day to three
(3) years;
All persons deprived of liberty under the custody of the Bureau of Jail
Management and Penology likewise have specific rights and privileges. These
include the rights to be treated as human beings; to not be subjected to corporal
punishment; to adequate food, space and ventilation, rest and recreation; to avail
themselves of medical, dental, and other health services. They likewise have the
privilege of being visited and treated anytime by a doctor of their choice, or
treated in a government or private hospital if necessary and allowed by the rules.
145
Moreover, under the same Manual, the Bureau of Jail Management and
Penology shall aim to "improve the living conditions of offenders in accordance
with the accepted standards set by the United Nations." 146
The Manual expressly references the United Nations Standard Minimum
Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, 147 or the Nelson Mandela Rules, on the rule
on segregation of prisoners and the treatment of prisoners with special needs,
which include senior citizens, infirm inmates with contagious diseases, pregnant
women, and female inmates with infants. Rule IV, Section 34 provides the
following guidelines:
SECTION 34. Handling Inmates with Special Needs. — The
following guidelines shall be observed in handling inmates with special
needs:
xxx xxx xxx
11. Senior Citizen Inmates
a. Senior citizen inmates should be segregated and close
supervised to protect them from maltreatment and other forms
of abuse by other inmates;
b. Individual case management strategies should be
developed and adopted to respond to the special needs of
elderly inmates;
c. Collaboration with other government agencies and
community-based senior citizen organizations should be done
to ensure that the services due the senior citizen inmates are
provided; and
d. Senior citizen inmates should be made to do tasks
deemed fit and appropriate, their age, capability, and physical
condition considered.
12. Infirm Inmates
a. Inmates with contagious diseases must be segregated to
prevent the spread of said contagious diseases;
b. Infirm inmates should be referred to the jail physician or
nurse for evaluation and management; and
c. Infirm inmates must be closely monitored and provide
with appropriate medication and utmost care.
13. Pregnant Inmates/Female Inmates with Infants
a. Pregnant inmates must be referred to jail physician or
nurse for pre-natal examination;
b. They should be given tasks that are deemed fit and
proper, their physical limitations, considered;
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c. During active labor, pregnant inmates should be
transferred nearest government hospital;
d. Treatment of mother and her infant/s shall be in
accordance with the BJMP Policy (Refer to DIWD Manual); and
e. Female inmates with infants shall be provided with ample
privacy during breastfeeding activity.
III
The constitutional rights to life and health, the prohibition against torture
and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment, and the State policy to guarantee
full respect for human dignity are affirmed in the international laws and standards
that bind us. These fundamental rights, anchored on the recognition of the
inherent dignity of every human being, have acquired the status of universal
application as jus cogens, or 'compelling law.' 148
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights prohibits "cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment" 149 and declares that every human being is
entitled to "the right to life, liberty, and security of persons." 150
Moreover, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 151
expressly provides that persons deprived of liberty do not shed their "inherent
dignity." Article 10 states:
Article 10
1. All persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with humanity
and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person.
2.
(a) Accused persons shall, save in exceptional circumstances, be
segregated from convicted persons and shall be subject to separate
treatment appropriate to their status as unconvicted persons;
(b) Accused juvenile persons shall be separated from adults and
brought as speedily as possible for adjudication.
3. The penitentiary system shall comprise treatment of prisoners the
essential aim of which shall be their reformation and social rehabilitation.
Juvenile offenders shall be segregated from adults and be accorded
treatment appropriate to their age and legal status. (Emphasis supplied)
The inherent dignity of persons deprived of liberty as human beings, as with
their humane treatment, is a "fundamental and universally applicable rule." 152 It
applies without any distinction, and does not depend on the available material
resources of a state party.
The Basic Principles for the Treatment of Prisoners 153 provides that all
prisoners retain all their rights under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and other international covenants where a state is a member party:
5. Except for those limitations that are demonstrably necessitated by
the fact of incarceration, all prisoners shall retain the human rights and
fundamental freedoms set out in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, and, where the State concerned is a party, the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Optional Protocol thereto, as
well as such other rights as are set out in other United Nations covenants.
Furthermore, on December 9, 1975, the United Nations General Assembly
declared that no state may permit torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading
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punishment. 154 Not even exceptional circumstances such as war, internal political
instability, and other public emergency can justify any of these prohibited acts.
155
international law." 162 A prominent modern definition is that "(t)he rules of jus
cogens [are] those rules which derive from principles that the legal conscience of
[hu]mankind deem[s] absolutely essential to coexistence in the international
community." 163
These definitions have been incorporated in Bayan Muna v. Romulo: 164
"The term 'jus cogens' means the 'compelling law.'" Corollary, "a jus
cogens norm holds the highest hierarchical position among all other
customary norms and principles." As a result, jus cogens norms are
deemed "peremptory and non-derogable." When applied to international
crimes, "jus cogens crimes have been deemed so fundamental to the
existence of a just international legal order that states cannot derogate
from them, even by agreement."
T h e s e jus cogens crimes relate to the principle of universal
jurisdiction, i.e., "any state may exercise jurisdiction over an individual who
commits certain heinous and widely condemned offenses, even when no
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other recognized basis for jurisdiction exists." "The rationale behind this
principle is that the crime committed is so egregious that it is considered to
be committed against all members of the international community" and
thus granting every State jurisdiction over the crime. 165 (Citations
omitted)
Among the fundamental rights established as jus cogens are the right to life
and the prohibition of torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or
punishment. 166 These non-derogable international customary norms have been
reiterated in several conventions that the Philippines signed and ratified, as
previously discussed.
In any case, the non-derogable international laws are not the only rules
governing the international community. For instance, a treaty creating the World
Trade Organization, or a Security Council Resolution defining a terrorist
organization, are non-peremptory in that accession is optional; yet, they still have
significant effects on the international community. As elegantly captured in Justice
Antonio Carpio's dissent in Bayan Muna:
Some customary international laws have been affirmed and
embodied in treaties and conventions. A treaty constitutes evidence of
customary law if it is declaratory of customary law, or if it is intended to
codify customary law. In such a case, even a State not party to the treaty
would be bound thereby. A treaty which is merely a formal expression of
customary international law is enforceable on all States because of their
membership in the family of nations. For instance, the Vienna Convention
on Consular Relations is binding even on non-party States because the
provisions of the Convention are mostly codified rules of customary
international law binding on all States even before their codification into
the Vienna Convention. Another example is the Law of the Sea, which
consists mostly of codified rules of customary international law, which have
been universally observed even before the Law of the Sea was ratified by
participating States.
Corollarily, treaties may become the basis of customary international
law. While States which are not parties to treaties or international
agreements are not bound thereby, such agreements, if widely accepted
for years by many States, may transform into customary international laws,
in which case, they bind even non-signatory States. 167 (Citations omitted)
Therefore, the Nelson Mandela Rules and its precedent, the United Nations
Minimum Standard on the Treatment of Prisoners, cannot simply be disregarded
as non-binding norms. The principles and fundamental rights on which these
declarations are based — the right to life, the prohibition of torture, and the
prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment — have attained a jus cogens status.
These Rules have been adhered to and transformed into local legislation and
incorporated in our penal institutions.
To view a resolution adopted by the United Nations General Assembly as not
being jus cogens, only being recommendatory, is limited. It fails to consider that a
resolution of the United Nations General Assembly may be any of the following:
(1) an articulation of a customary international norm; (2) a reiteration of existing
treaty obligations; (3) a reflection of emerging international norms and standards,
or commonly referred to as "soft law"; or (4) a binding source of obligation that is
judicially enforceable once acceded to by a member state.
First, the Nelson Mandela Rules articulates customary international norms on
the treatment of prisoners. These are based on one's fundamental dignity,
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including those under confinement. These are codified into several declarations
and conventions that the Philippines have ratified.
I n Razon v. Tagitis , 168 this Court recognized "resolutions relating to legal
questions in the [United Nations] General Assembly" as material sources of
international customs:
The most widely accepted statement of sources of international law
today is Article 38 (1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice,
which provides that the Court shall apply "international custom, as
evidence of a general practice accepted as law." The material sources of
custom include State practice, State legislation, international and national
judicial decisions, recitals in treaties and other international instruments, a
pattern of treaties in the same form, the practice of international organs,
and resolutions relating to legal questions in the UN General Assembly.
Sometimes referred to as "evidence" of international law, these sources
identify the substance and content of the obligations of States and are
indicative of the "State practice" and "opinio juris" requirements of
international law. 169 (Citations omitted)
It is erroneous to dismiss the Nelson Mandela Rules just because the United
Nations General Assembly resolutions are only recommendatory. The
preambulatory clauses of Resolution No. 70/175, 170 which adopted the Nelson
Mandela Rules, state that the precedent United Nations Minimum Standard on the
Treatment of Prisoners has already attained the status of a "universally
acknowledged minimum standards for the detention of prisoners and that they
have been of significant value and influence." 171
Second , a resolution of the United Nations General Assembly may reiterate
an existing treaty obligation, as in the preambulatory clause of Resolution No.
70/175:
Taking into account the progressive development of international law
pertaining to the treatment of prisoners since 1955, including in
international instruments such as the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights and the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and the Optional Protocol
thereto[.]
Notably, the Philippines acceded 172 to the Convention Against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. 173 This embraces
the following obligations:
Article 2
1. Each State Party shall take effective legislative, administrative, judicial
or other measures to prevent acts of torture in any territory under its
jurisdiction.
2. No exceptional circumstances whatsoever , whether a state of war
or a threat of war, internal political instability or any other public
emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture.
3. An order from a superior officer or a public authority may not be
invoked as a justification of torture.
xxx xxx xxx
Article 11
Each State Party shall keep under systematic review interrogation rules,
instructions, methods and practices as well as arrangements for the
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custody and treatment of persons subjected to any form of arrest,
detention or imprisonment in any territory under its jurisdiction, with a view
to preventing any cases of torture.
xxx xxx xxx
Article 16
1. Each State Party shall undertake to prevent in any territory under its
jurisdiction other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment which do not amount to torture as defined in article 1,
when such acts are committed by or at the instigation of or with the
consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an
official capacity. In particular, the obligations contained in articles 10,
11, 12 and 13 shall apply with the substitution for references to torture
of references to other forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment.
2. The provisions of this Convention are without prejudice to the
provisions of any other international instrument or national law which
prohibits cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment or
which relates to extradition or expulsion. (Emphasis supplied)
The Philippines also acceded to the Optional Protocol to the Convention
against Torture. 174 Among its objectives is to establish regular visits of detention
places and prisons from international and domestic bodies to prevent torture and
other cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment or treatment.
Third, the Nelson Mandela Rules reflects emerging international norms and
standards, or commonly referred to as "soft law." It partakes of "new soft law
standards" that function as a "significant normative reference for national
legislators, courts, correctional administrators, and advocates on a range of prison
conditions issues." 175
In Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines v. Duque III,
176 this Court held that a "soft law," while not necessarily binding, has great
political influence:
"Soft law" does not fall into any of the categories of international law
set forth in Article 38, Chapter III of the 1946 Statute of the International
Court of Justice. It is, however, an expression of non-binding norms,
principles, and practices that influence state behavior. Certain declarations
and resolutions of the UN General Assembly fall under this category. The
most notable is the UN Declaration of Human Rights, which this Court has
enforced in various cases, specifically, Government of Hongkong Special
Administrative Region v. Olalia , Mejoff v. Director of Prisons , Mijares v.
Rañada and Shangri-la International Hotel Management, Ltd. v. Developers
Group of Companies, Inc.
The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), a specialized
agency attached to the UN with the mandate to promote and protect
intellectual property worldwide, has resorted to soft law as a rapid means
of norm creation, in order "to reflect and respond to the changing needs
and demands of its constituents." Other international organizations which
have resorted to soft law include the International Labor Organization and
the Food and Agriculture Organization (in the form of the Codex
Alimentarius).
WHO has resorted to soft law. This was most evident at the time of
the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) and Avian flu outbreaks.
Although the IHR Resolution does not create new international law
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binding on WHO member states, it provides an excellent example of the
power of "soft law" in international relations. International lawyers typically
distinguish binding rules of international law-"hard law"-from non-binding
norms, principles, and practices that influence state behavior-"soft law."
WHO has during its existence generated many soft law norms, creating a
"soft law regime" in international governance for public health.
The "soft law" SARS and IHR Resolutions represent significant steps
in laying the political groundwork for improved international cooperation on
infectious diseases. These resolutions clearly define WHO member states'
normative duty to cooperate fully with other countries and with WHO in
connection with infectious disease surveillance and response to outbreaks.
This duty is neither binding nor enforceable, but, in the wake of the
SARS epidemic, the duty is powerful politically for two reasons. First, the
SARS outbreak has taught the lesson that participating in, and enhancing,
international cooperation on infectious disease controls is in a country's self
interest . . . if this warning is heeded, the "soft law" in the SARS and IHR
Resolution could inform the development of general and consistent state
practice on infectious disease surveillance and outbreak response, perhaps
crystallizing eventually into customary international law on infectious
disease prevention and control. 177 (Citations omitted)
Finally, the Nelson Mandela Rules could not be ignored, precisely because
the Philippines adopted these standards through its express adherence to the
established standards of the United Nations under Republic Act No. 10575, or the
Bureau of Corrections Act of 2013. Section 4 states:
SECTION 4. The Mandates of the Bureau of Corrections. — The
BuCor shall be in charge of safekeeping and instituting reformation
programs to national inmates sentenced to more than three (3) years.
(a) Safekeeping of National Inmates — The safekeeping of
inmates shall include decent provision of quarters, food, water and clothing
i n compliance with established United Nations standards . The
security of the inmates shall be undertaken by the Custodial Force
consisting of Corrections Officers with a ranking system and salary grades
similar to its counterpart in the BJMP.
xxx xxx xxx
SECTION 5. Operations of the Bureau of Corrections. — (a) The
BuCor shall operate with a directorial structure. It shall undertake reception
of inmates through its Directorate for Reception and Diagnostics (DRD),
formerly Reception and Diagnostic Center (RDC), provide basic needs and
security through its Security and Operations Directorates, administer
reformation programs through its Reformation Directorates, and prepare
inmates for reintegration to mainstream society through its Directorate for
External Relations (DER), formerly External Relations Division (ERD).
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Aside from those borne of the provisions under Rule 8, Part I,
Rules of General Application of the United Nations Standard Minimum
Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners and that of the existing regulation
of the BuCor on security classification (i.e., maximum, medium and
minimum security risk), inmates shall also be internally classified by the
DRD and segregated according to crimes committed based on the related
penal codes such as Crimes Against Persons, Crimes Against Properties,
Crimes Against Chastity, so on and so forth, as well as by other related
Special Laws, Custom and Immigration Laws. (Emphasis supplied)
As Justice Lazaro-Javier says, laws that use general terms, like the Nelson
Mandela Rules, do not make them any less judicially enforceable. 187 Even if a
certain law lacks a degree of specificity, the executive branch must still comply
with its mandate. Similarly, courts should not shy away from interpreting what
constitutes compliance with the law using the rules on statutory construction.
Courts are not meant to create new parameters, but to interpret statutes. We can
neither shirk from this duty nor excuse the other government branches' failure to
comply with their legal mandates.
I also agree with Justice Lazaro-Javier's position that budgetary restrictions,
while it may be a factor in implementation, do not determine the existence and
enforceability of a right. 188 As she aptly points, this Court should not be restricted
by the State's budget concerns in determining the existence and enforcement of a
right. 189
It is not the Nelson Mandela Rules as written that should be in focus. What is
relevant are the founding principles of international law on which the Nelson
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Mandela Rules are based. The first sentence of the Nelson Mandela Rules'
preambulatory clause states that in its adoption, the United Nations General
Assembly was guided by the "fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth
of the human person, without distinction of any kind." 190 These fundamental
human rights include the right to life and the prohibition against torture and other
cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment, both of which are anchored on one's
inherent dignity. 191
These principles are affirmed by the 1987 Constitution as a State policy. 192
Thus, persons deprived of liberty must be treated with humanity and with respect
for their inherent dignity. Furthermore, "provisions on the right to life, prohibition
from torture, inhuman and degrading treatment, and slavery remain free from any
derogation whatsoever, having acquired a jus cogens character." 193
More important, the Philippines' compliance with the United Nations
standards should be assessed based on how the country understood the
implications of adherence to these standards. This is done by examining the texts
of applicable local legislations and administrative issuances of penal institutions.
These local and international rules and standards operationalize the State's duty
on the safekeeping of its prisoners and affirm how the inherent dignity of a person
is to be valued, even when deprived of liberty.
As discussed at length earlier, our local laws and the international standards
we have adhered to reveal that while our prisoners and detainees' right to liberty
is restricted, their right to be treated humanely, including their right to reasonably
safe, sanitary, and sufficient provisions and facilities, is not suspended and is not
merely recommendatory. Thus, no extraordinary circumstance, not even the
global COVID-19 pandemic, can justify actions violating these fundamental rights.
IV
Considering the various sources of rights of persons deprived of liberty,
incarcerated individuals may file an appropriate action based on a violation of
these rights.
Violations of the constitutional right against cruel, degrading, and inhuman
punishment, the rights to life and health, the rights of prisoners and detainees
under international law principles and conventions, and our own local laws, rules,
and procedures are justiciable matters.
I agree with Justice Perlas-Bernabe that we should not diminish the
possibility that persons deprived of liberty may avail of their rights as listed in the
Bill of Rights, including their right to be protected against cruel, inhuman, and
degrading punishment. 194
Under Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, courts are given
judicial power "to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government." 195
The Bill of Rights is an enumeration of rights that are legally demandable
and enforceable. Courts will hear and decide cases involving violations of these
rights, or any statute providing standards to comply with these rights. This aspect
of judicial review, to measure the constitutionality of a government act or inaction
vis-à-vis an enumeration of an individual or group right, is even more established
than the expanded jurisdiction now contained in Article VIII, Section 1.
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Thus, with respect to actual controversies involving violations of
fundamental constitutional rights, this Court is not powerless to ensure its respect
and implementation. It is precisely why this Court exists. cDHAES
I thus disagree with Justice Delos Santos' statement that "only Congress has
the constitutional power to address subhuman conditions that plague our penal
institutions." 196 He would have this Court "defer to the political branches as
regards the matter of selecting the most appropriate strategy to maintain public
order and preserve public safety." 197 Such position reduces the Judiciary's role in
relation to the Constitution, especially the Bill of Rights.
First, petitioners' cause of action calls for this Court's interpretation of
constitutional text. When this Court interprets the Constitution and fleshes out its
text, its decisions form part of the law of the land. The Judiciary's constitutional
interpretations are guided not only by the Constitution itself, but by precedents
that have construed the text and articulated its intent through particular
circumstances. In David v. Senate Electoral Tribunal: 198
Reading a certain text includes a consideration of jurisprudence that
has previously considered that exact same text, if any. Our legal system is
founded on the basic principle that "[j]udicial decisions applying or
interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form part of [our] legal
system." Jurisprudence is not an independent source of law. Nevertheless,
judicial interpretation is deemed part of or written into the text itself as of
the date that it was originally passed. This is because judicial construction
articulates the contemporaneous intent that the text brings to effect.
Nevertheless, one must not fall into the temptation of considering prior
interpretation as immutable. 199 (Citations omitted)
Since petitioners anchor their cause of action on their constitutionally
protected rights, courts have the power to settle the controversy, and to articulate
and apply what the Constitution, statutes, and rules and regulations provide in
relation to the right.
Furthermore, the vagueness of the Bill of Rights' provisions does not detract
from their enforceability. In fact, they were written so to leave room for future
instances that can shed further light on how the provisions are to be interpreted.
The Constitution is not meant to pertain to a specific moment that would restrict
its application to a limited set of facts. Rather, it is meant to encapsulate
circumstances that may go beyond what was initially imagined by its framers.
Thus, when faced with a justiciable controversy, the Judiciary has the power to
define what constitutes a violation of these provisions.
In J. M. Tuason & Company, Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration: 200
VI
In this case, the claims of petitioners in relation to these standards clearly
require the presentation of evidence in the trial court. Several factual
determinations must be made before a ruling can be had on whether there is a
violation of their constitutional rights.
It is correct that this Court may take judicial notice of the nature of COVID-
19 and the longstanding jail congestion which has plagued the Philippine jails. This
unresolved crisis is a significant threat to the right to life, health, and security of
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persons in congested penal facilities, whose conditions make social distancing
impossible.
While factual allegations must be proven by evidence, courts may take
judicial notice of particular circumstances. Rule 129, Sections 1 to 3 of the Rules
of Court state:
SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. — A court shall take
judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the existence and
territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of government and
symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime
courts of the world and their seals, the political constitution and history of
the Philippines, the official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial
departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time,
and the geographical divisions.
SECTION 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary. — A court may
take judicial notice of matters which are of public knowledge, or are
capable of unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to judges
because of their judicial functions.
SECTION 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. — During the
trial, the court, on its own initiative, or on request of a party, may announce
its intention to take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be
heard thereon.
After the trial, and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on
its own initiative or on request of a party, may take judicial notice of any
matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon if such matter is decisive
of a material issue in the case. (Emphasis supplied)
From these, this Court has summed up the requisites of judicial notice. In
State Prosecutors v. Muro: 227
Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material
requisites: (1) the matter must be one of common and general knowledge;
(2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain;
and (3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the
court. The principal guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be
judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can be said that judicial
notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records and facts of general
notoriety. 228 (Citations omitted)
Thus, this Court may take judicial notice of the state of jail congestion in the
Philippines, the nature of transmission of COVID-19, and its deadly effects.
VI (A)
The available government data on prisons and jails reveal the appalling
state of congestion and overcapacity in the Philippines.
The Bureau of Corrections' statistics show that as of January 2020, all prison
facilities within its jurisdiction are overcrowded:
New Bilibid
29,173 6,435 453% 353%
Prison
CIW-
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Mandaluyong 3,422 1,008 340% 240%
Iwahig Prison
2,783 675 412% 312%
& Penal Farm
Davao Prison
6,607 1,354 488% 388%
& Penal Farm
CIW-
579 102 567% 467%
Mindanao
San Ramon
Prison & 2,329 733 318% 218%
Penal Farm
Sablayan
Prison & 2,646 994 266% 166%
Penal Farm
Leyte
Regional 2,045 679 301% 201% 229
Prison
The Commission on Audit found that the jail populations increased because
of the increase in drug-related cases, pendency of cases, and non-release on bail
due to poverty. 233 It noted that this congestion results in unhealthy living
conditions of inmates, which goes against the requirements of its governing
Manual and the United Nations standards. 234
Based on its findings, the Commission on Audit recommended the following
actions for the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology:
We recommended that Management:
(a) continue its efforts in making representations with concerned
government agencies in addressing the congestion problems in all jail
facilities;
(b) prioritize acquisition of lots and construction programs and projects
aimed at improving the jail facilities;
(c) require the Regional Bids and Awards Committee to ensure timely
completion of all procurement activities pertaining to the construction
and/or improvement of all jail facilities in order to decongest overcrowded
jails; and
(d) enhance and intensify the GCTA process and give more emphasis
on the Recognizance Act for detainees early release without necessarily
completing their sentence which could significantly reduce jail population
and congestion. 235
According to the World Prison Brief, the Philippines' occupancy level is at
463.6%, the second highest among all the prisons in the world. 236
In 2012, the United Nations Committee Against Torture alerted the
Philippines to provide information on measures undertaken to address
overcrowding in penitentiary institutions. 237 In 2016, it raised its concern against
the deplorable living conditions in jails, detention centers, and police lock-up cells,
which may qualify as ill treatment or torture:
Conditions of detention
27. The Committee is concerned at the persistence of appalling
conditions of detention prevailing in the State party, both in police lock-up
cells and the jails and detention facilities run by the Bureau of Jail
Management and Penology, which do not meet minimum international
standards and may constitute ill-treatment or torture. It is particularly
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concerned at the persistence of critical and chronic overcrowding in all
detention facilities, some of which may be operating at 380 percent of
capacity. Conditions in all places of deprivation of liberty include
dilapidated and small cells, in some of which detainees are forced to sleep
while sitting or standing, unsanitary conditions, inadequate amounts of
food, poor nutrition, insufficient natural and artificial lighting and poor
ventilation, which cause inter-prisoner violence and the spread of infectious
diseases such as tuberculosis, the incidence of which is extremely high. The
Committee is particularly alarmed at information that tuberculosis
eradication programmes were not a priority in the past because they were
seen as irrelevant to the maintenance of security. The Committee is
concerned about sexual violence against detained persons and about the
treatment of detainees belonging to minorities (arts. 2, 11 and 16). 238
(Emphasis supplied)
VI (B)
COVID-19 is an infectious disease caused by a new type of corona virus
called severe acute respiratory syndrome corona virus 2 (SARS-CoV-2). Generally,
coronaviruses cause respiratory infections to humans, which range from mild to
severe. The Middle East Respiratory Syndrome and Severe Acute Respiratory
Syndrome, both viral outbreaks that had swept the Philippines years ago, were
both caused by coronaviruses.
COVID-19 was first encountered in Wuhan, China last December 2019. 239
On January 9, 2020, its first death was publicly recorded. 240
The common symptoms of this disease include fever, dry cough, and
tiredness. Some manifestations include aches and pains, nasal congestion, sore
throat, diarrhea, anosmia (loss of smell), and dysgeusia (loss of taste). 241 These
signs begin mildly and may gradually progress. 242
According to the World Health Organization, 80% of infected persons recover
from COVID-19 without needing hospital treatment. However, one of every five
people becomes seriously ill and develops difficulty breathing. Any person can be
seriously ill, but those who are of advanced age, and those with underlying
medical problems such as high blood pressure, heart and lung problems, diabetes,
cancer, or immunosuppression have a higher chance of worsening conditions. 243
COVID-19 is highly contagious. 244 Some get infected but do not develop
any symptoms or feel unwell; some only experience mild symptoms. However,
even those with zero to very mild symptoms can transmit the virus if they carry it.
245 In fact, COVID-19 has since spread worldwide, prompting the World Health
Organization to declare it a pandemic — the first one caused by a corona virus.
246
The World Health Organization had initially found that the virus spreads
when a COVID-19-positive person expels small droplets from the nose or mouth
through speaking, coughing, or sneezing. People can catch COVID-19 "if they
breathe in these droplets," or if they touched objects or surfaces on which the
droplets are expelled and then they touched their eyes, nose, or mouth. It later
noted that "airborne transmission of the virus can occur in health care settings
where specific medical procedures, called aerosol generating procedures,
generate very small droplets called aerosols." It also reported that some
outbreaks in indoor crowded spaces suggested the possibility of combined aerosol
and droplet transmission, citing examples such as during choir practice, in
restaurants or in fitness classes. 247
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Thus, the World Health Organization lists several recommendations to
prevent transmission. These include frequent hand hygiene, physical distancing,
respiratory etiquette, avoiding "crowded places, close-contact settings and
confined and enclosed spaces with poor ventilation," wearing fabric masks, and
"good environmental ventilation in all closed settings and appropriate
environmental cleaning and disinfection." 248
As of now, there is no vaccine against the SARS-CoV-2 virus, and no proven
cure for COVID-19. 249
All these factors have caused the entire world to undergo extraordinary
changes to cope with the situation.
In the Philippines, where the first case of COVID-19 was reported on January
30, 2020, 250 the Department of Health has recommended measures to slow its
spread, including personal hygiene, social distancing, environmental cleanliness,
and food safety. 251 It also advised against public events and gatherings. 252
The government has imposed travel bans, 253 raised the COVID-19 Alert to
Code Red sublevel 2 — the highest level of national response management 254 —
announced a state of calamity throughout the country for six months, 255 and
declared a national emergency. President Rodrigo Duterte was also given
emergency powers to address the state of public health emergency. 256
Several levels of community quarantine measures — general, enhanced, to
extreme enhanced along with their modified versions — were imposed all over the
country, depending on each locality's situation. Notably, work was suspended in
the executive branch, and the other branches were encouraged to follow suit.
Private enterprises made flexible work arrangements. Land, domestic air, and
domestic sea travel to and from Metro Manila were suspended. 257 Local
governments started imposing curfews, implementing quarantine passes,
providing support to health workers, and distributing relief goods. 258
Quarantine was extended several times, 259 and was subsequently modified
based on the locality after consideration of the developments of the COVID-19
epidemiological curve, health capacity, and economic, security, and social factors.
Yet, based on publicly available Department of Health data, the total
number of cases continues to rise. In particular, Moreover, several news reports
announced positive cases of and deaths related to COVID-19 in jails. 260
While the Bureau of Corrections and the Bureau of Jail Management and
Penology submitted Verified Reports on the measures taken to address the
disease, they admit that social distancing is necessary to disrupt the spread of the
virus. They also concede that this is unachievable in all of the penal facilities in
the Philippines. 261 Petitioners invoke the general absence of adequate medical
and healthcare facilities to respond to basic needs of prisoners. 262
Clearly, the nature of COVID-19 and the jail congestion in this country are
matters that all courts may take judicial notice of. The fact of overcrowding in jails
and the transmissibility of COVID-19 no longer need further proof. However, even
if this Court takes judicial notice of these circumstances, there are several facts
that must first be determined in relation to the confinement of petitioners or any
other person deprived of liberty seeking release.
This includes, among others, the latest data on jail congestion and measures
taken to address the chronic problem of jail overcapacity; the capabilities of the
prison systems where petitioners are detained to prevent the spread of COVID-19;
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the demands made by petitioners to the detention facilities; any unjustified
refusal or negligence on the part of the detention facilities to act on their
concerns.
Courts cannot grant a blanket release without determining these facts.
Petitioners must establish the basis for their temporary release. To be released
based on a violation of their constitutional rights, petitioners must still show the
circumstances of their own detention and prove they are deprived of the basic and
minimum standards of imprisonment. They should establish the individual
conditions of their confinement which are not organic or consistent with the
punishment imposed on them. They must invoke which constitutional rights are
violated. They must show they have made a clear demand on the relevant
government agencies, and that the latter intentionally or persistently refused or
negligently failed to act on their concerns. They must ultimately show that the
responsible government instrumentality has been compliant or negligent with
constitutional, international, and local provisions and standards protecting their
rights.
Justice Lazaro-Javier opines that while this Court may take judicial notice of
jail congestion, 263 the infringement of the minimum standards required under the
law do not constitute cruel and inhuman punishment. To her, while it affects the
severity of the punishment, it is merely incidental to the punishment. 264
She also agrees that jail congestion has a bigger impact on petitioners' right
to life during the pandemic. 265 However, she finds that it cannot be said that the
increased risks caused by COVID-19 on their right to life, security and health are
the fault of respondents, such that the violation can be attributed to them. She
holds that respondents committed no positive act to increase petitioners' risks or
worsen the situation. 266 Neither are they guilty of inaction or idleness since they
have taken positive measures to minimize the spread of the virus and infection
among the prisoners. Even assuming their measures were not sufficient, the
inadequacy is attributable to other factors beyond the control and authority of
respondents, including the unpredictability of the pandemic. 267
Similarly, without trial on the merits, Justice Delos Santos is ready to
conclude that petitioners' continued detention is not unnecessarily oppressive
because they failed to show that the State has been "indifferent to their clinical
needs." 268
These are already factual conclusions that may only be determined in a
proper hearing in the trial courts. I suggest that before this Court make any
finding, a full-blown hearing is necessary. Without it, it cannot be established that
jail congestion and the general lack of adequate medical facilities preclude
respondents from preventing the spread of COVID-19 in its facilities. Without it,
the question of whether petitioners' constitutional rights were violated remains
unanswered.
VII
Finally, I suggest a measure grounded on social justice: that this Court
provide a remedy called the writ of kalayaan.
I recognize the many efforts and feats of this Court under Chief Justice
Peralta's leadership to facilitate the release of qualified persons deprived of
liberty. 269
However, I urge this Court to move even further. In recognition of the
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pervasiveness of congestion in our jails, this Court should fashion a remedy called
the writ of kalayaan similar to the writ of kalikasan or the writ of continuing
mandamus in environmental cases.
This Court is not without precedent in formulating rules to address pervasive
and urgent violations of constitutional rights with transcendental effects. In
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay,
270 this Court issued, for the first time, a writ of continuing mandamus ordering
various administrative agencies to fulfill their respective mandates to clean up and
restore Manila Bay. Having appreciated the extraordinary circumstances, the
urgency of the situation, and the extreme environmental degradation of Manila
Bay, this Court upheld the right to a balanced and healthful ecology through the
writ.
This Court likewise recognized that it needed to formulate special rules of
procedure to enforce environmental laws and finally address the continuing
violations of these laws. On April 10, 2010, it promulgated the Rules of Procedure
for Environmental Cases for the enforcement or violations of environmental and
other related rules. 271 The Rules provide the procedure for the issuance of a writ
o f kalikasan, 272 an "extraordinary remedy that covers environmental damages
the magnitude of which transcends both political and territorial boundaries." 273
The Rules also provide the issuance of a continuing mandamus, 274 a "distinct
procedure than that of ordinary civil actions for the enforcement/violation of
environmental laws." 275
This time, a writ of kalayaan should be issued when all the requirements to
establish cruel, inhuman, and degrading punishment are present. This is
necessary considering that the continued and malicious congestion of our jails
does not affect only one individual. Its issuance is grounded on this Court's rule-
making authority and the extreme situation brought upon by the COVID-19
pandemic. As in Metropolitan Manila Development Authority, this Court is again
being called to address a systemic problem that even the most basic health
protocols to prevent the spread of the virus cannot address. Jail congestion is as
virulent as COVID-19 itself, especially in the face of an unprecedented global
pandemic.
The writ of kalayaan may require a more constant supervision by an
executive judge for the traditional or extraordinary releases of convicts or
detainees. It should provide an order of precedence in order to bring the
occupation of jails to a more humane level. Those whose penalties are the lowest
and whose crimes are brought about, not by extreme malice, but by the
indignities of poverty may be prioritized.
Certainly, the writ of kalayaan will be the distinguishing initiative of the
Peralta Court — a measure that is grounded on social justice.
Persons deprived of liberty do not shed their humanity once they are taken
into custody, yet the perennial congestion that plague our jails do not reflect this.
Instead, they reveal our failure to respect the very fundamental rights that the
State has guaranteed to protect. This wrong, which we have allowed to persist, is
all the more pressing in the face of a highly contagious and deadly disease.
Persons deprived of liberty are in need of more remedies to ensure that their
detention do not prejudice their right to live.
Jail congestion harms so many individuals — most of them poor, and
therefore, invisible. The dawn of the COVID-19 pandemic has only made this a
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more urgent concern. We cannot just watch and sit idly by.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote that the Petition be referred to the appropriate trial
courts to determine, upon proper motion or petition of the parties, whether there
are factual bases supporting the temporary release of petitioners on the following
grounds:
First, they are entitled to release on bail or recognizance, if still applicable;
or
Second, there is a violation of their constitutional right against cruel,
inhuman, and degrading punishment or other related constitutional rights, such
that they may file either: (1) a motion for release if the case is still on trial or on
appeal; or (2) petition a writ of habeas corpus as a post-conviction remedy. The
grant of these remedies is subject to the establishment of the following requisites:
(a) existing inhuman, degrading, or cruel conditions not organic or consistent with
the statutory punishment imposed; (b) the conditions violate clear, enforceable
statutory or constitutional provisions including judicially discernable international
standards adopted in this jurisdiction; (c) a clear demand on the relevant
government agency to address their grievance; and (d) the conditions are the
result of intentional or persistent refusal or negligence on the part of the
government agency, be it the warden, director of prisons, local government unit,
or Congress.
I also vote that this Court En Banc create a subcommittee under the
Committee on Rules to immediately draft a proposal for a writ of kalayaan to set
the clearest guidance for the lower courts in adjudicating proven violations of the
right against cruel, inhuman, and degrading punishment as a result of continuous
congestion of detention centers or jails.
CAGUIOA, J.:
"It is evident that the incredible overcrowding of the prison cells, that taxed
facilities beyond measure and the starvation allowance of ten centavos per
meal for each prisoner, must have rubbed raw the nerves and dispositions
of the unfortunate inmates, and predisposed them to all sorts of violence to
seize from their owners the meager supplies from outsider in order to take
out their miserable existence. All this led inevitably to the formation of
gangs that preyed like wolf packs on the weak, and ultimately to pitiless
gang rivalry for the control of the prisoners, abetted by the inability of the
outnumbered guards to enforce discipline, and which culminated in violent
riots. The government cannot evade responsibility for keeping prisoners
under such subhuman and dantesque conditions. Society must not close its
eyes to the fact that if it has the right to exclude from its midst those who
attack it, it has no right at all to confine them under circumstances that
strangle all sense of decency, reduce convicts to the level of animals, and
convert a prison term into prolonged torture and slow death." 1
I concur.
The dystopian picture above that the Court refused to turn its gaze from was
drawn over five decades ago, and yet the insufferable state of affairs in the
penitentiary persists even today. So that although we, as a society, may have
made dizzying advances in fields we consider of great consequence, because the
least of us have continued to groan in unspeakable living conditions, and our
detention facilities are constantly breaking at the seams, one must wonder how
far we have truly come. Surely, we must have asked at one point if perhaps more
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than the deficient fiscal scaffolding and authoritative say-so, our institutions suffer
the more destructive lack of empathy.
This long-standing problem has been brought to the foreground by the
current exigencies the country is facing, and the Court's decision to refer the
instant petition to the concerned trial courts for the conduct of bail hearings and
other proceedings is agreeably the better approach to take under the
circumstances. 2
While I agree that the Court cannot grant the petitioners' prayer for
temporary release in the absence of a proper bail hearing, I also remain
unconvinced that the Court, on its own, is powerless to protect the most
vulnerable among us, especially those who cannot help themselves. Certainly in
this case, the Court's mandate as the final and ultimate dispenser of justice must
be more real than mere rhetoric. As proof of the Court's capacities, I write this
Opinion to highlight the steps that the Court has already swiftly undertaken in
response to the current pandemic. I also submit this Opinion to elaborate on my
position and to expound on several issues raised by the petitioners, particularly
the Court's equity jurisdiction, the propriety of using humanitarian considerations
as a ground for the allowance of bail, and the invocation of the petitioners' rights
under domestic and international law. This Opinion imagines that there may be no
more opportune time for all material institutions to revisit their powers and
awaken perceived apathies than now, with both historical underpinnings and the
current crisis taking us all to task, by exposing once more that the unbearable
conditions of persons deprived of liberty (PDLs) in our country is neither truly
noticed nor new.
I.
The instant Urgent Petition for the Release of Prisoners on Humanitarian
Grounds in the Midst of the COVID-19 Pandemic directly filed before this Court is
essentially an application for bail or recognizance. 3 The petitioners, who are
allegedly political prisoners charged with crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua
and life imprisonment, seek their provisional release on bail or recognizance on
the basis of humanitarian grounds. Citing Enrile v. Sandiganbayan 4 (Enrile), the
petitioners plead that the Court exercise its equity jurisdiction and grant them
temporary liberty as their health conditions and continued incarceration make
them highly vulnerable to COVID-19. 5
On the requirements for bail
Bail is the security required and given for the release of a person in custody
of the law to guarantee his appearance before the court as may be required under
specified conditions. 6 Recognizance, on the other hand, refers to "an obligation of
record, entered into before some court or magistrate duly authorized to take it,
with the condition to do some particular act, the most usual condition in criminal
cases being the appearance of the accused for trial." 7 If a person in custody or
detention is unable to post bail due to abject poverty, he may be released on
recognizance to the custody of a qualified member of the barangay, city or
municipality where the accused resides. 8
Section 13, Article III of the Constitution states that all persons,except those
charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is
strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released
on recognizance as may be provided by law. As a corollary matter, Section 7, Rule
114 of the Rules of Court provides that regardless of the stage of the criminal
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prosecution, no person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence
of guilt is strong. Further, Republic Act No. (R.A.) 10389 9 or the Recognizance Act
of 2012, states that the release on recognizance of any person in custody or
detention for the commission of an offense is a matter of right when the offense is
not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment. 10
Thus, before conviction, bail is either a matter of right or discretion. It is a
matter of right when the offense charged is punishable by any penalty lower than
reclusion perpetua. However, bail becomes a matter of judicial discretion if the
offense charged is punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment.
11 The court's discretion is, however, limited only to determining whether or not
the evidence of guilt is strong. Consequently, bail is to be granted if evidence of
guilt is not strong, and denied if evidence of guilt is strong. 12
I n Obosa v. Court of Appeals, 13 the Court reiterated its pronouncement in
De la Camara v. Enage, 14 on the purpose of bail and the rationale for denying the
said relief to persons charged with capital offenses when the evidence of guilt is
strong:
x x x Before conviction, every person is bailable except if charged
with capital offenses when the evidence of guilt is strong. Such a right
flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who
should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be
entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Thereby a regime of liberty is honored in the observance and not in the
breach. It is not beyond the realm of probability, however, that a person
charged with a crime, especially so where his defense is weak, would just
simply make himself scarce and thus frustrate the hearing of his case. A
bail is intended as a guarantee that such an intent would be thwarted. It is,
in the language of Cooley, a 'mode short of confinement which would, with
reasonable certainty, insure the attendance of the accused' for the
subsequent trial. Nor is there anything unreasonable in denying this right
to one charged with a capital offense when evidence of guilt is strong, as
the likelihood is, rather than await the outcome of the proceeding against
him with a death sentence, an ever-present threat, temptation to flee the
jurisdiction would be too great to be resisted. x x x 15 (Italics omitted)
In cases when bail is a matter of judicial discretion, the grant or denial
thereof hinges on the singular issue of whether or not the evidence of guilt of the
accused is strong. 16 As observed in the Court's Decision, 17 this necessarily
requires the conduct of a bail hearing where the prosecution has the burden to
prove that evidence of guilt is strong, subject to the right of the defense to cross-
examine witnesses and introduce evidence in its own rebuttal. 18 The Court
cannot perform the aforementioned bail hearing because of the well-entrenched
principle that it is not a trier of facts. The Court's jurisdiction is limited to
reviewing errors of law that may have been committed by the lower courts. 19 The
discretion to grant or deny bail is primarily lodged with the trial court judge who is
mandated under the rules to: (1) conduct a summary hearing and receive the
prosecution's evidence; and (2) provide, in its order granting or denying bail, a
summary of the evidence for the prosecution and his own assessment thereof. 20
As mentioned, the petitioners are all charged with offenses that are
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Thus, their entitlement to
bail is clearly a matter of judicial discretion. However, there is no showing that
any of them had applied for bail or that bail hearings were conducted to
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determine whether the evidence of guilt against them is strong. Nevertheless,
aware of such absence of bail application or hearing, the petitioners have
nonetheless proceeded directly to the Court praying for it to grant them
temporary liberty through bail or recognizance based on humanitarian grounds,
invoking the Court's equity jurisdiction. The petitioners cite the ruling of the Court
in Enrile to support their cause.
On the invocation of the Court's
equity jurisdiction
In order to properly invoke the Court's equity jurisdiction, the controlling test
is whether or not a court of law is unable to adapt its judgments to the special
circumstances of a case as a result of the inflexibility of its statutory or legal
jurisdiction. 21 Its aim is to enable the Court to rule on the basis of substantial
justice in an instance when the prescribed or customary forms of ordinary law
prove inadequate. 22
In a number of cases, the Court has found equity jurisdiction as sufficient
justification for the relaxation of rules in order to give way to substantial merit and
justice. In the early case of Catigbac v. Leyesa, 23 equity jurisdiction was invoked
in affording a litigant with a remedy through an action that did not exist in the
Code of Civil Procedure. The Court ruled that although the existing body of rules
no longer provided for such an ancient action, such was deemed to have
subsisted by virtue of a substantive right granted under Article 384 of the Civil
Code. The Court there held that where there is a right, there is also a remedy, and
equity jurisdiction steps in to scaffold the gap between the substantive right
granted and a remedy that ensures that right. 24
In the 1973 case of De los Reyes v. Ramolete , 25 involving the question of
ownership over a disputed land between bona fide possessors on the one hand,
and valid patent holders on the other, the Court found that equity jurisdiction
could be used to "set matters right." Still, in the succeeding case of Serrano v.
Court of Appeals, 26 which concerned the true nature of a purported contract of
sale, the Court iterated that procedural rules are not to be applied rigidly at the
expense of merit.
Apart from cases of restitution, equity jurisdiction has also been invoked in
criminal cases. In Curammeng v. People , 27 which involved an erroneous mode of
appeal from a conviction, the Court ruled:
Nevertheless, if a rigid application of the rules of procedure will tend
to obstruct rather than serve the broader interests of justice in light of the
prevailing circumstances of the case, such as where strong considerations
of substantive justice are manifest in the petition, the Court may relax the
strict application of the rules of procedure in the exercise of its equity
jurisdiction. x x x 28
Further, in Daan v. Hon. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division), 29 where the
accused therein was allowed to enter a plea bargain proposal pursuant to the
higher interest of justice and fair play, the Court discussed the concept of equity
as follows:
Equity as the complement of legal jurisdiction seeks to reach and do
complete justice where courts of law, through the inflexibility of their rules
and want of power to adapt their judgments to the special circumstances of
cases, are incompetent so to do. Equity regards the spirit of and not the
letter, the intent and not the form, the substance rather than the
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circumstance, as it is variously expressed by different courts. 30
Even in extradition cases, the equity jurisdiction of the Court was invoked,
as seen in Secretary of Justice v. Lantion: 31
We have ruled time and again that this Court's equity jurisdiction,
which is aptly described as "justice outside legality," may be availed of only
in the absence of, and never against, statutory law or judicial
pronouncements (Smith Bell & Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 267 SCRA 530
[1997]; David-Chan vs. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 677 [1997]). The
constitutional issue in the case at bar does not even call for "justice outside
legality," since private respondent's due process rights, although not
guaranteed by statute or by treaty, are protected by constitutional
guarantees. We would not be true to the organic law of the land if we
choose strict construction over guarantees against the deprivation of
liberty. That would not be in keeping with the principles of democracy on
which our Constitution is premised.
Verily, as one traverses treacherous waters of conflicting and
opposing currents of liberty and government authority, he must ever hold
the oar of freedom in the stronger arm, lest an errant and wayward course
be laid. 32
Ultimately, the Court's equity jurisdiction is found to be a sufficient
justification for the relaxation of rules in order to give way to substantial
merit of the case and the higher interest of justice.
Indeed, the peculiar nature of the instant petition prays for both prompt and
blanket relief to be applied to differentiated cases of the individual petitioners.
Thus, while I recognize their plea to resolve the instant petition based on
compassion and humanitarian considerations, the want of necessary factual
details brought about by a proper bail hearing precludes this Court from a full
calibration of each petitioner's eligibility for either release on bail or recognizance.
On the applicability of the ruling in
Enrile
In this regard, I agree with the position of some of my colleagues that the
case of Enrile is inapplicable to the instant petition, though my reasoning differs.
33
the Constitution, which are self-executing provisions and, as such, are judicially
enforceable.
Apart from the domestic laws earlier mentioned, the more relevant
consideration is that the enabling statutes of the BuCor and the BJMP have
expressly adopted the standards set by the UN for the safekeeping of PDLs. There
is no question, therefore, that included herein are the universally accepted
minimum standards set by the Nelson Mandela Rules . The BuCor's enabling law,
in particular, has explicitly referred thereto. Consequently, notwithstanding
the non-binding and recommendatory nature of the Nelson Mandela
Rules, they have effectively been transformed as part of the law of the
land.
Furthermore, flowing from the right to health guaranteed by ICESCR, PDLs
cannot be discriminated upon when it comes to access to health facilities and
services. 103 They are entitled to receive the same standard of care normally
available to those not incarcerated. This is referred to as the principle of
"equivalence of care," 104 initially adopted by the UN in General Assembly
Resolution 37/194, which declared principles for the role of physicians in
protecting PDLs against torture and cruel or degrading punishment:
Principle 1
Health personnel, particularly physicians, charged with the medical care of
prisoners and detainees have a duty to provide them with protection of
their physical and mental health and treatment of disease of the same
quality and standard as is afforded to those who are not
imprisoned or detained. 105 (Emphasis supplied)
This was further echoed in Rule 24 of the Nelson Mandela Rules , which
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states that:
1. The provision of health care for prisoners is a State responsibility.
Prisoners should enjoy the same standards of health care that are
available in the community, and should have access to necessary
health-care services free of charge without discrimination on the grounds of
their legal status.
2. Health-care services should be organized in close relationship to the
general public health administration and in a way that ensures continuity of
treatment and care, including for HIV, tuberculosis and other infectious
diseases, as well as for drug dependence. (Emphasis supplied)
It is interesting to note that under the BuCor Operating Manual, there is an
evident adherence to the principle of equivalence and non-discrimination, which is
apparent in the following provision:
Part V
Rehabilitation and Treatment of Inmates
xxx xxx xxx
Chapter 2
Inmate Services
xxx xxx xxx
SECTION 2. Health Services. — Health care and services shall be
given to inmates similar to those available in the free community and
subject to prison regulations. A prison shall have at least one qualified
medical doctor and a dentist. (Emphasis supplied)
Guided by the principle of equivalence of care, the petitioners and all other
PDLs are entitled to the same safeguards against illnesses that are available to
those not incarcerated. But considering the present state of our penal facilities,
and in light of the gravity of the present pandemic, the fulfillment of the minimum
standards for the safekeeping and health of PDLs has taken on a new sense of
urgency.
The problem with congestion within our penal facilities is no longer a
disputable matter. The New Bilibid Prison alone reportedly has a 353% congestion
rate. 106 The acuteness of the consequences of overcrowded jails and prisons,
however, has been sharpened by the highly infectious nature of COVID-19. The
Court can take judicial notice of the precautions published by the World Health
Organization on the import of social distancing and self-isolation as effective
measures to prevent the spread of COVID-19. 107 But given the notorious
conditions within prison walls, these recommended measures intended for the
protection of the health and safety of PDLs may well be unattainable. The
respondents themselves, in their Comment, admitted to the near impossibility of
adhering to these measures. 108 In the context of the present global pandemic,
therefore, the interwoven rights of PDLs run the risk of being impaired. And, while
it might be true that respondents have taken steps to address and contain the
spread of COVID-19 among the inmates, these measures may be easily negated
by the congestion of prison facilities, which render PDLs vulnerable to the risk of
contracting the virus.
If the causal link between PDLs' poor health and exclusion from standards of
care available to free individuals, on the one hand, and the fact of facility
congestion on the other, are both sufficiently established, such may give rise to an
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actionable claim based on the violation of the proscription against cruel and
inhuman punishment, and the State's commitment to various international law
instruments. Such a claim may be demonstrably supported by a showing that
within the present configuration of the prison systems, PDLs are deprived of the
means to practice standard protocols to ensure their health, including even the
simplest ones such as physical distancing and self-isolation.
In the case of Helling v. McKinney 109 (Helling), the US Supreme Court was
confronted with the question of whether a prison inmate's health risk as a result
of involuntary exposure to environmental tobacco smoke in the Nevada State
prison was a proper basis for a claim under the Eighth Amendment. The US
Supreme Court held that denial of a remedy for such health risk exposure was
tantamount to deliberate indifference in the contemplation of Estelle and further
rejected the proposition that only deliberate indifference to serious health
problems was actionable, viz.:
We have great difficulty agreeing that prison authorities may not be
deliberately indifferent to an inmate's current health problems but may
ignore a condition of confinement that is sure or very likely to cause
serious illness and needless suffering the next week or month or
year. In Hutto v. Finney , 437 U.S. 678, 682 (1978), we noted that inmates
in punitive isolation were crowded into cells and that some of them had
infectious maladies such as hepatitis and venereal disease. This was one of
the prison conditions for which the Eighth Amendment required a remedy,
even though it was not alleged that the likely harm would occur
immediately and even though the possible infection might not affect all of
those exposed. We would think that a prison inmate also could successfully
complain about demonstrably unsafe drinking water without waiting for an
attack of dysentery. Nor can we hold that prison officials may be
deliberately indifferent to the exposure of inmates to a serious,
communicable disease on the ground that the complaining inmate shows
no serious current symptoms.
That the Eighth Amendment protects against future harm to
inmates is not a novel proposition. The Amendment, as we have
said, requires that inmates be furnished with the basic human
needs, one of which is "reasonable safety." DeShaney, supra, at 200.
It is "cruel and unusual punishment to hold convicted criminals in
unsafe conditions." Youngberg v. Romeo , 457 U.S. 307, 315-316 (1982).
It would be odd to deny an injunction to inmates who plainly proved an
unsafe, life-threatening condition in their prison on the ground that nothing
yet had happened to them. x x x 110 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Again, quite notably, the US Supreme Court proclaimed in Helling that there
need not be an actual infection or affliction on the part of the inmate before the
protection of the Eighth Amendment can apply. As applied to petitioners'
situation, it is unnecessary to require them to submit to a physical examination, or
to first show symptoms of COVID-19 before recognizing a violation or threatened
violation of their rights. Such a proposition may be evidence of indifference to the
toll that substandard living conditions in our prison systems exact until it may be
too late. Perhaps that premise has been rejected not in the least because it may
well result in an exercise in futility, where the grave and possibly irreversible
consequences on the right to health of PDLs must precede a proper recognition of
such a right to begin with. I thus respectfully express my reservations to the
proposition of some of my colleagues that absent a clear showing of the
petitioners' health status, or that they are "actually suffering from a medical
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condition [requiring] immediate and specialized attention," 111 the actual risk for
the petitioners to contract COVID-19 in their respective penal facilities is
speculative. 112
In the later case of Brown, et al. v. Plata, et al., 113 involving a protracted
violation of inmates' rights in a California prison through substandard and unsafe
conditions of detainment, the US Supreme Court held that a court-mandated
decongestion of the prison facilities, as authorized by the Prison Litigation Reform
Act of 1995, was crucial in providing a remedy to these violations, and steps
taken to that end should only be affirmed, to wit:
Yet so too is the continuing injury and harm resulting from these
serious constitutional violations. For years the medical and mental health
care provided by California's prisons has fallen short of minimum
constitutional requirements and has failed to meet prisoners' basic health
needs. Needless suffering and death have been the well-documented
result. Over the whole course of years during which this litigation has been
pending, no other remedies have been found to be sufficient. Efforts to
remedy the violation have been frustrated by severe overcrowding
in California's prison system. Short term gains in the provision of care
have been eroded by the long-term effects of severe and pervasive
overcrowding.
Overcrowding has overtaken the limited resources of prison
staff; imposed demands well beyond the capacity of medical and
mental health facilities; and created unsanitary and unsafe
conditions that make progress in the provision of care difficult or
impossible to achieve. The overcrowding is the "primary cause of the
violation of a Federal right," 18 U.S. C. §3626(a)(3)(E)(i), specifically the
severe and unlawful mistreatment of prisoners through grossly inadequate
provision of medical and mental health care. 114 (Emphasis supplied)
Further echoing the ruling in Estelle, the US Supreme Court brought to the
fore the positive duty on the part of the State to ensure the basic dignity of the
human lives that it detains, premised on the fact that the detainees, by virtue of
their detention, are severely limited in their capacity to ensure such dignity
themselves, viz.:
As a consequence of their own actions, prisoners may be deprived of
rights that are fundamental to liberty. Yet the law and the Constitution
demand recognition of certain other rights. Prisoners retain the essence
of human dignity inherent in all persons. Respect for that dignity
animates the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment. "'The basic concept underlying the Eighth
Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man.'" Atkins v.
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311 (2002) (quoting Trop v. Dulles , 356 U.S. 86, 100
(1958) (plurality opinion)).
To incarcerate, society takes from prisoners the means to provide for
their own needs. Prisoners are dependent on the State for food, clothing,
and necessary medical care. A prison's failure to provide sustenance
for inmates "may actually produce physical 'torture or a lingering
death.'" Estelle v. Gamble , 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976) (quoting In re
Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890)); see generally A. Elsner, Gates of
Injustice: The Crisis in America's Prisons (2004). Just as a prisoner may
starve if not fed, he or she may suffer or die if not provided adequate
medical care. A prison that deprives prisoners of basic sustenance,
including adequate medical care, is incompatible with the concept
of human dignity and has no place in civilized society. 115 (Emphasis
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supplied)
It bears emphasis, however, that in these cases, the US Supreme Court only
ruled on the existence of causes of actions or possible claims under the Eighth
Amendment, but left it to the trial courts to try and hear said claims , aided
by the subjective and objective elements that plaintiffs would need to prove to
establish an Eighth Amendment violation.
There is no valid reason to depart from this practice of the US Supreme
Court, considering that claims for violations of a PDL's fundamental rights are
replete with factual matters best threshed out in the trial courts. Justice Bernabe
is of the same view, recommending that the petition be referred to the
appropriate trial court for a full-blown hearing on the petitioners' respective
situations, which should be examined using the "deliberate indifference" test. 116
As such, in the same manner that the prayer of the petitioners for
themselves and for other similarly situated PDLs to be granted bail or
recognizance must be brought before the proper trial court for hearings,
so should any claim for violation under the proscription against cruel
and inhuman punishment and substandard living conditions.
The Court, on a previous occasion, has affirmed its power to review alleged
violations of the constitutional rights of PDLs. In In the Matter of Petition for
Habeas Corpus of Alejano v. Caubay, 117 it held:
x x x Regulations and conditions in detention and prison facilities that
violate the Constitutional rights of the detainees and prisoners will be
reviewed by the courts on a case-by-case basis. The courts could afford
injunctive relief or damages to the detainees and prisoners subjected to
arbitrary and inhumane conditions. 118
At this juncture, I return to the elephant in the room: the causal link between
the congestion within prison walls and the exclusion of PDLs from the standard of
care that should be made available to them.
The Court should be mindful of the fact that the remedies of bail and
recognizance are not available for every PDL. To be more precise, these remedies
are not extended to PDLs who have already started serving their sentence. There
should be no reason, however, to ignore their plight in the midst of this global
pandemic, lest there arise a cause of action under the Constitution. It is important
to note that the US cases referred to earlier were decided outside the
circumstances of a global pandemic. It is with more reason that, in light of the
current situation, the State should recognize and acknowledge the possible
impairment of every PDL's basic right to life and human dignity.
In a proper action initiated at a more opportune time, courts may be taken
to task to provide relief against the employment of physical, psychological, or
degrading punishment or against the use of substandard or inadequate penal
facilities with subhuman conditions. The Court, unfortunately, must move only
within the bounds of its jurisdiction; nonetheless, it has taken the necessary
measures within its power, in order to guarantee the rights of PDLs in the face of
this global pandemic. Ultimately, however, the task of providing farsighted and
enduring solutions to the problem of overcrowding in penal facilities is a policy
question and formulation that is best within the powers of the Legislative and
Executive branches.
All told, pursuant to the significant body of laws both within and outside our
borders that affirms the positive rights of PDLs, I submit that it remains incumbent
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upon the State to organize and utilize its whole apparatus so that these human
rights are safeguarded. 119 In other words, any attendant limitation may not
excuse a slackening of efforts, but on the contrary serve as compulsion for the
State to exhaust all measures available to it to ensure that these fundamental
rights of PDLs are appreciated as such.
III.
For its part, in the exercise of its mandate to promulgate rules concerning
the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights 120 and its power of
supervision over all persons in custody for purposes of eliminating unnecessary
detention, 121 the Court has been implementing systems in promoting
rehabilitative and restorative criminal justice.
One such measure is Administrative Matter (A.M.) No. 12-11-2-SC, or the
Guidelines for Decongesting Holding Jails by Enforcing the Rights of Accused
Persons to Bail and to Speedy Trial . With the current public health emergency,
these measures are supplemented by various Court issuances aimed at ensuring
easy access to PDLs of the different modes of securing provisional liberty. Taken
together, laws and regulations in place have created a framework, essential facets
of which are as follows:
1. For PDLs currently in custody for a period equal to or more than the
possible maximum imprisonment prescribed for the offense charged,
he or she shall be released immediately, without prejudice to the
continuation of the trial or the proceedings on appeal, as the case may
be; 122
2. For PDLs detained for a period of at least equal to the minimum of the
penalty for the offense charged against him, he or she shall be ordered
released, motu proprio or on motion and after notice and hearing, on
his own recognizance without prejudice to the continuation of the
proceedings against him, 123 subject further to the guidelines set forth
in Administrative Circular (A.C.) No. 33-2020, 124 as implemented by
OCA Circular No. 89-2020, 125 on online bail proceedings and electronic
transmission of release orders;
3. For PDLs who qualify for provisional dismissal pursuant to A.M. No. 12-
11-2-SC, Section 10, 126 they may secure their release pursuant to said
guidelines. For this purpose, judges for the first and second level
courts are directed to immediately conduct an inventory of their
pending criminal cases to determine cases eligible for provisional
dismissal. 127
4. For all other PDLs who do not meet the above criteria, they may apply
for bail. Special considerations are given for indigent PDLs who may
post bail at a reduced amount or be released on recognizance:
a. All PDLs may still avail of their rights to bail pursuant to the
provisions of Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
b. In promoting social and restorative justice especially in this
period of public health emergency, indigent PDLs may avail of
the reduced bail and recognizance under A.C. No. 38-2020: 128
The amounts of bail for indigent PDLs are reduced following the
schedule below:
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Penalty of Crime Computation of Reduced
Charged Bail
For indigent PDLs charged with crimes punishable by arresto mayor or one
(1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months, and arresto menor or one (1) day to
thirty (30) days, they may be released on their own recognizance.
For indigent PDLs who meet the criteria set forth in R.A. 10389, specifically
Sections 5, 6, and 7 thereof, they shall be released on recognizance pursuant to
the provisions therein.
In further implementation of these rights, and considering the exigencies of
the situation brought about by the current public health crisis, courts have
introduced new capacities and accessible processes:
1. Proceedings concerning the right of the accused to bail 129 and
proceedings on provisional dismissal 130 are classified as urgent
matters that are immediately heard and resolved by courts during the
public health emergency;
2. A.C. No. 33-2020 further provides that motions for bail as a matter of
right, in accordance with Rule 114, Section 4 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, 131 and proceedings on provisional dismissal 132
are applied for and argued electronically, as implemented by OCA
Circular No. 89-2020.
3. Approval of the bail and the consequent release order shall likewise be
electronically transmitted by the Judge on duty to the Executive Judge
who in turn shall electronically transmit the same within the same day
to the proper law enforcement authority or detention facility to enable
the release of the accused. The electronically transmitted approval of
bail and release order by the Executive Judge shall be sufficient to
cause the release of PDL concerned. 133
In light of the imposition of modified community quarantine in certain areas
and the transition into general community quarantine for the rest of the country,
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the courts implemented hearings through videoconferencing in a number of pilot
courts through A.C. No. 37-2020, 134 as implemented by OCA Circular No. 93-
2020, 135 which will cover all PDLs and may apply to all stages of newly-filed and
pending criminal cases including, but not limited to, arraignment, pre-trial, bail
hearings, trial proper, and promulgation.
It is hoped that these measures are sufficient to address the exigencies
brought about by the current pandemic for the benefit of PDLs, including the
petitioners herein.
IV.
In sum, the Court acknowledges the petitioners' and all other PDLs' current
predicament in the face of this pandemic. Thus, prudence and exigency dictate
that instead of denying the petition outright, the better course of action is to refer
the petition to the respective trial courts for the conduct of bail proceedings. In
the process, it is my view that the respective trial courts should also look into the
petitioners' claims for violations of their rights under domestic and international
laws to ensure that they are not subjected to arbitrary and inhumane conditions in
their confinement.
Indeed, the Court is not unmindful of the current situation faced by PDLs.
The COVID-19 pandemic has become an unprecedented public health crisis, and
the sickness and death it leaves in its wake have forced all of us to a reckoning.
The incredible scale of the present problem has perhaps even begun to tug at the
seams of the familiar limits of institutional jurisdictions. In the clamor to quell the
spread of the virus on the one hand and address competing public concerns on
the other, government institutions are hard-pressed at confronting issues that fall
within the respective provinces of their agencies.
It is also pivotal that all material institutions acknowledge that the issue of
congestion in our prison systems, along with the manner by which it has been
brought before the unforgiving light of this global pandemic, finds its root in an
interplay of system failures, over which the penal system is not the sole author.
The sheer expanse of this crisis requires the synergized response that
must outlive the present emergency, from all three branches of
government and all relevant stakeholders. Any measure that is less than
farsighted and all-inclusive is a mere stop-gap that is myopic and wasteful at a
time such as this.
For its part, the Court, as the ultimate dispenser of justice, has taken
concrete steps to address the matter at hand in ways allowed by law, as seen
from the previous enumeration of issuances. To my mind, these circulars afford
the petitioners sufficient reliefs for the protection of their rights.
Verily, the Court has the unenviable role of balancing the scales of justice. In
this exceptional time, justice compels the Court to exercise compassion and
humanity but only within the parameters granted to it by law. The same spirit that
moves the Court to address the concerns of PDLs also constrains it not to overstep
its bounds.
It is in this light that I CONCUR in the Court's disposition to refer the
present bail and recognizance applications to the respective trial courts where the
petitioners' criminal cases are pending, without prejudice to any relief available to
the parties under the circumstances, and to direct the aforesaid trial courts to act
on the petitioners' cases with utmost dispatch.
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LAZARO-JAVIER, J.:
Prefatory
Petitioners allege a common denominator — they are most vulnerable
to catching the SARS-COV-2 and getting infected with COVID-19. 1 They are
detention prisoners or pre-judgment persons deprived of liberty (PDLs) who fall
into two (2) categories, either sickly older people (afflicted with severe medical
conditions) or pregnant women, who because of the crimes charged have no
access to bail as a matter of right.
They seek provisional liberty either on bail for a specified amount or on
recognizance for themselves and others similarly situated as may be determined
by a Prisoner Release Committee.
Petitioners approach their grievance in a rather novel fashion. They claim
that their plea does not fall into any of the remedies in the ordinary course
of law. While they assert rights which they say they should already be
enjoying as PDLs, an allegation that in ordinary times would found a cause
of action for an action, they make the assertion in this case only in support of
their call for the exercise of our equity jurisdiction, specifically humanitarian
considerations in light of our current state of public health emergency. 2
They invoke the ruling in Enrile v. Sandiganbayan 3 and the relief or
remedy for the infringement of petitioners' rights as PDLs that increases
the risks they each face as detainees from COVID-19.
Petitioners are not alone in their quest for remedial measures in this time
of the pandemic.
As they assert, justice systems of other countries have re-engineered
their approach to detaining persons accused of committing offenses because
of the present pandemic. 4
Respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), reduce the
issue here to "whether the State can provide medical care to the petitioners while
maintaining their confinement vis-à-vis the threat of COVID-19." They then
enumerate the collective efforts of the justice sector at curbing the threat of
COVID-19 among PDLs, which according to the OSG eliminate the need to grant
temporary liberty to petitioners on bail for a specified amount or under
recognizance.
Indeed, the world has undergone a swift transformation through the rise
of COVID-19. The criminal justice system is not immune from the changes
being forced upon everyone living through this time. The electronic filing of the
present petition and the physical closure of our courts nationwide, for example,
were just months ago unimaginable. Since then, prospects of our return to
normalcy has inevitably been prefaced with the cautious caveat of a new normal.
How this new normal would evolve and ultimately impact on the administration
of justice and the practice of law remains to be seen.
Equity jurisdiction — what is it
and is it necessary?
T h e history of our court system is alien to the distinction between a
court of common law and court of equity. In a manner of speaking, we simply
woke up one day having a court system that did not have these two sides of the
same coin. Nonetheless, our Civil Code has demanded of us judges that "[n]o
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judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity
or insufficiency of the laws," and "[i]n case of doubt in the interpretation or
application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and
justice to prevail." 5
The history of the court of common law and the court of equity began with
the legal reforms of King Henry II after 1154. 6 Administration of local courts
became more centralized. 7 Thus:
Henry II created a unified system of law "common" to the country as
whole. This was in part the result of his practice of sending judges from his
own central court to hear disputes throughout the country. Disputes were
resolved on an ad hoc basis according to what the customs were
interpreted to be. The king's judges then returned to the court, discussed
their cases with other judges in a manner that permitted and required
them to be used for the interpretation and application of the law in future
cases. In this way, the laws of England developed as "common-law"
— the collection of judge-made decisions based on tradition,
custom and precedent, as opposed to laws derived from statutes,
a civil code or equity. 8
By 1215, a court system was created:
The Court of Exchequer was developed to hear disputes where the
Crown sought money it claimed it was owed and answered claims for
money said to be owed by the Crown. The Court of Common Plea
developed as a local court for civil trials between individuals. The Court of
King's Bench developed as a court for more serious disputes and for the
hearing of criminal cases. . . . 9
Over time, procedure in the courts of common-law became convoluted and
ossified. 10 Litigants who felt they had been cheated or had not been given
justice by courts of common-law petitioned the King in person.11 From this
developed a system of equity, administered by the Lord Chancellor, in the
Court of Chancery. 12
It was observed that:
[51] The basis for decision-making in the Court of Chancery
was equity. It was a court of conscience and not a court of rules or
laws. An important distinction between court of equity (Chancery) and
courts of law was that a jury had no role in interpreting the law or in
matters of conscience. Only a judge could dispense equity.
[52] In courts of law, the opposite was the case. The jury
answered questions of fact, originally by its own investigation and later
solely from the evidence produced during a trial. Equity and law were
frequently in conflict, and litigation could continue for years as
courts of law countermanded courts of equity and vice versa. This
was so even though, by the 17th century, it was established that equity
should prevail over the common law.
[53] By the mid-19th century, disputes between, and
conflicting orders issued by, the courts of law and the courts of
equity had led to a breakdown of the English legal system — as
reflected in Charles Dickens' Bleak House — and the merger of the
courts of law and the courts of equity by legislation in 1873 and
1875. While the principles of law and of equity remained distinct for
a time after merger, legislation created a unified court system.
[54] Various statutes, both in England and in those common-law
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countries which derive their legal system from England, have modified
the practices and procedures by which courts determine matters
of law and of equity. For the most part they are based on the practices
that pre-existed the English Judicature Act of 1873. 13
The legislation that merged courts of law and court of equityconferred no
new rights but they confirmed the rights that previously existed in these
courts. The law merely gave to the courts the jurisdiction previously exercised
by both the courts of common law and the Court of Chancery. 14 Thereafter, there
was the complete consolidation of equitable and legal jurisdiction and
practice and procedure for both equitable and legal remedies in the courts. 15
Equitable and legal remedies differ from each other . Successful
litigants are entitled to legal remedies. 16 The principal legal remedy is
damages. 17 There is however no entitlement to equitable remedies. 18 By the
very nature of equity, they are granted by the discretion of the court and are
unlimited.
Equitable remedies are called such because they originated from the
court of equity. However, through time, these once flexible equitable
remedies have themselves ossified into distinct rules like the common law
remedies they had meant to correct for being inflexible. Among the principal
equitable remedies are declaratory judgments, injunctions, specific performance
or contract modification, accounting, rescission, estoppel, proprietary remedies
such as constructive trusts and tracing, subrogation, and equitable liens. CAacTH
of the standard. Instead, we said "whether there was already deadlock between
the union and the company is likewise a question of fact. It requires the
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determination of evidence to find. . ."
I also disagree with the thought that budgetary restrictions and
considerations are factors in determining the existence of a right and its
enforceability. I will of course be the first to concede that in the
"implementation" of a statutory program, budget becomes a critical factor.
But this weighing does not happen at the initial stage where the existence of a
right and its enforceability are being determined. Budget could be a factor in
fashioning the appropriate remedy or relief, and assessing the
reasonableness of the compliance with the remedy or relief, but this occurs
only after a right has been determined to exist and to be enforceable.
In any event, please recall that in one of the Court's more celebrated
decisions, we decreed:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The September 28, 2005
Decision of the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 76528 and SP No. 74944 and the
September 13, 2002 Decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. 1851-99 are
AFFIRMED but with MODIFICATIONS in view of subsequent developments or
supervening events in the case. The fallo of the RTC Decision shall now
read:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the abovenamed
defendant-government agencies to clean up, rehabilitate, and preserve
Manila Bay, and restore and maintain its waters to SB level (Class B sea
waters per Water Classification Tables under DENR Administrative Order
No. 34 [1990]) to make them fit for swimming, skin-diving, and other forms
of contact recreation.
In particular:
(1) Pursuant to Sec. 4 of EO 192, assigning the DENR as the
primary agency responsible for the conservation, management,
development, and proper use of the country's environment and natural
resources, and Sec. 19 of RA 9275, designating the DENR as the primary
government agency responsible for its enforcement and implementation,
the DENR is directed to fully implement its Operational Plan for the Manila
Bay Coastal Strategy for the rehabilitation, restoration, and conservation of
the Manila Bay at the earliest possible time. It is ordered to call regular
coordination meetings with concerned government departments and
agencies to ensure the successful implementation of the aforesaid plan of
action in accordance with its indicated completion schedules.
(2) Pursuant to Title XII (Local Government) of the Administrative
Code of 1987 and Sec. 25 of the Local Government Code of 1991, 42 the
DILG, in exercising the President's power of general supervision and its
duty to promulgate guidelines in establishing waste management programs
under Sec. 43 of the Philippine Environment Code (PD 1152), shall direct all
LGUs in Metro Manila, Rizal, Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga, and
Bataan to inspect all factories, commercial establishments, and private
homes along the banks of the major river systems in their respective areas
of jurisdiction, such as but not limited to the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers,
the NCR (Parañaque-Zapote, Las Piñas) Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-
Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, the Meycauayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan)
Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite) River, the Laguna De
Bay, and other minor rivers and waterways that eventually discharge water
into the Manila Bay; and the lands abutting the bay, to determine whether
they have wastewater treatment facilities or hygienic septic tanks as
prescribed by existing laws, ordinances, and rules and regulations. If none
be found, these LGUs shall be ordered to require non-complying
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establishments and homes to set up said facilities or septic tanks within a
reasonable time to prevent industrial wastes, sewage water, and human
wastes from flowing into these rivers, waterways, esteros, and the Manila
Bay, under pain of closure or imposition of fines and other sanctions.
(3) As mandated by Sec. 8 of RA 9275, 43 the MWSS is directed to
provide, install, operate, and maintain the necessary adequate waste water
treatment facilities in Metro Manila, Rizal, and Cavite where needed at the
earliest possible time.
(4) Pursuant to RA 9275, 44 the LWUA, through the local water
districts and in coordination with the DENR, is ordered to provide, install,
operate, and maintain sewerage and sanitation facilities and the efficient
and safe collection, treatment, and disposal of sewage in the provinces of
Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan where needed at the
earliest possible time.
(5) Pursuant to Sec. 65 of RA 8550, 45 the DA, through the BFAR,
is ordered to improve and restore the marine life of the Manila Bay. It is also
directed to assist the LGUs in Metro Manila, Rizal, Cavite, Laguna, Bulacan,
Pampanga, and Bataan in developing, using recognized methods, the
fisheries and aquatic resources in the Manila Bay.
(6) The PCG, pursuant to Secs. 4 and 6 of PD 979, and the PNP
Maritime Group, in accordance with Sec. 124 of RA 8550, in coordination
with each other, shall apprehend violators of PD 979, RA 8550, and other
existing laws and regulations designed to prevent marine pollution in the
Manila Bay.
(7) Pursuant to Secs. 2 and 6-c of EO 513 and the International
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, the PPA is ordered to
immediately adopt such measures to prevent the discharge and dumping of
solid and liquid wastes and other ship-generated wastes into the Manila
Bay waters from vessels docked at ports and apprehend the violators.
(8) The MMDA, as the lead agency and implementor of programs
and projects for flood control projects and drainage services in Metro
Manila, in coordination with the DPWH, DILG, affected LGUs, PNP Maritime
Group, Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC),
and other agencies, shall dismantle and remove all structures,
constructions, and other encroachments established or built in violation of
RA 7279, and other applicable laws along the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan
Rivers, the NCR (Parañaque-Zapote, Las Piñas) Rivers, the Navotas-
Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, and connecting waterways and esteros
in Metro Manila. The DPWH, as the principal implementor of programs and
projects for flood control services in the rest of the country more
particularly in Bulacan, Bataan, Pampanga, Cavite, and Laguna, in
coordination with the DILG, affected LGUs, PNP Maritime Group, HUDCC,
and other concerned government agencies, shall remove and demolish all
structures, constructions, and other encroachments built in breach of RA
7279 and other applicable laws along the Meycauayan-Marilao-Obando
(Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite) River, the
Laguna De Bay, and other rivers, connecting waterways, and esteros that
discharge wastewater into the Manila Bay.
In addition, the MMDA is ordered to establish, operate, and maintain
a sanitary landfill, as prescribed by RA 9003, within a period of one (1) year
from finality of this Decision. On matters within its territorial jurisdiction
and in connection with the discharge of its duties on the maintenance of
sanitary landfills and like undertakings, it is also ordered to cause the
apprehension and filing of the appropriate criminal cases against violators
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of the respective penal provisions of RA 9003, Sec. 27 of RA 9275 (the
Clean Water Act), and other existing laws on pollution.
(9) The DOH shall, as directed by Art. 76 of PD 1067 and Sec. 8 of
RA 9275, within one (1) year from finality of this Decision, determine if all
licensed septic and sludge companies have the proper facilities for the
treatment and disposal of fecal sludge and sewage coming from septic
tanks. The DOH shall give the companies, if found to be non-complying, a
reasonable time within which to set up the necessary facilities under pain
of cancellation of its environmental sanitation clearance.
(10) Pursuant to Sec. 53 of PD 1152, 48 Sec. 118 of RA 8550, and
Sec. 56 of RA 9003, 49 the DepEd shall integrate lessons on pollution
prevention, waste management, environmental protection, and like
subjects in the school curricula of all levels to inculcate in the minds and
hearts of students and, through them, their parents and friends, the
importance of their duty toward achieving and maintaining a balanced and
healthful ecosystem in the Manila Bay and the entire Philippine archipelago.
(11) The DBM shall consider incorporating an adequate budget in
the General Appropriations Act of 2010 and succeeding years to cover the
expenses relating to the cleanup, restoration, and preservation of the water
quality of the Manila Bay, in line with the country's development objective
to attain economic growth in a manner consistent with the protection,
preservation, and revival of our marine waters.
(12) The heads of petitioners-agencies MMDA, DENR, DepEd,
DOH, DA, DPWH, DBM, PCG, PNP Maritime Group, DILG, and also of MWSS,
LWUA, and PPA, in line with the principle of "continuing mandamus ," shall,
from finality of this Decision, each submit to the Court a quarterly
progressive report of the activities undertaken in accordance with this
Decision.
No costs. 44
The kilometric dispositive portion will at once tell us that the concerned
entities will have to spend some money, which calls for a budget, to be able to
comply with what the Court has ruled to be the rightful entitlements of the
claimants therein. It was never an issue to the Court that in determining the
existence of a right and in enforcing it, we may be requiring some government
agencies to spend some resources to promote, protect and defend the right.
In truth, nothing ought to restrict the Court from adjudicating the
existence of a right and its enforceability on the basis of the availability of
budget for the implementation of a right. We should be able to distinguish
one from the other and to keep sacred this dichotomy.
Second. I disagree with the rationale that:
Presently, there is no constitutional provision or law which
automatically grants bail, releases on recognizance or allows other modes
of temporary liberty to all accused or inmates who are clinically-vulnerable
(i.e., sickly, elderly or pregnant). As it stands, courts concerned will still
have to consider the following guidelines for bail in Sections 5 and 9, Rule
114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. . . .
The above-mentioned enumeration clearly pertain to purely factual
questions that trial courts are equipped to pass upon. Moreover, the
consideration of these factors which includes others not mentioned but are
analogous to the ones provided means that such guidelines do not work
in isolation. (emphases supplied)
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The cited rule pertains to the determination of the amount of bail where
bail is a matter of right. It has no application where bail is a matter of
discretion as a result of the imposable penalties upon the crime charged where
evidence of guilt is strong.
I do not wish to impart the idea that Section 9, Rule 114 per se is a list
of factors to be weighed every time a petition for bail is filed. Section 9
becomes relevant only when the ruling in Enrile is applicable in the sense of
b e i n g the standard for resolving the case, particularly, in determining
whether the Enrile two-step test is complied with: (a) that the detainee will not
be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and (b) that there exist special,
humanitarian and compelling circumstances. The Section 9 factors are good
indicators, among others, of the existence of these elements in the Enrile test.
In this connection, I disagree with the statement that:
Fourth, the Court's ruling in Enrile v. Sandiganbayan, et al. , is
inapplicable in the instant case.
xxx xxx xxx
In Enrile, the Court emphasized that while the Philippines honors its
"commitment to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the
worth and dignity of every person," the grant of bail to those charged in
criminal proceedings as well as extraditees must be based upon a clear and
convincing showing: (a) that the detainee will not be a flight risk or a
danger to the community; and (b) that there exist special, humanitarian
and compelling circumstances. . . .
Here, the petitioners do not deny the allegations of the OSG that they
are indeed charged with heinous crimes related to national security and
are also valuable members of the CPP-NPA-NDF and its affiliates. Even if the
alleged facts underlying humanitarian reasons were to be accepted without
question, they still have to be weighed against the fact that the charges
against the petitioners involve serious matters of national security and
public safety. . . . As a consequence, the petitioners' reliance on this ruling
is patently misguided. . . .
Even assuming for the sake of argument that the petitioners had
managed to attach documents proving the foregoing pieces of information,
the determination of whether or not guilt is strong should still be lodged
with the trial courts who are well-equipped to handle them. . . . (emphases
and underscoring supplied)
As submitted earlier, Enrile applies here, not in the sense that herein
petitioners would also be entitled to be released on a bail plan, but in the sense
that Enrile is a legally binding decision, a law, that mustapply equally to all
who are able to meet the standards that Enrile espouses. To conclude otherwise
is to institutionalize the forbidden thought that some people are better
treated in and under the law than others upon dubious grounds.
Thus, herein petitioners are correct in invoking Enrile but may still be
not released on bail for a specified amount or on recognizance unless they are
able to muster the two-step test in Enrile: (a) the detainee will not be a
flight risk or a danger to the community; and (b) there exist special,
humanitarian and compelling circumstances. The test in Enrile has nothing
to do with assessing whether or not the evidence of petitioners' guilt is
strong, but on other factors as mentioned above.
Third. I disagree with the rationale that:
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In the case of the petitioners' continued confinement in their
respective detention facilities, the Court cannot issue an order for the
creation of a "Prisoner Release Committee" in the absence of any
law and in the absence of any concluded bail hearing which
resulted in the grant of provisional liberty. As it stands, only the
political branches of government (Executive and Legislative) have
the power to determine for themselves if such recourse is
warranted. The only act that the Court may do under the circumstances is
to order the conduct bail hearings before the trial courts with dispatch. . . .
I have my misgivings if the political branches of government have the
authority to order the release of PDLs, or for that matter, their continued
detention, if, in the former, the evidence of guilt is strong for a crime
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment or there has been
yet no determination thereof in a hearing, or if, in the latter, it has been
decided after a hearing that the evidence of guilt is not strong for a crime
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. The
determination in this regard exclusively belongs to the courts.
Fourth. I also disagree with this statement:
Besides, whenever a conundrum arises in times of emergency
when police power collides with constitutionally-protected freedoms or
fundamental rights, the political questions doctrine will often tip the
balance in favor of general welfare acts or policies in view of the State's
duty to primarily protect general interests. . . However, while public safety
is the paramount and overriding concern of the State and while it is also
true that laws should be interpreted in favor of the greatest good of the
greatest number during emergencies, individual freedoms also have to be
respected. . . (Emphases supplied)
I do not want to give the misimpression that petitioners will remain in
detention because "whenever a conundrum arises in times of emergency when
police power collides with constitutionally-protected freedoms or fundamental
rights, the political questions doctrine will often tip the balance in favor of
general welfare acts or policies in view of the State's duty to primarily protect
general interests." This is farthest from the truth. They will stay under
detention because they failed to satisfy the requirements that would have
otherwise qualified them to be released.
More, I am not comfortable with the idea that during emergencies, the
Court will already desist from acting in favour of individual rights since the
political question doctrine will often tip the balance. This is a recipe for
authoritarianism which I am sure even respondents and the OSG are not
advocating at present.
Fifth. I disagree with the references to the following conclusions which may
have an impact on the trial of petitioners' criminal cases below:
Here, the petitioners do not deny the allegations of the OSG that they
are indeed charged with heinous crimes related to national security and
are also valuable members of the CPP-NPA-NDF and its affiliates. . .
xxx xxx xxx
. . . As earlier discussed, the government cannot afford to gamble its
chances and resources by allowing the petitioners who are allegedly key
members of the CPP-NPA-NDF to roam free while the COVID-19 pandemic
remains an imminent and grave threat. . .
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I would not have wanted us to give so much thought and weight to
petitioners' status as rebels when as the Separate Opinion itself states this matter
as being merely an allegation (i.e., the Separate Opinion uses the descriptor
"alleged") and more importantly when this is an issue being litigated at the trial
courts below. It would have sufficed to focus on petitioners' collective
inability to provide concrete circumstances and bail plan to prove the first-
prong of the Enrile test.
No one left behind, healing
as one — fashioning the
appropriate relief.
We are not in ordinary times. Also, time is not on anyone's side. The
reason lies in the nature of the enemy we are all facing. The spread or
transmission rate of COVID-19, to use lay language, is "less than a week and
that more than 10 percent of patients are infected by somebody who has
the virus but does not yet have symptoms." 45 As further explained by WHO:
Q. How are COVID-19 and influenza viruses different?
The speed of transmission is an important point of difference between
the two viruses. Influenza has a shorter median incubation period (the
time from infection to appearance of symptoms) and a shorter serial
interval (the time between successive cases) than COVID-19 virus. The
serial interval for COVID-19 virus is estimated to be 5-6 days,
while for influenza virus, the serial interval is 3 days. This means that
influenza can spread faster than COVID-19 . Further, transmission
in the first 3-5 days of illness, or potentially pre-symptomatic
transmission — transmission of the virus before the appearance of
symptoms — is a major driver of transmission for influenza. In contrast,
while we are learning that there are people who can shed COVID-
19 virus 24-48 hours prior to symptom onset, at present, this
does not appear to be a major driver of transmission. The
reproductive number — the number of secondary infections
generated from one infected individual — is understood to be
between 2 and 2.5 for COVID-19 virus, higher than for influenza. . .
. Children are important drivers of influenza virus transmission
in the community. For COVID-19 virus, initial data indicates that
children are less affected than adults and that clinical attack
rates in the 0-19 age group are low. Further preliminary data
from household transmission studies in China suggest that
children are infected from adults, rather than vice versa. . . .
For COVID-19, data to date suggest that 80% of infections are mild or
symptomatic, 15% are severe infection, requiring oxygen and 5% are
critical infections, requiring ventilation. These fractions of severe and
critical infection would be higher than what is observed for influenza
infection. Those most at risk for severe influenza infection are children,
pregnant women, elderly, those with underlying chronic medical
conditions and those who are immunosuppressed. For COVID-19, our
current understanding is that older age and underlying
conditions increase the risk for severe infection. 46
T h e ubiquitous advice about this pandemic is that, unlike in other
situations where time heals, time is not our best ally. Transmission is rapid
and easy. The host and carrier does not carry a badge for easy identification.
Those who look healthy can be just that, mere appearance of health.
I therefore do not criticize petitioners for resorting directly to this Court. As
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correctly held by the ponencia, the doctrine of the hierarchy of courts does
not apply to the present circumstances.
Fortunately, respondents have responded well to the call for preventive
measures against COVID-19 at our detention centers. From all indications, and in
the absence of evidence to the contrary, respondents have acquitted
themselves well in this regard. It is my hope that they remain aggressive
against the virus and continue keeping the PDLs safe from the disease. Their
timely response answers petitioners' rightful concerns against this invisible
enemy.
It is my understanding from the petition that at the time of filing,petitioner
Reina Mae Nasino was five-months pregnant. She must have given birth by
now. I do not know if her baby now stays with her. But if the baby does, it is
entitled to separate protection apart from its mother, petitioner Nasino, would
be entitled to.
Hence, while I recognize and adhere to the primordial if not exclusive
role of the Executive Branch in the fight against COVID-19, I believe that we have
a role to play in protecting the baby from adverse consequences that are not
of the baby's own doing. After all, her mother is in this state of panic because
the lower court has issued processes for her preventive detention; further, she
and her co-petitioners are invoking their entitlement to bail under the
circumstances; and, lastly, the health of the baby is exposed to a greater risk
of infection than those who are staying with their mothers outside the detention
facilities. To use the hyperbole of Human Rights Watch , the baby's situation is
akin to having a death sentence imposed upon it by mere accident or as an
innocent by-stander. 47 SCaITA
ZALAMEDA, J.:
The Petition raises just one issue: whether petitioners, who are elderly,
sickly, and with other medical conditions, should be released on humanitarian
considerations in the context of COVID-19. 11 Meanwhile, this Court formulated
the following issues during deliberations:
A. Whether the instant Petition filed directly before this Court may be
given due course.
B. Whether the Nelson Mandela Rules are enforceable in Philippine
courts.
C. Whether the petitioners may be given provisional liberty on the ground
of equity.
D. Whether the Court has the power to pass upon the State's prerogative
of selecting appropriate police power measures in times of emergency.
12
certificates, and only six medical certificates out of the 17 were issued
in 2020. None of the petitioners have been tested for, or are alleged to
have, COVID-19.
The Petition described the physical situations in the Quezon City Jail, the
Cebu City Jail, the Mandaue City Jail, and the New Bilibid Prison (NBP) in
Muntinlupa, to support their claim of exposure and vulnerability to contract
COVID-19. Yet, none of the petitioners are confined in any of the said institutions.
Petitioners are actually detained in four other different sites: MMDJ 4 in Camp
Bagong Diwa, Taguig City Jail; Female Dorm, which is also in Camp Bagong Diwa,
Taguig City Jail; Manila City Jail, and the CIW in Mandaluyong City. 23
Petitioners emphasize that their collective actual health situation and
congested detention facilities put them at greater risk of contracting COVID-19.
They harp upon these facts, but conveniently ignore the reality of the absence of
any incident of COVID-19 infection in their actual detention facilities. While it is
true that after the filing of the Petition, and during its pendency, 20 PDLs and 1
staff tested positive for COVID-19 at the CIW where one of the petitioners is
imprisoned, those who tested positive have since been transferred to the isolation
facilities at the NBP. 24 Thus, the actual risk of petitioners contracting COVID-19 is
more speculative than real.
In seeking for their temporary release through bail or recognizance,
petitioners are primarily asking this Court to turn a blind eye to the
established requirements which take into account the nature and gravity
of the crimes charged. Petitioners ultimately want the Court to controvert Art.
III, Section 13 of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that "[a]ll persons, except
those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of
guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be
released on recognizance as may be provided by law. x x x" Most of the
petitioners are incarcerated for non-bailable crimes and offenses. Even conceding
the extraordinary backdrop of this case, humanitarian reasons alone cannot justify
the utter disregard of the Constitution, the law, and the rules of procedures.
If only to belabor the point, judicial policy dictates that this Court will not
entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the
appropriate courts or where exceptional and compelling circumstances justify
availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of our primary
jurisdiction. 25 And since petitioners failed to show that they have exhausted the
appropriate remedies before the lower courts, i.e., by filing applications for bail
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and recognizance therein, or compelling circumstances have exempted them
from disregarding the hierarchy of courts, the Petition must be denied.
The Court issued Guidelines for Both
the Temporary and Permanent
Release of Qualified PDLs
Recognizing that We cannot assume the role of the trial courts concerning
applications for bail or recognizance, the Court has issued circulars on the trial
courts' conduct of procedures on both the temporary and permanent release
of qualified persons deprived of liberty (PDLs). These circulars serve as
further proof that the entire judiciary was in operation regardless of the threat of
contracting COVID-19. In the same vein, this Court acknowledged the congestion
in detention facilities nationwide and the consequent high risk of PDLs contracting
COVID-19. This Court, by itself or through the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA), issued these circulars as part of its response to the demands brought
about by COVID-19.
First, on 31 March 2020, we issued AC No. 33-2020 26 directing the online
filing of complaints or information, and posting of bail due to the rising number of
COVID-19 infection. The OCA released the corresponding guidelines, OCA 89-
2020, 27 on 03 April 2020. Second, on 20 April 2020, the OCA issued OCA Circular
No. 91-2020 28 to address the temporary or permanent release of qualified
PDLs, reminding judges to adhere to the Guidelines for Decongesting Jails by
Enforcing the Rights of the Accused Persons to Bail and to Speedy Trial (A.M. No.
12-11-2-SC, effective 1 May 2014), 29 particularly Sections 5 (release after service
of minimum imposable penalty) and 10 (provisional dismissal). Third, AC No. 38-
2020 30 dated 30 April 2020 set the guidelines for reduced bail and recognizance
as modes for the temporary release of qualified PDLs during this public health
emergency, pending resolution of their cases.
As a result, 9,731 PDLs from 17 March to 29 April 2020 were released
nationwide. This number has since increased to 33,790 as of 22 June 2020. 31 The
Chief Justice's far-reaching efforts to further decongest our detention facilities,
especially in light of the situation brought about by COVID-19, is truly
commendable.
Corollary to this Court's initiatives, on 15 April 2020, 32 the Department of
Justice (DOJ), through the Board of Pardons and Parole (BPP), issued Board
Resolution No. OT-04-15-2020, or the Interim Rules on Parole and Executive
Clemency (Interim Rules). 33 The BPP addresses the congestion in the national
penitentiaries by advocating the permanent release of qualified PDLs. As of
10 June 2020, the DOJ's efforts resulted to 749 PDLs' release on parole and 356
PDLs' receipt of executive clemency. 34 The combined efforts of this Court,
the OCA, and the DOJ has brought about the release of 34,895 PDLs from
17 March to 22 June 2020.
The Enforceability of the Nelson
Mandela Rules in the Philippines vis-
à-vis the State's Prerogative of
Selecting Appropriate Police Power
Measures in Times of Emergency
Petitioners cite Rules 13, 16, 18, 22, 24, 25, 27, 30, 42, 109, and 111 of the
Revised UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, or the Nelson
Mandela Rules (Mandela Rules), 35 in support of their claim that the State has the
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duty to protect the health and safety of its prisoners.
The Mandela Rules, however, must be read in their entirety and in the
proper context. The Expert Group that formulated the Mandela Rules articulated
the standard of adequate systems in penal institutions. It also recognized that the
said Rules are not capable of wholesale application in all places because of the
difference in the legal, social, economic, and geographical situations in each
country. The preliminary observations which preface the Nelson Mandela Rules
bear witness to this recognition:
Preliminary observation 1
The following rules are not intended to describe in detail a model
system of penal institutions. They seek only, on the basis of the general
consensus of contemporary thought and the essential elements of the most
adequate systems of today, to set out what is generally accepted as being
good principles and practice in the treatment of prisoners and prison
management.
Preliminary observation 2
1. In view of the great variety of legal, social, economic
and geographical conditions in the world, it is evident that not all
of the rules are capable of application in all places and at all times.
They should, however, serve to stimulate a constant endeavor to overcome
practical difficulties in the way of their application, in the knowledge that
they represent, as a whole, the minimum conditions which are accepted as
suitable by the United Nations.
2. On the other hand, the rules cover a field in which thought is
constantly developing. They are not intended to preclude experiment and
practices, provided these are in harmony with the principles and seek to
further the purposes which derive from the text of these rules as a whole. It
will always be justifiable for the central prison administration to
authorize departures from the rules in this spirit. 36
These preliminary observations allow us to characterize the measures that
this Court has undertaken for the temporary and permanent release of PDLs, as
well as the practices introduced by the officials of the BJMP, under the Department
of the Interior and Local Government (DILG), and the BuCor, under the DOJ, 37 as
part of our country's compliance with United Nations standards and as part of our
country's response in catering to the needs of PDLs brought about by COVID-19.
38 Section 4 (a) of RA 10575, or The Bureau of Corrections Act of 2013, expressly
states that "the safekeeping of inmates shall include decent provision of quarters,
food, water, and clothing in compliance with United Nations standards."
The BJMP and the BuCor have prohibited jail visits since March 2020 to
minimize PDLs' exposure to the COVID-19 virus. 39 They have also implemented a
"no paabot" policy prohibiting bringing food and other personal items into the
detention facilities and penal institutions. 40 Aside from information campaigns
involving both personnel and PDLs, 41 there have been activities such as
distribution of vitamins to personnel 42 and PDLs, 43 production of face masks, 44
and distribution of sanitation and disinfection materials. 45 PDLs are also given the
means for electronic money transfer 46 and for video calls (e-dalaw). 47
Measures put in place for addressing tuberculosis in Philippine detention
facilities have been replicated to address probable COVID-19 cases. These
measures include conducting infection control protocols (proper entry screening
48 and mass screenings inside detention facilities), creating isolation units for
The PDLs failed to present similar circumstances. The filing of petitions for
bail before the trial courts where the criminal cases are pending is a remedy that
has always been available. However, the PDLs opted not to avail of such process
insisting that this will not provide an adequate and speedy relief to escape the
ravaging effects of the pandemic. I see no reason for this apprehension. Foremost,
the trial courts conduct only a summary hearing in bail applications. 18 Also, there
are ample safeguards under the Revised Guidelines for Continuous Trial of
Criminal Cases against any delay in the proceedings. Specifically, petitions for bail
shall be set for summary hearing after arraignment and pre-trial and shall be
resolved by the trial court within a non-extendible period of 30 calendar days from
date of the first hearing, without need of oral argument and submission of
memoranda. 19 Lastly, the Guidelines for Decongesting Holding Jails by Enforcing
the Rights of Accused Persons to Bail and to Speedy Trial provides that a motion
to reduce bail shall enjoy priority in the hearing of cases. 20
Worldwide initiatives to release prisoners
amid the pandemic are not absolute.
It is true that several countries have implemented release programs for
prisoners to prevent the spread of COVID-19 virus but these initiatives were
subject to exceptions. In Afghanistan, the members of Islamist Militant Group are
not included. In Indonesia, those released were mostly juvenile offenders and
those who already served at least two-thirds of their sentences. In Iran, only low-
risk and non-violent offenders serving short sentences are released. In Morocco,
the prisoners were selected based on their health, age, conduct, and length of
detention and were granted pardon. In United Kingdom, high-risk inmates
convicted of violent or sexual offenses, or of national security concern or a danger
to children were excluded. 21 It must be stressed that the release of prisoners in
other jurisdictions was made upon the orders of their Chief Executives.
Corollarily, the matter of unilaterally ordering the temporary release of the
PDLs solely on equitable grounds is, strictly speaking, not purely judicial in
character. This Court must abstain from exercising such power lest it encroach on
the prerogatives of the President and the Congress. The separation of powers is a
fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not through
express provision but by actual division in the framing of our Constitution. Each
department has exclusive cognizance of matters placed within its jurisdiction and
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is supreme within its own sphere. 22 It is not within the province of the judiciary to
express an opinion, or express a suggestion, that would reflect on the wisdom or
propriety of the action of the Chief Executive or the Congress on matters purely
political in nature. Otherwise, it may be considered as an interference or an
attempt to influence the exercise of their powers. 23 Hence, the temporary release
of PDLs outside of bail, recognizance and other court processes is best left to the
Chief Executive and Congress, especially since matters related to public health
and safety are political questions.
PDLs can avail of adequate protections
under international and domestic laws.
The overcrowding situation in jail facilities in the Philippines increases the
risk of contracting any disease. This means that regardless of age or whether they
have pre-existing medical condition, the PDLs are all vulnerable to contracting
COVID-19 because of the congestion, along with inadequate nutrition and scarcity
in health care. These are problems that need to be sufficiently addressed, not only
on account of the pandemic, but more so because these rights are ought to be
guaranteed to prisoners both under international and domestic laws.
On this score, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is customarily
binding upon the members of the international community. The Philippines has
the responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty
and due process, ensuring that those detained or arrested can participate in the
proceedings before a court, to enable it to decide without delay on the legality of
the detention and order their release if justified. The Philippine authorities are
under obligation to make available to every person under detention such
remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies
include the right to be admitted to bail. 24 Accordingly, this Court extended the
application of bail to deportation 25 and extradition 26 proceedings.
Later, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the United Nations
Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners 27 or the Nelson Mandela
Rules, which seeks to set out what is generally accepted as being good principles
and practice in the treatment of prisoners and prison management. 28 It clothed
the PDLs with the following rights:
Rule 24
1. The provision of health care for prisoners is a State
responsibility. Prisoners should enjoy the same standards of health care
that are available in the community, and should have access to necessary
health-care services free of charge without discrimination on the grounds of
their legal status.
2. Health-care services should be organized in close relationship to the
general public health administration and in a way that ensures continuity of
treatment and care, including for HIV, tuberculosis and other infectious
diseases, as well as for drug dependence.
Rule 25
1. Every prison shall have in place a health-care service tasked with
evaluating, promoting, protecting and improving the physical and mental
health of prisoners, paying particular attention to prisoners with
special health-care needs or with health issues that hamper their
rehabilitation.
xxx xxx xxx
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Rule 27
1. All prisons shall ensure prompt access to medical attention in
urgent cases. Prisoners who require specialized treatment or
surgery shall be transferred to specialized institutions or to civil
hospitals. Where a prison service has its own hospital facilities,
they shall be adequately staffed and equipped to provide
prisoners referred to them with appropriate treatment and care.
xxx xxx xxx
Rule 30
A physician or other qualified health-care professionals, whether or not
they are required to report to the physician, shall see, talk with and
examine every prisoner as soon as possible following his or her admission
and thereafter as necessary. Particular attention shall be paid to:
xxx xxx xxx
(d) In cases where prisoners are suspected of having
contagious diseases, providing for the clinical isolation and
adequate treatment of those prisoners during the infectious period;
xxx xxx xxx
B. Prisoners with mental disabilities and/or health conditions
Rule 109
1. Persons who are found to be not criminally responsible, or who are
later diagnosed with severe mental disabilities and/or health conditions, for
whom staying in prison would mean an exacerbation of their condition,
shall not be detained in prisons, and arrangements shall be made to
transfer them to mental health facilities as soon as possible.
2. If necessary, other prisoners with mental disabilities and/or
health conditions can be observed and treated in specialized
facilities under the supervision of qualified health-care professionals.
xxx xxx xxx (Emphases supplied.)
The standards for the treatment of prisoners are expressly incorporated in
Republic Act No. 10575 or the Bureau of Corrections (BuCor) Act of 2013 29 and its
implementing rules 30 viz.:
[R.A. No. 10575]
SECTION 4. The Mandates of the Bureau of Corrections. — The BuCor
shall be in charge of safekeeping and instituting reformation programs to
national inmates sentenced to more than three (3) years.
(a) Safekeeping of National Inmates — The safekeeping of inmates shall
include decent provision of quarters, food, water and clothing in
compliance with established United Nations standards. x x x
xxx xxx xxx
[Implementing Rules]
RULE II — GENERAL PROVISIONS
xxx xxx xxx
Section 2. Declaration of Policy . — It is the policy of the State to
promote the general welfare and safeguard the basic rights of every
prisoner incarcerated in our national penitentiary by promoting and
ensuring their reformation and social reintegration, creating an
environment conducive to rehabilitation and compliant with the
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United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for Treatment of Prisoners
(UNSMRTP).
xxx xxx xxx
ee. Safekeeping — refers to the custodial mandate of the BuCor's
present corrections system, and shall refer to the act that ensures the
public (including families of inmates and their victims) that national
inmates are provided with their basic needs. The safekeeping of inmates
shall moreover comprise decent provision for their basic needs, which
include habitable quarters, food, water, clothing, and medical
care, in compliance with the established UNSMRTP, and consistent with
restoring the dignity of every inmate and guaranteeing full respect for
human rights. The complementary component of Safekeeping in custodial
function is Security which ensures that inmates are completely
incapacitated from further committing criminal acts, and have been totally
cut off from their criminal networks (or contacts in the free society) while
serving sentence inside the premises of the national penitentiary. Security
also includes protection against illegal organized armed groups which have
the capacity of launching an attack on any prison camp of the national
penitentiary to rescue their convicted comrade or to forcibly amass
firearms issued to corrections officers.
xxx xxx xxx
RULE IV — MANDATES OF THE BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS AND
TECHNICAL OFFICERS
a) Safekeeping of National Inmates. In compliance with established
United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners
(UNSMRTP), the safekeeping of inmates shall include:
1. Decent and adequate provision of basic necessities such as
shelters/quarters, food, water, clothing, medicine;
2. Proper observance of prescribed privileges such as regulated
communication and visitation; and
3. Efficient processing of necessary documentary requirements and
records for their timely release. The processing of these documentary
requirements shall be undertaken by the Directorate for Inmate Documents
and Records (DIDR).
The core objective of these safekeeping provisions is to "accord the dignity
of man" to inmates while serving sentence in accordance with the basis for
humane understanding of Presidential Proclamation 551, series 1995, and
with UNSMRTP Rule 60. (Emphases Supplied)
The implementing rules is explicit that PDLs who are suffering from
contagious diseases should be confined in the hospital or infirmary inside the
prison compound. Those needing advanced medical treatment shall be brought to
the nearest hospital if the prison's medical facilities are not adequate to treat the
disease:
RULE VII — FACILITIES OF THE BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS
d) Hospital/Infirmary — refers to a medical facility established inside the
prison compound for treatment of sick or injured inmates. This will also
serve as a place of confinement for inmates with contagious disease. Sick
inmates requiring advance medical treatment shall be brought to the
nearest hospital if the prison hospital does not have the necessary medical
equipment and expertise to treat such malady.
Hospital/Infirmary for Types A and B shall contain, at least, basic facilities
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such as isolation room, emergency room, operating room, recovery room,
dental, laboratory, X-ray room, comfort rooms, beddings, pharmacy and
other standard facilities for Hospitals/Infirmaries. This shall be in
accordance with the Administrative Order No. 147-s-2004 issued by the
Department of Health.
Verily, the trial courts having jurisdiction over the criminal cases and bail
applications may refer the PDLs to the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology
(BJMP)'s or BuCor's infirmary for purposes of evaluation and treatment. The 2015
BJMP Comprehensive Operations Manual likewise provides that, in cases of
emergency wherein it would not be possible to secure the trial court's order
granting Temporary Pass, the BJMP is authorized to take an inmate who is
seriously ill to the nearest hospital. Thereafter, the Jail Warden shall notify the
regional director and the trial court. 31 All jail personnel must also observe the
guidelines in handling inmates with special needs such as mentally ill patients,
suicidal inmates, inmates with disability, children in conflict with the law, senior
citizen inmates, infirm inmates and pregnant or female inmates with infants. 32
FOR THESE REASONS, I concur in the result that the immediate referral of
the petition to the appropriate trial courts handling the PDLs' cases is in order.
The Court is once again called to strike a balance between upholding police
power and protecting civil liberties — this time, in the backdrop of a worldwide
adversity.
Antecedents
Background:
In December of 2019, a new variant of corona virus closely related to the
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Corona Virus (SARS-CoV) 1 and the Middle
East Respiratory Syndrome Corona Virus (MERS-CoV) 2 officially known as SARS-
CoV-2 suddenly emerged from Wuhan, China. 3 Corona Virus Disease 2019
(COVID-19), the pulmonary disease caused by SARS-CoV-2.
COVID-19 spread around the world like wildfire. It eventually reached the
Philippine soil for the first time on January 21, 2020 thru a 38-year old female
Chinese national who was eventually tested positive for the presence of SARS-
CoV-2. 4 This was followed by a declaration of "public health emergency of
international concern" by the World Health Organization (WHO) on January 30,
2020 after an emergency committee convened in Geneva, Switzerland. 5
Unfortunately, on March 7, 2020, the Department of Health (DOH) reported the
first local transmission of COVID-19 in the Philippines. 6 Since the first case of local
transmission in the Philippines, COVID-19-related infections and deaths have
exponentially skyrocketed. Panic had spread and the government had to act
swiftly to protect the people.
Government Responses:
On March 8, 2020, President Rodrigo Roa Duterte (President Duterte) issued
Proclamation No. 922 declaring a State of Public Health Emergency throughout
the Philippines due to COVID-19. 7
On March 16, 2020, President Duterte issued Proclamation No. 929 declaring
a State of Calamity throughout the Philippines due to COVID-19 and imposing the
Enhanced Community Quarantine (ECQ) effective March 17, 2020 at 12:00 A.M. 8
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Immediately thereafter, Executive Secretary Salvador C. Medialdea issued a
Memorandum by order of President Duterte containing among others a directive
on all the heads of departments, agencies, offices and instrumentalities of the
government including the Philippine National Police (PNP), Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP), Philippine Coast Guard (PCG), all government-owned-and-
controlled corporations (GOCCs), all government financial institutions (GFIs), all
state universities and colleges (SUCs) and all local government units (LGUs) to
commence the implementation of the ECQ and Stringent Social Distancing (SSD)
Measures. 9
On March 24, 2020, Republic Act No. 11469 (Bayanihan to Heal as One Act)
was signed into law. 10 This law granted special powers to President Duterte for
the purpose of suppressing the COVID-19 pandemic.
On April 6, 2020, inmates Dionisio S. Almonte, Ireneo O. Atadero, Jr.,
Alexander Ramonita K. Birondo, Winona Marie O. Birondo, Rey Claro Casambre,
Ferdinand T. Castillo, Francisco Fernandez, Jr., Renante Gamara, Vicente P. Ladlad,
Ediesel R. Legaspi, Cleofe Lagtapon, Ge-Ann Perez, Adelberto A. Silva, Alberto L.
Villaror, Virginia B. Villamor, Oscar Belleza, Norberto A. Murillo, Reina Mae A.
Nasino, Dario Tomada, Emmanuel Bacarra, Oliver B. Rosales and Lilia Bucatcat
filed directly before this Court a petition denominated as "In the Matter of the
Urgent Petition for the Release of Prisoners on Humanitarian Grounds in the Midst
of the COVID-19 Pandemic."
Petition
The petitioners allege that they are "political prisoners and detainees" and
are among the elderly, sick and pregnant "currently committed in places of
detention where it is practically impossible to practice self-isolation, social
distancing, and other COVID-19 11 precautions." 12 As such, they are invoking this
Court's power to exercise "equity jurisdiction" and are seeking "temporary liberty
on humanitarian grounds" either on recognizance or on bail. 13 In seeking their
provisional release on recognizance or bail, the petitioners raise the following
arguments:
(1) The fatal COVID-19 virus causing respiratory failure — which emerged
from Wuhan, China and spread all over the world — has no known
vaccine and has no proven cure. 14
(2) "The continued incarceration and detention of highly vulnerable
inmates such as the elderly, pregnant women, and those who have
pre-existing medical conditions that pose a high risk of contracting the
corona virus is tantamount to cruel and unusual punishment, which the
1987 Constitution explicitly prohibits." 15
(a) The United Nations (UN) Human Rights Committee makes it
incumbent upon the State to protect and preserve all its
prisoners' right to health and medical care which are among the
guarantees of the right to life. 16
(b) "Prisons and jails are incubators and amplifiers of infectious
diseases and given the sorry state and conditions of jails all over
the world, a corona virus outbreak in prison would be awfully and
especially destructive" which even "prompted UN High
Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet to call for the
immediate release of vulnerable prisoners all over the world." 17
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(c) Other countries (specifically US, Canada, Germany, Ethiopia,
India, Indonesia, England, Ireland and Wales, Iran, Sri Lanka and
Egypt) had already began releasing "hundreds to tens of
thousands of prisoners" due to the COVID-19 pandemic while the
Philippines has yet to respond to the High Commissioner's call. 18
(3) The instant case should be resolved "based on compassion and
humanitarian considerations" in line with this Court's "just, humane
and compassionate discretion" 19 "in view of the silence or
insufficiency of the law and the rules in regard to [the petitioners']
urgent and extraordinary predicament." 20
(a) Rule 114 of the Rules of Court "does not include humanitarian
considerations as a ground for the grant of bail" 21 and the
guidelines for granting provisional liberty on bail set in Cortes v.
Judge Catral 22 "do not provide any recourse to the said
accused who has literally nowhere to go to avoid the life-
threatening perils of public health emergencies like the COVID-19
outbreak." 23
(b) The Court "may include humanitarian considerations as a
ground for the grant of bail" 24 "by way of an exception to
procedures on applications for bail or personal recognizance as
well as the different modes of judicial review under the Rules of
Court." 25
(c) This Court has the power under Section 1 and Section 5 (5) in
relation to Rule 3, Section 1 of the Internal Rules of the Supreme
Court 26 to "apply equity where the court is unable to arrive at a
conclusion or judgment strictly on the basis of law due to a gap,
silence, obscurity or vagueness of the law that the Court can still
legitimately remedy, and the special circumstances of the case."
27
(b) This Court is not a trier of facts and it will be overwhelmed with
countless petitions which might set a precedent by simple
invocation of "equity" and the threat of the COVID-19 pandemic.
63
(i) The petitioners have acknowledged that they are not infected
with COVID-19. 90
(15) OCA Circular No. 91-2020 sufficiently provides guidelines towards
decongesting penal facilities and humanizing conditions of detained
persons pending hearing of their cases. 91
(16) COVID-19 "knows no age and health conditions and can infect
anyone at any time and any place" because "[t]here are cases of old
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and sickly COVID-19 positive patients who have fully recovered, while
some of the young healthy patients have lost their battle to the virus."
92
Issues
-I-
Whether or not the instant petition filed directly before this Court may be
given due course. . .
-II-
Whether or not the Nelson Mandela Rules are enforceable in Philippine
courts. . .
-III-
Whether or not the petitioners may be given provisional liberty on the
ground of equity. . .
-IV-
Whether or not the Court has the power to pass upon the State's
prerogative of selecting appropriate police power measures in times of
emergency. . .
Discussions
On giving due course to the present
petition:
Petitions filed before this Court are essentially divided into two (2) main
categories: (a) those that invoke appellate jurisdiction; and (b) those that invoke
original jurisdiction. Those falling within the first category are petitions for review
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court where the Court's main function is resolving
pure questions of law much like the courts of cassation in other jurisdictions.
Those falling under the second category are petitions that either: (a) seek for the
issuance of extraordinary or prerogative writs (certiorari, prohibition, mandamus,
continuing mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus, amparo , habeas data, and
kalikasan); or (b) seek for the invocation of the Court's inherent powers such as
those pertaining to the maintenance of orderly proceedings (contempt) or those
pertaining to administrative disciplinary proceedings against members of both the
Bench and the Bar. While the procedural requirements to be evaluated by this
Court in deciding whether or not to give due course for petitions under the first
category are relatively straightforward, the procedural requirements for petitions
under the second category involving extraordinary writs are a tad complicated.
The requirements as well as the corresponding exceptions in this specific
subcategory of petitions differ depending on the writ or type of remedy sought.
As to the procedural requirements for the issuance of extraordinary writs —
when directly invoking this Court's jurisdiction — are concerned, there have been
several instances where technicalities have been brushed aside in order to resolve
cases with utmost constitutional significance and far-reaching consequences.
Accordingly, due to the practical importance of keeping the dockets down to a
controllable level or load so that only petitions with significant import will be
entertained, the doctrine of hierarchy of courts was devised and developed in
order to manage petitions falling under the concurrent jurisdiction of the second,
third and final level courts. Hence, the issuance of extraordinary writs will
essentially depend on the guidelines laid down in the recent landmark case of
GIOS-SAMAR, Inc. v. Department of Transportation and Communications,
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et al., 93 which are condensed as follows:
(1) Despite having original and concurrent jurisdiction with the Regional
Trial Courts and the Court of Appeals (or the Sandiganbayan and the
Court of Tax Appeals, in some cases) in the issuance of extraordinary
writs, a direct recourse to this Court seeking for such issuance is
proper only to seek resolution of questions of law because it is not a
trier of facts;
(2) The hierarchy of courts is a constitutional imperative and a filtering
mechanism so that this Court may be able: (a) to devote its time and
resources primarily to cases falling within its exclusive jurisdiction; and
(b) to ensure the adequate ascertainment of all facts by lower courts
which are necessarily equipped to perform such function.
(3) The doctrine of hierarchy of courts proceeds from the constitutional
power of this Court to promulgate rules "concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure
in all courts" for the orderly administration of justice.
(4) The recognized exceptions to the hierarchy of courts have a common
denominator — the issues for resolution are purely legal. These
exceptions are:
(a) when there are genuine issues of constitutionality that must be
addressed at the most immediate time;
(b) when the issues involved are of transcendental importance;
(c) cases of first impression;
(d) the constitutional issues raised are better decided by the Court;
(e) exigency in certain situations;
(f) the filed petition reviews the act of a constitutional organ;
(g) when petitioners rightly claim that they had no other plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law that
could free them from the injurious effects of respondents' acts in
violation of their right to freedom of expression; and
(h) the petition includes questions that are "dictated by public
welfare and the advancement of public policy, or demanded by
the broader interest of justice, or the orders complained of were
found to be patent nullities, or the appeal was considered as
clearly an inappropriate remedy."
Considering the aforementioned guidelines in GIOS-SAMAR , the
undersigned now proceeds to evaluate the present unsanctioned "Petition for the
Release of Prisoners on Humanitarian Grounds in the Midst of the COVID-19
Pandemic" seeking for the issuance of an extraordinary writ: (a) directing the
release of the petitioners from their detention either on bail or on recognizance;
(b) mandating the creation of a "Prisoner Release Committee" for the purpose of
"urgently study[ing] and implement[ing] the release of all other prisoners in
various congested prisons throughout the country who are similarly vulnerable but
cannot be included in [their petition] due to the difficult circumstances"; and (c)
declaring "the issuance of ground rules relevant to the release of eligible
prisoners."
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Accordingly, the undersigned deems it imperative to clarify that litigants
may only file petitions and other pleadings sanctioned by the
Constitution, law, or procedural rules promulgated by this Court. In other
words, this Court is generally not bound to entertain or to give due course to
unsanctioned petitions. Nonetheless, the arguments put forth in the pleadings of
both parties involve: (a) significant and far-reaching implications on disputes
involving a collision of general welfare and individual rights; and (b)
unprecedented and pressing concerns related to the COVID-19 pandemic currently
affecting the whole nation. Considering the magnitude of the pandemic which
affects all sectors of society, there is now a pressing need and compelling
justification to suspend the application of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts and
to take on its constitutional duty to settle controversies. However, such statement
should not be interpreted to mean that litigants shall have an unbridled freedom
to file unsanctioned pleadings directly before this Court. Hence, it should be
emphasized that the rarity of the present occurrence (which is the present COVID-
19 pandemic) is more than enough to indicate to the public that this act of giving
due course to the present petition shall not be abused as it is primarily based on
observations regarding compelling matters raised by both parties as earlier
mentioned.
On the Judicial Enforceability of the
Nelson Mandela Rules in the Philippine
Jurisdiction:
A comprehensive initial discussion as to the effect of international law on
Philippine laws is imperative in order to determine the degree of enforceability of
the Nelson Mandela Rules.
The term "international law" (or "public international law" according to other
recognized authorities) generally refers to a body of rules which govern the
relationship 94 of states and international organizations which, in some instances
like human rights concerns, include the treatment of natural persons. 95 It is
founded largely upon the principles of reciprocity, comity, independence, and
equality of states. 96 The sources of this "body of rules" are provided by Article 38
of the Statute of the International Court of Justice 97 as follows:
Article 38
1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international
law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:
a. international conventions, whether general or particular,
establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states;
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted
as law;
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the
teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various
nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of
law.
2. This provision shall not prejudice the power of the Court to decide a
case ex aequo et bono, if the parties agree thereto.
The aforementioned sources of international law have been traditionally
categorized into peremptory and non-peremptory norms. On one hand,
peremptory norms or jus cogens refers to those mandatory and non-derogable
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norms or principles which give rise to erga omnes obligations (even if no
consensus exists on their substance) 98 and which are modifiable only by general
international norms of equivalent authority. 99 On the other hand, non-
peremptory norms, are those international principles or rules which do not have
compelling or binding effect against a state.
Concomitantly, the 1987 Philippine Constitution contains some provisions
alluding to the practice of considering international norms and principles as part
of domestic laws. However, it is settled that the Constitution is the basic and
paramount law to which all other laws must conform and to which all persons,
including the highest officials of the land, must defer. 100 This long-standing
doctrinal pronouncement, in relation to international law, is consistent with
Articles 1 (2) and 55 of the UN Charter 101 which espouses "the principle of equal
rights and self-determination of peoples." 102 From a Philippine legal standpoint,
international norms which are considered forming part of domestic laws must still
yield to the supremacy of the Constitution. 103 Consequently, both peremptory
and non-peremptory norms may become part of the sphere of domestic law as
provided under the present Constitution either by: (a) transformation — a
method which requires an international law or principle to be converted to
domestic law thru a constitutional mechanism such as enactment of an enabling
legislation or ratification of a treaty; and (b) incorporation — a method where an
international law or principle is deemed to have the force of domestic law thru a
constitutional declaration. 104 Of these methods, it is understood that
international norms are either transformed or incorporated into domestic laws
depending on which category they belong.
Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 105 (Vienna
Convention) states that "a peremptory norm of general international law is a norm
accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole
as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only
by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character."
Since Section 2, Article II of the Constitution expressly states that the Philippines
"adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law
of the land," it is beyond question that only norms which have attained a
peremptory status by general acceptance or recognition by the community of
states can be considered as part of the law of the land by incorporation.
Resultantly, all other norms not contemplated or covered in the definition of
"peremptory norm" in Article 53 of the Vienna Convention have to undergo the
method of transformation in order to have a binding effect as other domestic
laws. Furthermore, transformation may be undertaken either of the following
methods: (a) thru ratification of a treaty under Section 21, 106 Article VII of the
Constitution; or (b) thru enactment of an enabling law adopting a non-peremptory
norm of international law.
As to the characterization of the Nelson Mandela Rules, the undersigned
reproduces Articles 10 to 14, Chapter IV of the United Nations (UN) Charter as
follows:
Article 10
The General Assembly may discuss any questions or any matters
within the scope of the present Charter or relating to the powers and
functions of any organs provided for in the present Charter, and, except as
provided in Article 12, may make recommendations to the Members of the
United Nations or to the Security Council or to both on any such questions
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or matters.
Article 11
1. The General Assembly may consider the general principles of
cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security,
including the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of
armaments, and may make recommendations with regard to such
principles to the Members or to the Security Council or to both.
2. The General Assembly may discuss any questions relating to the
maintenance of international peace and security brought before it by
any Member of the United Nations, or by the Security Council, or by a
state which is not a Member of the United Nations in accordance with
Article 35, paragraph 2, and, except as provided in Article 12, may
make recommendations with regard to any such questions to the state
or states concerned or to the Security Council or to both. Any such
question on which action is necessary shall be referred to the Security
Council by the General Assembly either before or after discussion.
3. The General Assembly may call the attention of the Security Council to
situations which are likely to endanger international peace and
security.
4. The powers of the General Assembly set forth in this Article shall not
limit the general scope of Article 10.
Article 12
1. While the Security Council is exercising in respect of any dispute or
situation the functions assigned to it in the present Charter, the
General Assembly shall not make any recommendation with regard to
that dispute or situation unless the Security Council so requests.
2. The Secretary-General, with the consent of the Security Council, shall
notify the General Assembly at each session of any matters relative to
the maintenance of international peace and security which are being
dealt with by the Security Council and shall similarly notify the General
Assembly, or the Members of the United Nations if the General
Assembly is not in session, immediately the Security Council ceases to
deal with such matters.
Article 13
1. The General Assembly shall initiate studies and make
recommendations for the purpose of:
a. promoting international co-operation in the political field and
encouraging the progressive development of international law
and its codification;
b. promoting international co-operation in the economic, social,
cultural, educational, and health fields, and assisting in the
realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all
without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.
2. The further responsibilities, functions and powers of the General
Assembly with respect to matters mentioned in paragraph 1 (b) above
are set forth in Chapters IX and X.
Article 14
Subject to the provisions of Article 12, the General Assembly may
recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation,
regardless of origin, which it deems likely to impair the general welfare or
friendly relations among nations, including situations resulting from a
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violation of the provisions of the present Charter setting forth the Purposes
and Principles of the United Nations. (Underscoring supplied)
The aforementioned provisions clearly show that the UN Charter merely
grants recommendatory powers to the UN General Assembly (composed of all
member states per Article 9 of the same Charter) in terms of policy-making. As
observed by Associate Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen (Justice Leonen), UN
General Assembly Resolutions such as the Nelson Mandela Rules may constitute
"soft law" or non-binding norms, principles and practices that influence state
behavior. 107 Consequently, any resolution issued by the UN General Assembly
does not carry with it the status of being a peremptory norm. Simply put, it has no
binding effect on UN member states. Since the Nelson Mandela Rules gained an
official international status thru the UN General Assembly's adoption of a
Resolution on December 17, 2015, it stands to reason that the same Rules cannot
be considered as a binding peremptory norm of international law for being merely
recommendatory. A contrary rule of interpretation which will make every
resolution of the UN General Assembly, like the Nelson Mandela Rules,
automatically binding and part of the law of the land would undermine and
unduly restrict the sovereignty of the Republic of the Philippines. It stifles
the Republic's prerogative to interpret international laws thru the lenses of its own
legal system or tradition. Therefore, the Nelson Mandela Rules needs to be
transformed into a domestic law thru an enabling act of Congress in aclear and
unequivocal manner to have a legally binding force.
In response to the UN General Assembly's adoption of the Nelson Mandela
Rules, R.A. No. 10575 108 (Bureau of Corrections Act) was enacted by Congress. It
made an implied reference to the Nelson Mandela Rules by providing as follows:
Section 4. The Mandates of the Bureau of Corrections. — The
[Bureau of Corrections] shall be in charge of safekeeping and instituting
reformation programs to national inmates sentenced to more than three (3)
years.
(a) Safekeeping of National Inmates — The safekeeping of inmates
shall include decent provision of quarters, food, water and
clothing in compliance with established United Nations
standards. The security of the inmates shall be undertaken by
the Custodial Force consisting of Corrections Officers with a
ranking system and salary grades similar to its counterpart in the
BJMP.
(b) Reformation of National Inmates — The reformation programs,
which will be instituted by the [Bureau of Corrections] for the
inmates, shall be the following:
(1) Moral and Spiritual Program;
(2) Education and Training Program;
(3) Work and Livelihood Program;
(4) Sports and Recreation Program;
(5) Health and Welfare Program; and
(6) Behavior Modification Program, to include Therapeutic
Community.
(c) The reformation programs shall be undertaken by Professional
Reformation Personnel consisting of Corrections Technical
Officers with ranking system and salary grades similar to
Corrections Officers.
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(1) Corrections Technical Officers are personnel employed in
the implementation of reformation programs and those
personnel whose nature of work requires proximate or
direct contact with inmates.
(2) Corrections Technical Officers include priests, evangelists,
pastors, teachers, instructors, professors, vocational
placement officers, librarians, guidance counselors,
physicians, nurses, medical technologists,
pharmacists, dentists, therapists, psychologists,
psychiatrists, sociologists, social workers, engineers,
electricians, agriculturists, veterinarians, lawyers and
similar professional skills relevant to the implementation of
inmate reformation programs. (Emphasis supplied)
At this juncture, there now arises a need to determine whether this Court or
the entire Judicial branch is constitutionally-empowered to issue writs or other
orders to compel the Bureau of Corrections and all the other public respondents to
implement Section 4 of the Bureau of Corrections Act in someparticular manner.
The answer strongly points to the negative for the following reasons:
First, the general import of the terms in Section 4 (a) of the Bureau of
Corrections Act in relation to the Nelson Mandela Rules clearly shows that such
provision (Section 4) is not judicially-enforceable.
In constitutional interpretation, it is settled that a provision is self-executing
if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed
by the Constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and
construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is
referred to the legislature for action. 109 The same can be said of statutory
interpretation if the law itself clearly defines a right in terms of its nature and
extent as well as the liability or duty imposed pursuant to such right. In effect,
statutory provisions which are not self-executing do not confer rights which can
be judicially enforced — they only provide guidelines for executive action. 110
The phrase "in compliance with established United Nations standards" in
Section 4 (a) of the Bureau of Corrections Act is so generic that it clearly appears
to be silent regarding the manner of its implementation. A thorough
reading of the law will reveal that Section 23 of the same law merely delegates
the task of jointly promulgating the necessary implementing rules and regulations
to the Department of Justice (DOJ) in coordination with the Bureau of Corrections,
the Civil Service Commission (CSC), the Department of Budget and Management
(DBM), and the Department of Finance (DOF). 111 The law is also silent as to the
degree (moderate or strict).
For purposes of demonstration, the undersigned reproduces some provisions
in the Nelson Mandela Rules pertaining to the accommodation of prisoners as
follows:
Rule 5
xxx xxx xxx
2. Prison administrations shall make all reasonable accommodation and
adjustments to ensure that prisoners with physical, mental or other
disabilities have full and effective access to prison life on an equitable
basis.
xxx xxx xxx
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Rule 13
All accommodation provided for the use of prisoners and in particular
all sleeping accommodation shall meet all requirements of health, due
regard being paid to climatic conditions and particularly to cubic content of
air, minimum floor space, lighting, heating and ventilation.
xxx xxx xxx
Rule 28
In women's prisons, there shall be special accommodation for all
necessary prenatal and postnatal care and treatment. Arrangements shall
be made wherever practicable for children to be born in a hospital outside
the prison. If a child is born in prison, this fact shall not be mentioned in the
birth certificate. (Underscoring supplied)
As to the issue of specific implementation, the following phrases of the
afore-cited Nelson Mandela Rules stand out: (a) "reasonable accommodation and
adjustments"; (b) "full and effective access to prison life on an equitable basis";
(c) "shall meet all requirements of health"; (d) "cubic content of air, minimum
floor space, lighting, heating and ventilation"; (e) "special accommodation"; and
(f) "[a]rrangements shall be made." All of these phrases do not provide specific
details as to the manner of implementation. They all appear to constitute or
operate as primary guidelines for the proper handling of inmates in terms of
accommodation. For instance, the words "reasonable," "access," "special," and
"arrangements" are so vague that the ministerial duty of an executive or
administrative agency cannot be pinpointed in terms of the effectivity of a
mandatory injunctive writ. Bluntly speaking, how will the Bureau of Corrections
determine what is "special" or what is "reasonable" in executing a writ? A court
cannot simply define these terms and invent parameters akin to
administrative issuances resembling subordinate legislation. Other details
lacking in the general import of the Nelson Mandela Rules are the dimensions
associated with "cubic content of air, minimum floor space, lighting, heating and
ventilation." The dimensions regarding the living quarters and amenities provided
in Implementing Rules and Regulations 112 (IRR) of the Bureau of Corrections Act
cannot possibly be altered by virtue of a court order without violating the principle
of separation of powers. As pointed out earlier, Section 23 of the Bureau of
Corrections Act places the task of promulgating the IRR on the DOJ (in
coordination with the Bureau of Corrections), the CSC, the DBM and the DOF.
There is nothing in the same Section which permits the courts to adjust these
rules based on "equitable" considerations. Under the circumstances contemplated
in the aforementioned provisions in the Nelson Mandela Rules, only the Executive
department can reasonably determine the parameters of its compliance. Besides,
the Judiciary's interference with the Executive department in the enforcement of a
plain provision of the statute would, in effect, destroy the independence of the
latter department and subject it under the former's ultimate control. 113
As keenly observed by Chief Justice Diosdado M. Peralta (Chief Justice
Peralta), the Nelson Mandela Rules espouse the generally vicarious idea that it is
the responsibility of every state to make accommodations in prisons well suited
for proper hygiene, nutrition and hydration, especially to prisoners with particular
health care needs. These rules, instead, highlight the obligation of transferring
prisoners, whether convicts or detainees, with urgent medical conditions to
specialized institutions and in specialized facilities where they can have prompt
access to medical attention. The main premises for the application of international
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law principles are lacking in the case of the petitioners, especially in the absence
of an emerging and/or immediate need to receive specialized medical attention
which the prison facilities cannot cater to and address at the moment.
Second, the implementation of the Bureau of Corrections Act is dependent
on the available funds of the Bureau. aCIHcD
MR. MAAMBONG:
Yes, Madam President, but I would just like to make a statement.
Considering that Commissioner Suarez mentioned "PHYSICAL" — I did
say "corporal" — to save time, I would rather ask the Committee to
allow me to change "corporal" to PHYSICAL; then, I will accept that
amendment on the word PHYSICAL by Commissioner Suarez.
THE PRESIDENT:
Commissioner Regalado is recognized.
MR. REGALADO:
Madam President, I am proposing a further amendment to put some
standards on this, to read: "The employment of PHYSICAL,
psychological OR DEGRADING punishment ON ANY PRISONER."
Please permit me to explain. The punishment may not be physical but
it could be degrading. Perhaps, the Members have seen the picture of
that girl who was made to parade around the Manila International
Airport with a placard slung on her neck, reading "I am a thief."
That is a degrading form of punishment. It may not necessarily be
corporal nor physical. That is why I ask for the inclusion of OR
DEGRADING "punishment" on this line and employment should be ON
ANY PRISONER. It includes a convicted prisoner or a detention
prisoner.
MR. MAAMBONG:
Where would the words be?
MR. REGALADO:
"The employment of PHYSICAL, psychological OR DEGRADING
punishment ON ANY PRISONER." This is all-inclusive.
MR. MAAMBONG:
In other words, the Commissioner seeks to delete the words "against
CONVICTED prisoners or pretrial detainees," and in its place would be
"ON ANY PRISONER."
MR. REGALADO:
Because in penal law, there are two kinds of prisoners: the prisoners
convicted by final judgment and those who are detention prisoners.
Delete "or pretrial detainees"; then, "or the use of GROSSLY
substandard or INADEQUATE penal facilities." If we just say
"substandard," we have no basis to determine against what standard it
should be considered. But if we say "GROSSLY substandard," that is
enough of a legislative indication and guideline.
MR. MAAMBONG:
Madam President, before we take it up one by one, the Committee
modification actually deleted the words "substandard or outmoded,"
and in its place, we put the word INADEQUATE. Is it the Gentleman's
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position that we should put back the word "substandard" instead of
"INADEQUATE"?
MR. REGALADO:
I put both, "or the use of GROSSLY substandard or INADEQUATE penal
facilities," because the penal facilities may be adequate for a specific
purpose but it may be substandard when considered collectively and
vice-versa; and then, we delete the rest, "should be dealt with BY
LAW." That capsulizes, I think, the intent of the sponsor of the
amendment.
FR. BERNAS:
If we add the word "GROSSLY," we are almost saying that the
legislature should act only if the situation is gross.
MR. REGALADO:
How do we determine what is substandard?
FR. BERNAS:
We leave that to the legislature . What I am saying is that the
legislature could say: "Well, this is substandard but it is not grossly
substandard; therefore, we need not do anything about it."
MR. REGALADO:
Could we have a happy compromise on how the substandard
categorization could come in because it may be substandard from the
standpoint of American models but it may be sufficient for us ?
FR. BERNAS:
I do not think we should go into great details on this. We are not
legislating . . .
MR. REGALADO:
So, the sponsor's position is that we just leave it to the legislature
to have a legislative standard of their own in the form of an
ordinary legislation?
FR. BERNAS:
Yes.
MR. MAAMBONG:
Before I make any acceptance of the offered amendment, may I know
from the Committee if on line 3, after the word "INADEQUATE," we
should also replace "substandard" which we have cancelled earlier?
FR. BERNAS:
I do not know where we are now, but this is what I have. "The
employment of PHYSICAL, psychological OR DEGRADING PUNISHMENT
against CONVICTED PRISONERS . . ."
MR. MAAMBONG:
"against ANY PRISONER. . ." They were thinking of any prisoner.
MR. REGALADO:
No, I put the word ON not "against." One inflicts the punishment on a
person.
MR. MAAMBONG:
Yes.
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FR. BERNAS:
But the word "inflict" is not used but "employment" is used. So, the
preposition is "against," not "ON."
MR. REGALADO:
That is right; it is a matter of style.
MR. BENGZON:
Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT:
The Acting Floor Leader is recognized.
MR. BENGZON:
May we just leave that to the Committee on Style? What is important
is, we decide on the concept. If we can decide on the concept, then we
can leave the style to the Committee on Style.
THE PRESIDENT:
It should be left to the Committee on Style or to the Committee itself,
to the Committee of Commissioner Bernas if they are agreed on the
substance as to what is to be contained in the proposed amendment.
FR. BERNAS:
I just have one question on the substance. If we just say "ANY
PRISONER," that may connote that the person is either a prisoner
convicted or a pretrial prisoner and, therefore, charged. I would much
rather have ANY PRISONER OR DETAINEE because a "prisoner" usually
connotes someone who is convicted; a "detainee" could be on pretrial
or not charged at all.
THE PRESIDENT:
May we now have the recommendation of the Committee as to how
this whole provision will read?
FR. BERNAS:
So, the recommendation of the Committee would be: "The employment
of PHYSICAL, psychological OR DEGRADING punishment against ANY
PRISONER OR DETAINEE, or the use of INADEQUATE penal facilities
UNDER subhuman conditions should be dealt with BY LAW."
MR. RODRIGO:
Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT:
Yes, Commissioner Rodrigo is recognized.
MR. RODRIGO:
I would like to call attention to the fact that the word "DEGRADING" is
already in the first sentence of this section: "Excessive fine shall not be
imposed nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted." So,
why repeat the word "DEGRADING"?
FR. BERNAS:
Precisely, Madam President, yesterday, we said that the provision we
have in the present Constitution has reference to the punishment that
is prescribed by the law itself; whereas what we are dealing with
here is t h e punishment or condition which is actually being
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practiced (sic). In other words, we are, in the present Constitution,
talking about punishment which, if imposed by the law, renders the
law invalid.
In this paragraph, we are describing conditions of detainees who
may be held under valid laws but are being treated in a manner
that is subhuman or degrading.
MR. RODRIGO:
So, that is the reason for repeating the word "DEGRADING."
FR. BERNAS:
Yes, that is the reason.
MR. COLAYCO:
Just one suggestion for the Committee.
THE PRESIDENT:
Yes, Commissioner Colayco is recognized.
MR. COLAYCO:
To shorten the sentence, I would suggest this: "The employment of
PHYSICAL, psychological OR DEGRADING punishment IN ANY PLACE OF
DETENTION." That will cover prisoners who are already convicted and
those under detention or during trial.
MR. MAAMBONG:
I am sorry I cannot accept that. I think the Committee has made a
good job in modifying the sentence.
THE PRESIDENT:
Will Commissioner Maambong please read his proposed amendment
with all the suggestions that have come in?
MR. MAAMBONG:
Yes. It would read like this: "The employment of PHYSICAL,
psychological OR DEGRADING punishment against ANY PRISONER OR
DETAINEE or the use of substandard or INADEQUATE penal facilities
UNDER subhuman conditions should be dealt with BY LAW."
MR. FOZ:
Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT:
Commissioner Foz is recognized.
MR. FOZ:
May I just ask one question of the proponent of the amendment[?] I get
it that the law shall provide penalties for the conditions described by
his amendment.
MR. MAAMBONG:
In line with the decisions of the Supreme Court on the interpretation of
cruel and unusual punishments, there may be a law which punishes
this violation precisely or there may not be a law. What could happen
is that the law could provide for some reliefs other than penalties.
In the United States, there are what is known as injunctive or
declaratory reliefs and that is not exactly in the form of a penalty. But I
am not saying that the legislature is prevented from passing a law
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which will inflict punishment for violations of this section.
MR. FOZ:
In case the law passed by the legislature would impose sanctions, not
so much in the case of the first part of the amendment but in the case
of the second part with regard to substandard or outmoded legal
penal facilities characterized by degrading surroundings and insanitary
or subhuman conditions, on whom should such sanctions be applied?
MR. MAAMBONG:
It would have to be applied on the administrators of that penal
institution. In the United States, in my reading of the cases furnished to
me by Commissioner Natividad, there are instances where the law or
the courts themselves ordered the closure of a penal institution and, in
extreme cases, in some states, they even set the prisoners free for
violations of such a provision.
MR. FOZ:
I am concerned about the features described as substandard or
outmoded penal facilities characterized by degrading surroundings,
because we know very well the conditions in our jails , particularly
in the local jails. It is not really the fault of those in charge of the jails
but these conditions are the result of lack of funds and the support by
local government, in the first instance, and by the national
government.
Does the Gentleman think we should penalize the jailers for outmoded
penal facilities?
MR. MAAMBONG:
No, Madam President. What we are trying to say is that lack of funds is
a very convenient alibi for the State, and I think with these provisions,
the State should do something about it.
MR. FOZ:
Thank you, Madam President.
FR. BERNAS:
Madam President, we are not telling the legislature what to do :
we are just telling them that they should do something about
it.
MR. DE CASTRO:
Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT:
Commissioner de Castro is recognized.
MR. DE CASTRO:
Thank you.
The provision which says: "The employment of PHYSICAL,
psychological OR DEGRADING PUNISHMENT against ANY PRISONER OR
DETAINEE SHALL be dealt with BY LAW" is already provided for by our
present laws. We already have laws against third-degree punishments
or even psychological punishments. Do we still need this provision?
Thank you. Madam President.
MR. MAAMBONG:
As regards the broad standards set by the Nelson Mandela Rules as well as
the generic terms used in Section 4 (a) of the Bureau of Corrections Act, the Court
has no power to promulgate rules or even order thru adjudication the specific
manner on how to implement specific protective measures which the inmates are
entitled. Such power of "subordinate legislation" belongs to administrative
agencies to "fill in the gaps of a statute for its proper and effective
implementation" by virtue of their expertise in their fields of specialization. 140 In
other words, providing for details as to how a provision of law will be carried out or
implemented is part of executive — not judicial — functions. Moreover, it also
goes without saying that the Bureau of Corrections is duty-bound under Sections 3
and 4 of the Bureau of Corrections Act to look after the welfare of the inmates
even "including families of inmates and their victims." Consequently, this Court
would be engaging in subordinate legislation if it supplies the details on how to
implement the Bureau of Corrections Act instead of providing for rules on either
pleading and practice or protection and enforcement of constitutional rights.
However, this realization that judicial functions do not include the duty to "fill in
the gaps of the statute" should be distinguished from the courts' power to strike
down laws or administrative issuances for being unconstitutional or invalid. In this
case, striking down portions of administrative issuances does not result in the
creation of new rules or new entitlements — it merely renders such stricken
portions ineffectual. DACcIH
that explicit provisions define the limits of judicial power only to those matters
within the confines of the law.
Besides, the adjudicative approach of primarily resorting or deferring to the
text of the law is not without cogent reasons. It greatly minimizes, if not removes,
any personal and subconscious bias that an unelected magistrate may
inadvertently factor in weighing the rights or interests and obligations of
conflicting parties. This is the reason why a judge must always maintain cold
neutrality and impartiality for he or she is a magistrate, not an advocate. 176
Moreover, such approach is also in recognition of the idea that, in a democratic
and republican system of government, laws are borne out of the general
consensus of the people's directly chosen representatives. It ensures that
magistrates do not wander far away into their own subjective preferences. As
such, what it says according to the text of the provision to be construed compels
acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate
that the framers and the people mean what they say. 177
Accordingly, those claiming that the resort to common law is "progressive"
fail to realize that even such legal tradition is as ancient as the civil law tradition
relative to the modern times. The idea is not novel or revolutionary such as to
create a messianic realization that our Judiciary, all on its own, should suddenly
discard the civil law aspect of its legal tradition and wholly replace it with common
law.
However, the undersigned is not saying that the Philippines cannot change
the primary aspect of its legal system or tradition from civil law to common law.
Such shift in legal tradition should be done in a constitutionally-permissible
manner. Stated differently, there are constitutionally-sanctioned processes or
remedies available to change a policy, governmental structure, or legal culture.
These processes should not be bypassed for the sake of convenience or
disputable exigencies if this government is one "of laws and not of men." All that
the undersigned is emphasizing is that a shift in legal tradition would require no
less than a constitutional (or legislative for purely statutory rights and obligations)
amendment or revision 178 — a process explicitly sanctioned in the Constitution
itself. For now, the Judiciary cannot short-circuit the legislative democratic process
and invent a new right in the guise of interpretation.
At some point, the people should be able to bear the brunt of being
responsible in their exercise of the constitutional right to suffrage. The present
existing policies are but fruits of the seeds sowed by the people thru the exercise
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of their right to vote. Policies are virtually the results of public consensus — of
majoritarian choice, if the basic ideals of democracy itself are to be respected.
Those who are unhappy with these policies have the option to vote for a new set
of officials come elections. For the majority, this is relatively effortless; but for the
minority, it is up to them to convince those on the other side on the merits of their
choices — there should be no compulsion, even thru judicial enforcement, as it is
a vice on sovereign will; unless, of course, fundamental rights are arbitrarily
violated. More importantly, those principles and values that we have come to
accept as "absolute" or to recognize as "inherent" did not even start out as such
— they arose and developed as a result of the people's collective and cumulative
experiences as well as their corresponding responses over time. We might hold
some values or principles dear to our hearts, but that does not mean that we are
absolutely entitled to legally enforce them against others just because we strongly
believe in them; more so that strong personal beliefs especially of unelected
magistrates do not make general consensus. These values and principles must
first be recognized by the Constitution or law in a clear and discernible
manner. Surely, principles and values are not static just as all the other aspects
of the world that influence or dictate our lives; but they have to function according
to the legal platform in which they are recognized. HSCATc
grant of a relief based on equity was, in turn, based on some specific provision of
law found on the Civil Code and other laws which allow for the application of
equity to some degree (e.g., Articles 19, 477, 1192, 1229, 1310, 1359, 1362,
1423, 1486, 1520, 1547, 1601, 1603, 1711, 1722, 1741, 1762, 1794, 1797, 1798,
1819, 1831, 2142, 2208, 2215 and 2227 of the Civil Code); and (2) the exercise of
equity jurisdiction was resorted to set aside the rules of procedure in favor of
resolving cases on the merits or upholding substantive rights.
In the instant case, the petitioners' reliance on equity is misplaced for they
are asking this Court to grant them a relief not supported by any provision of the
Constitution or law. While the rules on bail appear to be inflexible on the
petitioners' part, equity does not authorize courts to create substantive rights by
way of "adjustment" and in the guise of interpretation. Granting provisional liberty
to the petitioners may or may not be morally right depending on the personal
belief of each individual person. However, what is "moral," "just," "fair," or
"equitable" is highly subjective and relative; which is why a reasonable inference
(such as the text of a law) is needed to minimize subjectivity and strengthen the
impartiality of presiding magistrates and mitigate instances of grave abuse of
discretion. As aptly put in Rural Bank of Parañaque, Inc. v. Remolado, et al. :
197
accused" and "the need for a tie to the jurisdiction and the right to freedom from
unnecessary restraint before conviction under the circumstances surrounding
each particular accused" should all be balanced in one equation. As a
consequence, the petitioners' reliance on this ruling is patently misguided. In the
case of former Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, there was showing that he was neither
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a flight risk nor a danger to the community.
Fifth, the grant or denial of bail applications is within the jurisdiction of the
trial courts well-equipped to handle questions of fact.
The Rules of Criminal Procedure requires a hearing before resolving a
motion for bail by persons charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua
where the prosecution may discharge its burden of showing that the evidence of
guilt is strong. 218 This hearing, whether summary or otherwise, 219 is mandatory
and indispensable. 220 Connectedly, a "summary hearing" means such brief and
speedy method of receiving and considering the evidence of guilt as is practicable
and consistent with the purpose of the hearing which is merely to determine the
weight of the evidence for the purpose of bail. 221 If a party is denied the
opportunity to be heard, there would be a violation of procedural due process. 222
Thus, in applications for bail, courts are duty-bound to: (a) notify the prosecutor of
the hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit his
recommendation; (b) conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of
whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt
of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound
discretion; (c) decide whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong based
on the summary of evidence of the prosecution; and (d) if the guilt of the accused
is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the bail bond —
otherwise; bail should be denied. 223 Therefore, regardless of the trial court's
disposition in applications for bail, the order should not be tainted with grave
abuse of discretion and should give all parties an opportunity to present their
respective pieces of evidence to support their causes or defenses. 224 As
elucidated by Justice Bernabe, the Court would be betraying its mandate to apply
the law and the Constitution should it prematurely order the release of petitioners
on bail or recognizance absent the requisite hearing to determine whether or not
the evidence of guilt against them is strong.
Relatedly, it is a settled rule that this Court is not a trier of facts. 225 With
respect to a direct invocation of this Court's original jurisdiction writs, the same
shall not be allowed unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the
appropriate courts. 226 The rationale for this rule is two-fold: (a) it would be an
imposition upon the precious time of this Court; and (b) it would cause an
inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of cases,
which in some instances had to be remanded or referred to the lower court as the
proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the
issues because this Court is not a trier of facts. 227 Like Justice Bernabe, Associate
Justice Henri Jean Paul B. Inting also shares the view that the Court cannot
prematurely order the petitioners' release, either on bail or recognizance, without
the mandatory bail hearing for the determination of the strength of the
prosecution's cases against them because it is not equipped to receive evidence
and make separate factual assessments for each petitioner in order to determine
his or her entitlement to bail.
Here, the petitioners pray for their release on recognizance or bail and for
the creation of a "Prisoner Release Committee" which strongly indicates that
theirs is a petition for bail or recognizance filed directly before this Court. This
cannot be done because, as previously pointed out, the factors enumerated in
Sections 5 and 9, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure are purely
factual in nature. To determine whether evidence of guilt of the accused is strong,
the conduct of bail hearings is required where the prosecution has the burden of
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proof, subject to the right of the defense to cross-examine witnesses and
introduce evidence in rebuttal. 228 Only after weighing the pieces of evidence as
contained in the summary will the judge formulate his or her own conclusion as to
whether the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong based on his
discretion. 229
Besides, the principle espoused in Enrile cannot be applied in the instant
case for the purpose of entertaining the present petition because, in the case of
former Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, a bail hearing was indeed conducted by the
Sandiganbayan. The same cannot be said of the petitioners who, whether
deliberate or not, failed to provide enough data or information in their petition
involving the following matters: (a) specific charges, nature of their crimes and
corresponding penalties; (b) stages of trial or proceedings; (c) specific dates and
lengths of detention; (d) any motion filed before the trial courts for provisional
release; and (e) present results of physical examinations on their status of health
relating to COVID-19. For this reason, the Court has no way of assessing whether
or not the evidence of guilt as to the petitioners is strong. As observed by both
Justice Bernabe and Justice Caguioa, the petitioners have not shown that any of
them have filed the necessary bail applications. It was also not shown by the
petitioners that bail hearings were conducted in their respective cases in order to
determine whether or not there exists strong evidence of guilt, which would, in
turn, determine their qualification or disqualification for the reliefs prayed for. As
Justice Zalameda bluntly puts, the petitioners are seeking to carve out for
themselves a special circumstance that is not present in our established rules but
failed in their duty to present the reasons why the general rule is not applicable to
them; in effect, they want this Court to turn a blind eye to the established rules
which take into account the nature and gravity of the crimes committed, as well
as the number of years served.
Even assuming for the sake of argument that the petitioners had managed
to attach documents proving the foregoing pieces of information, the
determination of whether or not guilt is strong should still be lodged with the trial
courts who are well-equipped to handle them. As precisely declared by Justice
Caguioa, the want of necessary factual details brought about by a proper bail
hearing precludes this Court from a full calibration of each petitioner's eligibility
for either release on bail or recognizance.
Incidentally, since the petitioners failed to provide the data as to whether
they have previously applied for bail, the Court is also not in the proper position to
direct all the trial courts where each of the petitioners' respective cases are
pending to conduct bail proceedings or expedite unresolved bail applications. To
do so would constitute an implied nullification of previously concluded bail
proceedings in which some of the respective trial courts may have found strong
evidence of guilt against some of the petitioners. This would result in a re-hearing
or duplication of otherwise concluded proceedings. As such, the same petition
should have been individually and separately filed before the respective
trial courts where each the petitioners' cases are currently pending.
Otherwise, this Court will be flooded with a deluge of bail applications seeking for
a factual evaluation of every petitioner's unique circumstances.
Sixth, the respondents have adequately shown that they have already
undertaken efforts to address the COVID-19 concern.
Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts that judges may properly
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take and act on without proof because these facts are already known to them. 230
Put differently, it is the assumption by a court of a fact without need of further
traditional evidentiary support. 231 The principle is based on convenience and
expediency in securing and introducing evidence on matters that are not
ordinarily capable of dispute and are not bona fide disputed. 232
Here, the Court can take judicial notice of the fact that COVID-19 is
transmitted from person to person via droplets, contact, and fomites. It is
transmitted when one individual talks, sneezes, or coughs producing 'droplets' of
saliva containing the COVID-19 virus. 233 These droplets are then inhaled by
another person. COVID-19 transmission usually occurs among close contacts. It is
therefore important to maintain a distance of more than one meter away from any
person who has respiratory symptoms. 234 Likewise, it has been conveyed to the
general public that there are population groups who have a higher risk of
developing sever COVID-19 infections such as individuals aged 60 and above,
pregnant, and those with underlying conditions or co-morbidity at risk of COVID-
19 exacerbation. 235 This information is of public knowledge as has been imparted
not only by international COVID-19 experts through different information media
but also through the official acts of the executive department, through the
issuances and advisories of the Department of Health and the country's Inter-
Agency Task Force on Emerging Infectious Diseases (IATF-EID). As such,
mandatory and discretionary judicial notice can be taken on this fact.
On a related note, the OSG in its Comment stated the specific precautions
used by the Bureau of Corrections and the Bureau of Jail Management and
Penology (BJMP) to control the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic and attached as
an annex the April 21, 2020 BJMP Verified Report 236 which included relevant
information on the following matters:
(1) COVID-19 Management in the:
(a) Manila City Jail Male Dormitory
(b) Manila City Jail Female Dormitory
(c) Metro Manila District Jail — Annex 4
(d) Taguig City Female Dormitory
(2) Best Practices in COVID-19 Management in all Regions;
(3) Isolation Facilities;
(4) Distribution of Medical Health Personnel; and
(5) Compendium of Policies and Interim Guidelines on COVID-19
Management.
In its Verified Report, the BJMP stated that it was adopting the following
specific measures to prevent the spread of COVID-19 in detention facilities, to wit:
(a) the suspension of inmate visitation as early as March 11, 2020; (b) continuous
conduct of information dissemination on precautionary measures against COVID-
19; (c) provision of facemasks and mandatory wearing of such among persons
deprived of liberty (PDLs); (d) social distancing among PDLs; (e) regular exercise
of PDLs to boost their immune system; (f) distribution of vitamins among PDLs; (g)
medicines and special diets given to PDLs who have pre-existing medical
conditions; (h) rigid disinfection of supplies and deliveries inside prison cells; (i)
regular sanitation and disinfection of the whole jail perimeter including jail
buildings and jail cells; (j) improvised foot bath to prevent virus to be carried
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inside jail cells and; (k) special monitoring for PDLs with pre-existing conditions.
In case where PDLs become infected or show symptoms of COVID-19, the
BJMP undertakes in its Verified Report to pursue the following safety measures: (a)
immediate isolation of PDL with COVID-19 symptoms; (b) assessment by the jail
nurse on the patient; (c) if associated with COVID-19, the jail officials refer the
patient to the Department of Health (DOH) in accordance with the DOH referral
procedure; (d) immediate conduct of contact tracing to monitor the extent of
inmate exposure; and (e) the jail official also informs the inmate's family of the
status and health condition of the inmate who is infected. Moreover, the BJMP
Verified Report also states that there are already established isolation rooms
equipped with medical equipment and supplies in case of inmate infection among
PDLs. The jail infirmary also operates twenty-four (24) hours a day. 237
Meanwhile, the April 22, 2020 Bureau of Corrections Verified Report 238
submitted along with the OSG's Comment provides for the following information:
(1) COVID-19 Management in:
(a) Correctional Institution for Women
(b) New Bilibid Prison
(2) Best Practices in COVID-19 Management in the Bureau of Corrections
(3) Isolation Facilities
(4) Compendium of Policies and Interim Guidelines on COVID-19
Management
The Bureau of Corrections' Verified Report contains specific measures
adopted throughout correctional facilities in the country, to wit: (1) general
information drive about COVID-19; (2) no contact policy between inmates; (3)
strict fourteen (14) days quarantine for newly committed PDLs; (4) proliferation
and creation of isolation facilities to accommodate future COVID-19 patients; (5)
no face mask, no entry policy; (6) the immediate deployment of manpower for the
construction and renovation of facilities of PDLs and; (7) strict monitoring of
ingress and egress of health personnel across jail buildings. 239
Indeed, the whole nation is under unprecedented times with the spread of
the COVID-19 pandemic. The threat of infection of COVID-19 reaches everyone
even Filipinos outside prison jails. Although inmates of prison jails are at high risk
of infection, the Bureau of Corrections and the BJMP have been steadfastly
containing the spread of the pandemic inside jails throughout the country. Based
on the records available to this Court, it appears that both bureaus have enforced
proper social distancing and are safeguarding PDLs with special health conditions
or high-risk inmates. Moreover, both bureaus also have in place isolation methods
to secure PDLs in the unfortunate event an inmate becomes infected with COVID-
19. As observed by Chief Justice Peralta, the Bureau of Corrections even put in
place the necessary infrastructure to provide inmates a facility for online
visits/video conference with their relatives. In light of these developments, the
Filipino people including PDLs throughout the country should be secure in their
thoughts that both bureaus are presumably performing their duties in properly
handling the spread of the COVID-19 virus in detention facilities despite budgetary
constraints.
Seventh, the petitioners have ample remedies under existing laws and
Supreme Court issuances. IDTSEH
As emphasized by Chief Justice Peralta, applying for bail before the trial
courts has not been rendered infeasible even amidst the COVID-19 pandemic and
the Luzon-wide lockdown especially with the issuance of Administrative Circular
Nos. 31-2020, 240 33-2020, 241 34-2020, 242 37-2020 243 and 38-2020. 244
At this point, it may be apt to disclose the data submitted by the OCA thru a
Memorandum 245 to the OCJ pertaining to the incremental release of thirty
thousand and five hundred twenty-two (30,522) PDLs from March 17, 2020 to June
22, 2020 as follows:
Date
Acted PAROLE CASES
Upon
Deferred
Parole (NBI
Total
Granted Records Denied No
Parole
Parole Check/Verify Parole Action
Cases
Pending
Cases
May 18 46 42 11 1 100
May 27 4 48 3 0 55
June 3 29 26 1 0 56
June
56 12 2 0 70
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10
TOTAL 221 466 50 12 749
Date
Acted EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY CASES
Upon
Recommended Recommended
Recommended Total
for Conditional for Conditional
for Deferred Denied No Executive
Pardon Pardon with
Commutation EC EC Action Clemency
without Parole Parole
of Sentence Cases
Conditions Conditions
May
0 0 0 37 2 1 40
18
May
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
20
May
1 21 9 46 19 0 96
27
June
11 0 10 30 0 0 51
10
Clearly, the foregoing data shows that this Court's issuances thru the OCJ
have made a significant impact in decongesting jails and other detention facilities
in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Indeed, ample judicial remedies are
available to the petitioners and other similarly-situated PDLs who seek provisional
liberty. Likewise, administrative remedies for PDLs who are currently serving their
sentences like petitioner Lilia Bucatcat are also available to them. As pointed out
by both Chief Justice Peralta and Justice Zalameda, such administrative actions
present an incontrovertible proof that institutions of the justice system other than
the Judiciary are indeed enacting measures to decongest our detention and penal
facilities in order to mitigate the possible spread of COVID-19. As such, the
petitioners have no valid reason to insist that they have no other judicial or
administrative remedy save for a direct recourse to this Court.
Besides, release on bail or recognizance is not the only way to decongest
jails. This Court, thru former Chief Justices Hilario G. Davide, Jr. and Reynato S.
Puno, had previously promulgated Administrative Circular Nos. 12-2000 248 and
08-2008 249 which gave the trial courts the option to impose the penalty of fine
with subsidiary imprisonment instead of imprisonment itself. This is also
supplemented by the enactment of Republic Act No. 11362 250 (Community
Service Act) which authorized courts to require community service in lieu of jail
service for offenses punishable by arresto menor and arresto mayor. 251 To claim
that releasing prisoners on bail or recognizance is the only way to decongest jails
is to ignore Congress and this Court's previous decongestion efforts that have
already been put in place for trial courts to apply either in deciding the case or
upon motion of the parties.
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Last , Philippine constitutional and statutory provisions remain in force
despite the ongoing pandemic as well as the international calls for the release of
prisoners.
As Chief Justice Peralta puts it, neither the pandemic nor the executive
declaration of a Luzon-wide lockdown has the effect of suspending our laws and
rules, much less of shutting down the Judiciary. In support of this finding, Justice
Zalameda quoted Justice Leonen's ponencia in Abogado, et al. v. Department
of Environment and Natural Resources, et al., 252 wherein the latter clearly
enunciated that "[t]he imminence or emergency of an ecological disaster should
not be an excuse for litigants to do away with their responsibility of substantiating
their petitions before the courts." This is also supplemented by Associate Justice
Jose C. Reyes, Jr.'s (Justice Reyes) opinion that the Philippine government is not
expected to simply conform to the manner of releasing prisoners being adopted
by other countries because such release is qualified by certain conditions. As
pointed out by Chief Justice Peralta, the initiatives of other countries in
decongesting prison facilities were based on laws and rules prevailing in those
jurisdictions — the Philippines did not lag behind in this respect. Therefore, if the
true ideals of independence are to be valued at all, supranational
entities and foreign sovereigns should not be allowed to dictate how the
Philippines should conduct or handle its internal affairs; especially when
it comes to protecting the lives, health and safety of its citizens.
On the prerogative to choose appropriate
strategies and the proper judicial approach
when general welfare concerns clash with
civil liberties in times of emergency:
Political questions refer to those which are to be decided by the people in
their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has
been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the government. 253
These questions are concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not the
legality, of a particular act or measure being assailed in which this Court will not
normally interfere unless the case shows a clear need for it to step in to uphold
the law and the Constitution. 254 Recourse to the political question doctrine
necessarily raises the underlying doctrine of separation of powers among the
three great branches of government that the Constitution has entrenched. 255
In relation to the political questions doctrine, police power is the power of
the state to promote public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty
and property; 256 although it also extends to providing for all public needs as
parens patriae. 257 It has been established by jurisprudence that police power
finds no specific Constitutional grant for the plain reason that it does not owe its
origin to the Charter since it is inborn in the very fact of statehood and
sovereignty. 258 However, no less than the Constitution declares that "[t]he
maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and
promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people
of the blessings of democracy." 259 Such seemingly redundant constitutional
declaration only serves to buttress the State's inherent prerogative "to prescribe
regulations to promote the health, morals, education, good order or safety, and
general welfare of the people [as it] flows from the recognition that salus populi
est suprema lex — the welfare of the people is the supreme law." 260
Concomitantly, the power to promote the health, morals, peace, education,
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good order or safety and general welfare of the people by making statutes or
ordinances is vested in the legislature. 261 The most obvious manifestation of such
power are penal statutes in which the State defines and punishes crimes as well
as lays down the corresponding criminal rules of procedure. 262 Also, related to
the enactment of penal statutes as an implement of police power, it is necessary
either for the State agents to have "custody of the law" in bail applications or for
the courts to acquire "jurisdiction over the person" of the accused 263 — the
purpose of which is for the accused "to have a speedy, impartial, and public, trial,
to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the
attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf." 264 In other
words, the State's act of detaining a person charged with a crime even when his
or her guilt is still to be proven by the prosecution is not without pragmatic and
underlying wisdom. Deprivation of liberty, especially if evidence of guilt is strong
or no bail was posted, in such instance ensures that: (a) the court will have
jurisdiction over the person of the accused, as earlier stated, in order to render a
binding judgment; (b) the state agents will be assured of having the ability to
bring the accused to participate in necessary proceedings as required by the
court; and (c) the accused will be prevented from committing another crime which
endangers society or from undertaking further acts to conceal the crime being
charged against him or her. Verily, it is reasonable to assume that police power
which includes keeping persons accused of a crime in custody is not subject to a
reasonable debate.
In the case of the petitioners' continued confinement in their respective
detention facilities, the Court cannot issue an order for the creation of a "Prisoner
Release Committee" in the absence of any law and in the absence of any
concluded bail hearing which resulted in the grant of provisional liberty. As it
stands, only the political branches of government (Executive and Legislative) have
the power to determine for themselves if such recourse is warranted. The only act
that the Court may do under the circumstances is to order the conduct of bail
hearings before the trial courts with dispatch. Besides, it must be emphasized in
the first place, that the legislature, which is the constitutional repository of
police power and exercises the prerogative of determining the policy of the
State, is by force of circumstances primarily the judge of necessity,
adequacy or reasonableness and wisdom, of any law promulgated in the
exercise of the police power, or of the measures adopted to implement the
public policy or to achieve public interest. 265 In instances, the President may
exercise police power to a limited extent only for the purpose of securing public
safety. 266 Thus, it is the elected representatives of the People who should
determine "the greatest good for the greatest number" 267 in times of national
emergencies.
Besides whenever a conundrum arises in times of emergency when police
power collides with constitutionally-protected freedoms or fundamental rights, the
political question doctrine will often tip the balance in favor of general welfare
acts or policies in view of the State's duty to primarily protect general interests.
Such rule of interpretation is consistent with the basic principle instilled in
Marcos, et al. v. Manglapus, et al. , 268 articulating that: "[i]t must be borne in
mind that the Constitution, aside from being an allocation of power[,] is also a
social contract whereby the people have surrendered their sovereign powers
to the State for the common good. " However, while public safety is the
paramount and overriding concern of the State and, while it is also true that laws
should be interpreted in favor of the greatest good of the greatest number during
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emergencies, individual freedoms also have to be respected. As Justice Reyes
describes, such duty entails the complex task of harmonizing fundamental
interests of every individual, both free and deprived of liberty, and the general
public and, while certain individual's plea for the application of the "humanity of
law" may be considered in exceptional circumstances, public protection is equally
paramount and thus, can never be discounted. Thus, in upholding police power
measures over constitutional freedoms in times of emergency, the Court should
subject any encroachment of either constitutional or statutory rights to the
following interpretational parameters:
(1) Such encroachment shall be incidental to public safety and shall not
enter the bounds of arbitrariness;
(2) Measures pursued or concerns protected by the State should be
reasonably related or linked to the attainment of its legitimate
objectives consistent with general welfare; and
(3) The measure undertaken or concern addressed for the benefit of the
majority pursuant to an exercise of police power must not be
unnecessarily oppressive on the minority.
The current choice of the State to continually detain the petitioners satisfies
the aforementioned criteria for these reasons:
First, the State's exercise of its prerogative to elect appropriate strategies
under the present public health emergency situation branches have ample basis.
"Public safety" involves the prevention of and protection from events that
could endanger the safety of the general public from significant danger,
injury/harm, or damage, such as crimes or disasters — it is an abstract term with
no physical form with a boundless range, extent or scope. 269
In the case at hand, there is wisdom in the continued detention of the
petitioners as the nature of their respective charges is serious enough to justify
their continued detention until bail hearings have been conducted and their
applications have been acted upon favorably. Viewed in the context of the
Executive department's vantage point, the release of the petitioners endangers
national security. It can be reasonably inferred under the circumstances that the
Executive department has already made up its mind that the last thing they need
in the fight against COVID-19 is to face the hostilities of armed rebel groups. As it
is there are reports of COVID-19 cases already permeating in jails; there are also
reports that rebel groups have launched armed attacks against the military and
the police who are engaged in their duties of distributing relief goods and
manning the check points. At this point, the most prudent course of action that
the Court may do is to defer to the political branches as regards the matter of
selecting the most appropriate strategy to maintain public order and preserve
public safety. As Justice Zalameda opines, there has to be a balance between the
State's duty to protect the specific victims of the crime as well as the general
public, and the petitioners' rights under international law.
Second, the State's measure of continually detaining the petitioners is
reasonably related to its objective of maintaining public order and preserving
public safety. While there is still no judicially declared terrorist organization in our
jurisdiction pursuant to Section 17 270 of R.A. No. 9372 271 to date, 272 the US and
the European Union have both classified the CPP, NPA and Abu Sayyaf Group as
foreign terrorist organizations. 273 Obviously, this is a legitimate and vital concern
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to national security. As earlier discussed, the government cannot afford to gamble
its chances and resources by allowing the petitioners who are allegedly key
members of the CPP-NPA-NDF to roam free while the COVID-19 pandemic remains
an imminent and grave threat. During this time, the government cannot afford to
lose its front-liners in its battle against the pandemic. The last thing that this Court
should do in times of nationwide public health emergency is to tip the scales of
justice against public safety and against national security interests. This
realization alone adequately supports the reasonable link or relation between the
petitioners' continued detention and the objective of suppressing the COVID-19
pandemic.
However, such pronouncement is merely for the very limited purpose of
determining whether or not there is a reasonable link or relation between the
assailed government measures or concerns and the legitimate objectives
regarding general welfare in times of emergency. Admittedly, the undersigned
cannot, in good conscience, naively ignore age-old and popular allegations that
the CPP-NPA-NDF is a terrorist organization. But as part of due process, the
undersigned cannot also preempt at this time any finding that the authorizing
division of the Court of Appeals may encounter in the future should the DOJ file an
application under the newly-enacted Section 26 of R.A. No. 11479 274 (formerly
Section 17 of R.A. No. 9372 which used to lodge proscription proceedings before
the Regional Trial Court) to have the CPP-NPA-NDF declared "as a terrorist and
outlawed group of persons, organization, or association." In essence, the DOJ still
has to prove in such proscription proceedings that the CPP-NPA-NDF was and is
indeed engaged in acts constitutive of terrorism. As voiced out by Justice Reyes,
the Court should refrain at this time from making such pronouncements that goes
into the merits of petitioners' pending cases.
Last , the petitioners' continued detention cannot be considered as an
unnecessarily oppressive act of the State.
Oppression has been defined as "an act of cruelty, severity, unlawful
exaction, domination or excessive use of authority." 275 Since the petitioners are
allegedly members of the CPP-NPA-NDF, their continued detention is still deemed
necessary until and unless they prove during the bail hearing that the evidence
of their supposed guilt is not strong. Such unavoidable restraint of liberty is not
"unnecessarily oppressive" as the petitioners have not shown that the State had
been indifferent to their clinical needs. The medical certificates attached by the
petitioners as annexes adequately prove that the Bureau of Corrections and the
BJMP had not been remiss in their duties of assisting inmates in undergoing the
required medical checkups. Had the opposite been the case, the petitioners would
have been left to their own devices to deal with their own vulnerable health.
Allowing the petitioners to undergo medical checkups with the necessary
assistance from State agents negates the presence of "excessive use of
authority," "cruelty" or "domination." Under the extant circumstances, the State
cannot be reasonably considered by the Court as having acted cruelly in
continually denying the petitioners of their liberty in the midst of the COVID-19
pandemic.
Treatment of the Petition
In a nutshell, the petitioners' prayers in seeking for the release on
recognizance or bail and for the creation of a "Prisoner Release Committee" (along
with the issuance of ground rules for eligible prisoners) indicate that theirs is a
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petition for bail or recognizance filed directly before this Court. As explained in
detail earlier in the discussions, not one of these prayers may be granted for the
following reasons:
(1) The grant or denial of bail application requires a hearing and an
evaluation of proven facts which are functions of trial courts;
(2) This Court's time and resources will be better utilized by resolving
cases within the scope of its exclusive jurisdiction;
(3) The petitioners failed to provide any data or attachment pertaining to
their bail applications filed, if any, with the respective trial courts
handling their cases for this Court to evaluate;
(4) The petitioners are not without any remedy to seek for provisional
liberty before the proper forum if they so choose;
(5) This Court had already issued several guidelines to facilitate the
proceedings involving the possible release of PDLs and;
(6) The creation of a "Prisoner Release Committee" has no clear
constitutional and statutory basis.
Although the Court may, in some instances, refer bail or recognizance
applications filed before it to the trial courts, it is not feasible to do so in this case
because: (a) some of the petitioners may have already filed their bail or
recognizance applications before the respective trial courts handling their cases;
(b) re-opening bail or recognizance applications may unnecessarily prolong the
criminal proceedings if evidence of guilt adduced by the prosecution had already
been adjudged by the respective trial courts as strong; (c) bail or recognizance
application is an absolute prerogative or option of a detained accused; and (d)
guidelines for the possible release of PDLs have been put in place. Under the
circumstances, the most prudent course of action is to let the petitioners pursue
their bail or recognizance applications before the proper forum. After all, this
Court had already promulgated several issuances to facilitate the possible release
of PDLs — all that the petitioners have to do is to abide by these guidelines.
At this point, it is wise to impart Chief Justice Peralta's conclusion that the
petitioners are probably seeking administrative — not judicial — remedies that
would genuinely address their concerns in regard to which this Court, as overseer
of the Judiciary, could exercise no other prerogative than to direct the trial
courts concerned to resolve the underlying criminal cases with
deliberate dispatch. That judicial remedy is unavailable to the reliefs prayed
for, is all the more apparent from their collective sentiment that the government-
imposed quarantine and lockdown measures, which in the interim necessarily
denied them of supervised access to their families and friends, have negatively
affected their mental well-being. As the petitioners complain about languishing in
isolation, they fail to see that in truth, the rest of the outside world is likewise
socially isolating as a basic precautionary measure in response to a pandemic of
this kind. They lament the lingering fear of a potential infection within their
confinement on account of their respective physical vulnerabilities and hereby
plead that they be indefinitely set free, without realizing that it is the same exact
fear which looms outside of prison walls.
Conclusion
The world is currently facing a battle that harbors the potential to be one of
the deadliest in history. The enemy cannot be seen and its workings cannot, as of
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yet, be understood even by the most brilliant of minds in the scientific
community. Faced with a monumental task of balancing all governmental efforts
of curbing a formidable enemy for the benefit of the general population against
some sensible but conjectural fears that the health of some inmates or detainees
might be neglected by authorities, it is prudent to interpret the Constitution and
the law in a manner which places public safety as the pinnacle of all concerns for "
[s]elf-preservation is the first law of nature" 276 and "the fundamental and
paramount objective of the [S]tate [is to bring] about 'the greatest good to the
greatest number.'" 277 However, as a matter of duty, such interpretation is of
course subject to strict libertarian safeguards. While the undersigned sympathizes
with the petitioners' miserable plight, it simply cannot act in a manner violative of
the fundamental law. The remedy simply lies with the political branches to pursue.
As lucidly explained in Vera, et al. v. Avelino, et al. , 278 by Associate Justice
(later Chief Justice) Cesar Bengzon:
Let us not be overly influenced by the plea that for every wrong there
is a remedy, and that the judiciary should stand ready to afford relief.
There are undoubtedly many wrongs the judicature may not correct, for
instance, those involving political questions. x x x
Let us likewise disabuse our minds from the notion that the judiciary
is the repository of remedies for all political or social ills. We should not
forget that the Constitution has judiciously allocated the powers of
government to three distinct and separate compartments; and that judicial
interpretation has tended to the preservation of the independence of the
three, and a zealous regard of the prerogatives of each, knowing full well
that one is not the guardian of the others and that, for official wrong-doing,
each may be brought to account, either by impeachment, trial or by the
ballot box.
Despite Associate Justice Gregorio Perfecto's livid and scathing dissent that
the afore-cited ratiocination "is irrelevant" because the Court at that time was
supposedly "dealing with a constitutional wrong which, under the fundamental
law, can and must be redressed by the [J]udiciary," 279 the reliefs prayed for by
the petitioners are constitutionally-impossible to grant because it involves
"engrafting upon a law something that has been omitted which someone believes
ought to have been embraced" 280 — a clear act of judicial legislation. The
petitioners and the public have to understand that, as guardian of the
Constitution, this Court cannot break its sworn duty to uphold the fundamental
law. Succinctly, the Court is not constitutionally-empowered to perform acts
contrary to the principle of separation of powers no matter how lofty the
underlying intentions may be.
Besides impartiality demands that this Court should exercise an even-
handed temperament in balancing the conflicting interests embodied in both the
general welfare clause and the constitutionally-protected fundamental rights. An
emotional approach to an extraordinarily tense situation betrays the objective
resolution of highly-controversial disputes. Therefore, the undersigned is of the
view that it is not what this Court is willing to do — but what it can do — under the
circumstances which determines the fate of the present petition.
WHEREFORE, the undersigned votes to DENY the instant petition for lack
of merit and for improperly invoking the Court's original jurisdiction. TAacHE
Footnotes
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1. Corona Virus Disease.
2. Rollo , p. 14.
3. Id. at 8.
4. Id. at 7-8.
7. Id. at 6.
8. Id. at 8-10, 54-58.
9. Id. at 10.
10. Id. at 225, 232.
23. See: Obosa v. Court of Appeals, et al. , 334 Phil. 253, 270 (1997). (Citations
omitted)
24. See: Leviste v. Court of Appeals, et al. , 629 Phil. 587, 610-611 (2010). (Citations
omitted)
25. Napoles v. Sandiganbayan , 820 Phil. 506, 517 (2017).
26. See: Go v. Court of Appeals, et al. , 293 Phil. 425, 447 (1993). (Citations omitted)
27. People v. Tanes , G.R. No. 240596, April 3, 2019. (Citations omitted)
PERALTA, C.J.:
1. Rollo , pp. 3-62.
4. Id. at 59.
5. Id. at 42-48.
6. Id. at 224-266.
7. Id. at 232.
9. Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by
sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The
right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the Writ of Habeas
Corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
10. People v. Presiding Judge of the RTC of Muntinlupa City, 475 Phil. 234, 244 (2004).
11. See People v. Judge Dacudao , 252 Phil. 507, 513 (1989).
12. Dated March 31, 2020.
21. Partido ng Manggagawa (PM) v. COMELEC , 519 Phil. 644, 671 (2006).
22. Id. (Emphasis ours).
26. https://www.humanrightsinitiative.org/content/stateut-wise-prisons-response-to-
covid-19-pandemic-in-india. Last visited May 27, 2020.
27. Figure as of June 22, 2020. See note 17.
30. https://tribune.net.ph/index.php/2020/05/12/4188-prisoners-freed-to-decongest-jails/.
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Last visited on May 31, 2020.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
1. Petition, p. 57.
4. See Section 3 of Republic Act No. (RA) 10389, entitled "AN ACT INSTITUTIONALIZING
RECOGNIZANCE AS A MODE OF GRANTING THE RELEASE OF AN INDIGENT PERSON
IN CUSTODY AS AN ACCUSED IN A CRIMINAL CASE AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES,"
otherwise known as "RECOGNIZANCE ACT OF 2012," approved on March 14, 2013.
5. Section 13, Article III of the 1987 CONSTITUTION reads:
Section 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by
reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be
bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided
by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
6. Section 5 of RA 10389 reads:
(a) Before or after conviction by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court,
Municipal Trial Court in Cities and Municipal Circuit Trial Court; and
(b) Before conviction by the Regional Trial Court: Provided, further, That a person
in custody for a period equal to or more than the minimum of the principal penalty
prescribed for the offense charged, without application of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, or any modifying circumstance, shall be released on the person's
recognizance.
7. See Section 2, Rule I of the "PPA-DOJ INTERNAL GUIDELINES FOR THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10389" (2014).
10. See Section 20, Rule 114 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.
11. See Sections 6 to 8, RA 10389.
(22) Lilia Bucatcat — Arson (convicted). (see Separate Opinion of Associate Justice
Edgardo L. Delos Santos, pp. 9-12).
17. Id.
18. Id. at 161-163.
19. In De la Rama v. People's Court [77 Phil. 461, 465-466 (1946)], therein petitioner was
afflicted with, among others, active pulmonary tuberculosis, an ailment which was,
at that time, still had no known cure. In granting bail, the Court held:
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Considering the report of the Medical Director of the Quezon Institute to the effect
that the petitioner "is actually suffering from minimal, early, unstable type of
pulmonary tuberculosis, and chronic, granular pharyngitis," and that in said
institute they "have seen many similar cases, latter progressing into advance
stages when treatment and medicine are no longer of any avail"; taking into
consideration that the petitioner's previous petition for bail was denied by the
People's Court on the ground that the petitioner was suffering from quiescent and
not active tuberculosis, and the implied purpose of the People's Court in sending
the petitioner to the Quezon Institute for clinical examination and diagnosis of the
actual condition of his lungs, was evidently to verify whether the petitioner is
suffering from active tuberculosis, in order to act accordingly in deciding his
petition for bail; and considering further that the said People's Court has adopted
and applied the well-established doctrine cited in our above-quoted resolution in
several cases, among them, the cases against Pio Duran (Case No. 3324) and
Benigno Aquino (Case No. 3527), in which the said defendants were released on
bail on the ground that they were ill and their continued confinement in New Bilibid
Prison would be injurious to their health or endanger their life; it is evident and we
consequently hold that the People's Court acted with grave abuse of discretion in
refusing to release the petitioner on bail.
28. Refer to Rules 2, 5 (2), 39 (3), 55 (2) and 109-110 of the United Nations SMRs.
29. Refer to Rules 24-27, 29-35 of the United Nations SMRs.
30. <https://www.unodc.org/documents/justice-and-prison-
reform/Brochure_on_the_UN_SMRs.pdf> (last visited July 17, 2020).
31. 561 Phil. 386 (2007).
34. Record of the 1986 Constitutional Commission No. 034 (July 19, 1986).
35. 481 US 739 (1987).
36. Id.
37. Deshaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Services, 489 US 189 (1989).
46. Entitled "RELEASE OF QUALIFIED PERSONS DEPRIVED OF LIBERTY" dated April 20,
2020.
47. Entitled "GUIDELINES FOR DECONGESTING HOLDING JAILS BY ENFORCING THE
RIGHTS OF ACCUSED PERSONS TO BAIL AND TO SPEEDY TRIAL," dated March 18,
2014.
48. See Comment, p. 32.
7. Petitioners assert these are recognized in the Philippines as they are referred in
Republic Act No. 10575 or the Bureau of Corrections Act and the Jail Manual of
Operations.
18. Id.
19. 767 Phil. 147 (2015) [Per J. Bersamin, En Banc].
SECTION 2. Conditions of the Bail; Requirements. — All kinds of bail are subject to
the following conditions:
(a) The undertaking shall be effective upon approval, and unless cancelled, shall
remain in force at all stages of the case until promulgation of the judgment of the
Regional Trial Court, irrespective of whether the case was originally filed in or
appealed to it;
(b) The accused shall appear before the proper court whenever required by the
court or these Rules;
(c) The failure of the accused to appear at the trial without justification and despite
due notice shall be deemed a waiver of his right to be present thereat. In such
case, the trial may proceed in absentia; and
(d) The bondsman shall surrender the accused to the court for execution of the
final judgment.
The original papers shall state the full name and address of the accused, the
amount of the undertaking and the conditions required by this section.
Photographs (passport size) taken within the last six (6) months showing the face,
left and right profiles of the accused must be attached to the bail. (2a)
41. RULES OF COURT, Rule 114, sec. 17 provides:
SECTION 17. Bail, Where Filed. — (a) Bail in the amount fixed may be filed with the
court where the case is pending, or in the absence or unavailability of the judge
thereof, with any regional trial judge, metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial
judge, or municipal circuit trial judge in the province, city, or municipality. If the
accused is arrested in a province, city, or municipality other than where the case is
pending, bail may also be filed with any regional trial court of said place, or if no
judge thereof is available, with any metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge,
or municipal circuit trial judge therein. (b) Where the grant of bail is a matter of
discretion, or the accused seeks to be released on recognizance, the application
may only be filed in the court where the case is pending, whether on preliminary
investigation, trial, or appeal.
(c) Any person in custody who is not yet charged in court may apply for bail with
any court in the province, city, or municipality where he is held. (17a)
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42. RULES OF COURT, Rule 114, secs. 8 and 18 provide:
SECTION 8. Burden of Proof in Bail Application. — At the hearing of an application
for bail filed by a person who is in custody for the commission of an offense
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, the prosecution has
the burden of showing that evidence of guilt is strong. The evidence presented
during the bail hearing shall be considered automatically reproduced at the trial
but, upon motion of either party, the court may recall any witness for additional
examination unless the latter is dead, outside the Philippines, or otherwise unable
to testify.
SECTION 18. Notice of Application to Prosecutor. — In the application for bail under
section 8 of this Rule, the court must give reasonable notice of the hearing to the
prosecutor or require him to submit his recommendation. (18a)
Should the court grant the application, the accused may be allowed to continue on
provisional liberty during the pendency of the appeal under the same bail subject
to the consent of the bondsman.
If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6) years,
the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled upon a showing by
the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or other similar
circumstances:
(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed
the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or
violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification;
(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional
pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released
on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the
pendency of the appeal.
The appellate court may, motu proprio or on motion of any party, review the
resolution of the Regional Trial Court after notice to the adverse party in either
case. (5a)
44. RULES OF COURT, Rule 114, sec. 7 provides
47. A.M. No. 12-11-2-SC (2014), Third Whereas Clause. Guidelines for Decongesting
Holding Jails by Enforcing the Rights of Accused Persons to Bail and to Speedy
Trial.
(a) Before or after conviction by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court,
Municipal Trial Court in Cities and Municipal Circuit Trial Court; and
(b) Before conviction by the Regional Trial Court: Provided, further, That a person
in custody for a period equal to or more than the minimum of the principal penalty
prescribed for the offense charged, without application of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, or any modifying circumstance, shall be released on the person's
recognizance.
53. Republic Act No. 10389 (2013), secs. 6 and 7 provide:
SECTION 6. Requirements. — The competent court where a criminal case has been
filed against a person covered under this Act shall, upon motion, order the release
of the detained person on recognizance to a qualified custodian: Provided, That all
of the following requirements are complied with:
(a) A sworn declaration by the person in custody of his/her indigency or incapacity
either to post a cash bail or proffer any personal or real property acceptable as
sufficient sureties for a bail bond;
(b) A certification issued by the head of the social welfare and development office
of the municipality or city where the accused actually resides, that the accused is
indigent;
(c) The person in custody has been arraigned;
(d) The court has notified the city or municipal sanggunian where the accused
resides of the application for recognizance. The sanggunian shall include in its
agenda the notice from the court upon receipt and act on the request for
comments or opposition to the application within ten (10) days from receipt of the
notice. The action of the sanggunian shall be in the form of a resolution, and shall
be duly approved by the mayor, and subject to the following conditions:
(c) The accused had been found to have previously escaped from legal
confinement, evaded sentence or has violated the conditions of bail or release on
recognizance without valid justification;
(d) The accused had previously committed a crime while on probation, parole or
under conditional pardon;
(e) The personal circumstances of the accused or nature of the facts surrounding
his/her case indicate the probability of flight if released on recognizance;
(f) There is a great risk that the accused may commit another crime during the
pendency of the case; and
(g) The accused has a pending criminal case which has the same or higher penalty
to the new crime he/she is being accused of.
56. Bureau of Jail Management and Penology Operations Manual Revised (2015), Rule
VIII, sec. 65.
59. Id. at 6.
60. Id. at 7.
61. Id.
62. 767 Phil. 147 (2015) [Per J. Bersamin, En Banc].
65. Id. at 56, 59, and 66-67; J. Reyes, Separate Opinion, pp. 3-4.
66. J. Reyes, Separate Opinion, p. 3.
67. 456 Phil. 1 (2003) [Per J. Carpio, First Division]. See also Regulus Development, Inc.
v. Dela Cruz, 779 Phil. 75 (2016) [Per J. Brion, Second Division].
68. Id. at 10.
69. Reyes v. Lim , 456 Phil. 1 (2003) [Per J. Carpio, First Division].
72. Orata v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 263 Phil. 846, 852 (1990) [Per J. Paras,
Second Division].
79. 694 Phil. 223 (2012) [Per J. Villarama, Jr., First Division].
80. Id. at 224-225.
89. If the crime charged is punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the
court having jurisdiction must determine if the evidence of guilt is strong.
Otherwise, the mandatory hearing is only for determining the amount of bail.
90. J. Perlas-Bernabe, Separate Opinion, pp. 6-7.
97. J. Perlas-Bernabe, Separate Opinion, pp. 14-15; J. Delos Santos, Separate Opinion, p.
96.
109. Id. at 6.
110. Id. at 6; J. Lazaro-Javier, Separate Opinion, p. 32.
123. These definitions of torture and other cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment or
punishment under Republic Act No. 9745 were adopted from the Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
which the Philippines ratified on June 18, 1986.
124. Republic Act No. 9745 (2009), secs. 3-5.
138. Bureau of Corrections Operating Manual (2000), Book I, Part III, ch. 1, secs. 1-3
provide:
SECTION 1. Rights of an Inmate. — An inmate shall have the following basic rights:
Section 1. MANDATE. — The Bureau of Jail Management and Penology was created
on January 2, 1991 pursuant to Republic Act 6975, replacing its forerunner, the Jail
Management and Penology Service of the defunct Philippine Constabulary-
Integrated National Police. The BJMP exercises administrative and operational
jurisdiction over all district, city and municipal jails. It is a line bureau of the
Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG).
141. Bureau of Jail Management and Penology Operations Manual Revised (2015), Rule II,
sec. 16.
142. Bureau of Jail Management and Penology Operations Manual Revised (2015), Rule II,
sec. 17.
143. Bureau of Jail Management and Penology Operations Manual Revised (2015), Rule II,
sec. 16.
144. Bureau of Jail Management and Penology Operations Manual Revised (2015), Rule I,
secs. 2, 3, 4, 5, 10, and 11 provide:
SECTION 2. Vision. — The BJMP envisions itself as a dynamic institution highly
regarded for its sustained humane safekeeping and development of inmates.
SECTION 5. Functions. — In line with its mission, the Bureau endeavors to perform
the following functions:
SECTION 10. Objectives. — The broad objectives of the Bureau are the following:
a. To improve the living conditions of offenders in accordance with the accepted
standards set by the United Nations;
b. To enhance the safekeeping, rehabilitation and development of offenders in
preparation for their eventual reintegration into the mainstream of society upon
their release; and
c. To professionalize jail services.
145. Bureau of Jail Management and Penology Operations Manual Revised (2015), Rule
VIII, secs. 63 and 64 provide:
Section 63. RIGHTS OF INMATES. — Although the purpose for committing a person
to jail is to deprive him/her of liberty in order to protect society against crime, such
person is still entitled to certain rights even while in detention. These rights are:
8. The right to separate detention facilities or cells particularly for women inmates;
and
J. To read books and other reading materials available in the library, if any;
K. To maintain cleanliness in their cells and brigades or jail premises and perform
other work as may be necessary for hygienic and sanitary purposes;
L. To be entitled to Good Conduct Time Allowance (GCTA) as provided by law; and
148. J. Leonen, Dissenting Opinion in Ocampo v. Abando , 726 Phil. 441, 486-487 (2014)
[Per Sereno, En Banc].
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149. United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UNGA Res 217 III (A) (1948),
art. 5.
150. United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UNGA Res 217 III (A) (1948),
art. 3.
151. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, A/RES/21/2200 (1966).
152. General Comment No. 21, Article 10 (Humane treatment of persons deprived of
their liberty), HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (Vol. I) (1992), par. 4.
159. United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (the Nelson
Mandela Rules), A/RES/70/175 (2015).
162. Karen Parker, Jus Cogens: Compelling the Law of Human Rights, 12 HASTINGS INT'L.
& COMP. L. REV. 411, 414 (1989).
163. Id. at 415 citing U.N. Conference on the Law of Treaties, 1st and 2nd Sess. Vienna
Mar. 26-May 24, 1968, U.N. Doe. A/CONF./39/11/Add. 2 (1971), and Statement of
Mr. Eduardo Suarez (Mexico) at 294 during the 52nd meeting on May 4, 1968.
166. See Karen Parker, Jus Cogens: Compelling the Law of Human Rights, 12 HASTINGS
INT'L. & COMP. L. REV. 411 (1989).
171. United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (the Nelson
Mandela Rules), A/RES/70/175 (2015).
172. UN Treaty Body Database, UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICE OF THE HIGH
COMMISSIONER, available at
<https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/TreatyBodyExternal/Treaty.aspx?
CountryID=137&Lang=E> (last visited on July 6, 2020).
173. A/RES/39/46 (1984).
"However, for the Philippines which has been reportedly afflicted with persisting
issues of overcrowding, the instance of 'temporary overcrowding' is colloquially
'the stuff of dreams.'"
185. J. Leonen, Concurring Opinion in Knights of Rizal v. DMCI Homes, Inc., 809 Phil. 453,
591-592 (2017) [Per J. Carpio, En Banc].
186. J. Delos Santos, Separate Opinion, p. 32.
200. G.R. No. L-21064, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 413 [Per J. Fernando, Second
Division].
209. David v. Senate Electoral Tribunal, 795 Phil. 529 (2016) [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].
210. Id. at 576.
217. 429 U.S. 97 (1976). In Estelle, a prisoner was injured while unloading a bale of
cotton from a truck. He filed a civil action for deprivation of rights against the
Director of the Department of Corrections, the warden of the prison, and its
medical doctors, alleging that the inadequate medical treatment subjected him to
cruel and inhuman punishment.
The U.S. Supreme Court recognized the government's responsibility to provide
medical care for its prisoners. Failure to do so may constitute a cause of action for
cruel and inhuman punishment. First, however, the prisoner must allege "acts or
omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious
medical needs," which constitutes "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain" and
in worst cases, "physical torture or a lingering death." Moreover, this deliberate
indifference to a prisoner's serious medical needs must be of such nature that
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offends the contemporary standards of decency as expressed in prison
regulations. This means that not every accident or medical malpractice is
sufficient. There must be a deliberate disregard of a prisoner's serious medical
condition, delay, or complete denial of access to treatment, or intentional
interference to a prescribed treatment.
218. 509 U.S. 25 (1993). In Helling, the deliberate indifference test was dissected into its
subjective and objective components. The prisoner filed a civil action for damages
and injunction against various prison officials. Roomed with another prisoner who
daily smoked five packs of cigarettes sold by the prison store, he raised health
damage that constituted cruel and unusual punishment.
The U.S. Supreme Court held that the conditions of confinement are included in the
scope of the right against cruel and unusual punishment. The reason is that in
depriving liberty, the State renders prisoners unable to care for themselves. In a
series of cases, the Court had categorically held that the protection against cruel
and unusual punishment extends to "sufficiently imminent dangers" such that a
"remedy for unsafe conditions need not await a tragic event."
While the Court affirmed that a cause of action exists under cruel and unusual
punishment, the case was remanded to the trial courts to prove the objective and
subjective components of such right. The objective factor consists of the prisoner's
exposure to a grave risk that is not tolerated in the modern society. Moreover, the
prisoner's exposure is of the nature that violates contemporary standards of
decency. On the other hand, the subjective factor pertains to prison management
showing deliberate indifference of the detention officers to the risks and exposure
of the prisoner.
219. Ejercito v. Commission on Elections, 748 Phil. 205 (2014) [Per J. Peralta, En Banc]
citing Republic of the Philippines v. Manila Electric Company, 449 Phil. 118 (2003)
[J. Puno, Third Division] and Central Bank Employees Assoc., Inc. v. Bangko Sentral
ng Pilipinas, 487 Phil. 531 (2004) [J. Puno, En Banc].
220. 505 Phil. 298 (2005) [Per J. Carpio, En Banc] citing Fisher v. Winter , 564 F Supp. 281
(1983).
221. Id. at 313-317.
224. Alejano v. Cabuay, 505 Phil. 298, 323 (2005) [Per J. Carpio, En Banc].
225. J. Caguioa, Separate Opinion, pp. 19-20.
231. Id. at 5.
232. Commission on Audit Annual Audit Report of the Bureau of Jail Management and
Penology, COMMISSION ON AUDIT, available at
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55 (last accessed on July 6, 2020).
233. Id. at 55.
234. Id.
235. Id.
237. List of issues prepared by the Committee prior to the submission of the third
periodic report of the Philippines, CAT/C/PHL/Q/3 (2012).
238. United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
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248. Id. See also COMMUNICATING: PROTECT VULNERABLE & HIGH RISK GROUPS,
WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, available at
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groups> (last accessed on July 6, 2020).
249. Ali Rismanbaf, Potential Treatments for COVID-19; a Narrative Literature Review , 8
ARCHIVES OF ACADEMIC EMERGENCY MEDICINE 1 (2020), available at
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252. COVID Advisory No. 7, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, February 7, 2020, available at
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Relief Operations to be Distributed to Muslim Communities are Halal Compliant
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on the Implementation of Enhanced Community Quarantine in Luzon, and State of
Public Health Emergency in other parts of the Country due to the COVID-19 Threat,
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Government Units in the Provision of Social Amelioration Measures by the National
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Proper Welfare of Persons with Disabilities during the Enhanced Community
Quarantine Due to the Corona Virus 2019 (COVID-19) Pandemic,
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Circular-No.-2020-066.pdf> (last accessed on July 6, 2020).
DILG Memorandum Circular 2020-067, April 2, 2020, Additional Guidelines on
Quarantine and Isolation Measures Relative to the COVID-19 Situation, available at
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DILG Memorandum Circular 2020-071, April 9, 2020, Mandatory Wearing of Face
Masks or Other Protective Equipment in Public Areas, available at
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202049_cfaebca293.pdf> (last accessed on July 6, 2020).
DILG Memorandum Circular 2020-073, April 13, 2020, Guidelines for the Conduct
of the Expanded Testing Procedures for COVID-19, available at
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2020414_6237b314e6.pdf> (last accessed on July 6, 2020).
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Augmentation of SK Budgets to Provide Funds for Programs, Projects, and Activities
(PPAs) Related to Corona Virus Disease 2019 (COVID-19), available at
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2020414_a10aee3325.pdf> (last accessed on July 6, 2020).
275. Dolot v. Paje , 716 Phil. 458, 471 (2013) [Per J. Reyes, En Banc].
CAGUIOA, J.:
3. Id.
4. 767 Phil. 147 (2015).
19. Far Eastern Surety and Insurance Co., Inc. v. People, 721 Phil. 760, 769 (2013).
20. See People v. Presiding Judge of the RTC of Muntinlupa City, 475 Phil. 234, 244
(2004).
21. Reyes v. Lim , 456 Phil. 1, 10 (2003).
24. The case provides: "The remedy here sought is the old action of deslinde y
amojonamiento. Though this action is not specifically provided for in the Code of
Civil Procedure, there can be no doubt that it still exists. The substantive right
upon which it is based is granted by article 384 of the Civil Code, and where there
is a right there is also a remedy; the issuing of commissions to establish
boundaries is an ancient branch of equity jurisdiction and this power no doubt still
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resides in our courts of general jurisdiction." (Catigbac v. Leyesa , id. at 223.)
25. 207 Phil. 574 (1983).
38. N.B. Padua v. People (G.R. 220913, February 4, 2019) cites only the Separate
Opinion of Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion in Enrile and not the ponencia itself.
39. Separate Opinion of Senior Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe, pp. 5-6.
40. See Separate Opinion of Associate Justice Edgardo L. Delos Santos, p. 81; see also
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Separate Opinion of Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier, p. 8.
41. J. Leonen, Dissenting Opinion in Enrile v. Sandiganbayan , supra note 4, at 180-181.
45. Decision, p. 7.
46. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Article 6 (1).
51. UN Human Rights, Office of the High Commissioner, UN Treaty Body Database,
Ratification Status for Philippines, available at
<https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/TreatyBodyExternal/Treaty.aspx?
CountryID=137&Lang=EN> (last accessed June 14, 2020).
52. CONSTITUTION, Art. II, Sec. 11.
60. AN ACT PENALIZING TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN AND DEGRADING
TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT AND PRESCRIBING PENALTIES THEREFOR, approved
on November 10, 2009.
72. See Separate Opinion of Associate Justice Edgardo L. Delos Santos, pp. 54-55.
73. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted."
74. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
MR. MAAMBONG. No, Madam President. What we are trying to say is that lack of
funds is a very convenient alibi for the State, and I think with these provisions, the
State should do something about it. [II RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
COMMISSION: PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES, pp. 23, 25 (1986).]
77. Separate Opinion of Associate Justice Edgardo L. Delos Santos, p. 57.
78. Separate Opinion of Associate Justice Edgardo L. Delos Santos, p. 36, quoting
Commissioner Natividad.
85. The Whereas Clauses of the Nelson Mandela Rules explicitly took into account "the
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progressive development of international law pertaining to the treatment of
prisoners since 1955, including in international instruments such as the [ICCPR],
the [ICESCR] and the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment and the Optional Protocol thereto."
90. Revised IRR of R.A. 10575, Sec. 3 (ee). Emphasis and underscoring supplied.
91. Id., Sec. 4.
92. Now found in Rule 5 (1) and Rule 87 of the Nelson Mandela Rules .
93. R.A. 6975, AN ACT ESTABLISHING THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE UNDER A
REORGANIZED DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, AND
FOR OTHER PURPOSES, approved on December 13, 1990, Sec. 6.
94. Id., Sec. 63; RULES AND REGULATIONS IMPLEMENTING THE DEPARTMENT OF THE
INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT ACT OF 1990, Sec. 62.
95. BJMP COMPREHENSIVE OPERATIONS MANUAL, 2015 Edition, Sec. 6 (b).
98. Section 34. HANDLING INMATES WITH SPECIAL NEEDS. — The following guidelines
shall be observed in handling inmates with special needs:
b. They should be given tasks that are deemed fit and proper, their physical
limitations, considered;
b. Infirm inmates should be referred to the jail physician or nurse for evaluation
and management; and
c. Infirm inmates must be closely monitored and provide with appropriate
medication and utmost care.
101. See Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 14: The
Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (Art. 12), UN Document
E/C.12/2000/4, par. 3, available at
<https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4538838d0.pdf> (last accessed June 14, 2020).
105. United Nations, Principles of Medical Ethics relevant to the Role of Health Personnel,
particularly Physicians, in the Protection of Prisoners and Detainees against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, GA
Resolution 37/194, Principle 1 (December 18, 1982).
106. BuCor Statistics on Prison Congestion, available at
<http://www.bucor.gov.ph/inmate-profile/Congestion-04062020.pdf> (last
accessed June 14, 2020).
107. World Health Organization, Corona Virus Disease (COVID-19) Advice for the Public,
at <https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019/advice-for-
public> (last accessed June 14, 2020).
108. OSG Comment, p. 31.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Separate Opinion of Senior Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe, pp. 17-18.
117. 505 Phil. 298 (2005).
(1) the hearing in the case has been previously twice postponed due to the non-
appearance of the essential witness and both witness and the offended party, if
they are two different persons, have been given notice of the setting of the case
for third hearing, which notice contains a warning that the case would be
dismissed if the essential witness continues to be absent; and
(2) there is proof of service of the pertinent notices of hearings or subpoenas upon
the essential witness and offended party at their last known postal or e-mail
addresses or mobile phone numbers.
127. See OCA Circular No. 91-2020, Re: Release of Qualified Persons Deprived of Liberty,
dated April 20, 2020.
128. Re: Reduced Bail and Recognizance as Modes for Releasing Indigent Persons
Deprived of Liberty during this Period of Public Health Emergency, Pending
Resolution of Their Cases, dated April 30, 2020.
129. See A.C. No. 32-2020.
134. Re: Pilot Testing of Hearings of Criminal Cases Involving Persons Deprived of Liberty
Through Videoconferencing, dated April 27, 2020.
135. Re: Implementation of Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 37-2020 on the
Pilot Testing of Hearings of Criminal Cases Involving Persons Deprived of Liberty
Through Videoconferencing, dated May 4, 2020.
LAZARO-JAVIER, J.:
1. World Health Organization at https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-
coronavirus-2019/technical-guidance/naming-the-coronavirus-disease-(covid-
2019)-and-the-virus-that-causes-it (last accessed April 9, 2020). I refer to both
SARS-COV-2 and COVID-19 as COVID-19.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid., quoting Ontario Court of Appeals Justice Robert J. Sharpe's address on October
1st, 1997 to a National Judicial Institute Conference of Justices of the Ontario
Superior Court of Justice on the application and impact of judicial discretion in
commercial litigation.
20. Article 9. No judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence,
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obscurity or insufficiency of the laws. (6)
21. Article 10. In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed
that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.
22. By way of an aside, I see this interpretation and practice to be skewed for being
clearly inconsistent with texts of the constitutional provision and the Rules of Court
and the effect of the allocation of the burden of proof. As written:
Constitution, Article III, Section 13. All persons, except those charged with
offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is
strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released
on recognizance as may be provided by law. . . .
28. Chavez v. National Housing Authority , G.R. No. 164527, August 15, 2007 ruled "It is a
settled precept that decisions of the Supreme Court can only be applied
prospectively as they may prejudice vested rights if applied retroactively."
29. G.R. No. 227155, March 28, 2017.
32. Preventing COVID-19 outbreak in prisons: a challenging but essential task for
authorities, at http://www.euro.who.int/en/health-topics/health-
determinants/prisons-and-health/news/news/2020/3/preventing-covid-19-outbreak-
in-prisons-a-challenging-but-essential-task-for-authorities (last accessed April 10,
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
2020).
33. Indonesia releases 22,000 prisoners over COVID-19 fears: Government set to release
total of 30,000 prisoners over a week, official says, at
https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/indonesia-releases-22-000-prisoners-over-
covid-19-fears/1791209 (last accessed April 10, 2020).
34. Ibid.
35. Why people are being released from jails and prisons during the pandemic,
https:www.vox.com/2020/4/3/21200832/jail-prison-early-release-coronavirus-covid-
19-incarcerated (last accessed April 10, 2020); see also US jails begin releasing
prisoners to stem COVID-19 infections, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-
canada-51947802 (last accessed April 10, 2020).
36. Iran has released 85,000 prisoners in an emergency bid to stop the spread of the
corona virus, https://www.businessinsider.com/coronavirus-covid-19-iran-releases-
eighty-five-thousand-prisoners-2020-3 (last accessed April 10, 2020).
38. Release or isolate: The debate on how to help people inside Canada's prisons and
jails during COVID-19, https:/aptnnews.ca/2020/04/07/release-or-isolate-the-
debate-on-how-to-help-people-inside-canadas-prisons-and-jails-during-covid-19/
(last accessed April 10, 2020).
39. Judges release growing number accused of violent crimes due to COVID-19 fears,
https://globalnews.ca/news/6788223/coronavirus-prisons-inmates-released/ (last
accessed April 10, 2020).
40. BJMP puts up corona virus isolation facility for inmates, at https://news.abs-
cbn.com/news/04/09/20/bjmp-puts-up-coronavirus-isolation-facility-for-inmates
(last accessed April 9, 2020).
2. SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower
courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and
to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.
3. SECTION 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
SECTION 1. The Supreme Court [is] a court of law. — The Court is a court of law. Its
primary task is to resolve and decide cases and issues presented by litigants
according to law. However, it may apply equity where the court is unable to arrive
at a conclusion or judgment strictly on the basis of law due to a gap, silence,
obscurity or vagueness of the law that the Court can still legitimately remedy, and
the special circumstances of the case.
5. Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, Rule 114; Cortes v. Catral, A.M. No. RTJ-97-1387,
10 September 1997.
6. Republic Act (RA) No. 10389, Recognizance Act of 2012. See also Implementing
Guidelines (http://probation.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Implementing-
Guidelines-ROR.pdf [last accessed 07 July 2020]).
7. Petition, p. 6.
8. Id. at 12.
9. Id. at 12-16.
10. Data entered twice in petition under (c) and (q).
13. Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, Rule 114, Section 4; RA 10389, Section 5.
14. Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, Rule 114, Section 9.
15. Dionisio S. Almonte, Alexander Ramonita K. Birondo, Rey Claro Casambre, Ferdinand
T. Castillo, Francisco O. Fernandez, Jr., Vicente P. Ladlad, Ediesel R. Legaspi,
Adelberto A. Silva, Alberto L. Villamor, Norberto A. Murillo, Dario Tomada, and
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Oscar Belleza. Petition, pp. 37-38.
16. Renante Gamara. Petition, p. 38.
17. Ireneo O. Atadero, Jr., Emmanuel Bacarra, and Oliver Rosales. Petition, pp. 37-38.
18. Winona Marie O. Birondo and Virginia B. Villamor. Petition, pp. 37-38.
24. https://www.cnnphilippines.com/news/2020/4/21/Women-s-Correctional-more-COVID-
19-infections.html (last accessed 11 May 2020).
25. Santiago v. Vasquez , G.R. Nos. 99289-90, 27 January 1993; 291 Phil. 664 (1993); 217
SCRA 633. Emphasis added.
26. http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/11145/ (last accessed 06 July 2020).
33. https://law.upd.edu.ph/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/DOJ-BR-No-OT-04-15-2020.pdf
(last accessed 06 July 2020)
34. Letter of DOJ Secretary Menardo I. Guevarra to Chief Justice Diosdado M. Peralta
dated 15 June 2020.
35. On 17 December 2015, the United Nations' General Assembly, in A/Res/70/175,
approved the recommendation of the Expert Group that the Rules should be known
as "the Nelson Mandela Rules," to honor the legacy of the late President of South
Africa, Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela, who spent 27 years in prison in the course of his
struggle for global human rights, equality, democracy and the promotion of a
culture of peace.
36. https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%20999/volume-999-i-14668-
english.pdf (last accessed 10 July 2020).
37. The DOJ has also initiated the same response in the Bureau of Immigration (BI) which
reported on 14 May 2020 that its 75 personnel and 84 foreign detainees in Camp
Bagong Diwa have all tested negative for COVID-19. The 84 out of 400 detainees
were tested because they are at greater risk of contracting COVID-19. They are
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either senior citizens or have underlying medical conditions. All detainees are
required to sanitize. The BI detention facility undergoes "rigorous cleaning and
continuous disinfection." Visits have been temporarily prohibited.
https://tribune.net.ph/index.php/2020/05/14/foreign-inmates-bi-personnel-
negative-of-covid-19/ (last accessed 06 July 2020).
38. From the verified reports of the BJMP and BuCor submitted by the OSG as annexes to
its Comment. Annex A — Verified Report, BJMP, pp. 17-18; Annex C — Verified
Report, BJMP, pp. 2-7, 13, 17.
39. Annex E — Verified Report, BJMP, pp. 1-2; Annex E — Compendium of Policies, BuCor,
p. 7.
42. Annex B — Verified Report, BJMP, pp. 3-4; Annex C — Verified Report, BJMP, p. 2;
Annex D — Verified Report, BJMP p. 1; Annex E — Verified Report, BJMP, p. 4;
Annex B — Management in the NBP, BuCor, pp. 1-2.
43. Annex B — Verified Report, BJMP, p. 6; Annex D — Verified Report, BJMP, p. 7; Annex
E — Verified Report, BJMP, p. 6; Annex B — Management in the NBP, BuCor, pp. 7-
8.
44. Annex C — Verified Report, BJMP, p. 14; Annex A — Management of CIW, BuCor, pp.
11-15.
45. Annex B — Verified Report, BJMP, p. 7; Annex C — Verified Report, BJMP, pp. 12-13;
Annex D — Verified Report, BJMP, pp. 2, 7.
46. Annex A — Verified Report, BJMP, pp. 8-9, 20; Annex B — Verified Report, BJMP, pp.
11-12; Annex D — Verified Report, BJMP, p. 12; Annex E —Verified Report, BJMP, p.
10.
47. Annex A — Verified Report, BJMP, p. 7; Annex C — Verified Report, BJMP, p. 14;
Annex D — Verified Report, BJMP, p. 10; Annex E — Verified Report, BJMP, p. 10.
48. Annex B — Verified Report, BJMP, p. 14; Annex C — Verified Report, BJMP, pp. 14-16;
Annex D — Verified Report, BJMP, pp. 12-13; Annex E — Verified Report, BJMP, p.
15; Annex A — Management of CIW, BuCor, pp. 3-8; Annex B — Management in
the NBP, BuCor, pp. 3-4, 9-22.
49. Annex A — Verified Report, BJMP, pp. 9-15; Annex B — Verified Report, BJMP p. 31;
Annex C — Verified Report, BJMP, pp. 17-20; Annex E — Verified Report, BJMP, pp.
11-13; Annex F — Verified Report, BJMP; Annex D — Isolation Practices, BuCor.
52. Annex A — Verified Report, BJMP, pp. 7, 20; Annex B — Verified Report, BJMP, p. 11;
Annex A Verified Report, BJMP, pp. 14-16; Annex A — Management of CIW, BuCor,
pp. 16-17.
59. https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/04/23/why-irans-coronavirus-
pandemic-is-also-crisis-human-rights/ (last accessed 06 July 2020).
60. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/03/egypt-release-prisoners-of-
conscience-and-other-prisoners-at-risk-amid-coronavirus-outbreak/ (last accessed
06 July 2020).
61. https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/coronavirus-egypt-tests-political-prisoners-
preventive-measure (last accessed 06 July 2020).
62. https://globalvoices.org/2020/04/28/despite-covid-19-no-respite-for-human-rights-
crackdowns-in-egypt/ (last accessed on 06 July 2020).
63. Gelos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 86186, 08 May 1992; 284-A Phil. 114-124 (1992);
208 SCRA 608.
6. Philippine Carpet Manufacturing Corporation v. Tagyamon, 723 Phil. 562 (2013). See
also Lim Tupas v. Court of Appeals, 271 Phil. 628 (1991); and Zabat, Jr. v. Court of
Appeals, 226 Phil. 489 (1986).
7. See CONSTITUTION, Article III, Section 14 (2).
8. Comment, pp. 3-9.
9. Reply, p. 5.
10. CONSTITUTION, Art. III, Sec. 13; see also RULES OF COURT, Rule 114, Section 7.
13. Gacal v. Infante , 674 Phil. 324 (2011), citing Cortes v. Catral, 344 Phil. 415 (1997).
14. Sy v. Sandiganbayan (Third Division) , G.R. No. 237703, October 3, 2018, 882 SCRA
217, 230.
15. RULES OF COURT, Rule 129, Sec. 2.
18. Revilla, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 218232, 218235, 218266, 218903 & 219162,
July 24, 2018.
19. A.M. No. 15-06-10-SC (Resolution), April 25, 2017.
20. Section 3 of A.M. No. 12-11-2-SC (March 18, 2014) states: "When amount of bail may
be reduced. — If the accused does not have the financial ability to post the amount
of bail that the court initially fixed, he may move for its reduction, submitting for
that purpose such documents or affidavits as may warrant the reduction he seeks.
The hearing of this motion shall enjoy priority in the hearing of cases.
(Emphasis Supplied)
21. List: Countries Releasing Prisoners Over Corona Virus Fears. Accessed April 23, 2020
at https://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/iq/257267-list-countries-release-prisoners-
over-coronavirus-fears.
24. In Government of Hongkong Special Administrative Region v. Olalia, Jr., 550 Phil. 63
(2007), this Court ruled that the Philippines, along with the other members of the
family of nations, committed to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as
value the worth and dignity of every person. This commitment is enshrined in
Section 2, Article II of our Constitution which provides: "The State values the
dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights."
3. https://www.who.int/csr/don/05-january-2020-pneumonia-of-unkown-cause-china/en/
(last accessed: April 28, 2020); https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/types.html (last
visited: April 28, 2020).
6. https://www.doh.gov.ph/doh-press-release/doh-confirms-local-transmission-of-covid-
19-in-ph (last accessed: April 28, 2020).
7. https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/downloads/2020/02feb/20200308-PROC-922-RRD-
1.pdf (last accessed: April 28, 2020).
8. https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/downloads/2020/03mar/20200316-PROC-929-
RRD.pdf (last accessed: April 28, 2020).
9. https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/downloads/2020/03mar/20200316-MEMORANDUM-
FROM-ES-RRD.pdf (last accessed: April 28, 2020).
13. Id. at 8.
14. Id. at 20-21.
15. Id. at 7.
16. Id. at 6-7.
17. Id. at 5.
18. Id. at 6.
19. Id. at 8.
20. Id. at 10.
21. Id.
22. A.M. No. RTJ-97-1387, September 10, 1997, 344 Phil. 415-431.
25. Id. at 9.
26. A.M. 10-4-20-SC (May 4, 2010).
27. Rollo , p. 9.
28. Id. at 10.
44. Rollo , p. 6.
45. Id. at 23-25.
51. Comprehensive Firearms and Ammunition Regulation Act (May 29, 2013).
52. Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 (January 23, 2002).
71. Id. at 249, citing: David-Chan v. Court of Appeals, et al. , G.R. No. 105294,
February 26, 1997, 335 Phil. 1140, 1149.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 254-255.
82. Id. at pp. 259-260, citing: Justice Jose C. Vitug's Separate Opinion in Government of
the United States of America v. Purganan, et al. (G.R. No. 148571, December
17, 2002, unreported extended resolution).
87. Id.
88. Id.
96. See: Republic of Indonesia, et al. v. Vinzon , G.R. No. 154705, June 26, 2003, 452
Phil. 1100, 1107, citations omitted.
97. All Members of the United Nations are ipso facto parties to the Statute of the
International Court of Justice (U.N. Charter Art. 93, ¶ 1).
98. The Court in Mijares, et al. v. Hon. Ranada, et al. (G.R. No. 139325, April 12,
2005, 495 Phil. 372, 395, citations omitted) enunciated that "[t]he classical
formulation in international law sees those customary rules accepted as binding
result from the combination two elements: the established, widespread, and
consistent practice on the part of States; and a psychological element known as
the opinion juris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity)"; see also:
Vinuya, et al. v. Romulo, et al. , G.R. No. 162230, April 28, 2010, 633 Phil. 538,
557-580, citations omitted. On a related note, the initial factor for determining the
existence of custom is the actual behavior of states — this includes several
elements: duration, consistency, and generality of the practice of states (Bernas,
op. cit., pp. 10-11).
99. See: Bayan Muna v. Romulo, et al. , G.R. No. 159618, February 1, 2011, 656 Phil.
246, 306, citations omitted.
100. Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 , G.R. No. 192935,
December 7, 2010, 651 Phil. 374, 427, citations omitted.
101. Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice
(1945).
102. Self-determination refers to the need for a political structure that will respect the
autonomous peoples' uniqueness and grant them sufficient room for self-
expression and self-construction (Disomangcop, et al. v. Datumanong, et al. ,
G.R. No. 149848, November 25, 2004, 486 Phil. 398, 442-443, citations omitted).
103. Nothing is better settled than that the Philippines being independent and sovereign,
its authority may be exercised over its entire domain. There is no portion thereof
that is beyond its power. Within its limits, its decrees are supreme, its commands
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paramount. Its laws govern therein, and everyone to whom it applies must submit
to its terms. That is the extent of its jurisdiction, both territorial and personal.
Necessarily, likewise, it has to be exclusive. If it were not thus, there is a
diminution of its sovereignty (Reagan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue ,
G.R. No. L-26379, December 27, 1969, 141 Phil. 621, 625). In the final analysis,
this Court already had the opportunity to clarify that "[t]he fact that international
law has been made part of the law of the land does not pertain to or imply the
primacy of international law over national or municipal law in the municipal
sphere. The doctrine of incorporation, as applied in most countries, decrees that
rules of international law are given equal standing with, but are not superior to,
national legislative enactments. x x x In states where the constitution is the
highest law of the land, such as the Republic of the Philippines, both statutes and
treaties may be invalidated if they are in conflict with the Constitution (Secretary
of Justice v. Lantion, et al., G.R. No. 139465, January 18, 2000, 379 Phil. 165-
213, citations omitted).
104. See: Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines v.
Duque III, et al., G.R. No. 173034, October 9, 2007, 561 Phil. 386, 398, citations
omitted. However, the "incorporation clause" in Section 2, Article II cannot be
reasonably interpreted to automatically alter or deactivate other provisions of the
Constitution without passing through the sanctioned process of amendment or
revision outlined in Article XVII.
105. Ratified by the Philippines on November 15, 1972.
106. No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred
in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.
109. Manila Prince Hotel v. Government Service Insurance System, et al. , G.R.
No. 122156, February 3, 1997, 335 Phil. 82, 102, citations omitted.
110. Cf. Kilosbayan, Incorporated, et al. v. Morato, et al. , G.R. No. 118910,
November 16, 1995, 320 Phil. 171, 183-184.
111. See: Section 23 of R.A. No. 10575 (Implementing Rules and Regulations. — The DOJ,
in coordination with the BuCor, the CSC, the DBM and the Department of Finance
(DOF), shall, within ninety (90) days from the effectivity of this Act, promulgate the
rules and regulations necessary to implement the provisions of this Act.).
115. As amended by Republic Act No. 10592 (An Act Amending Articles 29, 94, 97, 98
and 99 of Act No. 3815, as Amended, Otherwise Known as the Revised Penal Code
[May 29, 2013]).
116. See: Inmates of the New Bilibid Prison, et al. vs. Sec. Leila M. De Lima, et
al., G.R. No. 212719, June 25, 2019.
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117. Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment
inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty
already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.
118. Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted.
119. See: Perez v. People, et al. , G.R. No. 164763, February 12, 2008, 568 Phil. 491,
518, citations omitted.
120. G.R. No. 132601, October 12, 1998, 358 Phil. 410, 430, 434-436, citations omitted.
121. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
122. See: Ient, et al. v. Tullett Prebon (Philippines), Inc. , G.R. No. 189158, January
11, 2017, 803 Phil. 163, 186.
123. Read in the entire context of this Decision, this statement is clearly not meant to
foreclose any judicial relief to remedy subhuman conditions — it is meant to
anchor these judicial reliefs on statutes positively enacted by Congress.
124. Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives, et al. , G.R. No. 160261, November
10, 2003, 460 Phil. 830, 886.
125. Atty. Macalintal v. Commission on Elections, et al. , G.R. No. 157013, July 10,
2003, 453 Phil. 586, 632, citations omitted.
128. Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, et al. , G.R. No. 202242, July 17, 2012, 691
Phil. 173, 199.
129. See: Columbia Pictures, Inc., et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al. , G.R. No.
110318, August 28, 1996, 329 Phil. 875, 907, citations omitted.
130. Cf. First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, et al. , G.R. No. 110571,
March 10, 1994, 301 Phil. 32, 40, citations omitted; Banco Filipino Savings and
Mortgage Bank v. Navarro, et al., G.R. No. L-46591, July 28, 1987, 236 Phil.
370. 378-379, citations omitted; Tayug Rural Bank v. Central Bank of the
Philippines, G.R. No. L-46158, November 28, 1986, 230 Phil. 216, 223-224,
citations omitted; People v. Que Po Lay , No. 6791, March 29, 1954, 94 Phil. 640,
642, citations omitted; contra: Jardeleza v. People , G.R. No. 165265, February 6,
2006, 517 Phil. 179, 201-202.
131. No. L-25513, March 27, 1968, 131 Phil. 408, 412.
132. G.R. No. 149276, September 27, 2002, 438 Phil. 749, 754, cited in: Maturan v.
Commission on Elections, et al., G.R. No. 227155, March 28, 2017, 808 Phil. 86,
94.
133. G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006, 522 Phil. 705, 795, citations omitted.
137. Guingona, Jr., et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al. , G.R. No. 125532, July 10, 1998,
354 Phil. 415, 426, citations omitted.
138. Estipona v. Lobrigo, et al. , G.R. No. 226679, August 15, 2017, 816 Phil. 789,
800-806, citing: Section 5 (5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.
140. See: H. Villarica Pawnshop, Inc., et al. v. Social Security Commission, et al. ,
G.R. No. 228087, January 24, 2018, 824 Phil. 613, 633-634, citations omitted.
141. Swagman Hotels and Travel, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, et al. , G.R. No.
161135, April 8, 2005, 495 Phil. 161, 172, citations omitted.
142. See: Merryman, et al., The Civil Law Tradition (An Introduction to the Legal Systems
of Europe and Latin America), 3rd Ed., (2007), p. 1.
143. See: https://www.law.berkeley.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2017/11/CommonLawCivilLawTraditions.pdf (last accessed: May 1,
2020).
144. See: Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of Associate Justice (later Chief Justice)
Enrique M. Fernando in People v. Sabio, Sr., et al. , G.R. No. L-45490, November
20, 1978, 176 Phil. 212, 232, citations omitted.
145. The City of Davao, et al. v. The Regional Trial Court, Branch XII, Davao
City, et al., G.R. No. 127383, August 18, 2005, 504 Phil. 543, 560, citations
omitted.
146. See: Doerr, et al. v. Mobil Oil Corporation, et al. , 774 So.2d 119 (2000),
citations omitted.
147. Stare decisis et non quieta movere — stand by the decisions and disturb not what is
settled (see: Lazatin, et al. v. Desierto, et al. , G.R. No. 147097, June 5, 2009,
606 Phil. 271, 281-283, citations omitted.
148. See: United Coconut Planters Bank v. Spouses Uy , G.R. No. 204039, January
10, 2018, 823 Phil. 284, 293-295, citations omitted; Pepsi-Cola (Phils.), Inc. v.
Espiritu, et al., G.R. No. 150394, June 26, 2007, 552 Phil. 594, 599-600, citations
omitted.
149. See: Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation (Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System:
The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws),
1st Ed., (1997), p. 4.
152. See: Levine v. United States , 362 U.S. 610 (1960), citing: Offutt v. United
States, 348 U.S. 11 (1954).
153. An Act Amending Section Thirteen of Act Numbered Twenty-Six Hundred and Fifty-
Seven, Known as the "Administrative Code" (March 17, 1917).
154. See: People v. Soler , G.R. No. 45263, December 29, 1936, 63 Phil. 868, 871-872.
155. Bolos v. Bolos , G.R. No. 186400, October 20, 2010, 648 Phil. 630, 637, citations
omitted.
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156. Coca-Cola Bottlers, Phils., Inc. (CCBPI), Naga Plant v. Gomez, et al. , G.R.
No. 154491, November 14, 2008, 591 Phil. 642, 659, citations omitted.
157. See: Gamboa v. Teves, et al. , G.R. No. 176579, June 28, 2011, 668 Phil. 1, 37,
citations omitted.
161. Ting v. Velez-Ting , G.R. No. 166562, March 31, 2009, 601 Phil. 676, 690, citations
omitted.
162. See: De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council, et al. , G.R. No. 191002, April 20,
2010, 632 Phil. 657, 686, citations omitted.
163. See: Concurring Opinion of Senior Associate Justice Elias Finley Johnson in
Government of the Philippine Islands v. Spinger, et al. , No. 26979, April 1,
1927, 50 Phil. 259, 305.
164. Abello, et al. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, et al. , G.R. No. 120721,
February 23, 2005, 492 Phil. 303, 309, citations omitted.
165. Corpuz v. People , G.R. No. 180016, April 29, 2014, 734 Phil. 353, 416, citations
omitted.
166. Nippon Express (Philippines) Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, G.R. No. 196907, March 13, 2013, 706 Phil. 442, 450, citations omitted.
167. The evolution of any legal doctrine takes place slowly. Law normally changes that
way. Otherwise[,] the law would lack the stability necessary for ordinary citizens to
rely upon it in planning their lives. x x x (Breyer, The Court and the World
[American Law and the New Global Realities], 1st Ed. [2015], p. 15.).
168. Fetalino, et al. v. Commission on Elections , G.R. No. 191890, December 4,
2012, 700 Phil. 129, 153, citations omitted.
169. Primicias v. Ocampo, et al. , No. L-6120, June 30, 1953, 93 Phil. 446, 452,
citations omitted.
170. Cf. Hon. Cariño, et al. v. Commission on Human Rights, et al. , G.R. No.
96681, December 2, 1991, 281 Phil. 547, 562, citations omitted.
171. See: Victorio-Aquino v. Pacific Plans, Inc., et al. , G.R. No. 193108, December
10, 2014, 749 Phil. 790, 822.
172. Scalia, et al., Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts, 1st Ed. (2012), pp. 3-
5.
173. Tagle v. Equitable PCI Bank, et al. , G.R. No. 172299, April 22, 2008, 575 Phil.
384, 395-396, citations omitted.
174. Mitsubishi Motors Philippines Corporation v. Bureau of Customs , G.R. No.
209830, June 17, 2015, 760 Phil. 954, 960, citations omitted.
175. Philippine Migrants Rights Watch, Inc., et al. v. Overseas Workers Welfare
Administration, et al., G.R. No. 166923, November 26, 2014, 748 Phil. 348, 356,
citations omitted.
178. Includes initiative and referendum in the case of purely statutory rights and
obligations. . .
179. Reyes v. Lim, et al. , G.R. No. 134241, August 11, 2003, 456 Phil. 1, 10, citations
omitted.
180. Chavez v. Bonto-Perez, et al. , G.R. No. 109808, March 1, 1995, 312 Phil. 88, 98,
citations omitted.
181. Elcee Farms, Inc., et al. v. Semillano, et al. , G.R. No. 150286, October 17,
2003, 460 Phil. 81, 93, citations omitted.
182. University of the Philippines, et al. v. Dizon, et al. , G.R. No. 171182, August
23, 2012, 693 Phil. 226, 260-261, citations omitted; United Feature Syndicate,
Inc. v. Munsingwear Creation Manufacturing Company, G.R. No. 76193,
November 9, 1989, 258-A Phil. 841, 849, citations omitted.
183. Regulus Development, Inc. v. Dela Cruz , G.R. No. 198172, January 25, 2016,
779 Phil. 75, 86, citations omitted.
184. Atty. Gomez, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al. , G.R. No. 77770, December 15,
1988, 250 Phil. 504, 513.
185. Angeles, et al. v. Santos, et al. , G.R. No. 43413, August 31, 1937, 64 Phil. 697,
706-707.
186. Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, et al. , G.R.
No. 126805, March 16, 2000, 384 Phil. 828, 838, citations omitted.
187. Agcaoili v. Government Service Insurance System , G.R. No. L-30056, August
30, 1988, 247-A Phil. 74, 83.
188. Zubiri v. Quijano , G.R. No. 48696, November 28, 1942, 74 Phil. 47, 48.
190. Aragon, et al. v. Aragon, et al. , G.R. No. L-11472, March 30, 1959, 105 Phil.
365, 368.
191. Catigbac, et al. v. Leyesa, et al. , G.R. No. 18806, December 23, 1922, 44 Phil.
221, 223.
192. The Board of Directors and Election Committee of the SMB Workers
Savings and Loan Association, Inc., et al. v. Tan, et al., G.R. No. L-12282,
March 31, 1959, 105 Phil. 426, 430-431, citations omitted.
193. Armamento v. Guerrero , G.R. No. L-34228, February 21, 1980, 185 Phil. 115,
120-121.
194. Ramos v. Court of First Instance of Zamboanga Del Norte, et al. , G.R. Nos.
55245-46, December 19, 1984, 218 Phil. 530, 536.
195. Citybank, N.A. v. National Labor Relations Commission, et al. , G.R. No.
159302, August 22, 2008, 585 Phil. 83, 86-87, citations omitted; Moll v. Hon.
Buban, et al., G.R. No. 136974, August 27, 2002, 436 Phil. 627, 640, citations
omitted.
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
196. Genova v. De Castro , G.R. No. 132076, July 22, 2003, 454 Phil. 662, 677-678.
197. G.R. No. 62051, March 18, 1985, 220 Phil. 95, 98.
198. G.R. No. 170867, December 4, 2018, citations omitted.
202. See: Alta Vista Golf and Country Club v. City of Cebu, et al. , G.R. No. 180235,
January 20, 2016, 778 Phil. 685, 704, citations omitted.
203. Agra, et al. v. Philippine National Bank , G.R. No. 133317, June 29, 1999, 368
Phil. 829, 833.
208. Section 4 (a), Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
209. Section 4 (b), Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
214. Microsoft Corporation v. Manansala, et al. , G.R. No. 166391, October 21,
2015, 772 Phil. 14, 22, citations omitted.
218. People v. Dacudao, etc., et al. , G.R. No. 81389, February 21, 1989, 252 Phil.
507, 514.
219. People v. Antona, etc., et al. , G.R. No. 137681, January 31, 2002, 426 Phil. 151,
157, citations omitted.
220. Atty. Gacal v. Judge Infante, etc. , A.M. No. RTJ-04-1845 (Formerly A.M. No. IPI
No. 03-1831-RTJ), October 5, 2011, 674 Phil. 324, 340; Concerned Citizens v.
Judge Elma , A.M. No. RTJ-94-1183, February 6, 1995, 311 Phil. 99, 104, citations
omitted.
221. Go v. Court of Appeals, et al. , G.R. No. 106087, April 7, 1993, 293 Phil. 425,
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
447, citations omitted.
222. Basco v. Rapatalo, etc. , A.M. No. RTJ-96-1335, March 5, 1997, 336 Phil. 214, 233.
223. Narciso v. Sta. Romana-Cruz , G.R. No. 134504, March 17, 2000, 385 Phil. 208,
220, citations omitted.
224. See: People v. Cabral, etc., et al. , G.R. No. 131909, February 18, 1999, 362 Phil.
697, 709, 716-717, citations omitted.
225. Heirs of Teresita Villanueva v. Heirs of Petronila Syquia Mendoza , G.R. No.
209132, June 5, 2017, 810 Phil. 172, 177.
226. See: Lacson Hermanas, Inc. v. Heirs of Cenon Ignacio, et al. , G.R. No.
165973, June 29, 2005, 500 Phil. 673, 677, citations omitted.
227. Hiyas Savings and Loan Bank, Inc. v. Acuña, et al. , G.R. No. 154132, August
31, 2006, 532 Phil. 222, 228.
236. Signed by: Jail Director Allan Sullano Irial (Chief of the Bureau of Jail Management
and Penology); see also: Annexes A to G and H to H-41 of the April 21, 2020
Verified Report of the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology.
242. The Court expanded the efficacy of electronic filing criminal complaints and
informations, together with bail applications, to keep up with the executive
determination of the need to extend the period of the enhanced community
quarantine in critical regions of the country.
243. The Court ordered the pilot-testing of videoconference hearings on urgent matters
in criminal cases, including bail applications, in critical regions where the risk of
viral transmission is high.
244. The Court authorized the grant of reduced bail and recognizance to indigent PDLs
pending the continuation of the proceedings and the resolution of their cases.
245. Re: Updated Report on the Number of Persons Deprived of Liberty (PDLs) Released
from Custody (July 2, 2020).
246. Letter of Secretary Menardo I. Guevarra to Chief Justice Diosdado M. Peralta (June
15, 2020).
247. Prepared by: Assistant Parole Officer Laine Apple M. Gernale; reviewed and
endorsed by: Executive Director III Reynaldo G. Bayang.
248. RE: PENALTY FOR VIOLATION OF B.P. BLG. 22 (November 12, 2000); subsequently
clarified by: Administrative Circular No. 13-2001 (SUBJECT: CLARIFICATION OF
ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 12-2000 ON THE PENALTY FOR VIOLATION OF
BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 22, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE BOUNCING CHECK LAW
[February 14, 2001]).
250. An Act Authorizing the Court to Require Community Service in lieu of Imprisonment
for the Penalties of Arresto Menor and Arresto Mayor, amending for the purpose
Chapter 5, Title 3, Book I of Act No. 3815, as Amended, Otherwise Known as "The
Revised Penal Code" (August 8, 2019).
251. Section 2 of Republic Act No. 11362.
254. Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, et al. , G.R. No. 141284, August
15, 2000, 392 Phil. 618, 637-638.
256. Gerochi, et al. v. Department of Energy (DOE), et al. , G.R. No. 159796, July
17, 2007, 554 Phil. 563, 579, citations omitted.
257. See: JMM Promotion and Management, Inc., et al. v. Court of Appeals, et
al., G.R. No. 120095, August 5, 1996, 329 Phil. 87, 93-94, citations omitted.
258. Zabal, et al. v. Duterte, et al. , G.R. No. 238467, February 12, 2019, citations
omitted.
263. See: David v. Agbay, et al. , G.R. No. 199113, March 18, 2015, 756 Phil. 278, 292-
293.
266. See: Fortun, et al. v. Macapagal-Arroyo, et al. , G.R. No. 190293, March 20,
2012, 684 Phil. 526, 556-557, citing: Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution.
267. See: Churchill, et al. v. Rafferty , G.R. No. L-10572, December 21, 1915, 32 Phil.
580, 604, citations omitted; Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company v.
City of Davao, et al., G.R. No. L-23080, October 30, 1965 (With Resolution of
October 30, 1965), 122 Phil. 478, 490, citations omitted.
268. G.R. No. 88211, September 15, 1989, 258 Phil. 479, 504.
269. Representative Lagman, et al. v. Hon. Medialdea, et al. , G.R. No. 231658,
July 4, 2017, 812 Phil. 179, 324, citations omitted.
270. Proscription of Terrorist Organizations, Associations, or Groups of Persons. — Any
organization, association, or group of persons organized for the purpose of
engaging in terrorism, or which, although not organized for that purpose, actually
uses the acts to terrorize mentioned in this Act or to sow and create a condition of
widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace in order to
coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand shall, upon application of
the Department of Justice before a competent Regional Trial Court, with due notice
and opportunity to be heard given to the organization, association, or group of
persons concerned, be declared as a terrorist and outlawed organization,
association, or group of persons by the said Regional Trial Court.
The application shall be filed with an urgent prayer for the issuance of a
preliminary order of proscription. No application for proscription shall be filed
without the authority of the ATC upon the recommendation of the National
Intelligence Coordinating Agency (NICA)."
273. See: Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc., et al. v. Anti-
Terrorism Council, et al., G.R. No. 178552, October 5, 2010, 646 Phil. 452, 475.
274. The Anti-Terrorism Act of 2020 (July 3, 2020).
275. Golangco v. Atty. Fung , G.R. No. 147640, October 12, 2006, 535 Phil. 331, 341,
citations omitted.
276. Soplente v. People , G.R. No. 152715, July 29, 2005, 503 Phil. 241, 242, quoting:
Samuel Butler.
277. See: Calalang v. Williams, et al. , G.R. No. 47800, December 2, 1940, 70 Phil.
726, 735.
278. G.R. No. L-543, August 31, 1946, 77 Phil. 192, 205-206.
279. Id. at 295.
280. See: Tañada v. Yulo, et al. , G.R. No. L-43575, May 31, 1935, 61 Phil. 515, 519.
n Note from the Publisher: Copied verbatim from the official document. Discrepancy
between words and figures