Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Xiv Anish and Arjun Memorial Moot Court, 2022 B T H O: Efore HE On'Ble High C F Madras
Xiv Anish and Arjun Memorial Moot Court, 2022 B T H O: Efore HE On'Ble High C F Madras
ANISHA SHARMA………………………………………...APPELLANT
Versus
Table of Contents
Statement of Fact
Index of Authorities
Summary of Arguments
Argument Advanced
VI. Prayer. 26
Statement of Facts
ISSUES RAISED
1. Whether Offence Committed By Anisha Satisfies The Provisions of section 328 of IPC?
4. Whether FIR lodged by Bhawna after Two months of the incident is Valid?
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
TABLE OF CASES
27. Kedar NathB hajoria v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1954 SC 660. 25
28. Khatri (II) v. State of Bihar, 1981 SCC (Cri) 228. 19
29. Kutuhgli Yadav v. State of Bihar, AIR 1954 SC 720. 25
30. Lakshmi Raj Seth v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1958 SC 1274. 25
31. Lala Ram @ Lala v. State (N.C.T.), 1999 (51) DRJ 52. 23
32. Llewelyn Evans Re, ILR 50 Bom. 19
33. Madhavan Pillai, 1966 Cri. L. J. 728 at 731. 24
34. Madhu Limaye In Re, (1969) 1 SCC 292. 19
35. Maganlal Radha Krishan v. Emperor, AIR 1946 Nag. 126. 17
36. Major E.G. Barsay, A.I.R.1961 S.C. 1761. 20
37. Mal Singh And Ors. v. State Of Rajasthan, 1995 CriLJ 2279. 23
38. Mangaleshwar Prasad v. State of Bihar, AIR 1954 SC 715. 25
39. Mobarik Ali Ahmed v. State of Bombay, AIR 1957 SC 857. 20
40. Mohammed Ajmal Mohammad Amir Kasab @ Abu Mujahid v. State Of Maharashtra,
Criminal appeal nos.1899-1900 of 2011. 17
41. Nabi Baksh, (1897) 25 Cal. 416. 24
42. P.L. Jaitly v. Chief Justice, Allahabad, AIR 1945 Oudh 226. 20
43. Padala Veera Reddy v. State of A.P. and Others, AIR (1990) SC 79. 25
44. Parbhu v. Emperor, AIR 1944 PC 73. 20
45. Parshadi v. State of U.P., AIR 1957 SC 21. 25
46. Prabhoo v. Emperor, AIR 1941 All. 402. 19
47. Queen v. Horh Nala, 1941 ALJ 416. 25
48. Rajesh Govind Jagesha v. State Of Maharashtra, Appeal (crl.) 737 of 1997. 23
49. Ramji Lal Modi v. State of U.P., AIR 1957 SC 620. 13
50. Ram Bharose v. State of U.P,. AIR 1954 SC 704. 25
51. Re, Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 SCR 217. 13
52. S.P. Bhatnagar v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1979 SC 826. 25
53. Satish Chandra Rai v. JoduNandan Singh, ILR 26 Cal 748. 19
54. Sharad Birdichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1984 SC 1622. 25
55. Sheela Barse v. State Of Maharashtra, 1983 AIR 378. 19
56. Shoukat Hussain Guru v. State (Nct) Delhi & Anr, 17
57. Smt. Jamni v. The State, 1995 CriLJ 3071. 23
58. State (N.C.T. of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu, 2005 Cri. L.J. 3950 (S.C.). 16
59. State of H.P. v. Krishna Lal, 1987Cri. L.J. 709 (S.C.). 24
60. State of Kerala v. Amemu, 1988 Cr. L.J. 107. 25
61. State Of Madhya Pradesh v. Shobharam And Ors, Criminal Appeal No. 20 of 1965. 19
62. State of U.P. v. Ashok Kumar, AIR 1992 SC 840. 25
63. State v. Barton, 71 MO 288, 296. 19
64. State v. Chotey Lal & Others, ILR 1999 Delhi 455. 23
65. Suk Das v. Union territory of Arunanchal Pradesh, 1986 SCC (Cri) 166. 19
66. Tara Singh v. State, 1951 S.C.R. 729. 19
67. Tarseem Kumar v. Delhi Administration, Appeal (crl.) 212 of 1981. 22
68. The State Of Punjab v. Ajaib Singh And Anotherr, 1953 AIR 10. 19
69. U.S. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). 13
70. Udaybhanshuki v. State of U.P., 1999 Cri LJ 274 (All). 18
71. Union Of India (Uoi) v. Paul Manickam And Anr, AIR 2003 SC 4622. 19
72. Will v State, 12 GA 444, 449. 19
73. Woolmington v. D.P.P., 1935 A.C. 462. 19
74. Yogeshkumar Pramodrai Brahmin v. State Of Gujarat, (2000) GLR 777. 23
Constitution of India. 18
Hallbach Penal Code. 17, 23
Special Court Act. 19
National Security Act, 1980 15
Indian Penal Code, 1860. 17
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. 10,17
The Indian Evidence Act, 1872. 21
British Museum Act, 1963 11
UNESCO convention on the means of prohibiting and preventing the illicit export and
transfer of ownership of cultural properties, 1970, UN.11806. 11
BOOKS REFERRED
O'CONNELL, “State Succession”, VOL. I, Cambridge University Press. 11, 12
MALCOLM N. SHAW, “International Law”, 5th edition, Cambridge University
Press. 12
RATAN LAL & DHIRAJ LAL, “The Indian Penal Code”, Student Edition, Lexis
Nexis. 16
S.N. MISHRA, “The Indian Penal Code”,19th Edition, Central Law Publication. 16
R.V. KELKAR, “Criminal Procedure”, 6th Edition, Eastern Book Company. 18
BATUK LAL, “The law of Evidence”, 21st Edition, Central Law Agency. 10, 20, 25
DR. R.K. SINHA, “The transfer of Property Act”, 17th Ed, Central Law Publication.
11
DR. H.O. AGARWAL, “International Law and Human Rights”, 21st Edition, Central
Law Publication.
12
INTERNATIONAL TREATIES AND CONVENTIONS
African Charter on Human Rights and the Right of Nations, October 21, 1986. 19
American Convention on Human Rights, Res. 448, U.N. Reg. 17955. B-32, July 18,
1978. 19
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI)
December 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. 17
ARTICLES
“The law of annexed territories”, James Lowndes: source- Political Science Quarterly, Vol.
XI, No. 4, Dec. 1896 , pg. 672-693.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Federal Court that that the charges placed on
Anisha (accused) is valid. If the Sections 376D and 34 are read together, it gives us the clear
picture of how the accused can be charged for the grievous offence of Rape, here accused is a
women and it is well known fact that the Provisions of Rape in Indian Penal Code is based on
the principle of vaginal penetration by a man and women to women rape is an impossible
event. But I argue that though Women cannot be accused for committing rape directly but the
punishment given for such offence should be given to the accused women, just because she
facilitated the act of rape. This can be made more clearer if Section 376D is read with Sec
34 of IPC in which “Section 376D says that if a woman is raped by one or more persons
acting in furtherance of common intention, each person shall be deemed to have committed
rape1” and “Section 34 says that When a criminal act is done by several persons in
furtherance of the common intention of all, each of such persons is liable for that act in the
same manner as if it were done by him alone2”.
So according to the provisions of 376D and 34, here the common intention of all was to make
Bhawna intoxicated and to commit rape, for which the plan was done from the beginning, so
out of 4 people i.e., Anisha Sharma, Chitransh Rawat, Devansh Rai and Faiz, even if one
person has committed the rape, then each of such person is liable for Rape in the same
manner, irrespective of the gender. Here, liable for rape does not mean Anisha raped Bhawna,
Anisha was the sole person who is responsible for the Rape to be happened, thus should be
punished according to Section 376D. This can be made strong with Barendra Kumar Ghosh
v. King Emperor3 case here the appellant was standing outside with pistol and postmaster
was shot dead by other accused. His defence was that he was just standing outside the door
and had not shot at the postmaster, but this was not accepted by the court. and it was said that
even the person who stands and wait outside will be charged for the offence. “Now imagine a
situation: There are five persons, one of them is amputated with both the hands, decide to kill
1
Section 376D of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
2
Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
3
(1925) 27 BOMLR 148 - https://indiankanoon.org/doc/979031/
a man. Four go inside the room and stab the man and fifth person, amputated with both the
hands stands outside do nothing. Question arises whether person who is amputated with both
hands, cannot even hold knife, can be charged for committing murder 4” off-course he can be
charged according to the judgment of Barendra kumar ghosh vs. King Emperor.
Hence, as in the present case, Anisha is a women like the person amputated with both hands
and it is impossible event to commit a rape to another women but she is absolutely liable for
the offence as how in the Barendra Kumar Ghosh case said that even though the accused was
standing outside the door and did not shot but was equally liable for the offence committed
by another. Now, here the accused Anisha sharma should be held liable for the grievous
offence done by her, and the accused cannot escape from the punishment using the loophole
that she is a women, she cannot be charged for rape and provisions of rape mentions only the
men. In the Supreme Court case of “Dhananjay Chatterjee vs State Of W.B. – it was held that
the measure of punishment in a given case must depend upon the atrocity of the crime;
the conduct of the criminal and the defenceless and unprotected state of the victim and the
courts must not only keep in view the rights of the criminal but also the rights of the
victim of crime and the society at large 5”. Hence, Rape is a Grievous offence and non-
bailable offence, the Honourable Court should consider this as rape and reject Bail
application.
4
A Case Comment on Priya Patel Case (2006) 6 SCC 263
5
Dhananjay Chatterjee vs State Of W.B. - https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1328822/
A Case comment on
Priya Patel v. State of
M.P.
(2006) 6 SCC 263
A Case comment on
Priya Patel v. State of
M.P.
(2006) 6 SCC 263
Z. PRESENT CASE DOES NOT SATISFY THE PRINCIPLES TO GRANT BAIL
AND TO BE REJECTED.
The Supreme Court case CBI vs. Amarmani Tripathi 6, which mentions about the well settled
principles of matters to be considered in an application for bail,
So the First step is to check whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to believe
that the accused had committed the offence – hence as per the facts and arguments made, it is
easily evident that the allegation placed on the accused is an grievous offence i.e., rape which
is an non bailable offence and Anisha is the one who facilitated the whole incident without
any doubt based on the facts and circumstances. Hence, it satisfies the first step.
Secondly, nature and gravity of the charge – Section 376D, 34, 328, and 506 are the charges
placed before, out of this 376D and 328 are non bailable offences, 506 & 34 are bailable
offences but here the offence made here is grave offence, hence accused is liable for the
maximum punishment according to the sections which eventually satisfies to reject the bail.
Thirdly, severity of the punishment in the event of conviction – in case of 376D accused shall
be punished with rigorous imprisonment which may extend to life; in case of 328 – accused
shall be punished with imprisonment which may extend to ten years, 506 - which may extend
to seven years. Hence, the severity of punishment is high against the accused.
Fourthly, danger of the accused absconding or fleeing – there is high chances of absconding
because accused knows the seriousness of the case and if she gets convicted then she has to
spend her whole life inside the jail and as a college student she will have more fear inside her,
so any person would do is absconding and to escape from the case.
Fifthly, character, behaviour, means, position and standing of the accused – to be simply
answered, offences done by them and charges placed on them is more than enough to decide
their character, behaviour etc…
Sixthly, likelihood of the offence being repeated – Probability of repeating the offence is
more in this case because the format or procedure used here in this case shows the experience
like for example choosing an innocent woman so that she can be easily threatened and
dominated, creating whatsapp group, intoxicating her, taking her phone in a pre-planned
manner. So it is obvious that the offence will be repeated.
6
State Through C.B.I vs Amaramani Tripathi on 26 September, 2005 - https://indiankanoon.org/doc/288878/
And lastly, danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant of bail – as already discussed
offence committed and charges placed on the accused is severe which extends up to life
imprisonment and its a sensitive issue which includes women who was sexually harassed and
turned her life upside down. Fair Justice is mandatory for Sexual offence victim, Prima facie
the applicant has actively administered the offence and conspired with co-accused to commit
the offence.
In Criminal cases, keeping the defense that FIR has been lodged delay is a common or
stereotyped defense placed in recent times. And it is very commonly known fact that “there
would be some delay in furnishing the first information to the police. It must be remembered
that law has not fixed any time for lodging the FIR. Hence a delayed FIR is not illegal7”.
The present case is related to the rape which is a grievous and non-bailable offence and delay
in lodging the FIR does not affect the case (supported in the case of State of Rajasthan vs.
Om Prakash8). Because here, it includes the reputation of the family and Career of a Child is
at stake. Here, Bhawna who is from normal family and who cannot even afford for something
more than an essential living, so Bhawna who is the victim cannot be expected to disclose the
incident happened to her which will break the whole family into pieces and due to which
Bhawna was affected mentally and left her studies because of the incident happened to her
and betrayal by her friends. Bhawna suffered for almost two months and only then Bhawna
had the courage to tell her parents and it is not at all unnatural for the family members to take
time when the offence of this nature is committed before taking a decision to lodge a report
with the police. The reputation and prestige of the family and the career and life of a young
women is involved It is then that Bhawna Singh, along with her parents, went to the police
station and registered the FIR against Anisha Sharma, Chitransh Rawat, Devansh Rai and
Faiz. The delay in reporting the matter to the police has thus been fully explained.
Section 506 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 talks about the criminal Intimidation and the main
requirement of the offence is threatening of the victim by the offender. “When a person is
induced by threat to perform any act or abstain from any act which he is not legally bound to
do or omit, it is termed as criminal intimidation. However, for it to be termed as an offence,
the offender shall have had the intention to harm either the victim himself/herself, or any
other person9”. The intention is an important ingrediant, and it should exist in the offender’s
mind even if he cannot execute it. Therefore, in the present case, next day after the incident
i.e., on 7.12.2021, Anisha Sharma, Chitransh Rawat and Devansh Rai called Bhawna the
prosecutrix that she must not disclose anything regarding the incident which occurred on the
night of 06.12.2021 and further threatened Bhawna of dire consequences. Here, Anisha
7
Ravinder Kumar and another vs the State of Punjab - https://indiankanoon.org/doc/99351/
8
The Supreme Court held that the delay does not necessarily affect the case of the prosecution as it is related to
the rape, where the reputation of a family and career of a child is at stake.
9
Section 506 - https://indiankanoon.org/doc/180217/
induced by threat to abstain Bhawna from not telling anyone about the Rape, and clearly
Anisha had the intention to cause harm to Bhawna right from the creation of whats app
group, planning for House party, making her to drink more, taking her Mobile Phone and
Pain on Private Parts – all these sequence gives us the picture about the Anisha’s intention.
And as a result, which became a life threat to the prosecutrix and lodged a First information
report against Anisha and others. Additionally, present case satisfies the three Ingredients
specified in the Supreme Court case – ‘Vikram Johar Vs. State of UP10’.
Based on the facts and circumstances, it is a heinous crime against a society and has a long
effect on the mind of victim. The victim must go through a serious emotional trauma and
physical suffering. Even in the case Farhan Ahmad (Shanu) v. State of Uttar Pradesh – the
Allahabad High court has refused bail to man, who is accused of raping a women man after
giving her false promise of marriage allegedly pressuring her to change her religion as a
condition to marry her. For which Justice Om Prakash Tripathi said that "There is serious
allegation of rape against the applicant with the victim, in these circumstances, the applicant
is not entitled to be released on bail 11" the Court said. In the present case, issue present here is
more serious than the cited case and clearly granting of Bail is impossible according to the
present facts and circumstances.
Section 328 of Indian Penal Code, 1840 can be easily interpreted as per the instructions
mentioned in the Supreme Court case – Joseph Kurain Vs. State of kerala 12 which will give us
the clarity on the present issue. Firstly, In order to prove offence under Section 328 the
prosecution is required to prove that the substance in question was a poison, or any
stupefying, intoxicating or unwholesome drug, etc., that the accused administered the
substance to the complainant or caused the complainant to take such substance, here in this
case, it is proved according to the facts that Anisha caused Bhawna to take further drinks and
10
i) That the accused threatened some person.
(ii) That such threat consisted of some injury to his person.
(iii) That he did so with intent to cause alarm to that person; or to cause that person to do any act which he was
not legally bound to do or omit to do any act which he was legally entitled to do as a means of avoiding the
execution of such threat.
11
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/allahabad/allahabad-hc-denies-bail-to-man-accused-of-raping-
threatening-victim-to-convert-for-marriage/articleshow/88796741.cms
12
1995 AIR, 4 1994 SCC (6) 535
she did so with intent to cause hurt or knowing it to be likely that she would thereby cause
hurt, or with the intention to commit or facilitate the commission of an offence. Now, on that
basis Anisha directly administered Bhawna to go for further drinks and took Bhawna’s Phone
with her so that she cannot call or text anyone in case if anything happens. As a result,
Bhawna was raped which is one of the grave offences which should not happen for a woman.
This incident made her to stop her studies for two months and went to psychiatrist for the
mental trauma she went through during the period. Hence, Anisha had the intent to cause hurt
to Bhawna through intoxicating and to facilitate the commission of an offence i.e., Rape
basically. Everything was pre planned and executed by the accused. This makes us clear that
Anisha made a non bailable offence and liable for 10 years imprisonment, hence no Bail.
In the High Court case - Shardulbhai Lakhmanbhai vs State of Gujarat 13, it held that looking
at the gravity of the offences, the bail can be rejected in cases where the charge sheet has
been filed on the merits of the case. Hence there is no rule that bail must be granted if the
charge sheet is filed, it is discretion of the courts to decide based on the facts and
circumstances. In the present case, Charge sheet was filed on 15/03/2022, but here the
offence charged on the accused is a grave or serious offence which extends up to
punishment of Life Imprisonment (Section 376 of IPC and Section 328 which is non-
bailable offence). And Rape is one of the grievous offences which violates the Human
rights of Women, in which Bail application should be rejected undoubtedly. And accused
has been kept in Custody for almost 2 months, as offence committed is grave,
“irrespective of the number of the accused or alleged role played should be rejected and
all such persons should be kept behind the bar till the trial” 14. Hence, the above arguments
made from the side of prosecution will help the honorable court to decide accordingly.
13
1990 CriLJ 1275, (1989) 2 GLR 666 GJ - https://indiankanoon.org/doc/113205/
14
Salimbhai Abdulgaffar Shaikh vs State Of Gujarat - https://indiankanoon.org/doc/975792/
PRAYER
Wherefore, in the light of the facts stated, issues raised, authorities cited and arguments
advanced, the Counsel for the Respondent humbly submits that the Hon’ble High Court to
adjudicate:
Hold
1. That the investigation and trial was consistent with the process of law.
2. That the arrest and subsequent prosecution of Jupiter Hestia was consistent with the
process of law.
3. That the acquittal of Dr. Ares for theft was invalid.
Declare
The court may also pass any other order as it may deem fit, in the interest of justice, Equity
and Good Conscience.
S/D-………………………………