THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 210161. January 10, 2018.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

BIENVINIDO UDANG, SR. y SEVILLA, 1 accused-appellant.

DECISION

LEONEN, J : p

A single act may give rise to multiple offenses. Thus, charging an

accused with rape, under the Revised Penal Code, and with sexual abuse,
under Republic Act No. 7610, in case the offended party is a child 12 years
old and above, will not violate the right of the accused against double
jeopardy. HTcADC

This resolves an appeal from the October 9, 2013 Decision 2 of the

Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 01032 affirming the conviction of
accused-appellant, Bienvinido Udang, Sr. y Sevilla (Udang), for two (2)
counts of rape defined under Article 266-A, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal
Code. 3 Udang was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua on
both counts and ordered to pay the private complainant civil indemnity,
moral damages, and exemplary damages.
On December 8, 2005, two (2) Informations for child abuse were filed
against Udang before the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City. The
first was docketed as Family Case No. 2006-140, the accusatory portion of
which read:
The undersigned Prosecutor II accuses BIENVINIDO UDANG for
the crime of CHILD ABUSE, committed as follows:
That in the later of December, 2003, at more or less
9:00 o'clock in the evening, at Lumbia, Cagayan de Oro
City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and sexually abuse
one [AAA], 14 yrs. old, minor by committing the following
acts, to wit: accused together with Bienvinido Udang, Jr.,
Betty Udang and the offended party dr[a]nk three (3)
bottles of pocket size of [T]anduay rum in the house of
the accused and when offended party became
intoxicated, accused brought and carried her inside the
room and undressed her by removing her . . . clothes and
panty and accused placed himself on top of her and have
sexual intercourse with offended party herein, which acts
of the accused had clearly debased, degraded or
demeaned the intrinsic worth and dignity of the said
minor as a human being.
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 Contrary to and in Violation of Article 266-A in relation to Sec. 5
(b) of R.A. 7610. 4
The second Information, docketed as Family Case No. 2006-141, read:
The undersigned Prosecutor II accuses BIENVINIDO UDANG for
the crime of CHILD ABUSE, committed as follows:
That in the later part of September, 2002, at more
or less 9:00 o'clock in the evening, at Lumbia, Cagayan de
Oro City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously, and sexually abuse
one [AAA], 14 yrs. old, minor by committing the following
acts, to wit: accused together with his [daughter] Betty
Udang, Renato Yana and the offended party dr[a]nk five
(5) bottles of pocket size [T]anduay rum in the house of
the accused and when offended party became
intoxicated, accused brought her inside his room, her
clothings (sic) were removed and then and there accused
placed himself on top of her and have sexual intercourse
with the offended party herein, which acts of the accused
had clearly debased, degraded or demeaned the intrinsic
worth and dignity of the said minor as a human being.
Contrary to and in Violation of Article 266-A in relation to Sec. 5
(b) of R.A. 7610. 5
Udang pleaded not guilty to both charges during his arraignment on
June 26, 2006. 6 Joint trial then ensued.
Testimonies from prosecution witnesses, private complainant, AAA, and
Dr. Darlene T. Revelo (Dr. Revelo) of the Department of Obstetrics and
Gynecology of the Northern Mindanao Medical Center, Cagayan de Oro City,
proved the following version of the facts.
One evening in September 2002, AAA, then 12 years old, 7 drank
alcoholic beverages with Udang's children, her neighbors: Betty Udang
(Betty) and Bienvinido Udang, Jr. (Bienvinido, Jr.), at their house in Lumbia,
Cagayan de Oro City. 8
After drinking five (5) bottles of Tanduay rum, AAA became intoxicated.
She later realized that she was being carried by Udang into a dark room
where he laid her on the bed, undressed her, and started kissing her. 9
Udang then went on top of AAA and inserted his penis into her vagina. 10 aScITE

After the incident, Udang went out to report for duty as barangay
tanod while AAA remained inside his house as she was still too weak to
move. 11
One (1) year and three (3) months after, in December 2003, AAA, who
by then was already 13 years old, again had some drinks at Udang's house.
This time, she was with Bienvinido, Jr. and Udang himself. When AAA felt
sleepy, she went into one (1) of the rooms inside the house. 12 While AAA
was lying in bed, Udang, who had followed her into the room, went on top of
her, undressed her, and inserted his penis into her vagina until he
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 ejaculated. 13 After having sexual intercourse with AAA, Udang went out to
report for duty as barangay tanod. AAA, too tired, remained lying in bed. 14
On April 14, 2004, AAA had herself physically examined by Dr. Revelo
at the Northern Mindanao Medical Center in Cagayan de Oro City. Dr. Revelo
found that AAA had hymenal lacerations in the 4, 7, and 10 o'clock positions,
15 as well as "excoriations" or reddish superficial scratched marks between
her thighs and genitalia. 16 According to Dr. Revelo, these lacerations "could
have been caused by trauma, frictions, infections, and also sexual
intercourse." 17 Although in AAA's case, the hymenal lacerations were old
and already healed. 18
The defense presented as witnesses Udang and his daughter, Betty.
Monera Gandawali (Gandawali) and Emirald Orcales (Orcales), fellow
inmates of AAA at the Cagayan de Oro City Jail, also testified in Udang's
defense. Their testimonies proved the following version of the facts.
Udang's daughter, Betty, denied drinking with AAA in September 2002.
She also belied the claim that her father, Udang, and her brother, Bienvinido,
Jr., had drinks with AAA in December 2003. However, she alleged that AAA
once went to their house to invite her to sniff some rugby, an offer which she
refused. She maintained that AAA only wanted to get back at her father for
having AAA arrested after she was caught grappling with Betty's
grandmother because the latter tried to stop AAA from sniffing rugby inside
Udang's house. 19
After Udang caused the arrest of AAA for sniffing rugby, 20 AAA was
detained at the Cagayan de Oro City Jail where she, Gandawali, and Orcales,
became fellow inmates. 21
Gandawali testified that sometime in 2007, she had the chance to talk
to AAA when the latter became anxious for receiving a subpoena to testify in
the cases she filed against Udang. During their conversation, AAA disclosed
that she was never actually raped by Udang and that it was actually her
stepfather who wanted to implicate him. 22
For her part, Orcales testified that she did not know Udang personally.
She claimed that she only knew Udang when AAA divulged her desire to
write to Udang and ask for his forgiveness. AAA likewise disclosed to Orcales
that it was not Udang but a security guard who had raped her and that it
was AAA's mother who had forced her to testify against Udang in retaliation
for her arrest for sniffing rugby. 23
In his defense, Udang denied ever raping AAA. He testified that he was
at home with his mother and other siblings at the time of the alleged
incident in September 2002. As for the alleged second incident in December
2003, Udang claimed that he was again at home with his mother and
siblings, Susan Udang and Cito Udang. He asserted that at 9:00 p.m., he
reported for duty as barangay tanod with his colleagues, Ruel Labis and
Carlo Banianon. Udang saw no reason for AAA to falsely charge him with
rape since no animosity existed between them. 24
Branch 22, Regional Trial Court, Cagayan de Oro City found for the
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 prosecution and convicted Udang of rape under Article 266-A (1) of the
Revised Penal Code, 25 instead of sexual abuse under Section 5 (b) of
Republic Act No. 7610. 26 It ratiocinated that while the allegations in the first
and second Informations satisfied the elements of rape under the first and
third paragraphs of Article 266-A, respectively, the charges can only be one
(1) for rape under the first paragraph of Article 266-A because "[an] accused
cannot be prosecuted twice for a single criminal act." 27
The trial court found that the prosecution "indubitably established" 28
Udang's act of raping AAA since she "categorically narrated" 29 how he took
advantage of her while she was intoxicated and that had she resisted his
advances, she would be mauled by Betty. That AAA was raped was also
supported by Dr. Revelo's finding of hymenal lacerations and excoriations on
AAA's thighs and genitalia. 30
The trial court did not give credence to Udang's defense of denial and
alibi, stating that he could have requested his family members and fellow
barangay tanods, who were allegedly with him at the time of the incidents,
to corroborate his testimony but that he failed to do so. Without the
corroborating testimony of these alleged companions, his testimony was, for
the trial court, "self-serving and unworthy to be believed." 31 HEITAD

The trial court likewise discounted Gandawali's and Orcales'

testimonies for being hearsay. 32 As for Betty, the trial court found her
testimony "bare" 33 and "unsupported by evidence." 34
In the Regional Trial Court March 12, 2012 Joint Decision, 35 Udang was
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua on both counts of rape
under the first paragraph of Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code. He was
also ordered to pay AAA civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary
damages. The dispositive portion of this Decision read:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered[,] judgment is
hereby rendered finding the accused BIENVINIDO UDANG y SEVILLA:
1. GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape as
defined and penalized under Article 266-A, Par. 1 of the Revised Penal
Code in FC-Criminal Case No. 2006-140 and is hereby sentenced to
suffer imprisonment of reclusion perpetua, and to pay "AAA"
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages and
P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
2. GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape as
defined and penalized under Article 266-A, Par. 1 of the Revised Penal
Code in FC-Criminal Case No. 2006-141 and is hereby sentenced to
suffer imprisonment of reclusion perpetua, and to pay "AAA"
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 n as moral damages and
P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED. 36 (Emphasis in the original)
Udang appealed before the Court of Appeals, maintaining that he did
not rape AAA. He also claimed that the judge who penned the Decision,
Judge Richard D. Mordeno (Judge Mordeno), was not the judge who
personally heard the witnesses testify and was not able to observe their
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 demeanor during trial. 37 Udang argued that Judge Mordeno, therefore, was
not in the position to rule on the credibility of AAA, given her "unbelievable
story" 38 of rape.
Udang emphasized that AAA's testimony was not credible for if she was
allegedly raped in his house in September 2002, she would not have gone to
the same house to have drinks with her supposed rapist a year after, in
December 2003, on the risk of being raped again. 39 He highlighted AAA's ill
motive against him for having caused her detention in the Cagayan de Oro
City Jail for sniffing rugby in his house. 40 Finally, he emphasized that Dr.
Revelo's testimony established that the lacerations found in AAA's genitalia
could have been caused by trauma other than rape. 41
In its ruling, the Court of Appeals found that although Judge Mordeno
was not the one who conducted trial, Udang's guilt was nonetheless proven
beyond reasonable doubt based on the records of the case and AAA's
"categorical, convincing and consistent" testimony. 42
That AAA returned to Udang's house a year after she was allegedly
raped was, for the Court of Appeals, not as bizarre as Udang would make it
appear. The Court of Appeals reasoned that "there is no standard form of
behavior that can be expected of rape victims after they have been defiled
because people react differently to emotional stress." 43
Finally, the Court of Appeals rejected Udang's claim that AAA charged
him with rape as vengeance for her arrest for sniffing rugby. It explained
that "ill motives become inconsequential if there is an affirmative and
credible declaration from the rape victim which clearly established the
liability of the accused." 44
Thus, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court Decision in toto and
dismissed Udang's appeal in its October 9, 2013 Decision, 45 the dispositive
portion of which read:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DISMISSED.
The March 12, 2012 Joint Decision of the Regional Trial Court, 10th
Judicial Region, Branch 22 of Cagayan de Oro City in FC Criminal Case
Nos. 2006-140 and 2006-141 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED. 46 (Emphasis in the original)
The case was brought on appeal before this Court through a Notice of
Appeal filed on October 23, 2013. 47 In its February 26, 2014 Resolution, 48
this Court directed the parties to file their respective supplemental briefs.
In their respective manifestations, the Office of the Solicitor General, 49
representing the People of the Philippines, and accused-appellant Udang 50
requested this Court to treat their appeal briefs filed before the Court of
Appeals as their appeal briefs before this Court. This Court noted the parties'
respective manifestations in its July 7, 2014 Resolution 51 and the case was
considered submitted for decision.
Udang denies ever raping AAA and maintains his innocence, just as he
did before the Court of Appeals. For him, AAA is not a credible witness and
her story of rape is unbelievable. He claims that AAA should not have
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 returned to his house a year after the alleged first incident to have drinks
with him and his son, Bienvinido, Jr., had he really raped her. He also
emphasizes how the rape charges were made only after he caused AAA's
arrest for sniffing rugby in his house. He points out how two (2) of AAA's
fellow inmates in the Cagayan de Oro City Jail, Gandawali and Orcales, even
attested to his innocence based on AAA's confession that he did not rape
her. Thus, the accused prays for his acquittal. ATICcS

In its Brief for the Appellee, 52 the Office of the Solicitor General argues
that Udang was correctly convicted of two (2) counts of rape punished under
Article 266-A (1) of the Revised Penal Code. It claims that "testimonies of
child-victims of rape are to be given full weight and credence" 53 because "a
girl of tender years," 54 like AAA at the time of the reported incidents, "is
unlikely to impute to any man a crime so serious as rape, if what she claims
is not true." 55 It adds that "when a woman, more so when she is a minor,
says she has been raped, she says in effect all that is required to prove the
ravishment." 56
The principal issue for this Court's resolution is whether or not accused-
appellant, Bienvinido Udang, Sr. y Sevilla, was correctly convicted of rape
punished under the first paragraph of Article 266-A of the Revised Penal
Code.
The appeal is affirmed with modification. Based on the Informations,
Udang was charged with two (2) counts of sexual abuse punished under
Section 5 (b) of Republic Act No. 7610. Hence, he could only be convicted of
sexual abuse under the Informations filed in this case and not for rape under
the Revised Penal Code. Furthermore, upon examination of the evidence
presented, this Court finds Udang guilty of two (2) counts of sexual abuse.
Thus, the penalty erroneously imposed on him — reclusion perpetua for each
count of rape — should be reduced accordingly.

Udang attempts to raise doubt in his conviction because the judge who
penned the trial court decision, Judge Mordeno, was not the judge who heard
the parties and their witnesses during trial. For Udang, Judge Mordeno was in
no position to rule on the credibility of the witnesses, specifically, of AAA, not
having observed the manner by which the witnesses testified.
Ideally, the same trial judge 57 should preside over all the stages of the
proceedings, especially in cases where the conviction or acquittal of the
accused mainly relies on the credibility of the witnesses. The trial judge
enjoys the opportunity to observe, first hand, "the aids for an accurate
determination" 58 of the credibility of a witness "such as the witness'
deportment and manner of testifying, the witness' furtive glance, blush of
conscious shame, hesitation, flippant or sneering tone, calmness, sigh, or the
scant or full realization of an oath." 59
However, inevitable circumstances — the judge's death, retirement,
resignation, transfer, or removal from office — may intervene during the
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 pendency of the case. 60 An example is the present case, where the trial
judge who heard the witnesses, Judge Francisco D. Calingin (Judge Calingin),
compulsorily retired pending trial. 61 Judge Calingin was then replaced by
Judge Mordeno, who proceeded with hearing the other witnesses and writing
the decision. Udang's argument cannot be accepted as this would mean that
every case where the judge had to be replaced pending decision would have
to be refiled and retried so that the judge who hears the witnesses testify
and the judge who writes the decision would be the same. 62 What Udang
proposes is impracticable.
As early as 1915, this Court ruled in United States v. Abreu 63 that in
the absence of a law expressly prohibiting a judge from deciding a case
where evidence was already taken, no such prohibition may be implied. In
Abreu, Judge Jose C. Abreu (Judge Abreu) refused to resolve a case where
the witnesses were already heard by the former presiding judge who had
resigned, arguing that the witnesses were heard by a judge whose authority
had been superseded by the then newly enacted Act No. 2347.
In rejecting Judge Abreu's argument, this Court held that the legislature
could not have intended to render void all the acts undertaken by judges
prior to the enactment of Act No. 2347. 64 According to this Court, Act No.
2347's purpose was "simply to change the personnel of the judges" 65 and
that it specifically provided that all cases and judicial proceedings pending
decision or sentence under the jurisdiction of the old courts shall be
continued until their final decision. 66
Further, this Court explained that with the existence of the transcript of
records, which are presumed to be a "complete, authentic record of
everything that transpires during the trial," 67 there is "little reason for
asserting that one qualified person may not be able to reach a just and fair
conclusion from [the] record as well as another." 68 Thus, it compelled Judge
Abreu to proceed with deciding the cases where evidence was already taken
by the former presiding judge.
I n People v. Court of First Instance of Quezon, Br. X , 69 a decision
acquitting the accused was penned by a trial judge temporarily detailed to
Branch 10 of the Court of First Instance of Quezon. However, the decision
was later on promulgated by a different judge who was subsequently
appointed permanently. The People of the Philippines then opposed the
judgment of acquittal, arguing that it was void for being promulgated
without authority as the temporary detail of the judge who penned the
decision had already expired. TIADCc

This Court rejected the reasoning that "[j]urisdiction is vested in the

court, not in the judges, so that when a complaint or information is filed
before one branch or judge, jurisdiction does not attach to said branch of the
judge alone, to the exclusion of the others." 70 Jurisdiction having attached
with the court, the judgment of acquittal was deemed valid, regardless of
the fact that one judge wrote it and another promulgated it.
Applying the foregoing, the trial court decision convicting Udang is
valid, regardless of the fact that the judge who heard the witnesses and the
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 judge who wrote the decision are different. With no showing of any
irregularity in the transcript of records, it is presumed to be a "complete,
authentic record of everything that transpire[d] during the trial," 71 sufficient
for Judge Mordeno to have evaluated the credibility of the witnesses,
specifically, of AAA.

II

However, this Court disagrees with the trial court's ruling that charging
Udang with both rape, under Article 266-A (1) of the Revised Penal Code, and
sexual abuse, under Section 5 (b) of Republic Act No. 7610, would violate his
right against double jeopardy.
The right against double jeopardy is provided in Article III, Section 21 of
the Constitution:
Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and
an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a
bar to another prosecution for the same act. 72
The first sentence of the provision speaks of "the same offense," which
this Court has interpreted to mean offenses having identical essential
elements. 73 Further, the right against double jeopardy serves as a
protection: first, "against a second prosecution for the same offense after
acquittal"; 74 second, "against a second prosecution for the same offense
after conviction"; 75 and, finally, "against multiple punishments for the same
offense." 76
Meanwhile, the second sentence of Article III, Section 21 speaks of "the
same act," which means that this act, punished by a law and an ordinance,
may no longer be prosecuted under either if a conviction or acquittal already
resulted from a previous prosecution involving the very same act.
For there to be double jeopardy, "a first jeopardy [must] ha[ve]
attached prior to the second; . . . the first jeopardy has been validly
terminated; and . . . a second jeopardy is for the same offense as that in the
first." 77
A first jeopardy has attached if: first, there was a "valid indictment"; 78
second, this indictment was made "before a competent court"; 79 third,
"after [the accused's] arraignment"; 80 fourth, "when a valid plea has been
entered"; 81 and lastly, "when the accused was acquitted or convicted, or the
case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent." 82
Lack of express consent is required because the accused's consent to
dismiss the case means that he or she actively prevented the court from
proceeding to trial based on merits and rendering a judgment of conviction
or acquittal. 83 In other words, there would be a waiver of the right against
double jeopardy if consent was given by the accused. 84
To determine the essential elements of both crimes for the purpose of
ascertaining whether or not there is double jeopardy in this case, below is a
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 comparison of Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code punishing rape and
Section 5 (b) of Republic Act No. 7610 punishing sexual abuse:

Rape under Article 266-A (1) Sexual abuse under

of the Revised Penal Code Section 5 (b) of Republic
Act No. 7610

Article 266-A. Rape; When and SECTION 5. Child Prostitution

How Committed. — Rape is and
committed —
Other Sexual Abuse. —
1) By a man who shall have Children, whether male or
carnal knowledge of a woman female, who for money, profit,
under any of the following or any other consideration or
circumstances: due to the coercion or
influence of any adult,
a) Through force, threat, or
intimidation; syndicate or group, indulge in
sexual intercourse or
b) When the offended party is lascivious conduct, are
deprived of reason or otherwise deemed to be children
unconscious; exploited in prostitution and
c) By means of fraudulent other sexual abuse.
machination or grave abuse of The penalty of reclusion
authority[.] temporal in its medium period
to reclusion perpetua shall be
imposed upon the following:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who commit the act
of sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct with a child
exploited in prostitution or
subjected to other sexual
abuse; Provided, That when
the victim is under twelve (12)
years of age, the perpetrators
shall be prosecuted under
Article 335, paragraph 3, for
rape and Article 336 of Act No.
3815, as amended, the
Revised Penal Code, for rape
or lascivious conduct, as the
case may be: Provided, That
the penalty for lascivious
conduct when the victim is
under twelve (12) years of age
shall be reclusion temporal in
its medium period[.]
(Underscoring provided)

The provisions show that rape and sexual abuse are two (2) separate
crimes with distinct elements. The "force, threat, or intimidation" or
deprivation of reason or unconsciousness required in Article 266-A (1) of the
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 Revised Penal Code is not the same as the "coercion or influence" required
in Section 5 (b) of Republic Act No. 7610. Consent is immaterial in the crime
of sexual abuse because "the [mere] act of [having] sexual intercourse . . .
with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to . . . sexual abuse" 85 is
already punishable by law. However, consent exonerates an accused from a
rape charge as exhaustively explained in Malto v. People: 86
VIOLATION OF SECTION 5 (B),
ARTICLE III OF RA 7610
AND RAPE ARE SEPARATE
AND DISTINCT CRIMES
Petitioner was charged and convicted for violation of Section 5
(b), Article III of RA 7610, not rape. The offense for which he was
convicted is punished by a special law while rape is a felony under
the Revised Penal Code. They have different elements. The two are
separate and distinct crimes. Thus, petitioner can be held liable for
violation of Section 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610 despite a finding that
he did not commit rape.
CONSENT OF THE CHILD IS
IMMATERIAL IN CRIMINAL
CASES INVOLVING
VIOLATION OF SECTION 5,
ARTICLE III OF RA 7610
Petitioner claims that AAA welcomed his kisses and touches and
consented to have sexual intercourse with him. They engaged in
these acts out of mutual love and affection. But may the "sweetheart
theory" be invoked in cases of child prostitution and other sexual
abuse prosecuted under Section 5, Article III of RA 7610? No.
The sweetheart theory applies in acts of lasciviousness and
rape, felonies committed against or without the consent of the victim.
It operates on the theory that the sexual act was consensual. It
requires proof that the accused and the victim were lovers and that
she consented to the sexual relations.
For purposes of sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct in
child abuse cases under RA 7610, the sweetheart defense is
unacceptable. A child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other
sexual abuse cannot validly give consent to sexual intercourse with
another person.
The language of the law is clear: it seeks to punish
[t]hose who commit the act of sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or
subjected to other sexual abuse. SDAaTC

Unlike rape, therefore, consent is immaterial in cases involving

violation of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610 . The mere act of having
sexual intercourse or committing lascivious conduct with a child who
is exploited in prostitution or subjected to sexual abuse constitutes
the offense. It is a malum prohibitum , an evil that is proscribed.
A child cannot give consent to a contract under our civil laws.
This is on the rationale that she can easily be the victim of fraud as
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 she is not capable of fully understanding or knowing the nature or
import of her actions. The State, as parens patriae, is under the
obligation to minimize the risk of harm to those who, because of their
minority, are as yet unable to take care of themselves fully. Those of
tender years deserve its protection.
The harm which results from a child's bad decision in a sexual
encounter may be infinitely more damaging to her than a bad
business deal. Thus, the law should protect her from the harmful
consequences of her attempts at adult sexual behavior. For this
reason, a child should not be deemed to have validly consented to
adult sexual activity and to surrender herself in the act of ultimate
physical intimacy under a law which seeks to afford her special
protection against abuse, exploitation and discrimination. (Otherwise,
sexual predators like petitioner will be justified, or even unwittingly
tempted by the law, to view her as fair game and vulnerable prey.) In
other words, a child is presumed by law to be incapable of giving
rational consent to any lascivious act or sexual intercourse.
This must be so if we are to be true to the constitutionally
enshrined State policy to promote the physical, moral, spiritual,
intellectual and social well-being of the youth. This is consistent with
the declared policy of the State
[T]o provide special protection to children from all
forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation and
discrimination, and other conditions prejudicial to
their development; provide sanctions for their
commission and carry out a program for prevention and
deterrence of and crisis intervention in situations of child
abuse, exploitation, and discrimination.
as well as to
intervene on behalf of the child when the parents,
guardian, teacher or person having care or custody of the
child fails or is unable to protect the child against abuse,
exploitation, and discrimination or when such acts
against the child are committed by the said parent,
guardian, teacher or person having care and custody of
the same.
This is also in harmony with the foremost consideration of the
child's best interests in all actions concerning him or her.
The best interest of children shall be the
paramount consideration in all actions concerning
them, whether undertaken by public or private social
welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative
authorities, and legislative bodies, consistent with the
principles of First Call for Children as enunciated in the
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child.
Every effort shall be exerted to promote the
welfare of children and enhance their
opportunities for a useful and happy life. 87
(Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)
People v. Abay 88 — insofar as it ruled that charging an accused with
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 both rape, under Article 266-A (1) of the Revised Penal Code, and sexual
abuse, under Section 5 (b) of Republic Act No. 7610, violates his or her right
against double jeopardy 89 — must therefore be abandoned. 90 As held in
Nierras v. Dacuycuy: 91
[A] single criminal act may give rise to a multiplicity of offenses and
where there is variance or differences between the elements of an
offense in one law and another law as in the case at bar there will be
no double jeopardy because what the rule on double jeopardy
prohibits refers to identity of elements in the two (2) offenses.
Otherwise stated prosecution for the same act is not prohibited. What
is forbidden is prosecution for the same offense. Hence, the mere
filing of the two (2) sets of information does not itself give rise to
double jeopardy. 92
In People v. Judge Relova: 93 acEHCD

[T]he constitutional protection against double jeopardy is not

available where the second prosecution is for an offense that is
different from the offense charged in the first or prior prosecution,
although both the first and second offenses may be based upon the
same act or set of acts. 94
The only time that double jeopardy arises is when the same act has
already been the subject of a previous prosecution under a law or an
ordinance. This is not the situation in the present case.
All told, the trial court erred in ruling that prosecuting an accused both
for rape, under Article 266-A (1) of the Revised Penal Code, and sexual
abuse, under Section 5 (b) of Republic Act No. 7610, violates his or her right
to double jeopardy.

III

Moreover, contrary to the trial court's determination, the Informations

actually charged Udang with sexual abuse, under Section 5 (b) of Republic
Act No. 7610, and not with rape, under Article 266-A (1) of the Revised Penal
Code.
Based on the Informations, the charge against Udang was "child
abuse," 95 defined in Section 3 of Republic Act No. 7610 as "the
maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of [a] child" and includes "any act by
deeds or words which debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and
dignity of a child as a human being." The allegations in the Informations
stated that Udang "sexually abuse[d]" 96 AAA by having sexual intercourse
with her while she was intoxicated, thus, "debas[ing], degrad[ing], or
demean[ing] the intrinsic worth of AAA." 97 While the Informations stated
that the acts were "[c]ontrary to and in [v]iolation of Article 266-A in relation
to Sec. 5 (b) of R.A. 7610," 98 the factual allegations in the Informations
determine the crime being charged. 99
Given that the charges against Udang were for sexual abuse, this Court
examines whether or not the elements of sexual abuse under Section 5 (b)
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 of Republic Act No. 7610 are present in this case. Section 5 (b) of Republic
Act No. 7610 reads:
SECTION 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. —
Children, whether male or female, who for money, profit, or any other
consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult,
syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and
other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to
reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon the following:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected
to other sexual abuse; Provided, That when the victim is under twelve
(12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article
335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as
amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as
the case may be: Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct
when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion
temporal in its medium period[.]
To wit, the elements of sexual abuse are: first, "the accused commits
the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct"; 100 second, "the said act
is performed with a child exploited in prostitution"; 101 and, finally, that "the
child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age." 102
All the elements of sexual abuse are present in this case.
As an adult and the father of AAA's friend, Betty, Udang had influence
over AAA, which induced the latter to have drinks and later on have sexual
intercourse with him. AAA, born on May 20, 1990, 103 was 12 and 13 years
old when the incidents happened. The following transcript of stenographic
notes shows AAA's "categorical, convincing and consistent" 104 testimony as
to how Udang sexually abused her in September 2002:
Q. In September, 2002 AAA, what unusual incident that happened
between you and the accused?
A. Yes.
Q. What is that AAA?
A. We are drinking in their house.
Q. You are saying in the house of Bienvenido Udang, Sr.?
A. Yes.
Q. Where was it located? SDHTEC

A. We are neighbors.
Q. So, in crossing Lumbia, Cagayan de Oro City?
A. Yes.
Q. And you said that you were drinking, what were you drinking in
the house of B[ie]nvenido Udang, Sr.?
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 A. Tanduay.
Q. And who were your companions, if any, at that time?
A. Betty, myself and Bienvenido, Jr.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. So, how many Tanduay bottles were you really drinking in
September, 2002?
A. Five.
Q. What happened next while you were in the house of the
accused?
A. They let me drink until I was drunk and carried me to the room.
Q. And when you were carried to the room, what happened next?
A. Then he undressed me.
Q. Let us clarify this, who carried you to the room?
A. Bienvenido Udang, Sr.
Q. When he carried you to the room, you said you were undressed,
who undressed you?
A. Bienvenido Udang, Sr.
Q[.] And what happened next?
A. He kissed me and then went on top of me.
Q. And when he was on top of you, what, if any, was your position
then?
A. I was lying down.
Q. By the way, you said that you were undressed at that time, AAA,
so at that time you had no upper garments?
A. No more.
Q. How about your lower garment?
A. No more.
Q. How about Bienvenido Udang, Sr., what was the state of his
dress?
A. I could not remember because it was already night and it was
dark.
Q. When he went on top of you, what was the state of his dress at
that time?
A. I did not notice.
Q. When Bienvenido Udang[,] Sr. went on top of you while you were
lying down, what was Bienvenido Udang, Sr. do[ing]?
A. I am shy.
Pros. Sia-Galvez:
  We would like to manifest at this juncture, your honor, that the
witness is hesitant in answering [the] question because of the
feeling of embarrassment, your honor.
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   (To witness) AAA, would you want your mother inside this court
room or we will have her stay outside this court room?
A. She will stay.
Q. Can we continue, AAA?
A. Yes.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Let us go back, when Bienvenido Udang[,] Sr. was on top o[f]
you and you were lying down, what happened next?
A. He inserted his penis on my vagina.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. So, you felt [his] penis entering your vagina?
A. Yes. AScHCD

Q. And how many times, if any, did he do that [i]n September,

2002?
A. Only once. 105

As for the sexual abuse in December 2003, AAA testified:

Q. In December, 2003, AAA, what incident, if any, happened
between you and the accused?
A. Yes, there was.
Q. What incident was that?
A. The same thing, we had a drinking session with Bienvenido
Udang, Sr., and Jr.
Q. And when was this happened?
A. In the house.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. You said that you were drinking in the house of the accused,
what were you drinking then?
A. Tanduay
Q. And you said it happened again, where did it happened (sic)?
A. In their house, in a room.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. And when you were inside the room, what happened next?
A. I was lying down and after a while, they went inside.
Q. You are referring to?
A. Bienvenido Udang, Sr.
Q. And when they were inside the room, what happened next?
A. The same thing, he undressed me and inserted his penis into my
vagina?
Q. How many times?
A. Until he had an ejaculation. 106
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 This Court finds AAA credible not because of the generalization that
she was a child of tender years incapable of fabricating a story of defloration
but because of her categorical narration of her experience and her
straightforward explanation that she was intimidated by Betty to have drinks
with her father. Thus, she was compelled to return to the accused's house
even after she was raped. AAA testified that Betty, her "friend," "sold" 107
her to Udang; Betty, who was taller than AAA, even threatened to "maul" her
had she resisted:
Q. After the September, 2002 incident, did you tell any person
about the incident?
A. No, I did not tell it to anyone because if I tell, his child will maul
me.
Q. And after the said incident, you still went back to their house, is
that correct?
A. Yes, because his child wanted me to go.
Q. And you were drinking Tanduay with the accused.
A. Yes, because if [I] will not drink, his child Betty will maul me.
Q. Was (sic) this Betty already mauled you?
A. Yes, because whenever she asked me to buy cigarette, she maul
(sic) me because she was taller than me before. 108
To this Court, Betty's threat of violence was enough to induce fear in
AAA.
AAA's delay in reporting the incidents did not affect her credibility.
Delay is not and should not be an indication of a fabricated charge because,
more often than not, victims of rape and sexual abuse choose to suffer alone
and "bear the ignominy and pain" of their experience. 109 Here, AAA would
not have revealed the incidents had she not been interviewed by the police
when she was arrested for sniffing rugby:
Q. To whom for the first time did you reveal these two incidents
that happened to you?
A. Only when Bienvenido Udang, Sr. ha[d] me arrested.
Q. Why did Bienvenido Udang, Sr. have you arrested? AcICHD

A. Because his child let me used to sniff "rugby."

Q. What is the name of that child?
A. Betty Udang.
Q. Do you mean to say that you also use "rugby"?
A. No, I am not using "rugby," but I used it for the first time when
his child let me used then (sic).
Q. Were you, in fact, being arrested (sic) at that time when
Bienvenido Udang, Sr. have you arrested?
A. Yes.
Q. Who arrested you?

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 A. I was arrested by the police and I told the police about the
incident because I wanted to go out but the police needed a
signature in order for me to go out.
Q. Whose signature is needed?
A. Bienvenido Udang, Sr.
Q. How come those two incidents of sexual abuse by Bienvenido
Udang, Sr.
A. I reported the incidents to the police because they interviewed
me. 110
With AAA's categorical testimony, the prosecution discharged its
burden of proving Udang's guilt beyond reasonable doubt and has made a
prima facie case for two (2) counts of sexual abuse against him. In other
words, the prosecution presented the "amount of evidence which would be
sufficient to counterbalance the general presumption of innocence, and
warrant a conviction." 111 The burden of evidence then shifted to the
defense to counter the prosecution's prima facie case. Explaining the
difference between "burden of proof" and "burden of evidence," this Court in
Bautista v. Sarmiento 112 said:
When a prima facie case is established by the prosecution in a
criminal case . . . the burden of proof does not shift to the defense. It
remains throughout the trial with the party upon whom it is imposed
— the prosecution. It is the burden of evidence which shifts from
party to party depending upon the exigencies of the case in the
course of the trial. This burden of going forward with the evidence is
met by evidence which balances that introduced by the prosecution.
Then the burden shifts back. 113 (Citation omitted)
Unfortunately Udang failed to present evidence sufficient to counter
the prosecution's prima facie case against him.
To destroy AAA's credibility, Udang capitalizes on the fact that he was
charged only after he had AAA arrested for sniffing rugby. However, given
AAA's affirmative and credible testimony, Udang's allegation of ill motive is
deemed inconsequential.
While prosecution witness Dr. Revelo testified that the lacerations
found in AAA's genitalia could have been "introduced by other operation" 114
aside from sexual intercourse, Udang had nothing but denials and alibis as
defenses. If, as Udang testified, he was with his mother, siblings, and some
barangay tanods during the alleged incidents, he could have presented them
as witnesses to corroborate his testimony, but he did not. Neither is Betty's
testimony that Udang never had drinks with AAA sufficient to acquit her
father. Udang's and Betty's testimonies are "self-serving" 115 and were
correctly disregarded by the trial court.
As correctly held by the trial court and by the Court of Appeals, the
testimonies of Gandawali and Orcales, AAA's fellow inmates at the Cagayan
de Oro City Jail, were hearsay, hence, inadmissible in evidence. 116 This is
because Gandawali and Orcales had no personal knowledge of the incidents
as they were not there when the incidents happened.
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 In sum, this Court is morally convinced that Udang committed two (2)
counts of sexual abuse under Section 5 (b) of Republic Act No. 7610, with
each count punishable by reclusion temporal in its medium period to
reclusion perpetua. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law 117 and absent
any mitigating or aggravating circumstance in the present case, the
maximum imposable penalty for each count should be the penalty
prescribed by law in its medium period 118 which is reclusion temporal in its
maximum period ranging from 17 years, four (4) months, and one (1) day to
20 years. 119 On the other hand, the minimum term of the imposable penalty
shall be the next penalty lower in degree than that prescribed by law which
i s prision mayor in its medium period to reclusion temporal in its minimum
period. This minimum term ranges from eight (8) years and one (1) day to 14
years and eight (8) months. 120 Udang shall serve the penalties successively.
121 TAIaHE

Further, AAA is entitled to P50,000.00 as civil indemnity. 122 The award

of moral damages is likewise retained at P50,000.00. 123 However, the award
of exemplary damages is deleted given the absence of any aggravating
circumstance in this case. 124
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Court of Appeals October 9,
2013 Decision in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 01032 is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Bienvinido Udang, Sr. y Sevilla is found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of sexual abuse, under Section 5 (b) of
Republic Act No. 7610, and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of twelve (12)
years of prision mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months,
and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum for each count.
Furthermore, the accused shall pay AAA P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and
P50,000.00 as moral damages for each count of sexual abuse, all amounts
shall earn interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the
finality of this Decision until full payment. The award of exemplary damages
is deleted.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr., Bersamin, Martires and Gesmundo, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1. While the RTC documents referred to him as "Bienvinido Udang, Sr.," the CA
referred to him as "Bienvenido Udang, Sr."
2. Rollo , pp. 3-14. The Decision was penned by Associate Justice Edgardo T. Lloren
and concurred in by Associate Justices Marie Christine Azcarra-Jacob and
Edward B. Contreras of the Twenty-third Division, Court of Appeals, Cagayan
de Oro City.
3. REV. PEN. CODE, art. 266-A (1) provides:

  Article 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed. — Rape is committed —

  1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of
the following circumstances:
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   a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;

  b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise

unconscious;

  c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and

  d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is
demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be
present.

4. RTC records, p. 3.

5. Id. at 15.
6. Rollo , p. 5, Court of Appeals Decision.

7. Id. AAA was born on May 20, 1990.

8. Id. at 5 and 9.

9. Id. at 10.

10. Id. at 11.

11. Id.

12. Id.
13. Id. at 12.

14. Id.

15. CA rollo, p. 38, Trial court Decision.

16. TSN dated December 8, 2006, p. 8.

17. Rollo , p. 12.

18. CA rollo, p. 38.

19. Id. at 40.

20. TSN dated November 11, 2010, p. 7.

21. Rollo , p. 6, Court of Appeals Decision.

22. CA rollo, p. 39, Trial court Decision.

23. Id. at 40.

24. Id. at 39.

25. REV. PEN. CODE, art. 266-A (1) partly provides:

  Article 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed. — Rape is committed —

  1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of
the following circumstances:
  a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;

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   b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious;

  c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority[.]

26. Rep. Act No. 7610 (1992), sec. 5 as amended by Rep. Act No. 8353 (1997),
provides:

    Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. — Children,

whether male or female, who for money, profit, or any other consideration or
due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in
sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited
in prostitution and other sexual abuse.

  The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua

shall be imposed upon the following:

xxx xxx xxx

  (b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct
with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse;
Provided, That when the victims is under twelve (12) years of age, the
perpetrators shall be prosecuted under [paragraph (d), Article 266-A of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by the Anti-Rape Law of 1997] and Article
336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or
lascivious conduct, as the case may be: Provided, That the penalty for
lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall be
reclusion temporal in its medium period[.]
27. CA rollo, p. 41, Trial court Decision.

28. Id. at 42.

29. Id.

30. Id. at 42-44 and TSN dated December 8, 2006, p. 8.

31. CA rollo, p. 44.

32. Id. at 45.

33. Id.
34. Id.

35. Id. at 36-46. The Joint Decision was penned by Judge Richard D. Mordeno of
Branch 22, Regional Trial Court, Cagayan de Oro City.
36. CA rollo, p. 46, Trial Court Decision.

37. Id. at 25. Appellant's Brief.

38. Id. at 26.

39. Id. at 29-30.

40. Id. at 30-32.

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 41. Id. at 32-33.
42. Rollo , p. 9, Court of Appeals Decision.

43. Id. at 12.

44. Id. at 13.

45. Id. at 3-14.

46. Id. at 13.

47. Id. at 15-17.

48. Id. at 21.

49. Id. at 27-31. Manifestation and Motion (In Lieu of Supplemental Brief).
50. Id. at 32-35. Manifestation with Motion.

51. Id. at 36.

52. CA rollo, pp. 57-76.

53. Id. at 71.

54. Id.
55. Id.

56. Id.
57. People v. Court of First Instance of Quezon, Br. X, G.R. No. L-48817, October
29, 1993, 227 SCRA 457, 461 [Per J. Bellosillo, First Division].

58. People v. Diaz , 331 Phil. 240, 252 (1996) [Per J. Davide, Jr., Third Division].

59. Id.
60. See In Re: Transfer of Hearing of A.M. No. 07-11-592-RTC, 572 Phil. 1, 5 (2008)
[Per J. Reyes, R.T., Third Division].

61. As per the Office of the Court Administrator.

62. United States v. Abreu , 30 Phil. 402, 410 (1915) [Per Curiam, En Banc].

63. Id.
64. Id. at 410.

65. Id. at 408.

66. Id.
67. Id. at 415.

68. Id.
69. People v. Court of First Instance of Quezon, Br. X, G.R. No. L-48817, October
29, 1993, 227 SCRA 457, 461 [Per J. Bellosillo, First Division].
70. Id. at 461.
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 71. United States v. Abreu , 30 Phil. 402, 415 (1915) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
72. CONST., art. III, sec. 21.

73. See People v. Judge Relova, 232 Phil. 269, 283 (1987) [Per J. Feliciano, First
Division].
74. People v. Dela Torre , 430 Phil. 420, 430 (2002) [Per J. Panganiban, Third
Division].
75. Id.
76. Id.

77. See People v. Cawaling , 355 Phil. 1, 24 (1998) [Per J. Panganiban, First
Division].
78. Id.
79. Id.

80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.

83. See People v. Salico, 84 Phil. 722, 726 (1949) [Per J. Feria, En Banc].
84. Id.
85. Rep. Act No. 7610, sec. 5 (b).
86. 560 Phil. 119 (2007) [Per J. Corona, First Division].

87. Id. at 138-142.

88. People v. Abay, 599 Phil. 390 (2009) [Per J. Corona, First Division].
89. Id. at 395-396.

90. Other cases citing the Abay doctrine are: People v. Dahilig , 667 Phil. 92 (2011)
[Per J. Mendoza, Second Division]; and People v. Matias, 687 Phil. 386 (2012)
[Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, Third Division].
91. Nierras v. Dacuycuy , 260 Phil. 6 (1990) [Per J. Paras, En Banc].
92. Id. at 13, citing People v. Milflores n , 115 SCRA 570 (1982) [Per J. Escolin,
Second Division].
93. People v. Judge Relova, 232 Phil. 269, 283 (1987) [Per J. Feliciano, First
Division].

94. Id. at 278.

95. RTC records, pp. 3 and 15.
96. Id.
97. Id.

98. Id.
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 99. See Malto v. People , 560 Phil. 119, 135-136 (2007) [Per J. Corona, First
Division].

100. Amployo v. People , 496 Phil. 747, 758 (2005) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Second
Division].

101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Rollo , p. 5, Court of Appeals Decision.

104. Id. at 9.
105. Id. at 9-11.
106. Id. at 11-12.

107. CA rollo, p. 28, Appellant's Brief citing TSN dated December 7, 2007, pp. 16-
17.
108. Id. at 26-27.
109. See People v. Bahuyan, 308 Phil. 346, 358 (1994) [Per J. Romero, Third
Division]. See also People v. Errojo, 299 Phil. 51, 61 (1994) [Per J. Nocon,
Second Division].
110. CA rollo, pp. 30-31, Appellant's Brief citing TSN dated December 7, 2007, p.
23.

111. Bautista v. Sarmiento , 223 Phil. 181, 185 (1985) [Per J. Cuevas, Second
Division], citing WORDS & PHRASES PERMANENT EDITION 33, p. 545.

112. Bautista v. Sarmiento , 223 Phil. 181, 185 (1985) [Per J. Cuevas, Second
Division].
113. Id. at 186.
114. CA rollo, p. 32, Appellant's Brief.

115. Id. at 44.

116. RULES OF COURT, Rule 130, sec. 36 provides:
    Section 36. Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge;
hearsay excluded. — A witness can testify only to those facts which he
knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own
perception, except as otherwise provided in these rules.
117. Rep. Act No. 4103 (1965), as amended.

118. REV. PEN. CODE, art. 64 (1) provides:

  Article 64. Rules for the Application of Penalties which Contain Three
Periods. — In cases in which the penalties prescribed by law contain three
periods, whether it be a single divisible penalty or composed of three
different penalties, each one of which forms a period in accordance with the
provisions of articles 76 and 77, the courts shall observe for the application of
the penalty the following rules, according to whether there are or are not
mitigating or aggravating circumstances:
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   1. When there are neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances,
they shall impose the penalty prescribed by law in its medium period.

119. People v. Matias , 687 Phil. 386, 391 (2012) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, Third
Division].
120. Id.
121. REV. PEN. CODE, art. 70 partly provides:

  Article 70. Successive Service of Sentences; Exception. — When the

culprit has to serve two or more penalties, he shall serve them
simultaneously if the nature of the penalties will so permit; otherwise, said
penalties shall be executed successively, following the order of their
respective severity, which shall be determined in accordance with the
following scale:

  1. Death.
  2. Reclusión perpetua.
  3. Reclusión temporal.
  4. Prisión mayor.
  5. Prisión correccional.
  6. Arresto mayor.
  7. Arresto menor.

xxx xxx xxx

122. See Malto v. People , 560 Phil. 119, 143-144 (2007) [Per J. Corona, First
Division].
123. Id. at 144.
124. Id. citing CIVIL CODE art. 2230, which provides that "[i]n criminal offenses,
exemplary damages as a part of the civil liability may be imposed when the
crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. Such
damages are separate and distinct from fines and shall be paid to the
offended party."
n Note from the Publisher: Written as "P50,000.000" in the original document.
n Note from the Publisher: Written as "People v. Miraflores" in
the official document.

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