CASE OF NIT S.R.L. v. THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA

GRAND CHAMBER
CASE OF NIT S.R.L. v. THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA
(Application no. 28470/12)
JUDGMENT
Art 10 • Freedom of expression • Justified revocation of broadcasting licence of a

TV channel after repeated and serious breach of the statutory requirement to ensure
political balance and pluralism in news bulletins • Development of general principles
when striking a proper balance between political pluralism in the media and editorial
freedom • Internal and external pluralism to be considered in combination with each
other • Wide margin of appreciation afforded in principle as to choice of means for
ensuring media pluralism • Fairness of proceedings and procedural safeguards
particularly relevant to proportionality assessment in case of licence revocation,
given sanction severity • Convention compliance of national framework including
safeguards to ensure media regulator’s independence and its protection against
political pressures • Sanction devoid of political motivation and proportionate, given
availability of other means of broadcasting, possibility to reapply for a licence in a
year, judicial review and procedural safeguards
Art 1 P1 • Control of the use of property • Fair balance struck between general
interest of the community and property rights of the applicant company in decision
to revoke broadcasting licence
STRASBOURG
5 April 2022
This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.

NIT S.R.L. v. THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA JUDGMENT
In the case of NIT S.R.L. v. the Republic of Moldova,

The European Court of Human Rights, sitting as a Grand Chamber
composed of:
Robert Spano, President,
Jon Fridrik Kjølbro,
Ksenija Turković,
Síofra O’Leary,
Yonko Grozev,
Paul Lemmens,
Valeriu Griţco,
Egidijus Kūris,
Branko Lubarda,
Stéphanie Mourou-Vikström,
Jolien Schukking,
María Elósegui,
Ivana Jelić,
Arnfinn Bårdsen,
Darian Pavli,
Erik Wennerström,
Saadet Yüksel, judges,
and Søren Prebensen, Deputy Grand Chamber Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 14 October 2020 and 1 December 2021,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the last-
mentioned date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case originated in an application (no. 28470/12) against the
Republic of Moldova lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
(“the Convention”) by a company incorporated in Moldova, ÎM “Noile Idei
Televizate” S.R.L. - NIT S.R.L. (“the applicant company”), on 11 May 2012.
2. The applicant company was represented successively by
Ms A. Răileanu and Ms Z. Curuci, its general managers, and Mr P. Bălan, a
lawyer practising in Chişinău, and was granted leave to have its case
presented in the oral hearing proceedings before the Court by Ms A. Nica, an
adviser (Rule 36 of the Rules of Court). The Moldovan Government (“the
Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr O. Rotari, of the Ministry
of Justice.
3. The applicant company alleged that the revocation by the Audiovisual
Coordinating Council (“the ACC”) of the broadcasting licence of its
television channel of the same name (NIT) on 5 April 2012 had amounted to
a violation of Article 10 of the Convention and that, as a result, its right to the
peaceful enjoyment of its possessions had been violated, contrary to Article 1
1
of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. In addition, the applicant company

alleged that the proceedings it had brought against the ACC’s
above-mentioned decision had been unfair, in breach of Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention. The applicant company also alleged that it had not had access to
an effective remedy for its complaints and had been discriminated against, in
breach of, respectively, Articles 13 and 14 of the Convention, each taken in
conjunction with Articles 6 and 10.
4. The application was initially allocated to the Third Section of the Court,
and subsequently to its Second Section (Rule 52 § 1).
5. On 17 April 2018 the Government were given notice of the application.
6. On 3 March 2020 a Chamber of the Second Section, composed of
Robert Spano, President, Valeriu Griţco, Egidijus Kūris, Ivana Jelić,
Arnfinn Bårdsen, Darian Pavli and Saadet Yüksel, judges, together with
Hasan Bakırcı, Deputy Section Registrar, relinquished jurisdiction in favour
of the Grand Chamber, neither of the parties having objected thereto
(Article 30 of the Convention and Rule 72).
7. The composition of the Grand Chamber was determined in accordance
with Article 26 §§ 4 and 5 of the Convention and Rule 24.
8. The applicant company and the Government each filed written
observations.
9. A hearing took place in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on
14 October 2020 (Rule 59 § 3); on account of the public-health crisis resulting
from the COVID-19 pandemic, it was held via videoconference. The webcast
of the hearing was made public on the Court’s Internet site on the following
day.
There appeared before the Court:
(a) for the Government

Mr O. ROTARI, Ministry of Justice, Agent,
Ms D. MAIMESCU, lawyer attached to the Government’s Agent
Department, Ministry of Justice Adviser.
(b) for the applicant company

Ms A. NICA, Alliance for Justice and Human Rights, Adviser.
The Court heard addresses by Mr Rotari and Ms Nica, followed by their

answers to questions from judges.
THE FACTS
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
10. The applicant company is a limited liability company incorporated in

Moldova. The identity of its owners is unknown to the Court. Its television
channel NIT operated in Moldova from 1997. From 2004 NIT began
broadcasting nationally.
A. Historical background
11. Before Moldova gained independence in 1991, the ownership of mass

media outlets was a privilege exclusively reserved for the State and the ruling
party. In the 1990s and the early 2000s the National Television of Moldova
(NTM) was the only Moldovan television channel with national coverage. It
was fully State-controlled and had a virtual monopoly over audiovisual
broadcasting in the country. There were two other television channels with
national coverage at that time, the Russian State television channel and the
Romanian State television channel, which rebroadcast programmes from
their respective countries.
12. In the elections of 2001, the Party of the Communists of the Republic
of Moldova (PCRM), which was created at the beginning of the 1990s and
had declared itself to be the successor of the Communist Party of the
Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic, obtained seventy-one out of the total of
101 seats in Parliament. As a result, the PCRM became the only governing
party. A detailed description of the media situation at that time can be found
in the Court’s judgment in Manole and Others v. Moldova (no. 13936/02,
ECHR 2009 (extracts)). In that case, journalists from NTM alleged, inter alia,
that they had to comply with a policy of devoting a disproportionate amount
of airtime to reporting on the acts of members of the ruling political party,
with little or no coverage of the acts and views of the opposition parties (ibid.,
§ 105). In 2002 the journalists in question protested against this practice; they
went on strike and barricaded themselves in the NTM building. Eventually,
the building was stormed by special forces and the journalists were dismissed.
The situation gave rise to large-scale demonstrations organised by the
opposition to protest against the actions of the government and the practice
of censorship on national television, a heated public debate, and strong
international reactions, including from the Council of Europe (ibid.,
§§ 72-78). In its judgment the Court noted the following (ibid., § 108):
“... during most of the period in question [2001-2004] [NTM] was the sole Moldovan
broadcasting organisation producing television programmes which could be viewed
throughout the country ... Moreover, approximately 60% of the population lived in rural
areas, with no or limited access to cable or satellite television or, according to the
Secretary General’s Special Representative, newspapers ... In these circumstances, it
was of vital importance to the functioning of democracy in Moldova that [NTM]
transmitted accurate and balanced news and information and that its programming
reflected the full range of political opinion and debate in the country and the State
authorities were under a strong positive obligation to put in place the conditions to
permit this to occur.”
13. The Court found that the Moldovan State authorities had failed to
comply with their positive obligations under Article 10 of the Convention as
3
the legislative framework was flawed (ibid., § 111) and held that there had
been a violation of that Article.
B. Enactment of the Audiovisual Code of 2006
14. Against the background of the events described above and as a result
of internal and external reactions to them, the government decided to draft
new broadcasting legislation. The “Informative Note” appended to the draft
Audiovisual Code of 2006 (“the Code”) stated, inter alia, the following:
“This bill aims at establishing the democratic principles of functioning of the
audiovisual [sector] of the Republic of Moldova, ensuring protection of the
rights of programme consumers ...”. And: “The draft seeks to balance
broadcasting freedom with ‘more responsibility’ on the part of broadcasters,
especially with regard to observing ‘the rights of the programme consumer’,
who will now have ‘the possibility to address the competent authorities to
ensure the appropriate conditions for free formation of opinion’.”1
15. The Council of Europe’s Media Division was involved in the
legislative process. It requested two media experts to analyse and comment
on the draft bill. These experts, in their report of May 2006, welcomed,
inter alia, the fact that the draft bill specified procedures and criteria for
licensing private broadcasters.
16. As regards Article 7 of the draft Code on political and social balance
and pluralism (see paragraph 85 below), the experts expressed the view that
the principle set out in the second paragraph was “commendable”. No
comment was made by the experts in respect of what became Article 7 § 4 of
the final text of the draft Code.
17. As regards Article 27 on revocation of a broadcasting licence and
Article 38 on sanctions, the experts suggested that the ACC should have
discretion as to what, if any, sanction to apply rather than instituting an
obligation for it to withdraw a licence. They also suggested that the initial list
of three sanctions (public warning, fine and licence revocation) be extended
to five sanctions (public warning, fine, deprivation of the right to broadcast
advertisements, temporary suspension of licence and revocation of licence)
and that revocation of a licence could happen only in cases of repeated serious
violations of the Code. Those suggestions were incorporated in the final text
of the Code (see paragraph 85 below).
18. The Council of Europe experts also identified a number of
shortcomings in the draft Code, inter alia in relation to the structure of the
ACC. In their view the proposed structure gave the government the ability to
exert undue influence and control over the ACC and, through it, over all
broadcasters. The experts made several proposals to improve the draft bill,
1. Council of Europe Report ATCM(2006)004, “Analysis and Comments on the Draft

Audiovisual Code of the Republic of Moldova”, p. 3.
which were all accepted by the Moldovan Parliament and were included in
the final text of the Code (see paragraph 85 below). In particular, Parliament
excluded from the draft bill the idea that the nomination of the ACC members
should be done by “taking into account the number of mandates held by the
legally established parliamentary factions”. Parliament also accepted the
suggestions to extend the class of potential nominators to include major
sectors of civil society, to provide a detailed job description, to introduce
staggered terms for ACC members and to remove their status as “public
officials”, and the suggestions concerning the ACC’s funding.
19. The Code was adopted by Parliament on 27 July 2006 and was in force
until 1 January 2019, on which date it was replaced by the Audiovisual Code
of 2018.
C. Further political developments
20. On 5 April 2009 general elections took place in Moldova. According

to the preliminary results, announced on 6 April, the ruling party narrowly
won the elections. Accusations of electoral fraud, street protests and large-
scale operations by police and special forces units followed (a description of
the events in question can be found in the Court’s judgment in Iurcu v. the
Republic of Moldova, no. 33759/10, §§ 6-9, 9 April 2013). In July of the same
year fresh elections took place. As a result of those elections, the PCRM lost
its majority in Parliament and became the only opposition party, with
forty-eight of the total of 101 parliamentary seats. An alliance of four smaller
political parties, called the Alliance for European Integration (AEI), formed
the new government.
D. Broadcasting situation in Moldova in 2012
21. According to information submitted by the parties, on 1 January 2012

there were sixty-four broadcasting licences issued in Moldova, five of which
related to nationwide coverage.
22. According to a study conducted by the Moldovan Centre for
Independent Journalism in March 2012, the three television channels with
nationwide coverage which enjoyed the largest audience were Prime TV (a
channel rebroadcasting the Russian State television channel and inserting
some local content) with 47.9% of the audience, Moldova 1 (the former
NTM) with 34.5% of the audience, and NIT (rebroadcasting a Russian
television channel and inserting some local content) with 26.3% of the
audience. The fourth and fifth television channels with nationwide coverage
were 2Plus, which had taken over the frequency which used to belong to the
Romanian State television channel and was rebroadcasting a Romanian
channel and inserting some local content, with 6.9% of the audience, and
EuroTV Chişinău with 2.7% of the audience.
5
23. All these five channels were broadcasting on analogue frequencies.
E. Composition of the ACC in 2012
24. From the publicly available parliamentary decision confirming their

appointment, it appears that six out of the nine members who formed the ACC
in 2012 were appointed before the change of government in 2009. Three of
them were appointed in 2006 and remained in office until 2012; three were
appointed in 2008 and remained in office until 2014; and three were
appointed in 2011 and remained in office until 2017.
F. The case of NIT
1. Issuing of the new broadcasting licence

25. The television channel NIT operated in Moldova from 1997. From
2004 NIT had nationwide coverage. On 7 May 2008, a new broadcasting
licence was issued by the ACC to the applicant company, on the basis of
Article 23 of the Code, for a period of seven years.
26. The terms of the licence stated that the broadcaster was obliged to
observe the provisions of the Code. The terms of the licence, under point 3.1
letter (e), further stipulated that the broadcaster should provide information
completely, correctly and promptly, in the spirit of the constitutional
provisions, and the pluralism of opinions.
2. Sanctions imposed prior to the revocation of the broadcasting licence

27. Information published on the website of the ACC, including the
annual reports that it began to produce and publish in 2007, show that since
the Code had entered into force the ACC had imposed sanctions on numerous
companies holding broadcasting licences for radio and television channels,
including the applicant company, for breaches of provisions of that Code.
From the annual reports for 2007 and 2008 it appears that the ACC applied a
total of forty-three sanctions in 2007 and more than twenty-five sanctions in
2008.
28. It appears from this information that on 15 and 23 May 2007,
respectively, the ACC (i) fined the applicant company 2,000 Moldovan lei
(MDL) (approximately 122 euros (EUR)) because NIT had broadcast
deceptive advertisement during one of its shows and (ii) gave it a public
warning because NIT’s news bulletins had, among other things, breached
Article 7 §§ 1 and 4(c) of the Code during an election campaign in May 2007.
On the latter occasion the ACC gave the applicant company seven days to
ensure that NIT’s news bulletins complied with the relevant provisions of the
Code. It does not appear from this information that the applicant company
received any sanctions from the ACC in 2008.
29. From the materials submitted to the Court by the parties it appears that
between 2009 and 2011, on the basis of monitoring carried out by the ACC
either of its own motion or after complaints submitted to it, the ACC imposed
eleven sanctions on the applicant company because NIT had breached
Article 7 of the Code. In particular, NIT was found guilty of being one-sided
and politically biased in favour of the PCRM in its news bulletins, contrary
to the provisions of Article 7 § 2, and of failing to give an opportunity to other
parties to comment on the accusations made against them, contrary to
Article 7 § 4. The following sanctions were imposed:
(i) on 24 March 2009, a public warning for breaching Article 7 §§ 1, 2, 3
and 4(b) and (c); the applicant company did not challenge this sanction;
(ii) on 6 November 2009, a fine of MDL 5,400 (approximately EUR 330)
for breaching Article 7 §§ 1, 2, 3 and 4(b) and (c); the applicant company
unsuccessfully challenged the sanction in the courts and the court judgments
became final;
(iii) on 30 March 2010, a public warning for breaching Article 16 §§ 2
and 3; the applicant company unsuccessfully challenged it in the courts and
the court judgments became final;
(iv) on 15 September 2010, a fine of MDL 5,400 for breaching Article 7
§ 4(b) and (c); the applicant company unsuccessfully challenged it in the
courts and the court judgments became final;
(v) on 29 October 2010, deprivation of the right to broadcast
advertisements for three days for breaching Article 7 §§ 1 and 4(b) and (c);
the applicant company challenged the decision in the courts and had it
quashed on procedural grounds;
(vi) on 10 November 2010, a fine of MDL 5,400 for breaching Article 7
§§ 1, 2, 3 and 4(c); the applicant company challenged the decision in the
courts and had it quashed on procedural grounds;
(vii) on 19 November 2010, deprivation of the right to broadcast
advertisements for five days for breaching Article 7 §§ 1, 2, 3 and 4(c); the
applicant company challenged the decision in the courts and at the same time
asked the courts to suspend the enforcement of the decision pending the
outcome of the proceedings on the merits. Even though by an interlocutory
judgment of 13 December 2010, amenable to an appeal together with the
merits of the case, the courts dismissed the applicant company’s application
to have the enforcement of the decision suspended, they eventually quashed
the aforementioned ACC decision on procedural grounds;
(viii) on 18 May 2011, a public warning for breaching Article 7 §§ 1, 2, 3
and 4(c); the applicant company did not challenge it. Along with NIT,
six other television channels were warned about a breach of Article 7 of the
Code in their news bulletins;
(ix) on 27 May 2011, a fine of MDL 5,400 for breaching Article 7 §§ 1,
2, 3 and 4(c); the applicant company did not challenge it in the courts and
7
paid the fine. Along with NIT, two other television channels were warned
about a breach of Article 7 of the Code in their news bulletins;
(x) on 3 June 2011, deprivation of the right to broadcast advertisements
for five days for breaching Article 7 §§ 1, 2, 3 and 4(b) and (c); the applicant
company unsuccessfully challenged the decision in the courts and the court
judgments became final after the revocation of its licence. Along with NIT,
two other television channels, including the national channel, were warned
about a breach of Article 7 of the Code in their news bulletins; and
(xi) on 24 June 2011, suspension of its broadcasting licence for five days
for breaching Article 7 §§ 1, 2, 3 and 4(a), (b) and (c); the applicant company
unsuccessfully challenged the decision in the courts and the court judgments
became final after the revocation of its licence. Along with NIT, another
television channel was fined for breaching Article 7 of the Code in its news
bulletins.
30. In addition to the above-mentioned sanctions, NIT received sanctions
on two other occasions between 2009 and 2011 for breaching other provisions
of the Code. Furthermore, on two occasions in 2010 NIT was given deadlines
to comply with the provisions of the Code without any sanctions being
applied.
31. However, from information submitted to the Court by the parties it
also appears that the ACC dismissed complaints directed against NIT. For
instance, on 29 October 2010 the ACC dismissed a complaint of 22 October
2010 by the representative to the Central Electoral Commission of one of the
PCRM’s rival political parties alleging that one of NIT’s shows had failed to
comply with the principles of impartiality and pluralism of opinion and that
the political party he was representing had been denied the right to respond.
Also, on 7 January 2012 the ACC dismissed an application of 16 December
2011 by the State Inspectorate for the Supervision of Alcoholic Production to
have NIT punished for breaching the relevant legislation on advertising. In
addition, on 29 March 2012 the ACC dismissed an application of 15 March
2012 by a member of parliament to have NIT punished for broadcasting
during its evening news an allegedly propagandistic report by a Russian news
agency stating that incidents entailing mass disorder were to take place in
Moldova on the occasion of the presidential election and that the Prime
Minister and the President had prepared their escape from the country.
3. Revocation of the broadcasting licence

(a) The monitoring process
32. On 29 March 2012, during a public meeting, the ACC decided to carry
out a thematic monitoring process for the news bulletins of all television
channels with nationwide coverage and the Vocea Basarabiei radio station,
regarding compliance with Article 7 of the Code.
33. In accordance with Article 37 § 1, Article 40 § 1(a), (b) and (d) and
Article 41 § 1(a) of the Code, the main news bulletins of the Vocea Basarabiei
private radio station (Ştiri – aired at 6 p.m.), of the public television channel
Moldova 1 (Mesager – aired at 7 p.m.), and of the private television channels
Prime (Primele ştiri – aired at 9 p.m.), EuroTV Chişinău (Ştiri – aired at
8.30 p.m.), NIT (Curier – aired at 10 p.m.) and 2 Plus (Reporter – aired at
7 p.m.) were subjected to monitoring. The monitoring was carried out over a
period of five days.
34. The methodology of the monitoring, involving comparative and
chronometric measurements of contents, had been devised by the ACC in
collaboration with experts from the European Union (EU) and the Council of
Europe. Two international experts participated as observers in the monitoring
carried out in accordance with the above methodology between 2010 and
2011 and confirmed the monitoring results presented by the ACC in those
years.
(b) The monitoring report

35. The monitoring report on compliance with Article 7 of the Code
contained an overview per channel of data concerning screen time spent on
issues relating to specific political parties or specific political figures,
including the number of seconds during which those issues were presented in
a positive, negative or neutral manner. For each channel this overview was
accompanied by a number of comments. The report attested that the news
bulletins of the Vocea Basarabiei radio station and of the television channels
Moldova 1, Prime, EuroTV Chişinău and 2 Plus had presented news with a
balanced structure and had complied with the principle of providing
information from several sources in the event of conflicting issues.
Nonetheless, the monitoring results for Moldova 1 indicated that it had given
significantly more airtime to the ruling parties in its news bulletins.
36. As to NIT, the report indicated that the news items aired by it
concerning the AEI had lasted for over one hour and thirty-two minutes,
during which the AEI had been referred to in a neutral manner for only eight
seconds and the rest of the time in a negative manner. At the same time, the
news items concerning the PCRM had lasted for over forty-one minutes, of
which thirty-four minutes were neutral, six minutes were positive and only
forty-four seconds were negative. It was concluded that this imbalance was
in breach of Article 7 § 2 of the Code. Furthermore, the news items referred
only in a negative manner to representatives of the government, Parliament
and the Chişinău Mayor’s Office and the representatives of those bodies were
never given an opportunity to react as required by Article 7 § 4(c) of the Code.
The representatives of the PCRM and those involved in organising protests
together with the PCRM against the government were always praised or
referred to in a neutral manner.
9
37. The report also recorded that NIT’s news bulletins had publicised the
protest actions organised by the PCRM against the government, had included
an anti-government propaganda video clip and had featured captions
amounting to manipulation. In presenting a news item about an opinion poll
conducted by NIT reporters on the streets of Chişinău, Hânceşti and Străşeni,
NIT had, for example, presented exclusively the opinions of PCRM
supporters who had expressed critical views about the government. This was
found to be a breach of Article 7 § 4(c) of the Code.
38. It was further noted that in reporting about protests organised by the
PCRM, NIT had used captions and cited official declarations from those
protests without showing images of the actual documents referred to. Thus, it
was concluded that NIT had breached Article 7 § 4(a) of the Code, which
requires each news story to be accurate. Moreover, NIT was found to have
acted in breach of Article 7 § 4(b) because the news anchor had introduced
an item by saying: “Disturbed by the cynicism of the AEI, the Căuşeni local
councillors demand the resignation of the incompetent government”, before
reading out a declaration by members of the aforementioned local council.
39. Lastly, it was found that NIT had promoted aggressive journalistic
language, had often not complied with the requirements concerning the
diversification of sources, and had also used images, editing tricks or
comments in order to distort the real facts or to denigrate the image of other
subjects.
(c) The ACC’s decision

40. On 2 April 2012 the applicant company was provided with a copy of
the monitoring report. In the accompanying letter it was informed that its
news bulletins and those of the other national broadcasters had been
monitored following the ACC’s decision of 29 March (see paragraph 32
above), that the results of the monitoring would be examined at the ACC’s
public meeting of 5 April 2012, that this meeting would start at 10 a.m., and
that its presence at the meeting was mandatory.
41. The minutes of the 5 April 2012 meeting reveal that eight of the
ACC’s nine members were present and that NIT’s representative was also
present and answered questions. According to the minutes, NIT’s
representative had stated that although this might sound paradoxical, NIT was
pleased with the monitoring report because it mentioned NIT’s
predominantly neutral stance towards the PCRM and towards other political
parties. From the minutes it further appears that during the discussions which
ensued on the findings of the monitoring report on NIT, several ACC
members had described the way in which NIT had presented its news
bulletins as “manipulation” and “spreading fake news”. It was stated,
inter alia, that during one of the news bulletins one of the leaders of the AEI
had been compared to Hitler and all leaders had been referred to as
“criminals”, “bandits” and “crooks”. The terms used to describe the AEI
government had included “dictatorial regime”, “unconstitutional regime”,

“usurpers of power”, “traitors”, “the group of the three usurpers”, and
“criminal gang”. Some of the ACC members had believed that NIT’s news
bulletins incited to hatred, violence and xenophobia. For instance, in a news
item about anti-government demonstrations, slogans such as “usurpers, get
out of Moldova” or “enemies of the people” could be heard. In another news
item concerning an anti-government demonstration, people had been heard
saying: “we shall unleash a fight against the traitors in power to regain the
sovereignty of Moldova” and “we do not need pseudo-Romanianised and
Western stooges”. One member of the ACC had expressed the view that the
news bulletins had been presented in such a manner that no distinction could
be made between the facts presented in them and the biased opinions of the
journalists commenting on them. NIT had also been criticised for making
public announcements concerning the time and place of the anti-government
protests organised by the PCRM. One of the ACC members had stated that
the problem had not resided in the fact that the government had been
criticised, the television channel being free to criticise the government as
much as it wished in its shows. However, it was obliged to respect the rules
concerning pluralism in its news bulletins. One of the ACC members had
stated that Article 7 § 2 of the Code concerned rather the period for election
campaigns and that news bulletins could not remain neutral towards the
government. He believed that the monitoring had been conducted with the
sole purpose of imposing further sanctions on NIT and that if NIT’s
sanctioning by the ACC continued, this could be construed as an attack on
freedom of expression. He expressed the opinion that the other ACC members
were silently fulfilling political instructions and urged them to act responsibly
even though they had the power to close down a television channel.
42. At the end of the discussions the ACC member tasked with presenting
the findings of the monitoring report was given the floor and concluded by
saying that he always took responsibility and that today he was taking
responsibility in proposing that, in accordance with the gradual approach, a
sanction be imposed on NIT in the form of the revocation of its broadcasting
licence. The proposal was put to a vote and accepted by seven votes to one.
43. The ACC’s decision delivered on the same date reiterated the findings
set out in the monitoring report (see paragraphs 35-39 above). In addition, it
stated:
“At the same time, the breaches found fall under Article 10 § 5 of the ... Code...
Under the conditions of the broadcasting licence ..., point 3.1. letter (a): ̒ The licence
holder is obliged to carry out its activities in compliance with the ... Code ̓, and letter
(e), ‘to carry out its activities on condition of observing: the right to complete, truthful
and operative information within the meaning of the constitutional provisions, as well
as the pluralism of opinions.̓
At the same time, we should mention that ... NIT was publicly warned, by the ACC’s
decision ... of 18 May 2011, for breaches of the provisions of Article 7 ... of the ... Code.
11
By the ACC’s decision ... of 27 May 2011, a fine ... was imposed ... for repeated
breaches of the provisions of Article 7 ... of the ... Code. By the ACC’s decision ... of
3 June 2011, a sanction was applied ... in the form of suspension of the right to broadcast
commercial advertising ..., for repeated breaches of the provisions of Article 7 ... of the
... Code, and by the ACC’s decision ... of 24 June 2011, the ... [channel]’s broadcasting
licence was suspended ... for repeated breaches of the provisions of Article 7 ... of the
... Code.
Taking into account the ACC’s decisions ... of 6 November 2009, ... 15 September
2010, ... 18 May 2011, ... 27 May 2011, ... 3 June 2011 and ... 24 June 2011, as a result
of the examination of the monitoring report ..., [and] the public debates, on the basis of
the provisions of the ... Code..., the [ACC]
Decides:
... To approve the monitoring report ...
... To publicly warn ... the founder of the Moldova 1 television channel, for breaches
of the provisions of Article 7 § 2 of the Audiovisual Code, in accordance with Article 38
§ 3 ... (a) of the Audiovisual Code.
... To withdraw the broadcasting licence ... for the television channel NIT, in
accordance with Article 27 § 1 ... (a) and (b) and § 2 and Article 38 § 1 ... (e), § 2 ... (b)
and (f), § 3 of the ... Code, for repeated breaches of the provisions of Article 7 §§ 1, 2
and 4, ... (a), (b) and (c) and Article 10 § 5 of the ... Code and point 3.1, letters (a) and
(e) of the terms of the broadcasting licence.
...”
44. The ACC’s decision was published in the Official Gazette on 6 April
2012.
4. Proceedings against the revocation decision

(a) Preliminary challenge before the ACC
45. On 5 April 2012 the applicant company brought a preliminary
challenge before the ACC against the revocation decision, relying on
section 14 of Law no. 793-XIV/2000 on administrative court proceedings
(see paragraph 87 below) and seeking to have the revocation of the
broadcasting licence declared void. It argued, in essence, that the ACC’s
decision had been unlawful and unreasoned and had therefore interfered with
NIT’s editorial independence, in breach of the right to freedom of expression.
46. On 27 April 2012 the applicant company’s preliminary challenge was
dismissed by the ACC as being ill-founded. The ACC held, in short, that it
had revoked the broadcasting licence only after it had gradually applied all
the other sanctions provided for in Article 38 of the Code.
(b) Applications for interim measures

47. On 6 April 2012, at the same time as lodging an appeal against the
ACC’s decision of 5 April 2012 with the Chişinău Court of Appeal (“the
Court of Appeal”) (see paragraph 55 below), the applicant company also
asked the same court to stay the enforcement of the decision pending a
judgment on the merits and to take protective measures. The applicant

company relied on section 21 of Law no. 793-XIV/2000 on administrative
court proceedings (see paragraph 87 below) and on Articles 174, 175 and 177
of the Code of Civil Procedure (“the CCP”). It argued that the absence of a
protective measure would clearly cause difficulties when enforcing a
judgment on the merits in its favour and would very likely make that
judgment impossible to enforce. Also, it argued that the immediate
enforcement of the decision would result in serious and imminent losses for
the applicant company and would destroy its television channel.
48. The applicant company contended that, in accordance with the
applicable rules, the owner of the broadcasting licence had to return the
revoked licence to the ACC. Given the nature of the activity authorised by
the broadcasting licence, its owner would therefore be forced to suspend
broadcasting indefinitely or end it altogether. Thus, the psychological and
financial well-being of NIT’s employees would be affected and the television
channel would lose any current or future commercial endorsements and
would be forced to terminate other existing contracts, which could result in
significant financial liabilities and penalties. The impugned measure would
also breach the television channel’s right to freedom of expression, including
its right to impart information and the public’s right to receive it. Lastly, the
broadcasting frequencies covered by the licence would be made available to
other broadcasters through a public competition, rendering the enforcement
of a favourable judgment on the merits virtually impossible.
49. By an interlocutory judgment of 9 April 2012 the Court of Appeal
dismissed the applicant company’s application for a stay of enforcement. The
Court of Appeal held:
“Having reviewed the arguments raised [by the applicant company] in its application
..., [it] considers that the application is ill-founded and has to be dismissed ...
Under section 21(1) of Law no. 793-XIV/2000, the applicant [company] could ask for
a stay of enforcement of the administrative act at the same time as bringing proceedings
before the court.
The ... court [wishes] to mention that by the ACC decision ... of 5 April 2012 the
activity of the NIT television channel had in fact been stopped ... By staying [the
enforcement of] the contested administrative act, the court would expose itself [to the
risk] of determining the merits of the case, [a step] which is inadmissible at this stage
of the proceedings in accordance with the provisions of the CCP.
[Given] ... that the reasons for the [applicant company’s] application for a stay [of
enforcement] of the administrative act were not justified by it, the court ... considers
that it is necessary to dismiss the application ...”
50. On 10 April 2012 the applicant company repeated its application to
the Court of Appeal for a stay of enforcement, relying on the same provisions
of domestic law (see paragraph 47 above). It again argued that it might suffer
imminent and partly permanent damage, pointing to the fact that the
competent authorities had informed it on 6 April 2012 that its broadcasting
13
would be stopped and that one of the ACC members had confirmed in a press
statement the company’s concerns that the broadcasting frequencies covered
by the revoked licence would be advertised by way of public competition.
51. By an interlocutory judgment of 11 April 2012 the Court of Appeal
dismissed this application. It held:
“Having reviewed the arguments raised [by the applicant company] in its repeated
application ..., [it] considers that the application is ill-founded and has to be dismissed
...
... On 9 April 2012 the [court] dismissed a similar application by the applicant
company ...
... the interlocutory judgment ... of 9 April 2012 ... was served on the applicant
company’s representative on the same date, [together] with an explanation that [the
applicant company] could lodge an appeal on points of law [against the interlocutory
judgment] within fifteen days ... if [it] disagreed with that ... judgment.”
52. The applicant company appealed on points of law against both
interlocutory judgments. It argued that on 9 April 2012 the Court of Appeal
had dismissed its application of 6 April while ignoring its arguments about
the damage it would suffer if the ACC decision was enforced and the need
for protective measures in order to avoid making the enforcement of a
favourable judgment impossible. In addition, the applicant company argued
that the court’s observation that by staying the enforcement it would risk
prejudging the merits of the case was irrelevant. In the applicant company’s
submission, the court had ignored the fact that by dismissing the application
it had expressed an opinion on the outcome of the case in favour of the ACC.
53. The applicant company further argued that on 11 April 2012 the court
had dismissed its application of 10 April on the ground that that application
had been similar to the one of 6 April even though the applicant company’s
arguments and evidence showed that the former application had relied on
different circumstances from those referred to in the latter one, including the
fact that the television channel’s broadcasting activity had been stopped. No
explanation had been provided as to why the circumstances indicated by the
applicant company could not be characterised as being new.
54. By a judgment of 10 May 2012, not amenable to appeal, the Supreme
Court of Justice (“the Supreme Court”) dismissed the applicant company’s
appeal on points of law and upheld the lower court’s interlocutory judgments.
It held:
“... the solutions adopted by the [lower] courts were correct and complied with the
legal norms in force.
[Under Article 174 of the CCP], the court or the judge may take protective measures
in the case following a request by the parties to the proceedings. Protective measures
may be granted at any stage of the proceedings in circumstances where not taking such
measures would create judicial difficulties or would render impossible the enforcement
of the court judgment.
The applicant [asking] for protective measures has not presented the first-instance
court with evidence that could confirm a possible difficulty or impossibility in enforcing
a future favourable court judgment. However, the provisions of the cited norm can be
applied by the first-instance court which examines the application only in circumstances
where the parties to the proceedings who have asked for the [measure to be granted]
prove the possible existence of such consequences. Otherwise, an arbitrary application
of the cited norm could affect the rights and interests of another party to the proceedings
and breach one of the fundamental principles of civil proceedings as set out in Article 22
of the CCP.
Under section 21(1) of Law no. 793-XIV/2000, the applicant [company] may request
the administrative court to stay the enforcement of the contested administrative act at
the same time as lodging its application against that act.
Under subsection 2 of the [same] section [the court may also order a stay of
enforcement] of its own motion, but in such a case the court must establish damage that
is imminent and this finding must be well justified.
As transpires from ... section 21(2) of the Law ... [text], ... it falls within the court’s
discretion to assess how justified the need to order the stay ... is and [whether] this
intervention is going to prevent ... imminent damage.
The documents of the case confirm that ... the damage the applicant [company] claims
to have sustained ... [concerns] the losses it suffered ... [because of] the termination of
its commercial activities, which in turn was the result of the ACC’s decision whose
lawfulness and well-founded [nature] is contested and forms the scope of the case.
In other words, the administrative court is [called upon to examine] the [proceedings]
challenging the lawfulness of the administrative act, the results of which ... [are going
to be decisive] for the continuation of the [applicant company’s] activities.
Starting from the aforementioned considerations, the Court considers that the [first-
instance] court has correctly concluded that by the ACC’s decision ... of 5 April 2012
the activity of the NIT television channel had in fact been stopped and that by staying
[the enforcement of] the contested administrative act the court would expose itself [to
the risk] of determining the merits of the case, [a step] which is inadmissible at this
stage of the proceedings in accordance with the provisions of the CCP.
Moreover, the manner of recovering a loss suffered because of an administrative act
is provided for by Law [no. 793-XIV/2000] and was to be examined in the event that
the [applicant company’s action against the ACC] was allowed ...
For these reasons, the Court considers that the [applicant company’s] arguments
supporting its ... appeals on points of law cannot [be considered valid] grounds for
quashing the interlocutory judgments of the [lower] court ...
The applicant [company’s] allegation that the right to freedom of expression,
including the public’s right of access to information, might potentially be affected ... is
also [considered] by the court [to be] declaratory and unproven because ... there is no
evidence confirming such a situation.
The argument that the sale of the broadcasting frequencies could prevent the
enforcement of a possible judgment cannot be accepted and was correctly dismissed by
the [lower] court because it was grounded on mere suppositions.
Moreover, the legal provisions cited above give the court, where necessary, the
possibility of reconsidering throughout the judicial debates the issues deemed important
[in the case].
15
...”
(c) Proceedings on the merits before the Court of Appeal

(i) The applicant company’s submissions
55. The applicant company argued that the ACC’s decision of 5 April
2012 had been unlawful on substantive and procedural grounds. It stressed
that, according to the findings of the monitoring report, it had also referred to
the PCRM in a negative manner for forty-four seconds in its news bulletins.
It admitted that its news bulletins had been critical or even defamatory
towards the AEI. However, it pointed out that under the Convention it was
acceptable to criticise the government and that the freedom of the media
allowed journalists the right to exaggerate and act in a provocative manner.
According to the applicant company, it had thus acted in conformity with
Article 10 of the Convention. It expressed the view that the method chosen
by the State to ensure pluralism – as enacted in Article 7 of the Code – was
contrary to that Convention provision. It further submitted that the ACC’s
decision had not been lawful within the meaning of Article 10 as the law on
the basis of which the licence had been revoked had not made it clear that
such a serious sanction as the revocation of the licence could be imposed for
criticising the government. Nor had the ACC’s decision pursued a legitimate
aim, since the only aim pursued by the authorities had been to eliminate it
from the media market and get rid of a television channel critical of the
government. It stressed that the criticism of the government related to matters
of important public interest, such as foreign policy and domestic affairs. The
sanction imposed had been disproportionately harsh and the ACC had not
provided sufficient and pertinent reasons for that decision.
56. The applicant company also argued that the revocation of its licence
had been contrary to its rights guaranteed by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to
the Convention.
57. As regards the procedure, the applicant company submitted that
pursuant to Article 40 § 3 of the Code, the ACC’s decision of 29 March 2012
to carry out a monitoring process had entered into force on the date on which
it had been published in the Official Gazette, namely on 31 March 2012. The
monitoring report had been debated by the ACC at its meeting of 5 April
2012. The ACC had not observed the time-limits prescribed by
sections 3(2)(a) and 9 of Law no. 239-XVI/2008 on transparency in
decision-making (see paragraph 88 below). In addition, when adopting its
decision of 5 April 2012, as well as its decision of 24 June 2011, the ACC
had not acted in conformity with Article 27 § 2 of the Code in that it had
omitted to observe procedural requirements laid down in other laws before
suspending or revoking the licence. In particular, it had failed to apply to a
court within three working days from adopting its decisions, including the
one of 5 April 2012, as required by the CCP and section 17(3) of Law
no. 235-XVI/2006 on the basic principles of regulating entrepreneurial
activity. Also, the ACC had not provided any recommendations for
remedying the violations found following the monitoring and had not warned
the applicant company of the possible suspension or revocation of the licence
if the violations found were not remedied in due time, as required by
section 16(6)(e) of Law no. 235-XVI/2006 and section 19 of Law
no. 451-XV/2001 on regulating entrepreneurial activity through licensing.
Furthermore, the Constitutional Court had confirmed in its ruling of
6 December 2012 (see paragraphs 89-92 below) that the immediate
enforcement of the ACC’s decision of 5 April 2012 without waiting for the
outcome of the court proceedings examining the challenge against that
decision had been contrary to national legal and constitutional principles and
to the Convention.
58. The applicant company lastly contended that the ACC had been
politically biased and that certain leading politicians had influenced the
decision to revoke its licence.
(ii) The Court of Appeal’s judgment
59. On 11 February 2013 the Court of Appeal gave judgment and

dismissed the applicant company’s appeal as ill-founded. In so far as relevant
to the case before the Court, its reasoning included the following.
60. The court found that the ACC’s findings concerning NIT’s news
bulletins had been supported by the available evidence and that the ACC had
provided reasons for its decision to revoke the licence as also shown by the
minutes of the meeting of 5 April 2012. In addition, the court viewed the
recordings of the news bulletins and described in detail the contents of the
news bulletin of 6 February 2012. It found that this bulletin had lasted for
forty-one minutes of which thirty-nine minutes had been dedicated to
criticism of the governing parties. Words such as “bandits”, “criminals”,
“crooks”, “group of criminals”, “traitors”, and “swindlers” had been used to
describe the government and the parties forming it. Every minute contained
two or three such words and none of the persons mentioned in the bulletin
had been given a chance to react. The court considered the applicant
company’s allegations in this connection (see paragraph 55 above) to be
unfounded because they were contradicted by the aforementioned evidence
and grounded on an incorrect assessment of the applicable legal framework.
61. The court, addressing the applicant company’s complaint concerning
the method chosen by the State to ensure pluralism, found as follows:
“... the State has a positive obligation to ensure that the public has access to impartial
and trustworthy information through television and radio. It also has the obligation to
ensure the diversity of the opinions expressed via the above-mentioned media and it is
up to the State to choose the means by which the above objectives are to be reached.
The Moldovan State has opted for the method of implementation of the principle of
pluralism of opinions, by obliging television and radio stations, as the beneficiaries of
public broadcasting networks, to offer airtime to holders of all [political] views and
ideas. Moreover, when someone is criticised, the State has imposed on television and
17
radio stations an obligation to give that person the opportunity to react. The choice made
by the State is compatible with the so-called margin of appreciation under Article 10 of
the Convention ...
In this context, reference is made to ... the third sentence of paragraph 1 of Article 10
of the Convention, according to which: ‘This Article shall not prevent States from
requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.’
... audiovisual broadcasting is regulated by the Code, which is in line with
international standards and which received the approval of international bodies at the
time of its adoption ...
The law on the basis of which the television channel’s licence was revoked was
accessible and foreseeable, and NIT could have foreseen the consequences of its
behaviour.”
62. The court took the view that a broadcaster’s editorial independence
had to comply with the lawful requirements in the field and with society’s
interests.
63. The court accepted that the sanction imposed on the applicant
company had been very harsh. However, it considered it important that the
revocation of the licence had not been a spontaneous act which could not have
been foreseen by NIT. It noted that before imposing that sanction, the ACC
had made unsuccessful efforts for three years, between 2009 and 2012, to
make the television channel abide by the provisions of Article 7 of the Code.
The television channel had received sanctions on thirteen occasions between
2009 and 2012 for similar breaches and all those sanctions had been
ineffective:
“It is undisputed that the attempts undertaken by the ACC and the chances given to
the NIT television channel to return to legality, in conjunction with the sanctions
imposed, in the opinion of the court, were more than enough for NIT to draw the
appropriate conclusions and start complying with the law.
However, the court notes that NIT presented obvious characteristics of a violator of
the imperative norms in the field, ignoring all the attempts undertaken by society, in the
person of the [ACC], to keep NIT on the market of broadcasters in the Republic of
Moldova.”
64. The court noted that although all the legal conditions for the
revocation of the licence had been met much earlier (in 2010), the ACC had
imposed milder sanctions on two occasions instead of revoking the licence,
thus giving the applicant company additional chances to comply with the law
and avoid having its licence revoked. The court further noted that in 2011 the
television channel had contested only two of the five sanctions imposed on
it: the two official warnings had not been contested, and the fine had been
paid without being contested.
65. The Court of Appeal also took into account the fact that at the time of
the revocation of the licence, six of the sanctions imposed by the ACC had
been final, and that by the time of the adoption of its judgment, another four
sanctions had become final by way of final court judgments. Moreover, on
two occasions, the ACC had given NIT deadlines to comply with the law
without imposing any sanctions on it:
“... the court concludes that, by the date of the ACC’s decision no. 42 of 5 April 2012
regarding the revocation of NIT’s licence, out of all the sanctions applied to the NIT
television channel, six sanctions were in force and had legal effect, and subsequently,
by the time of the adoption of the decision in the case under examination, the legality
of four other sanctions imposed as a result of the ACC’s decisions has been confirmed
by irrevocable court decisions.”
66. The court further noted that in spite of all the efforts by the ACC to
make NIT stop violating the law and thus keep it on the market, the latter had
obstinately continued to do so, thus leaving no other option to the ACC but
to revoke the licence. It held:
“Had the ACC not imposed the harshest sanction on the television channel, it would
have sent the wrong signal to other broadcasters, which would have been led to believe
that failure to observe the law could not have serious consequences. Thus, the
imposition of the harshest sanction on the television channel corresponded to a strong
necessity in a democratic society, a necessity dictated by the obligation to impose
pluralism of opinions and the need to comply with the audiovisual legislation.”
67. The court also dismissed the applicant company’s allegations
concerning the breach of its rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the
Convention. It noted that the licence had been revoked for repeated breaches
of the law and that therefore, the revocation had been lawful, had pursued a
legitimate aim and had been necessary in a democratic society. The court also
considered unfounded the applicant company’s argument that the interference
had been disproportionate because of its exceptional and unjustifiably harsh
nature, which had ruined the applicant company’s entire professional activity,
depriving it of all the possible income from audiovisual activities, on the
grounds that during the years 2009 to 2012 NIT had not taken any measures
recommended by the ACC but had continued to breach the Code, a fact which
had eventually led to the revocation of the licence.
68. The court held, moreover, that the applicant company had not
submitted conclusive and pertinent evidence before it that could confirm the
damage alleged by it and that any losses suffered, including those from its
inability to honour its contractual obligations, were attributable to NIT’s
unlawful actions and therefore it had to accept responsibility for them.
69. As regards the procedural complaints, the court held that the ACC had
adopted the impugned decision in compliance with Articles 7, 10, 37, 38 and
40 of the Code and Articles 4, 5, 7, and 8 of the ACC’s articles of association
(see paragraphs 85-86 below) and by exercising its powers as set out in
Articles 37 and 40 of the Code. On 29 March 2012 the ACC had lawfully
ordered the monitoring of the news bulletins in accordance with the
provisions of Article 38 §§ 2(f) and 7 and Article 40 § 1(d) of the Code. In
line with the provisions of Article 38 § 7 of the Code, the applicant company
had been given a copy of the report on 2 April 2012 and had been informed
19
with sufficient advance notice of the date, place and time of the ACC’s
meeting at which the report was to be discussed. Its representative had had
sufficient time to become familiar with the contents of the report and to
prepare a defence, had attended the meeting of 5 April 2012 and had been
allowed to present the applicant company’s position without any restrictions.
The representative had not asked for an adjournment of the meeting in order
to have more time to study the report or to prepare his submissions, even
though he had had the right to do so. Therefore, the applicant company could
no longer claim that its rights had been affected because it had had insufficient
time for preparation.
70. The court further held in this connection that the applicant company’s
argument to the effect that the ACC’s decision had breached section 9 of Law
no. 239-XVI/2008 was ill-founded. The court observed that the applicant
company had never challenged the lawfulness of the ACC’s decision of
29 March 2012, so that it had not ceased to have effect. Moreover, the
lawfulness of that decision had not been the subject of the instant case. The
court also took the view that the Code was lex specialis and that therefore,
the provisions of the Law on regulating entrepreneurial activity through
licensing and the Law on the basic principles of regulating entrepreneurial
activity were not applicable to the case:
“The court considers unfounded the opinion of the representative of NIT according to
which the ACC’s decision no. 42 of 5 April 2012 is unlawful in that other decisions
previously adopted by the [ACC] do not include provisions on requirements and
recommendations for removing the violations found, which should be implemented
pursuant to the Law on regulating entrepreneurial activity through licensing (no. 451-
XV of 30 July 2001), because, in its activity, the [ACC] is governed by the provisions
of the special law, namely the Code, which lays down the conditions and procedure for
withdrawing the licence, and the provisions of the Code in this regard have been
observed.
At the same time, it is a well-known fact that, on the basis of the type of activity carried
out by [NIT], in the light of the present dispute, the Law on regulating entrepreneurial
activity through licensing (no. 451-XV of 30 July 2001) and the Law on the basic
principles of regulating entrepreneurial activity (no. 235-XVI of 20 July 2006) are not
applicable to the present case; thus, the references made to the provisions of those Laws
are likewise unfounded.”
71. As regards the applicant company’s argument that the findings of the
Constitutional Court in its ruling of 6 December 2012 (see paragraphs 89-92
below) on the constitutionality of the amendment to Article 38 of the Code
enacted on 29 May 2012, were relevant and applicable to its case, the Court
of Appeal found that those findings were not applicable and dismissed the
applicant company’s argument by making reference to the Law on the
Constitutional Court, which stated that the rulings of the Constitutional Court
did not have retroactive effect:
“It should be mentioned that, in accordance with the provisions of section 26(7) of
Law no. 317 of 13 December 1994 on the [Constitutional Court] of the Republic of
Moldova, the decisions of the [Constitutional Court] take effect only for the future, and
the court conducting the administrative proceedings reviews the lawfulness of an

administrative act with reference to the date when that act was adopted.”
72. The court lastly dismissed as unsubstantiated the applicant company’s
allegation that the ACC’s decision had been influenced by leading politicians.
It took the view that the argument that NIT had been discriminated against by
the ACC could not be accepted, given that NIT had been monitored at the
same time and under the same conditions as other broadcasters and that other
broadcasters had also been punished where breaches of the Code had been
found. It added that the monitoring methodology had been developed in
cooperation with international experts and had been approved by members of
civil society operating in the field after public deliberations.
(d) Proceedings before the Supreme Court

(i) The applicant company’s submissions
73. The applicant company appealed on points of fact and law against the
Court of Appeal’s judgment and argued, in so far as relevant to the case before
the Court, that it had misinterpreted and misapplied the relevant provisions
concerning its right to freedom of expression. It repeated the arguments
submitted to the Court of Appeal (see paragraph 55 above) and added that all
the insults directed at the government had been shouted out by the protesters
at meetings organised by the PCRM and that NIT had merely reported on the
events in question. Therefore, the television channel was not responsible for
the slogans shouted during those events. Moreover, the persons in respect of
whom criticism had been expressed had not been offered an opportunity to
react to that criticism because they had not asked for such an opportunity.
74. In addition, the applicant company submitted that the lower court had
wrongly concluded that the ACC had not failed to observe the principle of
gradual application of the sanctions when revoking its licence. It noted in
particular that the harshest sanction had been applied at a time when the
previous two sanctions were still being disputed in the courts. It was the
applicant company’s position that the ACC could only apply the next sanction
after the courts had ruled on the previous ones. Otherwise, its right to an
effective remedy within the meaning of Article 13 of the Convention would
be breached. The applicant company also contended that through its judgment
the Court of Appeal had breached Article 6 of the Convention and Article 1
of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention and had ignored the Court’s relevant
case-law in that regard.
75. Furthermore, the applicant company repeated its argument relating to
the time-limit set out in section 9 of Law no. 239-XVI/2008 (see paragraph 57
above), adding that the ACC had not been exempted from observing it even
though the applicant company had not asked for the meeting of 5 April 2012
to be adjourned.
21
76. The applicant company also submitted that the lower court had
wrongly established that the licence revocation procedure provided for in
Laws nos. 235-XVI/2006 and 451-XV/2001 had not been applicable to the
case. The lower court’s finding had ignored an explanation provided by the
Plenary of the Supreme Court in a judgment of 28 May 2012 to the effect that
all licensing bodies had to initiate court proceedings after they had issued
decisions suspending or revoking an entrepreneurial licence. In addition,
according to the Constitutional Court’s judgment of 6 December 2012, the
type of activity carried out by NIT could not exempt the licensing body from
initiating the aforementioned court proceedings.
(ii) The Supreme Court’s judgment
77. By a judgment of 2 May 2013 the Supreme Court dismissed the

applicant company’s appeal on points of fact and law. The court endorsed the
reasoning given by the Court of Appeal, noting that that court had correctly
interpreted and assessed the relevant laws and available evidence, including
the fact that the lawful conditions and procedure for the revocation of the
licence had been complied with and that Law no. 451-XV/2001 had not been
applicable to the case.
78. The Supreme Court further emphasised that the measure of revocation
of the applicant company’s licence had been necessary in order to enforce the
rules concerning the pluralism of opinions and in order to enforce the rule of
law. It took the view that the ACC had applied the sanctions by complying
with the principle of gradual application of sanctions and, as an exceptional
measure, had given NIT more chances to redress its behaviour than it was
obliged to give under the law in force, thus doing everything reasonably
possible and more in order to convince NIT to start abiding by the law. Since
NIT had refused to comply, the authorities had had no other solution but to
apply the harshest measure. The applicant company’s interpretation of the
provisions of the Code concerning the manner of and the procedure for the
application of sanctions had been ill-founded.
5. Reactions to the revocation of NIT’s broadcasting licence

79. The revocation of NIT’s licence gave rise to many reactions. For
instance, on 11 April 2012 the Union of Journalists of Moldova issued a
declaration in which it expressed the view that the ACC’s decision to revoke
the applicant company’s licence to broadcast was justified in view of the fact
that NIT had engaged in a practice of breaching the Code and acting in a
manner incompatible with the professional ethics of journalists. According to
the Union of Journalists, NIT had acted as a propaganda tool of one political
party, contrary to all the standards of fair journalism.
80. In an interview of 11 April 2012, the Secretary General of the Council

of Europe stated the following with regard to the revocation of the applicant
company’s licence:
“The Council of Europe has always upheld the principle of media pluralism in its
Member States. We firmly believe that free media are an important part of any
functioning democratic society. We are aware that NIT is in [the] process of appealing
the decision and that several cases are still pending in the courts with regard to last
year’s sanctions against NIT... We hope that the judicial process will be carried out in
line with standards established by the ... Convention ... and its Article 10 in particular.
We also note the reaction of other international organisations present in Chişinău. The
Council of Europe will continue to closely follow this case.”
81. The EU Mission to Moldova took note of the revocation of NIT’s
licence and called on the national authorities to apply the same legal
provisions to all broadcasters. The Mission stressed the importance of
pluralism in the mass media and the importance of reflecting the point of view
of the opposition.
6. Subsequent developments
82. After the revocation of its broadcasting licence, NIT continued to
share content such as news bulletins, reports and videos through its Internet
homepage and its YouTube channel until the end of 2014.
83. The applicant company did not reapply for a broadcasting licence.
RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND PRACTICE
I. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE
A. Domestic law
1. The Constitution
84. The relevant provisions of the Constitution of the Republic of
Moldova, as in force at the material time, read as follows:
Article 32
Freedom of opinion and expression
“1. Every citizen shall be guaranteed the freedom of thought and opinion, as well as
the freedom of expression in public by way of word, image or other possible means.
2. Freedom of expression may not prejudice the honour, dignity or right of another
person to his or her own vision.
3. It shall be prohibited and punished by law to challenge and defame the State and
the people, to call for a war of aggression or national, racial or religious hatred, to incite
discrimination, territorial separatism, or public violence, and to engage in other actions
that threaten the constitutional regime.”
23
Article 46
The right to private property and its protection
“1. The right to private property, as well as claims against the State, are guaranteed.
2. No one may be subjected to expropriation except in the public interest, established
in accordance with the law, in return for just and prior compensation.
3. Lawfully acquired assets may not be confiscated. The lawful nature of the
acquisition shall be presumed.
4. Goods intended for, used for or resulting from criminal or administrative offences
may be seized only in accordance with the law.
5. The right to private property shall oblige the owner to comply with the duties
relating to the protection of the environment and the provision of good neighbourliness,
as well as to the other duties which, in accordance with the law, fall to the owner.
6. The right to inherit private property shall be guaranteed.”
2. The Audiovisual Code of 2006

85. The relevant provisions of the Audiovisual Code of the Republic of
Moldova, as in force at the material time, read as follows:
Article 7
Political and social balance and pluralism
“1. In keeping with respect for fundamental freedoms and human rights, political and
social pluralism, cultural, linguistic and religious diversity, information, education and
entertainment of the public shall be realised and ensured through the transmission and
retransmission of programme services.
2. When giving airtime to a political party or movement for the propagation
(propagarea) of its position, a broadcaster shall also give airtime to other political
parties and movements within the same type of programme and in the same time slot,
without any unjustified delay and without favouring a certain party, regardless of the
percentage of its parliamentary representation.
...
4. In order to ensure the observance of the principles of social and political balance,
fairness and objectivity within [their] news programmes, [broadcasters] shall ensure
that:
(a) each news story is accurate;
(b) the sense of reality is not distorted by means of editing tricks, comments, wording
or headlines;
(c) the principle of multi‐source information is observed in cases of news stories
covering conflict situations.
...”
Article 8
Independence and editorial freedom
“1. Broadcasters under the jurisdiction of the Republic of Moldova have the right to
decide freely on the content of their broadcasts and programmes, respecting the
principle of plurality of opinions in accordance with the legal framework and the
conditions set out in the broadcasting licence.
...”
Article 10
Programme consumer rights
“...
5. Broadcasters shall ensure that information given to the public is presented
objectively and shall favour the free formation of opinions.
...”
Article 23
Broadcasting licences
“1. Licences for broadcasting programme services by means of terrestrial
radio-electric waves shall be issued by the Audiovisual Coordinating Council following
a competitive process ...
...
3. The Audiovisual Coordinating Council shall issue a broadcasting licence subject
to the following conditions:
(a) the issuing of a broadcasting licence shall be conditional on a subsequent
observance of the objectives set out in the Strategy on covering the national territory
with audiovisual programme services, in compliance with the National Plan of Radio
Frequencies;
(b) the issuing of a broadcasting licence shall be deemed to meet the principles of
ensuring pluralism in the audiovisual field, precluding the creation of any potential
conditions for monopolistic ownership and media concentration in the audiovisual
sector in particular and in the mass media in general, taking into consideration the
degree of compliance with this requirement of the broadcasters already issued with a
licence;
(c) a decision granting a licence shall be made taking into consideration the
applicant’s financial viability and the extent to which the applicant’s proposals coincide
with his or her real financial potential;
(d) applicants offering programmes of domestic production and European works
shall take precedence in the competitive process for a broadcasting licence.
4. The licensing terms and the procedure shall be published in the Official Gazette of
the Republic of Moldova and on the Audiovisual Coordinating Council’s website.
5. A broadcasting licence for terrestrial radio and/or television programme services
shall be granted for a seven-year period, whereas for cable radio or television
programme services [it shall be granted] for a six-year period;
6. In accordance with the Strategy on covering national territory with audiovisual
programme services, the Audiovisual Coordinating Council shall publish an
25
advertisement regarding the competition for available frequencies in the Official

Gazette of the Republic of Moldova, on the Council’s website and in other media,
including local media. The advertisement shall comprise the following information:
(a) application terms and deadline;
(b) the type of media (television, radio, and so on);
(c) the type of programmes required;
(d) technical parameters of frequencies, maximum capacity of transmitters, and
territorial coverage;
(e) the validity period of a broadcasting licence;
(f) the State fee for the broadcasting licence;
(g) an application form which shall provide at least the following obligatory
information: organisational structure and capital of the applicant institution, the owner’s
identification data, contents and duration of the proposed programmes, programme
orientation, potential audience, sources of financing the programme services, copies of
agreements on purchasing or renting the necessary equipment, and any other data
confirming the applicant’s technical potential;
(h) a business plan covering the validity period of the acquired broadcasting licence,
and information regarding other mass media activities.
7. The Audiovisual Coordinating Council shall publish the plans of the proposed
programme services and information on the participants in the competitive process, on
the basis of the applications submitted.
8. The Audiovisual Coordinating Council shall set the date for carrying out the
competitive process within twenty days of the date on which the deadline expires.
9. After an objective and impartial review of all the applications, according to the
criteria under paragraph 3, the Audiovisual Coordinating Council shall designate the
winner of the competition.
10. The Audiovisual Coordinating Council shall adopt a decision regarding the
results of the competition which shall be published in the Official Gazette of the
Republic of Moldova within fifteen days from the date of its adoption; this decision
may be contested in a court.
11. A broadcasting licence for public programme services shall comprise exhaustive
requirements as set out in the Code.
12. Licence holders shall notify the Audiovisual Coordinating Council in writing of
the starting date of their broadcasting at least seventy-two hours before the first
broadcast.”
Article 27
Revocation of a broadcasting licence
“1. The Audiovisual Coordinating Council may revoke a broadcasting licence if:
(a) the licensee continually fails to fulfil the conditions specified in the licence;
(b) the licensee violates the requirements of this Code;
...
2. The Audiovisual Coordinating Council shall withdraw the broadcasting licence, in

accordance with the procedure and in the manner established by this Code and other
legislation, only after exhausting the other sanctions provided for in Article 38 of this
Code.
...”
Article 37
Supervision and monitoring
“1. The Audiovisual Coordinating Council shall supervise the implementation and
observance of the provisions of this Code.
2. In exercising its duties, the Audiovisual Coordinating Council may request the
necessary information from broadcasters or service providers, specifying the legal basis
and the purpose of the request and shall set the deadlines within which this information
should be delivered.
3. Monitoring activities shall be performed as follows: (a) [by the Council] of its own
motion; (b) at the request of a public authority; (c) following a complaint filed by a
natural or legal person claiming to have been directly affected by a violation of
legislation in this field.
4. The Audiovisual Coordinating Council shall examine the submitted claims and
requests within fifteen days from the date of receiving them. The results of the
monitoring and, where appropriate, the decision to apply a sanction shall be published
on the Council’s website.”
Article 38
Sanctions
“1. If a broadcaster violates the legal rules, one of the following sanctions shall be
applied:
(a) a public warning;
(b) withdrawal of the right to broadcast advertisements for a certain period of time;
(c) a fine;
(d) suspension of the broadcasting licence for a certain period of time;
(e) revocation of the broadcasting licence;
2. Under this Code the following shall constitute breaches:
...
(b) transmission of programme services violating the conditions of the broadcasting
licence;
...
(f) transmission of programme services which, as a consequence, lead to the violation
of the provisions of Article 6, Article 7 §§ 2 to 4, Article 10 §§ 1 and 5, Article 11 §§ 2
to 8, Article 17 ...
27
3. The sanctions provided for in paragraph 1 shall be applied gradually as follows:

(a) the Audiovisual Coordinating Council shall issue a warning and publish it on its
website if a broadcaster or service provider violates the provisions of this Code or the
regulatory decisions of the Audiovisual Coordinating Council;
(b) if a broadcaster or service provider fails to [comply] within the deadlines and with
the conditions specified in the warning or repeatedly violates the same provisions, a
fine of 100 to 300 times the minimum wage shall be imposed;
(c) if a broadcaster or service provider fails to [comply after the imposition of a fine],
the Audiovisual Coordinating Council shall gradually apply the other sanctions
provided for in this Code.
4. The Audiovisual Coordinating Council may issue a decision regarding the
administrative offence, apply an administrative sanction or bring the matter to court and
criminal proceedings shall be instituted [against the broadcaster or service provider].
5. A broadcasting licence shall be withdrawn in accordance with Article 27 only if a
recurrent and serious violation of the provisions of the Code [has] occurred.
6. During the period of rehabilitation, provided for in the warning, the Audiovisual
Coordinating Council shall contribute fully to [ensuring that] the broadcaster concerned
complies with the law.
7. The Audiovisual Coordinating Council shall inform the broadcaster or service
distributor of any investigation concerning it and of any charges against it and shall give
it the opportunity to present its case to the Council.
8. A decision of the Audiovisual Coordinating Council on the imposition of any
sanction shall be reasoned and published on its website.
9. Any decision of the Audiovisual Coordinating Council to impose a sanction may
be challenged in court by the broadcaster or service distributor against which the
sanction was imposed.
10. A decision by the Audiovisual Coordinating Council imposing a sanction which
is not contested within the time-limit set shall constitute a writ of enforcement.”
Article 40
Duties of the Audiovisual Coordinating Council
“1. The Audiovisual Coordinating Council shall:
(a) supervise the performance of the obligations of public and private broadcasters
specified in the broadcasting licence within the meaning of and in accordance with the
legal provisions;
(b) supervise the accuracy of the content of programmes provided by broadcasters
only after broadcast;
...
(d) monitor, in accordance with paragraph 1(b), the content of programmes provided
by broadcasters and programme service packages guaranteed by service providers on a
periodic basis and whenever the Council deems it necessary, and whenever a complaint
is filed with regard to a broadcaster’s failure to observe the legal provisions, regulation
standards in the field or obligations specified in the broadcasting licence;
...
3. In the exercise of its powers, the Audiovisual Coordinating Council shall adopt
binding decisions, which shall enter into force on the date of [their] publication in the
Official Gazette of the Republic of Moldova.
4. All decisions of the Audiovisual Coordinating Council shall be reasoned.
Decisions, including the reasons, shall be published in the Official Gazette of the
Republic of Moldova and on the [Council’s] website.
5. Decisions of the Audiovisual Coordinating Council may be challenged in
administrative courts by any person who considers himself or herself prejudiced by
them.”
Article 41
Obligations of the Audiovisual Coordinating Council
“1. As a guarantor of the public interest in the field of audiovisual communication
based on democratic principles and the protection of programme consumer rights, the
Council shall:
(a) supervise the observance of the pluralist expression of ideas and opinions in the
programmes aired by broadcasters under the jurisdiction of the Republic of Moldova;
...”
Article 42
Structure of the Audiovisual Coordinating Council
“1. The Council shall consist of nine members, appointed by the Parliament of the
Republic of Moldova.
2. Candidates for the office of the member of the Council shall be selected by the
corresponding parliamentary commission [on the media] and by the commission on
law, nominations and immunities, which afterwards shall submit these candidates to
Parliament for approval. The candidates may be proposed by public associations,
foundations, trade unions, employers’ associations and religious organisations. The
candidacies shall be submitted to the [media] commission. When the list of candidates
is submitted to Parliament, the commission [on the media] shall draw up a report, and
the law commission shall draw up a co-report.
3. The members of the Audiovisual Coordinating Council shall be approved by a
decision of Parliament. If a candidate for the office of ACC member does not receive
the necessary number of votes, the commission [on the media] and the commission on
law, nominations and immunities shall nominate another candidate within two weeks.
4. The position of member of the Council can be occupied by any person who meets
the following requirements:
(a) has a university degree and at least five years’ experience in one of the following
fields: audiovisual, communication technologies, law, finance, accounting,
management, or informational development in a creative team at any institution;
(b) is at least 25 years old and has not reached the legal age of retirement;
(c) speaks the official language of the Republic of Moldova;
(d) has no previous convictions;
...”
29
Article 43
Members of the Audiovisual Coordinating Council
“1. The members of the Council shall be guarantors of the public interest and shall
not represent the authority that has nominated them.
2. The members’ term of office shall be six years. Their appointment shall be made
gradually: initially, three candidates shall be elected for a six-year term, three for a
four-year term and three for a two-year term. When the initial terms of office expire,
other candidates for the position of ACC member shall be appointed for a six-year term
upon proposals made by the parliamentary [media] commission and the commission on
law, nominations and immunities, after receiving a notification from the ACC.
3. During their term of office, the members of the Council may not be dismissed from
office, except during the period defined by this Code for forfeiture of office on grounds
of incompatibility.
4. No person shall serve two consecutive terms of office as a member of the
Audiovisual Coordinating Council.
5. The position of member of the Council shall become vacant in the following cases:
(a) resignation;
(b) expiry of the term of office;
(c) conviction by a final court judgement ...;
(d) loss of citizenship of the Republic of Moldova;
(e) physical or mental incapacity;
(f) reaching the age of retirement;
6. The members of the Council shall hold public dignity functions.
7. After being approved by Parliament, the members of the Audiovisual Coordinating
Council shall swear the following oath during a plenary meeting:
‘I swear to observe the Constitution and the laws of the Republic of Moldova, to
defend the rights and the fundamental freedoms of citizens, to accomplish the
prerogatives that this position bears with honour, consciously and without bias, [and]
not to make any political declarations during the validity of my mandate’.”
Article 47
Funding of the Audiovisual Coordinating Council
“1. The funding of the Audiovisual Coordinating Council shall cover the estimated
cost of all its activities, so that the Council may work effectively and efficiently, and
completely fulfil its duties.
2. The Audiovisual Coordinating Council’s budget shall be formed from the
following sources:
(a) government subsidies;
(b) income from the fees for licensing;
(c) income from the annual fee paid by broadcasters to cover regulatory expenses
amounting to 1% of their annual turnover;
(d) grants.
3. The share of the budget of the Audiovisual Coordinating Council that derives from
sources other than government subsidies shall constitute the Broadcasters’ Support
Fund, which shall have separate regulations, drawn up and published by the Council.
The Fund may not be used for remuneration of the Council’s members and employees.
31. State budget subsidies offered to public broadcasters in accordance with the
present Code shall not be taken into consideration when determining the tax covering
regulatory expenses.
4. The Audiovisual Coordinating Council shall annually present before Parliament a
budget proposal on the estimated costs of the activities planned by the Council to
accomplish its duties and obligations.
5. The proposals submitted by the Audiovisual Coordinating Council on the budget
and its organisational structure shall be considered and approved at a plenary meeting
of the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova.
6. The Audiovisual Coordinating Council shall publish an annual report on its
financial activity in the Official Gazette.”
Article 66
Private broadcasters
“...
3. A natural or legal person may hold a maximum of five broadcasting licences in the
same territorial administrative unit or zone, without the possibility of exclusivity.
4. A natural or legal person from Moldova or from abroad may be an investor or
majority shareholder, directly or indirectly, in a maximum of two broadcasting outlets
of different types.
...”
3. The Audiovisual Coordinating Council’s articles of association and

the Regulations on the procedure and conditions for issuing
broadcasting licences and retransmission authorisations
86. The relevant provisions of Articles 4-9 of the Audiovisual
Coordinating Council’s articles of association and of Article 27 of the
Regulations on the procedure and conditions for issuing broadcasting licences
and retransmission authorisations – both of which instruments were approved
by Parliament’s Decision no. 433-XVI of 28 December 2006 – as in force at
the material time, read as follows:
Article 4
“The members of the Council shall supervise:
(a) compliance by audiovisual institutions with the legislation and legal rules in force;
(b) external relations in the field;
(c) licensing of audiovisual programme genres;
(d) the activity of audiovisual institutions in the territory;
(e) the monitoring of audiovisual programmes;
31
(f) the prospects for the development of the domestic audiovisual [sector];
g) management of internal resources, and so on.”
Article 5
“1. The Council shall meet at public meetings twice a month or whenever necessary.
2. The agenda of the meeting, accompanied by the relevant documentation, shall be
forwarded to all members of the Council and, where appropriate, to the directorates
concerned at least seventy-two hours before the start of the meeting.
3. At the start of a meeting, the agenda may be supplemented, on a proposal from the
members of the Council, with the agreement of the majority.
4. The Council shall meet compulsorily when applications for broadcasting licences,
retransmission authorisations, regulatory decisions and proposals for sanctions are
submitted for approval and when monitoring and inspection reports are debated.”
Article 6
“...
2. The debates of the Council and the manner in which decisions and other measures
are taken shall be recorded in the minutes of the meeting, signed by the President of the
Council.”
Article 7
“The Council shall deliberate in the presence of at least six of its members and
decisions shall be taken if they receive the votes of at least five members.”
Article 8
“In the exercise of its powers, the Council shall adopt decisions, instructions or, where
appropriate, recommendations.”
Article 9
“Council decisions are administrative acts and shall be reasoned.”
Article 27
Revocation of a licence
“1. A broadcasting licence shall be revoked:
(a) in the cases mentioned in Article 27 of the Audiovisual Code;
...
2. Within fifteen working days, starting from the day the grounds are established, the
Council shall adopt a decision concerning the revocation of the licence and, within no
more than five working days from the date of adoption of the decision, it shall notify
the licence holder thereof, indicating the reasons for the revocation.
...
5. The owner of a licence that has been revoked may not apply for a new licence for
the same type of activity until twelve months have expired from the date on which the
revoked licence was returned to the Council.”
4. Law on administrative court proceedings

87. The relevant provisions of Law no. 793-XIV of 10 February 2000 on
administrative court proceedings, as in force at the material time, read as
follows:
Section 3
Subject matter of administrative court proceedings
“(1) The subject matter of administrative court proceedings shall be administrative
acts, of a normative and individual nature, by which a right of a person, including a
third party, recognised by law has been violated, issued by:
(a) public authorities and authorities treated as equivalent for the purposes of this
Law;
...”
Section 14
Preliminary challenge
“(1) A person who considers that his or her rights recognised by law have been
violated by an administrative act shall, by means of a preliminary challenge, request the
issuing public authority, within thirty days of the date of notification of the act, to
revoke it, in whole or in part, unless otherwise provided for by law.
...”
Section 15
Procedure for examination of a preliminary challenge
“(1) A preliminary challenge shall be examined by the issuing body or the
hierarchically superior body within thirty days of the date of its registration, the
decision being communicated forthwith to the petitioner unless otherwise provided by
law.
...”
Section 16
Submission of an application for appeal to the administrative court
“(1) A person who considers that his or her rights recognised by law have been
violated by an administrative act and is not satisfied with the reply received to the
preliminary challenge, or has not received any reply within the time-limit laid down by
law, shall have the right to refer the matter to the administrative court competent to set
aside that act, in whole or in part, and to award compensation for the damage caused.
(2) The action may be referred directly to the administrative court in cases expressly
provided for by law and in cases where the person considers that his or her rights have
been violated by the failure to decide on [the preliminary challenge] within the legal
time-limit or by the dismissal of the preliminary challenge ...
33
...”
Section 21
Suspension of the execution of the contested administrative act
“(1) An applicant may request the court to suspend the execution of an administrative
act at the same time as lodging his application against that act.
(2) In justified cases and with a view to preventing imminent damage, the court may
order the suspension of an administrative act of its own motion.
(3) As a derogation from the provisions of subsections (1) and (2), the acts of the
National Commission on Financial Markets and the Court of Accounts cannot be
suspended before the examination of the case.
...”
5. Law on transparency in decision-making

88. The relevant provisions of Law no. 239-XVI of 13 November 2008
on transparency in decision-making read as follows:
Section 3
Scope of this Law
“(1) The scope of this Law shall be the totality of the legal relations established in
the decision-making process between citizens, associations established in accordance
with the law, or other interested parties, on the one hand, and public authorities, on the
other.
(2) The following shall be covered by this Law:
(a) central public authorities: Parliament and the authorities created by it
(... Audiovisual Coordinating Council, ....) ...
...”
Section 9
Announcement concerning the initiation of the decision-making process
“(1) Upon initiation of the decision-making process, the public authority shall, at
least fifteen working days before the decision is examined, place a notice on the official
website, send it by email to the interested parties, display it at its premises in a space
accessible to the public and/or disseminate it in the national or local media, as
appropriate.
(2) The notice of initiation of the decision-making process shall necessarily indicate:
(a) the need to adopt the decision;
(b) the deadline, the place and the manner in which citizens, associations established
in accordance with the law and other interested parties may have access to the draft
decision and submit or send recommendations;
(c) the contact details of the persons responsible for receiving and examining the
recommendations.”
B. Subsequent developments in domestic law
1. Amendments to the Audiovisual Code of 2006 and the ruling of the

Constitutional Court
89. On 13 April 2012 the Moldovan Parliament passed Law no. 84, which
amended paragraphs 8 and 10 of Article 38 and paragraph 3 of Article 40 of
the Audiovisual Code of 2006. The Law amended Article 38 § 8 of the Code
to read:
“The decision of the Audiovisual Coordinating Council on the application of any
sanction shall be reasoned and shall become enforceable from the date of adoption and
notification of the broadcasters and service distributors concerned by registered letter,
with subsequent publication in the Official Gazette of the Republic of Moldova and on
the website of the issuing body.”
In addition, the Law repealed paragraph 10 of Article 38. Lastly, it
supplemented Article 40 § 3 in fine to read “..., with the exception of the
decisions referred to in Article 38 § 8”. Law no. 84 entered into force on
29 May 2012 after it was published in the Official Gazette on the same date.
90. In July 2012 a member of parliament successfully challenged the
amendment of Article 38 § 8 of the Code before the Constitutional Court. In
a ruling of 6 December 2012 the Constitutional Court declared the
amendment unconstitutional, by a majority, only in so far as it concerned two
of the sanctions provided for by Article 38, namely the suspension of the
broadcasting licence for a certain period of time and the revocation of the
broadcasting licence, after finding that it contravened the provisions of the
Constitution guaranteeing the right to property and the right to freedom of
expression. By contrast the Constitutional Court found that the amendment
of Article 38 § 8 of the Code was constitutional in so far as the remaining
three sanctions provided for in Article 38 were concerned. One of the judges
of the bench wrote a separate opinion.
91. Firstly, in respect of the allegations that the impugned amendment
breached broadcasters’ right to property, the Constitutional Court held,
amongst other things:
“...
56. As regards the legitimate purpose pursued by the interference, the Court cannot
accept, in this particular case, Parliament’s and the government’s argument that the
restrictions imposed on broadcasters serve the public interest ...
57. Respect for the right to property also implies compliance with procedural
safeguards provided for by law against arbitrariness, so that the measure in question is
correctly applied in relation to each case. In particular, there is not a sufficient legal
guarantee to protect broadcasters against the Audiovisual Coordinating Council making
use of its discretion.
58. Unlike the banking system ..., considered to be an area of major importance to
society, in which the discretion enjoyed by the State presupposes its right to establish
separate rules in relation to other similar areas subject to regulation, taking into account
35
the specificities of the audiovisual field and its importance for communicating
information and ideas to the public, such severe measures as the suspension or
revocation of a licence have to be reviewed concretely by the court prior to their
enforcement.
59. In reviewing the ‘fair balance’ between the competing interests at stake – the
general public interest, which, in the present case, would be that of preventing possible
culpable actions by the broadcaster in bad faith, of such a kind as to create or amplify
the situations which led to the interference, and the individual interests of the
broadcaster – the authorities have not argued, and the Court does not find any other
arguments [to this effect], that there is a risk of serious imminent damage to the public,
which would justify the need to immediately enforce such decisions of the Audiovisual
Coordinating Council, in the absence of a decision of a court or, at the very least, of the
possibility of challenging [them] in court prior to enforcement.
60. The [Constitutional] Court, in this particular situation, considers that the
immediate enforcement of the sanction ... of suspension or revocation of the licence is
not justified ... [by] a major [public] interest ...
61. For these reasons ..., the Court considers that the provisions of Article 38 § 8 of
the ... Code, ... in the part relating to the imposition of sanctions in the form of
suspension or revocation of licences, does not strike a fair balance between the interests
of the community and those of broadcasters, imposing an excessive individual burden
on [the latter] ...
62. In the light of the above, the Court concludes that the provisions of paragraph 8
of Article 38 relating to the immediate enforcement, pending an appeal to a court, of
the decisions of the Audiovisual Coordinating Council concerning the suspension and
revocation of a licence contravene not only the basic principles concerning
entrepreneurial activity, but also the constitutional guarantees regarding the right to
property of the founders of audiovisual institutions and its protection, enshrined in
Article 46 of the Constitution, and represent ‘an interference with the right to enjoy
property’, taking into account the immediate effect of these decisions and, as a result,
the prevention of the holder from continuing his or her [activity] ...”
92. Secondly, with regard to the allegations that the impugned amendment
breached the right of broadcasters to freedom of expression, the
Constitutional Court held, amongst other things:
“...
72. ... the [Constitutional] Court considers that the measure of suspension or
revocation of the broadcaster’s licence is liable to affect the substance of the procedural
guarantees which broadcasters should enjoy under Article 10 of the Convention and is
incompatible with the principle of the rule of law.
73. Consequently, the [Constitutional] Court considers that, under the specific
circumstances ..., such interference with the broadcasters’ right to freedom of
expression does not satisfy the condition ‘of being necessary in a democratic society’
and is therefore contrary to Article 32 of the Constitution and Article 10 of the ...
Convention.
...
75. Taking into account the fact that the Audiovisual Coordinating Council is a body
susceptible to politicisation, its decision to suspend or revoke the licence of a
broadcaster may lead to the establishment of censorship or self-censorship, both equally

dangerous for freedom of expression and the public’s right to information.
76. In view of the particular importance of freedom of expression for a democratic
society that is susceptible to political pressure and censorship, the only authority which
is authorised, in accordance with the democratic and constitutional principle of the
separation of powers ..., to find that a particular citizen has seriously violated the law,
including through the abusive exercise of freedom of expression, is the judicial
authority, which enjoys all the guarantees of independence.
77. ... the [Constitutional] Court has already found, pursuant to Article 46 of the
Constitution, that the interference with the rights of the broadcaster is not attended by
sufficient judicial guarantees within the meaning of its case-law. The above conclusion
exempts the Court from examining any further the contested provisions under
Article 32 of the Constitution, since it can only reach the same finding, and this is
sufficient to conclude that there is a violation of that Article.
...”
93. The operative part of the Constitutional Court’s ruling stated, among
other things:
“...
1. The provisions of Article 38 § 8 of the Code ..., set out in Law ... no. 84 of 13 April
2012, are acknowledged as constitutional in the part concerning the enforceability of
decisions of the Audiovisual Coordinating Council with regard to the imposition of the
sanctions of a public warning, withdrawal of the right to broadcast advertisements for
a certain period of time, and a fine from the date of adoption and notification of the
broadcasters and service distributors concerned by registered letter.
2. The provisions of Article 38 § 8 of the Code ..., set out in Law ... no. 84 of 13 April
2012, are declared unconstitutional in the part concerning the enforceability of
decisions of the Audiovisual Coordinating Council with regard to the imposition of the
sanctions of suspension of a broadcasting licence for a certain period of time or of
revocation of a broadcasting licence from the date of adoption and notification of the
broadcasters and service distributors concerned by registered letter.
...”
94. Lastly, the member of the Constitutional Court’s bench who wrote a
separate opinion stated in his opinion, among other things:
“...
2. The ruling of the Court generates uncertainty with regard to the application of the
sanctions of suspension of a broadcasting licence for a certain period of time or of
revocation of a broadcasting licence by the Audiovisual Coordinating Council. Having
regard to the fact that the types of activity supervised by the Audiovisual Coordinating
Council have a major social impact, the ruling of the Court makes it impossible to stop
the broadcasting of programmes that may seriously affect the public.
3. I consider that in paragraph 59 the Court has unjustly diminished the social impact
of the services provided by broadcasters. This paragraph stands in contradiction with
paragraph 66, in which the Constitutional Court has cited the assessment of the
European Court [of Human Rights] concerning this impact. The European [Court] has
held that radio and television have a very important role in this regard; because of their
ability to convey messages by sounds and images they have a more immediate and
37
powerful effect than the written press. The Court has ignored the arguments of the
authorities concerning possible calls for protests during election campaigns or political
events – protests that can turn into violent actions and require the immediate application
of the sanctions in question.
The major impact of broadcasting services on the public, in my opinion, justifies
Parliament’s interference with the exercise of the right to property in order not to allow
‘culpable actions by the broadcaster in bad faith, of such a kind as to create or amplify
the situations which led to the interference’, as well as to avoid a ‘risk of serious
imminent damage to the public’, in respect of which the Court has not found any
arguments in paragraph 59 of the ruling.
4. In paragraph 57 the Court makes an incorrect deduction on the procedural
guarantees afforded by the law against the Audiovisual Coordinating Council’s
arbitrary actions and for the protection of broadcasters against the power of assessment
of this institution ...
5. I consider unfounded the Court’s deduction set out in paragraph 61 according to
which the immediate application of the sanctions of suspension or of revocation of a
licence amounts to an ‘excessive individual burden’ for broadcasters. The Court has
ignored the provisions of [paragraph] 3 of Article 38 of the Code ..., which states that
‘the sanctions provided for in paragraph 1 shall be applied gradually’. In my view, this
provision is ‘the key’ to a ‘fair balance’ between the competing interests of society and
of broadcasters, convincingly proving the lawmaker’s intention, an intention which falls
within the limits of the constitutional provisions.
The Code, in [paragraph] 1 of Article 38, specifies the sanctions which may be applied
to broadcasters, in the following order: ... According to the meaning of [paragraph] 3 of
Article 38 ..., the Audiovisual Coordinating Council cannot ignore a less severe
sanction in order to impose a more severe one. I must stress that, under [paragraph] 9
of Article 38 ..., any sanction can be challenged by the broadcaster before a court of
law. Thus, in order for the sanctions of suspension and revocation of the licence to be
imposed there [must have been] at least three previous sanctions, whose lawfulness has
been acknowledged by a final judgment of a court of law.
In addition, an even more rigid procedure is provided for imposing the last sanction –
revocation of the licence. Thus, in accordance with ... Article 38, ‘the broadcasting
licence shall be withdrawn in accordance with Article 27 only if a recurrent and serious
violation of the provisions of the Code [has] occurred’...
Having regard to the manner in which the sanctions are applied, I consider that clear
procedural guarantees are provided for by the law ‘against arbitrariness’ and for the
protection of broadcasters against the power of assessment of the Audiovisual
Coordinating Council. In addition, I consider that, by forcing the Audiovisual
Coordinating Council to apply gradually the sanctions [taken] against broadcasters, the
restrictions in the form of suspension and revocation of the licence are set out by the
lawmaker ‘in a convincing manner’, in compliance with the Court’s case-law as set out
in the case ..., cited in paragraph 70 of the Constitutional Court’s ruling.
6. I agree with the Court’s remark that the financial field is of major importance to
society, in respect of which ‘the discretion enjoyed by the State presupposes its right to
establish separate rules in relation to other similar areas subject to regulation’, but when
it states that ‘such severe measures as the suspension or revocation of a licence have to
be reviewed concretely by the court prior to their enforcement’, the Court has failed to
take account of the fact that in the banking field the law imposes rules which are much
more stringent than in the audiovisual field. Thus, in the banking system, by contrast to
the audiovisual [system] [(ȋn raport cu cel al audiovizualului)], there is no preventive

sanction of suspension of a licence; regardless of the court’s decision, the licence is
irrevocably withdrawn; withdrawal of the licence necessarily entails the liquidation of
the bank; in the event of the withdrawal of the licence, only a small group of
shareholders of the bank has the right to go to court. The audiovisual field has as much
social impact as the banking [field], so the value of a licence in this area cannot be
reduced to the value of a licence in real estate, for example. Given that the procedure
for withdrawing an audiovisual licence is not as rigid as in the banking field, I believe
that the restriction applied by the legislature through the contested provisions is
proportionate to the aim pursued and, on account of the major social impact of the
audiovisual [field], is necessary in a democratic society.
7. At the same time, the Court did not take into account the fact that the broadcaster,
on the basis of the contested rule, had a real opportunity to ask the administrative court
to suspend the [ACC’s] decision on the application of the suspension or withdrawal of
the licence immediately after its adoption. In addition, in the event of an appeal against
the decision, the court could of its own motion adopt an order to stay the enforcement
of the [ACC’s] decision ... However, with regard to banking institutions, the court is
not entitled to take a decision to [stay the enforcement] ..., since the decision of the
National Bank to withdraw the licence is irrevocable.
...”
95. On the date of its ruling the Constitutional Court also published an
official press release about the ruling in response to media reports connecting
the reasons provided by the Constitutional Court in its ruling to the ACC’s
decision to revoke NIT’s licence. The press release stated that the legal
provisions examined by the Constitutional Court in its ruling had not entered
into force until May 2012 and had not been applicable at the time of the
ACC’s decision concerning the revocation of NIT’s licence. Moreover, the
constitutionality of the legal provisions relied on by the ACC in its decision
of 5 April 2012 had not been examined by the Constitutional Court because
they had been never challenged before the Constitutional Court. Therefore,
there had been no connection between the case before the Constitutional
Court and the one before the Court of Appeal and any allegations to the
contrary had been pure fiction and amounted to disinformation.
2. The Audiovisual Code of 2018

96. The relevant provisions of the Audiovisual Code of the Republic of
Moldova, in force as of 1 January 2019, read as follows:
Article 11
Respect for fundamental rights and freedoms
“...
2. The following audiovisual programmes shall be prohibited:
(a) those likely to propagate, incite, promote or justify racial hatred, xenophobia,
antisemitism or other forms of hatred based on intolerance or discrimination on grounds
of sex, race, nationality, religion, disability or sexual orientation;
39
(b) those disseminating child pornography;

(c) those whose dissemination is prohibited by the Audiovisual Content Regulations,
drawn up and approved by the Audiovisual [Coordinating] Council, after consultation
with media service providers and media service distributors.
...”
Article 17
Protecting the national audiovisual space
“1. Radio frequencies intended for the provision of audiovisual media services in
terrestrial digital or analogue systems shall constitute public assets and shall be used on
the basis of broadcasting licences issued under the law.
2. The national audiovisual space shall be used under the terms of this Code, with a
view to:
(a) favouring the free movement of information;
(b) contributing to ensuring freedom of expression;
(c) contributing to the coverage of social information needs;
(d) contributing to ensuring the professional and social integrity of media service
providers.
3. In the national audiovisual space, the broadcasting of audiovisual programmes
constituting hate speech shall be prohibited.
...”
Article 27
Revocation of a broadcasting licence
“1. A broadcasting licence shall be revoked in the following cases:
(a) the media service provider notifies the Audiovisual [Coordinating] Council of the
abandonment of broadcasting of the audiovisual media service;
(b) the media service provider has not started broadcasting within six months from
the [time] the broadcasting licence was issued in analogue format and three months in
the terrestrial digital system;
(c) the media service provider has not paid the fee for the broadcasting licence,
established in accordance with Law no. 160/2011 ..., after being warned twice, in
writing, by the Audiovisual [Coordinating] Council;
(d) the media service provider has submitted false information to the Audiovisual
[Coordinating] Council, which has led to a breach of the legal regime of ownership in
the field of audiovisual media services;
(e) the media service provider has refused to submit or for any other reason has not
submitted information on the legal regime of ownership in the field of audiovisual
media services to the Audiovisual [Coordinating] Council;
(f) the media service provider has repeatedly infringed the provisions of Article 11
§ 2 and Article 17 of this Code after the sanctions provided for in Article 84 § 9 of this
Code have been gradually applied to it;
(g) the media service provider, following the suspension of its broadcasting licence
in accordance with Article 84 § 10 of this Code, does not remedy the infringement in
respect of which the sanction of suspension was imposed and/or it has received more
than two sanctions within twelve months of the expiry of the sanction of suspension.”
Article 84
Sanctions
“1. Media service providers, video-sharing platform service providers and media
service distributors shall be liable for infringements of audiovisual legislation in
accordance with this Article and the legislation in force.
2. For infringements of the provisions of this Code, the Audiovisual [Coordinating]
Council shall apply individually determined sanctions, depending on the seriousness of
the infringement, its effects and the frequency of infringements committed in the last
twelve months.
...
9. A fine of between 40,000 lei and 70,000 lei shall be imposed on media service
providers and media service distributors which have infringed the provisions of
Article 11 § 2 and Article 17. For repeated violations of these provisions, the fine shall
be between 70,000 lei and 100,000 lei. The revocation of the broadcasting licence for
an infringement of the provisions of Article 11 § 2 and Article 17 shall be applied after
the sanctions provided for in this paragraph have been gradually applied.
10. A media service provider or media service distributor who has repeatedly
committed the infringements referred to in paragraph 8 within twelve months shall
receive the sanction of suspension of the broadcasting licence ... The suspension of the
broadcasting licence ... shall be applied after the sanctions referred to in paragraphs 4-8
have been gradually applied.
...
14. The broadcasting licence shall be revoked in accordance with Article 27 ...
15. The decision of the Audiovisual [Coordinating] Council on the application of the
sanction shall be reasoned and shall become enforceable from the date of its publication.
Decisions of the Audiovisual [Coordinating] Council on the application of the sanction
may be appealed against to a court by the media service provider or distributor against
which the sanction has been imposed.
16. In order to protect the national audiovisual space, the court shall examine disputes
arising from infringements of Article 11 § 2 and Article 17 within thirty days. An
appeal, or an appeal on points of law, shall be lodged within three days of the date of
the decision and shall be examined within ten days.
17. If, within twelve months of the date of the last sanction, the media service
provider or the media service distributor does not commit any other infringements of
the provisions of this Code, the previous sanctions shall be deemed null and void.”
41
II. STANDARDS AND DOCUMENTS ON RESPONSIBLE

JOURNALISM, MEDIA PLURALISM AND INDEPENDENCE OF
MEDIA REGULATORY AUTHORITIES
A. Council of Europe standards and documents
1. PACE Resolution on the ethics of journalism

97. On 1 July 1993 the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe
(“PACE”) adopted Resolution 1003 (1993) on the ethics of journalism, which
stated, inter alia:
“1. In addition to the legal rights and obligations set forth in the relevant legal norms,
the media have an ethical responsibility towards citizens and society which must be
underlined at the present time, when information and communication play a very
important role in the formation of citizens’ personal attitudes and the development of
society and democratic life.
2. The journalist’s profession comprises rights and obligations, freedoms and
responsibilities.
3. The basic principle of any ethical consideration of journalism is that a clear
distinction must be drawn between news and opinions, making it impossible to confuse
them. News is information about facts and data, while opinions convey thoughts, ideas,
beliefs or value judgments on the part of media companies, publishers or journalists.
4. News broadcasting should be based on truthfulness, ensured by the appropriate
means of verification and proof, and impartiality in presentation, description and
narration. Rumour must not be confused with news. News headlines and summaries
must reflect as closely as possible the substance of the facts and data presented.
5. Expression of opinions may entail thoughts or comments on general ideas or
remarks on news relating to actual events. Although opinions are necessarily subjective
and therefore cannot and should not be made subject to the criterion of truthfulness, we
must ensure that opinions are expressed honestly and ethically.
6. Opinions taking the form of comments on events or actions relating to individuals
or institutions should not attempt to deny or conceal the reality of the facts or data.
...
17. Information and communication as conveyed by journalism through the media,
with powerful support from the new technologies, has decisive importance for the
development of the individual and society. It is indispensable for democratic life, since
if democracy is to develop fully it must guarantee citizens participation in public affairs.
Suffice it to say that such participation would be impossible if the citizens were not in
receipt of the information on public affairs which they need, and which must be
provided by the media.
18. The importance of information, especially radio and television news, for culture
and education was highlighted in Assembly Recommendation 1067. Its effects on
public opinion are obvious.
19. It would be wrong to infer from the importance of this role that the media actually
represent public opinion or that they should replace the specific functions of the public
authorities or institutions of an educational or cultural character such as schools.
20. This would amount to transforming the media and journalism into authorities or
counter-authorities (‘mediocracy’), even though they would not be representative of the
citizens or subject to the same democratic controls as the public authorities, and would
not possess the specialist knowledge of the corresponding cultural or educational
institutions.
21. Therefore journalism should not alter truthful, impartial information or honest
opinions, or exploit them for media purposes, in an attempt to create or shape public
opinion, since its legitimacy rests on effective respect for the citizen’s fundamental right
to information as part of respect for democratic values. To that end, legitimate
investigative journalism is limited by the veracity and honesty of information and
opinions and is incompatible with journalistic campaigns conducted on the basis of
previously adopted positions and special interests.
22. In journalism, information and opinions must respect the presumption of
innocence, in particular in cases which are still sub judice, and must refrain from
making judgments.
23. The right of individuals to privacy must be respected. Persons holding office in
public life are entitled to protection for their privacy except in those cases where their
private life may have an effect on their public life. The fact that a person holds a public
post does not deprive him of the right to respect for his privacy.
24. The attempt to strike a balance between the right to respect for private life,
enshrined in Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, and the freedom
of expression set forth in Article 10, is well documented in the recent case-law of the
European Commission and Court of Human Rights.
25. In the journalist’s profession the end does not justify the means; therefore,
information must be obtained by legal and ethical means.
26. At the request of the persons concerned, the news media must correct,
automatically and speedily, and with all relevant information provided, any news item
or opinion conveyed by them which is false or erroneous. National legislation should
provide for appropriate sanctions and, where applicable, compensation.”
2. Committee of Ministers’ 1999 Recommendation on measures to

promote media pluralism
98. On 19 January 1999 the Committee of Ministers, emphasising,
inter alia, that the political and cultural diversity of media types and contents
was central to media pluralism, adopted Recommendation No. R (99) 1 on
measures to promote media pluralism, which stated, inter alia:
“Member States should consider possible measures to ensure that a variety of media
content reflecting different political and cultural views is made available to the public,
bearing in mind the importance of guaranteeing the editorial independence of the media
and the value which measures adopted on a voluntary basis by the media themselves
may also have.
...
Member States should consider, where appropriate and practicable, introducing
measures to promote the production and broadcasting of diverse content by
broadcasting organisations. Such measures could for instance be to require in
43
broadcasting licences that a certain volume of original programmes, in particular as

regards news and current affairs, is produced or commissioned by broadcasters.
Furthermore, under certain circumstances, such as the exercise of a dominant position
by a broadcaster in a particular area, member States could foresee ‘frequency sharing’
arrangements so as to provide access to the airwaves for other broadcasters.
Member States should examine the introduction of rules aimed at preserving a
pluralistic local radio and television landscape, ensuring in particular that networking,
understood as the centralised provision of programmes and related services, does not
endanger pluralism.”
3. Committee of Ministers’ 2007 Recommendation on media pluralism

and diversity of media content
99. On 31 January 2007 the Committee of Ministers adopted
Recommendation CM/Rec(2007)2 on media pluralism and diversity of media
content, which, in so far as relevant, reads:
“1.1 Member States should seek to ensure that a sufficient variety of media outlets
provided by a range of different owners, both private and public, is available to the
public, taking into account the characteristics of the media market, notably the specific
commercial and competition aspects.
1.2. Where the application of general competition rules in the media sector and access
regulation are not sufficient to guarantee the observance of the demands concerning
cultural diversity and the pluralistic expressions of ideas and opinions, member states
should adopt specific measures.
1.3. Member States should in particular envisage adapting their regulatory
framework to economic, technological and social developments taking into account, in
particular, the convergence and the digital transition and therefore include in it all the
elements of media production and distribution.
1.4. When adapting their regulatory framework, member States should pay particular
attention to the need for effective and manifest separation between the exercise of
political authority or influence and control of the media or decision making as regards
media content.
...
Pluralism of information and diversity of media content will not be automatically
guaranteed by the multiplication of the means of communication offered to the public.
Therefore, member States should define and implement an active policy in this field,
including monitoring procedures, and adopt any necessary measures in order to ensure
that a sufficient variety of information, opinions and programmes is disseminated by
the media and is available to the public.
...
2.1. Member States should, while respecting the principle of editorial independence,
encourage the media to supply the public with a diversity of media content capable of
promoting a critical debate and a wider democratic participation of persons belonging
to all communities and generations.
...
3.1. Member States should consider introducing measures to promote and to monitor
the production and provision of diverse content by media organisations. In respect of
the broadcasting sector, such measures could be to require in broadcasting licences that
a certain volume of original programmes, in particular as regards news and current
affairs, is produced or commissioned by broadcasters.
3.2. Member States should consider the introduction of rules aimed at preserving a
pluralistic local media landscape, ensuring in particular that syndication, understood as
the centralised provision of programmes and related services, does not endanger
pluralism.”
4. “Media Pluralism and Human Rights”, an Issue Discussion Paper

commissioned and published by the Council of Europe’s
Commissioner for Human Rights
100. The Council of Europe’s Commissioner for Human Rights
commissioned and published in December 2011 an “Issue Discussion Paper
on Media Pluralism and Human Rights”, written by Mr Miklós Haraszti, an
expert in this field who had served as the Organisation for Security and
Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Representative on Freedom of the Media.
This document refers to several dimensions of media pluralism, inter alia to
external and internal pluralism, describing those notions as follows.
101. External pluralism, that is, pluralism across multiple outlets may be
generated through the existence of various media outlets, each expressing a
different point of view, and is basically achieved by ensuring that the media
are not concentrated in the hands of too few. Ownership control is the
starting-point of such pluralism governance and it ensures that free speech is
not diminished by the overbearing control of too few media entrepreneurs or
too few actual media outlets. Internal pluralism, on the other hand, concerns
pluralism within a single media outlet and is another method of ensuring
pluralism in the media. It relates to how social and political diversity are
reflected in media content, that is, the representation of different cultural
groups in the media as well as divergent political or ideological opinions and
viewpoints. Internal pluralism governance is a necessity in a media market
marked by scarcity of frequencies and its purpose is to compensate for that
scarcity by imposing rules concerning diversity and fair journalism on each
media outlet.
102. The author of the discussion paper expressed the view that regulatory
approaches must combine the two (external and internal pluralism), just as
the standards of the Council of Europe do, since in a democracy both external
and internal pluralisms have to be functional. Diversity is sometimes best
achieved when people can freely enter the “marketplace of ideas” without any
governmental constraints; at other times and in other places, the survival of
various political views and cultural values necessitates State intervention.
103. In the paper it is further stated that both the formidable role of
television in shaping public opinion, and the difficulties of achieving external
pluralism in relatively small European markets, require every nation of
45
Europe to set up at least one strong, easily accessible audiovisual

infrastructure for objective news and reliably inclusive public journalism.
Scarcity of frequencies calls for stricter governance of internal pluralism.
104. On new democracies, the author of the paper notes:
“In societies recovering from periods of dictatorship, pluralism has assumed a special
strategic importance. In such places, the apparent end of ‘big’, governmental censorship
has disappointingly only led to ‘small’, private mini-censorships, maintained this time
by media-owning entrepreneurs and parties. Audiences who previously hated the
monotony of a directed press have found the cacophony of freedom startling. They may
have become irritated by the swift spread of commercialism and the slow increase in
ethical journalism. In new democracies, it has been hard for audiences to acknowledge
that press freedom may make quality journalism possible – but does not guarantee it.”
5. “The independence of media regulatory authorities in Europe: IRIS

Special”, a document published by the European Audiovisual
Observatory (Council of Europe)
105. The European Audiovisual Observatory (Council of Europe)
published the paper “The independence of media regulatory authorities in
Europe: IRIS Special” in September 2019. This document focuses on the
independence of regulatory authorities and bodies in the broadcasting and
audiovisual media sector in Europe and underlines, among other things:
“These entities have proliferated according to the different legal traditions of the
respective countries they belong to. They do not, therefore, conform [to] one, single
model. Nonetheless, they reflect a common approach of sorts with regard to the
institutional set-up of regulatory governance. The independence of these entities is
particularly important because it contributes to the broader objective of media
independence, which is in itself an essential component of democracy.
...
... Whereas demands of freedom of speech and freedom of the media on the one hand
require states to refrain from interference with media production and to protect the
independence of media organisations, it is widely accepted that states at the same time
are required to set a normative framework in order to guarantee the existence of a
diversified and pluralistic media landscape. The concept and institution of an
independent regulatory authority is seen as the default choice for the regulatory
governance of the audiovisual media sector, to ensure that interventions with the media
are impartial and at arm’s length from government and stakeholder interests.
...
Independent regulatory authorities ... have virtually become the natural institutional
form for regulatory governance in the broadcasting and audiovisual media sector. As an
institutional set-up, they can contribute to two aspects that are specific to the
audiovisual media sector:
1. the objective of regulation in the media sector to guarantee media freedoms; and
2. the specific and at times sensitive relationship between the media sector and
elected as well as non-elected politicians ...
... this is however not to say that independence is the same concept as freedom, but
that there are specific links between the two. ...”
B. European Union documents
1. European Commission staff working paper on Media Pluralism in the

Member States of the EU
106. The European Commission on 16 July 2007 released a staff working
paper on “Media pluralism in the Member States of the EU” (SEC(2007) 32),
which, inter alia, contains the following statements:
“Media pluralism analysis is very often limited to the aspect of external pluralism and
to aspects related to media ownership rules. External pluralism has to be seen together
with internal pluralism. The latter can be essential for smaller markets.
In the audiovisual field, a regulated market, internal pluralism, diversity of output
and/or content can be stimulated and monitored by imposing programme requirements
and obligations in the law or licence. In addition, internal pluralism could also be
reached by imposing structural obligations such as the composition of management
bodies or bodies responsible for the programme/content selection.
...”
2. Independent Study on Indicators for Media Pluralism in the Member

States of the EU
107. In a report called “Independent Study on Indicators for Media
Pluralism in the Member States – Towards a Risk-Based Approach”,
prepared in 2009 for the European Commission by a consortium of academic
institutions and a consultancy firm, five dimensions of media pluralism were
distinguished:
“Cultural pluralism in the media refers to the fair and diverse representation of and
expression by (i.e. passive and active access) the various cultural and social groups,
including ethnic, linguistic, national and religious minorities, disabled people, women
and sexual minorities, in the media.
...
Political pluralism in the media refers to the fair and diverse representation of and
expression by (i.e. passive and active access) various political and ideological groups,
including minority viewpoints and interests, in the media.
...
Geographical pluralism in the media refers to fair and diverse representation of and
expression by (i.e. passive and active access) local and regional communities and
interests in the media.
...
Pluralism of media ownership and control refers to the existence of media outlets and
platforms owned, or controlled, by a plurality of independent and autonomous actors.
It encompasses a plurality of actors at the level of media production, of media supply
47
and of media distribution (i.e. variety in media sources, outlets, suppliers and
distribution platforms).
...
Pluralism of media types refers to the co-existence of media with different mandates
and sources of financing, notably commercial media, community or alternative media,
and public service media, within and across media sectors, like print, television, radio
and internet. Pluralism of media genres refers to diversity in the media in relation to
media functions, including providing information, education, and entertainment.”
108. Referring to “political pluralism”, the report stated:
“The legal indicators for the risk domain ‘political pluralism’ assess the existence and
effectiveness of regulatory safeguards which, on the one hand, ensure access to the
media by the various political actors and groups, and, on the other hand, safeguard the
public’s right to become informed in a correct and complete way on the wide variety of
political viewpoints within society. In order to reach this goal, that of a politically
pluralistic media landscape, a difficult balance between political interference and
editorial independence needs to be struck in the different types of media. This balance
may evolve over time with the rise of new means of distribution.
The risk of political bias can be mitigated through both structural and behavioural
safeguards. Examples of the former include rules ensuring the fair representation of the
various political groups in management or board functions of media companies or
media councils, where these include political representatives. Behavioural rules can
prescribe, for instance, fair, balanced and impartial political reporting. Council of
Europe Recommendation (2007)2, on media pluralism and diversity of media content,
recommends that member states encourage the media to supply the public with a
diversity of media content capable of promoting critical debate and an increasingly
broad democratic participation of persons belonging to all communities and
generations. However, the Recommendation, by way of a disclaimer, states that they
should do so while respecting the principle of editorial independence. A careful balance
should be struck between stimulating political pluralism and respecting the editorial
independence of media outlets. Privately owned media are entitled to follow an editorial
line which might show a specific political preference. Therefore, impartiality as a
quality for political reporting cannot be required of this type of media. Nonetheless,
political coverage, even that by privately owned broadcasters and newspapers, should
at least be fair and accurate. Editorial independence cannot be used as an excuse for
incorrect reporting or defamation.
Political bias can also be tackled by providing tools for political actors and groups to
actively access the media in order to ‘personally’ expose their ideas, or to correct
misrepresentations of these ideas. The right to reply, or equivalent regulatory remedies
play, an important role in this respect.”
3. The European Commission Rule of Law Report of 20 July 2021

109. According to the 2021 Rule of Law Report of the European
Commission (COM/2021/700 final):
“Media pluralism and media freedom are key enablers for the rule of law, democratic
accountability and the fight against corruption. Member States have an obligation to
guarantee an enabling environment for journalists, protect their safety and promote
media freedom and media pluralism. ...
...
National media regulators play a key role in upholding and enforcing media pluralism.
As the 2020 Rule of Law Report emphasised, when implementing media-specific
regulation and taking media policy decisions, their independence from economic and
political interests has a direct impact on market plurality and on the political
independence of the media environment.”
III. COMPARATIVE LAW
110. The Court’s Research Division has examined practices concerning

pluralism in the audiovisual media in thirty-four Council of Europe member
States, namely Albania, Andorra, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Malta, Monaco, Montenegro,
the Netherlands, North Macedonia, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, the
Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine,
and the United Kingdom.
111. On the basis of the comparative law survey conducted by the
Research Division, it would seem that out of the thirty-four Contracting States
covered, all but one (Monaco) have a public broadcaster on which a duty of
political pluralism is imposed. As for private broadcasters, they have such a
duty in twenty States or local jurisdictions, whereas in fifteen States or
jurisdictions there is no such duty. Nevertheless, even in the States where
private broadcasters are not held to a duty of pluralism, there are some general
requirements concerning the contents of their programmes: for example,
news broadcasts must contain truthful information, and facts must be
distinguished from comments and opinions.
112. In an absolute majority of these thirty-four Contracting States private
broadcasting companies have either to obtain a broadcasting licence (in the
broad sense of the term) from the State authorities or at least to make a
unilateral declaration to them in order to be able to operate. Among the States
having a requirement of pluralism for private channels, the State usually
exercises prior control over the content of TV and radio programmes, when
granting the licence. On the other hand, there is always ex post facto control
through a system of penalties which, in most States, includes the possibility
of revoking the broadcasting licence. However, sanctions for failing to
observe political pluralism have been exceptional across Europe. In the
United Kingdom, on 27 March 2020, the High Court of England and Wales
(Administrative Court) delivered the Autonomous Non-Profit Organisation
TV-Novosti judgment ([2020] EWHC 689), dismissing the challenge to a fine
of 200,000 pounds imposed by Ofcom (the United Kingdom communications
regulatory authority) on the Russia Today channel for breaches of “due
impartiality”. In Romania, a broadcaster had its licence withdrawn for
carrying out political advertising outside the election campaign; however, this
sanction was imposed after the broadcaster had failed to pay a fine.
49
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 10 OF THE CONVENTION
113. The applicant company complained that the revocation of its licence
to broadcast had breached its right to freedom of expression under Article 10
of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom
to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference
by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from
requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities,
may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed
by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security,
territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the
protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others,
for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining
the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.”
A. Admissibility
114. The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded
within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes
that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared
admissible.
B. Merits
1. The parties’ submissions

(a) The applicant company
115. While admitting that the third sentence of paragraph 1 of Article 10
was applicable in the present case, the applicant company argued that the
revocation of its licence amounted to an interference with its right to freedom
of expression that could not be justified under paragraph 2 of that Article. It
distinguished the present case from Demuth v. Switzerland (no. 38743/97,
§ 33, ECHR 2002-IX), because the latter case had concerned a refusal to issue
a licence and not the revocation of a valid licence. It also pointed out that
whereas in Demuth the applicant’s proposed television channel had planned
to broadcast programmes about automobiles, NIT had focused on
broadcasting informative and analytical programmes, the main purpose of
which had been to impart information. Unlike in Demuth, where the Swiss
authorities had pursued the aim of encouraging pluralism in broadcasting, the
purpose of the measure imposed on NIT had been to punish the latter for
providing pluralism of opinions, including the views of an opposition
political party, and for presenting the governing parties in a negative light.
Lastly, the consequences of the measures were different in the two cases:
whereas in the case of NIT the television channel had had to shut down the
next day, in Demuth the applicant had merely been required to diversify his
channel’s programmes in order to obtain a licence.
116. The applicant company further submitted that the impugned measure
had not been prescribed by law as required by Article 10 § 2 of the
Convention. It followed from Article 38 § 10 of the Code that only an
uncontested decision of the ACC imposing a sanction on a broadcaster could
be enforced immediately. However, that had clearly not been the situation in
the present case because the applicant company had challenged the ACC’s
decision in court. In spite of the above, the Court of Appeal and the Supreme
Court had refused to order interim measures and to suspend the ACC’s
decision of 5 April 2012 pending the outcome of the proceedings, thus acting
in an unlawful manner.
117. The applicant company also provided an alternative interpretation of
the relevant domestic law, according to which the ACC’s decision of 5 April
2012 could not have been enforced until thirty days after its adoption at the
earliest. In this connection the applicant company relied on Article 40 § 5 of
the Code, which provided that any interested party could challenge the ACC’s
decisions, together with sections 14 and 21(1) of the Law on administrative
court proceedings, which provided that administrative acts could be
challenged within thirty days and that a challenge and a request for
suspension of an administrative act could be lodged at the same time.
118. The applicant company did not express a preference for any of the
above interpretations but argued that under the applicable domestic law the
decision of 5 April 2012 could not be enforced immediately and that,
therefore, the Court of Appeal had been under a duty to grant the interim
measures requested.
119. The applicant company submitted that the Constitutional Court’s
ruling of 6 December 2012 on the amendment to Article 38 of the Code which
had been enacted on 29 May 2012 (see paragraphs 89-92 above) could only
be interpreted in the sense that the immediate enforcement of the decision of
5 April 2012 on the basis of the legislation existing at that time had also been
contrary to the applicant company’s right to property and freedom of
expression. Thus, it concluded that the interference with its rights in the form
of the immediate enforcement of the ACC’s decision of 5 April 2012 had not
been prescribed by law.
120. The legal basis for the revocation of its licence was also problematic
from the point of view of accessibility, clarity and foreseeability. In
particular, the applicant company maintained that Article 7 § 2 of the Code
was discriminatory in its essence and unforeseeable and its scope was
uncertain. It did not regulate situations where politicians or political parties
refused to present their position when asked by NIT journalists. As to
Article 7 § 4, it was, in the applicant company’s view, contrary to the main
51
principles of journalistic independence. In view of the poor quality of the law,

NIT could not reasonably have expected that its activities would be
terminated.
121. The applicant company also argued that the revocation of its licence
had not pursued the aims of “protection of the reputation or rights of others”,
“the prevention of disorder or crime” or any of the other legitimate aims
mentioned in paragraph 2 of Article 10. The aim of the impugned measure
had been punitive in its essence. In reality, it was nothing but a measure of
retaliation for criticising the AEI and for covering the protests organised by
the PCRM. The applicant company also referred in that connection to the
Constitutional Court’s ruling of 6 December 2012, in which that court had
found that the immediate enforcement of a sanction imposed by the ACC did
not pursue a legitimate aim.
122. Referring to the necessity of the interference, the applicant
company’s main position was that Article 7 § 2 of the Code was not consistent
with the Court’s case-law under Article 10 of the Convention as it impaired
the essence of a broadcaster’s freedom of expression, interfered with the right
to impart information and ideas, affected fundamental values of pluralism
existing in a democratic society and impeded debate on matters of public
interest.
123. By way of alternative submission, the applicant company argued that
such a limitation as the one contained in Article 7 § 2 could be applied to
public broadcasters but under no circumstances to private ones. The applicant
company argued that that provision had placed an excessive burden on it,
especially since the key political figures had had a hostile attitude towards
NIT and refused to answer questions and give comments. In a situation where
other political parties had ignored NIT or had even displayed an aggressive
attitude towards its journalists, NIT could not but grant airtime to those
political parties which cooperated with it. Otherwise, the television channel
would have been left without content for its bulletins. In any event, NIT had
reported on the governing parties’ activity. Proof of that was to be found in
the ACC’s own monitoring report, according to which 46% of the content of
its news bulletins had been dedicated to the governing alliance and only 20%
concerned the PCRM.
124. The interference with the applicant company’s freedom of
expression had not been necessary in a democratic society. It had undermined
the main foundations of democracy, the spirit of pluralism and the rule of law.
125. The applicant company argued that it had become the target of
numerous attacks on the part of the ACC after the change of government in
2009. It had been evicted from premises which it used to rent in a government
building; then State enterprises had stopped placing advertisements with NIT
and it had been excluded from cable transmission. It had also been the target
of numerous complaints on the part of politicians from the governing parties
and had been boycotted by them. In addition, it had been defamed in the
media controlled by the government. NIT had received more than ten
sanctions from the ACC and was the only broadcaster to have had its licence
revoked. Many high-profile politicians had stated that the channel had to be
shut down. The criticism expressed by the NIT journalists in respect of the
government’s policies and representatives could be considered neither a
sufficient nor a relevant ground for the revocation of its licence.
126. The applicant company submitted that the domestic courts had
considered that the violation of legal norms by NIT consisted in the fact that
it had presented information about the demonstrations organised by the
PCRM. It could not be concluded from watching the news bulletins in
question that NIT had attempted to undermine the country’s national security
or its territorial integrity. The reporting about the protests had concerned
peaceful assemblies during which the participants had demanded the
resignation of the government and new elections. Thus, it was not the interests
of the State which were at stake but those of the governing coalition.
127. The applicant company was also of the view that it had received
sanctions from the ACC on the instructions of the government and stated that
there was no evidence that the material presented in its news bulletins was
propagandistic in nature or involved editing tricks.
128. The sanction imposed on NIT could not be reasonably regarded as
answering a pressing social need and the reasons relied upon by the ACC had
not been relevant and sufficient in circumstances in which the margin of
appreciation enjoyed by the State was very narrow for restricting political
speech and debate on matters of public interest.
129. The applicant company stated that the sanction imposed amounted
to a form of censorship intended to discourage NIT and other media from
criticising the government. Such a sanction was likely to deter journalists
from contributing to public debate on issues affecting the life of the country.
It also hampered the media in performing their task as a purveyor of
information and public watchdog.
130. Lastly, the harshest measure of revocation of the licence of a
broadcasting company could not in principle be regarded as corresponding to
a pressing social need, as falling within the State’s margin of appreciation and
as necessary in a democratic society. Such a measure was likely to undermine
pluralism of opinions and the principle of broad-mindedness and openness in
a democratic society whose nationals should be free to choose the information
they wished to receive. The situation was even more serious given the fact
that NIT had reflected the views of an opposition party, had been important
for a linguistic minority and had been critical of the government.
(b) The Government

131. The Government agreed that the revocation of the applicant
company’s licence had constituted an interference with its right to freedom
of expression under Article 10 § 1 of the Convention.
53
132. They submitted, however, that the licensing system in place at the
time in Moldova had been capable of contributing to the quality and balance
of television programmes through the powers conferred on the national
authorities and had been consistent with the third sentence of paragraph 1 of
Article 10 of the Convention. The Code, as in force at the material time, had
regulated broadcasters’ rights and duties. In particular, it provided in Article 8
§ 1 for the right of broadcasters to freely choose the content of their
programmes. At the same time the Code had provided in Article 7 for an
obligation on the part of broadcasters to observe the principle of pluralism. It
had also authorised the ACC to monitor how broadcasters observed the
principle of pluralism of ideas and opinions within their programmes. Further,
the Code had provided for sanctions in the event of failure by broadcasters to
comply with their obligations and also for the procedure by which such
sanctions were to be imposed.
133. The Government stressed that it fell within the States’ margin of
appreciation to choose which approach to adopt with a view to achieving
pluralism of opinions. The national authorities were better placed than an
international court to choose which policy in the field of pluralism to be
followed. They stressed that the Code had been drawn up in cooperation with
the Council of Europe and the OSCE and that both organisations had
welcomed its adoption and praised it for corresponding to European and
international standards. The Government drew the Court’s attention in
particular to the Council of Europe’s experts’ comments concerning Article 7
§ 2 of the Code, according to which the principles set forth in it were
“commendable” (see paragraph 16 above).
134. They submitted that the interference in question had been prescribed
by law. The ACC’s decision of 5 April 2012, as well as the judgments of the
Court of Appeal and of the Supreme Court of 11 February and 2 May 2013,
respectively, had relied on Article 27 §§ 1 and 2, Article 38 §§ 1-3, Article 7
§§ 1, 2 and 4 and Article 10 § 5 of the Code and point 3.1 of the broadcasting
licence. The law had been accessible, clear and foreseeable as to its effects
and had complied with all the requirements of quality arising from the Court’s
case-law.
135. The aim of the interference in the present case had been legitimate
under the third sentence of the first paragraph of Article 10 (see
paragraph 132 above). Besides that, the revocation of NIT’s licence had also
pursued the legitimate aims provided for in Article 10 § 2 of the Convention
of protecting national security and public safety and preventing disorder and
crime. NIT had encouraged the audience to participate in protests which could
turn violent as a result of the misinformation which it had disseminated and
the feeling of anger which it had deliberately provoked among its audience.
136. The interference had also been necessary in a democratic society
because there had been a pressing social need to protect the pluralism of
opinions. The Government stressed the importance of pluralism in a
democratic society and submitted that the aim pursued by the Moldovan
authorities was that the audience should be presented with multiple sources
of information, and information covering different political views, without
anyone being allowed to gain an undue advantage due to control over a
television channel. The mechanism put in place by Article 7 of the Code was
also aimed at preserving fairness and equality and maintaining a high quality
of political debate. In the absence of such a mechanism, given the particular
political circumstances that had existed at the time, there would have been a
risk of political propaganda and indoctrination through television in favour
of political parties which had access to a television broadcasting channel.
137. According to the Government, Article 7 § 2 of the Code – by obliging
broadcasters to grant airtime to different political parties and movements in a
balanced manner – was aimed, inter alia, at supporting the integrity of
democratic processes, at obtaining a fair framework for political and public
debate, and at ensuring that those political entities who could afford to have
their positions promoted during television programmes did not obtain unfair
advantages through the possibility of using the most potent and pervasive
medium; this all helped to preserve the political impartiality of television
broadcasting. This legal duty of the audiovisual media was also aimed at
improving the quality of political debate in general, given that broadcasters
which promoted the positions of certain political parties or movements could
distort certain complex issues of general interest, taking into account the
powerful impact of television. The applicant company’s case served as a
genuine example in that regard. Finally, yet importantly, Article 7 § 2 of the
Code also allowed other minor political parties or movements the possibility
of having their opinions on matters of public interest presented to the general
public, a factor which improved the democratic processes even more, by
offering such entities a certain level of attention in nationally televised
coverage which they might not have been afforded in other conditions.
138. Moreover, there had been a need to protect the public from the
negative impact of NIT’s unfair journalistic practices. In particular, the public
had to be protected from the misleading and false information broadcast by
the television channel and from the calls for hatred and xenophobia. In this
respect the Government pointed to the fact that it had been established by the
domestic courts that in its news bulletins NIT had reflected on the protests
organised by the PCRM during which calls for disobedience to the legal order
had been made and statements amounting to calls for division, intolerance
and even hatred towards Romania and the EU had been propagated, bordering
on xenophobia. The Government expressed the opinion, that, as in Sürek
v. Turkey (no. 1) ([GC], no. 26682/95, § 61, ECHR 1999-IV), NIT had incited
the audience to violence and fostered hostility among different social and
political groups, thus endangering democracy itself.
139. The Government argued that another important factor in determining
the necessity of the interference was the means of expression employed by
55
the applicant company. They pointed out that the audiovisual media had a
more immediate and powerful impact than the print media and mentioned that
not only had NIT been an audiovisual media outlet, but it also used to
broadcast on a frequency with national coverage, a fact that had significantly
increased the impact of the content of its broadcasting.
140. Furthermore, some of the statements made in NIT’s news bulletins
amounted to nothing more than personal insults and none of the persons
criticised had ever been given a right to reply. The Government provided
copies of over twenty-five complaints submitted to the ACC by politicians,
political parties, private individuals and non-governmental organisations in
the media field in respect of NIT’s alleged misinformation and failure to
observe the rules concerning pluralism and fair journalism. The Government
also referred to instances when some politicians had been insulted by being
called “criminals”, “dictators”, “traitors”, “usurpers” and other names.
141. The Government further submitted that the necessity of the
interference in the present case was dictated by the recurrent nature of the
breaches committed by the applicant company. Over a period of three years
the applicant company had received sanctions on more than eleven occasions
for similar breaches, namely for promoting the position of only one political
party in its news bulletins and for refusing to reflect the opinions of other
political parties, as required by the law. The applicant company had not even
challenged all the sanctions imposed on it. It had preferred to pay the fines
and to continue breaching the law. Since all the above-mentioned sanctions
had been unable to convince the applicant company to comply with the law,
the ACC had had no other alternative but to take a measure of last resort. Had
the authorities not imposed the harshest sanction on the applicant company
after all other sanctions had turned out to be ineffective, society and other
broadcasters would have been given the wrong message that non-compliance
with the law was tolerated.
142. The Government contended that it had been open to the applicant
company to apply for a new licence twelve months after its licence had been
revoked. However, it had not done so. Instead, the applicant company had
preferred to continue broadcasting on the Internet. It had regularly posted
news items and videos on its YouTube channel until the end of 2014.
143. They concluded that the authorities had struck a fair balance between
the general interest in promoting pluralism of opinions and NIT’s right to
impart information.
2. The Court’s assessment

(a) Preliminary remark
144. The Court notes at the outset that in its application lodged under the
Convention the applicant company complained about the decision to revoke
its broadcasting licence and about the proceedings leading to that decision. In
the course of the Convention proceedings, it complained in addition about the

sanctions that had been imposed prior to the revocation.
145. The Court reiterates that it cannot base its decision on facts that are
not covered by the complaint. To do so would be tantamount to deciding
beyond the scope of a case; in other words, to deciding on matters that have
not been “referred to” it, within the meaning of Article 32 of the Convention
(see Radomilja and Others v. Croatia [GC], nos. 37685/10 and 22768/12,
§ 126, 20 March 2018).
146. The Court therefore considers that it cannot review the sanctions
imposed on the applicant company prior to 5 April 2012. It will have regard,
however, to those sanctions when examining whether the revocation of the
broadcasting licence complied with the Convention requirements referred to
by the applicant company in its complaints.
147. The Court further observes that the applicant company is not only
contesting, among other things, the necessity of the revocation of the licence,
but is also challenging the compatibility of certain provisions of the Code
with Article 10 of the Convention.
148. The Court is therefore of the opinion that, in the present case, the
negative obligation of the State not to interfere is linked to the question as to
whether the State complied with its positive obligation to put in place a proper
legal and administrative framework guaranteeing media pluralism (see
paragraphs 184-186 and 198-209 below).
149. It is with this consideration in mind that the Court will examine the
specific circumstances of the case.
(b) Whether there has been an interference

150. The parties agreed that the measure of revocation of the applicant
company’s broadcasting licence amounted to an interference with its right to
freedom of expression under the first paragraph of Article 10 of the
Convention (see paragraphs 115 and 131 above). The Court sees no reason to
hold otherwise.
151. Such interference will constitute a breach of Article 10 unless it was
“prescribed by law”, pursued one or more legitimate aims set out by this
article, and was “necessary in a democratic society” for the achievement of
those aims.
(c) Relevance of the third sentence of Article 10 § 1

152. The parties agreed that the measure concerning the applicant
company’s broadcasting licence fell to be examined under the third sentence
of paragraph 1 of Article 10 (see paragraphs 115 and 132 above). The Court
sees no reason to hold otherwise.
153. In this regard, the Court reiterates that the object and purpose of the
third sentence of Article 10 § 1 is to make it clear that States are permitted to
57
regulate by means of a licensing system the way in which broadcasting is

organised in their territories, particularly in its technical aspects. The latter
are undeniably important, but the grant or refusal of a licence may also be
made conditional on other considerations, including such matters as the
nature and objectives of a proposed station, its potential audience at national,
regional or local level, the rights and needs of a specific audience and the
obligations deriving from international legal instruments. This may lead to
interferences whose aims will be legitimate under the third sentence of
paragraph 1, even though they may not correspond to any of the aims set out
in paragraph 2. The compatibility of such interferences with the Convention
must nevertheless be assessed in the light of the other requirements of
paragraph 2 (see Informationsverein Lentia and Others v. Austria,
24 November 1993, § 32, Series A no. 276; Demuth, cited above, § 33; and
Centro Europa 7 S.R.L. and Di Stefano v. Italy [GC], no. 38433/09, § 139,
ECHR 2012).
154. The Court can agree with the applicant company that the factual
circumstances and context of the present case are somewhat different from
those in the case of Demuth (cited above). However, it cannot see any reason
why the above-mentioned principles set out in its case-law would not be
applicable in this case. In this context, it notes that in Moldova, television
broadcasting required a licence to be issued by the ACC in accordance with
Article 23 of the Code. This provision also set out various instructions as to
the purposes, functions and content of television programmes (see
paragraph 85 above). Thus, the licensing system operating in Moldova was
capable of contributing to the quality and balance of programmes through the
powers conferred on the government. It was therefore consistent with the
third sentence of paragraph 1 (see Demuth, cited above, § 34).
155. In so far as the applicant company disputed the justification for the
revocation of its television broadcasting licence, it remains, however, to be
determined whether the interference satisfied the other relevant conditions of
paragraph 2 of Article 10 (see paragraph 151 above and Demuth, cited above,
§ 35).
(d) Whether the interference was prescribed by law

156. The applicant company and the Government differed as to whether
the interference with the applicant company’s freedom of expression was
“prescribed by law” (see paragraphs 116-120 and 134 above).
(i) General principles
157. The Court reiterates that, as regards the words “in accordance with
the law” and “prescribed by law” which appear in Articles 8 to 11 of the
Convention, it has always understood the term “law” in its “substantive”
sense, not its “formal” one. “Law” must be understood to include both
statutory law – encompassing also enactments of lower ranking statutes and

regulatory measures taken by professional regulatory bodies under
independent rule-making powers delegated to them by Parliament – and
judge-made “law”. In sum, the “law” is the provision in force as the
competent courts have interpreted it (see, mutatis mutandis, Leyla Şahin
v. Turkey [GC], no. 44774/98, § 88, ECHR 2005-XI, with further references;
Sanoma Uitgevers B.V. v. the Netherlands [GC], no. 38224/03, § 83,
14 September 2010; and Unifaun Theatre Productions Limited and Others
v. Malta, no. 37326/13, § 79, 15 May 2018).
158. The Court reiterates further that the expression “prescribed by law”
in the second paragraph of Article 10 not only requires that the impugned
measure should have a legal basis in domestic law, but also refers to the
quality of the law in question, which should be accessible to the person
concerned and foreseeable as to its effects (see, among other authorities,
Maestri v. Italy [GC], no. 39748/98, § 30, ECHR 2004-I; Delfi AS v. Estonia
[GC], no. 64569/09, § 120, ECHR 2015; and Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy
and Satamedia Oy v. Finland [GC], no. 931/13, § 142, 27 June 2017).
159. As regards the requirement of foreseeability, the Court has
repeatedly held that a norm cannot be regarded as a “law” within the meaning
of Article 10 § 2 unless it is formulated with sufficient precision to enable a
person to regulate his or her conduct. That person must be able – if need be
with appropriate advice – to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the
circumstances, the consequences which a given action may entail. Those
consequences need not be foreseeable with absolute certainty. A law which
confers a discretion is thus not in itself inconsistent with the requirement of
foreseeability, provided that the scope of the discretion and the manner of its
exercise are indicated with sufficient clarity, having regard to the legitimate
aim of the measure in question, to give the individual adequate protection
against arbitrary interference (see Magyar Kétfarkú Kutya Párt v. Hungary
[GC], no. 201/17, § 94, 20 January 2020). Whilst certainty is desirable, it may
bring in its train excessive rigidity, and the law must be able to keep pace
with changing circumstances. Accordingly, many laws are inevitably
couched in terms which, to a greater or lesser extent, are vague, and whose
interpretation and application are questions of practice (see Centro Europa 7
S.R.L. and Di Stefano, cited above, § 141; Delfi AS, cited above, § 121; and
Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy, cited above, § 143). At
the same time, the Court is aware that there must come a day when a given
legal norm is applied for the first time (see Kudrevičius and Others
v. Lithuania [GC], no. 37553/05, § 115, ECHR 2015, and Magyar Kétfarkú
Kutya Párt, cited above, § 97).
160. The role of adjudication vested in the national courts is precisely to
dissipate such interpretational doubts as may remain. The Court’s power to
review compliance with domestic law is thus limited, as it is primarily for the
national authorities, notably the courts, to interpret and apply domestic law
59
(see, among other authorities, Kudrevičius and Others, cited above, § 110,
and Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy, cited above, § 144).
Unless the interpretation is arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable, the Court’s
role is confined to ascertaining whether the effects of that interpretation are
compatible with the Convention (see Radomilja and Others, § 149, cited
above, and Centre for Democracy and the Rule of Law v. Ukraine,
no. 10090/16, § 108, 26 March 2020, with further references). Also, it is not
for the Court to express a view on the appropriateness of methods chosen by
the legislature of a respondent State to regulate a given field. Its task is
confined to determining whether the methods adopted and the effects they
entail are in conformity with the Convention (see Gorzelik and Others
v. Poland [GC], no. 44158/98, § 67, ECHR 2004-I, and Delfi AS, cited above,
§ 127). Moreover, the level of precision required of domestic legislation –
which cannot provide for every eventuality – depends to a considerable
degree on the content of the law in question, the field it is designed to cover
and the number and status of those to whom it is addressed (see Delfi AS,
cited above, § 122; Kudrevičius and Others, cited above, § 110; and
Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy, cited above, §144).
161. Persons carrying on a professional activity, who are used to having
to proceed with a high degree of caution when pursuing their occupation, can
on this account be expected to take special care in assessing the risks that such
activity entails (see Delfi AS, cited above, § 122, and Satakunnan
Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy, cited above, § 145, with further
references).
(ii) Application of these principles in the present case
162. As regards the existence of a legal basis for the impugned

interference in the instant case, the Court finds no reason to call into question
the national authorities’ finding that the revocation of the applicant
company’s licence had a basis under domestic law, in particular Articles 7,
10, 27, and 38 of the Code, as reflected in point 3.1 of the terms of the
broadcasting licence (see paragraphs 43 and 85 above).
163. As regards the applicant company’s argument that the legal basis for
the revocation of its licence, or part of that basis, was not accessible, the Court
reiterates that the Convention does not contain any specific requirements as
to the degree of publicity to be given to a particular legal provision (see
Špaček, s.r.o., v. the Czech Republic, no. 26449/95, § 57, 9 November 1999).
In this connection, the Court notes that the applicant company has never
maintained that it did not have access to the actual text of the broadcasting
licence it held or to the various points set out in the licence. Moreover, it has
not contended as such, or presented any evidence, that the Code was not
published and available in the country’s main legislation database, a source
of information easily accessible not only to a professional television operator,
but also to any member of the general public.
164. In these circumstances the Court cannot agree with the applicant
company that the legal basis relied on by the national authorities for the
revocation of its licence was not accessible.
165. Turning to the foreseeability of the domestic legislation and its
interpretation and application by the domestic courts, the Court notes that the
language used by the Code was rather unambiguous: it provided (i) that
broadcasters were under a duty to observe the principle of political pluralism
in their programme services – by giving airtime to different political parties
or movements in a balanced manner – together with the principles of
objectivity and fairness within their news programmes by ensuring accuracy,
avoiding distortion and adhering to the principles of multi-source information
in cases of news stories covering conflict situations; (ii) that the ACC
supervised the manner in which the private and public broadcasters complied
with the obligations set out in their broadcasting licences, and the accuracy
of their programmes, and monitored the content of their programmes;
(iii) that in the event of breaches of the legal rules by broadcasters, the ACC
was to apply one of the five sanctions provided for in the Code, revocation of
the broadcasting licence being one of them; (iv) that the ACC had to apply
the sanctions gradually in a particular initial order; (v) that the broadcasting
licence was to be revoked only if a recurrent and serious violation of the
provisions of the Code occurred and only after the other available sanctions
had been exhausted; (vi) that the ACC’s decisions entered into force on the
date of their publication in the Official Gazette of the Republic of Moldova;
and (vii) that the ACC’s decision imposing a sanction constituted a writ of
enforcement.
166. The Court is of the view that the Code did not lack the necessary
precision to enable NIT to regulate its conduct. It does not find it
unreasonable in circumstances where the national authorities have discretion
on such matters that a professional broadcaster, such as NIT, could be
expected to proceed with caution in carrying out its professional activity and
to take additional care in assessing the risks that such activity entailed and to
mitigate them following the imposition of a sanction.
167. In NIT’s case, the latter’s repeated breaches of Article 7 of the Code
had prompted the ACC to apply successively each of the five types of
sanctions provided for by Article 38 of the Code. These variously consisted
of the issuing of a public warning, the withdrawal of the right to broadcast
advertisements for a defined period and the imposition of a fine, then
increasing gradually to the suspension of the right to broadcast for a certain
period and ultimately to the revocation of the licence (see paragraphs 29 and
40-43 above). Therefore, the Court does not discern any element in the ACC’s
actions suggesting that the manner in which it exercised its discretion in the
instant case could be regarded as unforeseeable under the Code.
168. Nor is the Court persuaded by the applicant company’s allegations
that the relevant national law prohibited the ACC from enforcing a sanction
61
immediately without awaiting the outcome of a challenge in court and from

applying a new sanction before the national courts had adjudicated by a final
judgment on the lawfulness of the previous sanction, or placed the national
courts under a duty to grant interim measures pending the outcome of
challenges against sanctions. In this connection the Court observes that it
could not be said that either the Code or the Law on administrative court
proceedings included any provisions expressly confirming the applicant
company’s allegations. It notes that, while Article 38 § 10 of the Code
provided that a decision by the ACC imposing a sanction which is not
contested within the time-limit set constitutes a writ of enforcement,
Article 40 § 3 of the Code provided that decisions of the ACC enter into force
on the date of their publication in the Official Gazette of the Republic of
Moldova. The Court further observes that section 21 of the Law on
administrative court proceedings provided for a remedy to request the
suspension of the execution of an administrative act and gave the courts the
competence to order such a suspension. In fact, this would seem to contradict
the applicant company’s argument that the ACC’s decision could not have
been enforced immediately or that the courts had been under a legal duty to
grant interim measures.
169. In any event, the Court notes that it appears from the available
evidence that the national authorities, including the courts, were consistent in
interpreting and applying the relevant law in force on 5 April 2012 to the
effect that the ACC’s decisions were enforceable immediately after their
publication in the Official Gazette. Bearing in mind its limited role vis-à-vis
that of the national authorities and courts when it comes to the interpretation
and application of domestic law (see paragraph 160 above), the Court sees no
reason to call into doubt their rejection of the applicant company’s argument
based on the Law on regulating entrepreneurial activity (see paragraphs 70
and 77 above). Moreover, it appears that the ACC could apply an ensuing
sanction before the national courts had adjudicated by a final judgment on the
lawfulness of the previous sanction, and the courts had discretion in granting
interim measures pending the outcome of challenges against sanctions (see
paragraphs 29, 54, 65 and 66 above). In addition, it appears that since at least
November 2010 the applicant company had been or ought to have been aware
that the authorities interpreted the law and applied it in practice in a manner
which supported the immediate enforcement of the ACC’s decisions after
publication and the discretion of the courts in granting interim measures in
this regard (see paragraph 29 above).
170. In so far as the applicant company relied on the Constitutional
Court’s ruling of 6 December 2012 to substantiate its above allegations, the
Court observes that that court had declared unconstitutional an amendment to
Article 38 of the Code that entered into force in May 2012. As pointed out by
the Court of Appeal in the present case, according to the relevant national
statutory law, the Constitutional Court’s decision did not have retroactive
effect; it had effect only for the future. Therefore, it could not have had any
legal effects on the law and practice as applicable on 5 April 2012, when the
ACC had decided to revoke the applicant company’s licence, and on the
subsequent judicial proceedings reviewing the lawfulness of that decision
(see paragraph 71 above). This had also been confirmed in a press release
issued by the Constitutional Court on the day of its ruling by stating that the
provisions examined in its judgment had gained legal force only in May 2012
and had not been applicable at the time of the ACC’s decision concerning the
revocation of NIT’s licence (see paragraph 95 above).
171. Having regard to the above, the Court is of the view that the relevant
domestic law applicable in the applicant company’s case was formulated
sufficiently clearly in order to fulfil the requirements of precision and
foreseeability under Article 10 § 2 of the Convention.
172. The Court therefore concludes that the impugned interference was
“prescribed by law”.
(e) Whether the interference pursued a legitimate aim

173. The parties were in disagreement as to whether the interference
pursued one of the legitimate aims mentioned in paragraph 2 of Article 10
(see paragraphs 121 and 135 above).
174. The Court has accepted that the ability of a country’s licensing
system to contribute to the quality and balance of programmes constitutes a
sufficient legitimate aim for an interference under the third sentence of
Article 10 § 1, albeit not directly corresponding to any of the aims set out in
Article 10 § 2 (see Demuth, cited above, § 37). The Court has also accepted
that interferences seeking to preserve the impartiality of broadcasting on
matters of public interest correspond to the legitimate aim of protecting the
“rights of others” to which the second paragraph of Article 10 refers (see
Animal Defenders International v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 48876/08,
§ 78, ECHR 2013 (extracts)). It has further accepted that the latter aim is also
pursued by measures intended to ensure the audience’s right to a balanced
and unbiased coverage of matters of public interest in news programmes (see
ATV Zrt v. Hungary, no. 61178/14, § 39, 28 April 2020).
175. In the present case the Court has already found that Moldova’s
licensing system was capable of contributing to the quality and balance of
programmes in the country (see paragraph 154 above). Moreover, the need to
preserve the public’s access to impartial, trustworthy and diverse political
speech through television news programmes was at the heart of the national
authorities’ decision to uphold the sanction imposed on the applicant
company on 5 April 2012 (see paragraph 61 above). The Court finds nothing
to indicate that the aim of the impugned measure in the instant case was
“punitive in its essence”, as suggested by the applicant company. In these
circumstances, despite the applicant company’s arguments to the contrary,
the Court is satisfied that the aim of the interference in the present case was
63
legitimate under the third sentence of Article 10 § 1. It is prepared to accept

that the interference also corresponded to the legitimate aim of protecting the
“rights of others” to which the second paragraph of Article 10 refers.
176. However, the Court is not persuaded by the Government’s
suggestion that the impugned measure had been imposed in the interests of
“national security” or “public safety” or for the “prevention of disorder” (see
paragraph 135 above).
(f) Whether the interference was necessary in a democratic society

(i) General principles regarding freedom of expression
(α) On the requirement that an interference be “necessary in a democratic
society”
177. The general principles concerning the question whether an
interference is “necessary in a democratic society” are well established in the
Court’s case-law and have been summarised as follows (see, among many
authorities, Animal Defenders International, cited above, § 100; Delfi AS,
cited above, § 131; and Karácsony and Others v. Hungary [GC],
nos. 42461/13 and 44357/13, § 132, 17 May 2016):
“(i) Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a
democratic society and one of the basic conditions for its progress and for each
individual’s self-fulfilment. Subject to paragraph 2 of Article 10, it is applicable not
only to ‘information’ or ‘ideas’ that are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive
or as a matter of indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or disturb. Such are
the demands of pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness without which there is no
‘democratic society’. As set forth in Article 10, this freedom is subject to exceptions,
which ... must, however, be construed strictly, and the need for any restrictions must be
established convincingly ...
(ii) The adjective ‘necessary’, within the meaning of Article 10 § 2, implies the
existence of a ‘pressing social need’. The Contracting States have a certain margin of
appreciation in assessing whether such a need exists, but it goes hand in hand with
European supervision, embracing both the legislation and the decisions applying it,
even those given by an independent court. The Court is therefore empowered to give
the final ruling on whether a ‘restriction’ is reconcilable with freedom of expression as
protected by Article 10.
(iii) The Court’s task, in exercising its supervisory jurisdiction, is not to take the place
of the competent national authorities but rather to review under Article 10 the decisions
they delivered pursuant to their power of appreciation. This does not mean that the
supervision is limited to ascertaining whether the respondent State exercised its
discretion reasonably, carefully and in good faith; what the Court has to do is to look at
the interference complained of in the light of the case as a whole and determine whether
it was ‘proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued’ and whether the reasons adduced
by the national authorities to justify it are ‘relevant and sufficient’... In doing so, the
Court has to satisfy itself that the national authorities applied standards which were in
conformity with the principles embodied in Article 10 and, moreover, that they relied
on an acceptable assessment of the relevant facts ...”
(β) General principles concerning journalistic reporting on political issues and

other matters of public concern, notably in the audiovisual media
178. The most careful scrutiny on the part of the Court is called for when
the measures taken or sanctions imposed by the national authority are capable
of discouraging the participation of the press in debates over matters of
legitimate public concern (see Jersild v. Denmark, 23 September 1994, § 35,
Series A no. 298; Bergens Tidende and Others v. Norway, no. 26132/95,
§ 52, ECHR 2000-IV; Tønsbergs Blad A.S. and Haukom v. Norway,
no. 510/04, § 88, 1 March 2007; and Björk Eiðsdóttir v. Iceland,
no. 46443/09, § 69, 10 July 2012; compare MGN Limited v. the United
Kingdom, no. 39401/04, §§ 150 and 155, 18 January 2011; Von Hannover
v. Germany (no. 2) [GC], nos. 40660/08 and 60641/08, §§ 106-07, ECHR
2012; and Axel Springer AG v. Germany [GC], no. 39954/08, §§ 87-88,
7 February 2012). There is little scope under Article 10 § 2 of the Convention
for restrictions on political speech or on debate on matters of public interest
(see Sürek, cited above, § 61).
179. Article 10 of the Convention does not, however, guarantee a wholly
unrestricted freedom of expression even with respect to press coverage of
matters of serious public concern (see Bladet Tromsø and Stensaas v. Norway
[GC], no. 21980/93, § 65, ECHR 1999-III).
180. The protection of the right of journalists to impart information on
issues of general interest is subject to the proviso that they are acting in good
faith and on an accurate factual basis and provide “reliable and precise”
information in accordance with the ethics of journalism (see, for example,
Goodwin v. the United Kingdom, 27 March 1996, § 39, Reports of Judgments
and Decisions 1996-II; Fressoz and Roire v. France [GC], no. 29183/95,
§ 54, ECHR 1999-I; Bladet Tromsø and Stensaas, cited above, § 65; McVicar
v. the United Kingdom, no. 46311/99, § 73, ECHR 2002-III; and Pedersen
and Baadsgaard v. Denmark [GC], no. 49017/99, § 78, ECHR 2004-XI); or
in other words, in accordance with the tenets of responsible journalism (see
Bédat v. Switzerland [GC], no. 56925/08, § 50, 29 March 2016, with further
references).
181. These considerations play a particularly important role nowadays,
given the influence wielded by the media in contemporary society: not only
do they inform, they can also suggest, by the way in which they present the
information, how it is to be assessed. In a world in which the individual is
confronted with vast quantities of information circulated via traditional and
electronic media and involving an ever-growing number of players,
monitoring compliance with journalistic ethics takes on added importance.
(see Stoll v. Switzerland [GC], no. 69698/01, § 104, ECHR 2007-V).
182. Where the “duties and responsibilities” of journalists are concerned,
the potential impact of the medium of expression involved is an important
factor in assessing the proportionality of the interference. In this context, the
Court has acknowledged that account must be taken of the fact that the
65
audiovisual media have a more immediate and powerful effect than the print
media (see Jersild, cited above, § 31, and Radio France and Others v. France,
no. 53984/00, § 39, ECHR 2004-II). The former have means of conveying
through images meanings which the print media are not able to impart (see
Jersild, cited above, § 31). The function of television and radio as familiar
sources of entertainment in the intimacy of the listener’s or viewer’s home
further reinforces their impact (see Murphy v. Ireland, no. 44179/98, § 74,
ECHR 2003-IX (extracts)).
183. At the same time, the methods of objective and balanced reporting
may vary considerably, depending among other things on the media in
question. It is not for this Court, nor for the national courts for that matter, to
substitute their own views for those of the press as to what technique of
reporting should be adopted by journalists. In this context the Court reiterates
that Article 10 protects not only the substance of the ideas and information
expressed, but also the form in which they are conveyed (see Jersild, cited
above, § 31; see also Stoll, cited above, § 146, and Gaunt v. the United
Kingdom (dec.), no. 26448/12, § 47, 6 September 2016).
(γ) General principles concerning pluralism in the audiovisual media

184. The Court stresses that the particular role of the press in imparting
information and ideas on political issues and on other subjects of public
interest, which the public is moreover entitled to receive (see Manole and
Others, cited above, § 96), cannot be successfully accomplished unless it is
grounded in the principle of pluralism, of which the State is the ultimate
guarantor (see Informationsverein Lentia and Others, cited above, § 38).
A public monopoly is the one which imposes the greatest restrictions on the
freedom of expression, namely the total impossibility of broadcasting
otherwise than through a national station and, in some cases, to a very limited
extent through a local cable station. The far-reaching character of such
restrictions means that they can only be justified where they correspond to a
pressing need (ibid., § 39).
185. The Court reiterates that there can be no democracy without
pluralism. Democracy thrives on freedom of expression. It is of the essence
of democracy to allow diverse political programmes to be proposed and
debated, even those that call into question the way a State is currently
organised, provided that they do not harm democracy. In order to ensure true
pluralism in the audiovisual sector in a democratic society, it is not sufficient
to provide for the existence of several channels or the theoretical possibility
for potential operators to access the audiovisual market. It is necessary in
addition to allow effective access to the market so as to guarantee diversity
of overall programme content, reflecting as far as possible the variety of
opinions encountered in the society at which the programmes are aimed (see
Centro Europa 7 S.R.L. and Di Stefano, cited above, §§ 129-30).
186. Having regard to the powerful impact of the audiovisual media (see
paragraph 182 above), the Court reiterates that a situation whereby a powerful
economic or political group in society is permitted to obtain a position of
dominance over the audiovisual media, and thereby exercise pressure on
broadcasters and eventually curtail their editorial freedom, undermines the
fundamental role of freedom of expression in a democratic society. In such a
sensitive sector as the audiovisual media, in addition to its negative duty of
non-interference the State has a positive obligation to put in place an
appropriate legislative and administrative framework to guarantee effective
pluralism. This is especially relevant when the national audiovisual system is
characterised by a duopoly. Member States should adapt the existing
regulatory frameworks, particularly with regard to media ownership, and
adopt any regulatory and financial measures called for in order to guarantee
media transparency and structural pluralism as well as diversity of the content
distributed (ibid., §§ 133-34).
(δ) On the need to develop the Court’s case-law on media pluralism

187. The Court notes that from the case-law outlined above it emerges
that the existing standards on media pluralism were developed chiefly or
exclusively in the context of complaints of unjustified State interference with
an applicant’s Article 10 rights and where the Court relied, inter alia, on the
principle of media pluralism in finding a violation. From this case-law it
transpires that that principle is considered crucial for the effective protection
of media freedom under the Convention.
188. In the case now under consideration, however, it is the other
dimension of media pluralism which is at stake in that the applicant company
complained of restrictions on its freedom of expression which were based on
the grounds of ensuring political pluralism in the media with the aim of
enabling diversity in the expression of political opinion and enhancing the
protection of the free-speech interests of others in the audiovisual media. In
other words, a question arises in the present case of striking a proper balance
between competing free-speech interests, namely between those of the
community in safeguarding political pluralism in the media on the one hand
and those of respecting the principle of editorial freedom on the other hand.
189. A further specific feature is the emphasis laid in the relevant national
legal framework on internal pluralism, namely the obligation on broadcasters
under Article 7 § 2 of the Code to present different political views in a
balanced manner without favouring a particular party or political movement.
In contrast, the cases mentioned above have been more concerned with what
can be described as issues of external pluralism (monopoly, duopoly and
other positions of dominance) (see paragraph 101 above).
190. This offers an opportunity for the Court to clarify that neither aspect,
internal or external, should be considered in isolation from each other. On the
contrary, the two aspects should be considered in combination with each
67
other. Thus, in a national licensing system involving a certain number of

broadcasters with national coverage, what may be regarded as a lack of
internal pluralism in the programmes offered by one broadcaster may be
compensated for by the existence of effective external pluralism. However,
as the Court held in Centro Europa 7 S.R.L. and Di Stefano (cited above), it
is not sufficient to provide for the existence of several channels. Or, as stated
in the Committee of Ministers Recommendation CM/Rec (2007)2 on media
pluralism and diversity of media content quoted at paragraph 99 above,
“pluralism of information and diversity of media content will not be
automatically guaranteed by the multiplication of the means of
communication offered to the public”. What is required is to guarantee
diversity of overall programme content, reflecting as far as possible the
variety of opinions encountered in the society at which the programmes are
aimed (see paragraph 185 above). There may be different approaches to
achieving overall programme diversity in the European space, as illustrated
by the fact that in nearly all of the thirty-four Contracting States surveyed,
public broadcasters are subject to a duty to observe political pluralism
whereas in twenty of the States or local jurisdictions concerned, unlike in
fifteen others, such a duty applies also to private broadcasters (see paragraphs
111-112 above). It thus appears that a number of national licensing systems
tend to rely on the diversity of perspectives provided by the different licensed
operators, coupled with structural safeguards and general obligations of fair
coverage, while other national systems require stricter content-based duties
of internal pluralism. Article 10 of the Convention does not impose a
particular model in this respect.
191. This is also an opportunity to address the issue of whether the
privileged position of the freedom of the press to report on political issues
and other matters of public interest should mean that the strict scrutiny
traditionally applicable to any restrictions imposed by the Contracting States
ought to limit correspondingly the States’ discretion in determining the means
of ensuring political pluralism in the area of licensing audiovisual media.
192. In this connection the Court has already acknowledged that in such
a sensitive sector as the audiovisual media the State has a positive obligation
to put in place an appropriate legislative and administrative framework to
guarantee true effective pluralism (see paragraph 186 above). It has further
recognised that, when it comes to audiovisual broadcasting, States are under
a duty to ensure, first, that the public are given access through television to
impartial and accurate information and a range of opinions and comments,
reflecting, inter alia, the diversity of political outlook within the country and,
secondly, that journalists and other professionals working in the audiovisual
media are not prevented from imparting such information and comment. As
the choice of the means by which to achieve these aims will vary according
to local conditions, it therefore falls within the State’s margin of appreciation
(see Manole and Others, cited above, § 100).
193. As regards the scope of the margin of appreciation, the Court

reiterates that, given the multifaceted character and sheer complexity of
issues concerning media pluralism (see paragraph 106-108 above), there are
a variety of means that could be deployed by the Contracting States to
regulate effective pluralism in the audiovisual broadcasting sector (see
paragraphs 107-108 above). In such circumstances the margin to be accorded
in this regard should be wider than that normally afforded to restrictions on
expression on matters of public interest or political opinion. The Contracting
States should therefore in principle enjoy a wide discretion in their choice of
the means to be deployed in order to ensure pluralism in the media. However,
their discretion in this respect will be narrower depending on the nature and
seriousness of any restriction on editorial freedom that the means thus chosen
may entail. In this connection, it should be reiterated that it is not for the
national authorities, nor for the Court for that matter, to review the press’s
own appreciation of the news or information value of an item (see Jersild,
cited above, § 33, and Couderc and Hachette Filipacchi Associés v. France
[GC], no. 40454/07, § 139, ECHR 2015 (extracts)) or to substitute their views
for those of the press on what methods of objective and balanced reporting
should be adopted by journalists (see Jersild, cited above, § 31; Bladet
Tromsø and Stensaas, cited above, § 63; and Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy
and Satamedia Oy, cited above, § 127).
194. The Court will have to be satisfied that the contents of the relevant
national legal norms and their application in the concrete circumstances of a
given case seen as a whole produced effects that were compatible with the
Article 10 guarantees and were attended by effective safeguards against
arbitrariness and abuse.
195. In this connection, the fairness of proceedings and the procedural
guarantees afforded are factors which in some circumstances may have to be
taken into account when assessing the proportionality of an interference with
freedom of expression (see Karácsony and Others, cited above, §§ 133-36,
with further references and case summaries, notably Association Ekin
v. France, no. 39288/98, § 61, ECHR 2001-VIII, where the practical
effectiveness of a full review was found to have been undermined by the
excessive length of the proceedings; and Cumhuriyet Vakfı and Others
v. Turkey, no. 28255/07, §§ 62-74, 8 October 2013, where the safeguards
were found to be insufficient having regard to (i) the exceptionally wide
scope of an injunction; (ii) its excessive duration; (iii) the failure of the
domestic court to give any reasoning for the measure; and (iv) the applicants’
inability to contest it before it had been granted).
196. The existence of procedural safeguards is of particular relevance to
the Court’s examination of the proportionality of the impugned revocation of
the applicant company’s broadcasting licence; as was undisputed, this
constituted the most severe sanction under the relevant provisions of national
law, which specified that this sanction was to be imposed “only if a recurrent
69
and serious violation of the provisions of the Code [had] occurred” (see
paragraph 218 below). In cases such as the one at hand, the severity of the
sanction is a factor calling for closer scrutiny by the Court and for a narrower
margin of appreciation to be accorded to the State.
(ii) Application of these principles in the present case
197. In examining the “necessity” of the interference in the light of the

above-mentioned principles and considerations, the Court will first have
regard to the regulatory framework on media pluralism put in place by the
respondent State and then to the manner in which it was applied to the
applicant company in the specific circumstances of the case.
(α) The regulatory framework in place

198. The Court notes that NIT received sanctions on account of its failure
to grant airtime to political parties in a balanced manner as required by
Article 7 § 2 of the Code and its failure to ensure – in order to observe the
principles of social and political balance, fairness and objectivity – accuracy,
non-distortion of the sense of reality and adherence to the principle of
multi-source information, as required by Article 7 § 4(a), (b) and (c) of the
Code. It further notes that the applicant company’s main position is that those
requirements are contrary to Article 10 of the Convention (see
paragraphs 120 and 122 above).
199. In addressing this argument the Court firstly reiterates that all the
provisions of the Code, including Articles 7 and 8, were fully accessible to
the applicant company (see paragraph 163 above). Secondly, the
requirements set out in paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article 7 of the Code largely
embodied the preconditions deriving from the Court’s case-law for affording
enhanced protection of journalistic freedom under Article 10. Even the duty
on a broadcaster, when giving airtime to one political party or movement
propagating its position, to do likewise in respect of other political parties or
movements, may be considered from this angle (see paragraphs 179-180, 183,
184-186, and 191 above).
200. The impugned provisions of the Code did not specify that a
broadcaster was under a duty to give an equal amount of airtime to all political
parties. As the heading of Article 7 of the Code indicates, broadcasters were
under a duty to ensure political balance and pluralism. The manner in which
the provisions in question were interpreted and applied in the instant case
suggests that this requirement could have been satisfied by offering an
opportunity to comment or reply (see paragraphs 36-38 and 60 above). The
Court reiterates in this connection that the right of reply, as an important
element of freedom of expression, falls within the scope of Article 10 of the
Convention. This flows from the need not only to be able to contest untruthful
information, but also to ensure a plurality of opinions, especially on matters
of general interest such as literary and political debate (see Kaperzyński

v. Poland, no. 43206/07, § 66, 3 April 2012).
201. The Court also notes that the internal pluralism policy as embodied
in the Code had received a positive assessment by the Council of Europe
experts, who found Article 7 § 2 of the Code to be “commendable” (see
paragraph 16 above). Moreover, nothing in those experts’ comments seems
to suggest that the requirements set out in Article 7 § 4 of the Code were
viewed as being at odds with the principles of journalistic independence and
editorial autonomy.
202. While the internal pluralism policy chosen by the national authorities
might be seen as rather strict, the present case relates to a period before
Moldova transitioned to terrestrial digital television (see the
friendly-settlement agreement concluded between the parties in Societatea
Română de Televiziune v. Moldova (dec.), no. 36398/08, 15 October 2013),
when the number of national frequencies was very limited (see paragraphs 23
and 106 above) and when, following the 2001 events, the authorities were
under a strong positive obligation to put in place broadcasting legislation
ensuring the transmission of accurate and balanced news and information
reflecting the full range of political opinions (see paragraphs 12-14 above).
203. Given the aforementioned context, the Court can accept that the
legislative choices underlying the adoption of the provisions in question were
carefully considered and that genuine efforts were made at parliamentary
level to strike a fair balance between the competing interests at stake (see
Animal Defenders International, cited above, § 108).
204. In the light of the above, the Court is of the view that the degree of
external pluralism related to the existence of four other television
broadcasters with nationwide coverage at the time is not a reason for calling
into question the requirement to observe the internal pluralism rules set out
in Article 7 §§ 2 and 4 of the Code. In fact, all broadcasters, whether they
were private or public, were equally subject to the same rules, which, it
appears from the evidence, were in practice applied not to the entire
audiovisual content of licensed broadcasters but only to their respective news
bulletins. Thus, all the sanctions that the ACC imposed on NIT and any other
broadcasters with nationwide coverage on account of non-compliance with
Article 7 of the Code in the period between 2007 and 2012 related to their
news bulletins only, and not to other programmes (see paragraphs 28-29
above).
205. The Court observes further that the implementation of the
above-mentioned requirements was monitored by the ACC, a specialist body
which was established by law. The Court stresses the important role which
regulatory authorities play in upholding and promoting media freedom and
pluralism, and the need to ensure their independence given the delicate and
complex nature of this role (see paragraphs 105 and 109 above). It notes in
this connection that the concerns expressed by the Council of Europe experts
71
in relation to the ACC’s structure and their proposals to improve the

safeguards in the draft Code against undue government influence and control
were in the main accepted by the Moldovan legislature and included in the
final text of the Code (see paragraph 18 above). Also, the selection,
appointment, funding and functions of its members were based on detailed
rules laid down in the Code, designed to secure the ACC’s independence and
to protect its decision-making process against political pressures and
interference (see paragraph 85 above).
206. The ACC’s meetings, monitoring reports and decisions were
accessible to the public. Its decisions to conduct monitoring, the resulting
monitoring reports, and information on meetings devoted to discussing the
reports were notified to the relevant broadcasters. The broadcasters’
representatives were given an opportunity to attend these meetings and to
submit comments on the findings of the monitoring reports.
207. In addition, the ACC was required to provide reasons for any
decision to impose a sanction on a broadcaster (see Article 40 § 4 of the Code,
cited in paragraph 85 above). Through a preliminary challenge, the ACC
could be requested to reconsider its decision. Also, the ACC’s decision could
be challenged before the national courts with a concurrent application for an
interim order to suspend its enforcement pending the outcome of the
proceedings.
208. Lastly, the Court notes that the internal pluralism governance
practice put in place by the Moldovan authorities does not seem to be
markedly different from that of many Council of Europe member States (see
paragraphs 110-111 above).
209. Having regard to all the above-mentioned considerations, the Court
concludes that the respondent State acted well within its margin of
appreciation in the manner in which it designed the national legal and
administrative framework with a view to achieving pluralism in the
audiovisual media.
(β) Application of the regulatory framework in NIT’s case

‒ Whether the restriction was supported by relevant and sufficient reasons
210. As regards the manner of implementation of the above-mentioned
framework to the case under review, the Court notes that the sanction imposed
on the applicant company followed a five-day monitoring process carried out
by the ACC with respect to NIT’s main news bulletin, in line with the
established practice of applying Article 7 of the Code to news bulletins only,
and not to the entire audiovisual content of the licence holder’s broadcast (see
211. The monitoring methodology, which involved comparative and
chronometric measurements of content and had been devised by the ACC in
collaboration with international experts, had been confirmed as efficient and
had been approved by members of civil society operating in the field after
public deliberations (see paragraph 72 above). The Court sees no reason to
call into question the relevance or accuracy of the methodology used.
212. The monitoring report on which the ACC based its decision provided
a detailed review of the news bulletins broadcast by NIT. The result of the
comparative and chronometric measurements of the content of NIT’s news
bulletins was not disputed by NIT. The findings made by the ACC to the
effect that NIT had failed to comply with its duty to obey the principle of
political pluralism as reflected in the requirements under Article 7 § 2 of the
Code involved conclusions that the time devoted to one party, namely the
PCRM, had been positive or neutral whilst that devoted to its opponent, the
AEI, had been mostly negative. Moreover, the persons, institutions or
political parties referred to or mentioned in a negative light were not given a
platform to present their own points of view in response to the criticism and
attacks to which they had been subjected. In addition, the bulletins had
contained information promoting a unilateral point of view, sometimes not
supported by any evidence, and had made use of features capable of distorting
reality. Furthermore, they had promoted aggressive journalistic language.
Those findings were upheld by the national courts.
213. Whilst the applicant company contested some of the above findings,
the Court, bearing in mind its subsidiary role, sees no reason to call into doubt
the assessment of facts made in the monitoring report (see paragraphs 35-39
above), the findings made therein that NIT had breached its duties and
responsibilities as set out in Article 7 §§ 2 and 4(a), (b) and (c) and Article 10
§ 5 of the Code and the assessment of the domestic courts in this regard (see
paragraphs 60 and 77 above). In this context the Court cannot but note that
from the evidence, including recordings of the news bulletins relied on by the
ACC in imposing sanctions on NIT, it appears that for most of their duration
the news bulletins in question were devoted to political matters and that the
reporting was clearly biased in favour of the activities of the PCRM and its
members and supporters, without providing anyone else with an opportunity
to respond to criticism and attacks as described in paragraph 212 above. Any
suggestion to the contrary by the applicant company in the Convention
proceedings appears to contradict its own submission before the Supreme
Court to the effect that persons in respect of whom criticism had been
expressed had not been offered an opportunity to respond because they had
not asked for such an opportunity (see paragraph 73 above).
214. In finding against the applicant company, the national authorities
held that the bulletins had used very strong language to describe the
government, the parties forming it and their leaders. Among other things, they
noted that one of the leaders of the AEI had been compared to “Hitler”, while
they had all been referred to as “criminals”, “bandits”, “crooks”, “swindlers”,
“group of criminals”, and so on. The domestic courts did not treat NIT’s
manner of reporting as a defamation case covered by Article 16 of the Civil
73
Code (contrast Urechean and Pavlicenco v. the Republic of Moldova,

nos. 27756/05 and 41219/07, § 20, 2 December 2014), but as a case
concerning a wider issue, namely that of pluralism and fair journalism,
covered by Article 7 of the Code. Thus, no analysis was carried out by the
ACC or the courts as to whether those statements referred to named
individuals (see Bladet Tromsø and Stensaas, cited above, §§ 61 and 71;
Selistö v. Finland, no. 56767/00, § 64, 16 November 2004; and Dmitriyevskiy
v. Russia, no. 42168/06, § 105, 3 October 2017) and to what extent they were
merely value judgments supported by factual elements. The impugned
statements were viewed as an additional aggravating factor in finding that
NIT had breached the rules concerning “political balance, fairness and
objectivity” as set forth in Article 7 § 4 of the Code. As the national courts
acknowledged, the above-mentioned issues went beyond a simple case of
defamation and concerned rather the interaction between the principle of
pluralism and, in substance, the requirements of accurate and reliable news
coverage in accordance with the ethics of journalism (see paragraph 61
above).
215. It is true, as stated above (see paragraph 178), that there is little scope
under Article 10 § 2 of the Convention for restrictions on political speech or
on debate on matters of public interest, and that the necessity for any
interference with political speech must be convincingly established (see,
among other authorities, Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy,
cited above, § 167). Also, in a democratic system the actions or omissions of
the government must be subject to close scrutiny not only by the legislative
and judicial authorities but also by public opinion (see Sürek, cited above,
§ 61). Moreover, as shocking, offensive, or disturbing as the impugned
statements singled out by the national authorities from NIT’s news bulletins
may appear, the Court has serious doubts that, given their context, they could
be considered to amount to incitement to violence, hatred or xenophobia or
that they could have affected the country’s territorial integrity and national
security as argued by the Government. Nevertheless, for the reasons stated
above and taking into account the fact that the exercise of freedom of
expression carries with it duties and responsibilities (see paragraphs 179-182
above), the news reporting at issue could hardly be said to have been of a kind
calling for the enhanced protection afforded to press freedom under
Article 10 of the Convention.
216. The Court is therefore not persuaded by the applicant company’s
submission that by conducting news reporting in the way it did in its news
bulletins that were monitored, NIT had contributed to political pluralism in
the media in any meaningful way (see paragraph 124 above).
217. Having regard to all the above considerations, the Court is satisfied
that the impugned decision to impose a “restriction” on the applicant
company’s freedom of expression as protected by paragraph 1 of Article 10
was supported by reasons that were both relevant and sufficient for the
purposes of the “necessity” test under paragraph 2 of this Article.
‒ Whether the restriction was proportionate

218. A further question to be examined under the latter test is whether
there was a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the impugned
sanction of revocation of the licence and the legitimate aims pursued. The
national courts acknowledged that this was the most severe sanction that
could be imposed (see paragraph 63 above). It entailed a shutdown of NIT’s
broadcasting activities and had other implications of the kind usually
associated with such a measure. Under Article 38 § 3 of the Code, the
sanctions provided for in the first paragraph of that Article were to be applied
gradually, the withdrawal of the broadcasting licence being the most severe
sanction envisaged. Paragraph 5 specified that this sanction was to be
imposed “only if a recurrent and serious violation of the provisions of the
Code [had] occurred”.
219. The Court observes that, as regards the series of sanctions previously
imposed on the applicant company, on ten occasions the sanction had been
imposed on account of failure to offer airtime in a balanced manner, in breach
of Article 7 § 2, and failure to give persons who had been criticised an
opportunity to comment, in breach of Article 7 § 4(c). On six of these
occasions the sanctions had been imposed on the additional grounds referred
to in sub-paragraph (b) of Article 7 § 4 (“the sense of reality [had been]
distorted by means of editing tricks, comments or headlines”) and on one
occasion because of a failure to comply with the requirement of accuracy in
sub-paragraph (a).
220. NIT’s news bulletins were broadcast nationwide and were therefore
accessible to a large audience and, in view of the type of medium in question,
capable of having a considerable impact, a factor which is important in
assessing the “duties and responsibilities” of the media and the
proportionality of the interference (see case references in paragraph 182
above).
221. The revocation of NIT’s licence was thus part of a gradual and
uninterrupted series of sanctions imposed by the ACC on the applicant
company. These had variously consisted of the issuing of a public warning,
the withdrawal of the right to broadcast advertisements for a defined period,
the imposition of a fine and then the suspension of the right to broadcast for
a certain period, ultimately concluding with the most severe sanction, the
revocation of the licence on 5 April 2012 (see paragraphs 29 and 40-43
above).
222. In so far as the applicant company has contended that the revocation
decision by the ACC was politically motivated, the Court has taken note of
the emphasis placed by the applicant company on the fact that the majority of
the sanctions imposed on NIT on the basis of the Code had taken place
75
between 2009 and 2011, thus after a change of the political parties in power
(see paragraph 20 above). It observes that at that time NIT had become a
platform for criticism of the governing forces and for promoting the
opposition party. In the light of the foregoing, and given also the severity of
the sanction imposed on the applicant company, the Court must scrutinise
closely (see paragraph 196 above) whether the Code and its application in the
concrete circumstances provided effective safeguards against arbitrariness
and abuse (see paragraph 194 above). In this connection the Court first
reiterates its findings above that the Code contained detailed rules pertaining
to the ACC’s structure and the selection, appointment and functioning of its
members, designed to secure this media regulator’s independence and to
safeguard against undue governmental influence (see paragraphs 109 and 205
above). Also, as a result of the rule imposing staggered terms for ACC
members, six out of the nine members who formed the ACC in 2012 had been
appointed before the change of government in 2009 (see paragraphs 24 and
85 above). The Court further observes that the applicant company’s
allegations that in taking its revocation decision the ACC had been influenced
by leading politicians, and had as a consequence treated the company in a
discriminatory manner, were duly examined by the national courts. The Court
of Appeal dismissed the allegation of political influence as being
unsubstantiated and rejected NIT’s argument that it had been discriminated
against, holding that it had been monitored at the same time and under the
same conditions as other broadcasters, and that other broadcasters had also
been punished where breaches of the Code had been found (see paragraph 72
above). In this connection, the Court finds unpersuasive the applicant
company’s argument that some high-profile politicians had made public
statements calling for the channel to be shut down. Although it cannot be
ruled out that such statements may potentially have a certain impact, this
cannot alone be regarded as a sufficiently concrete and strong indication that
the ACC failed to act independently when taking the impugned measure in
the instant case. In conclusion, the Court cannot but note that no concrete
evidence has been adduced in the proceedings before the domestic courts and
in turn before the Court to support the allegation that the ACC sought to
hinder the applicant company’s television channel from expressing critical
views of the government or pursued any other ulterior purpose when revoking
the licence.
223. In the context of the proportionality assessment, the Court further
considers it of particular importance that the measure did not prevent NIT
from using other means, such as the Internet, to broadcast its programmes,
including news bulletins, and could not prevent the applicant company from
pursuing other income-generating activities. Indeed, the applicant company
confirmed in its submissions to the Court that it had continued to share
content through its Internet homepage and its YouTube channel until 2014
(see paragraph 82 above). Moreover, the impugned measure did not have a
permanent effect as the applicant company could have reapplied for a

broadcasting licence one year after its licence had been revoked (see
224. The above considerations appear to support the Government’s
submission that before revoking the licence, the domestic authorities stayed
within the limits of the existing legislation in order to compel NIT to comply
with the relevant rules. Thus, the seriousness of the actions imputed to the
applicant company’s television channel appears to have resided not only in
its persistence in refusing to comply with the requirements on internal
pluralism but also in the nature and accumulation of the transgressions and
their gravity when seen as a whole. The fact that after receiving eleven
sanctions over a period of three years for the same or similar types of
breaches, NIT was not persuaded to change its behaviour and comply with
the Code entitled the authorities to consider that applying the most serious of
sanctions was warranted by the applicant company’s defiance.
225. As regards the fairness of the proceedings and the procedural
safeguards afforded, which are also of particular relevance to the Court’s
examination of the proportionality of the impugned sanction (see paragraphs
195-196 above), the Court notes the following. The ACC took its decision to
monitor NIT’s news bulletins during a public meeting and the applicant
company was informed both about the monitoring report and about the fact
that its findings would be examined at a public meeting, in conformity with
Article 38 § 7 of the Code (see paragraph 85 above). Furthermore, the
applicant company’s representative was not only invited to attend that
meeting, which he did, but it appears that his presence at the meeting was
perceived as mandatory (see paragraph 40 above). It is true that the relevant
national law governing the revocation of the licence contained no requirement
of prior warning of the licence holder that revocation was being
contemplated, and that the ACC took its decision to revoke NIT’s
broadcasting licence within a rather short time frame. However, it should also
be noted that the applicant company was acquainted with the applicable
procedure as it appears that its representatives had attended meetings of the
ACC on behalf of NIT on previous occasions (see paragraph 29 above). In
addition, NIT’s representative could have asked for an adjournment of the
meeting if he had been of the view that the time afforded for the preparation
of his submissions was insufficient, but he did not avail himself of that right
(see paragraphs 69 and 77 above).
226. The Court further takes into account that under the relevant domestic
law, the applicant company could challenge the ACC’s decision before the
competent courts and could also ask the latter to order a stay of execution of
the challenged decision pending the outcome of the proceedings on the merits
(see paragraphs 85 and 87 above). Indeed, it availed itself of these
possibilities. The Court emphasises that such procedural safeguards play a
particularly important role in situations where, as here, on the basis of
77
domestic law, a measure as intrusive as the revocation of a broadcasting

licence has immediate effect upon its publication. In this connection the Court
reiterates that the immediate effect of a measure interfering with the right to
freedom of expression may weigh heavily when assessing the measure’s
compatibility with Article 10, in circumstances where such procedural
guarantees are lacking (see Cumhuriyet Vakfı and Others, cited above,
§§ 72-74).
227. It is further significant in this context that when dismissing the
applicant company’s request for a stay of execution of the ACC’s decision,
the competent courts provided reasons (see paragraphs 49-54 above).
Although the reasons given were succinct, they in substance balanced the
conflicting interests at stake, including the applicant company’s free-speech
arguments. The Supreme Court, in addition, indicated that the dismissal of
the request did not prevent the applicant company from seeking the
reconsideration of its request in the event of a change in circumstances
deemed important for the case (compare Tierbefreier E.V. v. Germany,
no. 45192/09, § 58, 16 January 2014).
228. The Court is mindful of the fact that the severity of the impugned
measure might have adversely affected the applicant company’s operations
in a manner having a potentially “chilling effect” on the freedom of
expression of other licensed broadcasters in Moldova (see Cumpǎnǎ and
Mazǎre v. Romania [GC], no. 33348/96, §§ 116-19, ECHR 2004-XI).
However, against the background described above and taking into account
the specific circumstances of the present case, the Court is satisfied that the
domestic authorities acted within their margin of appreciation in achieving a
reasonable relationship of proportionality between the competing interests at
stake.
‒ Conclusion
229. Taking into account all the above circumstances, and having regard
in particular to the national context of the case (see paragraph 202 above), the
Court is satisfied that the decision to restrict the applicant company’s freedom
of expression was supported by reasons which were relevant and sufficient
for the purposes of the test of “necessity” under Article 10 § 2 of the
Convention and that the domestic authorities acted within their margin of
appreciation in achieving a reasonable relationship of proportionality
between the need to protect pluralism and the rights of others, on the one
hand, and the need to protect the applicant company’s right to freedom of
expression on the other hand.
230. The interference was thus “necessary in a democratic society” within
the meaning of Article 10 of the Convention. There has accordingly been no
violation of that Article in the present case.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL No. 1 TO

THE CONVENTION
231. The applicant company complained that the revocation of its

broadcasting licence had not been in accordance with the law or necessary in
a democratic society. In particular, it argued that the domestic courts had
failed to follow the procedure for revocation of licences as set out in Law
no. 451-XV/2001 and had unlawfully rejected its request for a stay of the
enforcement of the ACC’s decision of 5 April 2012 pending the outcome of
the ongoing proceedings. It relied on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the
Convention, which reads as follows:
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions.
No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to
the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to
enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance
with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or
penalties.”
A. Applicability

(a) The Government
232. The Government submitted that the measure taken against the
applicant company by the authorities had not amounted to an interference
with its right to the peaceful enjoyment of its possessions. The Government
were of the view that it was almost inconceivable that NIT could have
continued to have a legitimate expectation of pursuing its activities until the
applicant company’s broadcasting licence expired on 7 May 2015, given
NIT’s repeated breaches of the Code and of the terms of the broadcasting
licence.
(b) The applicant company

233. The applicant company argued that, according to the Court’s
well-established case-law, a licence to run a business constituted a possession
and its revocation amounted to an interference with property rights. These
considerations were also valid in respect of broadcasting licences, because
the interests associated with exploiting such licences constituted property
interests attracting the protection of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the
Convention, and its own legitimate expectation, which was linked to property
interests such as the operation of a television channel by virtue of the licence,
had a sufficient basis to constitute a substantive interest and hence a
“possession”.
79

234. The parties appear to disagree as to whether the ACC’s decision of
5 April 2012, which was subsequently upheld by the appellate courts, to
revoke the applicant company’s television broadcasting licence amounted to
an interference with its ”possessions” for the purposes of Article 1 of Protocol
No. 1 to the Convention.
235. In a number of previous cases the Court has found that the revocation
of a licence to carry on business activities amounted to an interference with
the right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions as enshrined in Article 1 of
Protocol No. 1 (see Tre Traktörer AB v. Sweden, 7 July 1989, § 53, Series A
no. 159; Bimer S.A. v. Moldova, no. 15084/03, § 49, 10 July 2007; and Centro
Europa 7 S.R.L. and Di Stefano, cited above, § 177). It has also held that the
interests associated with exploiting a broadcasting licence constituted
property interests attracting the protection of this provision and that an
applicant company’s legitimate expectation, which was linked to property
interests such as the operation of an analogue television network by virtue of
the licence, had a sufficient basis to constitute a substantive interest and hence
a “possession” (see Centro Europa 7 S.R.L. and Di Stefano, cited above,
§ 178).
236. The Court sees no reason to doubt that, at the time of the ACC’s
decision of 5 April 2012, the applicant company was operating an analogue
television network by virtue of a valid broadcasting licence and thus held a
“possession” within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. Although it
retained its property assets and was able to continue broadcasting news
bulletins and entertainment shows on the Internet, the revocation of its licence
had the immediate and intended effect of terminating its operations on the
analogue television network. Thus, the Court is of the view that there has been
an interference with the applicant company’s “possessions” attracting the
application of this Article.
237. In these circumstances, and having regard also to its considerations
under Article 10 § 2 above, the Court finds that the applicant company’s
complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention is not
manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the
Convention. It further considers that it is not inadmissible on any other
grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits

(a) The applicant company
238. The applicant company argued that while the measure in issue had
amounted to control of the use of property, its aim had been to punish NIT
and to stop criticism directed at the government; it had been motivated by
censorship and political revenge. It was difficult to believe that closing down
a visible television channel that was generating income, paying taxes and
employing numerous people would have served any public interest.
According to the applicant company, that point of view had been confirmed
by the Constitutional Court in its ruling of 6 December 2012 (see
239. The applicant company further submitted that the measure and its
immediate enforcement had been unlawful because the provisions of the
Code relied on by the ACC in imposing the sanction had not been clear,
accessible, and foreseeable as to their effect. NIT could not have reasonably
expected that its activities would be permanently stopped and that all its
property interests associated with the licence would become illusory.
240. The applicant company maintained that the interference with its right
of property had not been required in order to control the use of property and
had been disproportionate. In that connection it pointed out that NIT had been
the only broadcaster whose licence had been revoked, that soon after the
revocation its entire activity connected to television broadcasting had stopped
and that all contracts and agreements concluded in connection with that
activity had had to be terminated, entailing serious financial losses and the
redundancy of all NIT staff members. Even though the applicant company
had tried for some time to use the opportunities provided by the Internet, its
efforts had been in vain as it had been unable to reach the same level of
audience coverage and financial viability as before and therefore its activities
had had to be permanently terminated. The applicant company contended that
in order to avoid bankruptcy and to be able to pay off its existing loans
connected to NIT, it had been forced to continue operating in a sector that had
no connection with television broadcasting and generated a very low income.
241. In the proceedings before the Court the applicant company submitted
an expert report produced in November 2018 quantifying the damage
sustained by it following NIT’s closure. Referring to information concerning
the applicant company’s investments in fixed assets, or contained in its
financial statements submitted to the relevant national authorities from 2009
to 2011 and in the employment, rental, and advertising contracts existing at
that time, the report noted that the applicant company had not turned a profit
from 2009 to 2011. Nevertheless, it found that the damage sustained by the
company after NIT’s closure had consisted in the costs of its fixed assets
which remained unused and its other fixed costs and expenses.
242. According to the applicant company, the present case was similar to
other cases examined by the Court against Moldova concerning the
revocation of business licences. The authorities had not struck a fair balance
between the competing interests at stake and the applicant company had been
required to bear a disproportionate burden because of the harshness of the
measure and its discriminatory nature.
81
(b) The Government

243. The Government submitted that, as had also been confirmed by the
national courts, the applicant company should have foreseen and expected the
measure against it. Furthermore, any financial and material loss suffered by
the applicant company was a natural consequence of its own unlawful
conduct and was not substantiated by the expert report submitted by it.
244. Relying on the same arguments made in respect of the applicant
company’s complaint under Article 10 of the Convention, the Government
expressed the view that the revocation of the applicant company’s licence had
been lawful, had pursued a legitimate aim, and had been proportionate as it
had protected a prevailing public interest.

245. Since it has been established above that the revocation of the licence
entailed an interference with the applicant company’s “possessions”, the
question arises which of the rules embodied in Article 1 of Protocol No. 1
applies. The provision, it may be reiterated, comprises three distinct rules.
The first, which is expressed in the first sentence of the first paragraph and is
of a general nature, lays down the principle of peaceful enjoyment of
property. The second rule, in the second sentence of the same paragraph,
covers deprivation of possessions and subjects it to certain conditions. The
third, contained in the second paragraph, recognises that the Contracting
States are entitled, among other things, to control the use of property in
accordance with the general interest, by enforcing such laws as they deem
necessary for the purpose. However, the rules are not “distinct” in the sense
of being unconnected: the second and third rules are concerned with
particular instances of interference with the right to peaceful enjoyment of
property. They must therefore be construed in the light of the general
principle laid down in the first rule (see, among other authorities, Centro
Europa 7 S.R.L. and Di Stefano, cited above, § 185).
246. Whilst the applicant company appears to have taken the view that the
matter fell within the third rule, on control of the use of property, the
Government did not offer any comment.
247. The Court is of the view that it is the rule on control of the use of
property that applies in the present case, which falls to be examined under the
second paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (see, mutatis mutandis,
Tre Traktörer, cited above, § 55; Fredin v. Sweden (no. 1), 18 February 1991,
§ 47, Series A no. 192; and Centro Europa 7 S.R.L. and Di Stefano, cited
above, § 186). It will accordingly examine whether the interference was
lawful, was in the general interest and was proportionate.
(a) Lawfulness of the interference

248. In disputing that the revocation was “lawful” for the purposes of
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, the applicant company relied mostly on the same
arguments with reference to the provisions of the Code as those referred to
above in contesting that the measure was “prescribed by law” within the
meaning of paragraph 2 of Article 10 of the Convention (see
paragraphs 116-120 above). The Court takes the view that its findings with
regard to the lawfulness of the interference with the applicant company’s
right to freedom of expression are equally valid as regards its complaint
concerning the lawfulness of the interference with its right to the peaceful
enjoyment of its “possessions”. In this connection, regard must also be had to
the fact that when speaking of “law”, Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 alludes to
the very same concept as that to which the Convention refers elsewhere when
using that term (see Vistiņš and Perepjolkins v. Latvia [GC], no. 71243/01,
§ 96, 25 October 2012).
249. In so far as its assessment under Article 10 does not cover the
complaint that the domestic courts had failed to follow the procedure for
revocation of licences as set out in Law no. 451-XV/2001, the Court notes
that the applicant company raised this argument before the domestic courts,
which dismissed it on the grounds set out in paragraph 70 above. NIT has not
put forward any convincing arguments that could lead the Court to reach a
different conclusion.
250. It follows that the impugned interference was “lawful” for the
purposes of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
(b) Aim of the interference

251. As to the applicant company’s arguments to the effect that the
revocation of its broadcasting licence had not been in the public interest, the
Court observes that, in the context of similar arguments raised by the
applicant company in respect of its Article 10 complaint, it has already
established that the measure served the purposes of contributing to the quality
and balance of programmes in the country and preserving the public’s access
to impartial, trustworthy and diverse political speech through television news
programmes (see paragraphs 154 and 175 above). As regards the regulatory
framework in place, there is nothing to indicate that the legislature’s judgment
as to what was “in the public interest” was “manifestly without reasonable
foundation” (see, mutatis mutandis, James and Others v. the United Kingdom,
21 February 1986, § 46, Series A no. 98, and Beyeler v. Italy [GC],
no. 33202/96, § 112, ECHR 2000-I), nor is there anything to suggest that its
application in the present case was not in accordance with the general interest.
83
(c) Proportionality of the interference

252. In addition, Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 requires that any interference
be reasonably proportionate to the aim sought to be realised (see Jahn and
Others v. Germany [GC], nos. 46720/99 and 2 others, §§ 81-94, ECHR
2005‐VI, and Béláné Nagy v. Hungary [GC], no. 53080/13, § 115,
13 December 2016). In determining whether this requirement is met, the
Court recognises that the State enjoys a wide margin of appreciation with
regard both to choosing the means of enforcement and to ascertaining
whether the consequences of enforcement are justified in the general interest
for the purpose of achieving the object of the law in question (see Fredin,
cited above, § 51). The requisite fair balance will not be struck where the
person concerned bears an individual and excessive burden (see Sporrong
and Lönnroth v. Sweden, 23 September 1982, §§ 69-74, Series A no. 52, and
Béláné Nagy, cited above, § 115). In considering whether the interference
imposed an excessive individual burden the Court will have regard to the
particular context in which the issue arises (see Béláné Nagy, cited above,
§ 116).
253. In this connection, the Court refers to its above findings that the
impugned decision of 5 April 2012 was not only “lawful” for the purposes of
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and Article 10 § 2 of the Convention but was also
supported by relevant and sufficient reasons showing that the restriction of
the applicant company’s freedom of expression was “necessary in a
democratic society”. Furthermore, in assessing in the latter context the
proportionality of the sanction, namely the revocation of the applicant
company’s television broadcasting licence, the Court observed that the
seriousness of the actions imputed to the applicant company’s television
channel appeared to have resided not only in its persistence in refusing to
comply with the relevant licence requirements but also in the nature and
accumulation of the transgressions and their gravity when seen as a whole.
The fact that after receiving eleven sanctions over a period of three years for
the same or similar types of breaches, NIT was not persuaded to change its
behaviour and comply with the Code and the terms of the licence entitled the
authorities to consider that applying the most serious of sanctions was
warranted by the applicant company’s defiance.
254. The Court also finds it noteworthy that from the very early stages of
the court proceedings brought by the applicant company against the
impugned measure, the national courts found that its allegations about the
pecuniary and other proprietary losses it might suffer following the measure,
and the potential impossibility of enforcing a possible favourable judgment
on the merits, were mere suppositions and unsupported by evidence (see
paragraph 54 above). Also, the possibility of obtaining judicial redress for all
the proven pecuniary losses remained open to the applicant company in the
event of a potential favourable judgment on the merits of the case (see
paragraph 54 above). Likewise, at both levels during the main proceedings
the national courts found that the applicant company had failed to submit
conclusive and pertinent evidence before them that could confirm the damage
alleged by it, and that any losses sustained were attributable to its unlawful
conduct. In the proceedings before the Court the applicant company adduced
an expert report in which it was concluded that it had operated at a loss even
before the revocation of its licence (see paragraph 241 above). Consequently,
the Court does not find it established according to the general standard of
“proof beyond reasonable doubt” (see, for instance, Merabishvili v. Georgia
[GC], no. 72508/13, § 314, 28 November 2017) that the revocation of the
licence affected the applicant company’s proprietary interests to a degree
causing it to suffer an excessive individual burden. In this connection, the
Court notes, moreover, that even though the loss of the licence eventually led
to NIT’s demise as an analogue television network, it was not permanently
irreversible as the applicant company could have reapplied for a broadcasting
licence one year after its licence had been revoked (see paragraph 86 above).
It thus appears that the applicant company’s pecuniary and other proprietary
interests were sufficiently taken into account in the relevant proceedings.
255. In these circumstances, the Court is satisfied that the respondent
State, acting within its wide margin of appreciation in this area, struck a fair
balance between the general interest of the community and the property rights
of the applicant company, which was not made to bear a disproportionate
burden.
(d) Conclusion
256. In the light of the above, the Court concludes that there has been no
violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 in the instant case.
III. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION
257. The applicant company also complained that the proceedings

brought in respect of the revocation of its licence had not been fair. It relied
on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the relevant part of which reads as
follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ... everyone is entitled to a fair
... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal ...”
A. The parties’ submissions
1. The Government
258. The Government submitted that the proceedings in which the
applicant company had been involved after the revocation of its broadcasting
licence on 5 April 2012 had complied with the requirements set out in
Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
85
259. The national courts had examined all the arguments raised by the
applicant company and had dismissed them by providing relevant and
sufficient reasons. In addition, the authorities, including the courts, had acted
within the bounds of the applicable national legislation in force at the time
the measure against the applicant company was taken.
2. The applicant company

260. The applicant company argued that the proceedings in which it had
been involved after the revocation of its broadcasting licence on 5 April 2012
had been unfair. Repeating the grounds submitted to substantiate its
complaints under Article 10 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol
No. 1, it argued, in particular, that that decision and its immediate
enforcement had been unlawful given the provisions of the Code in force at
the relevant time (see paragraphs 116-119 above) and that the national courts
had failed to establish this. In the applicant company’s submission, the
national courts at both levels had examined its complaints in a narrow and
superficial manner, only providing a “blanket and formal analysis” of the case
before them.
261. Lastly, the applicant company argued that the amendment of
Article 38 § 8 of the Code shortly after its licence had been revoked (see
paragraph 89 above), suggested “a tendentious approach” on the part of the
authorities towards NIT, since it was the only broadcaster whose licence had
been revoked on the basis of that provision.
B. The Court’s assessment
262. The Court considers that most of the applicant company’s grievances
(see paragraph 260 above) cover largely the same grounds as the complaints
under Article 10 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. Given the
reasons set out above in this regard and the fact that the national courts
examined all the arguments raised by the applicant company and dismissed
them by providing reasons which do not appear arbitrary or manifestly
unreasonable, the Court cannot accept that these alleged shortcomings in the
proceedings affected their fairness in any way.
263. As to the specific complaint concerning the allegedly unlawful
amendment by the national authorities of Article 38 § 8 of the Code (see
paragraph 261 above), the Court notes that the impugned amendment came
into effect on 29 May 2012 – indeed, shortly after NIT’s licence had been
revoked. According to the available evidence, this amendment had no
influence or impact on the proceedings brought by the applicant company
before the national courts against the ACC’s decision of 5 April 2012 (see
264. Therefore, the Court is not persuaded that the amendment in question
rendered the proceedings in which the applicant company was involved
unfair.
265. It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded, within the
meaning of Article 35 § 3 and must be rejected, pursuant to Article 35 § 4 of
the Convention.
IV. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 13 OF THE CONVENTION
266. The applicant company complained that it had not had access to an
effective remedy for its complaints because the Supreme Court had not
remedied the breach of its rights committed by the ACC and the Court of
Appeal. It relied on Article 13 of the Convention taken in conjunction with
Article 6 § 1 and Article 10. Article 13 reads as follows:
“Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated
shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the
violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”
1. The Government
267. The Government contended that the applicant company had had
access to effective remedies at national level to raise its complaints under the
Convention. Therefore, they were of the opinion that no issues arose in this
case with regard to Article 13 of the Convention.

268. The applicant company argued that the domestic authorities had
breached its right to an effective remedy for its complaints. In particular, its
application for a stay of execution of the measure in issue pending the
outcome of the main proceedings had been dismissed by the courts on the
sole ground that by granting the stay of execution they would run the risk of
revealing their opinion on the merits of the case, without relying on a single
legal provision supporting such a conclusion. In addition, the courts had
unlawfully refused to take into account the Constitutional Court’s findings of
6 December 2012 which had been directly relevant to the case.
269. The applicant company had therefore been left with no prospect of
successfully redressing the immediate closure of NIT’s broadcasting
activities and its right of access to a court had thus been rendered illusory.
87
270. The applicant company’s complaint under Article 13 does not

concern any other issues than those which the Court has already examined
under Articles 6 and 10 of the Convention. In the light of that examination,
the Court does not consider it necessary to also examine the complaint under
Article 13 (see, amongst other authorities, Herczegfalvy v. Austria,
24 September 1992, § 96, Series A no. 244, and Kudła v. Poland [GC],
no. 30210/96, § 146, ECHR 2000-XI).
V. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 14 OF THE CONVENTION
271. The applicant company complained that it had been subjected to

discriminatory treatment by the authorities because the decision of the ACC
of 5 April 2012 had been enforced immediately. It relied on Article 14 of the
Convention taken in conjunction with Article 6 § 1 and Article 10. Article 14
reads as follows:
“The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in [the] Convention shall be
secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language,
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national
minority, property, birth or other status.”
1. The Government
272. The Government argued that the applicant company had failed to
exhaust the available domestic remedies because it had not raised this
complaint before the national courts.
273. In any event the applicant company had not been discriminated
against. The sanctions imposed by the authorities following breaches of the
Code were enforced in the same manner for all broadcasters in the country.
In addition, the authorities had imposed sanctions on all broadcasters which
were not complying with the requirements of the Code. The fact that the
authorities had revoked the applicant company’s broadcasting licence was
due to its repeated and serious breaches of the Code – which was not the case
for the other broadcasters – rather than to any discrimination.

274. The applicant company pointed out that it had raised its
discrimination complaint before the national courts and had therefore
exhausted the available domestic remedies in this regard.
275. In its opinion it had been treated differently from other broadcasters
on which sanction had been imposed under the Code, without any objective
justification for the difference in treatment. It was the first time in the history
of the country that a sanction imposed on a broadcaster had been enforced

immediately, especially in circumstances where the measure had been
challenged before the national courts.
276. Even though the national courts had been given an opportunity to
remedy the breach of the applicant company’s rights and to stay the
enforcement of the measure, they had failed to do so and to provide reasons
as to why the differential treatment applied to it had been justified.
277. The Court does not consider it necessary to examine the

Government’s objection concerning the failure of the applicant company to
exhaust the available domestic remedies. Even assuming that the objection
should be dismissed, the applicant company’s complaint is inadmissible for
the following reasons.
278. The essence of the applicant company’s complaint alleging
discrimination consisted in the fact that the authorities had enforced the
ACC’s decision of 5 April 2012 immediately, without awaiting the outcome
of court proceedings brought by the applicant company against that decision.
279. The Court notes that it has already established that the national
authorities, including the courts, were consistent in interpreting and applying
the relevant law in force to the effect that the ACC’s decisions were
enforceable immediately after their publication (see paragraphs 168-171
above). Moreover, there is no evidence in the file to suggest that NIT was the
first or the only broadcaster that had been faced with the enforcement of the
ACC’s decisions pending the outcome of judicial proceedings.
280. In this context, it cannot be said that the applicant company has
shown that it was treated differently from other broadcasters placed in a
relevantly similar situation.
281. It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded
within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 and must be rejected, pursuant to
Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT
1. Declares, unanimously, the application by the applicant company

admissible as regards the complaints under Article 10 of the Convention
and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention and inadmissible as
regards the complaints under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and
Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 6 § 1 and
Article 10;
2. Holds, by fourteen votes to three, that there has been no violation of

Article 10 of the Convention;
89
3. Holds, by fifteen votes to two, that there has been no violation of Article 1
of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention;
4. Holds, unanimously, that there is no need to examine separately the

complaint under Article 13 of the Convention.
Done in English and in French, and delivered at a public hearing in the

Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 5 April 2022, pursuant to
Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
{signature_p_2}
Søren Prebensen Robert Spano

Deputy to the Registrar President
In accordance with Article 45 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 74 § 2 of the

Rules of Court, the joint separate opinion of Judges Lemmens, Jelić and Pavli
is annexed to this judgment.
R.S.O.
S.C.P.
NIT S.R.L. v. THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA JUDGMENT – SEPARATE OPINION
JOINT DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGES LEMMENS,

JELIĆ AND PAVLI
1. The current case raises novel questions with fundamental implications
for freedom and pluralism of broadcasting, as well as the openness of political
discourse in our democracies. It touches on questions of the necessity and
proportionality of severe sanctions imposed on a private broadcaster on
grounds of internal pluralism, as well as the crucial procedural safeguards that
must apply in such circumstances. While we agree with much of the majority
analysis of the generally applicable principles and the possible grounds
justifying the revocation of the applicant company’s broadcasting licence, we
disagree with the conclusion that the decisions of the national authorities were
accompanied by sufficient procedural safeguards. It is on this basis that we
have voted to find a violation of Article 10 of the Convention.
A. General principles
2. This appears to be the first case in which the Court has been called upon
to review the revocation of the licence of a national broadcaster on grounds
of so-called internal pluralism, namely failure to provide balanced political
coverage. This made it necessary for the Court to clarify the relationship
between external pluralism – the overall pluralism of a country’s broadcasting
sector, which has been at the centre of much of our broadcasting
jurisprudence to date – and the requirements of internal pluralism, within
individual operators, which is a relatively novel issue for our case-law.
Today’s judgment seeks to address these general questions under the heading
of “the need to develop the Court’s case-law on media pluralism” (see
paragraphs 187-96 of the judgment). While we are generally in agreement
with the elucidation of the principles in this part of the judgment, we wish
that the Court had placed greater emphasis on the following key aspects.
3. First, any interferences with a broadcaster’s freedom of expression in
the name of internal pluralism should necessarily take into account their
implications for the overall pluralism of the country’s (or part of a country’s)
broadcasting offer. Internal pluralism is merely a tool for achieving the
ultimate goal of external pluralism, not necessarily an end in itself. In the
context of the current case, for example, it is highly relevant that the NIT
channel appeared to be the only national operator that gave prominence to the
views of the country’s only opposition party at the time. With its
disappearance from the broadcasting scene, it seems obvious that there was
an adverse impact on overall pluralism. This argument cannot translate into a
licence for minority voices to break the law with impunity, but it is
nevertheless an important consideration.
4. It is also important to highlight, secondly, that there are different
models of internal pluralism in the European legal space, as the judgment
91
rightly notes in paragraph 190. Depending on each country’s tradition and

political culture and the historical development of its broadcasting sector,
softer or stricter versions of internal pluralism have been chosen, especially
with respect to direct content-based requirements (see also the results of the
comparative-law survey in paragraphs 110-12 of the judgment). A large part
of the rationale behind these varying approaches – and this is what the
judgment should have acknowledged more explicitly in our view – is the fact
that stricter models of internal pluralism tend to be in significant tension with
the principle of the editorial autonomy of each individual broadcaster, a
cornerstone of media freedom (see the academic study commissioned by the
European Commission on media pluralism indicators, cited in paragraph 108
of the judgment, which is much more explicit on this point).1 Such models
therefore need to be subjected to closer scrutiny than softer versions of
internal pluralism, which rely on a combination of structural safeguards and
less stringent duties on broadcasters to ensure overall balance in their public
affairs programming.
5. Thirdly, we are in full agreement with the judgment’s emphasis on “the
important role which regulatory authorities play in upholding and promoting
media freedom and pluralism, and the need to ensure their independence
given the delicate and complex nature of this role” (see paragraph 205 of the
judgment). It is hard to overstate nowadays the importance of independent
broadcasting regulatory authorities, with their formidable powers of licensing
and oversight over a core sector of our political discourse, coupled with the
deference they tend to be accorded in view of their specialised expertise,
including by the judicial branches (see paragraphs 105 and 109 of the
judgment). We consider, however, that while a solid regulatory framework is
necessary to provide the conditions for the regulators’ independence and
impartiality, it is not sufficient, by itself, to ensure that these cardinal
principles are respected in practice. This is especially true for new
democracies, though not only. As a result, it is essential that both this Court
and domestic courts scrutinise quite carefully any interferences with media
freedoms by such regulatory authorities, to ensure that their decision-making
is not marred by any signs of bias or lack of fair treatment.
6. Fourthly, the judgment fails to provide in our view sufficient guidance
as to the conditions for subjecting a national broadcaster to the ultimate
sanction of delicensing – what can be referred to as the “nuclear option” – for
supposed failures of internal pluralism, a consideration that will always retain
1. In relation to “political pluralism” standards, referencing the Council of Europe

Recommendation CM/Rec(2007)2, the study notes: “A careful balance should be struck
between stimulating political pluralism and respecting the editorial independence of media
outlets. Privately owned media are entitled to follow an editorial line which might show a
specific political preference. Therefore, impartiality as a quality for political reporting cannot
be required of this type of media. Nonetheless, political coverage, even that by privately
owned broadcasters and newspapers, should at least be fair and accurate” (ibid.).
a measure of subjective assessment by a regulator. In our view, delicensing

on such grounds can be considered compatible with Article 10 only if the
following minimum proportionality conditions are met: it should be based on
findings of sustained bias in the broadcaster’s political coverage over an
extended period of time; it should be preceded by a gradually increasing scale
of sanctions, as well as a final warning prior to revocation of the licence; and
it should not be implemented, in the absence of a demonstrated serious and
imminent threat to major State interests (such as national security), without
giving the broadcaster an opportunity to seek prompt judicial review and a
stay of enforcement. After all, revocation of the licence is a form of prior
restraint and it should be subject to similar safeguards (see, mutatis mutandis,
RTBF v. Belgium, no. 50084/06, §§ 114-15, ECHR 2011).
7. Finally, we wish that the Grand Chamber had paid greater attention to
the changing role of broadcasting in the digital era, and its implications for
both external and internal pluralism. In some ways, the judgment reads as if
it were oblivious to the epochal changes that have occurred in the past twenty
years. There is no discussion, for example, as to how the analogue-to-digital
transition within broadcasting itself, coupled with the transformational
changes in the diversity of information and opinion that can be found in the
online environment, may (or may not) have affected the traditional rationales
for stricter regulation of broadcasting, such as spectrum scarcity or audience
behaviour. We happen to agree that, despite the blessings (and flaws) of the
digital era, the audiovisual media in Europe continue to be, at least for the
time being, “a sensitive sector” that requires careful regulation (see
paragraph 192 of the judgment). However, such a conclusion is far from
obvious, especially in the longer term, and the judgment would have made a
greater contribution to the field by engaging more seriously with these
questions.
B. The Moldovan framework of internal pluralism and regulatory

independence
8. Turning to the applicable national framework in this case, we can only

concur with the majority that the internal pluralism policy chosen by the
Moldovan legislature at the relevant time was “rather strict” (see
paragraph 202 of the judgment), but we cannot share the view that it was
largely unproblematic or not “markedly different from that of many Council
of Europe member States” (see paragraph 208 of the judgment). There are
several aspects of the national legal framework, as in force at the relevant
time, that we consider to be rather problematic.
9. The most significant concern is the requirement in Article 7 § 2 of the
Audiovisual Code to “give airtime to other political parties and movements
within the same type of programme and in the same time slot”, whenever
“giving airtime to a political party or movement for the propagation of its
93
position” (see paragraph 85 of the judgment). This requirement suffers from

both vagueness and potential overbreadth, and it can be quite difficult to
implement in practice without significantly undermining editorial
independence. It appears to be based on the premise that the main function of
a private television channel is to provide equal airtime to political movements
that wish to “propagate their positions”; if taken too literally, it would turn
private broadcasters into mere mouthpieces of political parties. While such
requirements may not be uncommon within the short windows of electoral
campaigns and as applicable to electoral programming alone, they would be
very difficult to comply with in regular programming and especially within
news editions. The latter need to be guided by the channel’s independent
editorial judgment about the newsworthiness of the events and topics of the
day, not the needs of political parties to advance their agendas. It is important
to recall, in this connection, that it was exclusively on the basis of its news
editions that the applicant company in the present case lost its licence. Lastly,
it is noteworthy that the current Audiovisual Code of Moldova, adopted
in 2018, does not include any provisions along the lines of the previous
Article 7 § 2, and is generally much closer to the European norm in its
formulation of the duties of fair and balanced coverage (see paragraph 96 of
the judgment).
10. Secondly, in terms of the applicable principles under Article 10 of the
Convention, we do not consider the majority’s references to “the right of
reply” to be helpful in this context (see paragraph 200 of the judgment). To
begin with, in those countries where a right of reply exists in some form, it
typically offers persons targeted by media criticism an opportunity to respond
to factually inaccurate and defamatory statements, subject to further
qualifications (see, as a recent example, Gülen v. Turkey (dec.), nos. 38197/16
and 5 others, § 67, 8 September 2020). As such, it is not a suitable vehicle for
ensuring overall political pluralism, especially in terms of diversity of opinion
(it is simply impossible for a media outlet to grant a right of reply to everyone
who disagrees with any and all opinions expressed in its pages or airtime).
Conversely, a general duty to provide an “opportunity to comment” (see
paragraph 200 of the judgment) to all the main sides to a particular debate or
controversy seems a more reasonable basis. However, such a duty is still quite
different from an obligation to “give airtime” to all political parties, whenever
one of them is provided with an opportunity to comment. We note that the
requirement in Article 7 § 4(c) of the Moldovan Audiovisual Code – to
provide “multi-source information” in conflict situations and as applicable
specifically to news editions – is better crafted than the sweeping obligations
under Article 7 § 2.
11. Finally, we wish to underscore certain concerns related to the
independence of the Audiovisual Coordinating Council (ACC), the
regulatory authority that ordered the revocation of the applicant company’s
licence. The judgment notes that the concerns expressed by the Council of
Europe experts in relation to the structural safeguards for the ACC’s

independence “were in the main accepted by the Moldovan legislature and
included in the final text of the Code” (see paragraph 205 of the judgment).
This is only partially correct, however. One of the key elements that led to
the positive assessment of the draft Audiovisual Code by the Council of
Europe experts involved a provision that required that ACC members be
appointed through a two-thirds supermajority in Parliament. The experts
specifically noted in their final assessment that this provision “is to be
welcome”,2 and it can be assumed that it was considered a significant
safeguard in the overall institutional scheme in order to ensure the ACC’s
insulation from single-party dominance. However, that provision was
changed in the final stages of the parliamentary adoption of the Code to
provide for appointment by simple majority (see Article 42 of the Code, as
cited in paragraph 85 of the judgment). Moreover, the concerns about the
ACC’s independence went beyond the legal framework: the European
Commission’s country progress report 2012 for Moldova urged the national
authorities to “ensure the full and effective independence” of the ACC as its
primary recommendation in the field of media freedom for that year.3 The
fact that a majority of ACC members had been appointed before the change
of government in 2009 (see paragraph 222 of the judgment) is not sufficient,
in our view, to dispel those concerns, which were reiterated by the European
Commission and other actors as late as 2013, that is, in the aftermath of the
controversy triggered by the events of the current case.
12. It is important to note at this juncture that we are not oblivious to the
general national context of the period, which was a challenging time in
Moldova’s transition towards a modern European democracy (see
paragraph 202 of the judgment). While such considerations might provide
justification for a rather strict regulatory framework of internal pluralism (if
not for its lack of clarity), any decisions taken pursuant to that framework still
need to be defensible under the substantive and procedural criteria set by the
Court in its Article 10 case-law.
C. The revocation of the applicant company’s broadcasting licence
13. In the light of the general considerations outlined above, we consider

that there were at least five factors in the present case that called for strict
scrutiny by the Court: the presence of a strict national model of internal
pluralism, based on legislative provisions that were liable to open-ended and
2. E Salomon and K. Jakubowicz, “Analysis and comments on the draft audiovisual Code
of the Republic of Moldova,” 15 May 2006, Doc. ATCM(2006)004, p. 29; available at:
http://old.parlament.md/download/expertises/ATCM(2006)004_en%20Moldova.pdf
3. Available at:
https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/enp/pdf/docs/2013_enp_pack/2013_memo_moldova_e
n.pdf
95
subjective enforcement; the imposition of the ultimate sanction on the

broadcaster with immediate effect; the fact that this particular operator
represented the main opposition voice in the country’s broadcasting scene;
certain concerns about the ACC’s independence; and the obvious chilling
effects that a licence revocation in these circumstances would have on other
broadcasters and the national political discourse generally. The majority do
in fact recognise that the Court “must scrutinise closely” the proportionality
of the interference in view of at least some of the cited factors (see
paragraph 222 of the judgment). We are not persuaded, however, that they
have in fact applied such close scrutiny, especially with respect to the
procedural safeguards against arbitrariness and abuse. Instead, the majority
have placed a rather impossible burden on the applicant company to adduce
“concrete evidence” that the ACC’s decision was motivated by political bias
or pressure (ibid., in fine).
14. We start by noting that we do not disagree with the core assessment
of the national authorities, largely endorsed by the Grand Chamber, that
NIT’s reporting was “clearly biased in favour of the activities” of a single
party, without providing sufficient opportunities for other political players,
especially the governing parties, to put across their viewpoints (see
paragraph 213 of the judgment). This is notwithstanding the obvious point
that it is unsurprising for the media in a democracy to be more critical of the
government of the day than of opposition actors; yet even the government is
entitled to fair treatment, broadly considered. We also agree that the applicant
company showed a certain persistence in its biased coverage, despite the
application of multiple sanctions over a number of years, which resulted in
increasingly harsher sanctions, even if most of these were in the form of
modest fines (see paragraph 224 of the judgment). That notwithstanding, we
are unable to share the majority’s view that the delicensing decision was
accompanied by adequate procedural safeguards against arbitrariness and
bias, for the following reasons.
15. Firstly, with respect to the methodology used by the ACC for its
monitoring of pluralism compliance, we note that it was based exclusively on
the news editions and covered a period of only five days. We do not consider
such a short period adequate or in line with relevant best practices, which tend
to require longer periods of monitoring that are randomly selected and spaced
out over several months. There is a significant risk that a single week of
monitoring may produce biased results, based on the political developments
of that particular week or the political temperature in the country, for
example. Furthermore, we have already noted the difficulties of applying the
standards of Article 7 § 2 of the Code to news editions (see paragraph 9
above).
16. Secondly, the extremely hasty manner in which the final ACC
decision was taken raises serious questions about its procedural fairness and
the applicant company’s ability to present an effective defence. The applicant
company’s lawyer was presented with the findings of the monitoring

exercise, without having prior knowledge of those findings, without a proper
opportunity to prepare a defence or consult with the client, and without any
warning that a revocation decision was being contemplated. The ACC
decision was taken the very same day and the station was taken off the air
within twenty-four hours. We simply cannot see how such a procedure can
be considered a fair administrative process, especially in view of the gravity
of its outcome.
17. Thirdly, the way the ACC organised this procedure and took its
decision raises serious questions about its attitude towards the applicant
company, and its own independence and impartiality in the process. As the
Court has often noted, beyond the niceties of any legislative text or
institutional arrangements, the independence of a decision-making body is,
ultimately, “a state of mind” (see, with respect to judicial bodies, Guðmundur
Andri Ástráðsson v. Iceland [GC], no. 26374/18, § 234, 1 December 2020).
As such, it may be extremely difficult for any applicant to provide “concrete
evidence” of bias or lack of independence, and we consider that the approach
adopted by the majority in this respect is not only inconsistent with the notion
of “close scrutiny” of government interferences with media freedom, but also
problematic for potential future applicants raising similar Article 10 claims
(as well as general discrimination claims more broadly).
18. The Court should be able to rely on the totality of the evidence before
it and draw inferences from the actions and justifications, or lack thereof,
provided by the relevant authorities. The proof of impartiality, in other words,
ought to be in the “decision-making pudding” – which is in fact the approach
followed by the Court when assessing the objective impartiality of judicial
decision-makers under Article 6 of the Convention. The relevant standard is
whether there are “ascertainable facts which may raise doubts as to the
impartiality of the body itself” in the eyes of an objective observer (see,
among many other authorities, Micallef v. Malta [GC], no. 17056/06, § 96,
ECHR 2009). The majority’s approach in today’s judgment also stands in
contrast to the broad contextual review undertaken by the Court in other
Article 10 cases involving prima facie claims of bias, “ulterior motives” or
punitive government motives in sanctioning a speaker because of his or her
views (see, for example, Baka v. Hungary [GC], no. 20261/12, §§ 145-49,
23 June 2016). In the current case, the respondent Government have not put
forward any convincing explanations for the extreme haste of the ACC in
taking and enforcing its revocation decision. That failure weighs heavily in
our assessment of the overall fairness of the process.
19. Finally, it is important to consider the role of the national courts. We
are prepared to concede that the concerns about the fairness of the
administrative process before the ACC could have been alleviated had the
national courts exercised robust judicial review in order to remedy those
shortcomings, especially in relation to the applicant company’s request for
97
urgent interim relief. As the judgment recognises, “the immediate effect of a

measure interfering with the right to freedom of expression may weigh
heavily ... in circumstances where [relevant] procedural guarantees are
lacking” (see paragraph 226 of the judgment). Regrettably, that was the case
here with the national judicial review and therein lies one of our strongest
disagreements with the majority’s conclusions on the merits of the case (see
paragraph 227 of the judgment, finding that the national courts “in substance
balanced the conflicting interests at stake”).
20. The national courts, including the Supreme Court, rejected the
applicant’s request for a stay of enforcement on the grounds that granting the
stay would expose the courts to the risk of “determining the merits of the
case”; and that the applicant company’s contention that its free-speech rights
were at risk of irreparable harm was merely “declaratory and unproven” (see
paragraph 54 of the judgment). We find such arguments to be wholly
unpersuasive, in view of what was at stake for the ability of a national
broadcaster to continue to stay on the air, and quite apart from the significant
financial implications for a television station that faced the prospect of being
off the air for many months before a final decision on the merits could be
reached. The flawed administrative procedure before the ACC – involving
the immediate shutdown of the main opposition voice in the national
broadcasting scene – should have raised obvious red flags for the national
courts, which were not properly addressed or even acknowledged in their
decisions, at both the interim and the final resolution stages. Such casual
disregard for core media freedom values cannot be considered to be in line
with the exacting standards of Article 10 in the arena of political speech. It is
also impossible to ignore the broader “chilling effect” for other domestic
broadcasters which were surely following the proceedings with keen
attention.
21. In conclusion, we concur that the national authorities might have had
good reasons to consider revoking the applicant company’s licence on
grounds of sustained bias in its political coverage. We consider, however, that
the actual revocation decision was marred by serious procedural
shortcomings that not only undermined the applicant company’s ability to
properly defend its interests but also raised substantial questions about the
ACC’s impartiality in the process. As the national courts also failed in our
view to promptly address and remedy these shortcomings, we conclude that
there has been a violation of the applicant company’s rights under Article 10
of the Convention.
22. With respect to the applicant company’s claims under Article 1 of
Protocol No. 1, Judges Lemmens and Pavli voted in favour of finding a
violation of that provision on the basis that the serious procedural violations
that marred the licence revocation decision are bound to have had a
significant adverse impact on the licence-holder’s property rights, rendering
the interference with such rights disproportionate in the circumstances.

CASE OF NIT S.R.L. v. THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

CASE OF NIT S.R.L. v. THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

GRAND CHAMBER

CASE OF NIT S.R.L. v. THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA

(Application no. 28470/12)

Art 10 • Freedom of expression • Justified revocation of broadcasting licence of a

This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.

In the case of NIT S.R.L. v. the Republic of Moldova,

of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. In addition, the applicant company

(a) for the Government

(b) for the applicant company

The Court heard addresses by Mr Rotari and Ms Nica, followed by their

THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE

10. The applicant company is a limited liability company incorporated in

11. Before Moldova gained independence in 1991, the ownership of mass

B. Enactment of the Audiovisual Code of 2006

1. Council of Europe Report ATCM(2006)004, “Analysis and Comments on the Draft

C. Further political developments

20. On 5 April 2009 general elections took place in Moldova. According

D. Broadcasting situation in Moldova in 2012

21. According to information submitted by the parties, on 1 January 2012

23. All these five channels were broadcasting on analogue frequencies.

E. Composition of the ACC in 2012

24. From the publicly available parliamentary decision confirming their

F. The case of NIT

1. Issuing of the new broadcasting licence

2. Sanctions imposed prior to the revocation of the broadcasting licence

3. Revocation of the broadcasting licence

(b) The monitoring report

(c) The ACC’s decision

government had included “dictatorial regime”, “unconstitutional regime”,

4. Proceedings against the revocation decision

(b) Applications for interim measures

judgment on the merits and to take protective measures. The applicant

(c) Proceedings on the merits before the Court of Appeal

(ii) The Court of Appeal’s judgment

59. On 11 February 2013 the Court of Appeal gave judgment and

the court conducting the administrative proceedings reviews the lawfulness of an

(d) Proceedings before the Supreme Court

(ii) The Supreme Court’s judgment

77. By a judgment of 2 May 2013 the Supreme Court dismissed the

5. Reactions to the revocation of NIT’s broadcasting licence

80. In an interview of 11 April 2012, the Secretary General of the Council

RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND PRACTICE

I. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE

2. The Audiovisual Code of 2006

advertisement regarding the competition for available frequencies in the Official

2. The Audiovisual Coordinating Council shall withdraw the broadcasting licence, in

3. The sanctions provided for in paragraph 1 shall be applied gradually as follows:

3. The Audiovisual Coordinating Council’s articles of association and

4. Law on administrative court proceedings

5. Law on transparency in decision-making

B. Subsequent developments in domestic law

1. Amendments to the Audiovisual Code of 2006 and the ruling of the

broadcaster may lead to the establishment of censorship or self-censorship, both equally

the audiovisual [system] [(ȋn raport cu cel al audiovizualului)], there is no preventive

2. The Audiovisual Code of 2018

(b) those disseminating child pornography;

II. STANDARDS AND DOCUMENTS ON RESPONSIBLE

A. Council of Europe standards and documents

1. PACE Resolution on the ethics of journalism

2. Committee of Ministers’ 1999 Recommendation on measures to

broadcasting licences that a certain volume of original programmes, in particular as

3. Committee of Ministers’ 2007 Recommendation on media pluralism

4. “Media Pluralism and Human Rights”, an Issue Discussion Paper