FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 119000. July 28, 1997.]

ROSA UY, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

Rolando P. Quimbo for Petitioner.

The Solicitor General for Respondents.

SYNOPSIS

Petitioner Rosa Uy worked as an accountant in a company owned by the husband of

Consolacion Leong. After Rosa’s resignation from the company, Rosa and Consolacion formed
a partnership in a lumber business, into which a total of P500,000.00 was claimed to have
been contributed by Consolacion, for which no receipt was issued. When the friendship
between the two turned sour, Consolacion asked for the return of her investment, but the
checks issued by Rosa for the purpose were dishonored for insufficiency of funds. Consolacion
filed a complaint against Rosa for estafa and for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law before
the Regional Trial Court of Manila.

After a joint trial, the Manila Regional Trial Court acquitted Rosa of estafa but convicted her of
the charges under B.P. Blg. 22. On appeal, respondent Court of Appeals affirmed the decision
of the trial court.

In this petition for review on certiorari, Rosa raises the issue of whether the RTC of Manila
acquired jurisdiction over the violations of the Bouncing Checks Law.

Petitioner challenges the jurisdiction of the lower court stating that none of the essential
elements constitutive of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 was shown to have been committed in the
City of Manila: (a) complainant was a resident of Makati; (b) petitioner was a resident of
Caloocan City; (c) the place of business of alleged partnership was located in Malabon; (d)
the drawee bank was located in Malabon; and (e) the checks were all deposited for collection
in Makati. No proof has been offered that the checks were issued, delivered, dishonored or
knowledge of insufficiency of funds occurred in Manila, which are essential elements
necessary of Manila to acquire jurisdiction over the offense.

The ineluctable conclusion is that said evidence would only show that none of the essential
elements of B.P. Blg. 22 occurred in Manila. The trial court’s acquisition of jurisdiction over
the estafa case does not follow that it also acquired jurisdiction over the violation of the
Bouncing Checks Law on the theory that the latter violations were merely incidental to the
estafa case. The crimes of estafa and violation of the Bouncing Checks Law are two different
offenses having different elements and, necessarily, for a court to acquire jurisdiction each of
the essential ingredients of each crime has to be satisfied .

The decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the trial court is reversed and
set aside

SYLLABUS
 1. REMEDIAL LAW; TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION IN CRIMINAL CASES, DISCUSSED. — For
jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases the offense should have been
committed or any one of its essential ingredients took place within the territorial jurisdiction
of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court has
jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the
accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense allegedly
committed outside of that limited territory. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the
criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. And once it is
so shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence
adduced during the trial show that the offense was committed somewhere else, the court
should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.

2. ID.; ID.; ESTAFA AND VIOLATION OF BOUNCING CHECKS LAW, DISTINGUISHED. — The
crimes of estafa and violation of the Bouncing Checks Law are two (2) different offenses
having different elements and, necessarily, for a court to acquire jurisdiction each of the
essential ingredients of each crime has to be satisfied. In the crime of estafa, deceit and
damage are essential elements of the offense and have to be established with satisfactory
proof to warrant conviction. For violation of the Bouncing Checks Law, on the other hand, the
elements of deceit and damage are neither essential nor required. Rather, the elements of
B.P. Blg. 22 are (a) the making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply to account or for
value; (b) the maker, drawer or issuer knows at the time of issuance that he does not have
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon
its presentment; and, (c) the check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not
the drawer, without valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment. Hence, it is incorrect for
respondent People to conclude that inasmuch as the Regional Trial Court of Manila acquired
jurisdiction over the estafa case then it also acquired jurisdiction over the violations of B.P.
Blg. 22. The crime of estafa and the violation of B.P. Blg. 22 have to be treated as separate
offenses and therefore the essential ingredients of each offense have to be satisfied.

3. ID.; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; MOTION TO QUASH ON THE GROUND OF LACK OF

JURISDICTION; TIMELY RAISED IN CASE AT BAR. — The Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure, under Rule 117, Sec. 3, provides that the accused may move to quash the
complaint or information on any of the following grounds: . . . (b) that the court trying the
case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged or over the person of the accused.
Moreover, under Sec. 8 of the same Rule it is provided that the failure of the accused to
assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or information,
either because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said motion,
shall be deemed a waiver of the grounds of a motion to quash, except the grounds of . . .
lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged . . . as provided for in paragraph . . . (b) . . . of
Section 3 of this Rule. After a careful perusal of the records, it is clear that petitioner timely
questioned the jurisdiction of the court in a memorandum before the Regional Trial Court and
thereafter in succeeding pleadings. Even if a party fails to file a motion to quash, he may still
question the jurisdiction of the court later on. Moreover, these objections may be raised or
considered motu propio by the court at any stage of the proceedings or on appeal.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE OF TIJAM V. SIBONGHANOY, NOT APPLICABLE. — The ruling in Tijam
v. Sibonghanoy is an exception to the general rule that the lack of jurisdiction of a court may
be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. In Sibonghanoy, the defense of
lack of jurisdiction of the court that rendered the questioned ruling was held to be barred by
laches. It was ruled that the lack of jurisdiction having been raised for the first time in a
motion to dismiss filed almost fifteen (15) years after the questioned ruling had been
rendered, such a plea may no longer be raised for being barred by laches. As defined in said
case, laches is failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do
that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is the
negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption
that the party entitled to assert has abandoned it or declined to assert it. The circumstances
 of the present case are very different from Tijam v. Sibonghanoy. No judgment has yet been
rendered by the trial court in this case. As a matter of fact, as soon as the accused discovered
the jurisdictional defect, she did not fail or neglect to file the appropriate motion to dismiss.
They questioned the jurisdiction of the trial court in a memorandum before the lower court.
Hence, finding the pivotal element of laches to be absent, we hold that the ruling in Tijam v.
Sibonghanoy does not control the present controversy. Instead, the general rule that the
question of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the proceedings must apply.
Petitioner is therefore not estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the trial court.

DECISION

BELLOSILLO, J.:

This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision of respondent Court of Appeals 1 which

affirmed in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Br. 32, 2 finding the
accused ROSA UY guilty of violating B.P. Blg. 22 in Crim. Cases Nos. 84-32335 to 84-32340,
inclusive, and acquitting her of estafa under Art. 315, par. 2 (a), of the Revised Penal Code in
Crim. Case No. 84-32334.

Rosa Uy was employed as an accountant in Don Tim Shipping Company owned by the
husband of complaining witness Consolacion Leong. During Rosa’s employment she was
regarded by the Leongs as an efficient and hardworking employee. On 15 March 1982, a few
months before she was to give birth, Rosa resigned. In the meantime, she helped her
husband manage their lumber business. The friendly relations between Rosa and Consolacion
continued. The two later agreed to form a partnership with Consolacion to contribute
additional capital for the expansion of Rosa’s lumber business and the latter as industrial
partner. Various sums of money amounting to P500,000.00 were claimed to have been given
by Consolacion for the business; however, because of the trust they had for each other, no
receipt was ever issued.

Thereafter a lumber store with warehouse was constructed in Bulacan, Bulacan, with funds
contributed by Consolacion evidenced by various receipts. But, unfortunately, the friendship
between Consolacion and Rosa turned sour when the partnership documents were never
processed. As a result, Consolacion asked for the return of her investment but the checks
issued by Rosa for the purpose were dishonored for insufficiency of funds.

The preceding events prompted Consolacion to file a complaint for estafa and for violation of
the Bouncing Checks Law before the Regional Trial Court of Manila.

On 10 December 1984 an Information for estafa 3 and several other Informations 4 for
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 were filed against petitioner. The offenses were subsequently
consolidated and tried jointly.

Through Consolacion Leong and Alexander D. Bangit the prosecution tried to establish that
petitioner Rosa Uy employed deceit in obtaining the amount of P500,000.00 from complainant
with respect to Crim. Case No. 84-32334. As regards Crim. Cases Nos. 84-32335 to 84-
32340, Alexander D. Bangit, manager of the Commercial Bank of Manila, Malabon Branch,
where Rosa Uy maintained an account, testified on the following transactions with respect to
the six (6) checks referred to in Crim. Cases Nos. 84-32335 to 84-32840 which were
dishonored

CHECK DATE REASON FOR

NO. PRESENTED DISHONOR

(1) 068604 16 December 1983 Drawn Against

Insufficient Fund

(DAIF)/Payment

Stopped (Exh. "G")

(2) 068605 16 December 1983 Drawn Against

Insufficient Fund

(DAIF)/Payment

Stopped (Exh. "H")

(3) 068603 16 December 1983 Drawn Against

Insufficient Fund

(DAIF)/Payment

Stopped (Exh. "F")

(4) 068601 16 December 1983 Drawn Against

Insufficient Fund

(DAIF)/Payment

Stopped (Exh. "E")

(5) 043122 3 January 1984 Drawn Against

Insufficient Fund

(DAIF)/Payment

Stopped (Exh. "A")

(6) 068660 24 January 1984 Drawn Against

Insufficient Fund

(DAIF)/Payment

Stopped (Exh. "I")

For her part, petitioner and her witnesses Fernando Abad and Antonio Sy maintained that no
misrepresentation was committed and that the funds were utilized to construct the building in
Bulacan, Bulacan. With respect to the issuance of the subject checks, petitioner did not deny
their existence but averred that these were issued to evidence the investment of complainant
in the proposed partnership between them.

After a joint trial, the Manila Regional Trial Court acquitted petitioner of estafa but convicted
her of the charges under B.P. Blg. 22. 5 On appeal, respondent appellate court affirmed the
decision of the trial court.

Petitioner now raises the following issues before us in this petition for review in certiorari: (a)
whether the RTC of Manila acquired jurisdiction over the violations of the Bouncing Checks
Law, and (b) whether the checks had been issued on account or for value. 6

As regards the first issue, petitioner contends that the trial court never acquired jurisdiction
over the offenses under B.P. Blg. 22 and that assuming for the sake of argument that she
raised the matter of jurisdiction only upon appeal to respondent appellate court, still she
cannot be estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the trial court.

It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases the
offense should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients took place within
the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory
where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed
therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an
offense allegedly committed outside of that limited territory. 7 Furthermore, the jurisdiction
of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or
information. 8 And once it is so shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the case.
However, if the evidence adduced during the trial show that the offense was committed
somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction. 9cralawnad

In the case at bar, the complaint for estafa and the various charges under B.P. Blg. 22 were
jointly tried before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Petitioner challenges the jurisdiction of
the lower court stating that none of the essential elements constitutive of violation of B.P.
Blg. 22 was shown to have been committed in the City of Manila. She maintains that the
evidence presented established that (a) complainant was a resident of Makati; (b) petitioner
was a resident of Caloocan City; (c) the place of business of the alleged partnership was
located in Malabon; (d) the drawee bank was located in Malabon; and, (e) the checks were all
deposited for collection in Makati. Taken altogether, petitioner concludes that the said
evidence would only show that none of the essential elements of B.P. Blg. 22 occurred in
Manila. Respondent People of the Philippines through the Solicitor General on the one hand
argues that even if there is no showing of any evidence that the essential ingredients took
place or the offense was committed in Manila, what is critical is the fact that the court
acquired jurisdiction over the estafa case because the same is the principal or main case and
that the cases for violations of Bouncing Checks Law are merely incidental to the estafa case.

We disagree with Respondent. The crimes of estafa and violation of the Bouncing Checks Law
are two (2) different offenses having different elements and, necessarily, for a court to
acquire jurisdiction each of the essential ingredients of each crime has to be satisfied.

In the crime of estafa, deceit and damage are essential elements of the offense and have to
be established with satisfactory proof to warrant conviction. 10 For violation of the Bouncing
Checks Law, on the other hand, the elements of deceit and damage are neither essential nor
required. Rather, the elements of B.P. Blg. 22 are (a) the making, drawing and issuance of
any check to apply to account or for value; (b) the maker, drawer or issuer knows at the time
of issuance that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the
payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and, (c) the check is subsequently
dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been
dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without valid reason, ordered the bank
to stop payment. 11 Hence, it is incorrect for respondent People to conclude that inasmuch as
the Regional Trial Court of Manila acquired jurisdiction over the estafa case then it also
acquired jurisdiction over the violations of B.P. Blg. 22. The crime of estafa and the violation
of B.P. Blg. 22 have to be treated as separate offenses and therefore the essential ingredients
of each offense have to be satisfied.

In this regard, the records clearly indicate that business dealings were conducted in a
restaurant in Manila where sums of money were given to petitioner; hence, the acquisition of
jurisdiction by the lower court over the estafa case. The various charges for violation of B.P.
Blg. 22 however are on a different plain. There is no scintilla of evidence to show that
jurisdiction over the violation of B.P. Blg. 22 had been acquired. On the contrary, all that the
evidence shows is that complainant is a resident of Makati; that petitioner is a resident of
Caloocan City; that the principal place of business of the alleged partnership is located in
Malabon; that the drawee bank is likewise located in Malabon and that all the subject checks
were deposited for collection in Makati. Verily, no proof has been offered that the checks were
issued, delivered, dishonored or knowledge of insufficiency of funds occurred in Manila, which
are essential elements necessary for the Manila Court to acquire jurisdiction over the offense.

Upon the contention of respondent that knowledge on the part of the maker or drawer of the
check of the insufficiency of his funds is by itself a continuing eventuality whether the
accused be within one territory or another, the same is still without merit. It may be true that
B.P. Blg. 22 is a transitory or continuing offense and such being the case the theory is that a
person indicted with a transitory offense may be validly tried in any jurisdiction where the
offense was in part committed. We note however that knowledge by the maker or drawer of
the fact that he has no sufficient funds to cover the check or of having sufficient funds is
simultaneous to the issuance of the instrument. We again find no iota of proof on the records
that at the time of issue, petitioner or complainant was in Manila. As such, there would be no
basis in upholding the jurisdiction of the trial court over the offense.

In an attempt to salvage the issue that the RTC of Manila had jurisdiction over the violations
of B.P. Blg. 22, respondent relies on the doctrine of jurisdiction by estoppel. Respondent
posits that it took some five (5) years of trial before petitioner raised the issue of jurisdiction.

The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, under Rule 117, Sec. 3, provides that the accused
may move to quash the complaint or information on any of the following grounds: . . . (b)
that the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charge or over the person
of the accused. Moreover, under Sec. 8 of the same Rule it is provided that the failure of the
accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or
information, either because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in
said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of the grounds of a motion to quash, except the
grounds of . . . lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged . . . as provided for in paragraph .
. . (b) . . . of Section 3 of this Rule. 12

After a careful perusal of the records, it is crystal clear that petitioner timely questioned the
jurisdiction of the court in a memorandum 13 before the Regional Trial Court and thereafter
in succeeding pleadings. On this finding alone, we cannot countenance the inadvertence
committed by the court. Clearly, from the abovequoted law, we can see that even if a party
fails to file a motion to quash, he may still question the jurisdiction of the court later on.
Moreover, these objections may be raised or considered motu propio by the court at any
stage of the proceedings or an appeal. 14

Assuming arguendo that there was a belated attempt to question the jurisdiction of the court
and hence, on the basis of the Tijam v. Sibonghanoy case 15 in which respondent seeks
refuge, the petitioner should be estopped. We nonetheless find the jurisprudence of the
Sibonghanoy case not in point.

In Calimlim v. Ramirez, 16 the Court held that the ruling in the Sibonghanoy case is an
exception to the general rule that the lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any
stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. The Court stated further that Tijam v. Sibonghanoy
is an exceptional case because of the presence of laches. The Court said:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library

A rule that had been settled by unquestioned acceptance and upheld in decisions so
numerous to cite is that the jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter of the action is a
matter of law and may not be conferred by consent or agreement of the parties. The lack of
jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. This
doctrine has been qualified by recent pronouncements which stemmed principally from the
ruling in the cited case of Sibonghanoy. It is to be regretted, however, that the holding in
said case had been applied to situations which were obviously not contemplated therein. The
exceptional circumstance involved in Sibonghanoy which justified the departure from the
accepted concept of non-waivability of objection to jurisdiction has been ignored and, instead
a blanket doctrine had been repeatedly upheld that rendered the supposed ruling in
Sibonghanoy not as the exception, but rather the general rule, virtually overthrowing
altogether the time-honored principle that the issue of jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or by
estoppel. 17

In Sibonghanoy, the defense of lack of jurisdiction of the court that rendered the questioned
ruling was held to be barred by laches. It was ruled that the lack of jurisdiction having been
raised for the first time in a motion to dismiss filed almost fifteen (15) years after the
questioned ruling had been rendered, such a plea may no longer be raised for being barred
by laches. As defined in said case, laches is failure or neglect for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should
have been done earlier; it is the negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable
time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert has abandoned it or declined
to assert it. 18chanrobles.com : virtual lawlibrary

The circumstances of the present case are very different from Tijam v. Sibonghanoy. No
judgment has yet been rendered by the trial court in this case. As a matter of fact, as soon as
the accused discovered the jurisdictional defect, she did not fail or neglect to file the
appropriate motion to dismiss. They questioned the jurisdiction of the trial court in a
memorandum before the lower court. Hence, finding the pivotal element of laches to be
absent, we hold that the ruling in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy does not control the present
controversy. Instead, the general rule that the question of jurisdiction of a court may be
raised at any stage of the proceedings must apply. Petitioner is therefore not estopped from
questioning the jurisdiction of the trial court. 19

WHEREFORE, finding the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Br. 32, to have no jurisdiction over
Crim. Case Nos. 84-32335 to 8432340, inclusive, the assailed decision of respondent Court of
Appeals affirming the decision of the trial court dated 24 September 1991 is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE, without prejudice to the filing of appropriate charges against petitioner with the
court of competent jurisdiction when warranted.

SO ORDERED.

Padilla and Vitug, JJ., concur.

Kapunan and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., are on leave.