Professional Documents
Culture Documents
LWVUT - Legislative Defendants MTD 5.2.22
LWVUT - Legislative Defendants MTD 5.2.22
v.
Case No: 220901712
UTAH STATE LEGISLATURE; UTAH
LEGISLATIVE REDISTRICTING
COMMITTEE; SENATOR SCOTT
SANDALL, in his official capacity; Honorable Dianna Gibson
REPRESENTATIVE BRAD WILSON, in his
official capacity; SENATOR J. STUART
ADAMS, in his official capacity; and
LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR DEIDRE
HENDERSON, in her official capacity,
Defendants.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
SUMMARY OF RELIEF REQUESTED AND GROUNDS FOR RELIEF ........................... 1
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND RULE 12(b) STANDARD ................................................ 3
ARGUMENT................................................................................................................................. 5
I. THE COURT LACKS JURISDICTION OVER PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIMS THAT
PRESENT NONJUSTICIABLE POLITICAL QUESTIONS. ................................................... 5
A. The Utah Constitution places the authority and discretion for redistricting solely with the
Legislature. ............................................................................................................................... 6
B. There are no judicially discoverable or manageable standards for providing Plaintiffs’
requested relief.........................................................................................................................10
II. PLAINTIFFS FAIL TO STATE A CLAIM AGAINST DEFENDANTS’ UTAH
LEGISLATIVE REDISTRICTING COMMITTEE, SENATOR SCOTT SANDALL,
SPEAKER WILSON, AND PRESIDENT ADAMS. ............................................................... 14
A. Plaintiffs fail to state a claim because the Committee and Individual Legislative Defendants
are unable to act on the Legislature’s behalf to provide the relief Plaintiffs seek. ......................14
B. Plaintiffs fail to state a claim because Individual Legislative Defendants are immune from
claims related to their actions as legislators. .............................................................................15
III. PLAINTIFFS’ COMPLAINT FAILS TO STATE A CLAIM UNDER THE UTAH
CONSTITUTION AGAINST LEGISLATIVE DEFENDANTS. ............................................ 17
A. Plaintiffs fail to state a claim because the relief they seek is barred by the separation of
powers doctrine. .......................................................................................................................18
B. Plaintiffs fail to state a claim under the Utah Constitution because the constitution does not
guarantee a beneficial political outcome for a given political affiliation and does not prohibit
drawing districts in a way that may impact the political power of a political party. ...................20
(1) Count One fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under article I,
section 17 of the Utah Constitution. ................................................................................................ 20
(2) Count Two fails to state a claim under article I, sections 2 and 24 of the Utah
Constitution...................................................................................................................................... 22
(3) Count Three fails to state a claim under article I, sections 1 and 15 of the Utah
Constitution...................................................................................................................................... 26
(4) Count Four fails to state a claim under article IV, section 2 of the Utah Constitution........ 27
C. Plaintiffs fail to state a claim under article I, section 2 and article VI, section 1 of the Utah
Constitution. ............................................................................................................................28
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................................... 32
i
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
2BD Assocs. Ltd. P’ship v. County Comm’rs, 896 F.Supp. 528 (D. Md. 1995) .............................. 16
Am. Bush v. City of S. Salt Lake, 2006 UT 40, 140 P.3d 1235 ..................................................... 27
Am. W. Bank Members, L.C. v. State, 2014 UT 49, 342 P.3d 224.................................................. 3
Anderson v. Cook, 102 Utah 265, 130 P.2d 278 (1942) ......................................................... 21, 22
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962)...................................................................................... 6, 7, 10
Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Utah v. State, 779 P.2d 634 (Utah 1989) .................................. 23, 26
Carter v. Lehi City, 2012 UT 2, 269 P.3d 141 ........................................................................ 29, 30
Cook v. Bell, 2014 UT 46, 344 P.3d 634 ...................................................................................... 27
Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986) ............................................................................... 25, 26
Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82 (1967) ................................................................................ 16
Eastland v. United States Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975) ............................................... 16
Gallivan v. Walker, 2002 UT 89, 54 P.3d 1069 ...................................................................... 23, 30
Grant v. Herbert, 2019 UT 42, 449 P.3d 141 ............................................................................... 30
Harper v. Hall, 868 S.E.2d 499 (N.C. 2022) .................................................................................. 6
In re Childers-Gray, 2021 UT 13, 487 P.3d 96 .......................................................................... 6, 7
In re Grand Jury, 821 F.2d 946 (3d Cir. 2006)............................................................................... 16
Johnson v. Johnson, 2010 UT 28, 234 P.3d 1100........................................................................... 5
Johnson v. Wis. Elections Comm’n, 967 N.W.2d 469 (Wis. 2021) .................................. 12, 13, 27
Koerber v. Mismash, 2013 UT App 266, 315 P.3d 1053.......................................................... 4, 25
League of Women Voters v. Commonwealth, 178 A.3d 737 (Pa. 2018) ......................................... 6
Marylanders For Fair Representation, Inc. v. Schaefer, 144 F.R.D. 292 (D. Md. 1992) ................ 16
Moore v. Harper, 142 S. Ct. 1089 (2022)..................................................................................... 10
Oakwood Vill. LLC v. Albertsons, Inc., 2004 UT 101, 104 P.3d 1226 ........................................... 3
Parkinson v. Watson, 4 Utah 2d 191, 291 P.2d 400 (1955) ...................................................... 9, 19
Radogno v. Ill. State Bd. Of Elections, No. 11-CV-04884, 2011 WL 5025251 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 21,
2011).......................................................................................................................................... 27
Riddle v. Perry, 2002 UT 10, 40 P.3d 1128 .................................................................................. 16
Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019) ................................................................ passim
Salt Lake City v. State, 2020 UT 27, 466 P.3d 158......................................................................... 3
Schlitz v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 854 F.2d 43 (4th Cir. 1988)................................................. 16
Skokos v. Corradini, 900 P.2d 539 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) .............................................................. 6
South Salt Lake City v. Maese, 2019 UT 58, 450 P.3d 1092 .......................................................... 4
State v. Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229, 1238 (Utah 1996) ................................................................... 17
State v. Angilau, 2011 UT 3, 245 P.3d 745............................................................................. 23, 26
State v. Canton, 2013 UT 44, 308 P.3d 517 ................................................................................. 25
State v. Daniels, 2002 UT 2, 40 P.3d 611 ..................................................................................... 16
State v. Drej, 2010 UT 35, 233 P.3d 476 ...................................................................................... 18
ii
Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951) .................................................................................. 16
United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501 (1972) ............................................................................. 16
Utah Power & Light Co. v. Provo City, 94 Utah 203, 74 P.2d 1191 (1937) ................................ 30
Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004) .......................................................................... 5, 8, 11, 12
Wood v. Univ. of Utah Med. Ctr., 2002 UT 134, 67 P.3d 436...................................................... 16
Constitutional Provisions
Utah Const. art. I, § 1 .............................................................................................................. 20, 26
Utah Const. art. I, § 2 .................................................................................................... 2, 20, 23, 29
Utah Const. art. I, § 15 ............................................................................................................ 20, 26
Utah Const. art. I, § 17 ............................................................................................................ 20, 21
Utah Const. art. I, § 24 ............................................................................................................ 20, 23
Utah Const. art. IV, § 2 ........................................................................................................... 20, 27
Utah Const. art. V, § 1 .................................................................................................................. 18
Utah Const. art. VI, § 1 ......................................................................................................... 2, 7, 30
Utah Const. art. VI, § 8 ................................................................................................................. 15
Utah Const. art. IX, § 1 .......................................................................................................... passim
Utah Const. art. IX, § 2 ................................................................................................................. 19
Utah Const. art. XXIII .................................................................................................................. 29
Rules
Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) .............................................................................................................. 1, 3
Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) .............................................................................................................. 1, 3
Treatises
Statutes subject to amendment—Acts enacted by initiative and referendum, 1A Sutherland
Statutory Construction § 22:6 (7th ed.) ..................................................................................... 31
William M. Howard, Construction and Application of Federal and State Constitutional and
Statutory Speech or Debate Provisions, 24 A.L.R. 6th 255 (2013) .......................................... 16
Other Authorities
National Archives and Records Administration, The Founding Fathers: Massachusetts, Mar. 5,
2018 ............................................................................................................................................. 8
National Conference of State Legislatures, Creation of Redistricting Commissions, Dec. 10,
2021 ............................................................................................................................................. 9
National Conference of State Legislatures, Redistricting Systems: A 50-State Overview ............ 8
Proceedings and Debates of the Convention Assembled to Adopt a Constitution for the State of
Utah, Day 19 (Mar. 22, 1895) ..................................................................................................... 8
Proceedings and Debates of the Convention Assembled to Adopt a Constitution for the State of
Utah, Day 22 (Mar. 25, 1895) ................................................................................................... 21
iii
This motion requires you to
respond. Please see the Notice
to Responding Party.
Scott Sandall, Representative Brad Wilson (“Speaker Wilson”), and Senator Stuart Adams
counsel, respectfully move the Court to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint under Rule 12(b)(1) and
(b)(6).
boundaries should be drawn. Plaintiffs would transform the highly political task of drawing
congressional boundaries into a judicial exercise based on illusory standards of political equality
in a highly unequal partisan landscape. They ask the Court to ignore the Utah Constitution’s
mandate for “the Legislature [to] divide the state into congressional . . . districts.” For Plaintiffs
to prevail on any of their claims would require an unprecedented reading of the Utah
Constitution, which would distort beyond recognition provisions never intended to apply to the
Legislature’s constitutional duty to draw congressional boundaries. The Utah Constitution has
committed the responsibility for the redistricting of congressional boundaries exclusively to the
Plaintiffs’ claims against Legislative Defendants should be dismissed in their entirety and
I. As a threshold matter, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’
because:
A. the Utah Constitution places the authority and discretion for redistricting solely
II. Plaintiffs fail to state any claim upon which relief may be granted against the
because those defendants cannot themselves provide the requested relief and because
III. Plaintiffs fail to state any claim upon which relief may be granted against Legislative
Defendants because:
A. the separation of powers doctrine precludes the Court from providing relief;
considerations or produced an effect that favored one political party over another;
and
C. article I, section 2 and article VI, section 1 of the Utah Constitution do not
prohibit the Legislature from passing legislation to enact or amend the Utah Code.
For these reasons, the Court should dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint in its entirety.
2
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND RULE 12(b) STANDARD
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief (“Complaint”). However, for the purpose of
Legislative Defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule
12(b)(1) and for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court should accept Plaintiffs’
factual allegations as true and consider reasonable inferences drawn from those facts in the light
most favorable to Plaintiffs. Salt Lake City v. State, 2020 UT 27, ¶ 26, 466 P.3d 158, 166;
Oakwood Vill. LLC v. Albertsons, Inc., 2004 UT 101, ¶ 9, 104 P.3d 1226, 1230. But the Court
“need not accept extrinsic facts not pleaded nor . . . accept legal conclusions in contradiction of
the pleaded facts.” Am. W. Bank Members, L.C. v. State, 2014 UT 49, ¶ 7, 342 P.3d 224, 228.
Additionally, the Court need not “accept legal conclusions or opinion couched as facts.” Koerber
1
For example, both a citizen initiative and the Legislature’s bills have the same effect of
enacting or modifying statutes in the Utah Code. The Legislature has not modified or repealed an
initiative but rather statutes in the Utah Code. Similarly, the Legislature has chosen to exercise
its exclusive authority to redistrict through legislation that enacts a statute that incorporates by
reference a congressional map that assigns over 70,000 individual census blocks to individual
districts. The legislation incorporating by reference a congressional map is what the Legislature
passed, and the Governor signed, and the resulting statute is the proper focus of the constitutional
evaluation.
2
For example, Plaintiffs suggest that political redistricting should be met with strict scrutiny on
par with race-based discrimination without identifying a single phrase in the Utah Constitution
that identifies a constitutional entitlement to a desired political outcome or any justification as to
why the Court should apply strict scrutiny. Similarly, Plaintiffs suggest that it is constitutionally
acceptable for an entity other than the Legislature to exercise the redistricting authority granted
exclusively to the Legislature by the Utah Constitution.
3
For example, Plaintiffs dramatize the parallel processes of the Legislative Redistricting
Committee and the Independent Redistricting Commission and theatricalize the Governor’s
signing of the congressional map.
3
v. Mismash, 2013 UT App 266, ¶ 3, 315 P.3d 1053, 1054 (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted). Finally, when a court is presented with a challenge to the constitutionality of a statute,
constitutionality.” South Salt Lake City v. Maese, 2019 UT 58, ¶ 8, 450 P.3d 1092, 1095.
Applying these standards of review, the Court should dismiss the Complaint for the reasons
stated herein.
The alleged facts that are material to the legal questions presented are as follows:
1. Every ten years, the federal government conducts a census enumeration of all persons living
in the United States, Congress reapportions congressional representation for each State based
on relational population changes, and states draw new congressional district boundaries to
2. The Utah Constitution states that “the Legislature shall divide the state into congressional,
legislative, and other districts accordingly.” (Id., ¶ 68 (citing Utah Const. art. IX, § 1).)
3. The Utah Constitution recognizes the people’s lawmaking power through ballot initiatives
4. In the November 2018 general election, the people passed Proposition 4 to enact statutory
5. On March 11, 2020, the Legislature passed SB 200 Redistricting Amendments, repealing
some of the statutory provisions that Proposition 4 enacted and amending others. (Id., ¶ 93.)
6. On November 9, 2021, the Utah State House of Representatives voted 50-22 to pass new
congressional district boundaries; on November 10, 2021, the Utah State Senate voted 21-7
4
to pass the new congressional district boundaries; and on November 12, 2021, Governor Cox
signed the bill adopting the new congressional district boundaries. (Id., ¶¶ 173, 180, 201.)
7. Proponents of the new congressional district boundaries stated an intent to ensure a mix of
8. All four congressional districts contain a minority of registered Democratic voters. (Id., ¶
226.)
ARGUMENT
The Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction related to Plaintiffs’ political redistricting
claims (Counts One through Four) because those claims present nonjusticiable political
questions. When a Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, it lacks authority to hear the merits of
a case. See, e.g., Johnson v. Johnson, 2010 UT 28, ¶ 8, 234 P.3d 1100, 1102. Accordingly, as a
threshold matter, the Court should dismiss the political redistricting claims asserted in Counts
One through Four as nonjusticiable political questions because (A) the Utah Constitution places
the authority and discretion for redistricting solely with the Legislature, and (B) these claims lack
any judicially discoverable or manageable standards for providing Plaintiffs’ requested relief.
Federal courts have tried for over twenty years to find manageable judicial standards to address
claims of partisan gerrymandering but have been unable to do so. 4 Plaintiffs now ask this Court
4
See generally, e.g., Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2491 (2019); Vieth v. Jubelirer,
541 U.S. 267, 270 (2004). Although some state courts have found partisan gerrymandering to be
justiciable based on those states’ existing constitutions and statutes, see, e.g., Harper v. Hall, 868
5
A. The Utah Constitution places the authority and discretion for redistricting solely
with the Legislature.
The Court should dismiss Plaintiffs’ political redistricting claims (Counts One though
Four) as nonjusticiable political questions because the Utah Constitution explicitly grants the
Legislature the sole authority and discretion to redistrict: “No later than the annual general
session next following the Legislature’s receipt of the results of an enumeration made by the
authority of the United States, the Legislature shall divide the state into congressional,
A court lacks subject matter jurisdiction when there is no justiciable controversy, Skokos
v. Corradini, 900 P.2d 539, 541 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), and political questions are prime
examples of nonjusticiable claims that a court must dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. A political
within the control and discretion of other branches of government.” Id.; see also In re Childers-
The political question doctrine is rooted in the separation of powers requirement. Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962); Skokos, 900 P.2d at 541; see infra Part III.A. The Utah
Constitution’s separation of powers provision, article V, section 1, “regulates and guides the
Gray, 2021 UT 13, ¶ 64 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Similarly, “the political
question doctrine . . . focus[es] on the proper roles of each branch of government and aim[s] to
S.E.2d 499 (N.C. 2022); League of Women Voters v. Commonwealth, 178 A.3d 737 (Pa. 2018),
Utah’s Constitution does not permit a court to re-draw district maps for reasons set forth herein.
6
curtail interference of one branch in matters controlled by the others.” Id. To determine whether
an issue poses a nonjusticiable political question, courts consider several factors, including
Article IX, section 1 of the Utah Constitution vests the power to divide the state into
congressional districts solely with the Legislature, and no other provision in the Utah
Constitution expressly confers redistricting authority on any other branch or to the people.
Contrary to article VI, section 1, in which the Utah Constitution explicitly grants legislative
authority to both the Legislature and the people, article IX, section 1 explicitly grants
redistricting authority solely to the Legislature. Furthermore, the Utah Constitution does not limit
legislative power, the Court does not have jurisdiction to opine on the political decision of the
political branch regarding where to draw district lines and the resulting effect on the potential
success of a given political party’s efforts to gain political power. Thus, the constitutional
5
In contrast to the Utah Constitution’s unrestricted delegation of authority to the Legislature to
divide congressional districts, other constitutional provisions expressly limit grants of authority.
Examples include article VIII, section 4, which grants the Utah Supreme Court the power to
“adopt rules of procedure and evidence to be used in the courts of the state,” but permits the
Legislature to amend those rules “upon a vote of two thirds of all members of both houses of the
Legislature;” and article VII, section 10, which grants the Governor authority to nominate and
appoint state and district officers, but limits this power to the “consent of the Senate.”
7
Claims of political gerrymandering have been raised since the nation was in its infancy,
and the framers of the Utah Constitution were certainly aware of it leading up to Utah’s
statehood in 1896. See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2494–95 (discussing framers’ understanding of
political gerrymandering when drafting the United States Constitution). “Political gerrymanders
are not new to the American scene. One scholar traces them back to the Colony of Pennsylvania
at the beginning of the 18th century, where several counties conspired to minimize the political
power of the city of Philadelphia . . .” Vieth, 541 U.S. at 274.6 Notwithstanding the Utah framers’
familiarity with the American redistricting context, the only “political equality” the framers
addressed was to confer “upon women the right to vote and exercise political privileges equal
with men.” Proceedings and Debates of the Convention Assembled to Adopt a Constitution for
Redistricting has historically been a legislative function. “For the first 160-plus years of
our nation’s history, all redistricting was performed by state legislatures, with little guidance on
relatively new phenomenon in American democracy.”8 While this new phenomenon is now the
6
Indeed, the concept predates Utah’s statehood by more than 80 years: the namesake for the
1812 term “gerrymander,” Massachusetts governor Elbridge Gerry, signed the Declaration of
Independence and served as a delegate to the constitutional convention. National Archives and
Records Administration, The Founding Fathers: Massachusetts, Mar. 5, 2018,
https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/founding-fathers-massachusetts#gerry.
7
https://le.utah.gov/documents/conconv/19.htm.
8
National Conference of State Legislatures, Redistricting Systems: A 50-State Overview,
https://www.ncsl.org/research/redistricting/redistricting-systems-a-50-state-overview.aspx (last
visited Apr. 12, 2022).
8
practice in some states, the reassignment of the redistricting power was accomplished by
exception to article IX, section 1. Instead, the framers expressly reserved the redistricting
Parkinson v. Watson, 4 Utah 2d 191, 199, 291 P.2d 400, 405 (1955).
term “partisan gerrymandering.” Although Utah’s constitutional framers did not seek to
constitutionally guarantee a particular political outcome for redistricting, Plaintiffs now ask the
Court to invent a judicial standard of redistricting that would guarantee a particular political
outcome. While reasonable minds may differ on whether vesting redistricting power solely with
the Legislature is the best policy, that policy is enshrined in the Utah Constitution and may not
be unilaterally changed by the judicial branch, which is the least political of the three branches of
government and, thus, the least suited to make policy decisions. Because the Utah Constitution
vests the authority to divide the state into congressional districts solely with the Legislature,
9
National Conference of State Legislatures, Creation of Redistricting Commissions, Dec. 10,
2021, https://www.ncsl.org/research/redistricting/creation-of-redistricting-commissions.aspx,
(last visited Apr. 12, 2022).
9
where the Legislature draws those divisions is a political question. Therefore, the Court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction regarding Plaintiffs’ Counts One through Four and must dismiss
them.10
The Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction related to Plaintiffs’ political redistricting
claims (Counts One through Four) as nonjusticiable political questions because there are no
Political questions arise in claims that lack “judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving [them].” Baker, 369 U.S. at 217. Unlike malapportionment of congressional districts
based on population (the “one person one vote” principle) or racial gerrymandering claims, both
of which the United States Supreme Court has concluded violate the United States Constitution,
standards to address political gerrymandering claims are not judicially discoverable and
manageable, and therefore, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to consider Plaintiffs’
claims.
Political gerrymandering claims are not judicially discoverable and manageable because
there are unlimited ways to divide the state’s tens of thousands of census blocks into districts
10
Moreover, under the independent state legislature doctrine, which several United States
Supreme Court Justices appear sympathetic to, the Elections Clause of the United States
Constitution assigns the task of congressional redistricting “to the state legislatures, expressly
checked and balanced by the Federal Congress.” See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2496 (discussing why
federal courts have a limited role to play); See Moore v. Harper, 142 S. Ct. 1089, 1091 (2022)
(Alito, J., dissenting with two other Justices and J. Kavanaugh, in his concurrence, also agreeing)
(dissenting from denial of stay and raising the Elections Clause argument as having merit).
According to the doctrine, state courts may be limited when reviewing state legislatures’ federal
election regulations. Moore, 142 S. Ct. at 1091 (Alito, J., dissenting).
10
based on the federal census data upon which a redistricting map is based. Because of this reality,
the Legislature is tasked with making difficult policy decisions by weighing various and
frequently competing redistricting principles. These conflicting policy decisions carry political
consequences, and those decisions are constitutionally assigned to, and best handled by, the
political branch of government. For a court to evaluate and opine on the political outcomes of
these policy decisions, the court would plunge itself into “one of the most intensely partisan
Rather than discovering whether the placement of a district line carries a political
outcome, the “‘central problem’ . . . is ‘determining when political gerrymandering has gone too
far,’” Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2497 (quoting Vieth, 541 U.S. at 296 (plurality opinion)). What
method or standard should the Court divine from the dearth of express language in the Utah
Constitution? The requirement that the population of congressional districts must be as nearly
equal as practicable makes it impossible to draw districts that genuinely reflect partisan equality
while also ensuring that the districts are geographically contiguous and compact. Voters favoring
major political parties are not uniformly geographically disbursed, voters favoring smaller
political parties are widely disbursed, and voters who are unaffiliated, nonpartisan, or anti-
partisan are randomly scattered among them. Furthermore, the way any of those individual
voters may vote, or whether they will vote at all, in a given election is subject to change and
dependent on the circumstances of the given election and consequently entirely unknowable.11
11
Plaintiffs’ arguments assume that voters who self-identify as members of a particular political
party will always vote for that political party’s candidates and ignore the possibility that
members of a political party who vote in one election may not vote at all in a subsequent
election.
11
The Utah Constitution simply does not require any proportional leveling of these disparate and
unknowable interests, let alone provide any discernable standards by which either the legislature
The United States Supreme Court described this impossibility in the Court’s plurality
opinion in Vieth: “[p]olitical affiliation is not an immutable characteristic, but may shift from one
election to the next; and even within a given election, not all voters follow the party line.” Vieth,
541 U.S. at 287. Recognizing a political gerrymandering claim would require this Court “to
indulge a fiction—that partisan affiliation is permanent and invariably dictates how a voter casts
every ballot.” Johnson v. Wis. Elections Comm’n, 967 N.W.2d 469, 483 (Wis. 2021). Moreover,
Plaintiffs conspicuously allege that the Legislature drew congressional district lines based on
partisan data to reach an expected political outcome while they ask the Court for relief that
commits the same alleged impropriety: providing new congressional district lines also drawn
based on partisan data to reach an expected political outcome, but instead their desired political
outcome.12
constitution, the Wisconsin Supreme Court stated that “[e]ven if a state's partisan divide could be
accurately ascertained, what constitutes a ‘fair’ map poses an entirely subjective question with no
governing standards grounded in law. ‘Deciding among . . . different visions of fairness . . . poses
basic questions that are political, not legal.’” Id. (citing Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2500). The
12
Plaintiffs allege that the legislature engaged in cracking (i.e., politically benefiting one party
by diffusing members of the other party among multiple districts), but appear to advocate,
instead, for packing (i.e., politically benefiting one party by concentrating its members into a
district to give that party a safe district).
12
Wisconsin Supreme Court found that nothing in Wisconsin’s constitution “authorizes this court
to recast itself as a redistricting commission in order ‘to make [its] own political judgment about
how much representation particular political parties deserve—based on the votes of their
supporters—and to rearrange the challenged districts to achieve that end.’” Id. (citing Rucho, 139
S. Ct. at 2499). Similarly, the Utah Constitution contains no authorization for Utah’s courts to
given political persuasion is entitled to a number of representatives that is equal to the proportion
of votes cast in support of that political persuasion. See, e.g., Compl., ¶ 206 (forecasting that the
newly enacted congressional map will ensure that a Republican wins each of Utah’s four
congressional seats for the next decade even though 100% of votes would not be cast for
“It hardly follows from the principle that each person must have an
equal say in the election of representatives that a person is entitled
to have his political party achieve representation in some way
commensurate to its share of statewide support.” . . . Perhaps the
easiest way to see the flaw in proportional party representation is
to consider third party candidates. Constitutional law does not
privilege the “major” parties; if Democrats and Republicans are
entitled to proportional representation, so are numerous minor
parties. If Libertarian Party candidates receive approximately five
percent of the statewide vote, they will likely lose every election;
no one deems this result unconstitutional.
Johnson, 967 N.W.2d at 482–484 (quoting Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2501) (additional quotations and
citations omitted).
13
There is simply no judicially discoverable or manageable method of guessing how a
given district’s population may vote and no judicially discoverable or manageable standards for
determining whether the imagined outcome of a given election in a given district is beyond the
redistricting claims are nonjusticiable, and the Court must dismiss Counts One through Four for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Court need not engage in the constitutional contortions
that would be required to invent a legal standard to provide Plaintiffs relief under the merits of
these claims.
Because this case involves a nonjusticiable political question, the Court need not
entertain the merits of the claims against the Legislative Defendants. However, in addition to
nonjusticiability, Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted against
Defendants Utah Legislative Redistricting Committee, Senator Scott Sandall, Speaker Wilson,
and President Adams (collectively, “Committee and Individual Legislative Defendants”) for two
reasons. First, the Committee and Individual Legislative Defendants are unable to act on the
Legislature’s behalf and provide the relief Plaintiffs request. Second, the Individual Legislative
A. Plaintiffs fail to state a claim because the Committee and Individual Legislative
Defendants are unable to act on the Legislature’s behalf to provide the relief
Plaintiffs seek.
The Legislature as a whole divides the state into congressional districts; the Committee
and Individual Legislative Defendants do not. Plaintiffs assume, incorrectly, that the Committee,
14
by recommending a map, and the Individual Legislative Defendants, by virtue of their chair
status and leadership positions, act as surrogates for the Legislature. (See Compl., ¶¶ 41–43,
142). This simply is not the case. The Committee merely recommended the map to the
Legislature. Despite their chair status and leadership positions, the Individual Legislative
Defendants are members of a 104-member Legislature that acts by majority vote. The Committee
and Individual Legislative Defendants are not responsible for the Legislature’s actions or
inactions, nor do they have the authority to compel legislative action. Even if, arguendo, the
Court grants Plaintiffs’ request for relief and compels the Legislative Defendants to redraw and
pass a redistricting plan, the Committee and Individual Legislative Defendants are unable to act
on the Legislature’s behalf and provide the relief Plaintiffs request. Because Plaintiffs fail to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted as to the Committee and Individual Legislative
Defendants, the Court must dismiss these defendants from the case.
The Court should dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims against the Individual Legislative Defendants
because they are immune from claims related to their actions as legislators. Like the federal
government and forty-three other states, Utah has adopted the common law legislative immunity
and legislative privilege doctrines into its constitution through a Speech or Debate Clause. 13 See
13
Utah’s Speech or Debate Clause provides that “[m]embers of the Legislature, in all cases
except treason, felony or breach of the peace, shall be privileged from arrest during each session
of the Legislature, for fifteen days next preceding each session, and in returning therefrom; and
for words used in any speech or debate in either house, they shall not be questioned in any other
place.” Utah Const. art. VI, § 8.
15
generally William M. Howard, Construction and Application of Federal and State Constitutional
acting in the sphere of legislative activity. See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 376 (1951).
Legislative immunity “enables legislators to be free, not only from ‘the consequences of litigation’s
results, but also from the burden of defending themselves.’” 2BD Assocs. Ltd. P’ship v. County
Comm’rs, 896 F.Supp. 528, 531 (D. Md. 1995) (quoting Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82, 85
(1967)). “Thus the effect of the doctrine [of legislative immunity] is twofold; it protects legislators
from civil liability, and it also functions as an evidentiary and testimonial privilege.” Id. (citing
Schlitz v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 854 F.2d 43, 46 (4th Cir. 1988)); Marylanders For Fair
Representation, Inc. v. Schaefer, 144 F.R.D. 292, 297 (D. Md. 1992)).
Legislative immunity has two critical features. First, it “applies broadly to evidence or
testimony about all ‘acts that occur in the regular course of the legislative process.’” In re Grand
Jury, 821 F.2d 946, 953 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 525
(1972)). Second, it “is ‘absolute;’ hence, it cannot be overcome by any countervailing interest no
matter how strong.” Id. (citing Eastland v. United States Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 509–10
n.16 (1975)). While there is little case law interpreting Utah’s Speech or Debate Clause, Utah
courts look to federal case law interpreting the federal clause for guidance. 14 See generally
Riddle v. Perry, 2002 UT 10, ¶ 8, 40 P.3d 1128, 1131 (repeatedly quoting and citing Tenney).
14
Additionally, Utah courts routinely rely on federal precedent when interpreting a state
constitutional provision that is substantially similar to its federal counterpart. See e.g., Wood v.
Univ. of Utah Med. Ctr., 2002 UT 134, ¶ 29, 67 P.3d 436 (applying federal law to interpret the
Utah Due Process Clause); State v. Daniels, 2002 UT 2, ¶ 42, 40 P.3d 611, 623 (applying federal
16
To the extent Plaintiffs make allegations against the Individual Legislative Defendants in
the Complaint, they entirely relate to the Individual Legislative Defendants’ performance of
against the Individual Legislative Defendants and those claims must be dismissed.
Because this case involves a nonjusticiable political question, the Court need not
entertain the merits of Plaintiffs’ claims under specific provisions of the Utah Constitution.
However, in addition to nonjusticiability, the Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted because: (A) the requested relief is barred by the separation of powers doctrine;
(B) the Utah Constitution does not guarantee a beneficial political outcome for a given political
affiliation and does not prohibit drawing districts in a way that may impact the political power of
a political party; and (C) article I, section 2 and article VI, section 1 of the Utah Constitution do
not prohibit the Legislature from passing legislation to enact or amend the Utah Code as alleged
in Count Five.
law to interpret Utah’s ex post facto clause); State v. Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229, 1238 (Utah 1996)
(applying federal law to interpret article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution).
17
A. Plaintiffs fail to state a claim because the relief they seek is barred by the
separation of powers doctrine.
Counts One through Four of Plaintiffs’ Complaint should be dismissed for failure to state
a claim upon which the Court may grant relief. In addition to being grounds for dismissal as a
nonjusticiable political question, the separation of powers doctrine stands alone as a basis for the
Plaintiffs ask the Court to compel Legislative Defendants to perform their redistricting
duties “in a manner that comports with the Utah Constitution”; set a deadline for Legislative
Defendants to enact a compliant map; and failing this, “order a Court-imposed plan that complies
with the Utah Constitution.” (Compl., pages 78–79). Plaintiffs’ requested relief would require the
Court to exercise a function that is constitutionally the exclusive province of the Legislature.
This constitutional provision explicitly prohibits the exercise of any function of one branch of
government that belongs to another branch unless the constitution expressly provides otherwise.
Or, as the Utah Supreme Court states, “[t]he latter phrase of this clause establishes that there may
be exceptions to the separation-of-powers doctrine, but any exception must be found within the
Utah Constitution.” State v. Drej, 2010 UT 35, ¶ 25, 233 P.3d 476, 484. As explained above, see
supra Part I.A, the Utah Constitution provides no express exception to the exclusive grant of
18
Although court review of a redistricting plan may be proper in some circumstances, it is not
proper for a court to substitute its judgment in the political arena for that of the Legislature. As
explained by the Utah Supreme Court in a decision relating to a previous version of Utah
Parkinson, 4 Utah 2d at 196, 291 P.2d at 403 (internal citations omitted). 15 Because Counts One
through Four of Plaintiffs’ Complaint ask the Court to violate the separation of powers doctrine,
these Counts must be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
15
Parkinson involved a challenge to population deviations between districts. While the
deviations upheld by the court in that case would have been held unconstitutional under
subsequent caselaw interpreting the federal constitution (in violation of the principle of one
person, one vote), the separation of powers principles discussed in that case are relevant to the
matter before the court in this action. In the present case, the Court is asked to read into the Utah
Constitution a mandate to balance the political outcome between the two major political parties
while ignoring the remaining parties, the unaffiliated voters, and the fact that not all members of
a political party consistently vote for that party’s candidates.
19
B. Plaintiffs fail to state a claim under the Utah Constitution because the
constitution does not guarantee a beneficial political outcome for a given
political affiliation and does not prohibit drawing districts in a way that may
impact the political power of a political party.
Plaintiffs fail to state a claim upon which the Court can grant relief in this case because
the Utah Constitution contains no provision that guarantees a redistricting map that benefits a
given political party based on anticipated outcomes in future elections. Similarly, the Utah
Constitution contains no provision that prohibits drawing districts in a way that may impact the
political power of a political party. Plaintiffs complain of a violation of a constitutional right that
simply does not exist and request that the Court invent legal standards that benefit one political
party and disregard smaller political parties and unaffiliated voters as a remedy for relief. More
specifically, (1) article I, section 17 of the Utah Constitution does not prohibit political
redistricting as alleged in Count One; (2) article I, sections 2 and 24 of the Utah Constitution do
not prohibit political redistricting as alleged in Count Two; (3) article I, sections 1 and 15 of the
Utah Constitution do not prohibit political redistricting as alleged in Count Three; and (4) article
IV, section 2 of the Utah Constitution does not prohibit political redistricting as alleged in Count
Four.
(1) Count One fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted
under article I, section 17 of the Utah Constitution.
Plaintiffs fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under Utah’s Free
Elections Clause in article I, section 17. The Free Elections Clause guarantees a qualified voter
the right to cast a vote, but there is nothing in the Free Elections Clause’s text or precedent to
suggest that it prohibits political redistricting or guarantees that each vote holds substantially
20
equal political power as measured by the voter’s political party affiliation or lack of political
Utah’s Free Elections Clause states: “All elections shall be free, and no power, civil or
military, shall at any time interfere to prevent the free exercise of the right of suffrage.” Utah
Const. art. I, § 17 (1896).16 If the framers had intended for the Free Elections Clause to guarantee
each voter’s “voting power” based on their partisan affiliation, then they would have expressly
guaranteed this theoretical concept. Nothing in the text of the Constitution suggests the Free
Elections Clause meant that the second largest political party was entitled to a packed
congressional district that could be considered a safe district in their favor, while not
In the only decision interpreting Utah’s Free Elections Clause, the Utah Supreme Court
did not expand the Clause’s meaning to guarantee equal voting power based on partisan
affiliation. Rather, the court held that the Clause did not guarantee a person’s “right to appear as
a candidate upon the ticket of any political party.” Anderson v. Cook, 102 Utah 265, 130 P.2d
278, 285 (1942). The Utah Supreme Court explained that voters’ right to suffrage is subject to
16
Utah framers of the Free Elections Clause at Utah’s 1895 Constitutional Convention explicitly
chose to remove “and equal” from the Free Elections Clause. In contrast, many state
constitutions’ have “free and equal clauses.” After reading a draft of section 17: “All elections
shall be free and equal, and no power . . . .”, one of the delegates moved to strike “and equal”
from the line. This motion was directly agreed to without further debate. See Proceedings and
Debates of the Convention Assembled to Adopt a Constitution for the State of Utah, Day 22
(Mar. 25, 1895), https://le.utah.gov/documents/conconv/22.htm (remarks of delegate William
Grant Van Horne). If the framers had intended for the Free Elections Clause to guarantee each
voter’s “voting power” based on their partisan affiliation, then they arguably would not have
removed “and equal” from the Free Elections Clause.
21
the Legislature’s power to prescribe means and methods for elections, voting, and selecting
nominees.
Id. The Utah Supreme Court also explained that the Clause is not self-executing but requires the
Legislature “to provide by law for the conduct of elections, and the means of voting, and the
methods of selecting nominees.” Id. The court’s focus was fixed on the exercise of the right to
The Court should dismiss Plaintiffs’ Free Elections claim, Count One in the Complaint,
because they have not alleged facts that would constitute a violation of a right guaranteed under
(2) Count Two fails to state a claim under article I, sections 2 and 24 of
the Utah Constitution.
Plaintiffs fail to state a claim under article I, sections 2 and 24 of the Utah Constitution.
The 2021 Congressional Plan does not violate Plaintiffs’ fundamental right to vote or preclude
Plaintiffs’ equal opportunity to vote for their preferred congressional candidates under article I,
sections 2 and 24, because political redistricting does not affect a fundamental or critical right
guaranteed to the voters of Utah, and does not create a suspect classification. The Court should
accordingly review the 2021 Congressional Plan under a rational basis standard, and should
conclude that any classification that ensued from the 2021 Congressional Plan was reasonable
22
and that a reasonable relationship exists between the classification and the Legislature’s
legitimate objective of ensuring that congressional districts contain both urban and rural areas.
(Compl., ¶ 187.)
Article I, section 2 of the Utah Constitution provides that “[a]ll political power is inherent
in the people; and all free governments are founded on their authority for their equal protection
and benefit, and they have the right to alter or reform their government as the public welfare may
require.” Utah Const. art. I, § 2 (1896). Article I, section 24 provides that “[a]ll laws of a general
nature shall have uniform operation.” Utah Const. art. I, § 24 (1896). The Court’s analysis of
Plaintiffs’ uniform operation of laws challenge is “guided by the well-settled proposition that all
statutes are presumed to be constitutional and the party challenging a statute bears the burden of
proving its invalidity.” Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Utah v. State, 779 P.2d 634, 637 (Utah
1989).
The Court applies a heightened degree of scrutiny to a law that implicates a “fundamental
2002 UT 89, ¶ 40, 54 P.3d 1069, 1085 (internal quotations and citation omitted). But, if there is
no fundamental or critical right and no impermissible or suspect classification, the Court applies
a “rationally related” test, or what is essentially rational basis review. See State v. Angilau, 2011
Plaintiffs allege that the 2021 Congressional Plan “arbitrarily classifies voters based on
partisan affiliation and geographic location, then targets the disfavored class of voters for
negative differential treatment compared to other similarly situated Utahns,” (Compl., ¶ 274) but
fail to state a claim under article I, sections 2 or 24: Plaintiffs do not identify any fundamental
23
right that the 2021 Congressional Plan violates, or suspect classification that the 2021
Congressional Plan creates. The Court should accordingly analyze Plaintiffs’ claims under
The 2021 Congressional Plan does not impact Utahns’ right to vote freely for the
candidate of one’s choice and, therefore, does not implicate a fundamental right. In the 2021
Congressional Plan, voters in each district have a vote exactly equal to that of voters in the same
district and in the other districts. Each voter may choose to vote with other Democratic voters or
with other Republican voters. Moreover, this map does not preclude a Republican from voting
for a Democrat, an independent, or another party’s candidate, nor does it preclude a Democrat
from voting for a Republican, an independent, or another party’s candidate, and it does not
preclude an unaffiliated voter from doing the same. The outcome in a future election is
undetermined, and Plaintiffs have not alleged that an individual’s party affiliation (ignoring
unaffiliated voters) is somehow immutable and controlling for all future elections. Even if the
Utah Constitution guarantees a population deviation-based one person, one vote principle that
parallels the federal constitution, there is nothing in the text of article I, Sections 2 or 24, in the
history of those provisions, or in any subsequent precedent to suggest there is a right to voting
Moreover, Plaintiffs complain that the 2021 Congressional Plan “intentionally cracks
Plaintiffs” who support Democratic candidates to prevent them from achieving a ballot box
victory (Compl., ¶ 275), but then asks that this court provide legal relief by intentionally packing
Plaintiffs. If cracking a partisan group violates the invented constitutional right Plaintiffs seek to
protect, then packing by the Court would certainly violate the same invented constitutional right.
24
Just as the United States Supreme Court noted that the Founders of the United States
Constitution did not think proportional representation was required, the same is true for the
framers of the Utah Constitution. See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2499. Neither the text nor history
contains any suggestion that “a person is entitled to have his political party achieve
representation in some way commensurate to its share of statewide support.” See id. at 2501. The
bottom line is that “[i]f members of the major political parties are protected by the [Uniform
Operation of Law provision] from dilution of their voting strength, then members of every
identifiable group that possesses distinctive interests and tends to vote on the basis of those
interests should be able to bring similar claims.” Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 147 (1986)
(O’Connor, J., concurring), abrogated by Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2484. If the invented
constitutional guarantee protects Plaintiffs’ partisan ambitions, it must also do so with all Utah
voters’ partisan ambitions. “There is simply no clear stopping point to prevent the gradual
group.” Id. Thus, Plaintiffs fail to allege the 2021 Congressional Plan implicates a fundamental
or critical right.
Plaintiffs also fail to allege any facts suggesting that the 2021 Congressional Plan creates
a suspect classification. Instead, they state a legal conclusion couched as fact. (Compl., ¶ 275.)
The Court need not “accept legal conclusions or opinion couched as facts.” Koerber, 2013 UT
App 266, ¶ 3, 315 P.3d 1053, 1054 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Unlike race-
based laws, which are inherently suspect, see State v. Canton, 2013 UT 44, ¶ 36, 308 P.3d 517,
525, there is no authority suggesting that classifications based on voters’ party affiliations,
expected alliance with a political party, or imagined voting outcome are suspect classifications.
25
Simply stated, the “right to vote does not imply that political groups have a right to be free from
discriminatory impairment of their group voting strength.” Davis, 478 U.S. at 150 (O’Connor, J.,
right or a suspect classification, the Court should apply rational basis review. See Angilau, 2011
UT 3, ¶ 21, 245 P.3d 745, 752. The Court’s rational basis review involves determining “whether
the classification is reasonable, whether the objectives of the legislative action are legitimate, and
whether there is a reasonable relationship between the classification and the legislative purpose.”
Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Utah, 779 P.2d at 637. The Court gives broad deference to the
Legislature and will sustain a classification if “facts can reasonably be conceived which would
justify the distinctions or differences in state policy [expressed by the challenged legislation] as
Accepting Plaintiffs’ factual allegations as true, and even in the light most favorable to
Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs’ allegations trigger only rational basis review of the Legislature’s action. The
Legislature voted on congressional district lines for the reasonable purpose of ensuring a balance
of urban and rural areas in each congressional district. (Compl., ¶ 187). Having an alleged
rational basis in hand, the Court should dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims under article I, Sections 2 and
(3) Count Three fails to state a claim under article I, sections 1 and 15 of
the Utah Constitution.
freely communicate thoughts and opinions under article I, sections 1 and 15 of the Utah
Constitution, respectively, simply do not relate to the redistricting process. Where the Legislature
26
chooses to place a congressional district boundary does not in any way restrict an individual’s
speech or impair an individual’s ability to communicate. See Radogno v. Ill. State Bd. Of
Elections, No. 11-CV-04884, 2011 WL 5025251 at *7 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 21, 2011); Johnson, 967
N.W.2d at 487. As previously noted, see supra Part I.A, the framers were fully aware of partisan
redistricting, and had they intended to prohibit redistricting for partisan gain, they would have
done so.
Nevertheless, these constitutional rights were not intended to be distorted in the manner
Plaintiffs suggest. “The minutes of the 1895 Utah constitutional convention point to the fact that
the framers of our constitution . . . envisioned a limited freedom of speech.” Am. Bush v. City of
S. Salt Lake, 2006 UT 40, ¶ 42, 140 P.3d 1235, 1248. As clearly expressed by the Utah Supreme
Court, “First Amendment jurisprudence in this case does not guarantee unlimited participation in
political activity, nor does it establish a right to political success. Rather, it protects individuals
from regulations that directly discourage or prohibit political expression.” Cook v. Bell, 2014 UT
46, ¶ 57, 344 P.3d 634, 642. Clearly, a map of a district boundary is not a regulation that directly
discourages or prohibits political expression. And the right to political expression does not
guarantee a voter’s right to political success. There is no way to grant Plaintiffs’ relief under
article I, sections 1 and 15 that comports with the text of those sections and relevant case law,
and, therefore, the Court should dismiss Count Three of the Complaint.
(4) Count Four fails to state a claim under article IV, section 2 of the Utah
Constitution.
Plaintiffs fail to state a claim under article IV, Section 2 of the Utah Constitution because
the congressional map does not restrict a citizen’s right to vote when that citizen is eighteen
years of age or over and presents proper proof of residence. Utah Const. art. IV, § 2. As
27
evidenced by the plain text of the provision, the intent of the ratifiers was to address a citizen’s
qualifications to cast a vote. There is no pertinent Utah history or case law that expands this
inapplicable to the present circumstances and, to the extent that it is based on this provision,
C. Plaintiffs fail to state a claim under article I, section 2 and article VI, section 1 of
the Utah Constitution.
Count Five of Plaintiffs’ Complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted because article I, section 2 and article VI, section 1 of the Utah
Constitution do not prohibit the Legislature from passing legislation to enact or amend the Utah
Code. To grant the relief sought under that Count, the Court would need to impose an
shifting primary responsibility for drawing electoral maps from the Legislature to an independent
including Plaintiffs, exercised their constitutional right to alter or reform their government.”
17
Plaintiffs’ allegations should be accepted as true for the purpose of this Rule 12 motion, and
the legal question of the Legislature’s plenary power to enact, amend, or repeal statutes through
legislation does not depend on a factual question. As a point of information irrelevant to the legal
determination of this motion against Count five, Plaintiffs’ argument that the Legislature
“repealed Proposition 4” (see Compl., ¶¶ 317–318) is incorrect based on the Utah Code. Through
Proposition 4, voters enacted Title 20A, Chapter 19, Utah Independent Redistricting Commission
and Standards Act. Later, through S.B. 200, 2020 General Session, the Legislature repealed and
replaced Title 20A, Chapter 19 with an alternate version in Title 20A, Chapter 20, Utah
Independent Redistricting Commission. Chapter 20 provides for an advisory redistricting
28
Article I, section 2 of the Utah Constitution provides: “All political power is inherent in
the people; and all free governments are founded on their authority for their equal protection and
benefit, and they have the right to alter or reform their government as the public welfare may
require.”
While the people clearly have the right to alter or reform their government, any alteration
expression of the will of the people regarding the power delegated by them. 18 Article IX, section
1 of the Utah Constitution expressly grants the power to “divide the state into congressional,
legislative, and other districts” to the Legislature. A change to this authority can only be
accomplished through a constitutional amendment or revision, and the people have expressed
their will regarding how this must be done in article XXIII of the Utah Constitution.19
commission but does not include the unconstitutional provisions of Chapter 19 related to the
Legislature’s authority. The Legislature could have made these statutory changes by amending
Chapter 19 or repealing it and replacing it with chapter 20, but either approach is well within the
Legislature’s plenary power to pass legislation. Simply stated, Chapter 19 is not Proposition 4,
and Chapter 20 is not S.B. 200: they are statutes contained within the Utah Code. The
Legislature’s amendment or repeal of a statute is not an amendment or repeal of the method, be it
initiative or bill, that originally enacted that statute. The method of enacting a statute does not in
any way restrict the Legislature’s plenary authority to later amend or repeal that statute.
18
“[T]he people have the inherent authority to allocate governmental power in the bodies they
establish by law. Acting through the state constitution, the people of Utah divided their political
power, vesting it in the various branches of government. Article VI vests ‘The Legislative power
of the State’ in two bodies: (a) ‘the Legislature of the State of Utah,’ and (b) ‘the people of the
State of Utah as provided in Subsection (2).’” Carter v. Lehi City, 2012 UT 2, ¶ 22, 269 P.3d
141.
19
Article XXIII provides that the constitution may be amended by a vote of the people: after a
favorable vote on a proposal of “two-thirds of all the members elected to each of the two
houses;” or after revision during a convention called by the same super-majority of the
Legislature. Utah Const. art. XXIII.
29
Article VI, section 1, provides that “the Legislative power of the State shall be vested in”
both a Senate and House of Representatives and “the people of the State of Utah.” Utah Const.
Art. VI, § 1. “The power of the legislature and the power of the people to legislate through
initiative and referenda are coequal, coextensive, and concurrent and share ‘equal dignity.’”
Gallivan, 2002 UT 89, ¶ 23, 54 P.3d 1069, 1080 (citing Utah Power & Light Co. v. Provo City,
94 Utah 203, 235–36, 74 P.2d 1191, 1205 (1937) (Larson, J., concurring)). “On its face, article
VI recognizes a single, undifferentiated ‘legislative power,’ vested both in the people and in the
legislature. Nothing in the text or structure of article VI suggests any difference in the power
vested simultaneously in the ‘Legislature’ and ‘the people.’ The initiative power of the people is
thus parallel and coextensive with the power of the legislature.” Carter, 2012 UT 2, ¶ 22, 269
Because the power of the Legislature and the people to legislate is coequal, the people
may amend or repeal legislation passed by the Legislature, and the Legislature may repeal or
amend legislation passed by the people. 20 The only limitations placed on this coequal power are
those expressly provided in the Constitution: for example, the limitation on the people’s
referendum power in relation to legislation “passed by a two-thirds vote of the members elected
to each house of the Legislature.” Utah Const. art. VI, § 1(2). Thus, subject to such express
limitations, the Court should not differentiate between a legislative action taken by the
Legislature, and one taken by the people. If a statute may be amended or repealed by either the
20
This occurred, for example, with the initiative on medical marijuana, which was the subject of
Grant v. Herbert, 2019 UT 42, 449 P.3d 141. In that case, the court held that the constitutional
prohibition of a referendum when legislation passes by two-thirds of both houses of the
Legislature applies even when the law sought to be challenged by referendum repealed an
initiative. Id. ¶¶ 32–33.
30
Legislature or the people, it is irrelevant whether the Legislature or the people enacted the
underlying legislation.
If the people intended to limit the Legislature’s power to repeal or amend law created via
an initiative, the limitation would have been included in our Constitution, as it has been in other
states.
Though such a limitation does not exist in Utah’s Constitution, the people are not left
without a remedy. If voters disagree with subsequent action by the Legislature in relation to an
initiative, they can hold their elected officials accountable at the polls or they can further amend
Count Five of the Complaint must be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted. While the people have the right to alter or reform their government, Utah’s
Constitution requires that this right be exercised by amendment or revision to the Constitution.
The people of Utah, via its Constitution, delegated the redistricting power to the Legislature, and
revocation of this delegation can only be accomplished by amending or revising the constitution,
not by statute. Further, the power of the people to legislate via initiative or referendum is coequal
31
with the power of the Legislature to legislate. Thus, both can, without limitation other than those
CONCLUSION
The Court should dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint in its entirety. In this case of first
impression, Plaintiffs seek for the Court to invent new law to prohibit partisan cracking and to,
paradoxically, grant them a remedy of partisan packing. First, and dispositive of Counts One
through Four, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims related to
partisan redistricting because they are nonjusticiable political questions and nonjusticiable for
lack of judicially discoverable or manageable standards. Second, Plaintiffs fail to state any claim
upon which relief may be granted against the Individual Legislative Defendants and the
Legislative Redistricting Committee because the Individual Legislative Defendants are protected
by legislative immunity and neither the Individual Legislative Defendants nor the Legislative
Redistricting Committee can provide any of the requested relief. Third, Plaintiffs fail to state any
claim upon which relief may be granted because the Utah Constitution does not contain any
provision requiring the Legislature to draw a district line based on the political affiliations or
preferences of the two largest political parties to the exclusion of all other political parties and
unaffiliated voters. Additionally, the constitutional provisions cited in Counts One through Four
do not prohibit political redistricting, and the constitutional provisions cited in Count Five do not
restrict the Legislature’s plenary power to pass legislation to enact or modify the Utah Code. For
the above reasons, the Court should dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint in its entirety.
32
DATED this 2nd day of May, 2022.
33
Notice to responding party Aviso para la parte que responde
You have a limited amount of time to Su tiempo para responder a esta moción es limitado.
respond to this motion. In most cases, you En la mayoría de casos deberá presentar una
must file a written response with the court respuesta escrita con el tribunal y darle una copia de
and provide a copy to the other party: la misma a la otra parte:
• within 14 days of this motion being • dentro de 14 días del día que se presenta la
filed, if the motion will be decided by moción, si la misma será resuelta por un juez, o
a judge, or • por lo menos 14 días antes de la audiencia, si la
• at least 14 days before the hearing, if misma será resuelta por un comisionado.
the motion will be decided by a
commissioner. En algunos casos debido a un estatuto o a una orden
de un juez la fecha límite podrá ser distinta.
In some situations a statute or court order
may specify a different deadline. Si usted no responde a esta moción ni se presenta a
la audiencia, la persona que presentó la moción
If you do not respond to this motion or podría recibir lo que pidió.
attend the hearing, the person who filed
the motion may get what they requested. Vea la página del tribunal
sobre Mociones para
See the court’s Motions encontrar más información
page for more sobre el proceso de las Para accesar esta página
information about the escanee el código QR
Scan QR code mociones, las fechas límites
motions process, to visit page y los formularios:
deadlines and forms: utcourts.gov/motions-span
utcourts.gov/motions
Finding help Cómo encontrar ayuda
The court’s Finding legal
Legal Help web page La página de la internet del
(utcourts.gov/help) Scan QR code tribunal Cómo encontrar Para accesar esta página
provides information to visit page ayuda legal escanee el código QR
about the ways you can get legal help, (utcourts.gov/help-span)
including the Self-Help Center, reduced- tiene información sobre algunas maneras de
fee attorneys, limited legal help and free encontrar ayuda legal, incluyendo el Centro de
legal clinics. Ayuda de los Tribunales de Utah, abogados que
ofrecen descuentos u ofrecen ayuda legal limitada,
y talleres legales gratuitos.
34
CERTIFICATE OF FILING
I certify that on this 2nd day of May 2022, I electronically filed the foregoing,
SUPPORT, with the Clerk of the Court by using the electronic filing system which will send a
Troy L. Booher (Utah Bar No. 9419)* OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
J. Frederic Voros, Jr. (Utah Bar No. 3340)* David N. Wolf
Caroline Olsen (Utah Bar No. 18070)* Lance Sorenson*
341 South Main Street 160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 P.O. Box 140856
(801) 924-0200 Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0856
[email protected] [email protected]
[email protected] Attorneys for Defendant Lieutenant Governor
[email protected] Deidre Henderson
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
*Served via Email
CAMPAIGN LEGAL CENTER
Mark Gaber*
Hayden Johnson*
Aseem Mulji*
1101 14th St. NW, Suite 400
Washington, D.C. 20005 /s/ Brooke Bolick
(202) 736-2200 Legal Research Assistant
[email protected] OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH AND
[email protected] GENERAL COUNSEL
[email protected]
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
35