GENERAL PROVISIONS

RULE 128
1. State vs. Silva, 21 Ida. 247, 120
Doctrines:
The general rule that when the answer of the defendant in a cause in equity is direct, positive, and unequivocal
in its denial of the allegations in the bill, and an answer on oath is not waived, the complainant will not be
entitled to a decree unless these denials are disproved by evidence of greater weight than the testimony of one
witness, or by that of one witness with corroborating circumstances, applies when the equity of the complainant's
bill is the allegation of fraud.

In order to rescind a contract for the purchase of real estate on the ground of fraudulent representation
by the seller, it must be established by clear and decisive proof that the alleged representation was made in
regard to a material fact, that it was false, that the maker knew that it was not true, that he made it in order to
have it acted on by the other party, and that it was so acted upon by the other party to his damage, and in
ignorance of its falsity and with a reasonable belief that it was true.

Statements made by the seller of a speculative property like a mine at the time of the contract of sale
concerning his opinion or judgment as to the probable amount of mineral which it contains, or as to the
character of the bottom of the ore chamber, or as to the value of the mine, if they turn out to be untrue, are
not necessarily such fraudulent representations as will authorize a court of equity to rescind the contract of sale.

The fact that a representation made by a seller was false raises no presumption that he knew that it was
false.

When the purchaser of a property undertakes to make investigations of his own respecting it before concluding
the contract of purchase, and the vendor does nothing to prevent his investigation from being as full as he
chooses, the purchaser cannot afterwards allege that the vender made representations respecting the subject
investigated which were false.

In equity. Decree dismissing the bill. Complainant appealed. The case is stated in the opinion of the Court.
Facts:
This is a bill in equity to rescind a contract of purchase of a silver mine on the ground of fraudulent
representations and to recover the consideration paid.

The suit was commenced originally in the Superior Court of Inyo County, California, on the 8th of May, 1884, but
on account of the diverse citizenship of the parties, the plaintiff being a corporation organized under the laws of
Nevada and the defendant a citizen of California, it was removed into the United States circuit court. Demurrers to
the original bill and to an amended bill having been sustained, the present "second amended" bill of complaint
was filed. Answer was filed by defendant, replication by complainant, and issue was joined. Testimony was taken,
and the case was heard, resulting in a decree dismissing the bill on the 14th of March, 1887.

It appears from the record that on the 15th of March, 1884, the appellant (who was the complainant below)
purchased from the defendant a mining claim known as the "sterling Mine," together with other mining
property, all situated in Inyo County, California, paying him therefore the sum of ten thousand dollars.

On the 8th of May, 1884, the original bill of complaint was filed charging in substance that complainant was
induced to purchase said mine and mining property solely upon the representations made by Silva as to its
condition, extent, and value; that such representations were made to H. M. Yerington, the president of said
complainant company, and to one Forman, a mining expert in his employ, in January, 1884, when an examination
of said mine was made by them; that said representations were false and fraudulent, and were well known to the
defendant at the time to be such, and that said representations were, in substance and in a somewhat
different order, as follows:

(1) That there were 2,000 tons of ore in the mine.

(2) That the bottom of what is called the "Ore Chamber" was solid ore, as good as the ore exposed on the sides of
the chamber.
(3) That there were not less than 500 tons of ore in and about the said ore chamber.

(4) That the mine was worth $15,000, and

(5) That, after going through the mine, the defendant represented to said Yerington and Forman that he had
shown them all the work which had been done in or about the mine that would throw any light upon the quantity
of ore therein.

The answer of the defendant is direct, positive, and unequivocal in its denials of the allegations of the bill, and,
as an answer on oath is not waived, unless these denials are disproved by evidence of greater weight than
the testimony of one witness or by that of one witness with corroborating circumstances, the complainant will not
be entitled to a decree, and this effect of the defendant's answer is not weakened by the fact that the equity of
the complainant's bill is the allegation of fraud. Vigel v. Hopp, 104 U. S. 441; 2 Story Eq.Jur. § 1528; 1 Daniell
Ch.Pr. 844.

The burden of proof is on the COMPLAINANT, and unless he brings evidence sufficient to overcome
the natural presumption of fair dealing and honesty, a court of equity will not be justified in setting
aside a contract on the ground of fraudulent representations. In order to establish a charge of this
character, the complainant must show by clear and decisive proof:

Issue/s:
First. That the defendant has made a representation in regard to a material fact.

Secondly. That such representation is false.

Thirdly. That such representation was not actually believed by the defendant, on reasonable grounds, to be true.

Fourthly. That it was made with intent that it should be acted on.

Fifthly. That it was acted on by complainant to his damage; and

Sixthly. That in so acting on it the complainant was ignorant of its falsity and reasonably believed it to be true.

Ruling:
The first of the foregoing requisites excludes such statements as consist merely in an expression of opinion or
judgment, honestly entertained; and again (excepting in peculiar cases), it excludes statements by the owner and
vendor of property in respect to its value.

The evidence in the case shows that in the development of this mine a tunnel, called the "sterling Tunnel," had
first been dug. At a distance of about 140 feet along the line of this tunnel, from its mouth, there are branches
running easterly and westerly. About 60 feet from the main tunnel, in the eastern branch, winze No. 1 starts
down. About 38 feet below the level of the tunnel, a level, known as the "38 feet level," starts off from this winze,
and at the bottom of the winze, a distance of about 82 feet vertical below the main tunnel, there is another level,
known as "82 feet level." In the easterly branch of the tunnel, about 30 feet from winze No. 1, there is another
winze starting downward, inclining to the southeast as it goes down. This winze is numbered 2, and is connected
with the 38 feet and the 82 feet levels. Intermediate between these levels is another level, known as the "55 feet
level," which opens out to the eastward of winze No. 2 into a chamber about 15 feet long and about 8 feet wide.
In the southeast corner of this chamber was a little hole or shaft, extending downward a few feet only. In sinking
winze No. 2, Silva struck an ore body at a point opposite the 38 feet level. It was irregular in shape, dipping at an
angle of about 45 degrees. Commencing at a point, comparatively speaking, it increased gradually as it
descended, and was in form somewhat like a pyramid. At its base it measured 4 or 5 feet across, and it was about
9 feet long. The surface of this inclined pyramid formed the floor or bottom of the chamber. There was, however,
a small space between the base and opposite foot-wall, which is called the "bottom" of the chamber by
complainant's witnesses, and it is the "bottom" spoken of in the bill. The ore comprising this pyramid was
carbonate, and, being friable, had slacked down over the face of the pyramid to the bottom, partially covering it,
and partially filling up the little hole or shaft in the southeast corner.

As to the first alleged representation, as classified above -- viz., that there were 2,000 tons of ore in sight in
the mine, and that Yerington relied upon such statement when he made the purchase -- the proof utterly fails to
establish either that Silva made the statement as a statement of fact or that Yerington relied upon such
statement, even had it been made. Silva, both in his answer and in his testimony, denies ever having made the
statement, and the testimony of Yerington himself is to the effect that Silva's statement was qualified by the
phrase "in his judgment." This, then, is shown to have been nothing more than an expression of opinion on the
part of Silva as to the quantity of ore in sight in the mine. But even if Silva had made the statement imputed to
him in the bill, there is abundant evidence to show that Yerington did not rely upon it in the purchase of the mine.
Yerington's own evidence on this point is against him. He testifies that he did not believe that there were more
than 1,000 tons of ore in the mine, and that Forman agreed with him on that point. And he further testifies that,
valuing this ore at 32 ounces of ore and 45 percent of lead per ton (which it appears was its approximate value,
as determined by several assays), and calculating that there would be 1,000 tons of ore there, the mine would be
worth $10,000 -- the sum he actually gave for it. This lacks much of coming up to the rule that the complainant
must have been deceived, and deceived by the person of whom he complains. Atwood v. Small, 6 Cl. & Fin. 232;
Pasley v. Freeman, 3 T.R. 57. Besides, the quantity of ore "in sight" in a mine, as that term is understood among
the miners, is at best a mere matter of opinion. It cannot be calculated with mathematical, or even with
approximate, certainty. The opinions of expert miners on a question of this kind might reasonably differ quite
materially.

In the case of Tuck v. Downing, 76 Ill. 71, 94, the court said:

"No man, however scientific he may be, could certainly state how a mine, with the most flattering
outcrop or blow-out, will finally turn out. It is to be fully tested and worked by men of skill and judgment.
Mines are not purchased and sold on a warranty, but on the prospect. 'The sight' determines the
purchase. If very flattering, a party is willing to pay largely for the chance. There is no other sensible or
known mode of selling this kind of property. It is, in the nature of the thing, utterly speculative, and
everyone knows the business is of the most fluctuating and hazardous character. How many mines have
not sustained the hopes created by their outcrop!"

We approve the position of the court below, that

"Yerington and his expert, Forman, were as competent to judge how much ore there was 'in sight' as Silva
was. They were no novices in matters of that kind. This misrepresentation, if such it be, does not contain either
the first, fourth, or fifth element stated by Pomeroy as essential elements in a fraudulent
misrepresentation."

As stated above, the substance of the allegation of the bill is that Silva represented that the bottom of this ore
chamber, which was covered with loose ore slacked down from the pyramid, was composed of ore as good as that
exposed on the sides of the chamber. Silva, in his answer, expressly denies ever having made such statement.
Forman testifies that with a little prospecting pick he had with him, he raked through the dirt and loose ore that
had slacked down to see if it would reach the bottom of the ore chamber, but that it would not. He further says:

"I asked Silva how the bottom was; if he had sunk below there. He said, 'No.' I said, 'How is the bottom.
You, as a miner, know it is a suspicious thing to see a bottom covered up, or anything of that kind.' He
said the bottom was as good or better than any ore which we saw in the chamber."

Yerington at first testifies that Silva, in reply to a question by Forman, stated that this floor was solid ore, but he
says that he does not think any comparison was made between that ore and the ore in the sides of the chamber,
as narrated by Forman. On the next day, however, Yerington having, as he says, refreshed his memory -- "and I
[he] had the means of doing it" -- was positive that the conversation between Silva and Forman at that time was
as Forman afterwards stated it. Silva, in addition to his positive denial in his answer, testifies that

"There never was a word said about that. They asked me this: 'What I thought of the ore body?', and I
said 'I thought it would be extensive.' I thought so at the time, and I think so yet."
The witness Eddy, who was present all the time in the ore chamber except when he went to the 38 feet level to
get a pick, does not know anything about a conversation such as Yerington and Forman narrate.

On this point, then, the testimony of Silva is directly to the contrary of that of Yerington and Forman.
Certain other material facts in the case seem to indicate that there is just as strong probability that Silva's
statements in this matter are true as that those of Yerington and Forman are true. In the bill, Yerington alleged
under oath that Silva had discovered the fact that the bottom of the ore chamber was not composed of ore, and
had afterwards covered the bottom with ore, vein-rock, and matter -- in other words, had "salted" the mine. There
is no evidence in the record to prove this or tending to prove it; on the contrary, the evidence of Yerington
himself, and of the other witnesses who were examined on that point, is all to the effect that the ore covering the
floor of the chamber had slacked down from natural causes in fine particles like wheat. Nor is there such evidence
to show that Silva knew the character of this floor, or of the extent of the ore vein, or deposit (as it afterwards
turned out to be), as would justify the interposition of a court of equity to set aside the contract on the ground of
fraudulent representations. He had come onto the ore in excavating from the top. The sides of the ore chamber
contained some ore of a good quality, and he had never demonstrated the extent and amount of ore in the
pyramidal wedge in the side of the chamber. It is shown by the evidence of Yerington himself that in the side of a
drift running westerly from the ore chamber there was ore which appeared to be continuous with the body of ore
in the chamber, so that the statement Silva said he made -- viz., that he thought the ore body would be extensive
-- at least, appears reasonable. Upon all the facts and circumstances apparent of record, he might have made the
statement he says he made and believed he was telling the truth. For there is also some evidence to the effect
that Silva had commenced to run a drift from the bottom of winze No. 1 for the purpose of striking and cutting the
suppose downward extension of the ore body in the chamber, and this before the examination of the mine by
Yerington and Forman. After the sale of the mine, Coffin, the superintendent for the complainant company, when
he commenced work in the mine, started in where Silva had left off in this drift and carried it immediately beneath
the ore chamber, entering the chamber by an up-raise. Then it was that the discovery was made that the ore
body, instead of being a continuous ledge or lead, was merely a deposit. Furthermore, the testimony of Yerington
and Forman as regards the little hole or shaft in the southeast corner of the chamber is directly opposed by the
testimony of Silva and Eddy. Both Yerington and Forman testify that this little shaft was completely filled up with
dirt and loose ore, while Silva and Eddy both testify that it was not so filled up, but that both Yerington and
Forman stood in that shaft and took samples of ore from it. It is thus seen that the evidence on this material point
does not clearly establish the fraudulent representations of Silva as claimed by the complainant, but that, on the
contrary, the material facts and circumstances as disclosed by the record are entirely compatible with the theory
that Silva did not make the representations charged against him, or at most that he merely gave expression to an
opinion as to the extent of the ore body, erroneous though it proved to be. This would not constitute fraud. In the
language of the court below:

"This testimony was taken in June, 1866, about two and a half years after the conversations took place. They
were present at the time, examining the mine and engaged in conversation for an hour or more. These
discrepancies in matters of detail during a long conversation, related by different parties, viewing the subject from
different standpoints after the lapse of so long a period of time, are no more than might reasonably be expected
even in honest witnesses. There is no occasion to impute any intention to testify falsely to either. . . . Parties are
extremely liable to misunderstand each other, and, in looking back upon the transaction in the light of subsequent
developments, are prone to take the view most advantageous to themselves."

As to the third alleged representation -- to-wit that there were not less than 500 tons of ore in and about that
ore chamber -- Silva, both in his answer and in his testimony, denies that he ever told Yerington and Forman or
anybody else that there were 500 tons of ore there, or that there was any amount fixed or agreed upon by them
as to the quantity of ore there, while the testimony of both Yerington and Forman is to the effect that Silva said,
in his opinion or in his judgment, there were 500 tons of ore in the chamber. So that, taking the strongest
testimony produced on the part of complainant upon this point, it simply amounts to an expression of opinion on
the part of Silva as to the amount of the ore in the chamber, and not a statement of fact. It therefore does not
constitute fraud.

It is equally true that any statements that may have been made by Silva with reference to the value of the mine
cannot, under the circumstances of this case, be considered an act of fraud on his part sufficient to warrant a
court of equity in setting aside the contract herein. Yerington testifies that Silva said he had been asking $15,000
for the mine, but that he would take $12,500, while Forman says he does not recollect that Silva made any
statement as to the value of the mine, but that he heard Silva say he thought it was worth $15,000. Such
statements are not fraudulent in law, but are considered merely as trade talk, and mere matters of opinion, which
is allowable. Gordon v. Butler, 105 U. S. 553; Mooney v. Miller, 102 Mass. 217. Moreover, it is clear beyond
question that Yerington did not purchase the mine upon Silva's representations as to its value, as we shall
hereafter see.

This disposes of all the alleged fraudulent representations as arranged above, except the last, adversely to the
complaint, and it is to this one that attention will now be directed. This charge is substantially that Silva
represented to Yerington and Forman when they visited the mine in January, 1884, and had gone through it that
he had shown them all the work which had been done in and about the mine that would throw any light on the
quantity of ore therein. This representation is alleged to have been false and fraudulent, and well known by Silva
to be such, because at a cut a short distance from the mouth of the main tunnel at a point known as the "point of
location," a little hole or shaft had been sunk which had been filled up, and was not observable at the time of the
examination of the mine in January, 1884, and also because there had been a number of drill holes made in the
sides of the ore chamber, and afterwards filled up before the examination in January, 1884, so that they were not
observable at that time, which holes clearly developed the fact that the ore about the chamber was nothing more
than a shell, instead of a continuous body, as it appeared to the observer.

The existence of the plugged-up drill holes in the sides of the ore chamber is the worst feature of the case against
Silva. They could not have been made by a former proprietor of the mine, as is slightly claimed in his behalf, for,
as has been already shown in this opinion, Silva himself, or at least persons in his employ, had excavated that
chamber after he had purchased it from one Edwards in 1876. And certain it is that the drill holes were found
plugged up within a short time after he had sold the mine to the complainant company, March 15, 1884. The
question is did Silva know of their existence at the time he sold the mine, and, having such knowledge, did he
falsely represent to the complainant that he knew nothing of them, thereby inducing complainant to act upon such
representations? Upon this question the evidence is somewhat conflicting. Yerington testifies that after going
through the mine, he asked Silva if he had shown him the whole of the mine, and he replied that he had. And
Forman testifies that Silva, in reply to a question from him, said that he had shown him all the work that had been
done in and about the mine that would throw any light upon the quantity of ore in the mine or the extent of the
ledge or deposit. Silva admits that in reply to a question by Yerington, he told him that he had shown him all the
work that had been done in and about the mine, either by himself or under his direction. So that the question is
narrowed down to simply this: were said drill holes in existence at the time Silva made such statement? If so, had
they been made by him, or under his direction, or did he know of their existence? In his sworn answer, Silva
expressly

"denies that he drilled any such hole or holes through the ore into the country rock or otherwise, or
thereby or at all discovered the extent of said ore, or that he filled up said drill holes or concealed them
from view, or kept them secret from complainant,"

etc., and in his testimony he also denies having any knowledge of their existence. He says that he drilled no holes
in the mine except what he had to do as a miner, and that he concealed nothing from Yerington when he showed
him the mine. And again he says: "I showed Mr. Yerington all the work that was done in the mine that I knew
anything of." There is no direct evidence going to show who drilled the holes, and there is nothing in the entire
record to connect Silva with them except the fact that he was the owner of the mine and was in possession of it at
a time when it is most likely they were drilled. But this circumstance alone should not outweigh the positive denial
of Silva in his answer, and also in his equally positive denial in his testimony, of his knowledge of the existence of
said drilled holes. The law raises no presumption of knowledge of falsity from the single fact per se that the
representation was false. There must be something further to establish the defendant's knowledge. Barnett v.
Stanton, 2 Ala. 181; McDonald v. Trafton, 15 Me. 225. This rule is fortified by the consideration that had he known
of the limited quantity of ore in and about the "ore chamber," Silva would hardly have gone to the expense and
labor of starting a drift from the bottom of winze No. 1 and constructing it for a certain distance before the sale of
the mine for the purpose of reaching the supposed downward extension of the ore in and about that chamber.
Knowing that the ore body terminated within a few inches of the surface of the chamber, and then, in the face of
that knowledge, actually constructing a drift on the 82 feet level at enormous expense for the purpose of getting
under that limited quantity of ore would not appear a reasonable thing to do by anyone, especially by such an
experienced and practical miner as Silva is admitted to have been.

The testimony therefore and all the other facts and circumstances of record do not substantiate complainant's
theory of the case on this point; in other words, there is not a satisfactory case of fraudulent representations on
this point made out -- not such a case as would justify the interposition of a court of equity to set aside the
contract under consideration on the ground of fraudulent representations.

As regards the little hole or shaft that had been sunk at the "point of location" and afterwards filled up so that it
was not observable at the time of Yerington's visit in January, 1884, there is absolutely no testimony at all to show
that Silva knew anything about its existence. He had done no work at that place, or very little, at most, and was
using the cut there as a sort of kitchen. The sides of the cut indicated that there was a ledge of ore there. It is
admitted that Forman asked Silva why he did not "go down" on that ore, and that he replied that he considered
the tunnel the best place to mine. Silva denies, both in his answer and in his testimony, that he ever knew that a
shaft had been sunk at the point of location, and no one is found who can testify that he did know anything about
it; on the contrary, the former owner of the mine, one Edwards, testifies that he himself dug that shaft and filled it
up prior to the time Silva purchased it, and that to his knowledge, Silva did not know anything about that shaft.

It is essential that the defendant's representations should have been acted on by complainant to his injury. Where
the purchaser undertakes to make investigations of his own and the vendor does nothing to prevent his
investigation from being as full as he chooses to make it, the purchaser cannot afterwards allege that the vendor
made misrepresentations. Atwood v. Small, supra; Jennings v. Broughton, 5 De Gex, M. & G. 126; Tuck v.
Downing, supra.

The evidence abundantly shows that Yerington had been willing to give $10,000 for the mine prior to the time he
visited it, and made his examination, in January, 1884. He had made inquiries of various persons for months
previous to that visit. Several experts in his employ had visited the mine, had taken samples of ore from it, and it
must have been from reports thus received that Yerington had made up his mind as to what the mine was worth.
From the letters of an agent (Woods) to Eddy, the testimony of the witness Boland, the testimony of the witness
Anthony, Eddy's testimony, and from the testimony of Silva himself, there can be no doubt that Yerington had
offered $10,000 for the mine several months before he had ever seen it, thus showing that his examination of the
mine in January, 1884, merely went to corroborate the reports that he had received of it from his experts,
Forman, Bliss, et al., and that it was upon such reports and his own judgment after an examination of the mine
that he made the purchase of it.

From all which it is clear to this Court that the complainant has not proven his case, and the decree below is

Affirmed.
2. US vs. Gil, 13 Phil. 530, G.R. No. L-4704, April 26, 1909
Doctrines:
1. CRIMINAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE; MURDER.—Held, That the facts proven sustain a finding of the guilt of
the accused of the crime of assassination.

2.ID.; RIGHTS OF ACCUSED; DYING DECLARATIONS.—The American authors of the Philippine Bill and of General
Orders, No. 58, must be presumed to have borrowed the provisions of the Constitution of the United States, securing
to accused persons the right of confrontation and cross-examination of the witnesses against them, subject to the
well-established exceptions which have always been recognized under the rule as laid down by the Constitution of
the United States; these provisions were never intended to render inadmissible dying declarations in criminal cases,
touching the circumstances leading up to the death for which the prosecution is instituted.

3. ID.; EXPERT WITNESSES.—Whether the opinion of a witness who claims to be an expert or skilled witness is
admissible or not is to be determined by proof of his skill and special knowledge as to the subject matter of the
particular question propounded; and the existence of the capacity to testify as an expert arises in theory as a new
inquiry from question to question.

4.PREMEDITATION.—The period of time necessary to justify the inference of deliberate premeditation is a period
sufficient in a judicial sense to afford full opportunity for meditation and reflection, and sufficient to allow the
conscience of the actor to overcome the resolution of his will if he desires to hearken to its warnings.

Facts:
The information filed in this case charges the accused, Joaquin Gil, with the crime of assassination,
in that on the 27th day of December, 1907, in the city of Iloilo, he entered the office of Benito
Lopez, governor of the Province of Iloilo, and then and there treacherously ( con alevosía) and with
deliberate premeditation fired four shots from a loaded revolver at the said Governor Benito Lopez,
who was at the time engaged in the execution of the duties of his office as governor, and inflicted
upon him four wounds from the effects of one or all of which he died on the 20th day of January,
1908.

It was conclusively proven that on the morning of the 27th of December, 1907, the accused entered
the office of Governor Lopez, who was at that time alone in his office, engaged in the transaction of
public business; that a short time thereafter four pistol shots were fired in the office; that a few
moments later Lopez ran from the room in a wounded condition, pursued by the accused with a
smoking revolver in his hand; and that Lopez died twenty-four days later as a result of the wounds
received on that occasion.

Gil, the accused, testifying on his own behalf, stated that he went to the government building on the
morning in question for the purpose of taking out a license to keep in his possession a revolver; that
learning that the governor was unoccupied he entered his office, took a few steps toward the
governor who was seated at his roll-top desk, at the same time drawing the revolver from its
holster, and with the pistol lying in his outstretched hand addressed to the governor the question:
"May I?" (Se puede?); that the governor glanced up at him, with a "fierce" look on his face, and
resumed his work at his desk; that nothing more was said or done for a considerable space of time,
not less than five minutes, when the governor raised his head and said: "What do you want?" that
he (Gil) then approached the desk where the governor was seated and told him that he had come to
ask for the favor of a license for the revolver; that the governor forthwith, and without slightest
provocation on Gil's part, answered in an insulting manner, upbraiding Gil for his temerity in seeking
a favor of a man whom he had denounced to higher authority, and wound up his insulting and
abusive tirade by calling Gil an infeliz ("miserable creature," or as translated by counsel for defense
"coward") and an hijo de puta (son of a whore); that he, Gil, then fell into a fit of ungovernable
rage, which was the more intense because it is true that he was born out of lawful wedlock, and the
governor having reached for the revolver, a struggle ensued during which the shots were fired, but
that he, Gil, had so completely lost control of himself and was so filled with rage and indignation by
the aspersions on his own and his mother's name and reputation, that he could not remember
whether he himself had fired the shots which wounded the governor, or whether the pistol had been
discharged accidentally in the course of the struggle for its possession.

The prosecution, on the other hand, insists that the shooting was the result of a deliberate, willful
and premeditated plan; that Gil went to the government building on the morning in question, not for
the purpose of securing a license, but with intent to kill his enemy, the provincial governor, incited
thereto by intense hatred and animosity, which had been engendered by bitter personal and political
quarrels; that his pretense of securing a license was a mere pretext adopted for the purpose of
securing admission to the office of the governor, while the latter was alone; that when he entered
the office the governor was seated, not at the desk as alleged by the accused, but at the end of a
long table, where he was engaged in writing an official indorsement; that the accused crossed the
room to a point about half way down the length on the table, where he stopped and immediately
commenced firing at the governor, who being unarmed arose from his seat, and attempted to
escape into the adjoining office, the accused pursuing him into a corridor connecting the two offices.

If the account of what occurred in the office of the deceased governor on the morning of the 27th of
December, 1907, as told by the accused when testifying in his own behalf, be accepted as true, this
testimony taken together with the other evidence of record not in conflicting therewith, would leave
no room for doubt of his guilt of the crime of unlawfully taking the life of Benito Lopez, deceased,
the commission of the crime being marked with a certain extenuating circumstances, but unmarked
either by "treachery" (alevosía) or "deliberate premeditation" ( premeditación conocida) as charged
in the information; and as the slayer was alone with his victim when the fatal shots were fired no
eye-witness could be called to the stand to contradict the testimony of the accused as to what
occurred in the office from the time he entered until the explosion of the pistol shots attracted the
attention of the other occupants of the building. In our opinion, however, the ante-mortem
statement of the deceased, taken together with the other evidence of record, conclusively
establishes not only the falsity in all its essential details of the account of the tragedy given by the
accused, but also the fact that the crime was committed with treachery ( alevosía) and deliberate
premeditation ( premeditación conocida).

The dying declaration of the wounded man is set out in full in the following extract from the
testimony of the fiscal of the Province of Iloilo (translated from the original Spanish), which was fully
corroborated by the testimony of the justice of the peace of Iloilo:

Q.       Did you see Governor Lopez on the 20th of January, 1908? If so, where?

A.       Yes, sir, at the Mission Hospital.

Q.       At what hour of the day did you see him?

A.       I saw him between 7 and 8, or perhaps a little later.

Q.       In which part of the Mission Hospital did you see Governor Lopez?

A.       In the room where they placed him and where Governor Lopez lying in bed.

Q.       In what physical condition was Governor Lopez at the time you saw him?
A.       We noticed that his breathing was so labored that it seemed to me that he was in a dying
condition.

Q.       Who were in the room at the time?

A.       I went in twice, the last time to get his testimony — I, Captain Lewis, Colonel La Garde, I,
Arsenio Jimenez, the justice of the peace, a sick American woman, and Doctor Hall — those are the
persons whom I saw.

Q.       What conversation did you have with Governor Lopez at that time, if any?

(I object to that, as immaterial and irrelevant.

Overruled.

Exception.)

A.       I asked him if he was convinced that he would die and whether he had any hopes of living.

Q.       What was the first question you asked Governor Lopez?

A.       "Are you convinced that you are going to die, and have you no hopes of living?" He answered
"Yes."

Q.       Was there any other conversation?

A.       Yes, sir, I then asked him: "Was there any provocation on your part against Gil?" "None," I
then asked him, "Did you insult him?" He answered "Not at all." I then finally asked him, "How did it
happen?" He answered, "Gil came in and fired at once." In view of the fact that he had almost said
the last word, and was breathing in more labored fashion, and that he bade us "good by," we could
not proceed [to question him] because we thought he was dying.

Q.       Was this testimony put in writing?

A.       No; because we had sent for a stenographer as was we had been told that he could only live
a few minutes, and the stenographer did not arrive.

(I object because it is not an answer to the question.

It is not sustained.

Exception.)

A.       We had sent for a stenographer but, in view of the fact that he was long in coming and the
physicians had told us that in all probability he would not live more than 2 to 5 minutes, as soon as
the justice of the peace arrived, we entered the room in order to take the testimony.

As will be seen, the dying declaration of the wounded man flatly contradicts the testimony of the
accused as to the alleged provocation and insult; — the chief bulwark of the defense against the
evidence of the prosecution tending to prove the existence of deliberate premeditation; and it as
flatly contradicts the statement of the accused, that he did not fire the fatal shots for some five
minutes after he entered the office and not until a wordy quarrel had arisen during which his
opponent had full opportunity to assume an attitude of defense, of which he availed himself; — the
chief bulwark of the defense against the evidence of the prosecution tending to prove that the
accused committed the crime with "treachery" (alevosía), in that he opened fire on his unarmed and
defenseless victim without giving him time or opportunity to offer resistance. But it must be
admitted, as claimed by the counsel for the defense, that the account of what occurred, as given by
the dying man, is so meager and incomplete that, in itself, and if it were not corroborated by other
evidence of record, as will hereinafter appear, it would be by no means sufficient to sustain a finding
of the falsity of the account given by the accused.

The trial court found that it was conclusively established by the testimony of the witnesses who saw
the accused enter the governor's office and later heard the shots fired, that the shooting took place
within a few moments after the entry of the accused, the interval not being more than long enough
to give the accused the time to walk from the door to the point at the side of the table from which,
as claimed by the prosecution, the other evidence in the record shows the accused fired at least one
shot. There appears to be some uncertainty in the testimony of some of the witnesses as to the
precise duration of this interval of time, but we think that the weight of the evidence fully sustains
this finding of the trial court and corroborates the truth and accuracy of the ante-mortem statement,
while it conclusively demonstrates the falsity of the testimony of the accused in this regard.

We think, too, that there can be no reasonable doubt of the falsity of the statement of the accused
that when he entered the office the governor was seated, writing, at a roll-top desk which stood in
one corner of the office, the truth being that he was seated at the end of the long table mentioned
in the following extract from the testimony of Captain Lewis, who examined the office immediately
after the shooting:

Q.       You may examine this plan and state if it represents accurately the governor's and
secretary's office in the provincial building at Iloilo?

A.       I can not say if it is exact because I have not measured it, but as far as I know it is correct. I
have been in the Governor's office a number of times and I noted the different pieces of furniture on
the day the governor was shot; they appeared that day as they are here on this map.

Q.       The table at the point A in the governor's office — I will ask you if it occupied the same
relative position as is represented on this map, on the 27th day of December, 1907?

A.       Yes, sir.

Q.       The desk C in the governor's office — I will ask you if it occupied the same relative position
as is designated on this plan, on the 27th day of December, 1907?

A.       It did.

Q.       In the secretary's office the desk at the point P, designated as the secretary's desk — I will
ask you if that desk occupied the same relative position in the secretary's office as is designated on
this plan, on the 27th of December, 1907?

A.       It did.

Q.       I will ask you if the desk R in the secretary's office occupied the same relative position as it
does on this plan — on the 27th of December, 1907?

A.       Yes, sir, it did.

Q.       And the desk S, did it occupy the same relative position on the 27th of December, 1907?
A.       It did.

Q.       When you returned to the governor's office or when you went to the governor's office on the
27th of December, 1907, state whether or not you observed anything on and about the table A. If
so, what?

A.       There was a blotter at the end of the table where the crime circle marked D and on top of
the blotter in front of the chair was the envelop that had been opened on the end, addressed to the
Honorable Governor of Iloilo Province; a little nearer the chair was a scratch pad lying down with a
sheet something similar to the size of regular legal size typewriting paper — had part of an
indorsement written on it — with ink, in the governor's handwriting and as I read it — it was in
Spanish, and as I read it — "Respectfully returned to the Executive Secretary of the Philippine
Islands, inviting his attention to the preceding indorsement" with the date of December 27, 1907, at
the top; the pen was lying down about the center of this piece of paper as if dropped, judging from
the drop ink under the point of the pen to the right at the margin of the sheet of paper which he
was writing on — partly on the sheet and partly on the blotter; there were other pieces of paper
lying around and other correspondence that had not been opened.

Q.       State whether or not when you made that examination there was a chair near the end of this
desk at the point marked D.

A.       Yes, sir; facing the desk, inclined to the left of the position of a man sitting — as if some one
had gotten up and passed to the left.

Q.       What, if anything, did you find or observe upon the desk C? —

A.       There were some books lying on top of each end of the desk and in the center there was a
straw hat that I recognized as being that of the governor by seeing the name written inside of the
sweat band; it was a telescope hat, and on top of it there was a paper case; roller-top desk, and
sitting at the back of it was a revolving office chair.

That at least one shot was fired at the deceased as he was in the act of rising from his seat at the
end of the long table appears from the foregoing extract from the testimony of Captain Lewis, read
together with the following extract from the testimony of Capt. Charles Gearhardt, of the United
States Army, which was fully corroborated by the testimony of Captain Lewis (both of these
witnesses being men of long experience in handling firearms) and by the testimony of Mr. T. L.
Wilson, treasurer of the province, who with Captain Lewis carefully examined the position of the
bullet mentioned in Captain Gearhardt's testimony, before it was extracted from the wall of the
office in which it was embedded:

A.       I will state that I first examined the hole and found that the bullet had entered not squarely
into the wall but at an angle, and it is plain to be seen by examining it by this magnifying glass that
a part of the mortar of the wall has come away and that the right-hand edge of it has crumbled
somewhat. Examining the bullet you find that it has mushroomed some, but it just fits — this bullet
was handed to me as the one taken out of the hole in the wall — and setting it in and holding it in
place it fits very well; to determine the angle by the bullet from an examination by the eye and
using the magnifying glass and setting in the pencil which I have in my hand I determined the angle
to be about as I have it here now. I also verified this angle afterward, and by setting the bullet in
and aiming that pencil so that by having the pencil in place as I have indicated and following its
trace back through the air as it naturally would have gone I determined that, within narrow limits, to
the best of my judgment, the pistol was held by some one standing about this position.

Mr. BLANCHARD (interrupting). About the center of the south side of the table marked A.

The WITNESS (continuing). The actual position held by the party firing the pistol would depend
considerably upon his height, for this line I have traced simply traces for one of about my height.

Mr. BLANCHARD. I would suggest that the attention of Captain Gearhardt be called to the defendant
as to his size.

The WITNESS (after standing up alongside of the defendant). The shoulders are almost the same.

A.       (continued.) Within limits, due to judgment and opinion, I should say that that is the path
that the bullet went over when it entered the wall — right over about here.

Q.       If a man were sitting in that chair — the chair marked D — at the time the bullet was fired
from the position you have indicated, and the bullet should pass through the right shoulder of the
man, coming out of the back, in what position in your own opinion, would be the man shot?

A.       I should say that the man was not sitting in the chair at the time he was shot; he was in the
act of rising or had partially rise.

Four shots were fired, all of which took effect in the body of the deceased, and if the testimony of
these witnesses be accepted as correct (and the trial judge so accepted it after a personal
examination of the relative positions of the table, chair, and the hole in the wall with the bullet
placed therein as it was found immediately after the shooting), there can be no reasonable doubt
that at least one shot was fired while the governor was in the act of rising from his seat at the end
of the table and before he had an opportunity to take any measures to defend himself.

The defense put one witness on the stand to corroborate the testimony of the accused as to the
insulting language addressed to him, and this witness swore that from an adjoining office he heard
the governor make use of the word infeliz ("contemptible creature" or "coward") and immediately
thereafter the movement of a chair being pushed back and the explosion of the pistol shot, but that
he did not hear the governor make use of the words hijo de puta. The prosecution offered a number
of witnesses who, at the time of the shooting, were in the same offices adjoining the governor's
office, and the testimony on this point tends strongly to prove that if the insulting language quoted
by the accused was used at all, it was used in a voice so low that it could not be heard by anyone in
the adjoining offices, although these offices were connected with the governor's office by open
doors and windows through which the human voice could readily be heard, the passage of sound
being impeded merely by light screens intended to cut off the view from one office to the other. This
testimony of itself is of course not sufficient to sustain a finding that such language was not in fact
used; but, taken together with the positive denial contained in the ante-mortem statement, and
keeping in mind the proven falsity of other essential details of the testimony of the accused, the
proof that shots were fired almost immediately after the accused entered the office, and the fact
that the witness who claims to have heard the word infeliz did not heard the word hijo de puta,
although he says that the governor was speaking in an "altered" (excited) tone of voice; we think
that the trial court properly found that no such series of insults had been directed to the accused by
the deceased as were claimed by him, and that beyond a reasonable doubt, the words hijo de
puta were not used at all; and this conclusion is confirmed by the consideration of the inherent
improbability of his testimony in this regard, for it is difficult to believe that Governor Lopez, if he
were in right senses, would without provocation, hurl such deadly insults at his enemy while that
enemy was standing before him with a loaded revolver in his outstretched hand.

Thus far we have limited ourselves to a review of the evidence which tends to corroborate the
wounded man's dying declaration that his assailant entered his office and without provocation
immediately (en seguida) began firing upon him, and to contradict the testimony of the accused as
to what occurred in the office at the time when the shooting took place. We shall no proceed to
summarize the great mass of testimony which in our opinion tends directly to establish the
contention of the prosecution that the crime was the result of a deliberately premeditated plan.

This witness, Anastasio Penas, testified that he overheard the accused, just before he entered the
government building, tell his carromata driver to wait for him, but if he heard shots to drive home at
once. Commenting on the testimony of this witness, the trial judge says, "it is denied by the accused
and strenuously attacked by his counsel" but "in the opinion of the court it is true," and "the court
believes this witness told the truth." We find nothing in the record which would justify us in doubting
the truth of the testimony of this witness or the correctness of the findings the trial judge in that
regard.

Ramon Lopez, a brother of the deceased, who rushed into the office immediately after the shots
were fired and found the accused and his brother alone in the corridor running round the building,
swore that when he came up to them, and before he snatched the revolver from the accused, he
asked what was the matter (que está pasando?), whereupon the accused exclaimed: "For some time
past I have wanted to kill you — I have wanted to kill you!" ( Hacia ya tiempo que queria matarte —
yo queria matarte.)
Jose Santiago, secretary of the provincial board of Iloilo, to whom the accused in his testimony
referred as his personal friend before the incident took place, swore that after the accused had been
arrested and taken to the provincial jail in the lower part of the government building, he (the
witness) was directed by the provincial treasurer to go to see the accused and find out if he needed
anything, and that when he found the accused in his cell, he asked him what had happened, to
which the accused replied: "I had thought this thing out already." ( Ya tenía eso pensado.)

Captain Lewis testified that, some little after the shooting, the accused in his cell stated to him (in
the language of the witness), "that Governor Lopez had been instrumental through his brothers in
trying to get a woman by the name of Paz Buenaflor to make certain allegations against him in the
Court of First Instance, since he had married the daughter of Angel Corteza, in Molo" (about two
weeks prior to the shooting), " and for that reason he stood under the abuse of the governor as
long as he could, and that he told his mujer (I interpreted that for his wife) the night before, that he
was going to see the governor the following morning and have a settlement."

The accused vehemently denied having made the statements testified to by Captain Lewis, Santiago
and Ramon Lopez, and swore that he could not have made such statements, because, while he was
politically opposed to Governor Lopez, their personal relations had been friendly and he had
harbored no such feelings of hatred and animosity toward Lopez prior to the shooting as those
statements would indicate. We are convinced, however, that whatever friendly personal relations
may have at one time existed, those relations must have been strained to the breaking point by the
intensely bitter and acrimonious political quarrel which gave rise to the formal charges against
Governor Lopez of official misconduct, bribery, and other criminal offenses which were submitted by
the accused to higher authority and pressed by him in the official investigation which followed,
during the month prior to the shooting; and it is hardly credible that such friendly personal relations
could have survived the filing of these charges by the accused; and that the differences between the
accused and Governor Lopez were not wholly impersonal and limited to political issues is made very
clear by the testimony of the father-in-law of the accused, who was called as a witness for the
defense, and swore that about a month before the shooting and a short time prior to the marriage
of the accused with the daughter of the witness, Governor Lopez tried to get the witness not to
consent to the marriage, telling him that Gil was a bad man and reminding him of Gil's "mother
antecedents."

While it is possible that Ramon Lopez, the brother of the deceased, might have been actuated by
the sentiments of revenge in testifying as he did, no such motives can be attributed to either Lewis
or Santiago, and we think the trial court properly declined to believe the vehement denials of the
accused, and rightly accepted the testimony of these witnesses as a true and correct relation of the
substance of the statements made by him, for there is nothing in the record to justify the contention
of the defense that they deliberately, willfully and maliciously invented these statements; and the
meaning and effect of their testimony can not be softened by any suggestion of misunderstanding
or mistake.

The fact that the accused, when he entered the provincial building on the morning in question,
anticipated the firing of pistol shots, and his admissions that what occurred had been thought out or
planned before it took place, and that stung by real or fancied personal wrongs he had told his wife
the night before that he would have a settlement with the governor on the following morning;
convince us, beyond a reasonable doubt, that his real purpose in seeking admission to the
governor's office was not to secure a license for his pistol, but to wreak vengeance on his personal
and political enemy; and his conclusion is confirmed by an examination of the evidence of record as
to the circumstances under which the pretended application for a license was made, the manner in
which he claims to have submitted his application, and his conduct immediately after the shooting
took place.

The accused himself admitted on the witness stand that he had owned the pistol in question since
the days of the insurrection (six years, more or less) without a license, and that it had been under
his immediate control for more than six months prior to the shooting; that on one occasion he had
aided a friend in securing such a license from the provincial inspector of Constabulary, and that
while he did not know whether the provincial inspector was authorized to grant such licenses
without the intervention of the provincial governor, he had made no effort to learn whether this was
the fact or not. Even in the absence of evidence to the contrary, it would be difficult to believe that
the accused, in good faith, walked into the office of his enemy, and suddenly presented himself
before that enemy with his loaded revolver in his extended right hand, merely for the purpose of
asking for a license therefor, and this without taking the trouble to inquire whether the license could
be obtained from another official who, he had reason to believe, had authority to issue it, and with
whom he had no quarrel; and the air of improbability of the story is increased when it is
remembered that although he had owned the revolver for many years he did not find it incumbent
upon him to make an application for a license until the precise moment when his personal and
political quarrel with the deceased was at its height; and that, despite the existence of that quarrel,
his alleged desire to obtained the license at that particular time was so great that, although it was
necessary for that purpose to ask an official favor of his enemy, he could not await the resolution of
superior authority, which was still pending, as to whether his enemy's reelection to office would be
affirmed, in view of the charges filed against him.
It also appears from the record, on the testimony of irreproachable witnesses, that immediately
after the shooting and before the accused was taken to the provincial jail, he was apparently in a
state of tense mental exaltation, and gave vent to cries to those around him which would tend to
disclose that he imagined that he had just done a highly patriotic deed, justified by the official
misconduct of the man he had shot. Over and over again he exclaimed the words "Justicia!
Justicia!" (Justice), declaring that what he had done had been done for Justicia, and that he had no
wish or desire to make his escape; in a loud voice he cried: "Down with the tyrant!" ( abajo con el
tirano!), and declaimed incoherently on the duties of a patriot; and finally, as he went downstairs
under arrest, he called to those around him: "Let us see if any of you will follow in my footsteps! ( A
ver si algunos de ustedes vienen en pos de mi!) Such language, used at much a time and under
such circumstances, would seem to the commission of a desperate act by brooding on some real of
fancied political wrong, rather than the cries of one who had just slain his enemy in a sudden
quarrel precipitated by unexpected and unprovoked insults.

Other than the testimony of the accused himself, no evidence appears of record which in our
opinion tends in anywise to cast a doubt upon the truth and certainty of the findings hereinbefore
set out, except only the testimony of the witnesses who swore that on the morning in question, the,
accused upon entering the government building, bore himself so as not to give rise to suspicion of
anything exceptional or extraordinary in his conduct, and that in conversing with the clerks in the
governor's anteroom he indicated some indisposition to go in person to the office of the governor to
ask for the license for which he said he had come. We think, however, that, granting that the
conduct of the accused was as calm and collected as it was described by the witnesses and that he
indicated an apparent unwillingness to approach the governor in person, this conduct, in the light of
the other evidence of record, must be taken to be the result of an effort to live up to the
requirement of his preconceived plan to gain admission to the office of his known enemy on the
pretense of seeking a license for his revolver.

Counsel for appellant lays great stress on the testimony of the witness who stated that he heard the
deceased make use of the word infeliz just before the shooting took place, and the testimony of one
of the counsel for the defense, who testified that soon after the shooting, while the accused was yet
wild with excitement, the witness caught him by the arm and shook him to bring him to his senses,
whereupon the accused exclaimed: "he called me an infeliz!" — "Who am I that I should be called
an infeliz by a governor?" In our opinion, however, this evidence in no way weakens the force of the
case made out by the prosecution; and indeed the evidence of the witness who testified that he
heard the word infeliz used before the shooting, if it is true tends rather to contradict the story of
the accused in one of its most essential details, and to confirm the theory of the prosecution as to
the manner in which the shooting took place. This witness testified as follows:

I heard the governor's voice in a somewhat altered tone. . . . After a few moments I heard a word,
among other words infeliz, and almost in the same act I heard a movement of a chair as if someone
were getting up, and at the same moment I heard shots and that was when we began to run.

As we have stated heretofore, this evidence by no means corroborates the testimony of the accused
as to the alleged series of insults heaped upon him by the deceased; and indeed when it is
remembered that the accused testified that the exclamation hijo de puta immediately followed the
use of the word infeliz, the fact that this witness for the defense heard the word infeliz, and yet did
not hear the words hijo de puta, a phrase which could not fail to strike the ear of one who heard the
word infeliz if both were in fact used, strongly corroborates the other evidence of record which tends
to prove that the deceased did not make use of the phrase hijo de puta; and so far as the
apparently self-serving statement of the accused made soon after the shooting, which was
introduced by the defense, was admissible at all, it tends to further corroborate this conclusion, for
the reference to the use of the word infeliz and the failure to refer to the really grave insult at such
a time, strongly suggests that the addition of the latter to the language put in the mouth of the
deceased by the accused, was an afterthought falsely injected to give an appearance of truth of his
story of a sudden outburst of uncontrollable passion.

It will be observed also that the witness for the defense testified that "almost at the same moment"
as he heard the word infeliz he heard "a movement of a chair as if some one were getting up," and
"at the same moment," he heard shots. This testimony fully corroborates the circumstantial evidence
introduced by the prosecution, which tends to prove that at least one shot was fired while the
deceased was sitting in or rather in the act of rising from his chair, and clearly contradicts the
statement of the accused, that all the shots were fired during a struggle with the deceased, after the
latter had attempted to take possession of the revolver.

It well might be that Governor Lopez, looking up from his desk where he was engaged in the
transaction of public business and wholly unarmed, and suddenly discovering his deadly enemy
leveling a pistol at his head, should have exclaimed infeliz ("miserable creature," or as translated by
counsel for the defense, "coward") as he leaped to his feet, but proof that he did make use this
particular word, without the additional phrase mentioned by the accused, "almost in the same
moment" as the shot was fired, in nowise support the story told by the accused, nor does it explain,
nor justify, nor excuse his murderous assault.

In the light of all the evidence of record, the substance of which is hereinbefore set out, we are
satisfied that it is not true, as claimed by the accused, that having gone to the office of the governor
merely for the purpose of seeking a license for his revolver, he made use of the revolver in a sudden
burst of passion aroused by the unprovoked insults heaped upon him on that occasion; and we are
of opinion that the evidence sustains a finding that his real purpose in going to the government
building on the morning in question was to take the life of his enemy; that the plan so to do
originated in his mind not later than the night before the morning on which the shooting took place;
that that plan was persisted in from the early hour at which he left his house until the time when he
gained admission to the office of the governor, a period of time long enough to justify us in holding
that the crime was committed with deliberate premeditation (  premeditacion conocida), because, in
a judicial sense, it afforded full opportunity for meditation and reflection, and was amply sufficient to
allow his conscience to overcome the resolution of his will ( vencer las determinaciones de la
voluntad) had he desired to hearken to its warnings; this being the measure of the period of time
necessary to justify the inference of deliberate premeditation, as laid down in the case of the United
States vs. Ricafor (1 Phil. Rep., 173), adopting the rule laid down by the supreme court of Spain in
its sentencia dated November 10, 1894.
Issue/s:

Ruling:
We are satisfied, too, that the crime was committed with treachery ( alevosía), because the evidence
of record leaves no room for doubt that, actuated by the hatred engendered by his personal and
political quarrel with his enemy, he sought his enemy alone in his office, and upon securing
admission opened fire upon his victim, who was at the moment engaged in the transaction of public
business and wholly unarmed, without giving him an opportunity to resist or to defend himself.
Counsel for the defense urges that the trial court erred in admitting the dying declaration of the
deceased governor, on the ground that its admission was in violation of the inalienable right of the
accused to be confronted by the witnesses against him, guaranteed by the provisions of section 5 of
the Philippine Bill and by the provisions of paragraph 5 [of section 15] of General Orders, No. 58. It
must not be forgotten, however, that the guaranties extended by the Congress to the people of the
Philippine Islands are to be interpreted as meaning what the like provisions meant when Congress
made them applicable to these Islands (Serra vs. Mortiga, 204 U. S., 470; also reported in 11 Phil.
Rep., 762). And in the United States, the constitutional clause providing for the confrontation by the
accused with the witnesses for the prosecution, purported merely to adopt the general principle of
the hearsay rule, and to secure to the accused the right to cross-examine the infrajudicial witnesses
against him, and did not purport to enumerate all of the exceptions and limitations to that principle:

There were (at the time of the adoption of the Constitution of the United States), a number of well-
established exceptions, and there might be others in the future; the Constitution indorsed the
general principle (of the hearsay rule), subject to these exceptions; merely naming and describing it
sufficiently to indicate the principle intended — just as the brief constitutional sanction for trial by
jury did not attempt to enumerate (all) the classes of cases to which that form of trial was
appropriate nor the precise procedure involved in it, and has always been construed as not absolute
and universal in effect, but as subject to the limitations and unessential variations understood to
accompany that institution. (Greenleaf on Evidence, Sixteenth Edition, Vol. 1, par. 163 and p. 283;
Campbell vs. State, 11 Georgia, 374; State vs. McO'Blenis, 24 Mo., 416; Robertson vs. Baldwin, U.
S., 17 Sup. 326.)

The American authors of the Philippine Bill and of General Orders, No. 58, must be presumed to
have borrowed the provisions of the Constitution of the United States securing to accused persons
the right of confrontation and cross-examination of the witnesses against them, subject to the well-
established exceptions which have always been recognized under the rule as laid down by the
Constitution of the United States, and it is clear that these provisions were not intended to render
inadmissible dying declarations in criminal cases touching the circumstances leading up to the death
for which the prosecution is instituted, for such declarations have always been regarded as an
exception to the general rule rejecting hearsay evidence, on the general principle, as laid down by
Lord Baron Eyre, "That they are declarations made in extremity, when the party is at that point of
death, and when every hope of this world is gone; when every motive to falsehood is silenced and
the mind is induced by the most powerful considerations to speak the truth. A situation so solemn
and so awful as to be considered by the law as creating an obligation equal to that which is imposed
by a positive oath in a court of justice." The rule is the same as the rule of the Roman Civil
Law, "Morti proximum, sive moribundum, non praesumendum est mentiri, nec esse immemorem
saluties aeternae; licet non praesumatur semper dicere verum." (Mascard, De Probat. Concl., 1080;
U. S. vs. Montes, 6 Phil. Rep., 443.)

It has been suggested, however, that since a specific exception is found in General Orders, No. 58,
to the rule touching the confrontation of witnesses, as therein laid down, the expression of this
exception should be taken to exclude all other exceptions. The exception relied upon is as follows:

Where the testimony of a witness for the prosecution has previously been taken down by question
and answer, in the presence of the accused or his counsel, the defense having had an opportunity
to cross-examine the witness, the deposition of the latter may be read, upon satisfactory proof to
the court that he is dead or insane, or can not with due diligence be found in the Islands.
It is very clear, however, that this express provision for an exception to the general rule, which has
not been universally recognized in those jurisdictions where it has not been provided for by express
legislation, can by no means be regarded as intended to exclude the various general exceptions to
the hearsay rule which have always been recognized despite the existence of the constitutional
provisions securing the rights of accused persons to be confronted by, and to cross-examine the
witnesses for the prosecution.

That the declarant was conscious of his impending death, and that he spoke with the prospect of
"almost immediate dissolution" confronting him; that he understood the meaning and effect of his
statement; and that he knew he was addressing the law officers of the town and province wherein
he lived, and informing them as to the circumstances which led up to his death, are facts which we
think are sufficiently established by the evidence of record: and the admissibility of the dying
declaration, resting, as it does, exclusively on the ground that the declarant was "in extremis" at the
time it was made, is in nowise affected by the failure of the law officers to secure no more formal
and detailed statement contemplated in the above-cited provision of General Orders, No. 58, which
they might perhaps have been able to obtain had they not been misled by the opinion of the
attending surgeons that the wounded man would probably recover.

Counsel for appellant also insist that the evidence of Captain Gearhardt and Captain Lewis as to the
probable trajectory of the bullet, which was found in the wall of the office, was inadmissible, in the
ground that these witnesses did not properly qualify as experts; and comment at considerable
length on the worthless character of the testimony of experts as rendered in judicial investigations
generally. We agree with counsel that the admission of this class of testimony, partly because of the
want of satisfactory standards of expertness, partly because of its too frequently conflicting and
unreliable character, and partly because of its tendency of prolong trials and increase the expense
incident thereto, leads to abuses which renders its value as an aid to investigation of truth in courts
of justice exceedingly doubtful and problematical. And yet the need for such testimony appears to
have justified its continued use, and we can not say that it does not in some cases serve a useful
purpose, when its inherent weakness and danger of abuse are kept constantly in mind.

An expert has been defined to be one possessing, in regard to a particular subject or department of
human activity, knowledge not usually acquired by other persons (12 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 2d Ed.,
424); and under this definition we think that Captain Gearhardt and perhaps Captain Lewis may
fairly be classed as experts, as to questions touching the course and effect of bullets shot from small
arms at moderate ranges, their long experience in the use of such arms, with the professional
obligation imposed upon them to study and familiarize themselves with their use and manipulation
as the tools of their trade, having, presumably, given to them a knowledge in such matters not
usually acquired by civilians. It is true that the frank admissions by these witnesses of their inability
to solve a number of hypothetical problems of a technical nature in the science of ballistics
(problems which in the present status of human knowledge on that subject may of may not be
capable of satisfactory solution) would indicate that, unlike many more pretentious expert witnesses,
there are limitations to the extent of the knowledge they claim to posses; but we think that, under
the principles laid down in the following extract from Greenleaf, their capacity as expert witnesses to
answer the questions propounded to them as to the probable trajectory of the bullet found in the
wall of the office was not affected by such confessed limitations to the extent of their knowledge
and to their capacity to answer every question propounded to them by opposing counsel:

It follows that there are no fixed classes of expert persons, in one of which a witness finds himself
and remains permanently. A person may be sufficiently skilled for one question, and totally
unqualified for the next. He may be competent to say whether the deceased had gray hair, and
incompetent to say what killed him; competent to say whether the deceased was asphyxiated by
gas, and incompetent to distinguish between coal gas and water gas; competent to say whether a
hatchet was sharp, and incompetent to tell whether a stain upon it was of human blood. The
witness may from question to question enter or leave the class of persons fitted to answer. It is
desirable to appreciate that expert capacity is a matter wholly relative to the subject of the particular
question; that therefore the existence of the capacity arises in theory as a new inquiry from question
to question; and that a particular person is not to be thought of as objectively or absolutely an
expert, in the sense that he is absolutely a german or a negro or six feet high. (Greenleaf on
Evidence, 1st vol., 16th ed., par. 430 (a), p. 523.)

But whatever may be the value which should be given to the expert opinions expressed by these
witnesses, and even were we to disregard these opinions altogether, the trajectory of the bullet to
which they testified must be taken to have been established to the satisfaction of the trial judge and
to ours (so far as it was proper for him to rely upon his own opinion of expert witnesses) by the
ocular examination of the scene of the tragedy made by him at the request of the counsel for
defense, the facts upon which the experts based their opinions having been submitted to him on
that occasion in such manner as to afford him full opportunity to draw his own conclusions without
regard to the opinion of the witnesses.

On appeal, as well as in the court below, the conduct of Captain Lewis, and the trustworthiness of
his testimony, have been attacked with no little severity , but commenting on these criticisms the
trial judge in his decision observes that "Captain Lewis as senior inspector of Constabulary has
simply performed his official duty as far as his action has been appeared to this court, and he has
merited commendation instead of blame for the faithful performance of his official duty;" and while
we agree with counsel for the appellant that Captain Lewis's official position having imposed upon
him the duty of securing testimony and otherwise aiding the prosecution, a due regard for the
frailties of human nature imposes on us the obligation of scrutinizing his testimony with the utmost
care, lest by any chance his interest as a prosecutor might have biased his feelings as a
disinterested witness; and while we recognize that, under the circumstances, too much reliance
should not be placed on his opinions or his recollection of facts as to which mistake or
misunderstanding might lead him astray; nevertheless we find nothing in the record which would
justify us in believing that there is any reason to doubt his honesty of intention or the truth or
accuracy of his testimony as to facts which mere bias on his part would not be likely to distort.

It appearing from the evidence of record that the accused was guilty, as charged, of unlawfully
taking the life of Benito Lopez, and that the crime was committed with treachery ( alevosía) and with
deliberate premeditation (  premeditación conocida), and that his victim was engaged in the
performance of the functions of his office, as governor of the Province of Iloilo, at the time when the
crime was committed, and the commission of the crime not being marked by any extenuating
circumstance, the accused was properly convicted of the crime of assassination, and the penalty
described by law was properly imposed in its maximum degree. The sentence of death imposed by
the trial court should, therefore, be, and is hereby, affirmed, with costs of this instance against the
appellant.
3. Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, March 29, 1996
Doctrines:
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; MOTION TO DISMISS; LACK OF CAUSE OF ACTION; NON-EXHAUSTION
OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES; DEEMED WAIVED FOR FAILURE TO INVOKE AT PROPER TIME. — A direct
action in court without prior exhaustion of administrative remedies, when required, is premature, warranting its
dismissal on a motion to dismiss grounded on lack of cause of action. However, the peculiarities of this case
preclude the rightful application of the principle aforestated. When the PCGG decided to file its motion to dismiss,
nearly seven (7) years already came to pass in between that so much has already transpired in the proceedings
during the interregnum. The motion to dismiss came only at the penultimate stage of the proceedings where the
remaining task left for the PCGG was to file its written formal offer of evidence as required by the
SANDIGANBAYAN. This Court, in "Sotto v. Jareno," 144 SCRA 116, 119 has mad it quite clear that: "Failure to
observe the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not affect the jurisdiction of the Court. We
have repeatedly stressed this in a long line of decisions. The only effect of non-compliance with this rule is that it
will deprive the complainant of a cause of action, which is a ground for a motion to dismiss. If not invoked at the
proper time, this ground is deemed waived and the court can take cognizance of the case and try it." PCGG is
guilty of estoppel by laches. With its undenied belated action, it is only to presume with conclusiveness that the
PCGG has abandoned or declined to assert what it bewailed lack of cause of action. PCGG should be deemed to
have waived such perceived defect for "proper time" cannot mean or sanction an unexplained and unreasoned
length of time. The leniency extended by the Rules and by jurisprudence cannot be invoked to cover-up and
validate the onset of laches — or the failure to do something which should be done or to claim or enforce a right
at a proper time.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; DOES NOT SUSPEND PERIOD TO SUBMIT WRITTEN FORMAL OFFER OF DOCUMENTARY
EVIDENCE, AND FAILURE THEREFOR IS DEEMED A WAIVER; INCORPORATION IN JUDGMENT THE RESOLUTION
OF MOTION TO DISMISS, PROPER. — The PCGG faults the SANDIGANBAYAN for incorporating in the judgment
the resolution of its motion to dismiss, arguing that said motion should have been resolved first and separately.
That would have been unnecessary in the light of the "peculiarities" of this case where there was nothing left for
the parties to do but to await the forthcoming judgment of the SANDIGANBAYAN, save for the submission of the
PCGG’s written formal offer of documentary evidence which the PCGG failed to do within the 20-day period given
it because it filed the motion to dismiss instead. That the 20-day period was not suspended upon the filing of the
motion to dismiss. The Court agrees with petitioners’ (SIPALAY and ALLIED) stance that the only period
suspended by a motion to dismiss is the period to file an answer where a period is to be suspended by the filing of
a pleading, the Rules of Court expressly provides for such suspension. PCGG filing of a motion to dismiss, without
seeking leave of court to stay the running. of the period for filing its written formal offer of evidence — as agreed
upon and ordered in open court could not have the effect of suspending the period. Without express leave of
court, PCGG could not improvidently assume that it has liberty to suspend the running of the period agreed upon.
PCGG is deemed to have waived presentation of further evidence and to have its evidence rested on the basis of
the evidence on record.

3. POLITICAL LAW; RECOVERY OF ILL-GOTTEN WEALTH; SEQUESTRATION ORDER AND SEARCH AND SEIZURE
ORDER NULLIFIED FOR NON-COMPLIANCE OF CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT OF SUFFICIENT PRIMA FACIE
FACTUAL FOUNDATION. — The pertinent constitutional provision in focus in SIPALAY’s case is Section 26 of
Article XVIII. The Sandiganbayan voided the sequestration order issued against SIPALAY" for lack of sufficient
prima facie factual foundation, . . ." In so concluding, it only took into account the testimonies of PCGG witnesses
Doromal, Bautista and Alonte. By way of preface, no serious objection can be raised insofar as the
SANDIGANBAYAN’S exclusive reliance on the testimonies of the three (3) PCGG witnesses is concerned. The
SANDIGANBAYAN had no other choice, for these testimonies in fact constitute the entire evidence for the PCGG,
inasmuch as no documentary evidence which might have supported the testimonial evidence were offered by the
PCGG below. The Rules of Court and jurisprudence decree that "The court shall consider no evidence which has
not been formally offered." There is no doubt that the testimonies of the PCGG witnesses were formally offered as
evidence meriting due appreciation by the SANDIGANBAYAN, since Section 35, Rule 32 of the Rules requires that
the offer of testimonial evidence "must be made at the time the witness is called to testify." With respect to
documents, however, the same Section 35 (second paragraph) provides a different time for their offer. Dr.
Doromal’s testimony is reviewable as no attack on its admissibility was ever launched by the SANDIGANBAYAN.
With respect to Atty. Alonte’s testimony, the SANDIGANBAYAN declared it as hearsay which finding the PCGG does
not contest. As to Commissioner Bautista’s supervening death in the course of her cross-examination, the
controlling case is "Fulgado v. C .A., Et Al., where the Court allowed the testimony of the plaintiff who died before
his cross-examination, to remain in the record. If testimony is inexpungible where the witness dies prior to any
cross-examination, with more reason should testimony partially cross-examined at the time of the witness’ death
(as in Commissioner Bautista’s case) remain intact. Dr. Doromal was basically reoccupied with identifying and
referring to documents purportedly coming from Malacañang, the US State Department and other sources. What
his testimony essentially yields is the fact that the prima facie evidence/s supporting the sequestration order
issued against SIPALAY is/are buried and ascertainable in these documents. But, to repeat, any reference thereto
is unwarranted since there was no offer thereof in evidence. And it must be emphasized at this point that mere
identification of documents and the marking thereof as exhibits do not confer any evidentiary weight on
documents not formally offered. Verily then, without the PCGG documents having been formally offered, however
decisive and compelling they may otherwise be, it is as if a prima facie evidence/s case does not exist at all. That
makes Dr. Doromal’s testimony by and in itself worthless. The same can be said of deceased Commissioner
Bautista as well who was similarly immersed in the mechanical process of identification. In fact, her testimony and
the documents she referred to were totally unrelated to the sequestration order issued against SIPALAY, as they
chiefly dwelt on the search and seizure order issued against ALLIED. Being immaterial, nothing therefrom can
shore up a prima facie case against SIPALAY.

4. ID.; ID.; PCGG MADE USE OF AN UNAUTHORIZED AND CONSTITUTIONALLY DEFECTIVE SEARCH WARRANT
TO EFFECT SEQUESTRATION. — The order which the PCGG issued against ALLIED typifies a search warrant. Not
only is the order captioned as SEARCH AND SEIZURE ORDER, the body thereof clearly enjoined the branch
manager to make available to the PCGG team all bank documents precisely for that purpose. It is unauthorized
because nowhere in Executive Order No. 1 (particularly Section 3) invoked by the PCGG to justify the search and
seizure order was the PCGG expressly empowered to issue such specie of a process in pursuit of its mandated
purpose of recovering ill-gotten/unexplained wealth. Section 3 of E.O. No. 1 enumerates the powers of the PCGG;
and the Court in "Cojuangco, Jr. v. PCGG" simplified these powers. It cannot be validly argued by the PCGG that
its authority to issue a search and seizure order possessing the essential features of a search warrant is derivable
from subparagraphs (b) and (c) of Section 3 of E.O. No. 1 or from No. 4 of the simplified enumeration in the
"Cojuangco" case, by implication. "Baseco" has clarified once and for all the essential nature of the provisional
measures of sequestration, freeze orders and provisional takeover that the PCGG is explicitly equipped with.
Attachment and receivership are legal processes purely conservatory in character, not involving an active and
drastic intrusion into and confiscation of properties as what a search warrant (or search and seizure order)
necessarily entails. All processes that the PCGG is allowed to issue in discharging the duty for which it was
created, therefore, ought to be viewed strictly in this context. And this finds further support in "Philippine Coconut
Producers Federation, Inc. [COCOFED] v. PCGG" and being in fact a search warrant, the SEARCH AND SEIZURE
ORDER cannot escape, and must pass the acide test for validity as provided by the prevailing constitution under
which it was issued — the FREEDOM CONSTITUTION which adopted verbatim the provision of the 1973
Constitution. Supporting jurisprudence thus outline the following requisites for a search warrant’s validity, the
absence of even one will cause its downright nullification: (1) it must be issued upon probable cause; (2) the
probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or any other person; (3) in the
determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or affirmation, the complainant and such
witnesses as the latter may produce; and (4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be
searched and persons or things to be seized. In addition to its unauthorized issuance (as just discussed), the
SEARCH AND SEIZURE ORDER is so constitutionally defective. Firstly, deceased Commissioner Bautista’s in-court
declarations did not in any way established probable cause. This is so because, as what her testimony irresistibly
suggested, the purported facts and circumstances supporting the order are exclusively traceable from documents
she identified but which were never formally offered in evidence in the SANDIGANBAYAN. She never testified to
any fact of her own personal knowledge to bolster the PCGG’S claim that ALLIED was in possession and control of
illegally-amassed wealth by Lucio Tan. Her testimony, therefore, is plain hearsay, self-serving, or uncorroborated
suspicion. And the rule is that search warrants are not issued on loose, vague or doubtful basis of fact, nor on
mere suspicion or belief. Secondly, the PCGG has no authority to issue the order in the first place. Only a" judge"
and "such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law" were empowered by the FREEDOM
CONSTITUTION to do so, and the PCGG is neither. Thirdly, the order does not provide a specification of the
documents sought to be searched/seized from ALLIED. It EXPRESSLY REFERS TO "all bank documents" which is
too all embracing, the obvious intent of which is to subject virtually all records pertaining to all business
transactions of ALLIED of whatever nature, to search and seizure. Such tenor of seizure warrant is not a particular
description, thus contravening the explicit command of the Constitution that there be a particular description of
things to be seized. Being a general warrant, the SEARCH AND SEIZURE ORDER is constitutionally objectionable
and to be more precise, void for lack of particularity.

5. ID.; ID.; SUIT AGAINST SEQUESTERED ENTITY SHOULD BE BROUGHT IN SANDIGANBAYAN WITHIN THE
PRESCRIBED PERIOD AS FAILURE THEREOF AUTOMATICALLY LIFTS SEQUESTRATION ORDER; SUIT AGAINST
STOCKHOLDERS IS NOT SUIT AGAINST THE CORPORATION. — The last key issue involves another constitutional
imperative — i.e., that the corresponding suit/s against a sequestered entity/ties should be brought in the proper
court, the Sandiganbayan, within the prescribed period — failure of which automatically lifts the sequestration
order or orders issued. At the fore is Section 26, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution. The 1987 Constitution was
ratified on February 2, 1987. Counting six (6) months therefrom, August 2, 1987 was the constitutional deadline
for the PCGG to file the corresponding judicial action/proceeding against entities it sequestered prior to February
2, 1987. Among such entities were SIPALAY and ALLIED. The PCGG admittedly did not file any direct complaint
either against SIPALAY or ALLIED before the SANDIGANBAYAN between February 2, and August 2 of 1987. But
within such period, the PCGG filed before the SANDIGANBAYAN a civil case against Lucio Tan and others docketed
as CC No. 0005. It did not name SIPALAY and ALLIED as defendants. SIPALAY and ALLIED were impleaded as
defendants in CC No. 0005 for the first time only after the lapse of more than four (4) years from the filing of the
original complaint in July of 1987, under an amended complaint filed by the PCGG in September of 1991. In PCGG
v. INTERCO, the Supreme Court made a distinction between the juridical personalities of a corporation and its
stockholders, ruling that if a corporation is not impleaded, it cannot be deemed to have been sued in an action
against its stockholders. Petitioner Sipalay Trading was not specifically impleaded therein as party-defendant, if at
all, the latter has been included therein as part of principal defendant’s ill-gotten assets. Under Rule 3, Section 7
of the Rules of Court, ‘(P)arties in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action shall be
joined either as plaintiffs or defendants.’ Sipalay Trading has a juridical personality separate and distinct from its
stockholders. Any civil charge filed against principal defendant Lucio C. Tan and/or his dummies is not deemed a
suit against the former. Neither does mere inclusion in the list of ill-gotten assets as part of principal defendant’s
ill-gotten wealth suffice to comply with the constitutional injunction. Impleading a party means bringing the suit
against it. Listing or annexing it to the complaint, on the other hand, implies being the objection of the action. The
PCGG erroneously relies on "Pangasinan Transportation Co. v. Philippine Farming Co., Ltd." where it was ruled to
the effect that: This case dealt solely with a defect in the cause of action stated in the original complaint filed. It
did not in any way involve a failure to implead a party-defendant. In the failure to implead a party in the original
complaint, the Court on at least two occasions said that the rule in "Pangasinan" would not apply to the party
impleaded for the first time in the amended complaint. These are the cases of "Aetna Insurance Co. v. Luzon
Stevedoring Corporation" and "Seno, Et. Al. v. Mangubat, Et. Al. cited by herein SIPALAY and ALLIED in their
"Comment." In "Aetna," the amended complaint filed by therein appellant Aetna Insurance Co. as plaintiff before
the then CFI of Manila impleading Barber Line Far East Service as defendant for the first time, was filed beyond
the one-year period fixed in the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act. In "Seno," one Andres Evangelista and Bienvenido
Mangubat was likewise impleaded as defendants for the first time under an amended complaint filed beyond the
ten-year period required under Article 1144 of the New Civil Code within which to bring an action upon a written
contract. And in both cases, the Court affirmed the dismissal of the complaints against these newly impleaded
defendants by refusing the application of the "Pangasinan" ruling and decreeing that the amended complaints did
not stall the running of the prescription periods provided under the applicable laws. Bearing once against similar
factual features as the "Aetna" and "Seno" cases, this particular sub-issue should, perforce, be resolved in
accordance therewith. The case of "Republic v. Sandiganbayan, Et. Al." 240 SCRA 376 [January 23, 1995] where
its "Final Disposition relating to the judicial action/proceeding in sequestration cases appear to clash with
"INTERCO," did not reverse, abandon or supplant "INTERCO." What the Court did was to explain the two
apparently colliding dispositions by making this a "hairline," but critical, distinction: As in "INTERCO," evidence of
the PCGG is nil to even come up with a prima facie case against SIPALAY (and ALLIED).This similitude is the one
decisive factor that draws the instant case away from the "Final Dispositions" made by the Court in the 1995
"Republic v. Sandiganbayan" case — thus making "INTERCO" as supported by the "Aetna" and "Seno" cases, the
controlling precedent. The principle of Stare Decisis, indeed, is most compelling, for "when the court has once laid
down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it to all
future cases where the facts are substantially the same. In answer therefore we hold that the sequestration and
the search and seizure issued were indeed automatically lifted.
Facts:
Save for slight modification of a specific disquisition made by the SANDIGANBAYAN in its now-assailed judgment
dated August 23, 1993 we affirm the same, as well as its Resolution promulgated on October 7, 1993 denying the
Motion For Reconsideration.

The factual background of this case is as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Petitioner PCGG issued separate orders against private respondents Sipalay Trading Corporation and Allied
Banking Corporation (hereinafter referred to as SIPALAY and ALLIED) to effect their sequestration. Two (2)
separate petitions were filed by SIPALAY and ALLIED before this Court assailing the sequestration orders. After the
consolidation of these petitions and the filing of the comments, other pleadings and certain motions by the parties,
this Court referred the cases to public respondent SANDIGANBAYAN for proper disposition 1 , where SIPALAY’s
petition was docketed as S.B. 0095, and that of ALLIED as S.B. 0100.

Concerning SIPALAY (S.B. 0095), its 360, 875, 513 shares of stock in Maranaw Hotels and Resort Corporation
which owns the Century Park Sheraton Hotel are, according to the PCGG, part of Lucio C. Tan’s ill-gotten wealth.
The PCGG on July 24, 1986 thus sequestered these SIPALAY shares under a "Sequestration Order and Supervisory
Committee" which reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"24 July 1986

Maranaw Hotels and Resort Corporation

C/O Mr. Lucio C. Tan

Allied Banking Corporation

Allied Bank Center

Ayala Ave., Makati

Metro Manila

Subject: Sequestration Order and Supervisory Committee

Gentlemen:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

By virtue of the powers vested in the Presidential Commission on Good Government by authority of the President
of the Republic of the Philip

pines, we hereby sequester the shares of stocks in Maranaw Hotel’s and Resort Corporation held by and/or in the
name of Sipalay Trading Corporation.

We direct you not to cause any transfer, conveyance encumbrance, concealment, or liquidation of the
aforementioned shares of stocks without any written authority from the commission.

x x x

This sequestration order and formation of the Supervisory Committee shall take effect upon your receipt of this
Order.

For your immediate and strict compliance.

Very truly yours,

FOR THE COMMISSION:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(Sgd.) (Sgd.)

RAMON A. DIAZ QUINTIN S. DOROMAL

Commissioner Commissioner" 2

SIPALAY was forced to litigate after the PCGG sought to implement the sequestration without acting on its
motion." . . To Lift Sequestration Order" and." . . For Hearing For Specification Of Charges And For Copies Of
Evidence." SIPALAY maintained that the sequestration was without evidentiary substation, violative of due
process, and deemed automatically lifted when no judicial proceeding was brought against it within the period
mandated under Article XVIII, Section 26 of the Constitution.

Anent ALLIED (S.B. 0100), its Valenzuela branch on August 13, 1986 was served a "Search and Seizure Order" by
agents of the PCGG, the text of which reads:
"The Manager

Allied Banking Corporation

Valenzuela Branch

Valenzuela, Metro Manila

SEARCH AND SEIZURE ORDER

Gentlemen:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

By virtue of the powers vested in this Commission by the President of the Republic of the Philippines, you are
hereby directed to submit for search and seizure all bank documents in the abovementioned premises which our
representative may find necessary and relevant to the investigation being conducted by this Commission.

Atty. Benjamin Alonte is deputized to head the team that will implement this Order.

August 13, 1986, Pasig, Metro Manila.

FOR THE COMMISSION:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(Sgd)

RAMON A. DIAZ

Commissioner

(Sgd.)

MARY CONCEPCION BAUTISTA

Commissioner" 3

ALLIED went to court for the same reason that the PCGG was bent on implementing the order. ALLIED contended
that this order is not one for sequestration but is partially a general search warrant which fails to meet the
constitutional requisites for its valid issuance.

The petitions were jointly heard by the SANDIGANBAYAN. Briefly, the more salient events which transpired therein
are as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

At the presentation of their evidence, PCGG Secretary Ramon Hontiveros appeared as the lone witness for
SIPALAY and ALLIED. He produced and identified excerpts of the minutes of the PCGG meetings held on March 13
and 12, 1986 4 in response to a subpoena duces tecum.

For the PCGG’s part, its witnesses were Commissioner Dr. Quintin Doromal, former PCGG Commissioner Mary
Concepcion Bautista, now deceased, and Atty. Benjamin Alonte, Director IV, Legal Department of the PCGG who
headed the team that served the search and seizure order on ALLIED. Commissioner Doromal identified
voluminous documents. Former Commissioner Bautista died midway her cross-examination. The PCGG almost
failed to present Atty. Alonte, had the SANDIGANBAYAN not reconsidered 5 its Order of March 8, 1993 6 declaring
the cases submitted for decision after the PCGG was deemed to have waived presentation of its evidence for its
repeated postponements of the hearing. After Atty. Alonte’s testimony and upon the PCGG’s manifestation that it
was no longer presenting any witness, the SANDIGANBAYAN 7 gave the PCGG twenty (20) days (from July 1,
1993) within which to submit its formal evidence in writing. SIPALAY and ALLIED were given the same period (20
days) from receipt of such written formal offer of evidence within which to file their formal comments and/or
objections thereto, and after which, the incident will be deemed submitted for resolution.

What the PCGG filed on July 7, 1993 was not a written formal offer of its evidence as directed by the
SANDIGANBAYAN, but a "Motion To Dismiss" the SIPALAY and ALLIED petitions. Admittedly, this motion to
dismiss came nearly seven (7) years after SIPALAY and ALLIED originally filed their petitions before this Court on
September 16, 1986 and August 26, 1986, respectively. The ground was SIPALAY’s and ALLIED’s alleged failure to
exhaust administrative remedies. The PCGG argued that SIPALAY and ALLIED should have first appealed the
sequestration orders t o the Office of the President before challenging them in court, invoking Sections 5 and 6 of
the PCGG Rules and Regulations. An "Oppositions" and a "Reply" were filed in relation to the motion.

At some earlier time (May 21, 1992), the PCGG filed a "Motion For The Consolidation Or Joint Trial" of SIPALAY’s
and ALLIED’s petitions (S.B. 0095 and S.B. 0100) with Civil Case 0005 — a complaint for "Reversion,
Reconveyance, Restitution, Accounting and Damages" dated July 17, 1987 likewise filed before the
SANDIGANBAYAN by the PCGG against Lucio Tan, Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos, and other defendants. 8 The
SANDIGANBAYAN formally denied this motion in an extended Resolution dated July 6, 1993. The PCGG filed a
"Motion for Reconsideration" thereof. This motion was deemed submitted for resolution when no opposition and
reply were filed. SIPALAY and ALLIED then filed a "Motion To Consider Cases Submitted For Decision", to which an
opposition and reply were filed.

The PCGG lost in these cases below. The SANDIGANBAYAN in its now-assailed August 23, 1993 Decision 9 voided
the orders issued against SIPALAY and ALLIED. The decretal portion reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"In S.B. No. 0095

"WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Court has no judicious recourse but to declare, as it hereby
declares, the writ of sequestration issued against petitioner Sipalay Trading Corporation’s shares of stock in
Maranaw Hotel and Resorts Corporation as deemed automatically lifted for respondent PCGG’s failure to implead
the petitioner within the period mandated under Section 26, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution. The same writ
is likewise declared null and void for having issued without sufficient evidentiary foundation — respondent PCGG
having failed to adduce and proffer that quantum of evidence necessary for its validity — without prejudice to the
issue of ill-gotten wealth being attributed to petitioner Sipalay Trading Corporation and/or defendants Lucio C.
Tan, Et. Al. being threshed out and litigated in Civil Case No. 0005.

"In S.B. No. 0100

"WHEREFORE, premises duly considered, the Court hereby declares the subject search and seizure order issued by
respondent PCGG directed against petitioner Allied Banking Corporation’s Valenzuela branch on August 13, 1986
as null and void ab initio for having been issued without due process and in contravention of the organic law then
in force, the Freedom Constitution, under which mantle, the Bill of Rights found in the 1973 Constitution was
amply protected and enforced. Consequently, all documents, records and other tangible objections (sic) seized
pursuant thereto are hereby ordered returned to petitioner Allied Banking Corporation through its duly authorized
representative, after proper inventory and accounting shall have been made within thirty (30) days from receipt
hereof.

SO ORDERED."cralaw virtua1aw library

The resolution of PCGG’s motion to dismiss and for reconsideration of the denial of its motion for consolidation or
joint trial, as well as SIPALAY’s and ALLIED’s motion to consider the cases submitted for decision, was
incorporated in the decision. And after its motion for reconsideration of the decision was denied in a Resolution
promulgated on October 7, 1993 10 , the PCGG brought the instant petition. A comment, reply, and rejoinder
were subsequently filed.
Issue/s:
The key issues, in query form, are:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(1) Was the SANDIGANBAYAN’s denial of the PCGG’s motion to dismiss proper?

(2) Should the SANDIGANBAYAN have disposed first such motion to dismiss rather than resolving it as part of the
judgment?

(3) Was the nullification of the sequestration order issued against SIPALAY and of the search and seizure order
issued against ALLIED correct?

(4) Were the sequestration and search and seizure orders deemed automatically lifted for failure to bring an action
in court against SIPALAY and ALLIED within the constitutionally prescribed period?
Ruling:
Hardly can it be disputed that a direct action in court without prior exhaustion of administrative remedies, when
required, is premature, warranting its dismissal on a motion to dismiss grounded on lack of cause of action. The
supporting cases cited by the PCGG in its petition indeed spell this out, to wit: "Pestanas v. Dyogi" 11 , Aboitiz v.
Coll. of Customs", 12 and Aquino-Sarmiento v. Morato." 13 And in the case of "Ocampo v. Buenaventura" 14
likewise cited by PCGG, the Court in essence approves of the filing of a motion to dismiss based upon failure to
state a cause of action at any stage of the proceedings.

"As a general rule, a motion to dismiss is interposed before the defendant pleads (Section 1, Rule 16, Rules of
Court). However, there is no rule or law prohibiting the defendant from filing a motion to dismiss after an answer
had been filed. On the contrary, Section 2 of Rule 9, expressly authorizes the filing of such motion at any stage of
the proceedings when it is based upon failure to state a cause of action . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library

These principles, at first impression, appear to favor the PCGG Sections 5 and 6 of the PCGG Rules and
Regulations indeed provide an administrative mechanism for persons or entitled contesting the sequestration
orders issued against them.

"Section 5. — Who may contest. — The person against whom a writ of sequestration or freeze or hold order is
directed may request the lifting thereof in writing, either personally or through counsel within five (5) days from
the receipt of the writ of order . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library

"Section 6. — Procedure for Review of writ of order — After due hearing or motu propio for good cause shown,
the Commission may lift the writ or order unconditionally or subject to such condition as it may deem necessary,
taking into consideration the evidence and circumstances of the case. The resolution of the Commission may be
appealed by the party concerned to the Office of the President of the Philippines within fifteen (15) days from
receipt thereof."cralaw virtua1aw library

Neither an initial request before the PCGG for the lifting of the sequestration orders nor an appeal to the Office of
the President was made by SIPALAY and ALLIED before they filed their respective petitions in court, albeit filed
beyond the period to answer.

However, the peculiarities of this case preclude the rightful application of the principles aforestated. The SIPALAY
and ALLIED petitions were both filed on the third quarter of 1986 (September 16 and August 26, respectively),
while the PCGG decided to file its motion to dismiss only in the middle of 1993 (July 7). Nearly seven (7) years
came to pass in between that so much has already transpired in the proceedings during the interregnum. SIPALAY
and ALLIED had rested their cases, and the PCGG had finished presenting all its witnesses, not to mention other
various motions and incidents already disposed of by the SANDIGANBAYAN, with special attention to the
numerous postponements granted the PCGG for presentation of its evidence which prevented an earlier
termination of the proceedings. The motion to dismiss came only at the penultimate stage of the proceedings
where the remaining task left for the PCGG was to file its written formal offer of evidence as required by the
SANDIGANBAYAN. This Court, in "Soto v. Janero" 15 has made it quite clear that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Failure to observe the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not affect the jurisdiction of the
Court. We have repeatedly stressed this in a long line of decisions. The only effect of non-compliance with this
rule is that it will deprive the complainant of a cause of action, which is a ground for a motion to dismiss. If not
invoked at the proper time, this ground is deemed waived and the court can take cognizance of the case and try
it." (Emphasis supplied)

The length if time the PCGG allowed ti drift away and its decision to file its motion to dismiss only at the
homestretch of the trial hardly qualify as "proper time." This factual scenario largely differs from the "Ocampo"
case relied upon by the PCGG. In that case and the case of "Community Investment & Finance Corp. v. Garcia" 16
cited therein, the motions to dismiss involved were filed just after the filing of the answer, and not at some
belated time nearing the end of the trial. The parties in those cases have not presented any testimonial or
documentary evidence yet, as the trial proper has not commenced, and neither does it appear that the movants
concerned took close to seven (7) years before filing their respective motions to dismiss. The PCGG therefore
cannot seek refuge in the "Ocampo" case to justify the marked delay in filing its motion to dismiss. Such tarried
maneuver made the PCGG guilty of estoppel by laches — the definition and effect of which this Court, speaking
through Mr. Justice Regalado, had the occasion to visit anew in the relatively recent case of "Olizon v. C.A." 17

"Laches has been defined as the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that
which by exercising due diligence could nor should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a
right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned
it or declined to assert it."cralaw virtua1aw library

With its undenied belated action, seven (7) years in the making at that, it is only proper to presume with
conclusiveness that the PCGG has abandoned or declined to assert what it bewailed as the SIPALAY and ALLIED
petitions’ lack of cause of action. More accurately, the PCGG should be deemed to have waived such perceived
defect in line with the "Soto" case, 18 for "proper time" cannot mean nor sanction an unexplained and
unreasonable length of time such as seven 97) years. The leniency extended by the Rules (Rule 9, Section 2,
Rules of Court) and by jurisprudence ("Ocampo case") in allowing a motion to dismiss based on lack of cause of
action filed after the answer or at any stage of the proceedings cannot be invoked to cover-up and validate the
onset of laches — or the failure to do something which should be done or to claim or enforce a right at a proper
time 19 which, in this case, was one of the PCGG’s follies. Indeed, in matters of timeliness, "indecent waste" is
just as reprehensible as "indecent haste" .

Another equally forceful reason warranting the denial of the PCGG’s motion to dismiss is that this case falls under
two recognized exceptions to the general rules of prior exhaustion of administrative remedies, and the
SANDIGANBAYAN’s brief but lucid disquisition on one exception merits this Court’s approval.

"Two. The rule on non-exhaustion of administrative (sic) remedies does not apply to petitioners’ case. This rule,
which is based on sound public policy and practical considerations, is not inflexible. It is subject to many
exceptions, to wit: (i) where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine; (ii) where the
challenged administrative act is patently illegal amounting to lack of jurisdiction; (iii) where there is unreasonable
delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant; and (iv) where the question involved is
purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice." 20

x x x

". . . there was no absolute necessity of appealing respondent PCGG’s resolution to the Office of the President, as
purportedly required by Section 6 of the PCGG Rules and Regulations, inasmuch as respondent PCGG seemed to
have exhibited indifference towards petitioners’ pleas for the lifting of the sequestration and search and seizure
orders. Official inaction or unreasonable delay, as heretofore intimated, is one of the exceptions to the rule on
non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, Hence, under the circumstance, petitioners may not be faulted for
seeking relief directly from the courts." 21

The other exception is the first in the enumeration, i.e., "where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking
the doctrine", consisting in the PCGG’s being guilty of estoppel by laches which has just been discussed in great
length. In answer therefore to the first key issue, this Court rules in the affirmative. The denial of the PCGG’s
motion to dismiss was in order.
In respect of the second key issue, the PCGG faults the SANDIGANBAYAN for incorporating in the judgment the
resolution of its motion to dismiss, arguing that said motion should have been resolved first and separately. That
would have been unnecessary and injudicious in the light of the "peculiarities" of this case where the motion was
filed only at the tail end of the trial and when the PCGG has visually presented all its evidence. At that stage, there
was in fact nothing left for the parties to do but to await the forthcoming judgment of the SANDIGANBAYAN, save
for the submission of the PCGG’s written formal offer of documentary evidence as directed by the court, which the
PCGG failed to do within the 20-day period given it because it filed the motion to dismiss instead. In this
connection, the PCGG’s contention that the 20-day period for the submission of its written formal offer of evidence
was suspended upon the filing of the motion to dismiss has no merit. The SANDIGANBAYAN’s observation on this
matter, as espoused by private respondents SIPALAY and ALLIED, is correct.

"The Court agrees with petitioners’ (SIPALAY and ALLIED) stance that the only period suspended by a motion to
dismiss is the period to file an answer (Section 4, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court) 22 and that where a period is to
be suspended by the filing of a pleading, the Rules of Court expressly provides for such suspension (Section 1[b],
Rules 12 of the Rules of Court, for instance, provides for the suspension of the period to file a responsive
pleadings if a motion for bill of particulars is filed). 23 Consequently, respondent’s (PCGG) filing of a motion to
dismiss, without seeking leave of court to stay or suspend the running of the period for filing its written formal
offer of evidence — as agreed upon and ordered in open court during the hearing on July 1, 1993 — could not
have the effect of suspending the period within which it should submit its formal offer of evidence in writing.
Without express leave of court, respondent (PCGG) could not improvidently assume that it has liberty to suspend
the running of the period agreed upon. Respondent (PCGG) should have been prudent enough to seek the
permission of this Court in respect of such matter to avert possible controversy arising therefrom. More
importantly, respondent (PCGG) should not have made a unilateral presumption of procedural norm." 24

x x x

"In view of the foregoing, the Court has no judicious recourse but to sustain petitioners’ (SIPALAY and ALLIED)
stance and declare, as it hereby declares, that respondent (PCGG) is deemed to have waived presentation of
further evidence and to have its evidence rested on the basis of the evidence on record."25cralaw:red

Besides, to insist on a prior and separate resolution of the PCGG’s motion to dismiss and the suspension of the 20-
day period for the filing of the written formal offer of its evidence would have needlessly prolonged further the
proceedings below — something that certainly does not, and will not, sit well with a "just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of every action and proceedings" envisioned by Section 2, Rule 1, of the Rules of Court. The same
reasoning likewise justifies dispensing with a prior determination of the PCGG’s "Motion For Reconsideration" of
the SANDIGANBAYAN’s Resolution denying consolidation or joint trial of the SIPALAY and ALLIED petitions with
Civil Case 0005, and private respondents’ (SIPALAY and ALLIED) "Motion To Consider Cases Submitted For
Decision." Thus, the second key issue should be resolved against the PCGG. The SANDIGANBAYAN was well-
justified in incorporating in its decision the resolution of the PCGG’s motion to dismiss, as well as its motion for
reconsideration of the denial of the motion for consolidation or joint trial and private respondents’ (SIPALAY and
ALLIED) motion to consider the cases submitted for decision.

Going now to the third key issue, the sequestration order and the search and seizure order against SIPALAY and
ALLIED, respectively, were nullified by the SANDIGANBAYAN on the ground of non-compliance with constitutional
requirements. Let us examine the SIPALAY and ALLIED cases separately.

The pertinent constitutional provision in focus in SIPALAY’s case is Section 26 of Article XVIII. It reads in
full:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Section 26. The authority to issue sequestration or freeze orders under Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25, 1986
in relation to the recovery of ill-gotten wealth shall remain operative for not more than eighteen months after the
ratification of this Constitution. However, in the national interest, as certified by the President, the Congress may
extend said period.

"A sequestration or freeze order shall be issued only showing of a prima facie case. The order and the list of the
sequestered or frozen properties shall forthwith be registered with the proper court. For orders issued before the
ratification of this Constitution, the corresponding judicial action or proceeding shall be filed within six months
from its ratification. For those issued after such ratification, the judicial action or proceeding shall be commenced
within six months from the issuance thereof.

"The sequestration or freeze order is deemed automatically lifted if no judicial action or proceeding is commenced
as herein provided."cralaw virtua1aw library

The SANDIGANBAYAN voided the sequestration order issued against SIPALAY "for lack of sufficient prima facie
factual foundation, . . ." 26 In so concluding, it only took into account the testimonies of PCGG witnesses Doromal,
Bautista and Alonte. It appears further that the SANDIGANBAYAN particularly zeroed in on Commissioner
Doromal’s testimony, considering its observations that: 1) "The testimony of former PCGG Commissioner Mary
Concepcion Bautista has no probative value and cannot be admitted in evidence in view of said witness’ untimely
demise prior to the completion of her cross-examination by petitioner’s counsel." (citing the cases of "Bachrach
Motor Co., Inc. v. CIR, Et. Al." [86 SCRA 27] and "Ortigas, Jr. v. Lufthansa German Airlines" [64 SCRA 610]). 27 ,
and 2) "Neither is Atty. Benjamin Alonte’s testimony relevant. His oral declarations, aside from being hearsay, do
not go into the substance of the cases." 28

By way of preface, no serious objection can be raised insofar as the SANDIGANBAYAN’s exclusive reliance on the
testimonies of the three (3) PCGG witnesses is concerned. The SANDIGANBAYAN had no other choice, for these
testimonies in fact constitute the entire evidence for the PCGG, inasmuch as no documentary evidence which
might have supported the testimonial evidence were offered by the PCGG below. The Rules of Court 29 and
jurisprudence 30 decree that "The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered." There is
no doubt that the testimonies of the PCGG witnesses were formally offered as evidence meriting due appreciation
by the SANDIGANBAYAN, since Section 35, Rule 132 of the Rules requires that the offer of testimonial evidence
"must be made at the time the witness is called to testify." With respect to documents, however, the same Section
35 (second paragraph) provides a different time for their offer, to wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Documentary and object evidence shall be offered after the presentation of a party’s testimonial evidence. Such
offer shall be done orally unless allowed by the court to be done in writing."cralaw virtua1aw library

The twenty (20)-day period from July 1, 1993, or until July 20, for the submission of a written formal offer of
evidence given by the SANDIGANBAYAN to the PCGG after the latter’s last witness (Atty. Alonte) has testified, was
intended precisely to accommodate any and all documentary evidence — even object evidence for that matter, the
PCGG would have wanted to offer. But, as previously discussed under the second key issue, the PCGG waived
such offer when it opted to file a motion to dismiss sans/in lieu of the written formal offer of evidence within such
given period that expired without interruption. Quite accurately therefore can it be said that due to its lapse in
procedure, the PCGG brought it upon itself if the existence or non-existence of "prima facie factual foundation"
had to be determined by the SANDIGANBAYAN only from what can be drawn from the PCGG’s testimonial
evidences — and from no other. And the Court, in reviewing that court’s finding that no prima facie evidence
exists to support the sequestration order, likewise has no other choice but to be similarly confined thereto.

But whose testimony or testimonies? The question becomes significant inasmuch as the SANDIGANBAYAN found
as inadmissible some of the PCGG witnesses’ testimonies.

Dr. Doromal’s testimony in reviewable as no attack on its admissibility was ever launched by the
SANDIGANBAYAN. With respect to Atty. Alonte’s testimony, the SANDIGANBAYAN declared it as hearsay which
finding the PCGG does not contest. The PCGG in fact now appears to do away with his testimony considering that
the PCGG neither quoted in, nor annexed to its petition, such testimony or any portion thereof. Atty. Alonte’s
testimony therefore can be dispensed with. However, the Court disagrees with the SANDIGANBAYAN’s ruling that
Commissioner Bautista’s supervening death in the course of her cross-examination rendered her entire testimony
without probative value and inadmissible. The SANDIGANBAYAN apparently clung to the principle enunciated in
the "Bachrach" and "Ortigas" cases, 31 to wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Oral testimony may be taken into account only when it is complete, that is, if the witness has been wholly cross-
examined by the adverse party or the right to cross-examine is lost wholly or in part thru the fault of such adverse
party. But when cross-examination is not and cannot be done or completed due to causes attributable to the party
offering the witness, the uncompleted testimony is thereby rendered incompetent.

"The right of a party to cross-examine the witness of his adversary is invaluable as it is inviolable in civil cases, no
less than the right of the accused in criminal cases. The express recognition of such right of the accused in the
Constitution does not render the right thereto of parties in civil cases less constitutionally based, for it is an
indispensable part of the due process guaranteed by the fundamental law. . . . Until such cross-examination has
been finished, the testimony of the witness cannot be considered as complete and may not, therefore, be allowed
to form part of the evidence to be considered by the court in deciding the case."cralaw virtua1aw library

But the "Bachrach" and "Ortigas" cases involved different factual features. In those cases, the witnesses
concerned whose testimonies were rightly stricken off the records either left for abroad or simply failed to appear
at the time they were supposed to be cross-examined by the adverse party. In short, the lack of cross-
examination by the opposing parties therein was occasioned by sudden or unexpired non-appearance, unlike in
this case where no less than the witness Bautista’s death prevented the completion of her cross-examination. The
controlling case here is "Fulgado v. C.A., et. al." 32 where the Court, in allowing the testimony of therein plaintiff
Ruperto Fulgado who died before his cross-examination, to remain in the record, ruled that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The wholesale exclusion of testimonies was too inflexible a solution to the procedural impasse because it
prejudiced the party whose only fault during the entire proceedings was to die before he could be cross-examined.
The prudent alternative should have been to admit the direct examination so far as the loss of cross-examination
could have been shown to be not in that instance a material loss. And more compellingly so in the instant case
where it has become evident that the adverse party was afforded a reasonable chance for cross-examination but
through his own fault failed to cross-examine the witness.

"Where death prevents cross-examination under such circumstances that no responsibility of any sort can be
ascribed to the plaintiff or his witness, it seems a harsh measure to strike out all that has been obtained in the
direct examination." (Emphasis supplied)

If testimony is inexpungible where the witness dies prior to any cross-examination, with more reason should
testimony partially cross-examined at the time of the witness’ death (as in Commissioner Bautista’s case) remain
intact. Thus, with the exception of Atty. Alonte’s testimony, Dr. Doromal’s and deceased Commissioner Bautista’s
testimonies, together with the evidence of SIPALAY and ALLIED, deserve a second scrutiny in determining the
correctness of the SANDIGANBAYAN ‘s finding of "lack of prima facie factual foundation" .

Here then are the highlights of Dr. Doromal’s and deceased Commissioner Bautista’s testimonies.
DR. DOROMAL

(DIRECT

"JUSTICE ESCAREAL:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Purpose please?

"ATTY. LEYNES:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

The testimony of this witness will cover the fact that at the time of sequestration there were issued (sic), there
were more prima facie evidence.

x x x

ATTY. LEYNES:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

q: Dr. Doromal, do you know the petitioner, Sipalay Trading Corporation?

a: yes. sir.

q: Why do you know Sipalay Trading Corporation?

a: It is one of those companies which we had investigated and eventually issued a Sequestration Order.

q: Do you you (sic) Maranao Hotels and Resorts?

a: Yes, sir.

q: Why do you know this Maranao Hotels and Resorts?

a: Again it is one of those we has sequestered because of its relation with Sipalay Trading Corporation?

q: Do you know the petitioner Allied Banking Corporation?

a: Yes, sir.

q: Why do you know it?

a: In the same manner that the material of documents we had, we ended up having a Sequestration Order on
Allied Banking Corporation.

x x x

"ATTY. LEYNES:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

q: Dr. Doromal at that time that the sequestration order which you have just recognized was issued and which
sequestration order was signed by you and Commissioner Ramon Diaz, what documents if any did you consider?

a: We considered documents which were gotten from Malacañang after the previous President had left. We had
also document (sic) which were gotten from the U.S. which were given by the States Department to the PCGG and
whatever had been gotten by our operation people.

q: If I show to you some of these documents will you be able to recognize them?

a: Yes, some of them I will be able to recognize.

q: I show to you a set of documents, what relation have these set of documents to those documents which you
have mentioned you and Commissioner Diaz or the Commission considered when the Sequestration Order dated
July 24, 1986 was issued?

Will you please go over these documents?

COURT INTERPRETER:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Witness is going over the voluminous documents.

WITNESS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

a: The documents that I have just slipped into here that would have to do with Sipalay Trading Corporation, this I
remember.
ATTY. LEYNES:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

q: The question is, what relation has this document to the document you considered in issuing the Sequestration
Order subject matter of this case?

a: This one which I had flipped into this had been considered by the Commission at the time of the sequestration.

ATTY. LEYNES:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

May I request that this document which the witness had identified, these documents consisted of seventy-six
documents and we have earlier inadvertently marked them as Exhibit A to WWW but if we can have them marked
accordingly as Exhibits 1, 2 to 76 accordingly.

x x x

ATTY. LEYNES:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

q: Doctor Doromal when you issued, when the Sequestration Order was issued in the judgment of the
Commission, what quantum of evidence do these documents amount to?

ATTY. MENDOZA:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Objection to the question, Your Honors (sic) please. First of all the witness did not identify all of those documents
as he was going over the folder of documents. He was picking up particular documents in the folder and it is a
question of law.

ATTY. LEYNES:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

We are proving that there is more prima facie evidence in the judgment when he issued the Sequestration Order.

What is the quantum of evidence do these documents represent?

JUSTICE ESCAREAL:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

For the purpose of issuance thereof?

ATTY. LEYNES:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Yes, Your Honor.

JUSTICE ESCAREAL:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

With that qualification are you willing to accept that qualification?

ATTY. LEYNES:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Yes, your Honor.

JUSTICE ESCAREAL:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Witness may answer:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

WITNESS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

a: These documents are more than just prima facie evidence which is the only thing required of us before issuing
the Sequestration Order.

In fact over and above what is needed there are plenty of evidence of these documents which movant amply
justifies our issuing of the Sequestration Order in the sense that there is just no reason no question that there is a
preponderance of evidence for the sequestration.

ATTY. LEYNES:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

That would be all, Your Honor.

JUSTICE ESCAREAL:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

How about this 0095?

ATTY. LEYNES:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

In both cases, Your Honor.

JUSTICE ESCAREAL:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Does the document include any reference to the Allied Banking Corporation?

ATTY. LEYNES:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Yes, Your Honor, but the Sequestration Order was issued by Commissioner Diaz and Mary Con Bautista.

JUSTICE ESCAREAL:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

With respect to?

ATTY. LEYNES:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Allied Banking Corporation.

May I ask additional questions, Your Honor.

JUSTICE ESCAREAL:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Please proceed.

ATTY. LEYNES:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

q: Dr. Doromal what if any is your participation in the issuance of the Sequestration Order or the Search and
Seizure Order against Allied Banking Corporation?

a: All these Sequestration Orders were brought by the Commission in (sic) banc and we are present with the
documents that had been available.

We listen to them and the action is made by the Commission and in the issuance of the Sequestration Order.
Then whoever is the Commissioner most involved in that particular company thus signs or do sign the
Sequestration Order.

In this particular case that you mentioned about Allied Banking Corporation, the two other Commissioners who
were there ahead of me were the ones who signed because they are most familiar with the Allied Banking
Corporation.

x x x

ATTY. LEYNES:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

q: Specifically what is your participation in the issuance of the sequestration personally of Allied Banking
Corporation?

a: I am one of the most who participated in the discussion when I became a member and that was April in 1986.

x x x

ATTY. LEYNES:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

q: when deliberated upon what documents were considered?

x x x

WITNESS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

a: First of all this Search and Seizure Order was issued this was during the time that I was already a member of
the PCGG as Commissioner and when this is brought before the group before the Commission there are the
attached documents that backed up this Search and Seizure Order and for that matter other items that have to do
with the sequestration or something similar to that so what I am saying the materials that go with this would
indicate the reason for the Search and Seizure Order similar to the papers that are needed when we issued the
Sequestration Order.

ATTY. LEYNES:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

q: I will show you again this Exhibit 1, these Exhibits 1 to 76 will you please go over the same and state before
this Honorable court what relation have these documents to the documents which you mentioned were considered
in the deliberation for the issuance of Search and Seizure Order against Allied Banking Corporation?

x x x

WITNESS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

a: I am looking at some of these documents that have to do with the Allied Banking Corporation and I recognize
some of these and the others i do not see because some of these are materials which were gathered by other
groups and their attachments but the others such as this letter, this I remember.

x x x
ATTY. LEYNES:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

q: Dr. Doromal in your recollection what is the reason or the finding of the PCGG why the Sequestration Order was
issued against Sipalay Trading Corporation or Maranao Hotels and Resorts?

WITNESS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

a: the reason was that in the Maranao Corporation which was the company which was later on acquired by Sipalay
Trading Corporation which was the holding company it was our judgment that there are enough indications there
that these were acquired because of closeness to the president and that this was really in fact one of those that
had been gotten from DBP, Development Bank of the Philippines with the idea being that it was, it could be gotten
through the help of the Office of the President and the President himself.

x x x

ATTY. LEYNES:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

q: What if any is the finding of PCGG regarding the ownership of Sipalay Trading Corporation?

a: Sipalay Trading Corporation was holding company and owner. The people in the ownership is not only Lucio
Tan but looks like relatives of Mr. Tan.

q: In your recollection Doctor Doromal, what is the finding or reason of companies why it issued the Search and
Issue (sic) Order against Allied Banking Corporation?

WITNESS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

a: The Commission wanted to find out documents that would indicate or prove the relationship between President
Marcos and Lucio Tan and one way to do that is to have access to the papers to the documents that were in the
Allied Banking Corporation.

ATTY. LEYNES:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

That would be all, Your Honor." 33

MARY CONCEPCION BAUTISTA

(DIRECT)

"JUSTICE ESCAREAL:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Purpose, please.

ATTY. LEYNES:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

The testimony of the witness is offered for the purpose of proving that when the Presidential Commission on Good
Government issued the search and seizure order dated August 13, 1988, the Commission considered ample
evidence in the issuance thereof and also to prove that defendant Lucio Tan in concert with defendants Ferdinand
Marcos and Imelda Marcos acquired General Bank and Trust Company in violation of existing rules and for
remedial consideration and that later on Genbank was converted by defendant Lucio Tan and defendants
Ferdinand Marcos owned beneficially.
x x x

ATTY. LEYNES:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

q: Madam Witness, what basis or document, if any did the commission consider when it issued the search and
seizure order?

a: We had several documents in our possession at that time, one of the documents was a list which have been
taken from the office of Imee M. Araneta om EDSA which contained a listing of the holdings of the late President
Marcos in several corporations and the extent of his participation on this corporations. And the other, in addition
to what have been given by certain informants, another was an affidavit of Mr. Gapud which he had issued
wherein he had mentioned also the participation of Mr. Marcos in Allied Banking, I think that affidavit is here and
also the fact that deposits were made from Allied Banking in the accounts of Mr. Marcos in the Security Bank.

x x x

q: Madam Witness, you mentioned certain documents on the basis of which the PCGG issued the search and
seizure order against Allied Banking Corporation, I am showing to you a folder containing Exhibit 1 to 18, will you
please go over this document and state which of these documents were considered by the Commission when it
issued the search and seizure order.

a: These documents marked Exhibits 1 which is a list, which is a letter, unfortunately I don’t see page two of this
but this is the document which we have addressed principally, as far as we know addressed to the late President
Marcos and together with this we have Exhibit 2, another letter dated March 28, 1977 addressed to the Deputy
Governor Mr. Briñas about the intention to purchase General Bank and Trust Company and subsequently
documents Exhibit 3 signed by Carlota Valenzuela, Special Assistant to the Governor, Exhibit 4 another document
marked Confidential signed by Mr. Barin reporting on the action taken regarding Genbank.

x x x

WITNESS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

And another document which has been marked as Exhibit 4, 5, 6, 7, these documents refers to the acquisition by
Lucio Tan of the Genbank for the amount of P500,000.00, the commission then considered that plus the fact that
the acquisition and transfer of Genbank to the Lucio Tan group was done in a short time without proper
observance of public bidding which the Commission then considered to be irregular, so this is one of the
documents we look at. Mr. Tan in the acquisition of Genbank had been given a favored treatment.

x x x

WITNESS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

This document dated May 17, 1989 under letterhead Allied Banking Corporation addressed to His Excellency
President Marcos, President and Prime Minister signed by Lucio Tan. In addition we have a document which has
already been marked as Exhibit 12 which is the affidavit of Mr. Rolando Gapud dated January 14, this is series of
1987, in this document Mr. Gapus (sic) has also made an enumeration of deposits made by certain individuals
from certain banks among them Allied Banking Corporation for the account of Mr. Marcos in the Security Bank.

x x x
WITNESS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Exhibits 13 and 13-a which is listings (sic) of deposits made and placements in the bank, in the bank account of
Mr. Marcos. In addition, we have the documents marked up to Exhibits 13-g, h, l, all showing checks or amounts
received from Allied Bank deposited in the Security Bank and Trust Company. Exhibits up to Exhibit 13-k, l, m, p,
t, v, 2, y and x." 34

x x x

"ATTY. LEYNES:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

q; Chairman Bautista, during the last hearing before it was adjourned we were going over this folder containing
Exhibits 1 to 80 and we are indicating which of these exhibits were considered by the PCGG when it issued the
Search and Seizure Order against Allied Banking Corporation;

Will you please go over again this folder and indicate to this Exhibit to whether what was considered by the
Presidential Commission on Good Government when it issued the Search and Seizure Order against Allied Banking
Corporation.

a: I recall that we had already pointed to the document marked Exhibit 7 in red which is a letter of Lucio Tan to
the Governor Licaros of the Central Bank and the one marked in red as Exhibit 8 which is the letter to Mr. Gregorio
Licaros signed by T.O. Domingo, the Allied Banking Report which is marked as Exhibit 9.

x x x

q: Apart from these exhibits which you have just mentioned what other evidence if any did the Commission
consider?

a: There were for instance the verbal information given to us by individuals as well as the information given to us
by Mr. Rolando Gaffud verbally.

x x x

ATTY. LEYNES:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

q: What is the finding based on these Exhibits which you mentioned and the information given by Rolando Gaffud
which he later on formalized in an affidavit.

What finding if any with regards to the Allied Banking Corporation did the Commission arrive that led to the
issuance of the Search and Seizure (sic) Order?

a: The Commission after reviewing al (sic) of these exhibits as with all the information that had come into its
possession had come to the conclusion that indeed Mr. Lucio Tan was a close associate of the late President
Marcos and they were involved in business associates and transactions and that the late President had substantial
holdings in this corporation in which Lucio Tan was also involved and therefore the commission would have to act
in accordance to its powers of the sequestration granted under Executive Order No. 1.

x x x

ATTY. LEYNES:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

q: To what corporation do you refer to when you mentioned Mr. Marcos has equity in the corporation owned by
Lucio Tan?

a: Among them is precisely Allied Banking Corporation, Asia Brewery and Sipalay Trading Corporation. I mean
these are some of the corporations.

q: Chairman Bautista, what is the legal basis or authority by the commission of the Presidential Commission on
Good Government when it issued the Search and Seizure Order against the Allied Banking Corporation?

a: The Commission under Executive Order No. 1, the President has been given specifically the power to sequester
business and property owned by the late President Marcos, Mrs. Marcos, relatives and closed business associates
and to take possession or take over this business and assets in order to prevent dissipation of these assets or
removal of these assets and concealment of these assets and also to take over such documents as the
Commission may consider necessary in order that these documents may be preserved for the purpose of the filing
of the case in order to prosecute or conduct civil action against President Marcos, Mrs. Marcos, relatives and other
close business associates that is very clearly stated in Executive Order No. 1.

x x x

ATTY. LEYNES:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

0100, Your Honor.

q: Chairman Bautista, the Search and seizure Order issued by PCGG dated August 13, 1986 against Allied Banking
Corporation reads in pertinent part and I quote:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"You are hereby directed to submit for Search and Seizure all bank documents in the above mentioned premises
which our representatives may find necessary and relevant to the investigation conducted by the
Commission."cralaw virtua1aw library

a: Well I think we clearly specify there that we are to seize the bank documents.

It is specifically stated that the Search and Seizure Order refers to bank documents precisely because of the
information that had been given to us that these documents could be found in the particular place.

x x x

ATTY. LEYNES:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

q: Now, Chairman Bautista do you know what happened after the Search and Seizure Order against Allied Banking
Corporation?

WITNESS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

a: We were not able to seize any document precisely because of the objection raised and so what happened is
that the parties agreed to just seal this place so that neither of the parties would be able to remove any
documents.

ATTY. LEYNES:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

That will be all, Your Honor." 35

Dr. Doromal was basically preoccupied with identifying and referring to documents purportedly coming from
Malacañang, the US State Department and other sources. What his testimony essentially yields is the fact that the
prima facie evidence/s supporting the sequestration order issued against SIPALAY is/are buried and ascertainable
in these documents. But, to repeat, any reference thereto is unwarranted since there was no offer thereof in
evidence. And it must be emphasized at this point that mere identification of documents and the mankind thereof
as exhibits do not confer any evidentiary weight on documents not formally offered. In "People v. Santito, Jr." 36 ,
the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Regalado once again, thus said that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Even assuming that the same had been identified in court, it would have no evidentiary value. Identification of
documentary evidence must be distinguished from its formal offer as an exhibit. The first is done in the course of
the trial and is accompanied by the marking of the evidence as an exhibit. The second is done only when the party
rests its case and not before. The mere fact that a particular document is identified and marked as an exhibit does
not mean it will be or has been offered as part of the evidence of the party. The party may decide to formally
offer it if it believes this will advance its cause, and then again it may decide not to do so at all." (Emphasis
supplied.)

Verily then, without the PCGG documents having been formally offered, however decisive and compelling they
may otherwise be, it is as if a prima facie case does not exist at all. That makes Dr. Doromal’s testimony by and in
itself worthless. the same can be said of deceased Commissioner Bautista as well who was similarly immersed in
the mechanical process of identification. In fact, her testimony and the documents she referred to were totally
unrelated to the sequestration order issued against SIPALAY as they chiefly dwelt on the search and seizure order
issued against ALLIED. Being immaterial, nothing therefrom can shore up a prima facie case against SIPALAY. And
it may well be clarified at this juncture that it is the immateriality of deceased Commissioner Bautista’s testimony
that justified the SANDIGANBAYAN into paying particular attention to Dr. Doromal’s testimony in its search for
prima facie evidence — not the inadmissibility of her testimony arising from her death during cross-examination
which we have heretofore adjudged to be a faulty observation. The SANDIGANBAYAN was therefore correct in
saying that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"No direct connection or relationship has been established, at least, as far as the evidence extant on the records
of these cases are concerned, between petitioner Sipalay Trading’s acquisition and ownership of the sequestered
shares of stock and Lucio C. Tan’s alleged fraudulent business maneuverings and connivance with the late
President Ferdinand E. Marcos. These oral testimonies are practically dependent on the existence of official
records of respondent PCGG which, due to the latter’s own doing, have not been formally offered. Hence, these
oral testimonies have no leg to stand on." 37

x x x

"Without credible and competent documentary evidence to fortify the witnesses’ bare allegations as aforestated, it
is difficult to sustain a finding of prima facie case in the proceedings — especially taking into account the fact that
petitioner Sipalay Trading is presumed by law to possess a separate and distinct judicial personality from its
principal stockholders, i.e., Lucio Tan, et. al. . . ." 38

The difficulty is easier to grasp when reckoned with the various but uniform definitions of prima facie
case/evidence aside from that given by the SANDIGANBAYAN, to wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Prima facie evidence has been defined as evidence which, standing alone unexplained or uncontroverted, is
sufficient to maintain the proposition affirmed. It is such as, in judgment of law, is sufficient to establish the fact,
and if not rebutted, remains sufficient for that purpose." 39

x x x

"It is evidence which suffices for the proof of a particular fact until contradicted and overcome by other evidence."
40
x x x

It is evidence which, standing alone and unexplained, would maintain the proposition and warrant the conclusion
to support which it is introduced." 41

x x x

Prima facie case is such as will suffice until contradicted and overcome by other evidence." 42

x x x

"A prima facie case is one which is apparently established by evidence adduced by plaintiff in support of his case
up to the time such evidence stands unexplained and uncontradicted." 43

x x x

"A prima facie case is one in which the evidence in favor of a proposition is sufficient to support a finding in its
favor, if all the evidence to the contrary is disregarded." 44

x x x

"A litigating party is said to have a prima facie case when the evidence in his favor is sufficiently strong for his
opponent to be called on to answer it. A prima facie case, then, is one which is established by sufficient evidence,
and can be overthrown only be rebutting evidence adduced on the other side." 45

From whatever definition we look at it, Dr. Doromal’s and deceased Commissioner Bautista’s testimonies are by no
means sufficiently strong evidence to make up a prima facie case for the PCGG. What gave them colorable weight
were the unoffered documents. But as things stand in the absence of such documentary evidence, they are empty
and crumble on their own even without counter-explanation or contradiction, as anything that may tend to prove
the proposition that the SIPALAY shares in Maranaw Hotels and Resort Corporation were/are ill-gotten is just
nowhere extractable from these testimonies by and in themselves. These declarations unfortunately fail to hurdle
judicial inspection, proceeding from the principle that a party’s evidence is "of necessity subject to a rigid scrutiny"
when he possesses, but does not produce, documentary evidence which would be far more satisfactory. 46 We
are thus vividly and fittingly reminded of the proverbial words of Mr. Justice Story that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Naked statements must be entitled to little weight when the parties hold better evidence behind the scenes" 47
and

"A party’s nonproduction of a document which courts almost invariably expect will be produced ‘unavoidably
throws a suspicion over the cause." 48

Corollary to this is that the presumption is always and inevitably against a litigant who fails to furnish evidence
within his reach, and it is the stronger when the documents, writings, etc. would be conclusive in establishing his
case. 49 This is indeed an occasion to emphasize once again that the superiority of written evidence, compared
with oral, is so pronounced, obvious and well known, that in most cases the deliberate and inexcusable
withholding of the written evidence, and effort to secure favorable consideration of oral testimony in the place of
it, is an affront to the intelligence of the court. 50

At best, the bare testimonies of Dr. Doromal and deceased Commissioner Bautista, in the eyes of the Court, yield
nothing but mere uncorroborated speculations or suspicions insofar as the PCGG attempted to establish the "prima
facie factual foundation" that would hold up the sequestration order against SIPALAY. But a fact cannot be found
by mere surmise or conjecture. 51 Suspicion cannot give probative force to testimony which in itself is insufficient
to establish or to justify an inference of a particular fact, 52 for "the sea of suspicion has no shore, and the court
that embarks upon it is without rudder or compass." 53 And as it is not the habit of any courts of justice to yield
themselves up in matters of right to mere conjectures and possibilities, 54 courts are not permitted to render
verdicts or judgments upon guesses or surmises. 55

Turning now to the evidence for SIPALAY and ALLIED, it unveiled no "prima facie factual foundation" either.
Former PCGG secretary and lone witness Atty. Hontiveros, in response to two (2) subpoenas duces tecum 56
requested by counsel for both corporations 57 which required him to bring to the court "all records, including
minutes of meeting of the PCGG, its resolutions, together with all supporting evidence or documents of whatever
nature" in connection with the issuance of the sequestration order against SIPALAY and the search and seizure
order against ALLIED, could only produce the following excerpts of minutes of two (2) PCGG meetings held on
March 13 and March 12, 1986:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"6. Commissioner Daza also informed the Commissioner that upon the instructions of Minister Salonga, any
Commissioner can file or issue a sequestral order provided the order has the conformity verbal or written of
another Commissioner. These could include any other order or seizure." 58

x x x

"6. Commissioner Pedro L. Yap before his departure on a mission, reported the work he had accomplished during
the past days. These included numerous ‘freeze’ and ‘sequestration’ orders. He asked that the list of orders should
not be particularized in the minutes." 59

after admittedly spending no less than two (2) months tracing documents to bring to court:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"ATTY. MENDOZA:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

x x x

Q: I am asking you how many months did it take looking for records?

A: I think more than two months, sir.

Q: And these were the records you found, marked Exhibits A and B?

A: Yes, sir, during the time I devoted to them." 60

x x x

"ATTY. MENDOZA:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

x x x

Q: But nonetheless, for two months you tried looking for records corresponding to the subpoena?

A: Yes, sir." 61
Other than being informative of PCGG internal procedure on how and by whom sequestration orders in general
are issued and of the "accomplishments" of one of its then commissioners, the excerpts are absolutely unreflective
of any deliberation by PCGG commissioners particularly concerning the sequestration order against SIPALAY, much
less the factual basis for its issuance. They do not even make the slightest allusion to SIPALAY, or ALLIED. That
Atty. Hontiveros devoted two (2) months for document-searching only to come up with minutes that are as barren
as the testimonial evidences of the PCGG validates indeed the claim of respondent corporations which may well
sum-up the PCGG’s case specifically against SIPALAY, that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The only logical conclusion that may be reached by Atty. Hontiveros’ inability to produce PCGG records in regard
respondent Sipalay is that there was no evidence before the PCGG or any of its Commissioners which would tend
to establish that the shares of stock in Maranaw registered in the name of private respondent Sipalay are ill-
gotten." 62 There being no evidence, not even a prima facie one, there was therefore no valid sequestration of
the SIPALAY shares in the Maranaw Hotels and Resort Corporation. We hereby re-emphasize the indispensability
of prima facie evidence by adverting to the Court’s pronouncement in "Republic v. Sandiganbayan", 63 to
wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"IV. The issue on the existence of prima facie evidence in support of the issuance of a sequestration order has
likewise been laid to rest in the BASECO case, in this wise:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

‘8. Requisites for Validity

What is indispensable is that, again as in the case of attachment and receivership, there exist a prima facie factual
foundation, at least, for the sequestration, freeze or takeover order, and adequate and fair opportunity to contest
it and endeavor to cause its negation or nullification.

Both were assured under the executive orders in question and the rules and regulations promulgated by the
PCGG.

a. Prima Facie Evidence as Basis for Orders

Executive Order No. 14 enjoins that there be ‘due regard to the requirements of fairness and due process.’
Executive Order No. 2 declares that with respect to claims on allegedly ‘ill-gotten’ assets and properties, ‘it is the
position of the new democratic government that President Marcos . . . (and other parties affected) be afforded fair
opportunity to contest these claims before appropriate Philippine authorities.’ Section 7 of the Commission’s Rules
and Regulations provides that sequestration or freeze (and takeover) orders issue upon the authority of at least
two commissioners, based on the affirmation or complaint of an interested party, or motu propio when the
Commission has reasonable grounds to believe that the issuance thereof is warranted. A similar requirement is
now found in Section 26, Art. XVIII of the 1987 Constitution, which requires that a ‘sequestration or freeze order
shall be issued only upon showing of a prima facie case.’ (Emphasis in the original text.)"

Notably the PCGG, in what apparently appears to be a desperate attempt to slither its way out of its failure to
show a prima facie case, would now argue that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . it is worth-mentioning the fact that the FREEDOM CONSTITUTION under which Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14
and 14-A had been issued, categorically authorized the issuance of writs of sequestration without requiring any
finding of prima facie evidence to support such issuance. Nevertheless the PCGG saw to it that before any writ of
sequestration was issued, the Commissioners carefully examined and weighed the evidence on hand that would
justify such issuance of sequestration order. The FREEDOM CONSTITUTION provides under Article II, Section 1,
the following:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

‘SECTION 1. Until a legislature is elected and convened under a New Constitution, the President shall continue to
exercise legislative power.

‘The President shall give priority to measures to achieve the mandate of the people to:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
a) . . .

b) . . .

c) . . . and

d) Recover ill-gotten properties amassed by the leaders and supporters of the previous regime and protect the
interest of the people through orders of sequestration or freezing of assets or accounts.

"It is only in the 1987 Constitution that the existence or finding of prima facie case was required before a
sequestration order could be issued. The writ of sequestration in question was issued long before the ratification
of the 1987 Constitution; hence, it was covered by the Freedom Constitution which did not require the prior
finding of prima facie evidence." 64

This argument is clearly without merit in the face of this Court’s pronouncement in the "Baseco" case, 65
that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Parenthetically, even if the requirement for a prima facie showing of ‘ill-gotten wealth’ were not expressly
imposed by some rule or regulation as a condition to warrant the sequestration or freezing of property
contemplated in the executive orders in question, it would nevertheless be exigible in this jurisdiction in which the
Rule of Law prevails and official acts which are devoid of rational basis in fact or law, or are whimsically and
capricious, are condemned and struck down."cralaw virtua1aw library

Going now to the case of ALLIED, the principal objection raised regarding the order issued against it is that the
PCGG made use of an unauthorized and constitutionally defective search warrant to effect the sequestration. The
SANDIGANBAYAN saw and declared it as such. We agree.

There can be no doubt that the order which the PCGG issued against ALLIED typifies a search warrant (full text of
which appears in the early part of this decision). Not only is the order captioned as SEARCH AND SEIZURE
ORDER, the body thereof clearly enjoined the branch manager to make available to the PCGG team all bank
documents precisely for the purpose. It is unauthorized because nowhere in the same Executive Order No. 1 66
(particularly Section 3) invoked by the PCGG to justify the search and seizure order was the PCGG expressly
empowered to issue such specie of a process in pursuant of its mandated purpose of recovering
ill-gotten/unexplained wealth. Section 3 of E.O. No. 1 enumerates the following powers of the
PCGG:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SECTION 3. — The Commission shall have the power and authority:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(a) To conduct investigation as may be necessary in order to accomplish and carry out the purposes of this order.

(b) To sequester or place or cause to be placed under its control or possession any building or office wherein any
ill-gotten wealth or properties may be found, and any records pertaining thereto, in order to prevent their
destruction, concealment or disappearance which would frustrate or hamper the investigation or otherwise
prevent the Commission from accomplishing its task.

(c) To provisionally take over in the public interest or to prevent its disposal or dissipation, business enterprises
and properties taken over by the government of the Marcos administration or by entities or persons close to
former President Marcos, until the transactions leading to such acquisition by the latter can be disposed of by the
appropriate authorities.

(d) To enjoin or restrain any actual or threatened commission of acts by any person or entity that may render
moot and academic, or frustrate, or otherwise make ineffectual the efforts of the Commission to carry out its tasks
under this order.

(e) To administer oaths, and issue subpoenas requiring the attendance and testimony of witnesses and/or the
production of such books, papers, contracts, records, statement of accounts and other documents as may be
material to the investigation conducted by the Commission.

(f) To hold any person in direct or indirect contempt and impose the appropriate penalties, following the same
procedures and penalties provided in the Rules of Court.

(g) To seek and secure the assistance of any office agency or instrumentality of the government.

(h) To promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this order."cralaw
virtua1aw library

The Court in "Cojuangco, Jr. v. PCGG" 67 simplified these powers in this wise:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"From the foregoing provisions of law, it is clear that the PCGG has the following powers and authority:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library

1. To conduct an investigation including the preliminary investigation and prosecution of the ill-gotten wealth
cases of former President Marcos, relatives and associates, and graft and corruption cases assigned by the
President to it;

2. Issue sequestration orders in relation to property claimed to be ill-gotten;

3. Issue ‘freeze orders’ prohibiting persons in possession of property alleged to be ill-gotten from transferring or
otherwise disposing of the same;

4. Issue provisional takeover orders of the said property;

5. Administer oaths and issue subpoenas in the conduct of investigation;

6. Hold any person in direct or indirect contempt and impose the appropriate penalties as provided by the
rules."cralaw virtua1aw library

Neither can it be validly argued by the PCGG that its authority to issue a search and seizure order possessing the
essential features of a search warrant is derivable from subparagraphs (b) and (c) of Section 3 of E.O. No. 1 or
from No. 4 of the simplified enumeration in the "Cojuangco" case, by implication. "Baseco" has clarified once and
for all the essential nature of the provisional measures of sequestration, freeze orders and provisional takeover
that the PCGG is explicitly equipped with:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"As thus described, sequestration, freezing and provisional takeover are akin to the provisional remedy of
preliminary attachment, or receivership. By attachment, a sheriff seizes property of a defendant in a civil suit so
that it may stand as security for the satisfaction of any judgment that may be obtained, and not disposed of, or
dissipated, or lost intentionally or otherwise, pending the action. By receivership, property, real or personal, which
is subject of litigation, is placed in the possession and control of a receiver appointed by the Court, who shall
conserve it pending final determination of the title or right or possession over it. All these remedies-sequestration,
freezing, provisional takeover, attachment and receivership-are provisional, temporary, designed for particular
exigencies, attended by no character or permanency or finality, and always subject to the control of the issuing
court or agency."cralaw virtua1aw library

Attachment and receivership are legal processes purely conservatory in character, not involving an active and
drastic intrusion into and confiscation of properties as what a search warrant (or search and seizure order)
necessarily entails. All processes that the PCGG is allowed to issue in discharging the duty for which it was
created, therefore, ought to be viewed strictly in this context. And this finds further support in "Philippine Coconut
Producers Federation, Inc. [COCOFED] v. PCGG" 68 where the Court stressed anew that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The question of the validity of PCGG sequestration and freeze orders as provisional measures to collect and
conserve the assets believed to be ill-gotten wealth has been laid to rest in BASECO v. PCGG (150 SCRA 181)
where this Court held that such orders are not confiscatory but only preservative in character, not designed to
effect a confiscation of, but only to conserve properties believed to be ill-gotten wealth of the ex-president, his
family and associates, and to prevent their concealment dissipation, or transfer, pending the determination of their
true ownership." (Emphasis supplied)

Being in fact a search warrant, the SEARCH AND SEIZURE ORDER cannot escape, and must pass, the acid test for
validity as provided by the prevailing constitution under which it was issued — the FREEDOM CONSTITUTION
which adopted verbatim the provision of the 1973 Constitution (Section 3, Article IV) relating to search warrants,
to wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall not be violated, and no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as
may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or things to be seized."cralaw
virtua1aw library

Supporting jurisprudence thus outlined the following requisites for a search warrant’s validity, the absence of even
one will cause its downright nullification:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(1) it must be issued upon probable cause;

(2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or any other person;

(3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or affirmation, the complainant
and such witnesses as the latter may produce; and

(4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized. 69

In addition to its unauthorized issuance (as just discussed), the SEARCH AND SEIZURE ORDER is so
constitutionally defective.

Firstly, as it suffered from the same inherent weakness or emptiness as that which marred dr. Doromal’s
testimony (as earlier discussed extensively), deceased Commissioner Bautista’s in-court declarations did not in any
way establish probable cause which has been consistently defined as:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed, and that objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be
searched. This probable cause must be shown to be within the personal knowledge of the complainant or the
witnesses he may produce and not based on mere hearsay." 70

This is so because, as what her testimony irresistibly suggested, the purported facts and circumstances supporting
the order are exclusively traceable from documents she identified but which were never formally offered in
evidence in the SANDIGANBAYAN. She never testified to any fact of her own personal knowledge to bolster the
PCGG’s claim that ALLIED was in possession and control of illegally-amassed wealth by Lucio Tan. Her testimony,
therefore, is plain hearsay, self-serving, or uncorroborated suspicion. And the rule is that search warrants are not
issued on loose, vague or doubtful basis of fact, nor on mere suspicion or belief. 71

Secondly, the PCGG has no authority to issue the order in the first place. Only a "judge" and "such other
responsible officer as may be authorized by law" were empowered by the FREEDOM CONSTITUTION to do so, and
the PCGG is neither. It is not a judge, as clarified by the Court in "Baseco", to wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"It should also by now be reasonably evident from what has thus far been said that the PCGG is not, and was
never intended to act as, judge. Its general function is to conduct investigations in order to collect evidence
establishing instances of ‘ill-gotten wealth’; issue sequestration, and such orders as may be warranted by the
evidence thus collected and as may be necessary to preserve and conserve the assets of which it takes custody
and control and prevent their disappearance, loss or dissipation; and eventually file and prosecute in the proper
court of competent jurisdiction all cases investigated by it as may be warranted by its findings. It does not try and
decide, or hear and determine, or adjudicate with any character of finality or compulsion, cases involving the
essential issue of whether or not property should be forfeited and transferred to the State because ‘ill-gotten’
within the meaning of the Constitution and the executive orders. This function is reserved to the designated court,
in this case, the Sandiganbayan. There can therefore be no serious regard accorded to the accusation, leveled by
BASECO, that the PCGG plays the perfidious role of prosecutor and judge at the same time." (Emphasis supplied.)

And the PCGG cannot be considered as "such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law" because
Executive Order No. 1, to reiterate, did not expressly nor impliedly grant the PCGG the power to issue search
warrants/orders.

Thirdly, the order does not provide a specification of the documents sought to be searched/seized from ALLIED.
The body thereof, to quote again, reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"By virtue of the powers vested in the Commission by the President of the Republic of the Philippines, you are
hereby directed to submit for search and seizure all bank documents in the aforementioned premises which our
representative may find necessary and relevant to the investigation being conducted by this Commission.

x x x"

It expressly refers to "all bank documents" which is too all-embracing, the obvious intent of which is to subject
virtually all records pertaining to all business transactions of ALLIED of whatever nature, to search and seizure.
Such tenor of a seizure warrant is not a particular description, 72 thus contravening the explicit command of the
Constitution that there be a particular description of things to be seized. 73 Being a general warrant, the SEARCH
AND SEIZURE ORDER is constitutionally objectionable 74 and to be more precise, void for lack of particularity. 75
We end our discussion on this matter with the Court’s admonition in "People v. Veloso." 76

"A search warrant must conform strictly to the requirements of the constitutional and statutory provisions under
which it was issued. Otherwise, it is void. The proceedings upon search warrants, it has rightly been held, must be
absolutely legal, ‘for there is not a description of process known to the law, the execution of which is more
distressing to the citizen. Perhaps there is none which excites such intense feeling in consequence of its
humiliating and degrading effect.’ The warrant will always be construed strictly without, however, going the full
length of requiring technical accuracy. No presumptions of regularity are to be invoked in aid of the process when
an officer undertakes to justify under it."cralaw virtua1aw library

The third key issue should therefore be answered in the affirmative, i.e., the nullification of the sequestration and
search and seizure orders was in order.

The last key issue involves another constitutional imperative — i.e., that the corresponding suit or suits against a
sequestered entity of entities should be brought in the proper court, the Sandiganbayan to be precise, 77 within
the prescribed period — failure of which automatically lifts the sequestration order or orders issued. Up for
determination is whether under the factual features of the case, there was compliance with this rule as professed
by the PCGG, or non-observance thereof, as argued and declared by respondent corporations and the
SANDIGANBAYAN, respectively. Stress should be given to the fact that the Court’s resolution of this crucial issue
would particularly apply to SIPALAY inasmuch as it involves a sequestration order — not to ALLIED against whom
was issued a search and seizure order that we have just heretofore declared as void. Nonetheless, for simplicity’s
sake, such resolution can be made to cover ALLIED’s case as well. We thus forego with the distinction in this
instance and assume that ALLIED was sequestered via sequestration order similar to that issued against SIPALAY.

At the fore once again in Section 26, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution, specifically the second and third
paragraphs:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Section 26.

x x x
"A sequestration or freeze order shall be issued only upon showing of a prima facie case. The order and the list of
the sequestered or frozen properties shall forthwith be registered with the proper court. For orders issued before
the ratification of this Constitution, the corresponding judicial action or proceeding shall be filed within six months
from its ratification. For those issued after such ratification, the judicial action or proceeding shall be commenced
within six months from the issuance thereof.

"The sequestration or freeze order is deemed automatically lifted if no judicial action or proceeding is commenced
as herein provided."cralaw virtua1aw library

And here are the relevant and undisputable facts: The 1987 Constitution was ratified on February 2, 1987.
Counting six (6) months therefrom, August 2, 1987 was the constitutional deadline for the PCGG to file the
corresponding judicial action/proceeding against entity or entities it sequestered prior to February 2, 1987. Among
such entity or entities were SIPALAY and ALLIED, the dates of their sequestration as appearing from the
corresponding orders issued against them are July 14, 1986 and August 13, 1986, respectively. The PCGG
admittedly did not file any direct complaint either against SIPALAY or ALLIED before the SANDIGANBAYAN
between February 2 and August 2 of 1987. But within such period, specifically on July 17, 1987, the PCGG filed
before the SANDIGANBAYAN a civil case against Lucio Tan and others, for "Revision, Reconveyance, Restitution,
Accounting and Damages", docketed as CC No. 0005. 78 The original complaint in CC No. 0005 did not name
SIPALAY and ALLIED as defendants, as it enumerated only natural persons, except for one, 79 as such. SIPALAY
and ALLIED were impleaded as defendants in CC No. 0005 for the first time only after the lapse of more than four
(4) years from the filing of the original complaint in July of 1987, under an amended complaint filed by the PCGG
in September of 1991.

Given this factual backdrop, two propositions are being bruited by the PCGG:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1) that the July 17, 1987 original complaint against Lucio C. Tan, et. al. (CC No. 0005) is the judicial action
required by the 1987 Constitution to justify the continued sequestration of SIPALAY (and ALLIED), and

2) even assuming arguendo that such original complaint was defective for not naming therein SIPALAY and
ALLIED as defendants, still there was faithful compliance with the constitutional mandate, since the September,
1991 amended complaint impleading SIPALAY and ALLIED as defendants — even when filed beyond the August 2,
1987 deadline — retroacted to July 17, 1987 which, thus, cured the defect.

Both propositions have to be rejected.

As to the first, the SANDIGANBAYAN correctly struck it down by following the doctrine laid down in "PCGG v.
International Copra Export Corporation, Interco Manufacturing Corporation and Sandiganbayan" 80 ("INTERCO"
case, for short). We thus quote with approval the pertinent disquisitions, to wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . On not a few occasions, the Court has sustained the merit and logic of motions seeking the lifting of writs of
sequestration for respondent PCGG’s failure to institute the corresponding judicial action or proceeding against
corporations which, either through sheer oversight or gross neglect, have not been expressly impleaded in the
various civil complaints filed before this Court. The case of ‘PCGG v. International Copra Export Corporation, et. al.’
(INTERCO case) is illuminating on this point. Therein, the Supreme Court made a distinction between the judicial
personalities of a corporation and its stockholders, ruling that if a corporation is not impleaded, it cannot be
deemed to have been sued in an action against its stockholders.

"A perusal of the original complaint in Civil Case No. 0005, which was concededly filed within the six-month period
provided for under the organic law, reveals that petitioner Sipalay Trading was not specifically impleaded therein
as party-defendant, either in a nominal or principal capacity. If at all, the latter has been included therein as part
of principal defendant’s ill-gotten assets. Under Rule 3, Section 7 of the Rules of Court, (P)arties in interest
without whom no final determination can be had of an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants.’

"It bears emphasis along this vein that, as implied from INTERCO, petitioner Sipalay Trading has a juridical
personality separate and distinct from its stockholders. As such, any civil charge filed against principal defendant
Lucio C. Tan and/or his dummies or agents is not deemed a suit against the former. Neither does mere inclusion
in the list of ill-gotten assets as part of principal defendant’s ill-gotten wealth suffice to comply with the
constitutional injunction. Impleading a party means bringing the suit against it. Listing or annexing it to the
complaint, on the other hand, implies being the object of the action.

x x x

"It must be stated with equal respect that the phrase judicial action or proceeding’, within the meaning of the
organic law, is subject to the ordinary rules of procedure and is subordinate to the requirements of due process.
Failure to implead petitioner corporation in the action within the constitutional period is, therefore, patently
transgressive of the constitutional mandate against deprivation of life, liberty and property without due process of
law." 81

To fortify this ruling, we need only to point out the similarity in factual antecedents obtaining in "INTERCO" and
the instant case. In "INTERCO", no judicial action or proceeding was instituted by the PCGG directly against
respondent corporations therein (International Copra Export and International Manufacturing) which it
sequestered on June 10, 1987 purportedly upon a prima facie finding that certain shares of stocks in those
corporations are beneficially owned but were acquired with ill-gotten wealth by Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., within six
(6) months from the date of their sequestration — i.e., between June 10, 1987 and December 10, 1987. And the
PCGG in "INTERCO" likewise filed a complaint before the SANDIGANBAYAN on July 31, 1987 against Eduardo
Cojuangco, Jr., among others (Civil case No. 0033) without, however, impleading respondent corporations as
parties-defendants. The Court in "INTERCO" rejected the PCGG’s contention that the July 31, 1987 complaint
against Cojuangco, Jr., et. al. was substantial compliance with the requirement under Section 26, Article XVIII of
the 1987 Constitution, by upholding very fundamental principles in corporation law:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"In this jurisdiction, a corporation has a legal personality distinct and separate from its stockholders. Thus, a suit
against any of the stockholders is not ipso facto a suit against the corporation.

x x x

"There is likewise no merit to petitioner’s argument that the doctrine which justifies the piercing of the veil of
corporate fiction’ is applicable to the case at bar. The Sandiganbayan correctly found the record bereft of sufficient
basis from which to conclude that private respondent’ respective corporate identifies have been used to defeat
public convenience, protect fraudulent schemes, or evade obligations and liabilities under statutes. Whether or not
Enrique Luy, a major stockholder of private respondents, acted as a dummy of Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., and
whether or not the shareholders of Enrique Luy are beneficially owned by Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., are matters still
to be established in Civil Case No. 0033. But as far as private respondents are concerned, inclusion of their major
stockholder in Civil Case No. 0033 does not detract from, nor excuse, petitioner’s failure to file the proper judicial
action against them in compliance with the constitutional requirement under Section 26 of Article XVIII."cralaw
virtua1aw library

And following the rule, elsewise stated, that cases circumstance identically should be resolved consistently,
adherence to the ruling of the Court in "INTERCO" is necessary and inescapable.

Regarding its second proposition, the PCGG erroneously relies on "Pangasinan Transportation Co. v. Philippine
Farming Co., Ltd." 82 where it was ruled to the effect that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Where the original complaint states a cause of action, but does it imperfectly, and afterward an amended
complaint is filed, correcting the defect, the plea of statute of limitations will relate to the time of filing the original
complaint."cralaw virtua1aw library

The "Pangasinan" case dealt solely with a defect in the cause of action stated in the original complaint filed by
therein petitioner Pangasinan Transport against its competitor, respondent Philippine Farming before the Public
Service Commission for illegal reduction of rates — i.e., non-specification of the acts constituting the offense. It
did not in any way involve a failure to implead a party-defendant which is an entirely different thing from a
defective cause of action. The scope of the retroactive and curative effect of an amended complaint as declared in
"Pangasinan" therefore ought not be broadened so as to cover infirmities in the original complaint other than
amendable imperfections in a cause of action. In fact, insofar as the failure to implead a party or parties in the
original complaint is specifically concerned, the Court on at least two occasions said that the rule in "Pangasinan"
would not apply to the party impleaded for the first time in the amended complaint. These are the cases of "Aetna
Insurance Co. v. Luzon Stevedoring Corporation" 83 and "Seno, et. al., v. Mangubat, et. al." 84 cited by herein
SIPALAY and ALLIED in their "Comment." In "Aetna", the amended complaint filed by therein appellant Aetna
Insurance Co. as plaintiff before the then CFI of Manila impleading Barber Line Far East Service as defendant for
the first time, was filed beyond the one-year period fixed in the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act. In "Seno", one
Andres Evangelista and Bienvenido Mangubat were likewise impleaded as defendants for the first time under an
amended complaint filed beyond the ten-year period required under Article 1144 of the New Civil Code within
which to bring an action upon a written contract. And in both cases, the Court affirmed the dismissal of the
complaints against these newly impleaded defendants by refusing the application of the "Pangasinan" ruling and
decreeing that the amended complaints did not stall the running of the prescription periods provided under the
applicable laws. Bearing once again similar factual features as the "Aetna" and "Seno" cases, this particular sub-
issue should, perforce, be resolved in accordance therewith.

This Court is, of course, fully aware of that very recent case of "Republic v. Sandiganbayan, et.al.", 240 SCRA 376
[January 23, 1995], where its "Final Dispositions" relating to the judicial action/proceeding in sequestration cases
appear to clash with "INTERCO." In resolving what appeared to be the "crucial question" involved in that 1995
"Republic v. Sandiganbayan" case, to wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"DOES INCLUSION IN THE COMPLAINTS FILED BY THE PCGG BEFORE THE SANDIGANBAYAN OF SPECIFIC
ALLEGATIONS OF CORPORATIONS BEING ‘DUMMIES’ OR UNDER THE CONTROL OF ONE OR ANOTHER OF THE
DEFENDANTS NAMED THEREIN AND USED AS INSTRUMENTS FOR ACQUISITION, OR AS BEING DEPOSITARIES
OR PRODUCTS, OF ILL-GOTTEN WEALTH; OR THE ANNEXING TO SAID COMPLAINTS OF A LIST OF SAID FIRMS,
BUT WITHOUT ACTUALLY IMPLEADING THEM AS DEFENDANTS, SATISFY THE CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT
THAT IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN A SEIZURE EFFECTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 1, s. 1986,
THE CORRESPONDING ‘JUDICIAL ACTION OR PROCEEDING’ SHOULD BE FILED WITHIN THE SIX-MONTH PERIOD
PRESCRIBED IN SECTION 26, ARTICLE XVIII, OF THE (1987) CONSTITUTION?"

the Court made these conclusions:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"It is thus both needful and timely to pronounce that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1) Section 26, Article XVIII of the Constitution does not, by its terms or any fair interpretation thereof, require that
corporations or business enterprises alleged to be repositories of ‘ill-gotten wealth’, as the term is used in said
provision, be actually and formally impleaded in the actions for the recovery thereof, in order to maintain in effect
existing sequestrations thereof;

2) complaints for the recovery of ill-gotten wealth which merely identify and/or allege said corporations or
enterprises to be the instruments, repositories or the fruits of ill-gotten wealth without more, come within the
meaning of the phrase ‘corresponding judicial action or proceeding’ contemplated by the constitutional provision
referred to; the more so, that normally, said corporations, as distinguished from their stockholders or members,
are not generally suable for the latter’s illegal or criminal actuations in the acquisition of the assets invested by
them in the former.

3) even assuming the impleading of said corporations to be necessary and proper so that judgment may
comprehensively and effectively be rendered in the actions, amendment of the complaints to implead them as
defendants may, under existing rules of procedure, be done at any time during the pendency of an appeal to the
Supreme Court — a procedure that, in any case, is not inconsistent with or proscribed by the constitutional time
limits to the filing of the corresponding complaints ‘for’ — i.e., with regard or in relation to, in respect of, or in
connection with, or concerning — orders or sequestration, freezing, or provisional takeover."cralaw virtua1aw
library

These fresh pronouncements, however did not reverse, abandon or supplant "INTERCO." What the Court did was
to explain the two apparently colliding dispositions by making this "hairline", but critical,
distinction:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"XVI. The "Interco" and "PJI" Rulings

"This Court is not unmindful of the fact that its Resolution of July 26, 1991 on the petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration in G.R. No. 92755 (PCGG v. Interco) appears to sustain the proposition that actual impleading in
the recovery action of a corporation under sequestration for being a repository of illegally-acquired wealth, is
necessary and requisite for such proposed or pending seizure to come under the protective umbrella of the
Constitution. But Interco is to be differentiated from the cases now under review in that in the former, as already
elsewhere herein made clear, there was a lack of proof, even of the prima facie kind, that Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr.
owned any stock in Interco, the evidence on record being in fact that said corporation had been organized as a
family corporation of the Luys.

"So, too, this Court’s judgment in the so-called ‘PJI Case’ (Republic of the Philippines [PCGG] v. Sandiganbayan
and Rosario Olivares) may not be regarded as on all fours with the cases under consideration. The PJI Case
involved the shares of stock in the name of eight (8) natural persons which had never been sequestered at all.
What happened was that the PCGG simply arrogated unto itself the right to vote those unsequestered shares on
the bare claim that the eight (8) registered owners thereof were ‘dummies’ of Benjamin Romualdez, the real
owner of the shares; and all that the PCGG had done as predicate for that act of appropriation of the stock, was to
include all the shares of PJI in a list (Annex A) appended to its complaint in Sandiganbayan Case no. 0035,
describing them as among the properties illegally acquired by Romualdez. Unfortunately, as in Interco, the PCGG
failed to substantiate by competent evidence its theory of clandestine ownership of Romualdez; and since
moreover, there had been no sequestration of the alleged dummies’ shares of stock, it was undoubtedly correct
for the Sandiganbayan to grant the latter’s motion for them to be recognized and declared as the true owners of
the stock in question, which judgment this Court subsequently pronounced to be free from grave abuse of
discretion." 85

We need only to recall at this juncture that, as in "INTERCO", evidence of the PCGG is nil to even come up with a
prima facie case against SIPALAY (and ALLIED). This similitude is the one decisive factor that draws the instant
case away from the "Final Dispositions" made by the Court in the 1995 "Republic v. Sandiganbayan" case — thus
making "INTERCO", as supported by the "Aetna" and "Seno" cases, the controlling precedent. The principle of
Stare Decisis, indeed, is most compelling, for "when the court has once laid down a principle of law as applicable
to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases where the facts are
substantially the same." 86 And it is in this light that Mr. Justice Padilla’s lone "Dissent" in the 1995 "Republic v.
Sandiganbayan" case becomes meaningfully relevant, to wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . failure to implead these corporations as defendants and merely annexing a list of such corporations to the
complaints is a violation of their right to due process for it would in effect be disregarding their distinct and
separate personality without a hearing.

"In cases where stocks of a corporation were allegedly the fruits of ill-gotten wealth, it should be remembered
that in most of these cases the stocks involved constitute a substantial if not controlling interest in the
corporations. The basic tenets of fair play demand that these corporations be impleaded as defendants since a
judgment in favor of the government will undoubtedly substantially and decisively affect the corporations as
distinct entities. The judgment could strip them of everything without being previously heard as they are not
parties to the action in which the judgment is rendered.

". . . Holding that the ‘corresponding judicial action or proceeding’ contemplated by the Constitution is any action
concerning or involving the corporation under sequestration is oversimplifying the solution, the result of which is
antagonistic to the principles of justice and fair play.

". . . the actions contemplated by the Constitution should be those which include the corporation not as a mere
annex to the complaint but as defendant. This is the minimum requirement of the due process guarantee. Short of
being impleaded, the corporation has no standing in the judicial action. It cannot adequately defend itself. It may
not even be heard.

"On the . . . opinion that alternatively the corporations can be impleaded as defendants by amendment of the
complaint, Section 26, Article XVIII of the Constitution would appear to preclude this procedure, for allowing
amendment of the complaint to implead therefore unimpleaded corporations would in effect allow complaints
against the corporations to be filed beyond the periods fixed by said Section 26.

"Justice Amuerfina Melencio-Herrera in her separate opinion in Bataan Shipyard and Engineering Corporation, Inc.
v. PCGG (150 SCRA 181, 253) correctly stated what should be the rule, thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

‘Sequestration is an extraordinary, harsh and severe remedy. It should be confined to its lawful parameters and
exercised, with due regard, in the words of its enabling laws, to the requirements of fairness due process and
Justice’. (Emphasis supplied)

"While governments efforts to recover illegally amassed wealth should have support from all its branches,
eagerness and zeal should not be allowed to run berserk, overriding in the process the very principles that it is
sworn to uphold. In our legal system, the ends do not always justify the means. Wrongs are never corrected by
committing other wrongs, and as above-discussed the recovery of ill-gotten wealth does not and should never
justify unreasonable intrusions into constitutionally forbidden grounds . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library

In answer therefore to the last key issue, we hold that the sequestration and the search and seizure orders issued
were indeed automatically lifted.

Finally, the PCGG in its "Reply" raises as "additional issue" the bias and partiality of the now-assailed decision’s
ponente and Chairman of the SANDIGANBAYAN’s SECOND DIVISION, Justice Romeo Escareal. To bolster this
charge, the PCGG harps on alleged prejudicial acts committed by Justice Escareal affecting CC No. 0005 — the
case filed against Lucio C. Tan, and the instant case (S.B. Nos. 0095 against SIPALAY and 0100 against ALLIED).

This issue deserves no merit at all. Firstly, the PCGG’s complaints against Justice Escareal’s supported bias and
partiality in CC No. 0005 have no bearing whatsoever to the instant case. That should be ventilated and passed
upon there, not her. And secondly, SIPALAY and ALLIED in their "Rejoinder" meritoriously parried the PCGG’s
accusation by arguing that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"1.02. Petitioner apparently overlooks that the Sandiganbayan is a collegiate court which sits in divisions
composed of three (3) members each. The unanimous vote of all the three (3) members of a division is required
for the rendition of a judgment (See Section 1(b), Rule XVIII, Revised Rules of the Sandiganbayan). The Decision
and Resolution subject of the present appeal, though penned by Justice Romeo Escareal, the Chairman of the
Second Division of the Sandiganbayan, were concurred in by the two (2) other members of the Sandiganbayan’s
Second Division. Such being the case, petitioner’s fears of bias or partiality on the part of Justice Romeo Escareal
cannot affect the questioned Decision and Resolution rendered by the Sandiganbayan (Second Division). As held
by this Honorable Court in Mirriam Defensor-Santiago v. Hon. Justice Francis Garchitorena, Et Al. (G.R. No.
109226, December 2, 1993):chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

‘Notwithstanding petitioner’s misgiving, it should be taken into consideration that three justices in each division.
Unanimity among the three members is mandatory for arriving at any decision of a division. (P.D. 1606, Sec. 5).
The collegiate character of the Sandiganbayan thus renders baseless petitioner’s fear of prejudice and bias on the
part of Presiding Justice Garchitorena (Paredes v. Gopenco, 29 SCRA 688 [1969]).’"

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., Melo and Panganiban, JJ., concur.

Narvasa, C.J., concur in the result.

4. Sapu-an, et al vs. CA, October 19, 1992
Doctrines:
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; BURDEN OF PROOF; PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE, MEANING OF. —
The general rule in civil cases is that the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a
preponderance of evidence. By "preponderance of evidence" is meant that the evidence as a whole adduced by
one side is superior to that of the other. In determining where the preponderance or superior weight of evidence
on the issues involved lies, the court may consider all the facts and circumstances of the case, the witnesses’
manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts on which they are
testifying, the nature of such facts, the probability or improbability of their testimony, their interest or want of
interest, and also their personal credibility as far as the same may legitimately appear at the trial. The court may
also consider the number of witnesses, although the preponderance is not necessarily with the greatest number.

2. ID.; ID.; PLEADINGS; GENUINENESS AND DUE EXECUTION OF THE DOCUMENT; REQUIREMENT ON SPECIFIC
DENIAL THEREOF, TO WHOM APPLICABLE; CASE AT BAR. — It is true that the genuineness and due execution of
the two deeds of sale presented in evidence by the petitioners were not denied by the private respondents under
oath, and that under Rule 8, Section 8, of the Rules of Court, the "genuineness and due execution of the
instrument shall be deemed admitted unless the adverse party, under oath, specifically denies them." However,
this rule applies only to the parties to the document and not, in the case at bar, to the private respondents. The
reason is that they were not parties to the deeds of sale but merely the heirs of the alleged vendors. It follows
that the unauthenticated deeds of sale cannot serve as valid bases for the petitioners’ claim of ownership over the
land in question.

3. CIVIL CODE; ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION; REQUIREMENTS THEREOF; CASE AT BAR. — Ordinary acquisitive
prescription is governed by Article 1134 of the Civil Code, quoted above. It requires possession of things in good
faith and with just title during the time fixed by law. The good faith of the possessor consists in the reasonable
belief that the person from whom he received the thing was the owner thereof and could transmit his ownership.
For the purpose of prescription, there is just title when the adverse claimant came into possession of the property
through one of the modes recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership or other real rights, but the grantor
was not the owner or could not transmit any right. It is well-settled that possession, to constitute the foundation
of a prescriptive right, must be adverse and under a claim of title. Possession by license or mere tolerance does
not give rise to acquisitive prescription. The above requirements have not been satisfactorily met by the
petitioners. They could not have possessed the land in good faith and with just title.

4. ID.; EXTINCTIVE PRESCRIPTION; 30-YEAR PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD FOR REAL ACTIONS; CASE AT BAR. —
Actions for the recovery of land are real actions. Extinctive prescription of such kind of actions is governed by
Article 1141 which provides that: Art. 1141. — Real actions over immovable prescribe after thirty years. (Emphasis
supplied). The private respondents’ submission that their cause of action arose in 1960, when they objected to the
expansion being made by the petitioners, is immaterial. As of now, the 30-year prescriptive period has not yet
expired.

5. REMEDIAL LAW; APPEALS; FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE TRIAL COURT GENERALLY UPHELD ON APPEAL; CASE
AT BAR. — This case turns mainly on questions of fact, which have been correctly appreciated by both the trial
court and respondent court. Their conclusions in favor of the private respondents are based on the evidence of
record and there is no reason for this Court to reverse or modify them. Absent a convincing showing that the
challenged decision was reached arbitrarily or in disregard of such evidence, our clear and only duty on appeal is
to uphold the courts below. It is settled that matters of credibility are addressed basically to the trial judge who is
in better position than the appellate court to appreciate the weight and evidentiary value of the testimonies of
witnesses who have personally appeared before him.
Facts:
The subject of this dispute is a 786 sq. m. lot situated in Valencia, Negros Oriental. It has been occupied since the
last World War by both the petitioners and the private respondents, who now mutually assert adverse claims of
exclusive ownership over the property.

The petitioners built their house near the center of the lot while the private respondents built their house near the
western boundary. Both parties made tax payments on the lot in the name of Alfonsa Ohoy and caused separate
surveys to be made on the land.

The petitioners claim the land by virtue of separate sales made by the original owners, namely Alfonsa Ohoy,
Luciana Ohoy, Porfirio Ohoy and Maria Ohoy, to Candida Favor, Ceriaco Abiera, Josefa Abiera, and Roberto (or
Edilberto) Abiera, the petitioners’ predecessors-in-interest.

For their part, the private respondents claim the same land by inheritance from their mother, Alfonsa Ohoy, who
had in turn acquired it from her mother after the land had been partitioned among her children.

Both the petitioners and the private respondents say they have occupied and farmed the disputed land without
objection from each other. The petitioners aver that it was they who gave permission to Calixto Tingcay to build
his house on the land after World War II. The private respondents contend that it was they who gave permission
to petitioner Marcelina Sapu-an to build her house on the land, also after World War II.

In 1962, the petitioners allegedly demolished their old house and began constructing a bigger one over the private
respondent’s objections. When their protests were ignored, the private respondents sued the petitioners for the
recovery of the land, with damages.

At the trial, the plaintiffs presented four witnesses, among them Zacarias Villegas, who testified that his mother,
Maria Ohoy, did not own any share in the disputed lot and that it belonged exclusively to Alfonsa. He also said
that he lived with the Tingcays for some time and that it was really Marcelina Sapu-an who requested permission
to live on the land. 1

They also submitted in evidence (1) tax declarations in the name of Alfonsa Ohoy from 1906 to 1949 and in the
name of Calixto Tingcay for 1962; (2) receipts of tax payments made by them for the period from 1953 to 1979;
(3) two private documents dated December 15, 1964, and March 18, 1947, respectively, evidencing the sale of
coconut trees planted thereon, to third persons; (4) a sworn statement on the current and fair value of the real
property; and (5) a survey of the land made by a geodetic engineer. 2

The defendants, for their part, presented two witnesses, Josefa Abiera, sister-in-law of Marcelina Sapu-an, and
Ester Abiera Solamillo, one of the petitioners.chanrobles law library

Josefa Abiera testified that she witnessed the execution and signing of the deed of sale disposing of Alfonsa’s and
Porfirio’s shares in the land, on April 2, 1943, for a consideration of P25.00. Luciana Ohoy also sold her shares in
the land to Josefa’s parents before the war broke out. Josefa was already thirty years old at the time this earlier
sale took place. She further declared that Atilano sold Maria Ohoy’s share to her and Edilberto Abiera for P5.00
during the evacuation of Valencia. 3

Ester Solamillo testified that her grandparents, Candida Favor and Ceriaco Abiera, her father Roberto, and her
aunt Josefa, purchased the disputed land in separate transactions with Luciana, Alfonsa and Porfirio Ohoy, and
Maria Ohoy, through her son Atilano. She also said that the defendants were the ones who introduced the
improvements on the land and enjoyed its fruits. Sometime in 1950, her father, Roberto Abiera, sought the
cancellation of the name of Alfonsa Ohoy in the tax declaration and the entry of their names therein, but the
treasurer’s office deferred action, pending the submission of supporting papers. 4

The defendants also presented (1) two private deeds of sale in their favor; (2) receipts of tax payments on the
land by Teopista and Ester Abiera; and (3) a survey contract of the land prepared by a surveyor. 5

After considering the testimonial and documentary evidence of the parties, the trial court 6 disposed as
follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

WHEREFORE. and in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the
defendants, declaring the plaintiffs as the absolute owners of the land in question described in paragraph 4 of the
Complaint, original and amended, and ordering the defendants to leave and vacate the property in question within
thirty days upon the finality of this decision.

On appeal, the decision was affirmed by the respondent court. 7 The petitioners then filed a motion for
reconsideration, raising therein the sole issue of prescription of the private respondents’ cause of action. This
motion was denied by the appellate court, prompting this petition.
Issue/s:

Ruling:
The petitioners now invoke three grounds for the allowance of the petition.

First, they contend that the respondent court failed or refused to apply to this case the "equiponderance of
evidence" rule, which states:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

When the scale shall stand upon an equipoise and there is nothing in the evidence which shall incline it to one side
or the other, the court will find for the defendant. 8

Under this principle, the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his evidence and not on the weakness of the
defendant’s claim. Even if the evidence of the plaintiff may be stronger than that of the defendant, there is no
preponderance of evidence on his side if such evidence is insufficient in itself to establish his cause of action. 9

The petitioners’ point is that on the whole, their evidence should be given more credence than that of the
respondents.chanrobles.com : virtual law library

The general rule in civil cases is that the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a
preponderance of evidence. By "preponderance of evidence" is meant that the evidence as a whole adduced by
one side is superior to that of the other. 10

In determining where the preponderance or superior weight of evidence on the issues involved lies, the court may
consider all the facts and circumstances of the case, the witnesses’ manner of testifying, their intelligence, their
means and opportunity of knowing the facts on which they are testifying, the nature of such facts, the probability
or improbability of their testimony, their interest or want of interest, and also their personal credibility as far as
the same may legitimately appear at the trial. The court may also consider the number of witnesses, although the
preponderance is not necessarily with the greatest number. 11

It is settled that matters of credibility are addressed basically to the trial judge who is in better position than the
appellate court to appreciate the weight and evidentiary value of the testimonies of witnesses who have personally
appeared before him.

Significantly, both the trial court and the respondent court found the credibility of Josefa Abiera to be highly
questionable. As the respondent court observed:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Appellants argue that the nullity of the said deed was not sufficiently established by the appellees nor had the
testimony of Josefa Abiera as to the due execution of the same been properly impeached. A re-examination of the
records of this case strengthens the opinion of this Court that the testimony of Josefa Abiera as to the fact of sale
of the alleged shares of Porfirio and Alfonsa Ohoy over the subject lot and the due execution of the purported
document evidencing the said sale cannot be given full credence. Not only had the testimony of the said witness
been successfully impeached by the appellees as regards the alleged sale of the shares of Luciana and Marie Ohoy
over the subject lot by a proper showing that Luciana could not have sold her alleged share in 1936 as testified to
by Josefa Abiera (pp. 41-42; t.s.n., May 13, 1982, hearing) because Luciana died in 1921 as evidenced by her
death certificate and that Josefa’s testimony to the effect that Maria Ohoy’s son, Atilano Villegas sold Maria’s share
over the said lot during the war was belied by the uncontroverted evidence for the appellees that Atilano migrated
to Dipolog, Mindanao, during the war and that the circumstances under which the sale was allegedly perfected
rendered Josefa’s testimony highly improbable; e.g. she never met Atilano before the alleged sale took place, no
written authority to sell from Maria Ohoy was presented by the man who introduced himself as Atilano Villegas
and most importantly, all their neighbors evacuated to another place in the morning of the day when the alleged
sale took place for fear of the Japanese forces who were headed their place but Josefa and Roberto Abiera, the
only ones left in the place, still found time in the afternoon of that day to perfect a contract of sale with a
complete stranger; the unquestionable and substantial interest of Josefa Abiera over the subject lot as co-owner
thereof had also been shown by the appellees as follows:chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

"ATTY. BRIONES:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Q. Mrs. Abiera, when you last declared in this case on July 25, 1977, and in the latter part of your testimony, you
told the Honorable Court that the property in question is owned in common between you and your brothers
Roberto, Teopisto and Pablo, all surnamed Abiera. Now, how much of the entire property is owned between you
and your aforesaid brother Roberto, Pablo and Teopisto?

WITNESS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

A. 778 square meters.

Q I am not asking you on specific figures. I am asking you on the proportion how much of the entire property is
owned by you only including your brothers Roberto, Teopisto and Pablo?

A Three-fourths for the four of us.

Q All right, now, the remaining one-fourth (1/4), and who owns the same?

A Maria Ohoy.

Q How about . . . What happened to that share of Maria Ohoy?

A It was sold.

Q Sold to whom?

A It was sold to me and with my brother Roberto.

Q Which sales was evidenced by Exhibit "5" of this case, the document executed by Atilano Villegas?

A Yes, sir."cralaw virtua1aw library

In view of Josefa Abiera’s dubious credibility and her inclination in favor of the cause for the appellants, the
uncorroborated testimony of Josefa Abiera cannot lend validity to the purported deed of sale. (p. 13, t.s.n., May
13, 1982, hearing)

It is true that the genuineness and due execution of the two deeds of sale presented in evidence by the
petitioners were not denied by the private respondents under oath, and that under Rule 8, Section 8, of the Rules
of Court, the "genuineness and due execution of the instrument shall be deemed admitted unless the adverse
party, under oath, specifically denies them." However, this rule applies only to the parties to the document and
not, in the case at bar, to the private respondents. The reason is that they were not parties to the deeds of sale
but merely the heirs of the alleged vendors.

It follows that the unauthenticated deeds of sale cannot serve as valid bases for the petitioners’ claim of
ownership over the land in question.

This Court has held that a mere tax declaration or a tax assessment, such as the one presented by the
respondents, does not by itself give title and is of little value in proving one’s ownership. 12 It must be noted,
nevertheless, that the conclusion of the respondent court was not premised on such declarations alone for, as it
correctly held:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Moreover, the acts of ownership exercised by the appellees over the subject lot such as the selling of a number of
trees to third parties with right of repurchase without objection from the appellants is very strong evidence in
appellee’s favor that they indeed are the owners of the subject lot and possessed it as such.chanrobles law library

The petitioners also submit, as their second and third grounds, that the complaint is bound by the principle of
acquisitive prescription and the statute of limitations.

Their contention is that their evidence shows they possessed the subject land in good faith and with just title and
they consequently validly acquired the disputed lot pursuant to Article 1134 of the Civil Code, providing as
follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Ownership and other real rights over immovable property are acquired by ordinary prescription through
possession of ten years.

The said period of ten years must, so they maintain, be counted at the earliest from April 2, 1943, when Exh. "4"
was executed, or at the latest from the year 1946, when they commenced possession of the lot in question. Since
then and up to the filing of the complaint by the private respondents on November 20, 1964, a period of at least
eighteen years had elapsed, making the action definitely tardy under the statute of limitations.

The respondent court held that the petitioners’ failure to raise the defense of prescription of the respondents’
cause of action precluded them from raising it for the first time on appeal. Demurring, the petitioners agree that
this issue was raised in their answer to the complaint when they alleged:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

2. That from the time this parcel of land was acquired by the predecessors-in-interest of the defendants, their
possession over the same which was continued by the latter, was continuous, public, peaceful, and in the concept
of owner, until this unwarranted civil action by plaintiffs disturbed their lawful possession.

They also invoke Gicano v. Gegato, 13 where the Court observed that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

What is essential only, to repeat, is that the facts demonstrating the lapse of the prescriptive period, be otherwise
sufficiently and satisfactorily apparent on the record; either in the averments of the plaintiff’s complaint, or
otherwise established by the evidence.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

The petitioners seem to have confused the terms "acquisitive prescription" and "extinctive prescription." These
concepts are distinguishable as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Adverse possession of real property for the requisite period confers title as effectually as any paper title, with the
exception that such a title cannot be acquired as against a title registered under the provisions of the Land
Registration Act. The statute of limitations is merely a bar to a right of action and does not operate as a transfer
of title at all. The statute of limitations is, therefore, new matter, which must be specially pleaded. 14

Ordinary acquisitive prescription is governed by Article 1134 of the Civil Code, quoted above. It requires
possession of things in good faith and with just title during the time fixed by law. The good faith of the possessor
consists in the reasonable belief that the person from whom he received the thing was the owner thereof and
could transmit his ownership. For the purpose of prescription, there is just title when the adverse claimant came
into possession of the property through one of the modes recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership or
other real rights, but the grantor was not the owner or could not transmit any right. 15 It is well-settled that
possession, to constitute the foundation of a prescriptive right, must be adverse and under a claim of title. 16
Possession by license or mere tolerance does not give rise to acquisitive prescription.

The above requirements have not been satisfactorily met by the petitioners. They could not have possessed the
land in good faith and with just title because, as aptly observed by the respondent court:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library

A scrupulous examination of the evidence presented by the parties would show that the plaintiffs and their mother
Alfonsa Ohoy have actually resided in the land in question in the house of Alfonsa Ohoy. That Alfonsa Ohoy had a
house in the land in question as early as 1906 is shown by Tax Declaration No. 2924 (Exh. "A" and "16"). At the
back side or page 2 of the said tax declaration under the heading "Building and Other Structures" the entry, "Una
casa caña y nipa" valued at P5.00. Plaintiffs’ evidence shows that plaintiffs lived with their mother in the land in
question since birth until they evacuated to the mountains during the Second World War; that after the war they
returned to the land in question. The fact that plaintiffs have a house in the land in question is admitted by
defendant Ester Abiera. Thus, in her testimony or direct examination by their counsel, Ester Abiera unguardedly
blurted out that the plaintiffs have a house in the lot in question even if the question asked was with respect to
the defendants’ having a house in the said lot.

The petitioners’ contention that the private respondents’ cause of action has already prescribed is also untenable.
Actions for the recovery of land are real actions. Extinctive prescription of such kind of actions is governed by
Article 1141 which provides that:chanrobles law library

ARTICLE 1141. — Real actions over immovable prescribe after thirty years. (Emphasis supplied)

The private respondents’ submission that their cause of action arose in 1960, when they objected to the expansion
being made by the petitioners, is immaterial. As of now, the 30-year prescriptive period has not yet expired.

Moreover, what the petitioners alleged in their answer was not prescription of the plaintiffs’ cause of action but
their own alleged ownership over the lot in question by virtue of acquisitive prescription. That claim was rejected
by the respondent court when it recognized the private respondents as the real owners of the land.

We find that this case turns mainly on questions of fact, which have been correctly appreciated by both the trial
court and respondent court. Their conclusions in favor of the private respondents are based on the evidence of
record and there is no reason for this Court to reverse or modify them. Absent a convincing showing that the
challenged decision was reached arbitrarily or in disregard of such evidence, our clear and only duty on appeal is
to uphold the courts below. We so affirm.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs against the petitioners. It is so ordered.
5. People vs. Francisco, et al, August 23, 2001
Doctrines:
Evidence; Circumstantial Evidence; Requisites.—Under Rule 133, §4 of the Revised Rules of Evidence,
circumstantial evidence is sufficient if: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the
inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt. In this case, the chain of circumstances established by the prosecution gives
rise to a fair and reasonable conclusion that accused-appellant is one of the perpetrators of the crime, to wit: (1)
The extrajudicial confession of co-accused Pedro Francisco; (2) The medico-legal report (Exhs. C and E) and the
testimony of Dr. Dario Gajardo; (3) The recovery of accused-appellant’s black bullcap (Exh. EE) from the scene of
the crime; and (4) The positive identification of the accused Romero by witness Carlos Obal as one of the three
men he had seen hurriedly leaving the victim’s residence on the day the crime was committed, each one carrying
a bag on his way out. We will discuss these circumstances which, in their totality, create a moral certainty as to
the guilt of accused-appellant.

Same; Extrajudicial Confessions; Although an extrajudicial confession is admissible only against the
confessant, it is admissible as corroborative evidence of other facts that tend to establish the guilt of
his co-accused, such rule implying that there must be a finding of other circumstantial evidence
which, when taken together with the confession, establishes the guilt of a co-accused beyond
reasonable doubt.—As to the extra-judicial confession of co-accused Pedro Francisco in which he affirmed the
circumstances surrounding the incident, we hold that such confession is valid and admissible, having been
voluntarily executed with the assistance of counsel, who explained to the accused the consequences of his
confession. While as a rule such confession cannot be used as evidence against a co-accused for the same is
considered hearsay, it may nevertheless be utilized as corroborative evidence to prove the existence of conspiracy
among the accused in committing the crime. As held in People v. Aquino, although an extrajudicial confession is
admissible only against the confessant, it is admissible as corroborative evidence of other facts that tend to
establish the guilt of his co-accused. The implication of this rule is that there must be a finding of other
circumstantial evidence which, when taken together with the confession, establishes the guilt of a co-accused
beyond reasonable doubt.

Witnesses; Two Types of Positive Identification; Positive identification may be provided not only by
a witness actually identifying an accused as the one who perpetrated the crime but also by one who
has seen the accused at the scene of the crime on or about the time of the alleged incident—positive
identification pertains essentially to proof of identity and not per se to that of being an eyewitness
to the very act of commission of the crime.—Fourth is the positive identification of accused-appellant by
Carlos Obal, who testified that on October 15, 1991, as he was approaching the residence of the victim, he saw
accused-appellant, together with the two other accused, hurriedly coming out of the gate. Positive identification
may be provided not only by a witness actually identifying an accused as the one who perpetrated the crime but
also by one who has seen the accused at the scene of the crime on or about the time of the alleged incident. As
this Court explained in People v. Gallarde: . . . Positive identification pertains essentially to proof of identity and
not per se to that of being an eyewitness to the very act of commission of the crime. There are two types of
positive identification. A witness may identify a suspect or accused in a criminal case as the perpetrator of the
crime as an eyewitness to the very act of the commission of the crime. This constitutes direct evidence. There
may, however, be instances where, although a witness may not have actually seen the very act of commission of
a crime, he may still be able to positively identify a suspect or accused as the perpetrator of a crime as for
instance when the latter is the person or one of the persons last seen with the victim immediately before and right
after the commission of the crime. This is the second type of positive identification, which forms part of
circumstantial evidence, which, when taken together with other pieces of evidence constituting an unbroken chain,
leads to only fair and reasonable conclusion, which is that the accused is the author of the crime to the exclusion
of all others.

Same; Alibi; Alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused.—We find no reason to
doubt Obal’s testimony, absent any showing that he had any motive to testify falsely against accused-appellant.
His positive identification of accused-appellant carries greater weight than the latter’s bare denial and his self-
serving claim that he was in Pilar, Sorsogon at the time of the commission of the crime in Quezon City. As we
have more than once said, alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of an accused. It crumbles in the
face of clear and positive identification by the prosecution witnesses that the accused was a participant in the
commission of the crime. For this reason, it is considered the weakest defense an accused can invoke. It is
noteworthy that no witness was presented by the defense in the case at bar to corroborate accused-appellant’s
claim that he was in Barangay Del Rosario, Pilar, Sorsogon on October 15, 1991 to attend the barrio fiesta.

Criminal Law; Murder; Damages; To seek recovery of actual damages, it is necessary to prove the
actual amount of loss with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof and on
the best evidence obtainable by the injured party.—We now consider the accused-appellant’s civil liability.
For the death of Purita Santos Luey (Exh. D), accused-appellant should be ordered to pay her legal heirs the
amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity and P46,500.00 as expenses for the funeral services and the payment of a
burial lot, which were duly proved (Exhs. H to J) by the prosecution. However, the award of actual damages for
the alleged loss of jewelry cannot be sustained for lack of competent evidence to prove it. In People v. Oliano, it
was held: We cannot, however, sustain the award of actual damages. To seek recovery of actual damages, it is
necessary to prove the actual amount of loss with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent
proof and on the best evidence obtainable by the injured party. In this case, we find no such proof to sustain the
award of actual damages. The prosecution merely presented a bond paper containing a list of the expenses
allegedly incurred from the killing to the burial of Benjamin Matias. They did not present any receipt or other
evidence to support the claim. Nonetheless, appellant should pay the heirs of the deceased temperate damages in
the amount of P10,000. Under Article 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate damages “may be recovered when the
Court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be
proved with certainty.” People vs. Francisco, 363 SCRA 637, G.R. No. 138022 August 23, 2001
Facts:
This is an appeal from the decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 100, Quezon City, finding accused-
appellant guilty of the complex crime of robbery with homicide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua and to pay damages.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Accused-appellant was charged, together with Pedro Francisco and Salvador Gregorio, with robbery with homicide
under Art. 294, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code. The amended information alleged —

That on or about the 15th day of October, 1991 in Quezon City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping one
another, with intent to gain and by means of violence and intimidation against person, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously rob the residence of PING YAN LUEY y CRUZ located at No. 41 Cristine Street,
Parkway Village, Barangay Apolonio Samson, this City, in the following manner, to wit: on the date and place
aforementioned, Accused pursuant to their conspiracy, barged into the residence of said PING YAN LUEY y CRUZ
and with [an] icepick pointed to PURITA LUEY y SANTOS, hogtied her and thereafter robbed, took and carried
away the following, to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

One (1) Sony Betamax and Adaptor P10,000

One (1) Lady’s gold ring with diamonds 10,000

One (1) pair of white gold earrings 5,000

Two (2) gold lady’s bracelet 10,000

One (1) lady’s necklace with heart shaped pendant 30,000

One (1) pearl necklace 10,000

TOTAL P75,000

All in the total amount of P75,000.00 and cash money of undetermined amount (Philippine currency and U.S.
dollar), and on the occasion of said robbery, Accused with intent to kill and without any justifiable cause, stabbed
said PURITA LUEY y SANTOS in the different parts of her body, thereby inflicting upon her serious and mortal
wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of her death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said
PURITA LUEY y SANTOS in such amount as may be awarded to them and to said PING YAN LUEY y CRUZ in the
aforementioned amount and in such other amount as may be awarded to him under the provisions of
law.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Contrary to law. 2
In the beginning, only Pedro Francisco was apprehended. Upon being arraigned on January 16, 1992, he pleaded
not guilty. Romeo Romero was apprehended two years later. Upon being arraigned on August 12, 1994, he too
entered a plea of not guilty to the crime charged. Thereupon trial was held. Accused Salvador Gregorio has
remained at large to this date.

After the initial stage of the trial, Pedro Francisco changed his plea from not guilty to guilty to the lesser offense of
robbery with physical injuries, of which he was convicted on July 16, 1997.

The prosecution presented six witnesses, whose testimonies are as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Carlos Obal, first cousin of the victim Purita Santos Luey, testified that on October 15, 1991, at about 8 o’clock in
the morning, he went to the victim’s residence where he worked as a gardener. As he was about to enter the
gate, he saw three men, whom he identified as Pedro Francisco, Romeo Romero, and Salvador Gregorio, hurriedly
coming out of the house, each one carrying a bag. 3 Obal knew Francisco whom he in fact had recommended to
the Lueys as a construction worker. As for accused-appellant Romeo Romero, Obal recognized him, having
previously seen him in Francisco’s house at Kaingin Road, Balintawak, where the two were neighbors. 4

Carlos Obal testified that when he entered the house of the Lueys, he found his cousin Purita Santos Luey dead.
The victim’s hands and feet were bound by a telephone cord. Her body bore signs of multiple stab wounds. Obal
went out of the house and tried to contact the victim’s husband, but failed to reach him. Obal was able to contact
the victim’s brother-in-law. 5

Investigating Officer SPO2 Rodrigo Mendez testified that on October 15, 1991, he was on duty at the Philippine
National Police (PNP) Station 1 in La Loma, Quezon City. He received a report of a killing at No. 41 Christine
Street, Parkway Village, Barangay Apolonio Samson, Quezon City. When he and his companions went to the place,
there were already several people inside the house, including some barangay officials. He found the lifeless body
of Purita Santos Luey lying in a pool of blood. There was a trail of blood from the dining room to the living room
where the victim’s body was found. 6 The victim’s neck was tied with a telephone wire, while her hands were tied
to the window grill. 7 The room had been ransacked, with some of the drawers forcibly opened. The house was in
complete disarray. The police recovered two improvised ice pick scabbards, one on top of the refrigerator and the
other on the table near the kitchen. 8

The victim’s husband, Ping Yan Luey, testified that he arrived home later in the morning of October 15, 1991. 9
He discovered his Sony Betamax and adaptor, several pieces of jewelry belonging to his wife, and sums of money
(both in Philippine and United States currencies) to be missing. He presented official receipts (Exhs. H to J)
showing the actual expenses he incurred for the funeral and burial of his deceased wife. The total amount of the
valuables and cash allegedly missing in the house of the Lueys was estimated to be P75,000.00. 10

Dr. Dario Gajardo performed an autopsy on the body of Purita Santos Luey on October 20, 1991. His report (Exh.
C) is as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

FINDINGS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Fairly developed, fairly nourished female cadaver in rigor mortis with postmortem lividity over the dependent
portions of the body. Conjunctive are pale. Lips and nailbeds are cyanotic.

HEAD, TRUNK AND UPPER EXTREMITIES:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(1) Stab wound, neck, measuring 0.6 by 0.3 cm, along the anterior midline.

(2) Stab wound, neck, measuring 0.5 by 0.3 cm, 4 cm left of the anterior midline.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

(3) Stab wound, left infraclavicular region, measuring 0.5 by 0.3 cm, 7.5 cm from the anterior midline.

(4) Stab wound, left infraclavicular region, measuring 0.5 by 0.3 cm, 10 cm from the anterior midline.
(5) Stab wound, left infraclavicular region, measuring 0.6 by 0.3 cm, 14 cm from the anterior midline.

(6) Stab wound, chest, measuring 0.7 by 0.3 cm, 10 cm left of the anterior midline.

(7) Stab wound, chest, measuring 0.8 by 0.3 cm, 4 cm left of the anterior midline.

(8) Stab wound, sternal region, measuring 0.7 by 0.3 cm, just right of the anterior midline.

(9) Stab wound, sternal region, measuring 0.8 by 0.3 cm, 1 cm right of the anterior midline.

(10) Stab wound, right mammary region, measuring 0.6 by 0.3 cm, 5 cm from the anterior midline.

(11) Stab wound, left mammary region, measuring 0.6 by 0.3 cm, 6 cm from the anterior midline.chanrob1es
virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

(12) Stab wound, left axillary region, measuring 0.7 by 0.3 cm, 23 cm from the anterior midline.

(13) Stab wound, left axillary region, measuring 0.7 by 0.3 cm, 24 cm from the anterior midline.

(14) Abrasion, right costal region, measuring 0.5 by 0.4 cm, 5 cm from the anterior midline.

(15) Stab wound, nape, measuring 0.5 by 0.2 cm, 2 cm right of the posterior midline.

(16) Stab wound, nape, measuring 0.6 by 0.3 cm, 2 cm left of the posterior midline.

(17) Stab wound, nape, measuring 0.5 by 0.2 cm, 2 cm right of the posterior midline.

(18) Stab wound, left suprascapular region, measuring 0.5 by 0.2 cm, 6 cm from the posterior midline.chanrob1es
virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

(19) Abrasion, left shoulder, measuring 0.7 by 0.4 cm, 15 cm from the posterior midline.

(20) Stab wound, left suprascapular region, measuring 0.5 by 0.3 cm, 10 cm from the posterior midline.

(21) Stab wound, left suprascapular region, measuring 0.6 by 0.2 cm, 2.5 cm from the posterior midline.

(22) Stab wound, left suprascapular region, measuring 0.5 by 0.2 cm, 5.5 cm from the posterior midline.

(23) Stab wound, interscapular region, measuring 0.7 by 0.2 cm, 3 cm right of the posterior midline.

(24) Stab wound, left scapular region, measuring 0.7 by 0.2 cm, 8 cm from the posterior midline.

(25) Stab wound, right infrascapular region, measuring 1 by 0.3 cm, 11 cm from the posterior midline.

(26) Stab wound, left infrascapular region, measuring 0.8 by 0.2 cm, 6 cm from the posterior midline.chanrob1es
virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

(27) Stab wound, left infrascapular region, measuring 0.7 by 0.2 cm, 8 cm from the posterior midline, 10 cm deep.

(28) Stab wound, left infrascapular region, measuring 0.6 by 0.2 cm, 9 cm from the posterior midline, 10 cm deep.

(29) Stab wound, left lumbar region, measuring 0.2 by 0.2 cm, 8 cm from the posterior midline.
(30) Stab wound, left suprascapular region, measuring 0.7 by 0.2 cm, 12 cm from the posterior midline.

(31) Stab wound, right mammary region, measuring 0.6 by 0.3 cm, 10.5 cm from the anterior midline.

(32) Ligature mark, around the right wrist, measuring 14 by 4 cm.

(33) Ligature mark, around the left wrist, measuring 18 by 0.6 cm.

(34) Contusion, left peri-orbital extending to the left maxillar region, measuring 11 by 8 cm, 5 cm, from the
anterior midline.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

The 5th right and 2nd left thoracic rib and sternum at the level of the 3rd thoracic rib are fractured.

Both lobes of the left lung, all lobes of the right lung, pericardial sac, left ventricle of the heart, 4th right, 2nd, 3rd,
5th and 7th left intercostal spaces are lacerated.

Stomach is empty.

(Sgd.)

SUPT. DARIO L. GAJARDO MS (PNP)

CONCLUSION:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Cause of death is cardio-respiratory arrest due to shock and hemorrhage secondary to multiple stab wounds in the
trunk. 11

Dr. Gajardo testified that the victim sustained 30 stab wounds on her body, six of which, located on the lungs and
the heart, were fatal. Four injuries were found to be ordinary marks, signs that the victim was tied with a rope or
something that was rough. 12 When asked what kind of weapon could have caused the wounds on the victim’s
body, Dr. Gajardo stated that the instrument was pointed, containing no edges, much like an ice pick. 13

SPO2 Geronimo Estacio, of PNP Station 1 in La Loma, Quezon City, testified that on October 19, 1991, he received
a call from an informant who said that Pedro Francisco, Romeo Romero, and Salvador Gregorio were responsible
for the killing of Purita Santos Luey and the robbery in the victim’s house and that the suspects could be found at
No. 86 Kaingin Road, Barangay Apolonio Samson. Accordingly, SPO2 Estacio said, he and two other policemen
proceeded to the address given and, with the assistance of a barangay official, found Pedro Francisco sleeping on
a bench. He testified that Pedro Francisco voluntarily went with them to PNP Station 1 in La Loma, Quezon City
and that, on their way, Francisco admitted participation in the commission of the crime. 14 According to SPO2
Estacio, Francisco pointed to accused-appellant Romeo Romero and Salvador Gregorio as his companions in
committing the crime. 15

In the morning of October 21, 1991, Francisco led SPO2 Estacio and some policemen to a house in Malinta,
Valenzuela where Romeo Romero and Salvador Gregorio were believed to be hiding. 16 The police failed to find
the two suspects, but they were able to recover from the place a Sony Betamax and adaptor which, according to
Pedro Francisco, he and his companions had taken from the house of victim Purita Santos Luey. 17 The Sony
Betamax (Exh. M) and adaptor (Exh. N) were later identified in court by Ping Yan Luey as among the items
missing from his house after his wife had been killed. 18

On October 22, 1991, Pedro Francisco expressed to SPO2 Mendez his willingness to give a statement in
connection with the crime. After apprising Pedro Francisco of his constitutional rights, SPO2 Mendez accompanied
the former that same afternoon to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Office in Quezon City, where they
were referred to Atty. Florimond Ross. 19 The lawyer asked Francisco to execute a formal request for legal
representation. 20 Francisco made the request (Exh. K), after which he was asked to remove some of his clothing
to determine if there were signs of external bodily injuries. The lawyer found none. 21 Thereafter, Atty. Ross
conferred with Pedro Francisco and informed him of the legal consequences of his confession. 22 Francisco said
he was willing to make the confession. 23 Afterwards, SPO2 Mendez again informed Pedro Francisco of his
constitutional rights. 24 In the presence of Atty. Ross, SPO2 Mendez took down the statement of Pedro Francisco,
wherein the latter admitted involvement not only in the killing of Purita Santos Luey but also in the robbery
perpetrated on the occasion thereof. 25 In his statement, Francisco identified accused-appellant Romeo Romero
and Salvador Gregorio as his companions in committing the crime. 26

The contents of his extrajudicial confession were read to Pedro Francisco and he was asked if he was giving the
statements voluntarily and without duress. Francisco answered in the affirmative. Afterwards, he and Atty.
Florimond Ross and SPO2 Rodrigo Mendez affixed their signatures to the said document. 27

Telesforo Abogado, Jr., PNP Police Officer and resident of Pilar, Sorsogon, testified that the town fiesta of the
Municipality of Pilar is celebrated on October 11 and 12 of each year, while the fiesta of Barangay Del Rosario in
the same municipality is observed on October 6 and 7 of each year. 28

On September 6, 1993, after nearly two years of sleuthing, the police finally caught Romeo Romero in Pilar,
Sorsogon. He was brought to the PNP Station 1 in La Loma, Quezon City by the arresting officers. 29

For its part, the defense presented accused-appellant Romeo Romero, who claimed that he and his family were in
Barangay Del Rosario, Pilar, Sorsogon, attending its fiesta at the time the crime was committed on October 15,
1991. He testified that he and his family left for Bicol on October 4, 1991 and stayed there until his arrest on
September 7, 1993. 30 Accused-appellant denied knowing Pedro Francisco and Salvador Gregorio, alleging that he
came to know Francisco only in jail after his arrest. 31 No other witness was presented by the defense.chanrob1es
virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

On February 11, 1999, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding herein accused ROMEO ROMERO Y
ASIADO GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of Robbery with Homicide as defined and
penalized under Article 294, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, to indemnify the heirs of the victim Purita Santos Luey the following:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. the value of the stolen jewelries in the amount of P65,000.00;

2. indemnity for the victim’s death in the amount of P50,000.00;

3. funeral and burial expenses in the amount of P46,000.00; and,

4. costs of the suit.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

SO ORDERED. 32
Issue/s:
Hence this appeal. Accused-appellant contends that —

I. THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL CREDENCE TO THE EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION;
AND

II. THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR THE OFFENSE CHARGED. 33
Ruling:
I.

The defense contends that no person actually witnessed the perpetration of the crime and that the prosecution
evidence is entirely circumstantial and does not satisfy the quantum of proof necessary for conviction.
This contention has no merit. Under Rule 133, §4 of the Revised Rules of Evidence, circumstantial evidence is
sufficient if: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt. In this case, the chain of circumstances established by the prosecution gives rise to a fair and reasonable
conclusion that accused-appellant is one of the perpetrators of the crime, to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(1) The extrajudicial confession of co-accused Pedro Francisco;

(2) The medico-legal report (Exhs. C and E) and the testimony of Dr. Dario Gajardo;chanrob1es virtua1 1aw
1ibrary

(3) The recovery of accused-appellant’s black bullcap (Exh. EE) from the scene of the crime; and

(4) The positive identification of the accused Romero by witness Carlos Obal as one of the three men he had seen
hurriedly leaving the victim’s residence on the day the crime was committed, each one carrying a bag on his way
out.

We will discuss these circumstances which, in their totality, create a moral certainty as to the guilt of Accused-
Appellant.

First, as to the extrajudicial confession of co-accused Pedro Francisco in which he affirmed the circumstances
surrounding the incident, 34 we hold that such confession is valid and admissible, having been voluntarily
executed with the assistance of counsel, who explained to the accused the consequences of his confession. While
as a rule such confession cannot be used as evidence against a co-accused for the same is considered hearsay, it
may nevertheless be utilized as corroborative evidence to prove the existence of conspiracy among the accused in
committing the crime. As held in People v. Aquino, 35 although an extrajudicial confession is admissible only
against the confessant, it is admissible as corroborative evidence of other facts that tend to establish the guilt of
his co-accused. The implication of this rule is that there must be a finding of other circumstantial evidence which,
when taken together with the confession, establishes the guilt of a co-accused beyond reasonable
doubt.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

The following excerpt taken from accused Francisco’s sworn statement (Exh. L) clearly shows the existence of
conspiracy among the accused and the vivid details of how the crime was committed contained therein prove the
complicity and participation of accused-appellant Romeo Romero in the commission of the crime in
question:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

T: Noong petsa 15, ng Oktubre 1991 ng mga bandang ika 8:00 ng umaga nasaan ka?

A: Naglalakad na po kami ng mga kasama ko papunta sa may lugar ng krimen sir.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

T: Sino ba ang mga kasamahan mong naglalakad noong mga oras na iyon at saang partikular na lugar kayo
naglalakad?

A: Si SALVADOR GREGORIO po sir at si ROMEO sa may Cristine St., Parkway Village, Quezon City.

T: Saan ba iyong tinutukoy mong lugar ng krimen?

A: Doon po sa may bahay na may numerong 41 Cristine St., Parkway Village po.

T: Ano ba ang dala dala mo ng kayo ay magpunta doon sa may no. 41 Cristine St.?

A: Wala po akong dala-dala sir.

T: Itong si Salvador Gregorio, ano naman ang dala niya kung mayroon man?
A: Bag po na kulay itim na medyo malaki.

T: Ano naman ang laman ng naturang bag?

A: Isang T-shirt po niya sir.

T: Bukod sa bag mayroon ka pa bang nakitan (sic) ibang dala itong si Salvador?chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

A: Wala na po akong napansin na dala niya o hawak.

T: Ito namang si ROMEO ano ang dala niya kung mayroon?

A: Wala din po siyang hawak o dala sir.

T: Mayroon akong ipakikita sa iyong mga sisidlan ng ice pick sabihin mo nga kung ano ang nalalaman mo dito?

A: Iyon pong malaki ay sisidlan ng ice pick ni Romeo at iyong isa naman po ay kay ADOR.

T: Mayroon akong ipakikita sa iyong isang sombrero na kulay itim na may tatak na letter na kulay pula, sino ba
ang may-ari o maysuot nito?

A: Iyan po ay suot ni Romeo ng magpunta kami doon sa no. 41 Cristine St., Parkway Village, Q.C.

T: Mayroon naman akong ipakikita sa iyong isang liyabe at tubo na kulay pula, sino ang nakita mong maydala
nito?chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

A: Ang nakita ko pong may bitbit niya (sic) ay si Romeo.

T: Paano ba kayong nakapasok doon sa may no. 41 Cristine St. sa may Parkway Village?

A: Kumatok po kami sa may bakal na pintuan at kami po ay pinagbuksan ni Mrs. [Luey].

T: Kayo ba naman ay pinatuloy o kusang pinapasok ni Mrs. LUEY sa kanilang bakuran?

A: Opo, sir.

T: Bakit naman kayo pinapasok ni Mrs. LUEY, kayo ba ay dati na niyang kakilala?

A: Kilala po kami ni Mrs. LUEY sir, dahilan sa kami po ay gumawa na dati o nagtrabaho sa kanilang bahay.

T: Nang makapasok kayo sa bakuran nila Mrs. LUEY ano ang ginawa ninyo?chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

A: Bigla na lamang pong tinutukan ni ROMEO ng ice pick si Misis at inakap ito.

T: Pagkatapos ano pa ang nangyari?

A: Hinatak po nila si Misis sa loob ng bahay, at bigla na lamang sinaksak ni Romeo sa may pintuan ng kusina at
sinuntok naman nitong si ADOR sa mukha si Misis at ng makapasok sa loob ay pinagsasaksak na nila ito sa harap
at sa likod.

T: Ano naman ang ginawa mo habang sinasaksak ng dalawa si Mrs. LUEY?

A: Hawak-hawak ko po sa dalawang kamay si Misis.

T: Sino ba ang nagtali ng kuryente ng telepono sa leeg at kamay ni Mrs. LUEY?

A: Si ADOR po, sir.

T: Mayroon akong ipakikitang isang Betamax sa iyo, at isang adaptor, sabihin mo nga sa akin kung saan ito
galing?chanrob1es virtua1 law library

A: Ng bumaba po sina Ador at Romeo galing sa itaas ay dala dala na po nila iyan.

T: Nalalaman mo ba na mayroon pa silang nakuhang mga alahas na nagkakahalaga ng animnaput limang libong
piso sa kabuuan at hindi malamang halaga ng pera natin at Dolyar?

A: Hindi ko po alam sir.

T: Bakit naman hindi mo alam?

A: Dahilan sa sila lamang po ang naghalughog ng bahay.

T: Hindi ba at usapan na ninyong bukod sa pagnanakawan ay papatayin ninyong talaga itong si Mrs. Luey dahilan
sa kayo ay kakilala niya?

A: Opo sir, usapan po namin iyon habang naglalakad kami papunta doon.

T: Ang ibig mong sabihin ay wala kang ginawa habang nandoon [k]ayo sa loob ng naturang bahay?chanrob1es
virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

A: Nandoon lamang po ako at nakatayo at nakabantay sa pintuan sa kusina.

T: Doon pa lamang sa may kainan ay bumagsak na at patay na marahil si Mr. LUEY sino ba ang kumaladkad sa
kanya patungong salas?

A: Si Salvador po si (sic), siya ang humila sa buhok.

T: Sino naman ang nagtali pa sa paa ng biktima sa may iron grill?

A: Si Salvador din po sir.

T: Saan ninyo inilagay itong mga Beta at adaptor ng kayo ay papaalis na?

A: Sa bag po na kulay itim na dala nila.

T: Hindi ba ikaw ang isa sa mga sumaksak sa biktimang si Mrs. LUEY?

A: Hindi po sir.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw library

T: Nasaan naman ngayon ang mga panaksak na ginamit ng dalawa?

A: Dala po nila sir.

T: Ikaw ba ay binigyan nila ng pera?

A: Opo, binigyan po ako ni Salvador noong Miyerkoles ng gabi ng halagang limandaang piso po.
T: Nasaan na ngayon itong dalawang ito?

A: Nakatakas po sila sir.

T: Sino naman ang nagtabi o nagtago nitong Beta at Adaptor?

A: Dala po iyan ni Salvador patungong Malinta.

T: Pansamantala ay wala na akong itatanong sa iyo, may gusto ka pa bang sabihin?chanrob1es virtua1 1aw
1ibrary

A: Wala na po. 36

After the execution of his extrajudicial confession, Accused Francisco led the police to the lair of his co-accused in
Malinta, Valenzuela where the authorities recovered the Betamax (Exh. M) and adaptor (Exh. N) which had been
taken from the victim’s house. The adaptor contained the name of its owner "Luey," 37 whereas a similar label
attached to the Betamax was removed. 38

Second are the Medico-Legal Report (Exh. C) and the testimony of Dr. Dario Gajardo that the victim died of
"cardio-respiratory arrest due to shock and hemorrhage secondary to multiple stab wounds in the trunk." In his
testimony, Dr. Gajardo explained that of the 34 marks found on the victim’s body, four were ordinary marks while
the rest were stab wounds, six of which were fatal. 39 He explained that, based on their nature, the wounds were
probably inflicted by a pointed instrument, possibly by an ice pick. 40 The possibility of the use of an ice pick in
the stabbing of the victim explains the presence of the two ice pick scabbards at the scene of the crime and
corroborates the statement of accused Pedro Francisco that his co-accused used an ice pick in stabbing the victim.
41

Third is the recovery of accused-appellant’s black bullcap, with the letter "E" engraved on it, from the scene of the
crime, 42 which confirms Pedro Francisco’s statement that accused-appellant wore a black cap bearing a red letter
marking on it when they went to the Luey residence. 43

Fourth is the positive identification of accused-appellant by Carlos Obal, who testified that on October 15, 1991, as
he was approaching the residence of the victim, he saw accused-appellant, together with the two other accused,
hurriedly coming out of the gate. Positive identification may be provided not only by a witness actually identifying
an accused as the one who perpetrated the crime but also by one who has seen the accused at the scene of the
crime on or about the time of the alleged incident. As this Court explained in People v. Gallarde: 44

. . . Positive identification pertains essentially to proof of identity and not per se to that of being an eyewitness to
the very act of commission of the crime. There are two types of positive identification. A witness may identify a
suspect or accused in a criminal case as the perpetrator of the crime as an eyewitness to the very act of the
commission of the crime. This constitutes direct evidence. There may, however, be instances where, although a
witness may not have actually seen the very act of commission of a crime, he may still be able to positively
identify a suspect or accused as the perpetrator of a crime as for instance when the latter is the person or one of
the persons last seen with the victim immediately before and right after the commission of the crime. This is the
second type of positive identification, which forms part of circumstantial evidence, which, when taken together
with other pieces of evidence constituting an unbroken chain, leads to only fair and reasonable conclusion, which
is that the accused is the author of the crime to the exclusion of all others. If the actual eyewitnesses are the only
ones allowed to possibly positively identify a suspect or accused to the exclusion of others, then nobody can ever
be convicted unless there is an eyewitness, because it is basic and elementary that there can be no conviction
until and unless an accused is positively identified. Such a proposition is absolutely absurd, because it is settled
that direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial court may draw its
conclusion and finding of guilt. If resort to circumstantial evidence would not be allowed to prove identity of the
accused on the absence of direct evidence, then felons would go free and the community would be denied proper
protection.
In the case at bar, although prosecution witness Carlos Obal did not witness the robbery and the killing of the
victim, he saw accused-appellant and the latter’s companions leaving the Luey residence in a hurry and carrying a
bag 45 on the day the crime was committed. Considering the statement of Pedro Francisco that he and his
companions were at the Lueys residence at around 8 o’clock in the morning 46 and Obal’s testimony that he saw
the three as they were leaving the Luey residence at around the same time, 47 there is reason to believe that
accused-appellant and his companions indeed committed the crime.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

We find no reason to doubt Obal’s testimony, absent any showing that he had any motive to testify falsely against
Accused-Appellant. His positive identification of accused-appellant carries greater weight than the latter’s bare
denial and his self-serving claim that he was in Pilar, Sorsogon at the time of the commission of the crime in
Quezon City. 48 As we have more than once said, alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of an
accused. 49 It crumbles in the face of clear and positive identification by the prosecution witnesses that the
accused was a participant in the commission of the crime. 50 For this reason, it is considered the weakest defense
an accused can invoke. 51 It is noteworthy that no witness was presented by the defense in the case at bar to
corroborate accused-appellant’s claim that he was in Barangay Del Rosario, Pilar, Sorsogon on October 15, 1991
to attend the barrio fiesta.

On the other hand, the prosecution presented Telesforo Abogado, Jr. of the PNP of Pilar, who said the barrio
fiesta of Barangay Del Rosario is observed on October 6-7 of each year, while the town fiesta of Pilar is observed
on October 11-12 each year, and not on October 15, the day the crime was committed.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw
1ibrary

It is likewise noteworthy that accused-appellant gave his address as No. 86 Kaingin Road, Balintawak, Quezon
City. 52 This is the same address of accused Pedro Francisco (Exh. L), because in fact the lot, where their houses
can be found, is a squatter’s area. Accused-appellant’s admission tends to confirm the testimony of prosecution
witness Carlos Obal that he knew accused-appellant Romeo Romero because he (Obal) had once seen accused-
appellant in the house of accused Pedro Francisco. Carlos Obal said the distance between the house of Pedro
Francisco and that of Romeo Romero was only about two to three houses away. 53 It is not true that, as accused-
appellant claims, he came to know Francisco only when he met him in jail. Indeed, the trial court observed in its
decision that accused-appellant and Francisco were close and intimate towards each other whenever they were
brought to the court for trial.

II.

We now consider the accused-appellant’s civil liability. For the death of Purita Santos Luey (Exh. D), Accused-
appellant should be ordered to pay her legal heirs the amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity and P46,500.00 as
expenses for the funeral services and the payment of a burial lot, which were duly proved (Exhs. H to J) by the
prosecution. However, the award of actual damages for the alleged loss of jewelry cannot be sustained for lack of
competent evidence to prove it. In People v. Oliano, 54 it was held:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

We cannot, however, sustain the award of actual damages. To seek recovery of actual damages, it is necessary to
prove the actual amount of loss with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof and on the
best evidence obtainable by the injured party. In this case, we find no such proof to sustain the award of actual
damages. The prosecution merely presented a bond paper containing a list of the expenses allegedly incurred
from the killing to the burial of Benjamin Matias. They did not present any receipt or other evidence to support the
claim. Nonetheless, appellant should pay the heirs of the deceased temperate damages in the amount of P10,000.
Under Article 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate damages "may be recovered when the Court finds that some
pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be proved with
certainty."cralaw virtua1aw library

In this case, save for the testimony of Ping Yan Luey, Purita’s husband, as to the existence and estimated value of
the jewelry allegedly owned by the deceased and taken by the accused, no, other evidence, such as receipts, was
presented by the prosecution to prove that such pieces of jewelry indeed existed and that the same were taken by
the accused-appellant and his companions. 55 As stated before, when the police and investigators arrived at the
scene of the crime, there were already several people inside the premises, anyone of whom could have taken the
jewelry. Indeed, even Pedro Francisco stated in his extrajudicial confession that he did not know whether such
pieces of jewelry actually existed and, if they did, that they were taken by his co-accused. He testified that he saw
accused-appellant and Salvador Gregorio going up the second story of the house of the Lueys and, upon coming
back, bringing with them items stashed in their bags. Consequently, the amount of P65,000.00 (P75,000.00 minus
P10,000.00 representing the value of the Betamax and adaptor) claimed by the prosecution cannot be
upheld.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

In lieu of actual damages, temperate damages should be allowed the heirs of Purita Santos Luey, considering that
some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot be proved with certainty. 56 The amount of
P30,000.00 for temperate damages would be appropriate. In addition, in accordance with Art. 2219, in relation to
Art. 2206, of the Civil Code, an award of moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 is likewise reasonable. 57

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 100, Quezon City, finding accused-appellant Romeo
Romero y Asiado guilty of the complex crime of robbery with homicide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the award of P65,000.00 as actual damages is
deleted and instead accused-appellant is ordered to pay to the heirs of victim Purita Santos Luey the following
amounts:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(1) P50,000.00 as indemnity for the victim’s death;

(2) P46,500.00 for funeral and burial expenses;chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

(3) P30,000.00 as temperate damages representing the monetary equivalent of the items taken by the accused;

(4) P50,000.00 as moral damages; and

(5) Costs of this suit.

SO ORDERED.
6. People vs. Aquino, 310 SCRA 437, G.R. Nos. 123550-51 July 19, 1999
Doctrines:
Criminal Law; Criminal Procedure; Plea of Guilty; Confession; Testimony; A confession is presumed to
be voluntary until the contrary is proved so that once the prosecution has shown that there was
compliance with the constitutional requirement of pre-interrogation advisories, a confession is
presumed to be voluntary and declarant bears the burden of proving that his confession is voluntary
and true.—Needless to say, a confession is presumed to be voluntary until the contrary is proved so that once the
prosecution has shown that there was compliance with the constitutional requirement on pre-interrogation advisories,
a confession is presumed to be voluntary and the declarant bears the burden of proving that his confession is
involuntary and untrue. We find that appellant Catap was unable to discharge that burden.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; An extra-judicial confession is admissible only against the
confessant, jurisprudence makes it admissible as corroborative evidence of other facts that tend to
establish the guilt of his co-accused.—But what is now the effect of Catap’s confession upon the guilt of his co-
accused Aquino who was implicated in said confession? In this regard, the rule is that although an extra-judicial
confession is admissible only against the confessant, jurisprudence makes it admissible as corroborative evidence of
other facts that tend to establish the guilt of his co-accused. The implication of this rule, therefore, is that there must
be a finding of other circumstantial evidence which when taken together with the confession would establish the guilt
of a co-accused beyond reasonable doubt. Applying this precept to Aquino’s case, this Court finds, upon a
painstaking scrutiny of the records, that circumstantial evidence shown by the prosecution failed to meet the
quantum of proof required for his conviction.

Same; Same; Penalties; Indemnification for the victim shall be in the amount of P75,000.00 if the
crime of rape is committed or effectively qualified, as in the instant case, by any of the circumstances
under which the death penalty is authorized by the applicable amendatory law.—We now discuss the issue
of indemnity. In line with the new policy adopted by the Court, the award of the trial court in the civil aspect of the
case must be modified. Under this policy, the indemnification for the victim shall be in the amount of P75,000.00 if
the crime of rape is committed or effectively qualified, as in the instant case, by any of the circumstances under
which the death penalty is authorized by the applicable amendatory laws. In addition, the Court ruled that in crimes
of rape the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages must be awarded to the victim without the need for pleading or
proof of the basis thereof.

Facts:
PER CURIAM:

For as long as constitutional safeguards are adequately complied with, a confession constitutes
evidence of the highest order since it is supported by the strong presumption that no person of
normal mind would deliberately and knowingly confess to a crime unless prompted by truth and his
conscience. 1 But since voluntariness in making such confession gives it its court's duty to determine
in every case that no undue pressure of whatever nature would taint it and render the same
inadmissible in evidence. We are not, however, lacking in guidance. In the early case of People v.
Paciano Cruz, 2 this Court ruled that the voluntariness of a confession may be inferred from its
language, such that if upon its face the confession exhibits no sign of suspicious circumstances
tending to cast doubt on its integrity, it being replete with details which could possibly be supplied
only by the accused, reflecting spontaneity and coherence which psychologically cannot be
associated with a mind to which violence and torture have been applied, the confession may be
considered as having been given voluntarily. It is in this light that the Court shall now resolve the
trial court's imposition of the capital punishment on the accused-appellants. X 1âwphi1.nêt

Records disclose that on October 11, 1994, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal charged
Leonardo Aquino y Calot, Eduardo Catap y Estrada and Jover Lofamia y Perlas with the complex
crime of rape with homicide under the following informations:

Criminal Case No. 107065-H

That on or about the 1st day of October 1994, in the Municipality of Pasig, Metro Manila, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Leonardo Aquino y Calot, with the
indispensable cooperation of accused Eduardo Catap y Estrada and accused Jover Lofamia Y Perlas,
all accused with lewd designs and by means of force, threats and intimidation, did, then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with one Angelita Anillo, six (6) years of
age; that on the occasion of said rape, the above-named accused taking advantage of their superior
strength, nocturnity and with intent to kill, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault, strangle and inflict physical injuries upon said Angelita Anillo, which directly caused
her death.

Contrary to law. 3X

Criminal Case No. 107066-H

That on or about the 1st day of October 1994, in the Municipality of Pasig, Metro Manila, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Eduardo Catap y Estrada, with the
indispensable cooperation of accused Leonardo Aquino y Calot and accused Jover Lofamia y Perlas,
all accused with lewd designs and by means of force, threats and intimidation, did, then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with one Angelita Anillo, six (6) years of
age; that on the occasion of said rape, the above-named accused taking advantage of their superior
strength, nocturnity and with intent to kill, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault, strangle and inflict physical injuries upon said Angelita Anillo, which directly caused
her death.

Contrary to law. 4X

Criminal Case No. 107067-H

That on or about the 1st day of October 1994, in the Municipality of Pasig, Metro Manila, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Leonardo Aquino y Calot, with the
indispensable cooperation of accused Eduardo Catap y Estrada and accused Jover Lofamia y Perlas
(sic), all accused with lewd designs and by means of force, threats and intimidation, did, then and,
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with one Angelita Anillo, six (6)
years of age; that on the occasion of said rape, the above-named accused taking advantage of their
superior strength, nocturnity and with intent to kill, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault, strangle and inflict physical injuries upon said Angelita Anillo, which
directly caused her death.

Contrary to law. 5X

Upon arraignment on November 16, 1994, all of the accused pleaded not guilty to the charges. Joint
trial on the merits soon followed establishing the following material facts:

Prosecution witness Ernesto Coronado, the victim's uncle, testified that upon arriving at home on the
evening of October 1, 1994, he noticed Jover Lofamia, Dick Magpili and three others having a
drinking spree in front of his house where the victim, Angelita Anillo, was likewise staying. At around
9:00 o'clock in the evening, accused-appellant Aquino came to his house looking for Rolando
Laureano but since Laureano was not there, Aquino left. Later, Ernesto heard the victim come home
also looking for Laureano, purportedly upon Aquino's request. It was at about 11:00 o'clock of that
evening when Ernesto last saw the victim alive. Upon learning subsequently that the victim was
missing, he joined her relatives in searching for her. 6X

Aurora Anillo, the victim's mother, testified that at around 9:00 o'clock in the evening of October 1,
1994, she was busy lulling her son to sleep when she felt the need to go to the toilet. On the way to
the toilet which was located outside of their house, she passed by a group of men, one of whom
was later identified as Jover Lofamia, having a drinking spree in front of their house. After half an
hour, she went back to the house. She checked her daughter but found that she was not in her
room. Alarmed, she immediately looked for her together with some of her relatives but their efforts
were futile. She then solicited the help of a radio station and their barangay captain. 7 The dead
body of her daughter would later turn up after four days in a vacant lot at Christine Village, Bgy.
Dela Paz, Pasig.X

SPO4 Remigio Bugnot testified that on October 5, 1994, a dead body of a little girl who was later
identified as that of the victim Angelita was reportedly found in a vacant lot in Christine Village. The
police branch chief who received the said report immediately dispatched an investigating team to
verify it. The investigation team conducted an ocular inspection of the crime scene and gathered
pieces of physical evidence like the victim's underwear, short pants, five bottles of "Merko" syrup,
and a broken shovel. 8X

The medico-legal officer, Dr. Emmanuel Aranas, testified that, pursuant to a letter-request from Sr.
Inspector Felix Bulatao, he conducted an autopsy on the decomposing body of the victim, to
determine the cause of death. 9 Post-mortem examination yielded the following results: 10X

FINDINGS:

Fairly developed, fairly nourished female child cadaver in beginning state of decomposition. The 5th
left toe is missing.

HEAD, NECK AND EXTREMETIES:

1. Lacerated wound, frontal region, measuring 1 x 0.7 cm., just right of anterior midline.

2. Lacerated wound, frontal region, measuring 1.5 x 9.6 cm., 4 cm left of anterior midline.

3. Contusion, neck, measuring 5 x 3 cm., bisected by the anterior midline.

4. Lacerated wound, dorsal aspect of the right hand, measuring 1.5 x 1 cm, 3 cm lateral to its
posterior midline.

5. Lacerated wound, perineum, measuring 5 x 3 cm, bisected by its midline with extrusion of the
small intestine.

6. Hematoma, middle third of the right thigh, measuring 19 x 6 cm, 10 cm medial to its anterior
midline.

The brain is liquefied.

The tracheal luminae reveals hemorrhages.

The anterior aspect of the uterine wall is lacerated with herniation of the small intestine.

Stomach is empty and the rest of the visceral organs are autolyzed.
EXTRAGENITAL AND GENITAL:
The breasts are undeveloped. There is absence of pubic hair. The labia majora and minora are
bloated. The anterior aspect of the vaginal wall as well as the cervix are lacerated.

Vaginal, peri-urethral and intrauterine smears are negative for gram-negative diplococci and for
spermatozoa. . . .

CONCLUSION:

Cause of death is Asphyxia by strangulation.

Subject is in non-virgin state physically.

To show that the victim was last seen in the company of the accused, the prosecution presented
Junior Caloma, a 15-year old tricycle driver who testified that on October 5, 1994, he was accosted
by a police officer who asked him if he had a driver's license. In the course of the inquiry, he was
allegedly asked if he knew something about the disappearance of Angelita Anillo. He then related to
the police officer that on the night in question, he saw the victim boarding a tricycle together with
accused Eduardo Catap and two others whom he did not recognize. 11X

On October 5, 1994, accused Eduardo Catap was arrested and brought to the Pasig Police Station.
Assisted by counsel, Atty. Reynario Campanilla, and Councilor Ernesto Dimapili, Catap gave a sworn
statement implicating a certain Reynaldo Magpili as having raped and killed the young Angelita
Anillo. 12 Subsequently, Catap intimated to Atty. Campanilla that he wanted to give another
confession, whereupon Atty. Campanilla asked him to write it down himself, which he did. 13 This
was followed by another sworn statement wherein Catap confessed that he and accused Leonardo
Aquino raped Angelita Anillo and that Aquino killed her. 14X

On the part of the defense, Leonardo Aquino denied any participation in the commission of the
crime for which he was indicted. He claims that at about 5:30 o'clock in the afternoon of October 1,
1994, after finishing his work as a helper (peon) in a demolition site, he went straight to his
grandmother's house and had dinner there. Thereafter, he proceeded to his uncle's residence where
mahjong was being played. He allegedly stayed there until 10:20 o'clock that night after which he
sat inside a parked tricycle owned by his brother and slept. He only woke up at around 3:00 to 4:00
a.m. the following day and then went home to sleep some more, eventually getting up at past 6:00
o'clock in the morning. Later, Rolando Laureano arrived to confirm whether he was looking for him.
He was informed by Laureano that Angelita Anillo was missing. 15X

On October 3, 1994, Aquino went to his aunt's house to paint her gate. After finishing his job, he
proceeded to Bataan on October 7 to give his earnings to his wife. At about 2:00 o'clock in the
afternoon of October 9, a team of seven policemen arrived at his house, introduced themselves as
members of the Pasig City police, and invited him for questioning to shed light on the disappearance
of the victim. While inside the vehicle on the way to Pasig, Metro Manila, a certain Fidelino allegedly
kicked him and forced him to admit having committed the crime. 16 His maltreatment, according to
him, resumed at the Pasig Police Headquarters, 17 but he did not disclose the same to media men
loitering about in the station or to his lawyer as he was warned by a certain SPO1 Mansibang not to
say anything that would destroy the image of the police force. Neither did he file an administrative
complaint against the policemen who allegedly tortured him. 18X
He testified further that during the investigation of the case, Catap's name was mentioned but he
denied having associated himself with the latter who was much younger than him. He saw how
Catap was manhandled by PO1 Fidelino and SPO1 Mansibang which abuse eventually forced Catap
to point to him as one of those who participated in the commission of the crime. 19X

Appellant Eduardo Catap likewise denied any involvement in the crime. According to him, he never
saw Atty. Campanilla sign his extra-judicial confession and that even if he signed his extra-judicial
confession, the same was not in the presence of said lawyer. For this reason, he claimed that his
extra-judicial confession was taken in violation of his constitutional rights. He admitted, however,
knowing the victim as "Helen" and that he was familiar with the victim's relatives who were residing
at F. Mariano St., Barangay dela Paz, Pasig City.

During his testimony, Catap claimed that after eating supper at home on October 1, 1994, a friend,
Vergel Alviz, invited him to have a drinking session. Later, they met co-accused Jover Lofamia,
together with other friends. The group then proceeded to the Bakahan/Manukan Apartment situated
near Catap's house where they drank two bottles of gin. Catap eventually fell asleep only to be
awakened later by Jay Azar and Nanding who requested him to buy two more bottles of gin so they
could continue their drinking session. He acceded to their request and so he went to a nearby sari-
sari store located in front of the victim's house. While there, he met Maricel Coronado and her
husband who informed him that the victim was missing. He brought the two bottles of gin to his
friends, then he allegedly joined the group searching for the victim. 20X

To corroborate Catap's testimony, Maricel Coronado testified that she indeed saw Catap in front of
the store and that he even joined the search party when it went to an apartment where the victim
usually played. 21X

Catap's mother, Estrellita, testified that in the early evening of October 1, 1994, her son arrived from
his work as a tricycle driver, turned over to her the key to the tricycle and the boundary earned for
the day, and then asked permission to go drinking with a friend. It was already 9:00 o'clock in the
morning of the following day when Catap returned home. She learned of Catap's arrest on October
5, and when she visited him at the Pasig Police Headquarters, she noticed that his face was swollen,
so she sought the assistance of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR). She denied having hired
the legal services of Atty. Campanilla to assist her son in the execution of the latter's alleged extra-
judicial confession. 22X

Acting upon the request of Catap's mother, Carlos Sabile, Jr., the CHR's Special Investigator,
testified that he took the sworn statement of Catap in the evening of October 17, 1994, at the Pasig
Detention Center and noticed the contusions on the latter's body. Catap allegedly sustained said
contusions when he was mauled by other prisoners detained therein. 23X

Finally, Vergel Alviz testified that he was with Catap and Lofamia in the evening of October 1, 1994
having a drinking session at the Bakahan/Manukan Apartment along F. Mariano St., Barangay dela
Paz, Pasig City. The last time he saw Catap was at around 11:00 o'clock of that evening when the
latter bought liquor from a store. 24X

The prosecution then presented rebuttal evidence in the form of the testimony of Atty. Reynario
Campanilla. According to Atty. Campanilla, Pasig City policemen went to his apartment in Pasig City
and informed him that there was someone who wanted to engage his services as counsel in
connection with that person's intention to execute an extra-judicial confession. He asked who it was
and was told that it was appellant Catap. At the police headquarters, he verified from Catap whether
he really wanted to execute an extra-judicial confession. At that time, Catap had a female
companion and there were several policemen around. In order to ensure that the extra-judicial
confession will be made voluntarily and without pressure from the policemen, Atty. Campanilla
brought Catap to the police captain's room where they talked in private. Atty. Campanilla informed
Catap of his constitutional rights, more particularly the right to counsel, the right to remain silent,
and that anything he would say might be used against him. He further declared before the trial
court that at the time Catap gave his extra-judicial confession, nobody inflicted physical harm on
him, Atty. Campanilla even requested the policemen for the medical examination of Catap before his
confession is taken. He likewise asked Catap if he really wanted legal services and Catap answered
in the affirmative. Finally, this witness testified that he instructed Catap to write down his
confession. 25 Considering, however, that Catap made two extra-judicial confessions on different
dates implicating different persons in each, Atty. Campanilla clarified that in both instances, he
apprised Catap of his constitutional rights, and let him write and sign his confession. Thus: X

Q: Mr, witness, you said you also requested Catap to sign this handwritten Extra Judicial Confession
marked as exh. "O" and wherein he implicated Andeing Aquino as the one who raped the young
Angelita and the fact that Aquino was the one who killed the child, before Eduardo Catap affixed his
signature thereon, what steps did you undertake if any to safeguard the rights of the accused
Catap?

A: Again, I apprised him of his constitutional rights.

Q: Thereafter, what did Aquino (sic) do?

A: He voluntarily signed and made those statements.

Q: You identified exh. "O-1" which is the second extra judicial confession executed on Oct. 9, 1994
which was a clear reflection of exh. "O," the handwritten statement. After the preparation of this
exh. "O-1," what steps if any did you undertake to safeguard the constitutional rights of the
accused?

A: As I said, I apprised him of his constitutional rights, I asked him to read the statement and I
explained to him in details the contents thereof and I asked him if he understood the same,
thereafter he voluntarily signed this documents together with me, I also signed the document.

Q: Were there people present when this was voluntarily signed by Catap?

A: Yes, ma'am.

Q: Could you recall who were present?

A: There were lots of people present at that time but I really do not know whether they were
policemen or media men, because there were many people at that time.

Q: Mr. witness, there was yet an allegation of the defense witness Aquino to the effect that it was
upon your instruction that Catap implicated himself, Leonardo Aquino in this case. When Catap was
executing or giving the extra judicial confession, what can you say to that?

A: When I arrived during the second time, Catap already told me that Aquino was his company and
he changed his previous statement that there was another person, I cannot remember the name. I
could not have induce Catap to implicate Aquino because Mr. Aquino was not known to me, so with
Catap, and I don't think that is in accordance with my oath as a lawyer. 26X

After the parties formally rested, the trial court rendered its decision 27 on December 1, 1995,
convicting Leonardo Aquino and Eduardo Catap as charged and acquitting Jover Lofamia. The
disposition portion of the decision reads:X

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby renders judgment finding accused
LEONARDO AQUINO and EDUARDO CATAP GUILTY beyond reasonable doubts of two (2) counts of
Rape with Homicide each and imposed the penalty of:

1. DEATH to both accused, in Criminal Case No. 107065-H;

2 DEATH to both accused, in Criminal Case No. 107066-H;

3. To jointly and solidarily indemnify the heirs of the victim Angelita Anillo the sum of P100,000.00
for each case; and

4. pay the cost of suit.

Accused JOVER LOFAMIA is hereby ACQUITTED as far as these cases are concerned for want of
proof beyond reasonable doubt. The Court orders his immediate release from detention unless held
for some other lawful cause or causes.

Criminal Case No. 107067-H is hereby ordered DISMISSED for lack of evidence.

Considering the penalties imposed, let the records of this case be elevated to the Supreme Court
within the reglementary period.

SO ORDERED.

In convicting appellants, the trial court gave full faith and credit to the extra-judicial confession
executed by Catap and the circumstantial evidence pointing to them as the perpetrators of the
crime. As explained by the trial court:

Admittedly, there is not one iota of evidence on record as to the manner by which the rape was
committed or to the acts done by the perpetrators which ultimately led to or caused the death of the
victim. In cases such as this when the victim dies, and more importantly when rape was committed
prior to said death, it is seldom if not ever that there is an eyewitness to the act itself. The Court
thus, relies on mainly circumstantial evidence, which in the natural course of things would lead to
the obvious conclusion and to the identity of the perpetrators. This is further strengthened if an
extrajudicial confession is subsequently executed by one of the perpetrators. As the testimony of the
confessant is usually the only direct evidence available, the Court is inclined to give credit to the
veracity of said confession if the same fits with the corroborative testimonies of other prosecution
witnesses. 28X
Issue/s:
With this case now on automatic review in light of the death sentence, appellants raise the following
errors 29 of the trial court, to wit:X

I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE EXTRAJUDICIAL
CONFESSION OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT EDUARDO CATAP.

II

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF RAPE WITH HOMICIDE.

Ruling:
According to appellants, the extra-judicial confession upon which the trial court placed heavy
emphasis to convict them was tainted with infirmity for non-compliance with the constitutional
guidelines. To them, appellant Catap, who executed two confessions, the second one implicating
appellant Aquino, acted under duress and without the benefit of a counsel of his choice. Appellants
averred, thus:

The circumstances attendant to its [the second confession] execution would readily show that it was
taken in violation of the constitutional rights of the accused.

As testified to by accused Catap he never retained the services of Atty. Campanilla to assist him in
the execution of the said written confession. No less than prosecution witness Investigator Remigio
Dugnot testified that he fetched Atty. Reynaldo Campanilla as the accused was allegedly ready to
execute a written confession as regards his participation is ( sic) the commission of the said crime.
We submit that on this score alone, the constitutional right of the accused to be assisted by a
counsel of his choice, as emphasized in RA-No. 7438, was already blatantly violated.

Assuming arguendo that Atty. Campanilla was the accused' counsel of choice at the time he
executed the said written confession, it is rather strange why he repeatedly remind ( sic) the accused
of his right to remain silent and right to counsel before the confession was reduced into writing and
before the accused affixed his signature thereon (TSN, pp. 9-11, Oct. 6, 1995).

Said lawyer's actuation only shows that he was not at the time acting as counsel for the accused but
as an investigator helping in the conduct of the interrogation. Moreover, the presence of several
policemen led by Capt. Balitao and Oscar Mansibang, at the time Catap executed his written
confession clearly casts doubt whether the accused indeed voluntarily executed the same or under
duress. Nonetheless, said doubt has been put to rest when Catap categorically claimed in court that
he was forced and maltreated into executing his alleged confession. Catap's allegation of torture is
not unfounded. Carlos Sabile, Jr., Special Investigator of the Commission on Human Rights, before
whom the accused executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay dated October 17, 1994 (Exhibit "I") testified
that he saw contusions on the body of Catap. The injuries sustained by the accused was also
noticed by no less than Atty. Reynaldo Campanilla at the time he assisted the accused in his second
confession for which reason he no longer required the accused to submit himself to a medical
examination unlike what he did at the time the accused made his first confession. We therefore take
exception to the court's finding that no external injuries were found on the person of the accused,
as noted in the medical certificate dated October 11, 1994 issued by a certain Dr. Samuel Malinit.
Clearly, said medical certificate states the fact that the accused (sic) physical examination was
conducted on October 5, 1994, on the day the accused executed his first written confession, and not
at the time he made his second confession on which the court premised its judgment of conviction.
The aforesaid injuries sustained by the accused lend credence to his claim that his confession was
secured through force and maltreatment. Further, if it was true that accused Catap signified his
intention to confess his participation in the commission of the said crime after his arrest at the Pasig
Police Headquarters, as what the prosecution is trying to impress upon the court a quo, then what
could be the reason behind the execution of two written confessions. Certainly, there was a
compelling reason why he execute (sic) a second written confession. Moreso, it was is ( sic) the
second extra-judicial confession that Catap narrated their alleged participation in the rape with
homicide incident. Thus, accused Catap was indeed tortured into executing the said confessions. 30X

These arguments fail to persuade us.

We have painstakingly scrutinized the records of this case but we find nothing indicative of
appellants' claim that Catap's confession was extracted in violation of his constitutional rights. In the
first place, the testimonies of Atty. Campanilla who stood beside Catap and counseled him when he
executed his handwritten confession as well as that of SPO1 Ricardo de los Santos who reduced said
confession into typewritten form, clearly demonstrate that Catap was sufficiently accorded his rights
as required by law. Excerpts from Atty. Campanilla's rebuttal testimony reveal that he was indeed
retained as Catap's counsel of choice and that he adequately saw to it that Catap's rights were
amply protected at the time that he executed his first confession and likewise when he recanted and
gave another confession upon which the trial court based the conviction. Thus:

Q: When you finally decided to talk to Catap privately inside a room, what exactly did you tell Catap
about this matter?

A I apprised him of his constitutional rights, the right to counsel, the remain silent and that anything
he said might be used against him.
Q: At that point in time, was Catap aware that you were a counsel or an attorney ?

A: Yes, I was introduced by the policemen to him as a lawyer.

Q: When Catap knew or learned that you were a lawyer, what was his initial reaction, if any?

A: At first ma'am, as if he is (sic) in doubt whether to give his confession to me, but afterwards, for
reasons I do not know, he changed his mind then finally started telling me what transpired .

xxx xxx xxx

Q: What did you do in order to safeguard the rights of the accused?

A: As I have said, before I hear (sic) the confession of Catap, I apprise (sic) him of his constitutional
rights, the right to remain silent, the right to have a counsel of his choice, and that whatever he is
going to say might be use (sic) against him before any Court of Justice and likewise I told him that
if he does not want my services, I can leave at anytime .
Q: And what was the answer of Catap?

A: The answer of Mr. Catap was that he is willing to give his confession before me .

Q: And you previously stated that you are sure that no physical injuries had been inflicted upon the
person of Catap, regarding this matter, what steps, if any did you take?

A: First, I asked the policemen to have him medically examined, secondly, the confession he gave
me, I asked him, in the presence of the policemen, to write it down , and thirdly, I asked for an
identification card in order to be sure that the signature in the identification card and the signature
he is going to affix will be one and the same to be sure that he is voluntarily making such
confession.
xxx xxx xxx

Q: You said that you require accused Catap to write down the extra-judicial confession, was it first
on Oct. 5, 1994 or Oct. 9, 1994?

A: Twice ma'am.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: How many extra-judicial confessions were made actually in your presence and upon your legal
advise (sic)?

A: There were two (2).

xxx xxx xxx

Q: Initially, when you asked him to write down in his own handwriting the admission he wish ( sic) to
do, what was his reaction or actuation when you thus requested him?

A: He voluntarily wrote down those statements appearing in the said document considering that at
the time he already had his confidence on me.
Q: When you said that he had already confidence on you what actually do you mean?

A: Meaning he is willing to make those statements voluntarily having me as his counsel to assist
him. 31 [Emphasis supplied].X

SPO1 Ricardo de los Santos, on the other hand, testified in this wise:

Q: How was this giving of extra-judicial confession made before the chief investigator?

A: It was given orally before Chief Balitao ma'm.

Q: When accused Catap gave his admission or confession before Chief Investigator Balitao what
happened in particular during that particular moment?

A: Accused Catap voluntarily wrote down his answers, ma'm.

Q: And how did you come about [with] this?

A: I heard Chief Investigator Balitao told Catap if he really want to admit the crime can you write it
down.
Q: And what was the answer of Catap?

A: Yes, ma'm.

Q: At the time Catap agreed to the said suggestion of Chief Investigator Balitao was Atty.
Campanilla present?
A: Yes, ma'm.

Q: Did Catap actually write the same?

A: The answers were written in every question, ma'm.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: After Catap signed this statement what happened next, if any?

A: Capt. Balitao instructed me [to] reduce his confession into writing, ma'am.

Q: Could you please tell the Honorable Court what was the medium did you use ( sic) in reducing it
into writing?

A: Typewriting, ma'am.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: Before reducing into a typewritten form of confession of accused Catap what step, if any, did you
take as a police officer as a safeguard to the accused ?
A: I apprised him of his constitutional right and introduced myself as a police officer, ma'am .

Q: What are the constitutional right (sic) that you tell (sic) him ?

A: Right to remain silent to answer the question and answer (sic) right to be assited of (sic) counsel
of his own choice; that if he cannot afford to get a counsel of his own choice, the government is
ready or that he may avail the service of the government lawyer; and anything that he would say
may be used against him before any court, ma'm.
Q: When you apprised him of his constitutional right particularly the right of ( sic) counsel of his own
choice, what was his answer?

A: When I told him that he was the right to assisted by his counsel he said he has his own, ma'am .

Q: And who was that counsel?

A: Atty. Campanilla, ma'm.

Q: Was he present when you asked him of his counsel ?

A: When I asked his counsel he pointed to [a] man near him, ma'am .

Q: When he answered that he has his counsel and even pointed to Atty. Campanilla as his lawyer,
what other steps did you take?
A: I again repeatedly told him his rights and I asked him again why he was giving his statement,
ma'am.
Q: And what was his answer, if any?

A: He said his conscience is bothering him because Helen Anillo was about to be interred. He wants
justice, ma'm.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: So, after these answers of accused Catap what else transpired, if any?
A: I told (sic) him why are you admitting it, don't you know that if you would admit it you would be
imprisoned?
Q: And what was his answer?

A: He said he wanted that justice could be done before Helen Anillo could be interred, ma'm,

Q: After this what happened, if any?

A: I started to reduce his confession into writing, ma'm.

Q: How did you reduce into writing the statement of Catap?

A: In question and answer form, ma'm.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: You mean to say that these were the very answers from the questions propounded by you ?

A: Yes, ma'm.

Q: And while conducting this question and answer, Atty. Campanilla was there all along ?

A: Yes, ma'm.

Q: And Catap finished the confession?

A: Yes, ma'm. 32 [Emphasis supplied.]X

Subsequent cross-examination of SPO1 de los Santos showed further how Catap's rights were
adequately protected.

Q: And you said that when this statement marked as Exh. O-1 was being reduced into typewritten
form of questions and answers, Atty. Campanilla was present all the time?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: You mean to say Atty. Campanilla was teaching or coaching Catap what to answer?

A: No, sir. What I mean is before giving answer to each question I asked [and] they talked and I
just took down the answer given by Catap, sir.

Q: So, do I get you right that everytime you asked question from Catap, Catap referred the matter
to Atty. Campanilla?

A: Yes, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: Of course before you took down or reduced into writing this Exh. O-1 you managed to notice the
physical condition of accused Catap?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And is it not true that at the time he has still some contusions in every part of his body?

A: Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx

Q: And that was the physical injuries inflicted on him, is it not?

A: According to him he was mauled sir.

COURT

Q: Who mauled him according to him?

A: According to him, he was mauled by the jail inmates, sir.

ATTY. VERA.

Q: Did you inquire further from Catap why he was mauled by his inmates?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What was his answer?

A: He said his inmates were mad at them, sir.

COURT

Q: Did you verify why the inmates were mad at them so much so that they inflicted physical
injuries?

A: According to them the inmates were waiting for them as rape suspects, sir.

ATTY. VERA.

Q: Is it not true that aside from these inmates who inflicted physical injuries he told you also that
some police officers mauled him?

A: There was no such information given to me, sir.

Q: Are you sure of that?

A: Yes, sir; 33X

Aside from the above testimonies, a reading of the handwritten confession itself does not give the
slightest suspicion that undue pressure attended its execution. The language used, the manner in
which it was composed and written, as well as the fact that it was replete with details that could
only be supplied by the accused and would not have been known to the investigating police officers
were it not voluntarily made, convinces Us, appellants' protestations to the contrary
notwithstanding, that indeed the confession of Catap was made voluntarily. Appellants' claim that
they have been tortured by the police officers investigating the case in order for Catap to confess is
belied by the records. Mr. Carlos Sabile, Jr., the Special Investigator of the Commission on Human
Rights, together with a certain Dr. Jessie Cruel, visited Catap in his cell on October 17, 1994, 34 eight
days after he executed his second confession. While there was indeed a finding that Catap sustained
injuries, the testimony did not show that these were sustained at the time the confession was made
on October 9, 1994. Moreover, it was adequately explained by the testimonies on record that the
mauling was actually done by inmates. The claim that policemen ordered the same is at best
conjectural, Catap himself not having been able to identify who these policemen were. It is worth
noting that Catap never even bothered to file criminal or administrative cases against the police
officers when he had the chance to meet with the representative from the CHR who would have
given him the help he needed in filing such cases.X

In addition to the detailed manner in which the confession was made, it likewise exhibits an
exculpatory tone which, to Our mind, is an indicium of the confession's voluntary nature. 35 An
excerpt from the handwritten confession shows this:X

. . . at inontog sa pader ang bata at ako ang nauna sa bata at si Anding [Leonardo Aquino] naman
ang nahuli. . . at pero si Anding ang pumatay sa bata. . . 36 [Emphasis supplied.]X

It bears stressing that Catap's account of the events that transpired during the commission of the
crime jibed with independent evidence presented during the trial which, apart from the confession,
tend to show the commission of the crime.

As aptly observed by the Solicitor General in the Appellee's Brief: 37X

Thus, appellant Catap's admission that he, accused Jover Lofamia and appellant Aquino were in the
company of the victim in the evening of October 1, 1994 on board the tricycle driven by appellant
Catap himself is corroborated by "Onio's" testimony that he saw appellant Catap and two others with
Angelita on board a tricycle driven by appellant Catap himself on the said date and time. Also,
appellant Catap's admission that he and appellant Aquino raped Angelita, that appellant Aquino
inserted syrup bottle into Angelita's vagina and that appellant Aquino banged Angelita's head against
a wall are corroborated by Dr. Emmanuel Aranas' testimony that Angelita sustained lacerations in
the head which could have been caused by a hard blunt object and that the laceration between
Angelita's vagina and anus could have been caused by inserting a bottle with a diameter which could
be accommodated by the same area or by sexual intercourse (TSN, January 19, 1995, 8:30 a.m.,
pp. 4-16). Appellant Catap's further admission that he borrowed a shovel from Jaime Benipayo in
order to bury Angelita's cadaver is also corroborated by Jaime Benipayo's statement given to the
police investigators (TSN, Feb. 9, 1995, 2 p.m., p. 9; Exhibit "P"; People vs. Bersamin, et al. supra).

Needless to say, a confession is presumed to be voluntary until the contrary is proved 38 so that once
the prosecution has shown that there was compliance with the constitutional requirement on pre-
interrogation advisories, a confession is presumed to be voluntary and the declarant bears the
burden of proving that his confession is in voluntary and untrue. 39 We find that appellant Catap was
unable to discharge that burden.X

But what is now the effect of Catap's confession upon the guilt of his co-accused Aquino who was
implicated in said confession?

In this regard, the rule is that although an extra-judicial confession is admissible only against the
confessant, jurisprudence makes it admissible as corroborative evidence of other facts that tend to
establish the guilt of his co-accused. 40 The implication of this rule, therefore, is that there must be a
finding of other circumstantial evidence which when taken together with the confession would
establish the guilt of a co-accused beyond reasonable doubt. Applying this precept to Aquino's case,
this Court finds, upon a painstaking scrutiny of the records, that circumstantial evidence shown by
the prosecution failed to meet the quantum of proof required for his conviction. X

It is worth noting that the records do not show that Aquino was positively identified by any witness
as being with his co-accused Catap or with the victim herself during the time that the crime was
committed. The prosecution, thus, relied on the following circumstantial evidence to link Aquino to
the crime:

(1) Catap's confession itself implicating him: 41X

(2) SPO4 Bugnot's testimony to the effect that Aquino admitted before members of the media
interviewing him that he was with Catap on October 1, 1994 but pointed to Catap as the one who
actually killed the victim; 42X

(3) The autopsy report on the victim's injuries which coincided with Catap's description of how
Aquino killed the victim; 43X

(4) Junior Caloma's testimony that he saw Catap boarding a tricycle together with two other
unidentified companions and the victim herself; 44X

(5) Aquino's alleged flight to Dinalupihan, Bataan a few days after the crime was committed; and

(6) Rolando Laureano's testimony that Aquino twice sent the victim to look for him. 45X

As we have said, the foregoing circumstances, even if taken together, would not really establish that
Aquino was a participant to the crime. If these would have any value at all, they would only place
Aquino in a situation where he is a suspect and that he probably had something to do with the
crime. But the realm of suspicion and probability are not synonymous with guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. Hence the saying: "The sea of suspicion has no shore, and the court that embarks upon it is
without rudder or compass." 46X

The insufficiency of Catap's confession to convict Aquino needs no further elaboration, considering
our declaration that such confession implicating Aquino must be corroborated by independent
evidence other than the said confession. With respect to SPO4 Bugnot's testimony regarding
Aquino's alleged confession before the media, the same has been consistently denied by Aquino
both in his direct and cross-examination. Neither did the autopsy report nor Junior Caloma's
testimony point to Aquino with certainty. Anent Aquino's alleged flight to Bataan, the same has been
adequately explained by him when he testified that his family was there and that it was actually his
place of residence. Finally, Laureano's testimony that Aquino called for him through the victim did
not show at all that the victim was actually in the company of Aquino at the time she was last seen
alive.

Considering that the strength of the prosecution's evidence against Aquino falls short of the required
quantum, Aquino's guilt is indeed put in serious doubt, hence, warranting a declaration of his
innocence. Consequently, the trial court's theory that there was conspiracy and that both appellants
are each guilty of two counts of rape would not therefore be applicable anymore.

We now discuss the issue of indemnity. In line with the new policy adopted by the Court, the award
of the trial court in the civil aspect of the case must be modified. Under this policy, the
indemnification for the victim shall be in the amount of P75,000.00 if the crime of rape is committed
or effectively qualified, as in the instant case, by any of the circumstances under which the death
penalty is authorized by the applicable amendatory laws. 47 In addition, the Court ruled that in crimes
of rape the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages must be awarded to the victim without the
need for pleading or proof of the basis thereof. 48X
Anent our decision to impose the death penalty on one of the appellants in this case, four justices of
the Court have continued to maintain the unconstitutionality of Republic Act 7659 insofar as it
prescribes the death penalty; nevertheless they submit to the ruling of the majority to the effect that
this law is constitutional and that the death penalty can be lawfully imposed in the case at bar.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Pasig City Regional Trial Court, Branch 68, is hereby
MODIFIED as follows:

(a) Accused-appellant Eduardo Catap y Estrada is found GUILTY of the complex crime of rape with
homicide and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of DEATH. He is further ordered to indemnify the
victim's heirs in the reduced amount of P75,000.00 as civil liability ex delicto and to pay the
additional amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages.

(b) The trial court's finding of guilt on appellant Leonardo Aquino y Calot is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Consequently, he is hereby ACQUITTED of all charges against him. Let him then be
immediately released from his place of confinement unless there is reason to detain him further for
any other legal or valid cause.

Considering the imposition of capital punishment upon appellant Eduardo Catap y Estrada, upon
finality of this decision, let a certified true copy thereof, as well as the records of this case, be
forwarded without delay to the Office of the President for possible exercise of executive clemency
pursuant to Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of Republic Act No.
7659.

SO ORDERED.
7. People vs. Guiltap, et al., May 4, 2003, GR. No. 144621
Doctrines:
Evidence; Witnesses; Hearsay Rule; The hearsay rule bars the testimony of a witness who merely
recites what someone else has told him, whether orally or in writing.—Under Rule 130, Section 36 of the
Rules of Court, a witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his own personal knowledge, i.e.,
which are derived from his own perception; otherwise, such testimony would be hearsay. Hearsay evidence is
defined as “evidence not of what the witness knows himself but of what he has heard from others.” The hearsay
rule bars the testimony of a witness who merely recites what someone else has told him, whether orally or in
writing. In Sanvicente v. People, we held that when evidence is based on what was supposedly told the witness,
the same is without any evidentiary weight for being patently hearsay. Familiar and fundamental is the rule that
hearsay testimony is inadmissible as evidence.

Same; Same; Same; Res Inter Alios Acta Rule; The res inter alios acta rule provides that the rights of
a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another—it would not only be rightly
inconvenient, but also manifestly unjust, that a man should be bound by the acts of mere unauthorized strangers,
and if a party ought not to be bound by the acts of strangers, neither ought their acts or conduct be used as
evidence against him.—Osabel’s extrajudicial confession is likewise inadmissible against appellant. The res inter
alios acta rule provides that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of
another. Consequently, an extrajudicial confession is binding only upon the confessant and is not admissible
against his co-accused. The reason for the rule is that, on a principle of good faith and mutual convenience, a
man’s own acts are binding upon himself, and are evidence against him. So are his conduct and declarations. Yet
it would not only be rightly inconvenient, but also manifestly unjust, that a man should be bound by the acts of
mere unauthorized strangers; and if a party ought not to be bound by the acts of strangers, neither ought their
acts or conduct be used as evidence against him.

Same; Same; Same; Criminal Law; Conspiracy; In order for such admission to be admissible against
a co-accused, Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court requires that there must be independent
evidence aside from the extrajudicial confession to prove conspiracy.—The rule on admissions made by
a conspirator, while an exception to the foregoing, does not apply in this case. In order for such admission to be
admissible against a co-accused, Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court requires that there must be
independent evidence aside from the extrajudicial confession to prove conspiracy. In the case at bar, apart from
Osabel’s extrajudicial confession, no other evidence of appellant’s alleged participation in the conspiracy was
presented by the prosecution. There being no independent evidence to prove it, her culpability was not sufficiently
established.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The rule that an extrajudicial confession may be admissible when
it is used as a corroborative evidence of other facts that tend to establish the guilt of his co-accused
implies that there must be a finding of other circumstantial evidence which, when taken together
with the confession, establishes the guilt of a co-accused beyond reasonable doubt.—Unavailing also is
rule that an extrajudicial confession may be admissible when it is used as a corroborative evidence of other facts
that tend to establish the guilt of his co-accused. The implication of this rule is that there must be a finding of
other circumstantial evidence which, when taken together with the confession, establishes the guilt of a co-
accused beyond reasonable doubt. As earlier stated, there is no other prosecution evidence, direct or
circumstantial, which the extrajudicial confession may corroborate.

Criminal Law; Conspiracy; Mere knowledge, acquiescence in or agreement to cooperate is not

sufficient to constitute one as a party to a conspiracy—conspiracy transcends mere companionship.—In
People v. Berroya, we held that to hold an accused liable as co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be
shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the conspiracy. That overt act may consist
of active participation in the actual commission of the crime itself, or it may consist of moral assistance to his co-
conspirators by being present at the time of the commission of the crime, or by exerting moral ascendancy over
the other co-conspirators by moving them to execute or implement the conspiracy. In the case at bar, no overt act
was established to prove that appellant shared with and concurred in the criminal design of Osabel, Dador and
Purcino. Assuming that she had knowledge of the conspiracy or she acquiesced in or agreed to it, still, absent any
active participation in the commission of the crime in furtherance of the conspiracy, mere knowledge,
acquiescence in or agreement to cooperate is not sufficient to constitute one as a party to a conspiracy.
Conspiracy transcends mere companionship.
Same; Same; Except in the case of the mastermind of a crime, it must also be shown that the alleged
co-conspirator performed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy.—Conspiracy must be proved as
convincingly as the criminal act itself. Like any element of the offense charged, conspiracy must be established by
proof beyond reasonable doubt. Direct proof of a previous agreement need not be established, for conspiracy may
be deduced from the acts of appellant pointing to a joint purpose, concerted action and community of interest.
Nevertheless, except in the case of the mastermind of a crime, it must also be shown that appellant performed an
overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy.
Facts:
Appellant Decena Masinag Vda. de Ramos assails the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court of Lucena City, Branch
60, in Criminal Case No. 92-387, finding her and accused Cesar Osabel guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Robbery with Homicide and sentencing each of them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with all
the accessory penalties provided by law, and to indemnify the heirs of the victims the amounts of P100,000.00 as
civil indemnity and P67,800.00 as actual damages.

On September 1, 1992, an Amended Information for Robbery with Double Homicide was filed against appellant
Masinag, Isagani Guittap y Pengson, Wilfredo Morelos y Cruz, Cesar Osabel,2 Ariel Dador y De Chavez, Luisito
Guilling and John Doe @ "Purcino". The accusatory portion of the information reads:

That on or about the 17th day of July 1992, in the City of Lucena, Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, conspiring and confederating with one another, armed with
bladed weapons, by means of violence, and with intent to gain, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take, steal and carry away certain personal items, to wit:

one (1)

solid gold ring valued at P8,000.00

one (1)

diamond ring valued at P40,000.00

one (1)

necklace with pendant valued at P2,000.00

cash money in the amount of P4,500.00

one (1)

samsonite bag valued at P650.00

one (1)

.22 Cal. Squibbman with SN 64130 valued at P5,000.00

one (1)

pair of sandal valued at P650.00

one (1)

music mate (karaoke) valued at P5,000.00

one (1)
jacket (adidas) valued at P1,000.00; and

one (1)

pair of shoes valued at P1,000.00

with a total value of P67,800.00, owned by and belonging to spouses Romualdo Jael and Lionela3 Caringal,
without the consent and against the will of the latter, to the damage and prejudice of the aforementioned
offended parties in the aforestated sum of P67,800.00, Philippine Currency, and, on the same occasion of such
robbery, the said accused, conspiring and confederating with one another, armed with the same bladed weapons,
taking advantage of superior strength, and employing means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to
insure or afford impunity, and with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously stab both
of said spouses Romualdo Jael and Lionela Caringal thereby inflicting upon the latter several fatal wounds which
directly caused the death of the aforenamed spouses.

Contrary to law.4

Upon arraignment, appellant Masinag pleaded "not guilty." Trial on the merits thereafter ensued. Accused Ariel
Dador was discharged as a state witness while accused Purcino remained at large.

On February 15, 2000, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this court finds Cesar Osabel and Decena Masinag GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide and they are sentenced to RECLUSION PERPETUA with all the
accessory penalties provided by law. For insufficiency of evidence, the accused Isagani Guittap, Wilfrido Morelos
and Luisito Guilling are hereby ACQUITTED.

The accused Cesar Osabel and Decena Masinag are also ordered to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Romualdo
Jael and Leonila Caringal Jael in the amount of (P100,000.00) One Hundred Thousand Pesos plus actual damages
of (P67,800.00) Sixty Thousand and Eight Hundred Pesos, Philippine Currency.

SO ORDERED.5

During the trial, state witness Ariel Dador testified that in the evening of July 15, 1992, Cesar Osabel asked him
and a certain Purcino to go with him to see appellant Masinag at her house in Isabang, Lucena City. When they
got there, Osabel and Masinag entered a room while Dador and Purcino waited outside the house. On their way
home, Osabel explained to Dador and Purcino that he and Masinag planned to rob the spouses Romualdo and
Leonila Jael. He further told them that according to Masinag, the spouses were old and rich, and they were easy
to rob because only their daughter lived with them in their house.

The following day, at 7:00 p.m., Dador, Osabel, and Purcino went to the house of the Jael spouses to execute the
plan. Osabel and Purcino went inside while Dador stayed outside and positioned himself approximately 30 meters
away from the house. Moments later, he heard a woman shouting for help from inside the house. After two hours,
Osabel and Purcino came out, carrying with them one karaoke machine and one rifle. Osabel's hands were
bloodied. He explained that he had to tie both the victims' hands with the power cord of a television set before he
repeatedly stabbed them, He killed the spouses so they can not report the robbery to the authorities.

Osabel ordered Dador to hire a tricycle while he and Purcino waited inside the garage of a bus line. However,
when Dador returned with the tricycle, the two were no longer there. He proceeded to the house of Osabel and
found him there with Purcino. They were counting the money they got from the victims. They gave him P300.00.
Later, when Dador accompanied the two to Sta. Cruz, Manila to dispose of the karaoke machine, he received
another P500.00. Osabel had the rifle repaired in Gulang-Gulang, Lucena City.

Dador and Osabel were subsequently arrested for the killing of a certain Cesar M. Sante. During the investigation,
Dador executed an extrajudicial confession admitting complicity in the robbery and killing of the Jael spouses and
implicating appellant and Osabel in said crime. The confession was given with the assistance of Atty. Rey Oliver
Alejandrino, a former Regional Director of the Human Rights Commission Office. Thereafter, Osabel likewise
executed an extrajudicial confession of his and appellant's involvement in the robbery and killing of the Jaels, also
with the assistance of Atty. Alejandrino.

Simeon Tabor, a neighbor of the Jaels, testified that at 8:00 in the morning of July 17, 1992, he noticed that the
victims, who were known to be early risers, had not come out of their house. He started calling them but there
was no response. He instructed his son to fetch the victims' son, SPO1 Lamberto Jael. When the latter arrived,
they all went inside the house and found bloodstains on the floor leading to the bathroom. Tabor opened the
bathroom door and found the lifeless bodies of the victims.

Dr. Vicente F. Martinez performed the post-mortem examination on the bodies of the victims and testified that
since rigor mortis had set in at the back of the neck of the victims, Romualdo Jael died between six to eight hours
before the examination while Leonila Jael died before midnight of July 16, 1992. The cause of death of the victims
was massive shock secondary to massive hemorrhage and multiple stab wounds.

Appellant Masinag, for her part, denied involvement in the robbery and homicide. She testified that she knew the
victims because their houses were about a kilometer apart. She and Osabel were friends because he courted her,
but they never had a romantic relationship. She further claimed that the last time she saw Osabel was six months
prior to the incident. She did not know Dador and Guilling at the time of the incident. According to her, it is not
true that she harbored resentment against the victims because they berated her son for stealing their daughter's
handbag. On the whole, she denied any participation in a conspiracy to rob and kill the victims.
Issue/s:
From the decision convicting appellant Masinag and Osabel, only the former appealed, based on the lone assigned
error:

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF CONSPIRING WITH HER CO-ACCUSED TO COMMIT THE CRIME OF ROBBERY WITH
HOMICIDE DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF HER ACTUAL PARTICIPATION IN THE COMMISSION OF THE SAID CRIME.
Ruling:
The appeal is meritorious.

While it is our policy to accord proper deference to the factual findings of the trial court,6 owing to their unique
opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and note their demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grueling
examination,7 where there exist facts or circumstances of weight and influence which have been ignored or
misconstrued, or where the trial court acted arbitrarily in its appreciation of facts,8 we may disregard its findings.

Appellant contends that the extrajudicial confessions of Osabel and Dador were insufficient to establish with moral
certainty her participation in the conspiracy. Firstly, Dador was not present to hear appellant instigate the group to
rob the Jael spouses. He only came to know about the plan when Osabel told him on their way home. Thus,
Dador had no personal knowledge of how the plan to rob was actually made and of appellant's participation
thereof. Secondly, while Osabel initially implicated her in his extrajudicial confession as one of the conspirators, he
repudiated this later in open court when he testified that he was forced to execute his statements by means of
violence.

On direct examination, Dador narrated what transpired in the house of appellant on July 15, 1992, to wit:

PROSECUTOR GARCIA:

Q. And do you remember the subject or subjects of that conversation that transpired among you?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Please tell us what was the subject or subjects of the conversation that transpired among you on July 15,
1992 at the house of Decena Masinag?

A. The subject of our conversation there was the robbing of Sps. Jael, sir.
Q. How did that conversation begin with respect to the proposed robbery of Sps. Jael?

A. It was only the two (2) who planned that supposed robbery, Daniel Murillo and Decena Masinag, sir.

Q. And why were you able to say that it was Danilo Murillo and Decena Masinag who planned the robbery?

A. Because they were the only ones who were inside the house and far from us and they were inside the
room, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q. On that night, July 15, 1992 did you ever have any occasion to talk with Decena Masinag together with
your companions Danilo Murillo and Purcino?

A. No, sir.

Q. Was there any occasion on the same date that Decena Masinag talk to you?

ATTY. FLORES:

Already answered, your Honor.

COURT:

Witness, may answer.

WITNESS:

None, sir. (emphasis ours)9

We find that the foregoing testimony of Dador was not based on his own personal knowledge but from what
Osabel told him. He admitted that he was never near appellant and that he did not talk to her about the plan
when they were at her house on July 15, 1992. Thus, his statements are hearsay and does not prove appellant's
participation in the conspiracy.

Under Rule 130, Section 36 of the Rules of Court, a witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his
own personal knowledge, i.e., which are derived from his own perception; otherwise, such testimony would be
hearsay. Hearsay evidence is defined as "evidence not of what the witness knows himself but of what he has
heard from others."10 The hearsay rule bars the testimony of a witness who merely recites what someone else
has told him, whether orally or in writing.11 In Sanvicente v. People,"12 we held that when evidence is based on
what was supposedly told the witness, the same is without any evidentiary weight for being patently hearsay.
Familiar and fundamental is the rule that hearsay testimony is inadmissible as evidence.13

Osabel's extrajudicial confession is likewise inadmissible against appellant. The res inter allos acta rule provides
that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another.14 Consequently, an
extrajudicial confession is binding only upon the confessant and is not admissible against his co-accused. The
reason for the rule is that, on a principle of good faith and mutual convenience, a man's own acts are binding
upon himself, and are evidence against him. So are his conduct and declarations. Yet it would not only be rightly
inconvenient, but also manifestly unjust, that a man should be bound by the acts of mere unauthorized strangers;
and if a party ought not to be bound by the acts of strangers, neither ought their acts or conduct be used as
evidence against him.15

The rule on admissions made by a conspirator, while an exception to the foregoing, does not apply in this case. In
order for such admission to be admissible against a co-accused, Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
requires that there must be independent evidence aside from the extrajudicial confession to prove conspiracy. In
the case at bar, apart from Osabel's extrajudicial confession, no other evidence of appellant's alleged participation
in the conspiracy was presented by the prosecution. There being no independent evidence to prove it, her
culpability was not sufficiently established.

Unavailing also is rule that an extrajudicial confession may be admissible when it is used as a corroborative
evidence of other facts that tend to establish the guilt of his co-accused. The implication of this rule is that there
must be a finding of other circumstantial evidence which, when taken together with the confession, establishes
the guilt of a co-accused beyond reasonable doubt.16 As earlier stated, there is no other prosecution evidence,
direct or circumstantial, which the extrajudicial confession may corroborate.

In People v. Berroya,17 we held that to hold an accused liable as co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be
shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the conspiracy. That overt act may consist
of active participation in the actual commission of the crime itself, or it may consist of moral assistance to his co-
conspirators by being present at the time of the commission of the crime, or by exerting moral ascendancy over
the other co-conspirators by moving them to execute or implement the conspiracy.

In the case at bar, no overt act was established to prove that appellant shared with and concurred in the criminal
design of Osabel, Dador and Purcino. Assuming that she had knowledge of the conspiracy or she acquiesced in or
agreed to it, still, absent any active participation in the commission of the crime in furtherance of the conspiracy,
mere knowledge, acquiescence in or agreement to cooperate is not sufficient to constitute one as a party to a
conspiracy.18 Conspiracy transcends mere companionship.19

Conspiracy must be proved as convincingly as the criminal act itself. Like any element of the offense charged,
conspiracy must be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt.20 Direct proof of a previous agreement need
not be established, for conspiracy may be deduced from the acts of appellant pointing to a joint purpose,
concerted action and community of interest. Nevertheless, except in the case of the mastermind of a crime, it
must also be shown that appellant performed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy.21

All told, the prosecution failed to establish the guilt of appellant with moral certainty. Its evidence falls short of the
quantum of proof required for conviction. Accordingly, the constitutional presumption of appellant's innocence
must be upheld and she must be acquitted.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Lucena City, Branch 60
in Criminal Case No. 92-487, insofar only as it finds appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Robbery with Homicide, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant Decena Masinag Vda. De Ramos is ACQUITTED of
the crime of Robbery with Homicide. She is ORDERED RELEASED unless there are other lawful causes for her
continued detention. The Director of Prisons is DIRECTED to inform this Court, within five (5) days from notice, of
the date and time when appellant is released pursuant to this Decision.

SO ORDERED.
8. People vs. Abellera, 47 Phil. 731, No. 23533 August 1, 1925
Doctrines:
CRIMINAL LAW; EVIDENCE; DYING DECLARATIONS MADE BY PAGAN.— The circumstance that the declarant is a
pagan and does not believe in a future state of rewards and punishment does not render his dying declaration
inadmissible in a criminal prosecution. Such circumstance affects only the weight of the statement.
Facts:
This appeal has been brought to reverse a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the subprovince of Benguet,
Mountain Province, finding the appellant, Gabino Abellera, guilty of the offense of homicide, and sentencing him to
undergo imprisonment for fourteen years, eight months and one day, reclusion temporal, to indemnify the heirs of
the deceased, one Day-ag, in the amount of P500, and to pay the costs.

Prior to the homicide which gave rise to this prosecution the appellant, Gabino Abellera, was caretaker and
foreman at the mansion house in Baguio. Among the persons employed under his supervision were two Igorot
gardeners named Day-ag and Caoili. In the afternoon of October 7, 1924, these two laborers had been working in
the garden near the house, but it rained and they took refuge in the part of the house where Day-ag had
quarters. When the shower had passed Caoili returned at once to work, but Day-ag remained behind, saying that
he wanted to fix his calapiao, a covering of woven leaves for protection from rain. Caoili worked for a few minutes
and heard the 4.30 whistle. At about this time he saw the appellant Abellera emerge from a room of the mansion
house and start in the direction where Caoili was working; but upon seeing Caoili he turned back and went
towards the stables where the appellant had his own quarters.

Meantime Day-ag had not come out, and about 5 Caoili ceased work and took his tools to leave them in the place
where Day-ag slept. Upon coming to this place Caoili noticed that Day-ag was not there and he passed on calling
aloud to him. Presently Caoili heard groans, and fearing that something had gone wrong, he went out and called
to Abellera to come, as Day-ag was groaning. Abellera asked what was the matter, and upon being informed, told
Caoili to call two fellow-laborers Paoil and Martin and go with them to Day-ag as he himself (Abellera) wished to
finish eating. Caoili went to find Paoil and Martin and as the three were preparing to enter the appellant called to
them to wait, saying that all would go together. The three then waited for the appellant, and when he came the
four approached Day-ag's room together, the appellant being in front. The appellant pushed open the door and
asked what was the matter. But no answer was returned and Day-ag only groaned. The appellant then went out,
telling the other three to stay outside where they then were until he (Abellera) could go into the house and
telephone for the police. While Abellera was absent upon this errand Paoil, contrary to his instructions, entered the
room and asked Day-ag stabbed him. Upon this Day-ag opened his eyes and said: "Gabino," referring to the
appellant, Gabino Abellera. This was heard by the other two companions standing at the door.

After telephoning for the police the appellant was seen to be unsettled and uneasy, running from place to place in
the premises, as if in search of the person who might have committed the deed.

The sergeant of police, accompanied by two others, presently arrived, and they were joined later by the chief of
police. Upon examining the injured person he was found to have a number of cuts in the abdomen and three in
the neck. His weakness was very marked, and owing to the fact that the windpipe had been perforated it was
almost impossible for him to talk. Upon being again asked by the sergeant who stabbed him, he pointed to Gabino
Abellera who was then present as the guilty person.

The chief of police then caused the appellant to be sent out of the room, and Caoili and Martin were brought in.
These were presented in turn to Day-ag and he was asked if either of them had stabbed him. He moved his head
negatively to these questions and the appellant was again brought in. Meanwhile attention having been drawn to
the condition of Day-ag's throat a cloth was tied around his neck to prevent the escape of air, as he attempted to
talk. With this assistance he was enabled to articulate words, and in reply to further questioning as to who had
stabbed him he pointed to Gabino Abellera and pronounced his name "Gabino." The chief of police then ordered
Abellera to go up to Day-ag and ask him who stabbed him and upon this being done Day-ag said: "You." A bolo
was then seen at Day-ag's side. It was picked up by one of the police officers and Day-ag was asked whose bolo
that was. Day-ag replied that it was the bolo with which the appellant had stabbed him in the abdomen and
throat, and he said that after stabbing him the appellant had put the bolo at his side and run away.

Day-ag was then taken to the hospital where he was treated, but he died in a day or two as a result of the
wounds which had been inflicted upon him. In the course of the first evening the justice of the peace of Baguio
visited Day-ag and told him that he might die and that it was desirable to have the truth. In response to the
questions then directed to him Day-ag again said that the appellant, Gabino Abellera, was the person who stabbed
him and indicated that the cause of enmity was the belief on the part of the appellant that Day-ag had informed
the city engineer that the appellant was improperly being visited by a woman at the mansion house.

Again, in the operating room of the hospital Day-ag repeatedly said in the presence of various persons, including
the provincial fiscal, that it was Gabino who had assaulted him, and the motive was again asserted to be that the
appellant blamed Day-ag as the one who reported to the district engineer that a woman had visited the appellant
at the mansion house.

Caoili and Paoil both testified that a few days before the crime was committed the appellant came where the two
were engaged and began to sharpen his knife on a grindstone. At the same time he admonished them that if he
should find out which one of them it was who was giving information to the district engineer he would kill him;
and on the same occasion the accused said that he had dismissed one Dimalig, who had been the predecessor of
Day-ag as gardener, because Dimalig had talked out.

The conviction of the appellant in the court below rests mainly upon the weight attributed by the trial court to the
repeated statements of Day-ag that the appellant was the guilty person; and we may observe that apart from
those declarations the proof would be insufficient to sustain the conviction.

Issue/s:

Ruling:
Upon a careful review of the evidence we are unable to entertain a doubt that Day-ag spoke truthfully in
denouncing this appellant as his slayer. The appellant undoubtedly had an opportunity to commit the deed, and
Day-ag pointed out as the slayer from the beginning. In this story he never wavered. The district engineer
testified that he had never obtained information from Day-ag or any other person prior to the date of this crime
that the appellant had improperly received a woman at the mansion house; and if the commission of the crime
was due to malice engendered by this belief, the appellant had probably been in error.

We may observe that the testimony of the Igorot Caoili is in our opinion entitled to weight. He says that he had no
malice against the appellant, and that in fact the appellant was married to a kinswoman of Caoili. It is difficult to
believe that either this witness or Paoil has testified falsely, and it is still more difficult to believe that Day-ag
would have falsely imputed the crime to the appellant if the latter were innocent.

An attempt was made on the part of the appellant's lawyer to destroy the weight of Day-ag's declaration by
reason of the fact that Day-ag was an Igorot, and therefore a pagan. It is generally accepted that Igorrotes have
no belief in a possible future life or in a doctrine of future rewards and punishment. It is urged that this
circumstance destroys the weight of Day-ag's statements. Admitting, however, that this circumstance may be
entitled to some weight as reflecting on the value of Day-ag's statements, it does not have the effect of rendering
such statements inadmissible, and his declarations were properly admitted in evidence as competent proof against
the accused. From the facts connected with Day-ag's condition at the time he made these repeated statements,
we have no doubt that he appreciated the fact that his death was near at hand and the statements referred to are
entitled to the weight usually attributed to dying declarations.

Evidence of the good character of the appellant was introduced in the lower court, and it appears that he was
esteemed by those who knew him as a competent and reliable man. This consideration, however, is not sufficient
to raise a reasonable doubt upon the point of the commission of the homicide, and no error was in our opinion
committed by the trial court. The penalty, we note, is in accordance with law.

The judgment will therefore be affirmed, and it is so ordered, with costs against the appellant.

Avanceña, C.J., Johnson, Malcolm, Villamor, and Johns, JJ., concur.

9. People vs. Beralde, 139 SCRA 426, No. L-68482 October 23, 1985
Doctrines:
Remedial Law; Evidence; Criminal Law; Violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act; Credibility of
witnesses; Prosecution 's version more credible; Entrapment case, legal, but not instigation; Crime
proved.—As is usual in criminal cases, the issue turns on the credibility of witnesses. The defense contends that
Beralde's guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. It is asserted that the case is one of instigation and not
entrapment (U.S. vs. Phelps, 16 Phil. 440; People vs. Abella and Bacalla, 46 Phil. 857). Judge Herminio C. Mariano
observed that the prosecution's version is more credible. Beralde or Egay was arrested because he was the one
who received the ?20 and delivered the marijuana leaves, We hold that this is a case of entrapment, which is
legal, not instigation (People vs. Valmores, G. R. No. 58635, June 24, 1983, 122 SCRA 922; People vs. Luces, G.
R. No. 60744, November 25, 1983, 125 SCRA 813; See People vs. Nillos, G, R. No. 66161, January 30, 1984, 127
SCRA 207), Beralde's guilt was proven to a moral certainty.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Privileged mitigating circumstances; Minority, present, as the accused
was only 17 years old at the time of the commission of the offense.—The booking and information sheet
(Exh. E) shows that Beralde was born on September 1,1964. He was 17 years old at the time he committed the
offense. He is entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority under article 68 of the Revised Penal
Code.

Same; Same; Same; Indeterminate Sentence Law; Accused not entitled to an indeterminate
sentence because the Indeterminate Sentence Law does not apply to persons convicted of offenses
punished with death penalty or life imprisonment, as the Dangerous Drugs Act on sale of prohibited
drugs.—However, he cannot be given an indeterminate sentence because section 2 of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law provides that said law "shall not apply to persons convicted of offenses punished with death penalty
or life imprisonment". Presidential Decree No. 1675 imposes "life imprisonment to death' on sale of prohibited
drugs.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Recommendation to the Chief Executive for executive clemency of the
accused consistent with the ends of retributive justice and the objectives of the Dangerous Drugs
Law.—The trial court's judgment is affirmed, but in view of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority, we
recommend to the Chief Executive, through the Minister of Justice, that clemency be extended to Beralde after he
had served a term of imprisonment consistent with the ends of retributive justice and the objectives 01 the
Dangerous Drugs Law.
Facts:
Edgardo Beralde appealed from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, convicting him of a violation of
section 4 of the Dangerous Drugs Law, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by Presidential Decrees Nos. 44 and
1675, and sentencing him to a penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P20,000. The two aluminum foils
of marijuana leaves (Exh. C) were declared forfeited and ordered to be delivered to the Dangerous Drugs Board
for immediate disposal.

Beralde admits the sale of marijuana leaves. His story is that at around three o'clock in the afternoon of
September 22, 1981 while he was at the junk shop of Paulina Estrada in Anak Bayan Street, Paco, Manila, he was
approached by his friend Dodo and a lady companion. They requested him to accompany them to buy marijuana.

Because of their persistent request, he assented. He brought them to a person named Eboy who was standing
near a store on the adjoining Dart Street. Dodo gave P20 to Eboy who in turn delivered to Dodo two aluminum
foils of marijuana. Dodo invited Beralde for a snack on San Andres Street near Anak Bayan Street. While taking
the snack, three policemen approached him and asked him to accompany them to Eboy's place.

When they did not find Eboy, he was taken to the police headquarters and charged with illegal possesion of
marijuana. He said that he never touched the P20.

The version of the prosecution is that the police had received information that Beralde was a marijuana peddler.
On September 22, 1981, Patrolwoman Lolita Opeñano and a male informant approached accused Beralde, alias
Egay, at the corner of Anak Bayan and San Andres Streets, Paco, Manila. The informant introduced Opeñano to
Egay as his girl friend. She asked Egay if he had marijuana for sale. Egay replied in the affirmative.
He asked for twenty pesos from Opeñano and said that he would get the stuff from his friend. Egay left. After the
lapse of about ten minutes, he reappeared and handed to Opeñano two aluminum foils of dried marijuana leaves
(Exh. C). At that juncture, Egay was arrested by the peace officers who were nearby watching the proceeding.

They asked him where he got the money. He said that it was given to him by a certain Eboy who lived in Dart
Street, adjoining Anak Bayan Street. Evidently, Eboy had gone into hiding because the police could not find him.

As is usual in criminal cases, the issue turns on the credibility of witnesses. The defense contends that Beralde's
guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. It is asserted that the case is one of instigation and not
entrapment (U.S. vs. Phelps, 16 Phil. 440; People vs. Abella and Bacalla, 46 Phil. 857).

Judge Herminio C. Mariano observed that the prosecution's version is more credible. Beralde or Egay was arrested
because he was the one who received the P20 and delivered the marijuana leaves.
Issue/s:

Ruling:
We hold that this is a case of entrapment, which is legal, not instigation (People vs. Valmores, G. R. No. 58635,
June 24, 1983, 122 SCRA 922; People vs. Luces, G. R. No. 60744, November 25, 1983, 125 SCRA 813; See People
vs. Nillos, G. R. No. 66161, January 30, 1984, 127 SCRA 207). Beralde's guilt was proven to a moral certainty.

The booking and information sheet (Exh. E) shows that Beralde was born on September 1, 1964. He was 17 years
old at the time he committed the offense. He is entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority under
article 68 of the Revised Penal Code.

However, he cannot be given an indeterminate sentence because section 2 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law
provides that said law" shall not apply to persons convicted of offenses punished with death penalty or life
imprisonment." Presidential Decree No. 1675 imposes "life imprisonment to death" on sale of prohibited drugs.

WHEREFORE, the trial court's judgment is affirmed, but in view of the privileged mitigating circumstance of
minority, we recommend to the Chief Executive, through the Minister of Justice, that clemency be extended to
Beralde after he had served a term of imprisonment consistent with the ends of retributive justice and the
objectives of the Dangerous Drugs Law. Costs de oficio.
10. Roan vs. Gonzales, November 25, 1986
Doctrines:
Criminal Procedure; Arrests; Words and Phrases; “Probable cause” defined—Probable cause was described
by Justice Escolin in Burgos v. Chief of Staff as referring to “such facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in
connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.” As held in a long line of decisions, the probable
cause must refer to only one specific offense.

Same; Same;Judge should not limit his inquiry on complainant’s affidavit only.—By his own account, all he
did was question Captain Quillosa on the contents of his affidavit only “to ascertain, among others, if he knew and
understood the same,” and only because “the application was not yet subseribed aad swora to.” The suggestion is
that he would not have asked any questions at all if the affidavit had already been completed when it was submitted
to him. In any case, he did not ask his own searching questions. He limited himself to the contents of the affidavit.
He did not take the applicant’s deposition in writing and attach them to the record, together with the affidavit
presented to him.

Same; Same; An application for search warrant if based on hearsay cannot, standing alone, justify
issuance of that writ—In other words, the applicant was asking for the issuance of the search warrant on the
basis of mere hearsay and not of information personally known to him, as required by settled jurisprudence. The
rationale of the requirement, of course, is to provide a ground for a prosecution for perjury in case the applicant’s
deciarations are found to be false. His application, standing alone, was insufficient to justify the issuance of the
warrant sought. It was therefore necessary for the witnesses themselves, by their own personal information, to
establish the applicant’s claims.

Same; Same; Ulterior motive ofapplicant’s witnesses to application for search warrant should alert the
judge to possible misrepresentations.—A study of the depositions taken from witnesses Esmael Morada and
Jesus Tohilida, who both claimed to be “intelligence informers,” shows that they were in the main a mere
restatement of their allegations in their affidavits, except that they were made in the form of answers to the
questions put to them by the respondent judge. Significantly, the meaningful remark made by Tohilida that they
were suspicious of the petitioner because he was a follower of the opposition candidate in the forthcoming election
(a “Lecarista”) did not excite the respondent judge’s own suspicions. This should have put him on guard as to the
motivations of the witnesses and alerted him to possible misrepresentations from them.

Same; Same; The judge should inquire into how the deponents were able to know even the caliber of
the guns and the number ofguns and bullets that are allegedly being kept in the place to be searched.—
0ne may well wonder why it did not occur to the respondent judge to ask how the witness could be so certain even
as to the caliber of the guns, or how far he was from the window, or whether it was on the first floor or a second
floor, or why his presence was not noticed at all, or if the acts related were really done openly, in the full view of the
withesses, considering that these acts were against the law. These would have been judicious questions but they
were injudiciously omitted. Instead, the declarations of the witnesses were readily accepted and the search warrant
sought was issued forthwith. The above-discussed defects have rendered the search warrant invalid. Nonetheless,
the Solicitor General argues that whatever defect there was, was waived when the petitioner voluntarily submitted to
the search and manifested his conformity in writing.

Same; Same; Waiver; Estoppel; Conformity of person in writing for his house to be searcked by the
military while serving a search warrant cannot be considered voluntary; No waiver to defects in the
warrant can be implied therefrom.—We do not agree. What we see here is pressure exerted by the military
authorities, who practically coerced the petitioner to sign the supposed waiver as a guaranty against a possible
challenge later to the validity of the search they were conducting. Confronted with the armed presence of the military
and the presumptive authority of a judicial writ, the petitioner had no choice but to submit. This was not, as we held
in a previous case, the manifestation merely of our traditional Filipino hospitality and respect for authority. Given the
repressive atmosphere of the Marcos regime, there was here, as we see it, an intimidation that the petitioner could
not resist.

Same; Same; Criminal Law; A prohibited article falling under the concept of’ malum prohibitum, such
as a pistol, may be seized butonly when the search is valid—Prohibited articles may be seized but only as
long as the search is valid. In this case, it was not because: 1) there was no valid search warrant; and 2) absent
such a warrant, the right thereto was not validly waived by the petitioner. In short, the military officers who entered
the petitioner’s premises had no right to be there and therefore had no right either to seize the pistol and bullets.

Same; Same; Same; As a rule, an article, like a gun, covered by offenses deftned as mala prohibita may
not be summarily seized; A search warrant is still necessary; Exceptions.—It does not follow that because
an offense is malum prohibitum, the subject thereof is necessarily illegalper se. Motive is immaterial in mala
prohibita, but the subjects of this kind of offense may not be summarily seized simply because they are prohibited. A
search warrant is still necessary. If the rule were otherwise, then the military authorities couid have just entered the
premises and looked for the guns reportedly kept by the petitioner without bothering to first secure a search warrant.
The fact that they did bother to do so indicates that they themselves recognized the necessity of such a warrant for
the seizure of the weapons the petitioner was suspected of possessing.

Same; Same; Same; Same.—It is true that there are certain instances when a search may be validly made without
warrant and articles may be taken validly as a result of that search. For example, a warrantless search may be made
incidental to a lawful arrest, as when the person being arrested is frished for weapons he may otherwise be able to
use against the arresting officer. Motor cars may be inspected at borders to prevent smuggling of aliens and
contraband and even in the interior upon a showing of probable cause. Vessels and aircraft are also traditionally
removed from the operation of the rule because of their mobility and their relative ease in fleeing the state’s
jurisdiction. The individual may knowingly agree to be searched or waive objections to an illegal search. And it has
also been held that prohibited articles may be taken without warrant if they are open to eye and hand and the peace
officer comes upon them inadvertently.

Same: Same; Same; Same.—Clearly, though, the instant case does not come under any of the accepted
exceptions. The respondents cannot even claim that they stumbled upon the pistol and builets for the fact is that
these things were deliberately sought and were not in plain view when they were taken. Hence, the rule having been
violated and no exception being applicable, the conclusion is that the petitioner’s pistol and bullets were confiscated
illegally and therefore are protected by the exclusionary principle.

Same; Same; Evidence; Seized pistol under a void warrant shall remain in custodia legis pendente lite
although it cannot be used in evidence against the accused.—The pistol and bullets cannot, of course, be
used as evidence against the petitioner in the criminal action against him for illegal possession of firearms. Pending
resolution of that case, however, the said articles must remain in custodia legis.

Same; Same; Courts; There is no need to ask for quaskal of warrant by the court that issued it when
tke petition before Supreme Court raises serious and urgent constitutional issues.—Finally, it is true
that the petitioner should have, before coming to this Court, filed a motion for the quashal of the search
warrant by the respondent judge in accordance with the normai procedure. But as we said and did in Burgos, “this
procedural flaw notwithstanding, we take cognizance of this petition in view of the seriousness and urgency of the
constitutional issues raised.” Roan vs. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687, No. L-71410 November 25, 1986

Facts:
Once again we are asked to annul a search warrant on the ground that it violates the Constitution.
As we can do no less if we are to be true to the mandate of the fundamental law, we do annul.

One of the most precious rights of the citizen in a free society is the right to be left alone in the
privacy of his own house. That right has ancient roots, dating back through the mists of history to
the mighty English kings in their fortresses of power. Even then, the lowly subject had his own
castle where he was monarch of all he surveyed. This was his humble cottage from which he could
bar his sovereign lord and all the forces of the Crown.

That right has endured through the ages albeit only in a few libertarian regimes. Their number,
regrettably, continues to dwindle against the onslaughts of authoritarianism. We are among the
fortunate few, able again to enjoy this right after the ordeal of the past despotism. We must cherish
and protect it all the more now because it is like a prodigal son returning.

That right is guaranteed in the following provisions of Article IV of the 1973 Constitution:
SEC. 3. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall not be violated,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

SEC. 4. (1) The privacy of communication and cor- respondence shag be inviolable except upon
lawful order of the court, or when public safety and order require otherwise.

(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.

Invoking these provisions, the petitioner claims he was the victim of an illegal search and seizure
conducted by the military authorities. The articles seized from him are sought to be used as
evidence in his prosecution for illegal possession of firearms. He asks that their admission be
temporarily restrained (which we have) 1 and thereafter permanently enjoined.X

The challenged search warrant was issued by the respondent judge on May 10, 1984. 2 The petitioner's
house was searched two days later but none of the articles listed in the warrant was discovered. 3 However, the officers conducting the
search found in the premises one Colt Magnum revolver and eighteen live bullets which they confiscated. They are now the bases of the
charge against the petitioner. 4X

To be valid, a search warrant must be supported by probable cause to be determined by the judge
or some other authorized officer after examining the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce. No less important, there must be a specific description of the place to be searched and the
things to be seized, to prevent arbitrary and indiscriminate use of the warrant. 5X

Probable cause was described by Justice Escolin in Burgos v. Chief of Staff 6 as referring to "such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects
sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched." As held in a long line of decisions, the probable cause must
refer to only one specific offense. 7X

The inclusion of the requirement for the "examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce" was a refinement proposed by Delegate Vicente J. Francisco in
the1934 Constitutional Convention. His purpose was the strengthening of the guaranty against
unreasonable searches and seizures. Although the condition did not appear in the corresponding
provision of the federa Constitution of the United States which served as our model it was then
already embodied in the Code of Criminal Procedure. Nevertheless, Delegate Jose P. Laurel,
Chairman of the Committee on the Bill of Rights of that body, readily accepted the proposal and it
was thereafter, following a brief debate, approved by the Convention. 8X

Implementing this requirement, the Rules of Court provided in what was then Rule 126:

SEC. 4. Examination of the applicant.  — The municipal or city judge must, before issuing the
warrant, personally examine on oath or affirmation the complainant and any witnesses he may
produce and take their depositions in writing, and attach them to the record, in addition to any
affidavits presented to him.

The petitioner claims that no depositions were taken by the respondent judge in accordance with
the above rule, but this is not entirely true. As a matter of fact, depositions were taken of the
complainant's two witnesses in addition to the affidavit executed by them. 9 It is correct to say, however, that
the complainant himself was not subjected to a similar interrogation.X

Commenting on this matter, the respondent judge declared:

The truth is that when PC Capt. Mauro P. Quinosa personally filed his application for a search
warrant on May 10, 1984, he appeared before me in the company of his two (2) witnesses, Esmael
Morada and Jesus Tohilida, both of whom likewise presented to me their respective affidavits taken
by Pat. Josue V. Lining, a police investigator assigned to the PC-INP command at Camp Col. Maximo
Abad. As the application was not yet subscribed and sworn to, I proceeded to examine Captain
Quillosa on the contents thereof to ascertain, among others, if he knew and understood the same.
Afterwards, he subscribed and swore to the same before me. 10X

By his own account, an he did was question Captain Quillosa on the contents of his affidavit only "to
ascertain, among others, if he knew and understood the same," and only because "the application
was not yet subscribed and swom to." The suggestion is that he would not have asked any
questions at all if the affidavit had already been completed when it was submitted to him. In any
case, he did not ask his own searching questions. He limited himself to the contents of the affidavit.
He did not take the applicant's deposition in writing and attach them to the record, together with the
affidavit presented to him.

As this Court held in Mata v. Bayona: 11X

Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The examining Judge
has to take depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he niay produce and attach
them to the record. Such written deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may be able to
properly determine the existence or non-existence of the probable cause, to hold liable for perjury
the person giving it if it wifl be found later that his declarations are false.

We, therefore, hold that the search warrant is tainted with illegality by the failure of the Judge to
conform with the essential requisites of taking the depositions in writing and attaching them to the
record, rendering the search warrant invalid.

The respondent judge also declared that he "saw no need to have applicant Quillosa's deposition
taken considering that he was applying for a search warrant on the basis of the information
provided by the aforenamed witnesses whose depositions as aforementioned had already been
taken by the undersigned." 12X

In other words, the applicant was asking for the issuance of the search warrant on the basis of mere
hearsay and not of information personally known to him, as required by settled jurisprudence." 13 The
rationale of the requirement, of course, is to provide a ground for a prosecution for perjury in case the applicant's declarations are found to
be false. His application, standing alone, was insufficient to justify the issuance of the warrant sought. It was therefore necessary for the
witnesses themselves, by their own personal information, to establish the apphcant's claims. 14X

Even assuming then that it would have sufficed to take the depositions only of the witnesses and
not of the applicant himself, there is still the question of the sufficiency of their depositions.

It is axiomatic that the examination must be probing and exhaustive, not merely routinary or pro-
forma, if the claimed probable cause is to be established. The examining magistrate must not simply
rehash the contents of the affidavit but must make his own inquiry on the intent and justification of
the application. 15X
A study of the depositions taken from witnesses Esmael Morada and Jesus Tohilida, who both
claimed to be "intelligence informers," shows that they were in the main a mere restatement of their
allegations in their affidavits, except that they were made in the form of answers to the questions
put to them by the respondent judge. Significantly, the meaningful remark made by Tohilida that
they were suspicious of the petitioner because he was a follower of the opposition candidate in the
forthcoming election (a "Lecarista") 16 did not excite the respondent judge's own suspicions. This should have put him on
guard as to the motivations of the witnesses and alerted him to possible misrepresentations from them. X

The respondent judge almost unquestioningly received the witnesses' statement that they saw eight
men deliver arms to the petitioner in his house on May 2, 1984. 17 This was supposedly done overtly, and Tohilida
said he saw everything through an open window of the house while he was near the gate. 18 He could even positively say that six of the
weapons were.45 caliber pistols and two were.38 caliber revolvers. 19X

One may well wonder why it did not occur to the respondent judge to ask how the witness could be
so certain even as to the caliber of the guns, or how far he was from the window, or whether it was
on the first floor or a second floor, or why his presence was not noticed at all, or if the acts related
were really done openly, in the full view of the witnesses, considering that these acts were against
the law. These would have been judicious questions but they were injudiciously omitted. Instead,
the declarations of the witnesses were readily accepted and the search warrant sought was issued
forthwith.

The above-discussed defects have rendered the search warrant invalid. Nonetheless, the Solicitor
General argues that whatever defect there was, was waived when the petitioner voluntarily
submitted to the search and manifested his conformity in writing. 20X
Issue/s:

Ruling:
We do not agree. What we see here is pressure exerted by the military authorities, who practically
coerced the petitioner to sign the supposed waiver as a guaranty against a possible challenge later
to the validity of the search they were conducting. Confronted with the armed presence of the
military and the presumptive authority of a judicial writ, the petitioner had no choice but to submit.
This was not, as we held in a previous case, 21 the manifestation merely of our traditional Filipino hospitality and respect for
authority. Given the repressive atmosphere of the Marcos regime, there was here, as we see it, an intimidation that the petitioner could not
resist.X

The respondents also argue that the Colt Magnum pistol and the eighteen have bullets seized from
the petitioner were illegal per se and therefore could have been taken by the military authorities
even without a warrant. Possession of the said articles, it is urged, was violative of P.D. 1866 and
considered malum prohibitum.  Hence, the Wegal articles could be taken even without a warrant.

Prohibited articles may be seized but only as long as the search is valid. In this case, it was not
because: 1) there was no valid search warrant; and 2) absent such a warrant, the right thereto was
not validly waived by the petitioner. In short, the military officers who entered the petitioner's
premises had no right to be there and therefore had no right either to seize the pistol and bullets.

It does not follow that because an offense is malum prohibitum, the subject thereof is necessarily
illegal per se.  Motive is immaterial in mala prohibita, but the subjects of this kind of offense may not
be summarily seized simply because they are prohibited. A search warrant is still necessary. If the
rule were otherwise, then the military authorities could have just entered the premises and looked
for the guns reportedly kept by the petitioner without bothering to first secure a search warrant. The
fact that they did bother to do so indicates that they themselves recognized the necessity of such a
warrant for the seizure of the weapons the petitioner was suspected of possessing.

It is true that there are certain instances when a search may be validly made without warrant and
articles may be taken validly as a result of that search. For example, a warrantless search may be
made incidental to a lawful arrest,22 as when the person being arrested is frished for weapons he may otherwise be able to use
against the arresting officer. Motor cars may be inspected at borders to prevent smuggling of aliens and contraband 23 and even in the
interior upon a showing of probable cause. 24 Vessels and aircraft are also traditionally removed from the operation of the rule because of
their mobility and their relative ease in fleeing the state's jurisdiction. 25 The individual may knowingly agree to be searched or waive
objections to an illegal search. 26 And it has also been held that prohibited articles may be taken without warrant if they are open to eye and
hand and the peace officer comes upon them inadvertently. 27X

Clearly, though, the instant case does not come under any of the accepted exceptions. The
respondents cannot even claim that they stumbled upon the pistol and bullets for the fact is that
these things were deliberately sought and were not in plain view when they were taken. Hence, the
rule having been violated and no exception being applicable, the conclusion is that the petitioner's
pistol and bullets were confiscated illegally and therefore are protected by the exclusionary principle.

Stonehill v. Diokno established this rule which was later expressly affirmed in the 1973 Constitution.
While conceding that there may be occasions when the criminal might be allowed to go free because
"the constable has blundered," Chief Justice Concepcion observed that the exclusionary rule was
nonetheless "the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction" against abuse. The
decision cited Judge Learned Hand's justification that "only in case the prosecution which itself
controls the seizing officials, know that it cannot profit by their wrong, will the wrong be repressed. "

The pistol and bullets cannot, of course, be used as evidence against the petitioner in the criminal
action against him for illegal possession of firearms. Pending resolution of that case, however, the
said articles must remain in custodia legis.

Finally, it is true that the petitioner should have, before coming to this Court, filed a motion for the
quashal of the search warrant by the respondent judge in accordance with the normal procedure.
But as we said and did in Burgos, "this procedural flaw notwithstanding, we take cognizance of this
petition in view of the seriousness and urgency of the constitutional issues raised. 28X

WHEREFORE, Search Warrant No. 1-84 issued by the respondent judge on May 10, 1984, is hereby
declared null and void and accordingly set aside. Our restraining order of August 6,1985, is made
permanent. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
11. People vs. Quizon, 142 SCRA 362, No. L-68603 June 25, 1986
Doctrines:
Evidence; Confessions; A person under custodial interrogation must be told that if she could not secure
a lawyer the Government will provide her one to assist her; otherwise the confession is void.—“The
foregoing indubitably shows that while the appellant was informed of her right to remain silent and to hire a lawyer
to assist her, she was not, however, informed that if she could not secure a lawyer, the State will provide her with
one, to assist her in the custodial investigation. The omission is a fatal defect rendering the extra-judicial confession
inadmissible in evidence as ruled by this Honorable Tribunal in People vs. Pascual, Jr. (109 SCRA 197, 205). Same;
Same; Same.—Moreover, the ruling in People vs. Galit (135 SCRA 465, 472), to the effect that the right to counsel
may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel, clearly applies to the
case at bar.

Same; Inconsistencies on material points render testimonies doubtful.—The Solicitor General also joins
with appellant in assailing the trial court for giving weight and credence to the testimonies of the witnesses for the
prosecution which are contradictory and inconsistent on material points, thus casting serious doubts as to the truth of
the alleged entrapment. Again, We agree.

Facts:
In Criminal Case No. 83-20146 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, National Capital Region, Branch
55, the appellant Nenita Quizon y Katipunan was charged with violation of Section 4, Article 11, in
relation to Section 21, Article IV of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended, allegedly
committed as follows:

That on or about August 25, 1983, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, not being
authorized by law to sell, deliver, give away to another or distribute any prohibited drug, did then
and there wilfully and unlawfully sell, deliver or give away to another fifteen (15) sticks of cigarette
containing marijuana, which is a prohibited drug.

Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty, and thereafter, trial proceeded and the prosecution
as well as the defense presented their respective evidence.

The prosecution presented in evidence, in addition to the testimonies of Pat. Jesus Gesolfon III,
Patrolwoman Susan Mendez, P/Lt. Reynaldo Jaylo and P/Sgt. Herminio Siochi, all of the Special Anti-
Narcotics Group, Auxiliary Services Bureau, Western Police District, Metropolitan Police Force and
Edwin C. Purificando, NBI Forensic Chemist, the extrajudicial confessions of appellant, wherein she
admitted the commission of the offense imputed to her.

Testifying in her own behalf, appellant repudiated her extrajudicial confessions, claiming that she
was forced to sign them.

The trial court convicted her of the crime charged primarily on the basis of her extrajudicial
confessions, and sentenced her "to suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT with the accessory
penalties provided by the law and to pay a fine of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), plus the
costs."
Issue/s:
Appellant interposed the present appeal, contending that —

THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN DURING THE TRIAL OF THIS CASE IT EXPOSED ITSELF WITH
MANIFEST AND CLEAR BIAS AND PREJUDICE AGAINST THE ACCUSED.

II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO CONSIDER THE TESTIMONIAL INCONSISTENCIES
AND CONTRADICTIONS OF PROSECUTION WITNESSES TO BE MATERIAL.

III

THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT ADMITTED IN EVIDENCE THE MONEY BILLS MARKED
EXHIBITS 'H' AND 'H-1'.

IV

THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT ADMITTED IN EVIDENCE THE ALLEGED EXTRAJUDICIAL
CONFESSIONS OF THE ACCUSED.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE THE CLAIM OF THE DEFENSE THAT THE
MARIJUANA AND THE TWO MONEY BILLS ARE PLANTED EVIDENCE.

VI

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING NENITA QUIZON GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
OF THE CRIME OF VIOLATION OF SECTION 4, ARTICLE II IN RELATION TO SECTION 21, ARTICLE
IV OF THE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 1972, AS AMENDED.
Ruling:
In his MANIFESTATION IN LIEU OF APPELLEE'S BRIEF, the Solicitor General agrees with appellant
and recommends that she be acquitted on the ground that the evidence extant in the record of this
case has not established her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In the said manifestation he
summarized the evidence of the prosecution and that of the defense, as follows:

A. Version of the Prosecution

On August 25, 1983 at about 7:30 o'clock in the evening, Lt. Alfredo Lazarte, Officer-in-Charge of
the Auxiliary Services Bureau, Special Anti-Narcotics Group of the Western Police District, received
information that a certain woman and her cohorts were selling marijuana in Almario St., Tondo,
Manila. (p. 16, tsn, December 14, 1983)

Acting on the aforesaid information, Lt. Lazarte dispatched a team of policemen headed by Sgt.
Herminio Siochi with the express instruction to entrap a certain Melda, the woman allegedly
engaged in the sale of marijuana. (p. 17, tsn, December 14, 1984)

Thus bidden, the said team of policemen proceeded to Almario St., Tondo, Manila. Patrolman
Gesolfon and Patrolwoman Mendez were specifically assigned the task of entrapping the supposed
marijuana seller. (p. 17, tsn, December 14, 1983)

The testimonies, however, of Gesolfon and Mendez as to here  the entrapment was made, who  did
the buying from the appellant, who  effected the arrest and when such arrest was effected was
made do not jibe with each other. Hence, their narrations on these material points will be separately
discussed.

a. Gesolfon's declaration

Upon reaching Almario St., Gesolfon, Mendez and informant saw the appellant Nenita Quizon
in front  of her house and they approached her. Mendez  told appellant that she wanted to buy 15
sticks of marijuana cigarettes from her. After receiving the cigarettes from appellant, Mendez
handed her two marked bills, one P10-bill and one P5-bill. At this point, Gesolfon said, 'I am a police
officer. you are under arrest.' Appellant was then brought to police headquarters for investigation,
(pp. 18-26, tsn, December 14, 1983)

b. Mendez' narrative

When they reached Almario St., Gesolfon, Mendez and the informant proceeded to the appellant's
house. The informant preceded the two in going up the second floor of the appellant's house. The
informant told the appellant they wanted to buy marijuana. Appellant brought out 15 sticks of
marijuana which she gave to Gesolfon. Gesolfon handed money to her after receiving the fifteen
(15) sticks of marijuana. At this point, Mendez gave a signal to their companions along Almario
Street. The latter responded by moving into the house of the appellant. Then, Lt. Jaylo arrested her.
(pp. 9-11, 14, 15 & 18, tsn, February 15, 1984).

The appellant was brought to the Police headquarters where she was made to execute a statement
(Exh. E and E-1) in which it would appear that she admitted her complicity in the crime imputed her.
The following day, she executed another statement (Exh. E-2).

B. Version of the Defense

On the night of August 25, 1983, the appellant was inside their house located at 766 R. Almario St.,
Dagupan, Tondo, Manila, putting a baby to sleep when suddenly three (3) policemen barged into
their house. They demanded of her to bring out the marijuana allegedly in her possession but which
she denied having any. The policemen then forced her to go with them. One of them whom she
recognized as Pat. Gesolfon poked a gun at her. (p. 34, tsn, April 4, 1984)

At the police precinct, the appellant was brought to a room by Patrolwoman Mendez who stripped
off appellant's pants and searched her body for marijuana. Patrolwoman Mendez found nothing from
her, Barely one (1) hour thereafter, she (appellant) was forced to execute a statement before
Mendez admitting the charge levelled against her. The policemen did this by shouting at her and
threatening her that she will rot in jail if she does not-give her statement. The policemen did not
allow her to read the statement, but instead forced her to sign it without knowing its content. She
was afraid and nervous during that time. (pp. 4-6, tsn, April 4, 1984)

The following day, while still under detention, the appellant was again investigated, this time by Pat.
Jaylo. The latter forced her to sign a statement, shouting bad words at her like 'Putang Ina mo, pag
hindi mo pinirmahan ito' and at the same time pulling his sidearm.

Corroborating the appellant's testimony, Maricel Uranyeza testified that she was at the appellant's
house using the latter's telephone while Nenita (appellant) was putting her nephew to sleep. She
saw three (3) persons wearing civilian clothes enter the house.

They asked Nenita Quizon where Imelda Quizon's house was. Nenita informed them that Imelda
lives in the house. Whereupon, the men insisted that Nenita was Imelda and they forced Nenita to
go with them. Seeing this happen, Uranyeza got afraid and ran downstairs where she was
confronted by one of the policemen. However, she told him that she did nothing wrong and went to
the appellant's house only to use their phone. Hearing this, the police let her go. (pp. 4-5, tsn,
March 19, 1984)
Uranyeza also executed a 'Sinumpaang Salaysay' on September 1983 categorically contradicting the
events as narrated by the police officers that led to the arrest of the appellant (Exh. 'I').

As previously stated, appellant was convicted primarily on the basis of her alleged extra-judicial
confessions. Appellant and the Solicitor General contend that the said extra-judicial confessions are
inadmissible in evidence because appellant was not fully apprised of her constitutional right to
counsel. (Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution)

We agree. As aptly observed by the Solicitor General —

The appellant's extra-judicial confession executed on the night of her arrest (Exhibits 'E' and 'E-1' is
prefaced as follows:

TANONG:

Nais mo bang magbigay ng kusang loob na salaysay at sagutin ng buong katotohanan lahat ng
itatanong namin sa iyo na hindi ka namin tinatakot, sinasaktan, o pinangakuan ng anumang pabuya
at dapat mong malaman ang lahat ay sasabihin mo dito ay maaring gamitin laban o pabor sa iyo at
kanino mang tao sa alin mang hukuman sa ating bayan at dapat mo ring malaman na sa
pagsisiyasat na ito karapatan mong magkaroon ng manananggol at ang karapatan mo sa ilalim ng
Saligang Batas ay maaari kang huwag sumagot sa itatanong namin sa iyo kung gusto mo.

SAGOT: Opo.

TANONG:

Samakatuwid, magbigay ka nang malayang salaysay kahit na wala kang manananggol?

SAGOT: Opo.

(SGD) NENITA K. QUIZON

The foregoing indubitably shows that while the appellant was informed of her right to remain silent
and to hire a lawyer to assist her, she was not, however, informed that   if she could not secure a
lawyer, the State will provide her with one, to assist her in the custodial investigation.
The omission is a fatal defect rendering the extra-judicial confession inadmissible in evidence as
ruled by this Honorable Tribunal in People vs. Pascual, Jr. (109 SCRA 197, 205).

Even the subsequent extra-judicial statement executed by the appellant does not unequivocably
show a clear and intelligent waiver by the appellant of her constitutional right to counsel, thus:

02. — T. Ngayon, nauunawaan mo ang iyong mga karapatan, gusto mo bang magbigay ng isang
malaya at kusang loob na salaysay at sagutin ng pawang katotohanan lamang ang lahat ng aking
mga itatanong sa iyo?

S. Opo, magbigay ako ng salaysay.

03. — T. Gusto mo bang kumuha ng isang abogadong makakatulong sa iyo?

S. Huwag na ho, alam ko naman ang isasagot ko.

As may be gleaned from the foregoing, the appellant was simply asked whether she wanted the
services of a lawyer. However, she was not told that if she could not afford to hire one, the State
would provide her one to assist her in the investigation.

This subsequent extra-judicial confession was also rejected by the appellant under oath. The
appellant testified that Pat. Jaylo intimidated her into signing the questioned statement by shouting
bad words at her and pulling his gun from his waist. This was not rebutted by Pat. Jaylo.

Considering, therefore, the circumstances under which the appellant's subsequent extra-judicial
confession was executed, it stands discredited in the eyes of the law and is a thing that never
existed. (People vs. Urro, 44 SCRA 473 [1972]).?

Only recently, this Court had the occasion to rule that —

When the Constitution requires a person under investigation 'to be informed' of his rights to remain
silent and to counsel, it must be presumed to contemplate the transmission of meaningful
information rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional
principle. As a rule, therefore, it would not be sufficient for a police officer just to repeat to the
person under investigation the provisions of Section 20, Article IV of the Constitution. He is not only
duty-bound to tell the person the rights to which the latter is entitled; he must also explain their
effects in practical terms, e.g., what the person under interrogation may or may not do, and in a
language the subject fairly understands. (See People vs. Ramos, 122 SCRA 312; People vs. Caguioa,
95 SCRA 2.) In other words, the right of a person under interrogation 'to be informed' implies a
correlative obligation on the part of the police investigator to explain, and contemplates an effective
communication that results in understanding what is conveyed. Short of this, there is a denial of the
right, as it cannot truly be said that the person has been 'informed' of his rights. Now, since the
right 'to be informed' implies comprehension, the degree of explanation required will necessarily
vary, depending upon the education, intelligence and other relevant personal circumstances of the
person under investigation. Suffice it to say that a simpler and more lucid explanation is needed
where the subject is unlettered. (People vs. Nicandro, G.R. No. 59378, February 11, 1986; People
vs. Duhan, et al., G.R. No. 65189, May 28, 1986)

Moreover, the ruling in People vs. Galit (135 SCRA 465, 472), to the effect that the right to counsel
may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel, clearly
applies to the case at bar.

The Solicitor General also joins with appellant in assailing the trial court for giving weight and
credence to the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution which are contradictory and
inconsistent on material points, thus casting serious doubts as to the truth of the alleged
entrapment.

Again, We agree. As observed by the Solicitor General —

... There are several material inconsistencies in the testimonies of the police officers raising serious
doubts as to the truth of the supposed entrapment. Significant portions of Pat. Gesolfon's testimony
are quoted, as follows:

COURT

Q Who entered the house of Nenita Quizon?

A Nobody entered the house sir,
Q What did P/w Mendez do?

A She requested the 15 sticks of marijuana cigarettes in front of the house of Nenita Quizon, sir.

Q How did you know that P/w Susan Mendez bought 15 sticks of marijuana cigarettes from the
accused on that occasion?

A I was with her, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q When P/w Susan Mendez  gave the P15.00 to Nenita Quizon immediately after Nenita Quizon gave
the 15 sticks of marijuana cigarettes what else transpired?

A After Nenita Quizon gave the 15 sticks of marijuana to P/w Mendez I  say that I am a Police
Officer, and I said to her that you are under arrest and we bring Nenita Quizon to the Police
Headquarters. ... (pp. 18-19, tsn, December 14, 1983; Emphasis supplied.)

while relevant portions of P/w Susan Mendez' testimony are reproduced hereinbelow, to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

q. Were you the one who handed the money to the accused?

a. Pat. Gesolfon, sir.

q. And who received the fifteen (15) sticks of marijuana?

a. Pat. Gesolfon handed the marijuana from the suspect but I was there.

q. Where is not the money?

q. It was on the possession of Lt. Jaylo, I gave it to him.

xxx xxx xxx

q. Where were you?

a. I was beside him, sir.

q. What were you doing when the accused handed the marijuana cigarette to Pat. Gesolfon?

a. I was standing beside Pat. Gesolfon because we have no instruction to arrest her on that actual
selling and buying of marijuana.

court

q. So you did not arrest the accused at that  moment?

a. No, Your Honor.

fiscal de jesus

q. After that, what did you do?

a. We went to the place of their house, then we gave a signal, I lighted cigarette and our
companions were a little far away from us when I lighted a cigarette, they saw it as our signal, then
they went with us.

court

q. What particular place did the accused sell  marijuana?

a. Inside their house, Your Honor.

fiscal de jesus

q. Was it on the second floor or 1st floor?

a. It was at the second floor, there was stairs.

q. You mean you went upstairs together with Pat. Gesolfon to push (sic) as the buyer of the
accused?
a. Yes, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

q. Who arrested the accused?

a. Lt. Jaylo, Sgt. Sayo, Pat. Gesolfon and Pat. Pedriz.

q. Where was accused arrested?

a. Inside their house, sir. (pp. 8-13, tsn, February 15, 1984; Emphasis Supplied.)

Several inconsistencies are readily noticeable from the aforequoted portions of the testimonies of
Patrolwoman Mendez. Thus:

(1) Gesolfon averred that it was P/w Mendez who handed the marked money to the appellant. On
the other hand, Mendez stated that it was Gesolfon who gave the said money to the appellant.

(2) While Pat. Gesolfon declared that the entrapment took place in front of the appellant's house,
P/w Mendez testified that it took place on the second floor of the appellant's house.
(3) Gesolfon testified that he personally arrested the appellant immediately after the feigned buying
took place. For her part, Mendez declared that the arrest was made by Pat. Jaylo  after receiving a
signal coming from her.

(4) Gesolfon narrated that the 15 sticks of marijuana cigarettes were already with the appellant
when they saw her in front of  the latter's house. Mendez, on the other hand, stated that the
appellant had yet to get the cigarettes from a room on the second floor of the said appellant's
house.

Further inconsistencies are correctly pointed out by the appellant in her brief, to wit:

1. During his direct examination, Pat. Gesolfon, declared that the appellant gave the marked money
only after  her investigation at the police headquarters (p. 21, tsn, December 14, 1983, lines 10-11).
On the other hand, Patrolwoman Mendez claimed that she immediately retrieved the money from
the appellant after handing it to her (p. 18, tsn, February 15, 1984, lines 12-16).
2. Gesolfon narrated that it was Patrolwoman Mendez  who asked the accused: 'Oh, mayroon ba
tayo' (p. 25, tsn, December 14, 1984). For her part, Mendez testified that the informant did the
asking of marijuana from the appellant (p. 15, tsn, February 15, 1984).

3. Pat. Gesolfon admitted during his cross-examination that he was armed with a.38 Cal. gun when
the alleged entrapment took place (p. 27, tsn, December 14, 1983). When presented as a rebuttal
witness, Lt. Jaylo, however, maintained that Gesolfon was unarmed, Rather, it was Patrolwoman
Mendez who was armed (p. 12, tsn, April 26, 1984).

4. The police crime report (Exhibit "C") does not specifically mention the name of the appellant,
Nenita, as one of those furnished by the informant allegedly engaged in selling marijuana, but
'Melda and cohorts'. In her testimony, however, Patrolwoman Mendez declared that 'our informant
told us that the marijuana was bought from Melda and Nenita Quizon. (p. 17, tsn, February 14,
1984).

Indeed, if there was an entrapment actually conducted by Gesolfon and Mendez against the
appellant, why would these police officers' testimonies relative thereto differ on material points? This
fact sufficiently raises doubt as to the truth of the alleged entrapment which engenders a reasonable
degree of doubt as to the appellant's guilt. This is one vital fact of substance which the lower court
overlooked, and provides basis for reversal. Thus, as reiterated in People vs. Pagkaliwagan,  36
SCRA 113 (1970):

And while the Court on Appeal would normally not disturb the findings of the trial court on the
credibility of witnesses in view of the latter's advantage of observing at first hand their demeanor in
giving their testimony, the Court has consistently held that this rule of appreciation of evidence must
bow to the superior and immutable rule that the guilt of the accused must be proved beyond
reasonable doubt, because the law, presumes that a defendant is innocent and this presumption
must prevail unless overturned by competent and credible proof  '(Emphasis supplied.)
The testimony of defense witness Leticia Limano is, however, revealing, significant portions of which
are quoted, to wit:

atty. dionido

q. Mrs. Leticia Limano, where were you on the night of August 25, 1983?

a. I was in our house by our window.

court

q. that window where you were, where was it lacing?

a. that is facing at the house of nenita quizon, your Honor.

atty. dionido

q. did you notice any unusual incident that happened during that night?

a. yes, sir.

q. will you please tell the honorable court what is that?

a. I was at the window baby sitting when I saw an owner jeep parked in front of the house of nenita
quizon, after that three persons went to the house of nenita quizon and one of those policemen hold
my husband in the neck.

q. and what did you do when you saw your husband was being held by the neck?

a. I went downstairs to stop the policeman in bringing my husband because I informed them that
my husband has not committed anything wrong and he is a good husband and Ideal one and i also
informed them that i am an employee of the NAPOLCOM and i explained to them that i just sent my
husband for an errand to get a pale of water as a matter of fact he was just wearing shorts.

court

q. by the way, do you know who is that arresting officer?

a. i only knew one of the three.

q. who among them?

a. capt. siochi. i don't know his full name,

q. after talking with this capt., what did you do?

a. after talking with him he release my husband and quest my husband to get water for me.

atty. dionido

a. then what happened next in your surrounding, if any

q. after that i noticed that the three policemen were going downstairs of the house of nenita quizon
together with aling juling.

a. and you also know apparently how long the duration when the policemen went upstairs and
downstairs?

q. no, sir.

court

q. do you know why the policemen tried to arrest your husband?

a. i do not know, your honor.

q. did you not asked capt. siochi why he was arresting your husband?

a. yes, your honor.

q. what did he tell you?

a. i was told by capt. siochi he was only asking my husband to point to him who is selling marijuana
in our place. (pp. 13-16, tsn, March 19, 1984; Emphasis Supplied.)

The foregoing was corroborated by prosecution rebuttal witness, Sgt. Siochi, as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

q. There is another witness for the defense in the person of Leticia Limano who testified that when
you arrested Nenita Quizon and before that incident her husband by the name of Willie Limano was
arrested because he refused to cooperate with you and said Leticia Limano talked to you that her
husband should not be arrested because he has nothing to do in the case you are imputing to
Nenita Quizon and that she introduced herself to you as a lady employee of the National Police
Commission, what can you say about that?

a. I remember that incident when I accosted a man before the arrest of Nenita Quizon.  And the
arrest of Nenita Quizon was not made by me but it was made by Policewoman Susan Mendez and
Pat. Gesolfon. I was in the street just around seven to ten meters away when Nenita Quizon was
being lead to the jeep.

q. Did that said woman introduced herself to you when she approached you?

a. She refuse to give her name first sir.

q. And after that what happened?

a. The man struggled to free himself when I told him to hopin-to the jeep

q. So after that?

a. The woman introduced herself as an lady employee of the NAPOLCOM inasmuch as the Identity
of the woman being arrested was already established and I gave weigh (way) to free the man. And
we have already Nenita Quizon in the jeep sir.

xxx xxx xxx

q. When you accosted Willie Limano, what was he doing?

witness

a. He was walking in the street?

q. Why as police officer you are accosting a man even though he is not making any trouble?

a. no sir.

q. What else did you do after accosting Willie Limano around that place?

a. nothing sir.

q. So usually you are accosting any persons who are making any trouble in the road as you testified
you accosted Willie Limano?

a. I accosted him but I did not arrested him. (pp. 7-8, tsn, April 25, 1984, Emphasis Supplied.)

Thus, it may be asked, if the team of policemen assigned to entrap the marijuana seller had fore-
knowledge of the identity of the said seller in the person of appellant, why would they still ask a
stranger, Willie Limano in this case, if the latter know anybody who was selling marijuana within the
vicinity of Almario St.?

Clearly, the evidence on record does not justify a verdict of guilt.

By and large, the prosecution failed in its task of proving the guilt of the appellant beyond
reasonable doubt. She is, therefore, entitled to an acquittal.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from should be, as it is hereby REVERSED, and another one
entered ACQUITTING the herein appellant of the charge against her.

SO ORDERED
12. Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals, 248 SCRA 590, G.R. No. 93833 September 28, 1995
Doctrines:
Anti-Wiretapping Act (R.A. No. 4200); Statutory Construction; Legislative intent is determined
principally from the language of a statute.—First, legislative intent is determined principally from the language
of a statute. Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express
terms, and interpretation would be resorted to only where a literal interpretation would be either impossible or
absurd or would lead to an injustice.

Same; Same; Even a person privy to a communication who records his private conversation with
another without the knowledge of the latter will qualify as a violator under Section 1 of R.A. 4200.—
Section 1 of R.A. 4200 clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all the parties to
any private communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder. The law makes no
distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different
from those involved in the private communication. The statute’s intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make
such recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier “any.” Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals
correctly concluded, “even a (person) privy to a communication who records his private conversation with another
without the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator” under this provision of R.A. 4200.

Same; Same; Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish.—The unambiguity of the
express words of the provision, taken together with the above-quoted deliberations from the Congressional Record,
therefore plainly supports the view held by the respondent court that the provision seeks to penalize even those privy
to the private communications. Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish.

Same; Criminal Procedure; The mere allegation that an individual made a secret reco rding of a private
communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of
R.A. 4200.—Second, the nature of the conversation is immaterial to a violation of the statute. The substance of the
same need not be specifically alleged in the information. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of secretly
overhearing, intercepting or recording private communications by means of the devices enumerated therein. The
mere allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a private communication by means of a tape recorder
would suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. As the Solicitor General pointed out in his
COMMENT before the respondent court: “Nowhere (in the said law) is it required that before one can be regarded as
a violator, the nature of the conversation, as well as its communication to a third person should be professed.”

Same; Words and Phrases; The contention that the phrase “private communication” in Section 1 of R.A.
4200 does not include “private conversations” narrows the ordinary meaning of the word
“communication” to a point of absurdity.—Finally, petitioner’s contention that the phrase “private
communication” in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not include “private conversations” narrows the ordinary meaning of
the word “communication” to a point of absurdity. The word communicate comes from the latin word communicare,
meaning “to share or to impart.” In its ordinary signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or
imparting, as in a conversation, or signifies the “process by which meanings or thoughts are shared between
individuals through a common system of symbols (as language signs or gestures)” These definitions are broad
enough to include verbal or non-verbal, written or expressive communications of “meanings or thoughts” which are
likely to include the emotionally—charged exchange, on February 22, 1988, between petitioner and private
respondent, in the privacy of the latter’s office. Any doubts about the legislative body’s meaning of the phrase
“private communication” are, furthermore, put to rest by the fact that the terms “conversation” and “communication”
were interchangeably used by Senator Tanada in his Explanatory Note to the bill.

Same; Instant case and Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 235 SCRA 111 [1994], Distinguished.
—In Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court , a case which dealt with the issue of telephone wiretapping, we held
that the use of a telephone extension for the purpose of overhearing a private conversation without authorization did
not violate R.A. 4200 because a telephone extension devise was neither among those devises enumerated in Section
1 of the law nor was it similar to those “device(s) or arrangement(s)” enumerated therein, following the principle that
“penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the accused.” The instant case turns on a different note,
because the applicable facts and circumstances pointing to a violation of R.A. 4200 suffer from no ambiguity, and the
statute itself explicitly mentions the unauthorized “recording” of private communications with the use of tape-
recorders as among the acts punishable.

Facts:
KAPUNAN, J.:

A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro D. Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City alleging that the private respondent, Ester S. Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter's
office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a "hostile and furious mood" and in a manner
offensive to petitioner's dignity and personality," contrary to morals, good customs and public
policy."1X

In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and sought moral
damages, attorney's fees and other expenses of litigation in the amount of P610,000.00, in addition
to costs, interests and other reliefs awardable at the trial court's discretion. The transcript on which
the civil case was based was culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made by
petitioner.2 The transcript reads as follows:X

Plaintiff Soccoro D. Ramirez (Chuchi) — Good Afternoon M'am.

Defendant Ester S. Garcia (ESG) — Ano ba ang nangyari sa 'yo, nakalimot ka na kung paano ka
napunta rito, porke member ka na, magsumbong ka kung ano ang gagawin ko sa 'yo.

CHUCHI — Kasi, naka duty ako noon.

ESG — Tapos iniwan no. (Sic)

CHUCHI — Hindi m'am, pero ilan beses na nila akong binalikan, sabing ganoon —

ESG — Ito and (sic) masasabi ko sa 'yo, ayaw kung (sic) mag explain ka, kasi hanggang 10:00 p.m.,
kinabukasan hindi ka na pumasok. Ngayon ako ang babalik sa 'yo, nag-aaply ka sa States, nag-aaply
ka sa review mo, kung kakailanganin ang certification mo, kalimutan mo na kasi hindi ka sa akin
makakahingi.

CHUCHI — Hindi M'am. Kasi ang ano ko talaga noon i-cocontinue ko up to 10:00 p.m.

ESG —  Bastos ka,  nakalimutan mo na kung paano ka pumasok dito sa hotel. Magsumbong ka sa
Union kung gusto mo. Nakalimutan mo na kung paano ka nakapasok dito "Do you think that on your
own makakapasok ka kung hindi ako. Panunumbyoyan na kita (Sinusumbatan na kita).

CHUCHI — Itutuloy ko na M'am sana ang duty ko.

ESG — Kaso ilang beses na akong binabalikan doon ng mga no ( sic) ko.

ESG — Nakalimutan mo na ba kung paano ka pumasok sa hotel, kung on your own merit alam ko
naman kung gaano ka "ka bobo" mo. Marami ang nag-aaply alam kong hindi ka papasa.

CHUCHI — Kumuha kami ng exam noon.

ESG — Oo, pero hindi ka papasa.

CHUCHI — Eh, bakit ako ang nakuha ni Dr. Tamayo

ESG — Kukunin ka kasi ako.

CHUCHI — Eh, di sana —

ESG — Huwag mong ipagmalaki na may utak ka kasi wala kang utak. Akala mo ba makukuha ka
dito kung hindi ako.

CHUCHI — Mag-eexplain ako.

ESG — Huwag na, hindi ako mag-papa-explain sa 'yo, makaalala ka kung paano ka puma-rito.
"Putang-ina" sasabi-sabihin mo kamag-anak ng nanay at tatay mo ang mga magulang ko.

ESG — Wala na akong pakialam, dahil nandito ka sa loob, nasa labas ka puwede ka ng hindi
pumasok, okey yan nasaloob ka umalis ka doon.

CHUCHI — Kasi M'am, binbalikan ako ng mga taga Union.

ESG — Nandiyan na rin ako, pero huwag mong kalimutan na hindi ka makakapasok kung hindi ako.
Kung hindi mo kinikilala yan okey lang sa akin, dahil tapos ka na.

CHUCHI — Ina-ano ko m'am na utang na loob.

ESG — Huwag na lang, hindi mo utang na loob, kasi kung baga sa no, nilapastangan mo ako.

CHUCHI — Paano kita nilapastanganan?

ESG — Mabuti pa lumabas ka na. Hindi na ako makikipagusap sa 'yo. Lumabas ka na. Magsumbong
ka.3X

As a result of petitioner's recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly taping the
confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case before the Regional Trial Court of
Pasay City for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled "An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping
and other related violations of private communication, and other purposes." An information charging
petitioner of violation of the said Act, dated October 6, 1988 is quoted herewith:

INFORMATION
The Undersigned Assistant City Fiscal Accusses Socorro D. Ramirez of Violation of Republic Act No.
4200, committed as follows:

That on or about the 22nd day of February, 1988, in Pasay City Metro Manila, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this honorable court, the above-named accused, Socorro D. Ramirez not being
authorized by Ester S. Garcia to record the latter's conversation with said accused, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with the use of a tape recorder secretly record the said
conversation and thereafter communicate in writing the contents of the said recording to other
person.

Contrary to law.

Pasay City, Metro Manila, September 16, 1988.

MARIANO M. CUNETA
Asst. City Fiscal
Upon arraignment, in lieu of a plea, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information on the
ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, particularly a violation of R.A. 4200. In
an order May 3, 1989, the trial court granted the Motion to Quash, agreeing with petitioner that 1)
the facts charged do not constitute an offense under R.A. 4200; and that 2) the violation punished
by R.A. 4200 refers to a the taping of a communication by a person other than a participant to the
communication.4X

From the trial court's Order, the private respondent filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with this
Court, which forthwith referred the case to the Court of Appeals in a Resolution (by the First
Division) of June 19, 1989.

On February 9, 1990, respondent Court of Appeals promulgated its assailed Decision declaring the
trial court's order of May 3, 1989 null and void, and holding that:

[T]he allegations sufficiently constitute an offense punishable under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. In thus
quashing the information based on the ground that the facts alleged do not constitute an offense,
the respondent judge acted in grave abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari.5X

Consequently, on February 21, 1990, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which respondent
Court of Appeals denied in its Resolution6 dated June 19, 1990. Hence, the instant petition.X

Petitioner vigorously argues, as her "main and principal issue" 7 that the applicable provision of
Republic Act 4200 does not apply to the taping of a private conversation by one of the parties to the
conversation. She contends that the provision merely refers to the unauthorized taping of a private
conversation by a party other than those involved in the communication. 8 In relation to this,
petitioner avers that the substance or content of the conversation must be alleged in the
Information, otherwise the facts charged would not constitute a violation of R.A. 4200. 9 Finally,
petitioner agues that R.A. 4200 penalizes the taping of a "private communication," not a "private
conversation" and that consequently, her act of secretly taping her conversation with private
respondent was not illegal under the said act. 10X
Issue/s:

Ruling:
We disagree.

First, legislative intent is determined principally from the language of a statute. Where the language
of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express terms, and
interpretation would be resorted to only where a literal interpretation would be either impossible 11 or
absurb or would lead to an injustice. 12X

Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, " An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping and Other Related
Violations of Private Communication and Other Purposes," provides:

Sec. 1. It shall be unlawfull for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private
communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or
arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by
using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or
tape recorder, or however otherwise described.
The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by
all the parties to any private communication to secretly record such communication by means of a
tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the
statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private
communication. The statute's intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is
underscored by the use of the qualifier "any". Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals
correctly concluded, "even a (person) privy to a communication who records his private conversation
with another without the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator" 13 under this provision of
R.A. 4200.X

A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, moreover, supports the respondent court's
conclusion that in enacting R.A. 4200 our lawmakers indeed contemplated to make illegal,
unauthorized tape recording of private conversations or communications taken either by the parties
themselves or by third persons. Thus:

xxx xxx xxx

Senator Tañada: That qualified only "overhear".

Senator Padilla: So that when it is intercepted or recorded, the element of secrecy would not appear
to be material. Now, suppose, Your Honor, the recording is not made by all the parties but by some
parties and involved not criminal cases that would be mentioned under section 3 but would cover,
for example civil cases or special proceedings whereby a recording is made not necessarily by all the
parties but perhaps by some in an effort to show the intent of the parties because the actuation of
the parties prior, simultaneous even subsequent to the contract or the act may be indicative of their
intention. Suppose there is such a recording, would you say, Your Honor, that the intention is to
cover it within the purview of this bill or outside?

Senator Tañada: That is covered by the purview of this bill, Your Honor.

Senator Padilla: Even if the record should be used not in the prosecution of offense but as evidence
to be used in Civil Cases or special proceedings?

Senator Tañada: That is right. This is a complete ban on tape recorded conversations taken without
the authorization of all the parties.
Senator Padilla: Now, would that be reasonable, your Honor?

Senator Tañada: I believe it is reasonable because  it is not sporting to record the observation of one
without his knowing it and then using it against him . It is not fair, it is not sportsmanlike. If the
purpose; Your honor, is to record the intention of the parties. I believe that all the parties should
know that the observations are being recorded.

Senator Padilla: This might reduce the utility of recorders.

Senator Tañada: Well no. For example, I was to say that in meetings of the board of directors where
a tape recording is taken, there is no objection to this if all the parties know. It is but fair that the
people whose remarks and observations are being made should know that the observations are
being recorded.

Senator Padilla: Now, I can understand.

Senator Tañada: That is why when we take statements of persons, we say: "Please be informed that
whatever you say here may be used against you." That is fairness and that is what we demand.
Now, in spite of that warning, he makes damaging statements against his own interest, well, he
cannot complain any more. But if you are going to take a recording of the observations and remarks
of a person without him knowing that it is being taped or recorded, without him knowing that what
is being recorded may be used against him, I think it is unfair .
xxx xxx xxx

(Congression Record, Vol. III, No. 31, p. 584, March 12, 1964)

Senator Diokno: Do you understand, Mr. Senator, that under Section 1 of the bill as now worded, if
a party secretly records a public speech, he would be penalized under Section 1? Because the
speech is public, but the recording is done secretly.

Senator Tañada: Well, that particular aspect is not contemplated by the bill. It is the communication
between one person and another person — not between a speaker and a public.
xxx xxx xxx

(Congressional Record, Vol. III, No. 33, p. 626, March 12, 1964)

xxx xxx xxx

The unambiguity of the express words of the provision, taken together with the above-quoted
deliberations from the Congressional Record, therefore plainly supports the view held by the
respondent court that the provision seeks to penalize even those privy to the private
communications. Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish.

Second, the nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the statute. The substance of
the same need not be specifically alleged in the information. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts
of secretly overhearing, intercepting or recording  private communications by means of the devices
enumerated therein. The mere allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a private
communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1
of R.A. 4200. As the Solicitor General pointed out in his COMMENT before the respondent court:
"Nowhere (in the said law) is it required that before one can be regarded as a violator, the nature of
the conversation, as well as its communication to a third person should be professed." 14X

Finally, petitioner's contention that the phrase "private communication" in Section 1 of R.A. 4200
does not include "private conversations" narrows the ordinary meaning of the word "communication"
to a point of absurdity. The word communicate comes from the latin word communicare, meaning
"to share or to impart." In its ordinary signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or
imparting signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting, as in
a conversation, 15 or signifies the "process by which meanings or thoughts are shared between
individuals through a common system of symbols (as language signs or gestures)" 16 These
definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal, written or expressive communications
of "meanings or thoughts" which are likely to include the emotionally-charged exchange, on
February 22, 1988, between petitioner and private respondent, in the privacy of the latter's office.
Any doubts about the legislative body's meaning of the phrase "private communication" are,
furthermore, put to rest by the fact that the terms "conversation" and "communication" were
interchangeably used by Senator Tañada in his Explanatory Note to the bill quoted below: X
It has been said that innocent people have nothing to fear from their conversations being
overheard. But this statement ignores the usual nature of conversations as well the undeniable fact
that most, if not all, civilized people have some aspects of their lives they do not wish to expose.
Free conversations are often characterized by exaggerations, obscenity, agreeable falsehoods, and
the expression of anti-social desires of views not intended to be taken seriously. The right to
the  privacy of communication, among others, has expressly been assured by our Constitution.
Needless to state here, the framers of our Constitution must have recognized the nature
of conversations between individuals and the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings
and of his intellect. They must have known that part of the pleasures and satisfactions of life are to
be found in the unaudited, and free exchange of communication between individuals — free from
every unjustifiable intrusion by whatever means.17X

In Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 18 a case which dealt with the issue of telephone
wiretapping, we held that the use of a telephone extension for the purpose of overhearing a private
conversation without authorization did not violate R.A. 4200 because a telephone extension devise
was neither among those "device(s) or arrangement(s)" enumerated therein, 19 following the
principle that "penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the accused." 20 The instant case
turns on a different note, because the applicable facts and circumstances pointing to a violation of
R.A. 4200 suffer from no ambiguity, and the statute itself explicitly mentions the unauthorized
"recording" of private communications with the use of tape-recorders as among the acts
punishable.X

WHEREFORE, because the law, as applied to the case at bench is clear and unambiguous and leaves
us with no discretion, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The decision appealed from is
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

13. Zulueta vs. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 699, G.R. No. 107383 February 20, 1996
Doctrines:
Evidence; Illegally Obtained Evidence; Constitutional Law; Privacy of Communication and
Correspondence; Privacy of communication and correspondence is inviolable. The only exception in the
Constitution is if there is a “lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order requires,
otherwise, as prescribed by law.”—Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence.
The constitutional injunction declaring “the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable” is no
less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband’s infidelity) who is the
party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the
Constitution is if there is a “lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as
prescribed by law.” Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible “for any purpose in any
proceeding.”

Same; Same; Same; Same; A person by contracting marriage does not shed his/her integrity or his
right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.—
The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the
other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does
not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to
him or to her.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses
by making it privileged.—The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it
privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse
while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to any communication
received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing is
freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the other. And
this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.

Facts:
This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch X) which ordered petitioner to return documents and papers
taken by her from private respondent's clinic without the latter's knowledge and consent.

The facts are as follows:

Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1982,
petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her
mother, a driver and private respondent's secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her
husband's clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Martin
and his alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martin's passport, and
photographs. The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal
separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against
her husband.

Dr. Martin brought this action below for recovery of the documents and papers and for damages
against petitioner. The case was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch X, which, after
trial, rendered judgment for private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, declaring him "the
capital/exclusive owner of the properties described in paragraph 3 of plaintiff's Complaint or those
further described in the Motion to Return and Suppress" and ordering Cecilia Zulueta and any person
acting in her behalf to a immediately return the properties to Dr. Martin and to pay him P5,000.00,
as nominal damages; P5,000.00, as moral damages and attorney's fees; and to pay the costs of the
suit. The writ of preliminary injunction earlier issued was made final and petitioner Cecilia Zulueta
and her attorneys and representatives were enjoined from "using or submitting/admitting as
evidence" the documents and papers in question. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the Regional Trial Court. Hence this petition.

There is no question that the documents and papers in question belong to private respondent, Dr.
Alfredo Martin, and that they were taken by his wife, the herein petitioner, without his knowledge
and consent. For that reason, the trial court declared the documents and papers to be properties of
private respondent, ordered petitioner to return them to private respondent and enjoined her from
using them in evidence. In appealing from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial
court's decision, petitioner's only ground is that in Alfredo Martin v. Alfonso Felix, Jr., 1  this Court
ruled that the documents and papers (marked as Annexes A-1 to J-7 of respondent's comment in
that case) were admissible in evidence and, therefore, their use by petitioner's attorney, Alfonso
Felix did not constitute malpractice or gross misconduct, For this reason it is contended that the
Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the trial court instead of dismissing private
respondent's complaint.X
Issue/s:

Ruling:
Petitioner's contention has no merit. The case against Atty. Felix, Jr. was for disbarment. Among
other things, private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, as complainant in that case, charged that in
using the documents in evidence, Atty. Felix, Jr. committed malpractice or gross misconduct
because of the injunctive order of the trial court. In dismissing the complaint against Atty. Felix, Jr.,
this Court took note of the following defense of Atty. Felix; Jr. which it found to be "impressed with
merit:"2

On the alleged malpractice or gross misconduct of respondent [Alfonso Felix, Jr.], he

maintains that:

....

4. When respondent refiled Cecilia's case for legal separation before the Pasig Regional Trial
Court, there was admittedly an order of the Manila Regional Trial Court prohibiting Cecilia
from using the documents Annex "A-1 to J-7." On September 6, 1983, however having
appealed the said order to this Court on a petition for certiorari, this Court issued a
restraining order on aforesaid date which order temporarily set aside the order of the trial
court. Hence, during the enforceability of this Court's order, respondent's request for
petitioner to admit the genuineness and authenticity of the subject annexes cannot be
looked upon as malpractice. Notably, petitioner Dr. Martin finally admitted the truth and
authenticity of the questioned annexes, At that point in time, would it have been malpractice
for respondent to use petitioner's admission as evidence against him in the legal separation
case pending in the Regional Trial Court of Makati? Respondent submits it is not malpractice.

Significantly, petitioner's admission was done not thru his counsel but by Dr. Martin himself
under oath, Such verified admission constitutes an affidavit, and, therefore, receivable in
evidence against him. Petitioner became bound by his admission. For Cecilia to avail herself
of her husband's admission and use the same in her action for legal separation cannot be
treated as malpractice.

Thus, the acquittal of Atty. Felix, Jr. in the administrative case amounts to no more than a
declaration that his use of the documents and papers for the purpose of securing Dr. Martin's
admission as to their genuiness and authenticity did not constitute a violation of the injunctive order
of the trial court. By no means does the decision in that case establish the admissibility of the
documents and papers in question.

It cannot be overemphasized that if Atty. Felix, Jr. was acquitted of the charge of violating the writ
of preliminary injunction issued by the trial court, it was only because, at the time he used the
documents and papers, enforcement of the order of the trial court was temporarily restrained by this
Court. The TRO issued by this Court was eventually lifted as the petition for certiorari filed by
petitioner against the trial court's order was dismissed and, therefore, the prohibition against the
further use of the documents and papers became effective again.

Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional
injunction declaring "the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable" is no less
3 

applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband's infidelity)
who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to
the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a "lawful order [from a] court or when public safety
or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law." Any violation of this provision renders the
4 

evidence obtained inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding." 

5

The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers
and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A
person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an
individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.

The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged.
Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected
spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to
6 

any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for
specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for
7 

each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of
fidelity that each owes to the other.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit.

14. Chieng Yen vs. Republic, 10 SCRA 180, No. L-18885 January 31, 1964
Doctrines:
Citizenship; Naturalization; Requirement of one year residence in the place where petition is filed;
Purpose.—The purpose of the law in requiring one year residence in a place where one seeks naturalization is to
facilitate acilitate the determination by official authorities of the different activities of petitioner, especially with
regard to his qualifications. That is why the law requires that the petition should state all his places of residence,
whether present or previous.

Same; Same; Same; Failure to state places of residence in petition.—Where a petitioner for naturalization
not only failed to state correctly his place of residence within one year prior to filing iling the petition, but even
failed to state some of his former places of residence it is held that the court a quo was justified in denying the
petition.

Same; Same; Same; Legal residence in the case at bar defined.— Legal residence imports not only
intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of
such intention. In the case at bar, the fact that petitioner has no business in Manila and that he has to attend to
his business in Olongapo is a potent reason for disbelieving any claim that he has transferred his residence to
Manila, for this Court can take judicial notice that Chinese businessmen rarely reside in a place different from
where they have their place of business. The documents at hand speak eloquently that all the business activities
of petitioner are in Olongapo, Zambales, and it is for this reason that he stated in all his official documents that his
residence is in that place.
Facts:
On July 29, 1957, Chieng Yen filed with the Office of the Solicitor General his declaration of intention to become a
Filipino citizen. Thereafter, on September 16, 1958, he filed before the Court of First Instance of Manila a petition
seeking to become a Filipino citizen. This petition was published in accordance with law. After hearing, the court a
quo rendered judgment denying the petition on the ground that petitioner was not a resident of Manila for at least
one year prior to the filing of his petition for naturalization and so the court had no jurisdiction over the case.
Petitioner has appealed.

Petitioner was born in Shantung, China on July 5, 1914. He is a citizen of the Republic of China. He came to the
Philippines on April 16, 1935, having resided therein continuously since then. He is a businessman with an average
annual income of P5,000.00. He is not delinquent in the payment of his license fees and taxes. He owns real
properties valued at P55,000.00. He has conducted himself in a proper manner during the entire period of his
residence in the Philippines in his relation with the government and the community in which he lives. He has
mingled socially with the Filipinos and desires to learn and embrace their customs, traditions and ideals. He has
never been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude. He is not suffering from any incurable or
contagious disease.

Petitioner speaks and writes English and Tagalog. He is married to Francisca Wong, with whom he has five
children, namely, Lily Chieng, Chieng Yen, Jr., Julie Chieng, William Chieng and Wilson Chieng. Lily Chieng and
Chieng Yen, Jr., the only children of school age, are studying in a public school in Olongapo. Petitioner believes in
the principle underlying the Constitution of the Philippines. He is not opposed to organized government, nor
affiliated with an association of persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposed to organized government.
Issue/s:
The only issue to be determined is whether petitioner is a resident of Manila for at least one year prior to the filing
of his petition for naturalization, as he tried to prove, or whether he is a resident of Olongapo, Zambales, as found
by the court a quo. This is the only ground on which the petition for naturalization was denied.
Ruling:
In support of his contention that since February, 1955 he has changed his residence from Olongapo, Zambales to
Manila, petitioner presented both oral and documentary evidence. Briefly stated, the nature of his evidence is as
follows: According to petitioner himself, he runs a restaurant, a night club and a furniture store at Olongapo,
Zambales. He transferred to Manila since 1955, and in order to run his different business activities at Olongapo,
Zambales, he had appointed a manager for each of them. He was prompted to transfer his residence to Manila
because the mother of his wife wanted to live with her.

Wilfredo Masa testified that he saw petitioner in 1955 while the latter was transferring his residence from
Zambales to Manila because petitioner's truck which was loaded with his belongings broke down near the gasoline
station where Masa's truck was parked. Filemon Verzamo, another witness, testified that every time a friend of his
wanted to buy furniture by installment from petitioner's store at Olongapo, Zambales, he would accompany his
friend to the house of petitioner at Fernandez Street in Manila in order that he may be able to talk to petitioner
about the matter. Benito Bernardo, who lives in the same apartment occupied by petitioner, also testified that
petition transferred to Manila since 1955 for they even helped him in unloading his belongings at the house where
he is now living. Lastly, Mansueto David, the same person who drove the truck used by petitioner in transferring
his belonging to Manila, also testified that he was paid P100.00 for job and helped in unloading petitioner's
belongings to his house at Fernandez St., Manila.

There is, however, enough evidence to show that, notwithstanding the transfer of the above belongings to Manila
as apparently testified to by petitioner's witnesses petitioner continued residing in Olongapo, Zambales, because
his business interests from which he derived his main source of income are deeply established there. Thus, in his
declaration of intention filed one year before he filed his application for naturalization, petitioner under oath that
his residence was Olongapo, Zambales his income tax return filed on February 23, 1958, much after he had filed
his petition for naturalization, he likewise stated under oath that he resided in Olongapo, Zambales. The last entry
in the records of annual report in person of an alien duly signed by petitioner also shows that Olongapo is the
place where he reported as a resident alien. These documents which were subscribed to by him under oath must
naturally reflect his true situation as regards the place of his residence especially that which refers to his
declaration of intention, and as such should deserve more credit and value than the testimony of petitioner and
his witnesses which, as we know, can easily be fashioned or arranged to suit the interest he intends to serve.

While it is true that two pieces of documentary evidence were presented by petitioner to strengthen the evidence
he has given regarding his alleged change of residence, the same are wanting in many particulars. While Exhibit
A, which is a document issued by the registration officer of the Bureau of Immigration, certifies that petitioner had
advised of his change of address from Olongapo, Zambales to Manila as of February 10, 1955, the advice was
given on March 3, 1959, or about six months after the filing of the present petition, and four years after the
supposed change of residence. This flaw is not in the least cured by the certificate Exhibit T, concerning the same
change of residence, for the investigation alleged to have been made leading to the issuance of the certificate on
March 3, 1959 could not have made any reference to the date of the alleged change of residence in 1955 for the
simple reason that the period mediating between the time of certification and that of the alleged change of
residence is not merely nominal but substantial. The two dates are too far apart.1äwphï1.ñët

Legal residence imports not only intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place,
coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.1 The fact that petitioner has no business in Manila and that he
has to attend to his business in Olongapo is a potent reason for disbelieving any claim that he has transferred his
residence to Manila, for this Court can take judicial notice that Chinese businessmen rarely reside in a place
different from where they have their place of business.2 The documents at hand speak eloquently that all the
business activities of petitioner are in Olongapo, Zambales, and it is for this reason that he stated in all his official
documents that his residence is in that place.

The purpose of the law in requiring one year residence in a place when one seeks naturalization is to facilitate the
determination by official authorities of the different activities of petitioner, especially with regard to his
qualifications. That is why the law requires that the petition should state all his places of residence, whether
present or previous. But in this case petitioner even failed to state some of his former places of residence, a fact
which itself is a sufficient disqualification.3 The court a quo, therefore, was justified in declaring itself bereft of
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the present case.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed. Costs against petitioner.

15. People vs. Malngan, 503 SCRA 294, G.R. No. 170470 September 26, 2006
Doctrines:
Criminal Law; Arson; Homicide; There is no complex crime of arson with (multiple) homicide—Art.
320 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, with respect to destructive arson, and the
provisions of PD No. 1613 respecting other cases of arson provide only one penalty for the
commission of arson, whether considered destructive or otherwise, where death results therefrom.—
The Information in this case erroneously charged accused-appellant with a complex crime, i.e.,
Arson with Multiple Homicide. Presently, there are two (2) laws that govern the crime of arson
where death results therefrom—Article 320 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by Republic Act
(RA) No. 7659, and Section 5 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1613, quoted hereunder, to wit: Revised Penal
Code: ART. 320. Destructive Arson.—x x x x If as a consequence of the commission of any of the acts penalized
under this Article, death results, the mandatory penalty of death shall be imposed. [Emphasis supplied.]
Presidential Decree No. 1613: SEC. 5. Where Death Results from Arson.—If by reason of or on the occasion of the
arson death results, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed. [Emphasis supplied.] Art. 320 of
the RPC, as amended, with respect to destructive arson, and the provisions of PD No. 1613 respecting other cases
of arson provide only one penalty for the commission of arson, whether considered destructive or otherwise,
where death results therefrom. The raison d'être is that arson is itself the end and death is simply the
consequence.

Same; Same; Same; In cases where both burning and death occur, in order to determine what
crime/crimes was/were perpetrated—whether arson, murder, or arson and homicide/murder, it is
de rigueur to ascertain the main objective of the malefactor.—In cases where both burning and
death occur, in order to determine what crime/crimes was/were perpetrated—whether arson, murder
or arson and homicide/murder, it is de rigueur to ascertain the main objective of the malefactor: (a) if the main
objective is the burning of the building or edifice, but death results by reason or on the occasion of arson, the
crime is simply arson, and the resulting homicide is absorbed; (b) if, on the other hand, the main objective is to
kill a particular person who may be in a building or edifice, when fire is resorted to as the means to accomplish
such goal the crime committed is murder only; lastly, (c) if the objective is, likewise, to kill a particular person, and
in fact the offender has already done so, but fire is resorted to as a means to cover up the killing, then there are
two separate and distinct crimes committed—homicide/murder and arson.

Same; Witnesses; The credibility given by trial courts to prosecution witnesses is an important
aspect of evidence which appellate courts can rely on because of its unique opportunity to observe
them, particularly their demeanor, conduct, and attitude, during the direct and cross-examination by
counsels.—All the witnesses are in accord that accused-appellant’s agitated appearance was out of the ordinary.
Remarkably, she has never denied this observation. We give great weight to the findings of the RTC and so accord
credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses as it had the opportunity to observe them directly. The
credibility given by trial courts to prosecution witnesses is an important aspect of evidence which appellate courts
can rely on because of its unique opportunity to observe them, particularly their demeanor, conduct, and attitude,
during the direct and crossexamination by counsels. Here, Remigio Bernardo, Rolando Gruta and Mercedita
Mendoza are disinterested witnesses and there is not an iota of evidence in the records to indicate that they are
suborned witnesses. The records of the RTC even show that Remigio Bernardo, the Barangay Chairman, kept
accused-appellant from being mauled by the angry crowd outside of the barangay hall.

Same; Same; Where the defense failed to show any evil or improper motive on the part of the
prosecution witnesses, the presumption is that their testimonies are true and thus entitled to full
faith and credence.—Accusedappellant has not shown any compelling reason why the witnesses presented
would openly, publicly and deliberately lie or concoct a story, to send an innocent person to jail all the while
knowing that the real malefactor remains at large. Such proposition defies logic. And where the defense failed to
show any evil or improper motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses, the presumption is that their
testimonies are true and thus entitled to full faith and credence.

Same; Same; Same; Circumstantial Evidence; Requisites; Words and Phrases; Circumstantial
evidence is that evidence which proves a fact or series of facts from which the facts in issue may be
established by inference—it is founded on experience and observed facts and coincidences
establishing a connection between the known and proven facts and the facts sought to be proved.—
While the prosecution witnesses did not see accused-appellant actually starting the fire that burned several houses
and killed the Separa family, her guilt may still be established through circumstantial evidence provided that: (1)
there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and, (3) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt. Circumstantial
evidence is that evidence which proves a fact or series of facts from which the facts in issue may be established
by inference. It is founded on experience and observed facts and coincidences establishing a connection between
the known and proven facts and the facts sought to be proved. In order to bring about a conviction, the
circumstantial evidence presented must constitute an unbroken chain, which leads to one fair and reasonable
conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of others, as the guilty person.

Same; Rights of Suspects; Miranda Doctrine; Extrajudicial Confessions; Requisites for Admissibility.
—We have held that the abovequoted provision applies to the stage of custodial investigation —when
the investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but starts to focus on a particular person as
a suspect. Said constitutional guarantee has also been extended to situations in which an individual has not been
formally arrested but has merely been “invited” for questioning. To be admissible in evidence against an accused,
the extrajudicial confessions made must satisfy the following requirements: (1) it must be voluntary; (2) it must
be made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; (3) it must be express; and (4) it must be in
writing.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Arguably, the barangay tanods, including the Barangay Chairman, may
be deemed as law enforcement officers for purposes of applying Article III, Section 12(1) and (3), of
the Constitution—the confession of accused, given to the Barangay Chairman, as well as the lighter
found by the latter in her bag are inadmissible in evidence against her as such were obtained in
violation of her constitutional rights.—Arguably, the barangay tanods, including the Barangay Chairman, in
this particular instance, may be deemed as law enforcement officer for purposes of applying Article III, Section
12(1) and (3), of the Constitution. When accused-appellant was brought to the barangay hall in the morning of 2
January 2001, she was already a suspect, actually the only one, in the fire that destroyed several houses as well
as killed the whole family of Roberto Separa, Sr. She was, therefore, already under custodial investigation and the
rights guaranteed by Article III, Section 12(1), of the Constitution should have already been observed or applied
to her. Accused-appellant’s confession to Barangay Chairman Remigio Bernardo was made in response to the
“interrogation” made by the latter—admittedly conducted without first informing accused-appellant of her rights
under the Constitution or done in the presence of counsel. For this reason, the confession of accused-appellant,
given to Barangay Chairman Remigio Bernardo, as well as the lighter found by the latter in her bag are
inadmissible in evidence against her as such were obtained in violation of her constitutional rights.

Same; Same; Same; Same; It should well be recalled that the constitutional safeguards during
custodial investigations do not apply to those not elicited through questioning by the police or their
agents but given in an ordinary manner whereby the accused verbally admits to having committed
the offense as what happened—the Bill of Rights solely governs the relationship between the individual on one
hand and the State (and its agents) on the other, and it does not concern itself with the relation between a private
individual and another private individual.—Be that as it may, the inadmissibility of accused-appellant’s confession
to Barangay Chairman Remigio Bernardo and the lighter as evidence do not automatically lead to her acquittal. It
should well be recalled that the constitutional safeguards during custodial investigations do not apply to those not
elicited through questioning by the police or their agents but given in an ordinary manner whereby the accused
verbally admits to having committed the offense as what happened in the case at bar when accused-appellant
admitted to Mercedita Mendoza, one of the neighbors of Roberto Separa, Sr., to having started the fire in the
Separas’ house. The testimony of Mercedita Mendoza recounting said admission is, unfortunately for accused-
appellant, admissible in evidence against her and is not covered by the aforesaid constitutional guarantee. Article
III of the Constitution, or the Bill of Rights, solely governs the relationship between the individual on one hand
and the State (and its agents) on the other; it does not concern itself with the relation between a private
individual and another private individual—as both accused-appellant and prosecution witness Mercedita Mendoza
undoubtedly are. Here, there is no evidence on record to show that said witness was acting under police authority,
so appropriately, accused-appellant’s uncounselled extrajudicial confession to said witness was properly admitted
by the RTC.

Same; Arson; Homicide; In the crime of arson, the identities of the victims are immaterial in that
intent to kill them particularly is not one of the elements of the crime.—In the crime of arson, the
identities of the victims are immaterial in that intent to kill them particularly is not one of the elements of the
crime. As we have clarified earlier, the killing of a person is absorbed in the charge of arson, simple or destructive.
The prosecution need only prove, that the burning was intentional and that what was intentionally burned is an
inhabited house or dwelling. Again, in the case of People v. Soriano, we explained that: Although intent may be an
ingredient of the crime of Arson, it may be inferred from the acts of the accused. There is a presumption that one
intends the natural consequences of his act; and when it is shown that one has deliberately set fire to a building,
the prosecution is not bound to produce further evidence of his wrongful intent.

Same; Same; There are two (2) categories of the crime of arson—(1) destructive arson, and (2)
simple arson, which classification is based on the kind, character and location of the property
burned, regardless of the value of the damage caused.—There are two (2) categories of the crime of
arson: 1) destructive arson, under Art. 320 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659; and
2) simple arson, under Presidential Decree No. 1613. Said classification is based on the kind, character and
location of the property burned, regardless of the value of the damage caused.

Same; Same; Pleadings and Practice; What is controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor the
designation of the offense charged or the particular law or part thereof allegedly violated, but the
description of the crime charged and the particular facts therein recited.—As stated in the body of the
Information, accused-appellant was charged with having intentionally burned the two-storey residential house of
Robert Separa. Said conflagration likewise spread and destroyed seven (7) adjoining houses. Consequently, if
proved, as it was proved, at the trial, she may be convicted, and sentenced accordingly, of the crime of simple
arson. Such is the case “notwithstanding the error in the designation of the offense in the information, the
information remains effective insofar as it states the facts constituting the crime alleged therein.” “What is
controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor the designation of the offense charged or the particular law or part
thereof allegedly violate, x x x, but the description of the crime charged and the particular facts therein recited.”

Same; Same; Damages; Moral damages cannot be awarded in the absence of proof of mental or
physical suffering on the part of the heirs of the victims.—Apropos the civil liabilities of accused-appellant,
current jurisprudence dictate that the civil indemnity due from accused-appellant is P50,000.00 for the death of
each of the victims. However, the monetary awards for moral and exemplary damages given by the Court of
Appeals, both in the amount of P50,000.00, due the heirs of the victims, have to be deleted for lack of material
basis. Similarly, the Court of Appeals award of exemplary damages to Rodolfo Movilla in the amount of P50,000.00
for the destruction of his house, also has to be deleted, but in this instance for being improper. Moral damages
cannot be award by this Court in the absence of proof of mental or physical suffering on the part of the heirs of
the victims. Concerning the award of exemplary damages, the reason for the deletion being that no aggravating
circumstance had been alleged and proved by the prosecution in the case at bar
Facts:
The Case
 
For review is the   Decision [1 ]  of the Court of Appealsin CA-G.R. CR HC No.
01139 promulgated on 2 September 2005, affirming with modification
the  Judgment [2 ]  of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 41, in
Criminal Case No. 01-188424 promulgated on 13 October 2003, finding
appellant Edna Malngan   y  Mayo (Edna) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of 'Arson with Multiple Homicide or Arson resulting to the death of six
(6) people, and sentencing her to suffer the penalty of death.
 
The Facts
 
As summarized[3 ]  by the Court of Appeals, the antecedent facts are as follows:
 
From the personal account of Remigio Bernardo, the Barangay Chairman in
the area, as well as the personal account of the pedicab driver named Rolando
Gruta, it was at around 4:45 a.m. on January 2, 2001 when Remigio Bernardo
and his tanods saw the accused-appellant EDNA, one hired as a housemaid by
Roberto Separa, Sr., with her head turning in different directions, hurriedly
leaving the house of her employer at No. 172 Moderna Street, Balut, Tondo,
Manila. She was seen to have boarded a pedicab which was driven by a
person later identified as Rolando Gruta. She was heard by the pedicab driver
to have instructed that she be brought to Nipa Street, but upon her arrival
there, she changed her mind and asked that she be brought instead
to Balasan Street where she finally alighted, after paying for her fare.
 
Thirty minutes later, at around 5:15 a.m. Barangay Chairman Bernardo's group
later discovered that a fire gutted the house of the employer of the
housemaid. Barangay Chairman Bernardo and his tanods responded to the fire
upon hearing shouts from the residents and thereafter, firemen from the Fire
District 1-NCR arrived at the fire scene to contain the fire.
 
When Barangay Chairman Bernardo returned to the Barangay Hall, he received
a report from pedicab driver Rolando Gruta, who was also a tanod, that shortly
before the occurrence of the fire, he saw a woman (the housemaid) coming
out of the house at No. 172 Moderna Street, Balut, Tondo, Manila and he
received a call from his wife telling him of a woman (the same housemaid)
who was acting strangely and suspiciously on Balasan Street. Barangay
Chairman Bernardo, Rolando Gruta and the other tanods proceeded to Balasan
Street and found the woman who was later identified as the accused-
appellant. After Rolando Gruta positively identified the woman as the same
person who left No. 172 Moderna Street, Balut, Tondo, Manila, Barangay
Chairman Bernardo and his tanods apprehended her and brought her to the
Barangay Hall for investigation. At the Barangay Hall, Mercedita Mendoza,
neighbor of Roberto Separa, Sr. and whose house was also burned, identified
the woman as accused-appellant EDNA who was the housemaid of Roberto
Separa, Sr. Upon inspection, a disposable lighter was found inside accused-
appellant EDNA's bag. Thereafter, accused-appellant EDNA confessed to
Barangay Chairman Bernardo in the presence of multitudes of angry residents
outside the Barangay Hall that she set her employer's house on fire because
she had not been paid her salary for about a year and that she wanted to go
home to her province but her employer told her to just ride a broomstick in
going home.
 
Accused-appellant EDNA was then turned over to arson investigators headed
by S[F]O4 Danilo Talusan, who brought her to the San Lazaro Fire Station in
Sta. Cruz, Manila where she was further investigated and then detained.
 
When Mercedita Mendoza went to the San Lazaro Fire Station to give her
sworn statement, she had the opportunity to ask accused-appellant EDNA at
the latter's detention cell why she did the burning of her employer's house and
accused-appellant EDNA replied that she set the house on fire because when
she asked permission to go home to her province, the wife of her employer
Roberto Separa, Sr., named Virginia Separa (sic) shouted at her: ' Sige umuwi
 ka, pagdating mo maputi ka na. Sumakay ka sa walis, pagdating mo maputi
ka na (TSN, January 22, 2002, p.6) (Go ahead, when you arrive your color
would be fair already. Ride a broomstick, when you arrive your color would be
fair already.') And when Mercedita Mendoza asked accused-appellant EDNA
how she burned the house, accused-appellant EDNA told her:
'Naglukot ako ng maraming diyaryo, sinindihan ko ng disposable lighter at
hinagis ko sa ibabaw ng lamesa sa loob ng bahay  (TSN, January 22, 2002, p.
7.) (I crumpled newspapers, lighted them with a disposable lighter and threw
them on top of the table inside the house.')
 
When interviewed by Carmelita Valdez, a reporter of ABS-CBN Network,
accused-appellant EDNA while under detention (sic) was heard by SFO4 (sic)
Danilo Talusan as having admitted the crime and even narrated the manner
how she accomplished it. SFO4 (sic) Danilo Talusan was able to hear the same
confession, this time at his home, while watching the television program 'True
Crime hosted by Gus Abelgas also of ABS-CBN Network.
 
The fire resulted in [the] destruction of the house of Roberto Separa, Sr. and
other adjoining houses and the death of Roberto Separa, Sr. and Virginia
Separa together with their four (4) children, namely: Michael, Daphne, Priscilla
and Roberto, Jr.
 
On 9 January 2001, an Information[4 ]  was filed before the RTC of Manila, Branch 41,
charging accused-appellant with the crime of Arson with Multiple Homicide.The case was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 01-188424. The accusatory portion of said Information
provides:
 
That on or about January 2, 2001, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused, with intent to cause damage, did then and there willfully, unlawfully,
feloniously and deliberately set fire upon the two-storey residential house of
ROBERTO SEPARA and family mostly made of wooden materials located at No.
172 Moderna St., Balut, Tondo, this city, by lighting crumpled newspaper with
the use of disposable lighter inside said house knowing the same to be an
inhabited house and situated in a thickly populated place and as a
consequence thereof a conflagration ensued and the said building, together
with some seven (7) adjoining residential houses, were razed by fire; that by
reason and on the occasion of the said fire, the following, namely,
 
1.            Roberto Separa, Sr., 45 years of age
2.            Virginia Separa y Mendoza, 40 years of age
3.            Michael Separa, 24 years of age
4.            Daphne Separa, 18 years of age
5.            Priscilla Separa, 14 years of age
6.            Roberto Separa, Jr., 11 years of age
 
sustained burn injuries which were the direct cause of their death immediately
thereafter.[5]
  
 
When arraigned, accused-appellant with assistance of counsel de oficio,  pleaded[6] 'Not
Guilty to the crime charged. Thereafter, trial ensued.[7]
 
The prosecution presented five (5) witnesses, namely, SPO4 [8] Danilo Talusan, Rolando
Gruta, Remigio Bernardo, Mercedita Mendoza and Rodolfo Movilla to establish its charge that
accused-appellant Edna committed the crime of arson with multiple homicide.
 
SPO4 Danilo Talusan, arson investigator, testified that he was one of those who responded to
the fire that occurred on 2 January 2001 and which started at No. 172 Moderna St., Balut,
Tondo, Manila.He stated that the fire killed Roberto Separa, Sr. and all the other members of
his family, namely his wife, Virginia, and his children, Michael, Daphne, Priscilla and Roberto,
Jr.; the fire also destroyed their abode as well as six neighboring houses. He likewise testified
that he twice heard accused-appellant ' once while the latter was being interviewed by
Carmelita Valdez, a reporter of ABS-CBN, and the other time when it was shown on channel 2
on television during the airing of the television program entitled 'True Crime hosted by Gus
Abelgas ' confess to having committed the crime charged, to wit:
 
Pros. Rebagay:
Based on your investigation, was there any occasion when the accused
Edna Malngan admitted to the burning of the house of the Separa
Family?
 
x x x x
 
Witness:
cralawYes, sir.
 
Pros. Rebagay:
cralawWhen was that?
 
A:On January 2 she was interviewed by the media, sir. The one who took the
coverage was Carmelita Valdez of Channel 2, ABS-CBN. They have a
footage that Edna admitted before them, sir.
 
Q:And where were you when Edna Malngan made that statement or admission
to Carmelita Valdez of ABS-CBN?
 
A:I was at our office, sir.
 
Q: Was there any other occasion wherein the accused made another
confession relative to the admission of the crime?
 
 A:Yes, sir.
 
Q:When was that?
 
A: Last Friday, sir. It was shown in True Crime of Gus Abelgas. She was
interviewed at the City Jail and she admitted that she was the one who
authored the crime, sir.
 
Pros. Rebagay:
And where were you when that admission to Gus Abelgas was made?
 
A:I was in the house and I just saw it on tv, sir.
 
Q:What was that admission that you heard personally, when you were
present, when the accused made the confession to Carmelita Valdez?
 
A:Naglukot po siya ng papel, sinidihan niya ng lighter at inilagay niya sa
ibabaw ng mesa yung mga diyaryo at sinunog niya.
 
x x x x
 
Q:Aside from that statement, was there any other statement made by the
accused Edna Malngan?
 
A:Yes, sir. 'Kaya po niya nagawa 'yon galit po siya sa kanyang amo na
si  Virginia, hindi siya pinasuweldo at gusto na po niyang umuwi na
(sic) ayaw siyang payagan. Nagsalita pa po sa kanya na, 'Sumakay ka
na lang sa walis. Pagbalik mo dito maputi ka na. (sic) 'Yon po ang
sinabi  ng kanyang amo.
 
Atty. Masweng:
That was a statement of an alleged dead person, your Honor.
 
Court:
Sabi ni Valdes, ha?
 
Pros. Rebagay:
Sabi ni Edna Malngan kay Carmelita Valdez, Your Honor.
 
Court:
Double hearsay na 'yon.
 
Pros. Rebagay:
No, Your Honor, the witness was present, Your Honor, when that confession
was made by the accused to Carmelita Valdez.[9]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
 
 
Rolando Gruta, the pedicab driver and one of the barangay tanods in the area, testified:
 
Pros. Rebagay:
cralawMr. Witness, what is your profession?
 
A:cralawSidecar driver, sir.
 
Q:cralawOn January 2, 2001 at around 4:45 in the morning, do you recall where
were (sic) you?
 
A:cralawI was at the corner of Moderna Street , sir.
 
Pros. Rebagay:
And while you were at the corner of Moderna St., what happened if
any, Mr. Witness?
 
A:cralawI saw Edna coming out from the door of the house of Roberto Separa,
sir.
 
Q:cralawDo you know the number of the house of the Separa Family?
 
A:cralaw172 Moderna St., Balut, Tondo, Manila, sir.
 
x x x x
 
Q:cralawAnd you said you saw Edna coming out from the house of the Separa
Family. How far is that house from the place where you were waiting
at the corner of Moderna and Paulino Streets?
 
A:cralawAbout three meters from Moderna and Paulino Streets where my
pedicab was placed. My distance was about three meters, sir.
 
x x x x
 
Q:cralawAnd how did you know that the house where Edna came out is that of
the house of the Separa Family?
 
A:cralawMismong  nakita  po ng dalawang mata ko na doon siya galing sa bahay
ng Separa Family.
 
Q:cralawHow long have you known the Separa Family, if you know them?
 
A:cralawAbout two years, sir.
 
Q:cralawHow about this Edna, the one you just pointed (to) awhile ago? Do you
know her prior to January 2, 2001 ?
 
A:cralawYes, sir. I knew(sic) her for two years.
 
Court:
cralawWhy?
 
Witness:
cralawMadalas ko po siyang maging pasahero ng aking pedicab.
 
Pros. Rebagay:
cralawHow about the Separa family? Why do you know them?
 
A:cralawThey were the employers of Edna, sir.
 
Q:cralawYou said you saw Edna coming out from the house of the Separa
Family. What happened when you saw Edna coming out from the
house of the Separa Family?
 
A:cralawWala pa pong ano 'yan naisakay ko na siya sa sidecar.
 
Q:cralawAnd what did you observe from Edna when you saw her coming out
from the house of the Separa family?
 
A:cralawNagmamadali  po  siyang lumakad at palinga-linga.
 
x x x x
 
Q:cralawAfter she boarded your pedicab, what happened, if any?
 
A:cralawNagpahatid  po  siya sa akin.
 
Q:cralawWhere?
 
A:cralawTo Nipa Street, sir.
 
Q:cralawDid you bring her to Nipa Street  as she requested?
 
A:cralawYes, sir.
 
x x x x
 
Q:cralawYou said that you brought her to Nipa Street. What happened when you
go (sic) there at Nipa Street, if any?
 
A:cralawNagpahinto po siya doon ng saglit, mga tatlong minuto po.
 
Q:cralawWhat did she do when she asked (you) to stop there for three minutes?
 
A:cralawAfter three minutes she requested me to bring her directly to Balasan
Street, sir.
 
 x x x x
 
Q:cralawWhat happened after that?
 
A:cralawWhen we arrived there, she alighted and pay (sic) P5.00, sir.
 
QcralawAnd then what transpired after she alighted from your pedicab?
 
Witness:
cralawI went home and I looked for another passenger, sir.
 
Pros. Rebagay:
cralawAfter that, what happened when you were on you way to your house to
look for passengers?
 
AcralawNakita ko na nga po na pagdating ko sa Moderna, naglalagablab na
apoy.
 
Q:cralawFrom what place was that fire coming out?
 
A:cralawFrom the house of Roberto Separa Family, sir.
 
x x x x
 
Pros. Rebagay:
cralawAfter you noticed that there was a fire from the house of Roberto Separa
Family, what did you do if any?
 
A:cralawSiyempre po, isang Barangay Tanod po ako, nagresponde na po kami
sa sunog. Binuksan na po ng Chairman naming 'yung tangke, binomba
na po naming 'yung apoy ng tubig.
 
Q:cralawAfter that incident, Mr. Witness, have you seen Edna Again (sic).
 
A:cralawNo, sir.
 
Pros. Rebagay:
cralawAnd after that incident, did you come to know if Edna was apprehended or
not?
 
cralawx x x x
 
A:cralawI was called by our Barangay Chairman in order to identify Edna, sir.
 
x x x x[10]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
 
 
Remigio Bernardo, Barangay Chairman of the area where the fire occurred, stated:
 
Pros. Rebagay:
 
On January 2, 2001, do you recall if there is a fire that occurred
somewhere in your area of jurisdiction, particularly Moderna Street?
 
A:cralawYes, sir.
 
Q:cralawNow, where were you when this incident happened?
 
A:cralawKasi  ugali  ko na po tuwing umagang-umaga po ako na pupunta sa
barangay Hall mga siguro 6:00  or  5:00 o clock, me sumigaw ng sunog
nirespondehan  namin iyong  sunog  eh me dala kaming fire.
 
Court:
You just answer the question. Where were you when this incident
happened?
 
Witness:cralaw
cralawI was at the Barangay Hall, Your Honor.
 
Pros. Rebagay:
And you said that there was a fire that occurred, what did you do?
 
Witness:
Iyon nga nagresponde kami doon sa sunog eh nakita ko iyong sunog
mukha talagang arson dahil napakalaki kaagad, meron pong mga
tipong ' Iyong namatay po contractor po iyon eh kaya siguro
napakaraming kalat ng mga pintura, mga container, kaya hindi
po  namin naapula  kaagad  iyong apoy, nasunog ultimo iyong fire
tank  namin sa  lakas, sir.
 
Pros. Rebagay:
cralawNow, will you please tell us where this fire occurred?
 
A:cralawAt the house of the six victims, sir.
 
Q:cralawWhose house is that?
 
A:cralawThe house of the victims, sir.
 
x x x x
 
Pros. Rebagay:
You said that you responded to the place, what transpired after you
responded to the place?
 
A:cralawIyon  nga po ang nagsabi may lumabas na isang babae po  noon sa
 bahay na nagmamadali habang may sunog, me isang barangay tanod
po akong nagsabi may humahangos na isang babae na may dalang
bag papunta po roon palabas ng sasakyan, sir.
 
Q:cralawAnd so what happened?
 
A:cralawSiyempre hindi  naman ako nagtanong kung sino ngayon may dumating
galing na sa bahay naming, may tumawag, tumawag po si Konsehala
Alfonso na may isang babae na hindi mapakali doon sa Calle Pedro
Alfonso, ke konsehal na baka ito sabi niya iyong ganito ganoon
nirespondehan ko po, sir.
 
Q:cralawWhere did you respond?
 
A:cralawAt Balasan, sir, but it's not the area of my jurisdiction.
 
x x x x
 
Q:cralawWhat happened when you reached that place?
 
A:cralawSiya po ang nahuli ko doon, sir.
 
Court:
cralawWitness pointing to accused Edna Malngan.
 
Pros. Rebagay:
cralawAnd what happened?
 
A:cralawI brought her to the barangay hall, sir.
 
Q:cralawAnd what happened at the barangay hall?
 
A:cralawInembestigahan  ko, kinuha naming iyong bag niya, me lighter siya eh.
Inamin niya po sa amin na kaya niya sinunog hindi siya pinasasahod
ng more or less isang taon na eh. Ngayon sabi ko bakit eh gusto ko ng
umuwi ng probinsya ang sabi sa akin ng amo ko sumakay na lang daw
po ako ng walis tingting para makauwi, sir.
 
Atty. Herman:
We would like to object, Your Honor on the ground that that is
hearsay.
 
Pros. Rebagay:
That is not a hearsay statement, Your Honor, straight from the mouth
of the accused.
 
Atty. Herman:
It's not under the exemption under the Rules of Court, Your Honor. He
 is testifying according to what he has heard.
 
Court:
That's part of the narration. Whether it is true or not, that's another
matter. Let it remain.
 
Pros. Rebagay:
Now, who were present when the accused are telling you this?
 
A:cralawIyon nga  iyong mga tanod ko, mamamayan doon nakapaligid, siyempre
may sunog nagkakagulo, gusto nga siyang kunin ng mga mamamayan
para saktan hindi ko maibigay papatayin siya gawa ng may namatay
eh anim na tao and namatay, kaya iyong mga tao kinokontrol siya
madidisgrasya siya dahil pin-pointed po siya, Your Honor, iyong dami
na iyon libo iyong nakapaligid doon sa barangay hall napakahirap
awatin. Gustong-gusto siyang  kunin ng mga taong-bayan, nagalit
dahil ang daming bahay hong nasunog.[11]
 
 
For her part, Mercedita Mendoza, one of the neighbors of the Separa Family and whose
house was one of those destroyed by the fire, recounted:
 
Pros. Rebagay:
Madam Witness, on January 2, 2001, do you recall where were you
residing then?
 
A:cralawYes, sir.
 
Q:cralawWhere were you residing at?
 
A: cralawAt No. 170 Moderna St., Balut, Tondo, Manila, sir.
 
Q:cralawWhy did you transfer your residence? Awhile ago you testified that you
are now residing at 147 Moderna St., Balut, Tondo,  Manila ?
 
A:cralawBecause our house was burned, sir.
 
Q:cralawMore or less, how much did the loss incurred on the burning of your
house (sic)?
 
A:cralawMore or less, P100,000.00, sir
 
Q:cralawDo you know the accused in this case Edna Malngan?
 
A:cralawYes, sir.
 
Q:cralawWhy do you know her?
 
A:cralawShe is the house helper of the family who were (sic) burned, sir.
 
Q:cralawWhat family?
 
A:cralawCifara (sic) family, sir.
 
Q:cralawWho in particular do you know among Cifara (sic) family?
 
A:cralawThe woman, sir.
 
Q:cralawWhat is the name?
 
A:cralawVirginia Mendoza Cifara (sic), sir.
 
Q:cralawAre you related to Virginia Mendoza Cifara (sic)?
 
A:cralawMy husband, sir.
 
Q:cralawWhat is the relationship of your husband to the late Virginia Mendoza
Cifara (sic)?
 
A:cralawThey were first cousins, sir.
 
Q:cralawHow far is your house from the house of the Cifara (sic) family?
 
A:cralawMagkadikit  lang po. Pader lang ang pagitan.
 
Q:cralawYou said that Edna Malngan was working with the Cifara (sic) family.
What is the work of Edna Malngan?
 
A:cralawNangangamuhan po. House helper, sir.
 
Q:cralawHow long do you know Edna Malngan as house helper of the Cifara (sic)
family?
 
A:cralawI cannot estimate but she stayed there for three to four years, sir.
 
Q:cralawDo you know who caused the burning of the house of the Cifara (sic)
family?
 
Witness:
Edna Malngan, sir.
 
Pros. Rebagay:
cralawWhy do you know that it was Edna Malngan who burned the house of the
Cifara (sic) family?
 
 A:cralawWhen the fire incident happened, sir, on January 3, we went to San
Lazaro Fire Station and I saw Edna Malngan detained there, sir.
 
Q:cralawAnd so what is your basis in pointing to Edna Malngan as the culprit or
the one who burned the house of the Cifara (sic) family?
 
A:cralawI talked to her when we went there at that day, sir.
 
Q:cralawWhat transpired then?
 
A:cralawI talked to her and I told her, ' Edna, bakit mo naman ginawa 'yung
ganun?
 
Q:cralawAnd what was the answer of Edna?
 
A:cralawShe answered, 'Kasi pag nagpapaalam ako sa kanyang umuwi ng
probinsya, nagpapaalam po siyang umuwi ng probinsya ang sinasabi
daw po sa kanya ni Baby Cifara (sic) na, (sic)Sige umuwi  ka,
pagdating mo maputi ka na. Sumakay ka sa walis pagdating mo
maputi ka na.
 
Pros. Rebagay:
cralawWhat is the basis there that she was the one who burned the house of the
Cifara (sic) family?
 
A:cralawI also asked her, 'Paano mo ginawa 'yung sunog? She told me,
'Naglukot ako ng maraming diyaryo, sinindihan ko ng disposable lighter
at hinagis niya sa ibabaw ng lamesa sa loob ng bahay.  (sic)
[12]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
 
 
Lastly, the prosecution presented Rodolfo Movilla, owner of the house situated beside that of
the Separa family. He testified that his house was also gutted by the fire that killed
the Separa family and that he tried to help said victims but to no avail.
 
The prosecution presented other documentary evidence [13] and thereafter rested its case.
 
When it came time for the defense to present exculpatory evidence, instead of doing so,
accused-appellant filed a Motion to Admit Demurrer to Evidence [14] and the
corresponding Demurrer to Evidence[15] with the former expressly stating that
said Demurrer to Evidence was being filed 'x x x without express leave of court
x x x.[16]
 
In her Demurrer to Evidence, accused-appellant asserts that the prosecution's
evidence was insufficient to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the
following reasons:[1 7 ]  (a) that she is charged with crime not defined and
penalized by law; (b) that circumstantial evidence was insufficient to prove her
guilt beyond reasonable doubt; and (c) that the testimonies given by the
witnesses of the prosecution were hearsay, thus, inadmissible in evidence against
her.
 
The prosecution filed its Comment/Opposition to accused-appellant's Demurrer to
Evidence.
 
On 13 October 2003, acting on the Demurrer to Evidence, the RTC promulgated
its Judgment[18] wherein it proceeded to resolve the subject case based on the evidence of
the prosecution. The RTC considered accused-appellant to have waived her right to present
evidence, having filed the Demurrer to Evidence without leave of court.
 
In finding accused-appellant Edna guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Arson with
Multiple Homicide, the RTC ruled that:
 
The first argument of the accused that she is charged with an act not defined
and penalized by law is without merit. x x x the caption which charges the
accused with the crime of Arson with Multiple Homicide is merely descriptive of
the charge of Arson that resulted to Multiple Homicide. The fact is that the
accused is charged with Arson which resulted to Multiple Homicide (death of
victims) and that charge is embodied and stated in the body of the
information. What is controlling is the allegation in the body of the Information
and not the title or caption thereof. x x x.
 
xxxx
 
The second and third arguments will be discussed jointly as they are
interrelated with each other. x x x.
 
xxxx
 
[W]hile there is no direct evidence that points to the accused in the
act of burning the house or actually starting the subject fire, the
following circumstances that show that the accused intentionally
caused or was responsible for the subject fire have been duly
established:
 
1.cralawthat immediately before the burning of the house, the accused
hurriedly and with head turning in different directions (palinga-linga)
went out of the said house and rode a pedicab apparently not
knowing where to go x x x;
 
 2.cralawthat immediately after the fire, upon a report that there was a
woman in Balasan St. who appears confused and apprehensive
(balisa), the Barangay Chairman and his tanods went there, found
the accused and apprehended her and brought her to the barangay
hall as shown by the testimony of Barangay Chairman Remigio
Bernardo; and
 
3.cralawthat when she was apprehended and investigated by the
barangay officials and when her bag was opened, the same
contained a disposable lighter as likewise shown by the testimony of
the Barangay Chairman.
 
[T]he timing of her hurried departure and nervous demeanor
immediately before the fire when she left the house and rode a
pedicab and her same demeanor, physical and mental condition
when found and apprehended at the same place where she alighted
from the pedicab and the discovery of the lighter in her bag
thereafter when investigated indisputably show her guilt as charged.
 
cralawIf there is any doubt of her guilt that remains with the
circumstantial evidence against her, the same is removed or
obliterated with the confessions/admissions of the commission of
the offense and the manner thereof that she made to the prosecution
witnesses Barangay Chairman Remigio Bernardo, Mercedita Mendoza
and to the media, respectively.
 
xxxx
 
[H]er confessions/admissions are positive acknowledgment of guilt
of the crime and appear to have been voluntarily and intelligently
given. These confessions/admissions, especially the one given to her
neighbor Mercedita Mendoza and the media, albeit uncounselled and
made while she was already under the custody of authorities, it is
believed, are not violative of her right under the Constitution.
 
The decretal part of the RTC's Judgment reads:
 
WHEREFORE, the Demurrer to Evidence is hereby denied and
judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused EDNA MALNGAN Y
MAYO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Arson with
Multiple Homicide or Arson resulting to the death of six (6) people
and sentencing her to suffer the mandatory penalty of death, and
ordering her to pay the heirs of the victims Roberto Separa, Sr. and
Virginia Separa and children Michael, Daphne, Priscilla and Roberto,
Jr., the amount of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos for each victim
and the amount of One Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos as
temperate damages for their burned house or a total of Four Hundred
 Thousand (P400,000.00) Pesos and to Rodolfo Movilla the amount of
One Hundred [Thousand] (P100,000.00) Pesos.
 
 
Due to the death penalty imposed by the RTC, the case was directly elevated to
this Court for automatic review. Conformably with our decision in People
v. Efren  Mateo y Garcia,[19] however, we referred the case and its records to the
CA for appropriate action and disposition.
 
On 2 September 2005, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the
decision of the RTC, the fallo  of which reads:
 
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed October 13, 2003
Judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 41, finding
accused-appellant Edna Malngan y Mayo guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of Arson with multiple homicide and sentencing her to suffer
the DEATH PENALTY is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in
that she is further ordered to pay P50,000.00 as moral damages and
another P50,000.00 as exemplary damages for each of the victims
who perished in the fire, to be paid to their heirs. She is ordered to
pay Rodolfo Movilla, one whose house was also burned, the sum of
P50,000.00 as exemplary damage.
 
Pursuant to Section 13 (a), Rule 124 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal
Procedure as amended by A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC dated September 28,
2004, which became effective on October 15, 2004, the Court of
Appeals, after rendering judgment, hereby refrains from making an
entry of judgment and forthwith certifies the case and elevates the
entire record of this case to the Supreme Court for review.
[20]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
 
It is the contention of accused-appellant that the evidence presented
by the prosecution is not sufficient to establish her guilt beyond
reasonable doubt as the perpetrator of the crime charged. In support
of said exculpatory proposition, she assigns the following errors [2 1 ] :

Issue/s:
I.
 
THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE CIRCUMSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION IS SUFFICIENT TO CONVICT THE
ACCUSED; and

 
II.
 
 THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING AND GIVING
CREDENCE TO THE HEARSAY EVIDENCE AND UNCOUNSELLED
ADMISSIONS ALLEGEDLY GIVEN BY THE ACCUSED TO THE
WITNESSES BARANGAY CHAIRMAN REMIGIO BERNARDO,
MERCEDITA MENDOZA AND THE MEDIA.

Ruling:
THERE IS NO COMPLEX CRIME OF ARSON WITH (MULTIPLE) HOMICIDE.
 
The   Information  in this case erroneously charged accused-appellant
with a  complex crime ,  i.e. ,  Arson with Multiple Homicide . Presently,
there are two (2) laws that govern the crime of arson where death
results   therefrom  '  Article 320 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as
amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 7659, [22]  and  Section 5 of
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1613 [23] , quoted hereunder, to wit:
 
Revised Penal Code:
 
ART. 320. Destructive Arson. ' x x x x
If as a consequence of the commission of any of the acts penalized
under this Article, death results, the mandatory penalty of death
shall be imposed. [Emphasis supplied.]
 
Presidential Decree No. 1613:
 
SEC. 5. Where Death Results from Arson.  ' If by reason of or on the
occasion of the arson death results , the penalty
of reclusion  perpetua to death shall be imposed . [Emphasis
supplied.]
 
 
 
Art. 320 of the RPC, as amended , with respect to destructive arson, and
the provisions of   PD No. 1613  respecting other cases of arson
provide   only one penalty for the commission of arson, whether
considered destructive or otherwise, where death results   therefrom .
The   raison d'tre  is that arson is itself the end and death is simply the
consequence. [2 4 ] chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
 
c r a l a w Whether the crime of arson will absorb the resultant death or

will have to be a separate crime altogether, the joint

discussion [2 5 ]  of the late Mr. Chief Justice Ramon C.   Aquino  and
Mme. Justice Carolina C.   Grio-Aquino , on the subject of the crimes of
arson and murder/homicide, is highly instructive:
 
Groizard says that when fire is used with the intent to kill a particular
person who may be in a house and that objective is attained by
burning the house, the crime is murder only. When the Penal Code
declares that killing committed by means of fire is murder, it intends
that fire should be purposely adopted as a means to that end. There
can be no murder without a design to take life. [26] In other words, if
the main object of the offender is to kill by means of fire, the offense
is murder. But if the main objective is the burning of the building, the
resulting homicide may be absorbed by the crime of arson.
[27]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
 
x x x x
 
If the house was set on fire after the victims therein were killed, fire
would not be a qualifying circumstance. The accused would be liable
for the separate offenses of murder or homicide, as the case may be,
and arson.[28]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
 
c r a l a w Accordingly, in cases where both burning and death occur, in
order to determine what crime/crimes was/were perpetrated '
whether arson, murder or arson and homicide/murder, it is   de
rigueur  to ascertain the main objective of the malefactor: (a) if the
main objective is the burning of the building or edifice, but death
results by reason or on the occasion of arson, the crime is
simply   arson,  and the resulting homicide is absorbed; (b) if, on the
other hand, the main objective is to kill a particular person who may
be in a building or edifice, when fire is resorted to as the means to
accomplish such goal the crime committed is   murder  only; lastly, (c)
if the objective is, likewise, to kill a particular person, and in fact the
offender has already done so, but fire is resorted to as a means to
cover up the killing, then there are two separate and distinct crimes
committed '  homicide/murder and arson .
 
Where then does this case fall under?
 
From a reading of the body of the Information:
 
That on or about January 2, 2001, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, with
intent to cause damage, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and deliberately
set fire upon the two-storey residential house  of ROBERTO SEPARA and family mostly made
of wooden materials located at No. 172 Moderna St., Balut, Tondo, this city, by lighting
crumpled newspaper with the use of disposable lighter inside said house knowing the same
to be an inhabited house and situated in a thickly populated place and as a consequence
thereof a conflagration ensued and the said building, together with some seven (7) adjoining
residential houses, were razed by fire; that by reason and on the occasion of the said fire , the
following, namely,

1.    Roberto Separa, Sr., 45 years of age

2.    Virginia Separa y Mendoza, 40 years of age

3.    Michael Separa, 24 years of age

4.    Daphne Separa, 18 years of age

5.    Priscilla Separa, 14 years of age

6.    Roberto Separa, Jr., 11 years of age

sustained burn injuries which were the direct cause of their death immediately
thereafter.[29] [Emphasis supplied.]X

accused-appellant is being charged with the crime of arson. It   it  is

clear from the foregoing that her intent was merely to destroy her
employer's house through the use of fire.
 
We now go to the issues raised. Under the first assignment of error,
in asserting the insufficiency of the prosecution's evidence to
establish her guilt beyond reasonable doubt, accused-appellant
argues that the prosecution was only able to adduce circumstantial
evidence ' hardly enough to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
She ratiocinates that the following circumstances:
 
1.            That immediately before the burning of the house , the
accused hurriedly and with head turning in different directions
(palinga-linga) went out of the said house and rode a pedicab
apparently not knowing where to go for she first requested to
be brought to Nipa St. but upon reaching there requested
again to be brought to Balasan St. as shown by the testimony
of prosecution witness Rolando Gruta;
 
2.            That immediately after the fire, upon a report that there was a
woman in Balasan St. who appears confused and apprehensive
(balisa), the Barangay Chairman and his tanods went there,
 found the accused and apprehended her and brought her to
the barangay hall as shown by the testimony of Barangay
Chairman Remigio Bernardo; and
 
3.cralawThat when she was apprehended and investigated by the
barangay officials and when her bag was opened, the same
contained a disposable lighter as likewise shown by the
testimony of the Barangay Chairman.[30]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
 
fall short of proving that she had any involvement in setting her
employer's house on fire, much less show guilt beyond reasonable
doubt, given that 'it is a fact that housemaids are the first persons in
the house to wake up early to perform routine chores for their
employers, [3 1 ]  one of which is preparing and cooking the morning
meal for the members of the household; and necessity requires her to
go out early to look for open stores or even nearby marketplaces to
buy things that will complete the early meal for the day. [3 2 ]  She then
concludes that it was normal for her to have been seen going out of
her employer's house in a hurry at that time of the day and 'to look at
all directions to insure that the house is secure and that there are no
other persons in the vicinity. [3 3 ] chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
 
c r a l a w We are far from persuaded.

 
True, by the nature of their jobs, housemaids are required to start the
day early; however, contrary to said assertion, the actuations and the
demeanor of accused-appellant on that fateful early morning as
observed firsthand by Rolando Gruta, one of the witnesses of the
prosecution, belie her claim of normalcy, to wit:
 
Q:cralawYou said you saw Edna coming out from the house of the
Separa Family. What happened when you saw Edna coming
out from the house of the Separa Family?
 
A:cralawWala pa pong ano 'yan naisakay ko na siya sa sidecar.
 
Q:cralawAnd what did you observe from Edna when you saw her
coming out from the house of the Separa family?
 
A:cralawNagmamadali  po  siyang lumakad at palinga-linga.
 
x x x x
 
 Q:cralawAfter she boarded your pedicab, what happened, if any?
 
A:cralawNagpahatid  po siya sa akin.
 
Q:cralawWhere?
 
A:cralawTo Nipa Street, sir.
 
Q:cralawDid you bring her to Nipa Street  as she requested?
 
A:cralawYes, sir.
 
x x x x
 
Q:cralawYou said that you brought her to Nipa Street. What happened
when you go (sic) there at Nipa Street, if any?
 
A:cralawNagpahinto  po siya doon ng saglit, mga tatlong minuto po.
 
Q:cralawWhat did she do when she asked (you) to stop there for three
minutes?
 
A:cralawAfter three minutes she requested me to bring her directly
to Balasan Street, sir.
 
x x x x
 
 
We quote with approval the pronouncem ent of the RTC in discrediting
accused-appellant's aforementioned rationale:
 
[O]bviously it is never normal, common or ordinary to leave the
house in such a disturbed, nervous and agitated manner, demeanor
and condition. The timing of her hurried departure and nervous
demeanor immediately before the fire when she left the house and
rode a pedicab and her same demeanor, physical and mental
condition when found and apprehended at the same place where she
alighted from the pedicab and the discovery of the lighter in her bag
thereafter when investigated indisputably show her guilt as charged.
[34]
 
 
All the witnesses are in accord that accused-appellant's agitated appearance was
out of the ordinary. Remarkably, she has never denied this observation.
 
We give great weight to the findings of the RTC and so accord credence to the testimonies of
the prosecution witnesses as it had the opportunity to observe them directly. The credibility
given by trial courts to prosecution witnesses is an important aspect of evidence which
appellate courts can rely on because of its unique opportunity to observe them, particularly
their demeanor, conduct, and attitude, during the direct and cross-examination by
counsels. Here, Remigio Bernardo, Rolando Gruta and Mercedita Mendoza are disinterested
witnesses and there is not an iota of evidence in the records to indicate that they are
suborned witnesses. The records of the RTC even show that Remigio Bernardo,
the Barangay Chairman, kept accused-appellant from being mauled by the angry crowd
outside of the barangay hall:

 
Pros. Rebagay:
Now, who were present when the accused are (sic) telling you
this?
 
A:cralawIyon  nga iyong mga tanod ko, mamamayan doon nakapaligid,
siyempre may sunog nagkakagulo, gusto nga siyang kunin ng
mga mamamayan para saktan hindi ko maibigay papatayin
siya gawa ng may namatay eh anim na tao and namatay, kaya
iyong mga tao kinokontrol siya madidisgrasya siya dahil pin-
pointed po siya, Your Honor, iyong dami na iyon libo iyong
nakapaligid doon sa barangay hall napakahirap awatin.
Gusting-gusto siyang kunin ng mga taong-bayan, nagalit dahil
ang daming bahay hong nasunog.[35]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
 
 
Accused-appellant has not shown any compelling reason why the witnesses
presented would openly, publicly and deliberately lie or concoct a story, to send
an innocent person to jail all the while knowing that the real malefactor remains
at large.  Such proposition defies logic. And where the defense failed to show any
evil or improper motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses, the presumption
is that their testimonies are true and thus entitled to full faith and credence. [36]
 
While the prosecution witnesses did not see accused-appellant
actually starting the fire that burned several houses and killed the
Separa family, her guilt may still be established through
circumstantial evidence provided that: (1) there is more than one
circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; and, (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as
to produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt. [3 7 ] chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
 
Circumstantial evidence is that evidence which proves a fact or series
of facts from which the facts in issue may be established by
inference. [3 8 ]  It is founded on experience and observed facts and
coincidences establishing a connection between the known and
proven facts and the facts sought to be proved. [3 9 ]  In order to bring
about a conviction, the circumstantial evidence presented must
constitute an unbroken chain, which leads to one fair and reasonable
conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of others, as the
guilty person. [4 0 ] chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
 
In this case, the interlocking testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses, taken together, exemplify a case where conviction can be
upheld on the basis of circumstantial evidence.  First, prosecution
witness Rolando Gruta, the driver of the   pedicab  that accused-
appellant rode on, testified that he knew for a fact that she worked
as a housemaid of the victims, and that he positively identified her as
the person hurriedly leaving the house of the victims on  2 January
2001 at 4:45 a.m., and acting in a nervous manner.  That while riding on
the  pedicab , accused-appellant was unsure of her intended
destination. Upon reaching the place where he originally picked up
accused-appellant only a few minutes after dropping her off,
Rolando  Gruta  saw the   Separas  house being gutted by a blazing
fire.Second,   Remigio  Bernardo testified that he and his  tanods ,
including Rolando   Gruta , were the ones who picked up accused-
appellant Edna at   Balasan Street (where Rolando   Gruta  dropped her off)
after receiving a call that there was a woman acting strangely at said
street and who appeared to have nowhere to go.  Third,
SPO4  Danilo   Talusan  overheard accused-appellant admit to Carmelita
Valdez, a reporter of Channel 2 (ABS-CBN) that said accused-
appellant started the fire, plus the fact that he was able see the
telecast of Gus   Abelgas  show where accused-appellant, while being
interviewed, confessed to the crime as well.  The foregoing
testimonies juxtaposed with the testimony of   Mercedita  Mendoza
validating the fact that accused-appellant confessed to having started
the fire which killed the   Separa  family as well as burned seven houses
including that of the victims, convincingly form an unbroken chain,
which leads to the unassailable conclusion pinpointing accused-
appellant as the person behind the crime of simple arson.
 
In her second assigned error, accused-appellant questions the
admissibility of her uncounselled extrajudicial confession given to
prosecution witnesses, namely Remigio Bernardo, Mercedita Mendoza,
and to the media. Accused- appellant Edna contends that being
uncounselled extrajudicial confession, her admissions to having
committed the crime charged should have been excluded in evidence
against her for being violative of Article III, Section 12(1) of the
Constitution.
 
Particularly, she takes exception to the testimony of prosecution
witnesses Remigio Bernardo and Mercedita Mendoza for being
hearsay and in the nature of an uncounselled admission.
 
With the above vital pieces of evidence excluded, accused-appellant
is of the position that the remaining proof of her alleged guilt,
consisting in the main of circumstantial evidence, is inadequate to
establish her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
 
We partly disagree.
 
Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution in part provides:
 
(1)cralawAny person under investigation for the commission of an
offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain
silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of
his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel,
he must be provided with one.These rights cannot be waived except
in writing and in the presence of counsel.
 
xxxx
 
(3)cralawAny confession or admission obtained in violation of this
Section or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence.
 
We have held that the abovequoted provision applies to the stage of
custodial investigation ' when the investigation is no longer a general
inquiry into an unsolved crime but starts to focus on a particular
person as a suspect. [4 1 ]  Said constitutional guarantee has also been
extended to situations in which an individual has not been formally
arrested but has merely been 'invited for questioning.
[4 2 ] chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
 
To be admissible in evidence against an accused, the extrajudicial
confessions made must satisfy the following requirements:
 
(1)                   it must be voluntary;
(2)                   it must be made with the assistance of competent and
independent counsel;
(3)                   it must be express; and
(4) cralawit must be in writing.[43]
 
 
Arguably , the barangay tanods, including the Barangay Chairman, in this
particular instance, may be deemed as law enforcement officer for purposes of
applying Article III, Section 12(1) and (3), of the Constitution. When accused-
appellant was brought to the barangay hall in the morning of 2 January 2001, she
was already a suspect, actually the only one, in the fire that
destroyed several houses as well as killed the whole family of
Roberto  Separa , Sr.She was, therefore, already under custodial
investigation and the rights guaranteed by Article III, Section 12(1),
of the Constitution should have already been observed or applied to
her. Accused-appellant's confession to   Barangay  Chairman Remigio
Bernardo was made in response to the 'interrogation made by the
latter ' admittedly conducted without first informing accused-
appellant of her rights under the Constitution or done in the presence
of counsel.  For this reason, the confession of accused-appellant,
given to Barangay Chairman Remigio Bernardo, as well as the lighter
found by the latter in her bag are inadmissible in evidence against
her as such were obtained in violation of her constitutional rights.
 
Be that as it may, the inadmissibility of accused-appellant's
confession to Barangay Chairman Remigio Bernardo and the lighter as
evidence do not automatically lead to her acquittal.It should well be
recalled that the constitutional safeguards during custodial
investigations do not apply to those not elicited through questioning
by the police or their agents but given in an ordinary manner whereby
the accused verbally admits to having committed the offense as what
happened in the case at bar when accused-appellant admitted to
Mercedita Mendoza, one of the neighbors of Roberto Separa, Sr., to
having started the fire in the   Separas  house.  The testimony of
Mercedita Mendoza recounting said admission is, unfortunately for
accused-appellant, admissible in evidence against her and is not
covered by the aforesaid constitutional guarantee. Article III of the
Constitution, or the Bill of Rights, solely governs the relationship
between the individual on one hand and the State (and its agents) on
the other; it does not concern itself with the relation between a
private individual and another private individual ' as both accused-
appellant and prosecution witness   Mercedita  Mendoza undoubtedly
are. [4 4 ]  Here, there is no evidence on record to show that said
witness was acting under police authority, so appropriately, accused-
appellant's   uncounselled  extrajudicial confession to said witness was
properly admitted by the RTC.
 
Accused-appellant likewise assails the admission of the testimony of
SPO4 Danilo Talusan.Contending that '[w]hen SPO4 Danilo Talusan testified in
court, his story is more of events, which are not within his personal knowledge
but based from accounts of witnesses who derived information allegedly from the
accused or some other persons x x x. In other words, she objects to the testimony
for being merely hearsay. With this imputation of inadmissibility, we agree with
what the Court of Appeals had to say:

Although this testimony of SFO4 Danilo Talusan is hearsay because he was not

present when Gus Abelgas interviewed accused-appellant EDNA, it may
nevertheless be admitted in evidence as an independently relevant statement to
establish not the truth but the tenor of the statement or the fact that the
statement was made [People v. Mallari, G.R. No. 103547, July 20, 1999, 310 SCRA
621 citing People v. Cusi, Jr., G.R. No. L-20986, August 14, 1965, 14 SCRA 944.].
In People vs. Velasquez, G.R. Nos. 132635 & 143872-75,  February 21, 2001, 352
SCRA 455,  the Supreme Court ruled that:
 

Under the doctrine of independently relevant statements, regardless of their truth

or falsity, the fact that such statements have been made is relevant. The hearsay
rule does not apply, and the statements are admissible as evidence. Evidence as to
the making of such statement is not secondary but primary, for the statement
itself may constitute a fact in issue or be circumstantially relevant as to the
existence of such a fact.[45]chanroblesvirtuallawlibraryX

As regards the confession given by accused-appellant to the media,

we need not discuss it further for the reporters were never presented
to testify in court.
 
As a final attempt at exculpation, accused-appellant asserts that
since the identities of the burned bodies were never conclusively
established, she cannot be responsible for their deaths.
 
Such assertion is bereft of merit.
 
In the crime of arson, the identities of the victims are immaterial in
that intent to kill them particularly is not one of the elements of the
crime. As we have clarified earlier, the killing of a person is absorbed
in the charge of arson, simple or destructive.  The prosecution need
only prove, that the burning was intentional and that what was
intentionally burned is an inhabited house or dwelling.  Again, in the
case of  People v.  Soriano , [4 6 ]   we explained that:
 
Although intent may be an ingredient of the crime of Arson, it may be inferred
from the acts of the accused. There is a presumption that one intends the natural
consequences of his act; and when it is shown that one has deliberately set fire to
a building, the prosecution is not bound to produce further evidence of his
wrongful intent.[4 7 ] X

The ultimate query now is which kind of arson is accused-appellant guilty of?

As previously discussed, there are two (2) categories of the crime of arson:
1) destructive arson, under Art. 320 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 7659; and 2) simple arson, under Presidential Decree No.
1613.Said classification is based on the kind, character and location of the
property burned, regardless of the value of the damage caused, [48] to wit:X

Article 320 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659, contemplates the
malicious burning of structures, both public and private, hotels, buildings,
edifices, trains, vessels, aircraft, factories and other military, government or
commercial establishments by any person or group of persons.[ [49]]The
classification of this type of crime is known asDestructive Arson, which is
punishable by reclusion  perpetua to death. The reason for the law is self-evident:
to effectively discourage and deter the commission of this dastardly crime, to
prevent the destruction of properties and protect the lives of innocent people.
Exposure to a brewing conflagration leaves only destruction and despair in its
wake; hence, the State mandates greater retribution to authors of this heinous
crime. The exceptionally severe punishment imposed for this crime takes into
consideration the extreme danger to human lives exposed by the malicious
burning of these structures; the danger to property resulting from the
conflagration; the fact that it is normally difficult to adopt precautions against its
commission, and the difficulty in pinpointing the perpetrators; and, the greater
impact on the social, economic, security and political fabric of the nation.
[Emphasis supplied.]X

If as a consequence of the commission of any of the acts penalized under Art. 320,
death should result, the mandatory penalty of death shall be imposed.

On the other hand, PD 1613 which repealed Arts. 321 to 326-B of The Revised
Penal Code remains the governing law for Simple Arson. This decree contemplates
the malicious burning of public and private structures, regardless of size, not
included in Art. 320, as amended by RA 7659, and classified as other cases of
arson. These include houses, dwellings, government buildings, farms, mills, plantations,
railways, bus stations, airports, wharves and other industrial establishments.[ [50]] Although
the purpose of the law on Simple Arson is to prevent the high incidence of fires and other
crimes involving destruction, protect the national economy and preserve the social, economic
and political stability of the nation, PD 1613 tempers the penalty to be meted to offenders.
This separate classification of Simple Arson recognizes the need to lessen the severity of
punishment commensurate to the act or acts committed, depending on the particular facts
and circumstances of each case. [Emphasis supplied.]X

To emphasize:

The nature of Destructive Arson is distinguished from Simple Arson by the degree
of perversity or viciousness of the criminal offender. The acts committed under
Art. 320 of the Revised Penal Code (as amended) constituting Destructive
Arson are characterized as heinous crimes for being grievous, odious and hateful
offenses and which, by reason of their inherent or manifest wickedness,
viciousness, atrocity and perversity are repugnant and outrageous to the common
standards and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered
society.[51] On the other hand, acts committed under PD 1613 constituting Simple
Arson are crimes with a lesser degree of perversity and viciousness that the law
punishes with a lesser penalty. In other words, Simple Arson contemplates crimes
with less significant social, economic, political and national security implications
than Destructive Arson. However, acts falling under Simple Arson may
nevertheless be converted into Destructive Arson depending on the qualifying
circumstances present. [Emphasis supplied.] [52]chanroblesvirtuallawlibraryX

Prescinding from the above clarification vis--vis the description of the crime as

stated in the accusatory portion of the Information, it is quite evident that
accused-appellant was charged with the crime of Simple  Arson ' for having
'deliberately set fire upon the  two-storey residential house of ROBERTO SEPARA
and family x  x  x knowing the same to be an inhabited house and situated in a
thickly populated place and as a consequence thereof a conflagration ensued and
the said building, together with some seven (7) adjoining residential houses,
were razed by fire. [Emphasis supplied.]
 

The facts of the case at bar is somewhat similar to the facts of the case of People
v.  Soriano.[53]The accused in the latter case caused the burning of a particular
house.Unfortunately, the blaze spread and gutted down five (5) neighboring
houses.The RTC therein found the accused guilty of destructive arson under
paragraph 1[54] of Art. 320 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic
Act No. 7659.This Court, through Mr. Justice Bellosillo, however, declared that:X

x x x [T]he applicable provision of law should be Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD 1613, which

imposes a penalty of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetuafor other cases of
arson as the properties burned by accused-appellant are specifically described as
houses, contemplating inhabited houses or dwellings under the aforesaid law. The
descriptions as alleged in the second Amended Information particularly refer to
the structures as houses rather than as buildings or edifices. The applicable law
should therefore be Sec. 3, Par. 2, of PD 1613, and not Art. 320, par. 1 of the Penal
Code. In case of ambiguity in construction of penal laws, it is well-settled that
such laws shall be construed strictly against the government, and liberally in favor
of the accused.

The elements of arson under Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD 1613 are: (a) there is intentional
burning; and (b) what is intentionally burned is an inhabited house or dwelling.
Incidentally, these elements concur in the case at bar.[55]chanroblesvirtuallawlibraryX

As stated in the body of the Information, accused-appellant was charged with

having intentionally burned the two-storey residential house of
Robert Separa.Said conflagration likewise spread and destroyed seven (7)
adjoining houses. Consequently, if proved, as it was proved, at the trial, she may
be convicted, and sentenced accordingly, of the crime of simple arson.Such is the
case 'notwithstanding the error in the designation of the offense in the
information, the information remains effective insofar as it states the facts
constituting the crime alleged therein.[56]What is controlling is not the title of the
complaint, nor the designation of the offense charged or the particular law or part
thereof allegedly violate, x x x, but the description of the crime charged and the
particular facts therein recited.[57]chanroblesvirtuallawlibraryX

There is, thus, a need to modify the penalty imposed by the RTC as Sec. 5 of PD
No. 1613 categorically provides that the penalty to be imposed for simple arson is:

SEC. 5. Where Death Results from Arson. -If by reason of or on the occasion of

arson death results, the penalty of reclusion  perpetua  to death shall be imposed.
[Emphasis supplied.]

Accordingly, there being no aggravating circumstance alleged in the Information,

the imposable penalty on accused-appellant is reclusion  perpetua.

Apropos the civil liabilities of accused-appellant, current jurisprudence [58] dictate

that the civil indemnity due from accused-appellant is P50,000.00 for the death of
each of the victims.[59] However, the monetary awards for moral and exemplary
damages given by the Court of Appeals, both in the amount of P50,000.00, due
the heirs of the victims, have to be deleted for lack of material basis. Similarly, the
Court of Appeals award of exemplary damages to Rodolfo Movilla in the amount
of P50,000.00 for the destruction of his house, also has to be deleted,  but in this
instance for being improper. Moral damages cannot be award by this Court in the
absence of proof of mental or physical suffering on the part of the heirs of the
victims.[60] Concerning the award of exemplary damages, the reason for the
deletion being that no aggravating circumstance had been alleged and proved by
the prosecution in the case at bar.[61]chanroblesvirtuallawlibraryX

To summarize, accused-appellant's alternative plea that she be acquitted of the

crime must be rejected. With the evidence on record, we find no cogent reason to
disturb the findings of the RTC and the Court of Appeals.  It is indubitable that
accused-appellant is the author of the crime of simple arson. All the circumstantial
evidence presented before the RTC, viewed in its entirety, is as convincing as
direct evidence and, as such, negates accused-appellant's innocence, and when
considered concurrently with her admission given to Mercedita Mendoza,
the former's  guilt beyond reasonable doubt is twice as evident.Hence, her
conviction is effectively justified. More so, as it is propitious to note that in stark
contrast to the factual circumstances presented by the prosecution, accused-
appellant neither mustered a denial nor an alibi except for the proposition that
her guilt had not been established beyond reasonable doubt.
 

 IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 2 September

2005, in CA G.R. CR HC No. 01139, is hereby AFFIRMED insofar as the
conviction of accused-appellant EDNA MALNGAN   Y  MAYO is concerned.
The sentence to be imposed and the amount of damages to be
awarded, however, are MODIFIED. In accordance with Sec. 5 of
Presidential Decree No. 1613, accused-appellant is hereby sentenced
to  RECLUSION PERPETUA. Accused-appellant is hereby ordered to pay
the heirs of each of the victims  P 50,000.00 as civil indemnity.
 
17. People vs. Lauga, 615 SCRA 548, G.R. No. 186228 March 15, 2010
Doctrines:
Miranda Rights; Rights of Suspects; Bantay Bayan; Words and Phrases; A “bantay bayan” is a group of
male residents living in an area organized for the purpose of keeping peace in their community.—
Following the rationale behind the ruling in Malngan, this Court needs to ascertain whether or not a “bantay bayan”
may be deemed a law enforcement officer within the contemplation of Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution. In
People of the Philippines v. Buendia, 382 SCRA 714 (2002), this Court had the occasion to mention the nature of a
“bantay bayan,” that is, “a group of male residents living in [the] area organized for the purpose of keeping peace in
their community[,which is] an accredited auxiliary of the x x x PNP.” Also, it may be worthy to consider that pursuant
to Section 1(g) of Executive Order No. 309 issued on 11 November 1987, as amended, a Peace and Order Committee
in each barangay shall be organized “to serve as implementing arm of the City/Municipal Peace and Order Council at
the Barangay level.” The composition of the Committee includes, among others: (1) the Punong Barangay as
Chairman; (2) the Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan; (3) a Member of the Lupon Tagapamayapa; (4) a
Barangay Tanod; and (5) at least three (3) Members of existing Barangay-Based Anti-Crime or neighborhood Watch
Groups or a Non Government Organization Representative well-known in his community.

Same; Same; Same; Barangay-based volunteer organization in the nature of watch groups, as in the
case of the “bantay bayan,” are recognized by the local government unit to perform functions relating
to the preservation of peace and order at the barangay level; Any inquiry a bantay bayan makes has
the color of a state-related function and objective insofar as the entitlement of a suspect to his
constitutional rights provided for under Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution, otherwise known as
the Miranda Rights, is concerned, and an extrajudicial confession taken from a suspect by such bantay
bayan without a counsel is inadmissible in evidence.—This Court is, therefore, convinced that barangay-based
volunteer organizations in the nature of watch groups, as in the case of the “bantay bayan,” are recognized by the
local government unit to perform functions relating to the preservation of peace and order at the barangay level.
Thus, without ruling on the legality of the actions taken by Moises Boy Banting, and the specific scope of duties and
responsibilities delegated to a “bantay bayan,” particularly on the authority to conduct a custodial investigation, any
inquiry he makes has the color of a state-related function and objective insofar as the entitlement of a suspect to his
constitutional rights provided for under Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution, otherwise known as the Miranda
Rights, is concerned. We, therefore, find the extrajudicial confession of appellant, which was taken without a
counsel, inadmissible in evidence.

Evidence; Witnesses; Inconsistencies which refer to minor, trivial or inconsequential circumstances

strengthen the credibility of the witnesses, as they erase doubts that such testimonies have been
coached or rehearsed.—The testimony of AAA does not run contrary to that of BBB. Both testified that they
sought the help of a “bantay bayan.” Their respective testimonies differ only as to when the help was sought for,
which this Court could well attribute to the nature of the testimony of BBB, a shortcut version of AAA’s testimony that
dispensed with a detailed account of the incident. At any rate, the Court of Appeals is correct in holding that the
assailed inconsistency is too trivial to affect the veracity of the testimonies. In fact, inconsistencies which refer to
minor, trivial or inconsequential circumstances even strengthen the credibility of the witnesses, as they erase doubts
that such testimonies have been coached or rehearsed.

Same; Same; The Court is not dissuaded from giving full credence to the testimony of a minor
complainant by motives of feuds, resentment or revenge.—Appellant’s contention that AAA charged him of
rape only because she bore grudges against him is likewise unmeritorious. This Court is not dissuaded from giving
full credence to the testimony of a minor complainant by motives of feuds, resentment or revenge. As correctly
pointed out by the Court of Appeals: Indeed, mere disciplinary chastisement is not strong enough to make daughters
in a Filipino family invent a charge that would not only bring shame and humiliation upon them and their families but
also bring their fathers into the gallows of death. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that it is unbelievable for a
daughter to charge her own father with rape, exposing herself to the ordeal and embarrassment of a public trial and
subjecting her private parts to examination if such heinous crime was not in fact committed. No person, much less a
woman, could attain such height of cruelty to one who has sired her, and from whom she owes her very existence,
and for which she naturally feels loving and lasting gratefulness. Even when consumed with revenge, it takes a
certain amount of psychological depravity for a young woman to concoct a story which would put her own father to
jail for the most of his remaining life and drag the rest of the family including herself to a lifetime of shame. It is
highly improbable for [AAA] against whom no proof of sexual perversity or loose morality has been shown to fake
charges much more against her own father. In fact her testimony is entitled to greater weight since her accusing
words were directed against a close relative.
Same; Rape; Qualified Rape; Penalties; Elements.—Having established the credibility of the witnesses for the
prosecution, We now examine the applicability of the Anti-Rape Law of 1997 to the case at bar. The law provides, in
part, that rape is committed, among others, “[b]y a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman” “through
force, threat or intimidation.” The death penalty shall be imposed if it is committed with aggravating/qualifying
circumstances, which include, “[w]hen the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent.”

Facts:
Before Us for final review is the trial court’s conviction of the appellant for the rape of his thirteen-
year old daughter.

Consistent with the ruling of this Court in People v. Cabalquinto, 1 the real name and the personal
circumstances of the victim, and any other information tending to establish or compromise her
identity, including those of her immediate family or household members, are not disclosed in this
decision.X

The Facts

In an Information dated 21 September 2000,2 the appellant was accused of the crime of QUALIFIED
RAPE allegedly committed as follows:X

That on or about the 15th day of March 2000, in the evening, at Barangay xxx, municipality of xxx,
province of Bukidnon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, being the father of AAA with lewd design, with the use of force and intimidation,
did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally have carnal knowledge with his own daughter
AAA, a 13 year[s]old minor against her will.3X

On 12 October 2000, appellant entered a plea of not guilty. 4 During the pre-trial conference, the
prosecution and the defense stipulated and admitted: (a) the correctness of the findings indicated in
the medical certificate of the physician who examined AAA; (b) that AAA was only thirteen (13)
years old when the alleged offense was committed; and (c) that AAA is the daughter of the
appellant.5 On trial, three (3) witnesses testified for the prosecution, namely: victim AAA; 6 her
brother BBB;7 and one Moises Boy Banting,8 a "bantay bayan" in the barangay. Their testimonies
revealed the following:X

In the afternoon of 15 March 2000, AAA was left alone at home. 9 AAA’s father, the appellant, was
having a drinking spree at the neighbor’s place.10 Her mother decided to leave because when
appellant gets drunk, he has the habit of mauling AAA’s mother. 11 Her only brother BBB also went
out in the company of some neighbors.12X

At around 10:00 o’clock in the evening, appellant woke AAA up; 13 removed his pants, slid inside the
blanket covering AAA and removed her pants and underwear; 14 warned her not to shout for help
while threatening her with his fist;15 and told her that he had a knife placed above her head.16 He
proceeded to mash her breast, kiss her repeatedly, and "inserted his penis inside her vagina." 17X

Soon after, BBB arrived and found AAA crying. 18 Appellant claimed he scolded her for staying out
late.19 BBB decided to take AAA with him.20 While on their way to their maternal grandmother’s
house, AAA recounted her harrowing experience with their father. 21 Upon reaching their
grandmother’s house, they told their grandmother and uncle of the incident, 22 after which, they
sought the assistance of Moises Boy Banting. 23X
Moises Boy Banting found appellant in his house wearing only his underwear. 24 He invited appellant
to the police station,25 to which appellant obliged. At the police outpost, he admitted to him that he
raped AAA because he was unable to control himself. 26X

The following day, AAA submitted herself to physical examination. 27 Dra. Josefa Arlita L. Alsula,
Municipal Health Officer of x x x, Bukidnon, issued the Medical Certificate, which reads: X

hyperemic vulvae with 4 o’clock & 6 o’clock freshly lacerated hymen; (+) minimal to moderate
bloody discharges 2° to an alleged raping incident 28X

On the other hand, only appellant testified for the defense. He believed that the charge against him
was ill-motivated because he sometimes physically abuses his wife in front of their children after
engaging in a heated argument,29 and beats the children as a disciplinary measure.30 He went further
to narrate how his day was on the date of the alleged rape. X

He alleged that on 15 March 2000, there was no food prepared for him at lunchtime. 31 Shortly after,
AAA arrived.32 She answered back when confronted.33 This infuriated him that he kicked her hard on
her buttocks.34X

Appellant went back to work and went home again around 3 o’clock in the afternoon. 35 Finding
nobody at home,36 he prepared his dinner and went to sleep.37X

Later in the evening, he was awakened by the members of the "Bantay Bayan" headed by Moises
Boy Banting.38 They asked him to go with them to discuss some matters. 39 He later learned that he
was under detention because AAA charged him of rape. 40X

On 8 July 2006, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 9, Malaybalay City, Bukidnon, rendered its
decision41 in Criminal Case No. 10372-0, finding appellant guilty of rape qualified by relationship and
minority, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. 42 It also ordered him to
indemnify AAA ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity with exemplary
damages of ₱25,000.00.43X

On 30 September 2008, the decision of the trial court was AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS 44 by the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00456-MIN.45 The appellate court found that appellant is not
eligible for parole and it increased both the civil indemnity and moral damages from ₱50,000.00 to
₱75,000.00.46X

On 24 November 2008, the Court of Appeals gave due course to the appellant’s notice of
appeal.47 This Court required the parties to simultaneously file their respective supplemental
briefs,48 but both manifested that they will no longer file supplemental pleadings. 49X
Issue/s:
The lone assignment of error in the appellant’s brief is that, the trial court gravely erred in finding
him guilty as charged despite the failure of the prosecution to establish his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt,50 because: (1) there were inconsistencies in the testimonies of AAA and her brother BBB; 51 (2)
his extrajudicial confession before Moises Boy Banting was without the assistance of a counsel, in
violation of his constitutional right;52 and (3) AAA’s accusation was ill-motivated. 53
Ruling:
Our Ruling

Appellant contests the admissibility in evidence of his alleged confession with a " bantay bayan" and
the credibility of the witnesses for the prosecution.
Admissibility in Evidence of an Extrajudicial Confession before a "Bantay Bayan"

Appellant argues that even if he, indeed, confessed to Moises Boy Banting, a " bantay bayan," the
confession was inadmissible in evidence because he was not assisted by a lawyer and there was no
valid waiver of such requirement.54X

The case of People v. Malngan55 is the authority on the scope of the Miranda doctrine provided for
under Article III, Section 12(1)56 and (3)57 of the Constitution. In Malngan, appellant questioned the
admissibility of her extrajudicial confessions given to the barangay chairman and a neighbor of the
private complainant. This Court distinguished. Thus:X

Arguably, the barangay tanods, including the Barangay Chairman, in this particular instance, may be
deemed as law enforcement officer for purposes of applying Article III, Section 12(1) and (3), of the
Constitution. When accused-appellant was brought to the barangay hall in the morning of 2 January
2001, she was already a suspect, actually the only one, in the fire that destroyed several houses x x
x. She was, therefore, already under custodial investigation and the rights guaranteed by x x x [the]
Constitution should have already been observed or applied to her. Accused-appellant’s confession to
Barangay Chairman x x x was made in response to the ‘interrogation’ made by the latter –
admittedly conducted without first informing accused-appellant of her rights under the Constitution
or done in the presence of counsel. For this reason, the confession of accused-appellant, given to
Barangay Chairman x x x, as well as the lighter found x x x in her bag are inadmissible in evidence
against her x x x.
1avvphi1

[But such does] not automatically lead to her acquittal. x x x [T]he constitutional safeguards during
custodial investigations do not apply to those not elicited through questioning by the police or their
agents but given in an ordinary manner whereby the accused verbally admits x x x as x x x in the
case at bar when accused-appellant admitted to Mercedita Mendoza, one of the neighbors x x x [of
the private complainant].58 (Emphasis supplied)X

Following the rationale behind the ruling in Malngan, this Court needs to ascertain whether or not a
"bantay bayan" may be deemed a law enforcement officer within the contemplation of Article III,
Section 12 of the Constitution.

In People of the Philippines v. Buendia,59 this Court had the occasion to mention the nature of a
"bantay bayan," that is, "a group of male residents living in [the] area organized for the purpose of
keeping peace in their community[,which is] an accredited auxiliary of the x x x PNP." 60X

Also, it may be worthy to consider that pursuant to Section 1(g) of Executive Order No. 309 issued
on 11 November 1987, as amended, a Peace and Order Committee in each barangay shall be
organized "to serve as implementing arm of the City/Municipal Peace and Order Council at the
Barangay level."61 The composition of the Committee includes, among others: (1) the Punong
Barangay as Chairman; (2) the Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan; (3) a Member of the Lupon
Tagapamayapa; (4) a Barangay Tanod; and (5) at least three (3) Members of existing Barangay-
Based Anti-Crime or neighborhood Watch Groups or a Non Government Organization Representative
well-known in his community.62X

This Court is, therefore, convinced that barangay-based volunteer organizations in the nature of
watch groups, as in the case of the " bantay bayan," are recognized by the local government unit to
perform functions relating to the preservation of peace and order at the barangay level. Thus,
without ruling on the legality of the actions taken by Moises Boy Banting, and the specific scope of
duties and responsibilities delegated to a "bantay bayan," particularly on the authority to conduct a
custodial investigation, any inquiry he makes has the color of a state-related function and objective
insofar as the entitlement of a suspect to his constitutional rights provided for under Article III,
Section 12 of the Constitution, otherwise known as the Miranda Rights, is concerned.

We, therefore, find the extrajudicial confession of appellant, which was taken without a counsel,
inadmissible in evidence.

Be that as it may, We agree with the Court of Appeals that the conviction of the appellant was not
deduced solely from the assailed extrajudicial confession but "from the confluence of evidence
showing his guilt beyond reasonable doubt."63X

Credibility of the Witnesses for the Prosecution

Appellant assails the inconsistencies in the testimonies of AAA and her brother BBB. AAA testified
that BBB accompanied her to the house of their grandmother. Thereafter, they, together with her
relatives, proceeded to look for a "bantay bayan." On the other hand, BBB testified that he brought
her sister to the house of their "bantay bayan" after he learned of the incident.

Citing Bartocillo v. Court of Appeals,64 appellant argues that "where the testimonies of two key
witnesses cannot stand together, the inevitable conclusion is that one or both must be telling a lie,
and their story a mere concoction."65X

The principle, however, is not applicable in the case at bar. In Bartocillo, the two testimonies could
not simply stand together because:

On one hand, if we are to believe Susan, Orlando could not have possibly seen the hacking incident
since he had accompanied Vicente home. On the other hand, if we are to accept the testimony of
Orlando, then Susan could not have possibly witnessed the hacking incident since she was with
Vicente at that time.

Here, the testimony of AAA does not run contrary to that of BBB. Both testified that they sought the
help of a "bantay bayan." Their respective testimonies differ only as to when the help was sought
for, which this Court could well attribute to the nature of the testimony of BBB, a shortcut version of
AAA’s testimony that dispensed with a detailed account of the incident.

At any rate, the Court of Appeals is correct in holding that the assailed inconsistency is too trivial to
affect the veracity of the testimonies.66 In fact, inconsistencies which refer to minor, trivial or
inconsequential circumstances even strengthen the credibility of the witnesses, as they erase doubts
that such testimonies have been coached or rehearsed.67X

Appellant’s contention that AAA charged him of rape only because she bore grudges against him is
likewise unmeritorious. This Court is not dissuaded from giving full credence to the testimony of a
minor complainant by motives of feuds, resentment or revenge. 68 As correctly pointed out by the
Court of Appeals:X

Indeed, mere disciplinary chastisement is not strong enough to make daughters in a Filipino family
invent a charge that would not only bring shame and humiliation upon them and their families but
also bring their fathers into the gallows of death. 69 The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that it is
unbelievable for a daughter to charge her own father with rape, exposing herself to the ordeal and
embarrassment of a public trial and subjecting her private parts to examination if such heinous
crime was not in fact committed.70 No person, much less a woman, could attain such height of
cruelty to one who has sired her, and from whom she owes her very existence, and for which she
naturally feels loving and lasting gratefulness.71 Even when consumed with revenge, it takes a
certain amount of psychological depravity for a young woman to concoct a story which would put
her own father to jail for the most of his remaining life and drag the rest of the family including
herself to a lifetime of shame.72 It is highly improbable for [AAA] against whom no proof of sexual
perversity or loose morality has been shown to fake charges much more against her own father. In
fact her testimony is entitled to greater weight since her accusing words were directed against a
close relative.73X

Elements of Rape

Having established the credibility of the witnesses for the prosecution, We now examine the
applicability of the Anti-Rape Law of 199774 to the case at bar.X

The law provides, in part, that rape is committed, among others, "[b]y a man who shall have carnal
knowledge of a woman" "through force, threat or intimidation." 75 The death penalty shall be imposed
if it is committed with aggravating/qualifying circumstances, which include, "[w]hen the victim is
under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent."76X

The consistent and forthright testimony of AAA detailing how she was raped, culminating with the
penetration of appellant’s penis into her vagina, suffices to prove that appellant had carnal
knowledge of her. When a woman states that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is
necessary to show that rape was committed. 77 Further, when such testimony corresponds with
medical findings, there is sufficient basis to conclude that the essential requisites of carnal
knowledge have been established.78X

The Court of Appeals pointed out that the element of force or intimidation is not essential when the
accused is the father of the victim, inasmuch as his superior moral ascendancy or influence
substitutes for violence and intimidation.79 At any rate, AAA was actually threatened by appellant
with his fist and a knife allegedly placed above AAA’s head. 80X

It may be added that the self-serving defense of appellant cannot prevail over the positive and
straightforward testimony of AAA. Settled is the rule that, "alibi is an inherently weak defense that is
viewed with suspicion because it is easy to fabricate." 81 "Alibi and denial must be supported by
strong corroborative evidence in order to merit credibility." 82 Moreover, for the defense of alibi to
prosper, the accused must establish two elements – (1) he was not at the locus delicti at the time
the offense was committed; and (2) it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene at the
time of its commission.83 Appellant failed in this wise.X

Aggravating/Qualifying Circumstances

The presence of the qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship with the offender in the
instant case has likewise been adequately established. Both qualifying circumstances were
specifically alleged in the Information, stipulated on and admitted during the pre-trial conference,
and testified to by both parties in their respective testimonies. Also, such stipulation and admission,
as correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, are binding upon this Court because they are
judicial admissions within the contemplation of Section 4, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Court. It
provides:
Sec. 4. Judicial admissions. - An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the
proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by
showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.

Penalty

Finally, in increasing the amount of civil indemnity and damages each from ₱50,000.00 to
₱75,000.00, the Court of Appeals correctly considered controlling jurisprudence to the effect that
where, as here, the rape is committed with any of the qualifying/aggravating circumstances
warranting the imposition of the death penalty, the victim is entitled to ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity
ex delicto84 and ₱75,000.00 as moral damages.85 However, the award of exemplary damages should
have been increased from ₱25,000.00 to ₱30,000.00. 86 Also, the penalty of reclusion perpetua in lieu
of death was correctly imposed considering that the imposition of the death penalty upon appellant
would have been appropriate were it not for the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346, or An Act
Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines. 87 We further affirm the ruling of the
Court of Appeals on appellant’s non-eligibility for parole. Sec. 3 of Republic Act No. 9346 clearly
provides that "persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences
will be reduced to reclusion perpetua by reason of the law, shall not be eligible for parole." X

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 30 September 2008 in CA-G.R. CR HC No.
00456-MIN is hereby AFFIRMED. Appellant Antonio Lauga is GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
qualified rape, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility
for parole and to pay AAA ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱75,000.00 as moral damages, and
₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages.

SO ORDERED.
18. People vs. Gallo, 157 SCRA 17, Nos. L-70193-96 January 11, 1988
Doctrines:
Criminal Law; Evidence; Murder; Constitutional Law; Extrajudicial confessions, inadmissibility of; A
confession made by a defendant is admissible only against him but not against his co-defendants as
to whom said confession is hearsay evidence; Where the alleged confessions were properly objected
to upon formal offer, they are inadmissible against appellant.—The extrajudicial confessions of Argales
and Soriano are inadmissible against appellant Gallo. It is well settled that as a rule, a confession made by a
defendant is admissible only against him but not against his co-defendants as to whom said confession is hearsay
evidence. [See U.S. v. Castillo, 2 Phil. 17 (1903); People v. Ferry, 66 Phil. 310 (1938); People v. Cabiltes, L-18010
(September 25, 1968), 25 SCRA 112]. More so in the case at bar if we consider that the alleged confessions were
repudiated by Soriano and Argales when they took the witness stand. As these alleged confessions were properly
objected to upon formal offer (Original Record, p. 55), they are inadmissible against appellant Gallo.

Same; Same; Same; Acquittal; Identification by a prosecution witness of appellant as the assailant is
inadmissible evidence because he had no opportunity to confront and cross-examine the prosecution
witness who died before he could take the witness stand.—In the case at bar, Antonio Dacio, Sr. identified
Gallo to be one of the culprits while the latter was under police custody for another offense. Unfortunately,
Antonio Dacio, Sr. died before he could take the witness stand. Even as Gallo candidly admitted that he was
positively identified by Antonio, Sr. to be one of the killers of his son (t.s.n., November 15, 1982, p. 4.), the
condition set forth under the aforecited Rule for the admissibility of the evidence was not satisfied. At the time it
was made, Gallo had no opportunity to confront and cross-examine Antonio, Sr. Hence, the identification is
inadmissible evidence.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Judgment; The Supreme Court as a rule will not interfere with the
judgment of the trial court on the credibility of the opposing witnesses; Exception.— As a rule, “the
Supreme Court will not interfere with the judgment of the trial court in passing on the credibility of opposing
witnesses, unless there appears in the record some fact or circumstance of weight and influence, which has been
overlooked or the significance of which has been misinterpreted.” [People v. De Otero, 51 Phil. 201 (1927)].

Same; Same; Same; Same; Serious doubts raised in the testimony of a prosecution witness; Failure
of the witness to give a statement to the police about the killing or to participate in the identification
at the police line-ups, not explained.—If Antonio, Jr. really witnessed the killing, why did he not give his
statement to the police, at least, to corroborate the story of his father on the killing of his brother, and help in
identifying the other wrongdoers, their neighbors? Why did he not participate in the identification at the police
line-ups? No explanation was offered by the prosecution.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Inconsistencies in the testimony of the witness affects the credibility of
the witness.—Secondly, his testimony contains inconsistencies. For instance, on cross-examination he declared
that the three of them, his father, his brother, and himself, were walking together when they were attacked
(t.s.n., April 5, 1982, p. 41). This is quite discordant with his testimony on direct examination that it was while his
father and his brother were walking towards his direction that the group assaulted the two. Nonetheless, if indeed
the three of them were walking together when the group attacked, his testimony that a ‘sumpak’ was poked at his
father (presumably so he would not be able to come to the rescue of the victim), whereas nothing was done to
him (Antonio, Jr.) as he was able to run and hide, is unsettling. It seems out of the ordinary that the assailants,
allegedly eleven of them, all armed, would let Antonio, Jr. loose and not put him under restraint as his father was.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Lack of motive on the part of appellant to commit the acts imputed to
him; If there is doubt whether the defendant is or is not the person who committed an act, the
existence or non-existence of a motive for the doing of the act is a circumstantial evidence leading
to the inference that he is or is not the author of the act done.— One other circumstance leads this Court
to acquit appellant Gallo: the lack of motive on the part of the appellant to commit the acts imputed to him. It has
been held that if there is doubt as to whether the defendant is or is not the person who committed an act, the
existence or non-existence of a motive for the doing of the act is a circumstantial evidence leading to the
inference that he is not the author of the act done. [U.S. v. McMann, 4 Phil. 561 (1905)].

Same; Same; Same; Same; Alibi; The fact alone that the defense of alibi was indeed weak, does not
justify the judgment of conviction; Burden of proof in criminal cases is on the prosecution;
Prosecution’s evidence has not proven appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.—Granting that the
defense of alibi was indeed weak, that fact alone does not justify the judgment of conviction. The burden of proof
in criminal cases is on the prosecution. [Rule 131, Sec. 2]. Failing in its task to prove the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt, the prosecution cannot rely on the weakness of the defense to secure a conviction.
[People v. Ola, L-47147 (July 3, 1987); People v. Formentera, L-30892 (June 29, 1984), 130 SCRA 114; People v.
Somontao, L-45366-68 (March 27, 1984), 128 SCRA 415; Duran v. CA, L-39758 (May 7, 1976), 71 SCRA 68].
Considering that the evidence of the prosecution has not proven Gallo’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the trial
court should have acquitted the appellant notwithstanding the weakness of his defense.
Facts:
Under separate informations, seven accused were charged of the crime of murder. One pleaded guilty to the lesser crime of homicide,
and was sentenced accordingly; 1 two were acquitted by the trial court; 2 while the other four, including the appellant, were convicted,
after trial, of the lesser crime of homicide, and "sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from seventeen (17) years, four (4)
months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to 20 years of reclusion temporal, as maximum.3 Three of the accused
appealed but only appellant Gallo filed an appellant's brief. Hence, the appeals of the other two were dismissed by the Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals   is of the opinion that the crime committed in this case was murder, as
4

originally charged, and not the less serious crime of homicide, so that the penalty to be imposed
should be raised to reclusion perpetua. Since the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, places in this
Court exclusive appellate jurisdiction over cases where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua,
the Court of Appeals did not enter judgment but referred the instant case to this Tribunal.

The information filed against accused-appellant reads:

That on or about October 8, 1979, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused, conspiring and confederating together with Gener Argales y Repalda,
Teofilo Soriano, Jr. y Alcala, Mario Asuzano y Moral and June Bermudez y
Quintero, who were already charged before the Circuit Criminal Court of Manila
under Crim. Case Nos. CCC-VI-128(79), CCC-VI-146(79), CCC-VI-4(80) and CCC-
VI-83(80), respectively, for the same offense, and with several others whose true
names, Identities and present whereabouts are still unknown, and helping one
another, taking advantage of their superior strength, and with intent to kill, with
evident premeditation and treachery, attack, assault and use personal violence
upon one Erlinio Dacio y Servetillo by then and there mauling, stabbing and
hacking him with deadly bladed weapons on the different parts of his body,
thereby inflicting upon the said Erlinio Dacio y Servetillo mortal stab wounds which
were the direct and immediate cause of his death soon thereafter.

Contrary to law.

The aforementioned criminal cases, together with one other case, CCC-VI- 20(81), were jointly
tried inasmuch as they an referred to the death of Erlinio Dacio. On October 20, 1979, Argales
pleaded guilty to the crime of homicide, and was sentenced accordingly. Trial was held with
respect to the other cases, and on April 15, 1983, the trial court rendered a decision finding
accused Gallo, Soriano, Bermudez and Villanueva guilty of the crime of homicide, aggravated by
superior strength. The accused Asuzano and Marteja were acquitted.

The evidence of the prosecution implicating accused-appellant Gallo in the crime charged consist
of (1) the extrajudicial confessions of his co-accused Argales and Soriano, (2) the Identification by
Antonio Dacio, Sr. (father of the victim) of Gallo as one of the perpetrators of the crime, which
Identification was made in the course of police investigation while Gallo was under police custody,
and (3) the testimony in court of Antonio Dacio, Jr. (brother of the victim).

(1) The extrajudicial confessions of Argales and Soriano are inadmissible against appellant Gallo.
It is well settled that as a rule, a confession made by a defendant is admissible only against him
but not against his co-defendants as to whom said confession is hearsay evidence. [See U.S. v.
Castillo, 2 Phil. 17 (1903); People v. Ferry, 66 Phil. 310 (1938); People v. Cabiltes, L-18010
(September 25, 1968), 25 SCRA 112]. More so in the case at bar if we consider that the alleged
confessions were repudiated by Soriano and Argales when they took the witness stand. As these
alleged confessions were properly objected to upon formal offer (Original Record, p. 55), they are
inadmissible against appellant Gallo.

(2) The identification by Antonio Dacio, Sr. is likewise inadmissible. Rule 115 Section l(f) of the
1964 Rules of Court on Criminal Procedure (which was in effect during the trial of this case)
provides:

Section 1. Rights of defendant at the trial. In all Prosecutions the defendant shall
entitled:

xxx xxx xxx

(f) to be confronted at the trial by, and to cross-examine the witnesses against
him. Where the testimony of a witness for the prosecution has previously been
taken down by question and answer in the presence of the defendant or his
attorney, the defense having had an opportunity to cross-examine the witness, the
testimony or deposition of the latter may be read, upon satisfactory proof to the
court that he is dead or incapacitated to testify, or cannot with due diligence be
found in the Philippines;

xxx xxx xxx(Emphasis supplied.)  5

In the case at bar, Antonio Dacio, Sr. Identified Gallo to be one of the culprits while the latter was
under police custody for another offense. Unfortunately, Antonio Dacio, Sr. died before he could
take the witness stand.

Even as Gallo candidly admitted that he was positively Identified by Antonio, Sr. to be one of the
killers of his son (t.s.n. November 15, 1982, p. 4.), the condition set forth under the aforecited
Rule for the admissibility of the evidence was not satisfied. At the time it was made, Gallo had no
opportunity to confront and cross-examine Antonio, Sr. Hence, the Identification is inadmissible
evidence.

(3) Thus, We are left with no evidence against the accused other than the testimony of Antonio
Dacio, Jr. to the effect that Gallo stabbed the victim with a knife.

The People would want to show by the testimony of this witness that on the night of October 8,
1979, between 10:00 and 10:30 o'clock in the evening, he was waiting for his father Antonio, Sr.
and his brother Erlinio (the victim) at the comer of Dagonoy and Oro-B Streets, Sta. Ana, Manila.
When Antonio, Sr. and Erlinio arrived, they were blocked by a group, among whom were accused-
appellant Gallo, Argales, Soriano, Bermudez and Villanueva. Argales then poked a "sumpak" at
Antonio, Sr., while the victim Erlinio was taken away. Antonio, Jr., apprehensive and fearing that
the group would also harm him, ran and hid at a place about fifteen meters away from his
brother. Meantime, the victim was boxed, clubbed and stabbed to death.
As a rule, "the Supreme Court will not interfere with the judgement of the trial court in passing on
the credibility of opposing witnesses, unless there appears in the record some fact or
circumstances of weight and influence, which has been overlooked or the significance of which
has been misinterpreted." [People v. De Otero, 51 Phil. 201 (1927)].
Issue/s:

Ruling:
The Court has carefully examined the testimony of Antonio Dacio, Jr. Certain aspects of that
testimony raise serious doubt as to whether Antonio Dacio, Jr. was indeed an eyewitness to the
killing of his brother, as he claims to be.

Firstly, the witness, a 16-year old high school student, admitted that he did not give any
statement to the police immediately after the killing in 1979, and that it was only his father who
did. He also admitted that it was only in December, 1981, when his father died that he was asked
to testify in court.

Likewise, in all the police line-ups for purposes of Identifying the culprits, only the father, Antonio,
Sr. was present to identify the suspects. Antonio, Jr. was not.

At this point it may be noted that in his statement before the police immediately after the killing,
when asked by the police as to who killed the victim, Antonio Dacio, Sr. could identify only Pilo
(Soriano) and Gener (Argales). The identity of the others was not known to him although they
were his neighbors.

If Antonio, Jr. really witnessed the killing, why did he not give his statement to the police, at
least, to corroborate the story of his father on the killing of his brother, and help in Identifying the
other wrongdoers, their neighbors? Why did he not participate in the Identification at the police
line-ups? No explanation was offered by the prosecution.

Antonio, Jr. claims that while his brother was being clubbed and stabbed to death, he was able to
run and seek cover while his father was held under the control of the assailants. He also claims
that it was from his hiding place that he witnessed the incident. If that were true, then he was in
a better position to observe the killing than his father, and, thus, could better shed light on the
incident. Yet, inexplicably, nothing was heard from him until after his father had died.

Secondly, his testimony contains inconsistencies. For instance, on cross- examination he declared
that the three of them, his father, his brother, and himself, were walking together when they
were attacked (t.s.n., April 5, 1982, p. 41). This is quite discordant with his testimony on direct
examination that it was while his father and his brother were walking towards his direction that
the group assaulted the two.

Nonetheless, if indeed the three of them were walking together when the group attacked, his
testimony that a "sumpak" was poked at his father (presumably so he would not be able to come
to the rescue of the victim), whereas nothing was done to him (Antonio, Jr.) as he was able to
run and hide, is unsettling. It seems out of the ordinary that the assailants, allegedly eleven of
them, all armed, would let Antonio, Jr. loose and not put him under restraint as his father was.

For these reasons, this Court is not presented to accord Antonio, Jr.'s testimony the same weight
the trial court accorded it.

(4) One other circumstance leads this Court to acquit appellant Gallo: the lack of motive on the
part of the appellant to commit the acts imputed to him.

It has been held that if there is doubt as to whether the defendant is or is not the person who
committed an act, the existence or non-existence of a motive for the doing of the act is a
circumstantial evidence leading to the inference that he is or is not the author of the act done.
[U.S. v. McMann, 4 Phil. 561 (1905)].

Argales and Soriano, in their confessions, admitted that the reason why they and their group
killed the victim was that a member of their gang, the Bahala na Gang, had previously been killed
by a member of the Commando Gang. Believing the victim to be member of the latter gang,
Argales group killed him to avenge the death of their confederate.

Gallo alleges, and the prosecution does not dispute, that he is not a member of the Bahala na
Gang. No reason, thus exists why Gallo should participate in the killing.

(5) Gallo interposed the defense of alibi. He claims that on that fateful night, he was in their
house waiting for vendors of his father to turn in their earnings. He presented as witness
Consuelo Soriano who testified that she is an ambulant vendor whose financier is Pablo Gallo, Sr.,
and that at about 10:00 to 10:30 on October 8, 1979, on her way to the Gallos' residence, there
was a commotion along Dagonoy St., Sta. Ana, Manila, so she asked the driver of the taxi she
was riding in to speed up. And that upon reaching the Gallos' place, she saw the accused-
appellant Pablo Gallo, Jr. to whom she turned over her earnings for the day.

Granting that the defense of alibi was indeed weak, that fact alone does not justify the judgment
of conviction. The burden of proof in cases is on the prosecution. [Rule 131, Sec. 2]. Failing in its
task to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the prosecution cannot rely on
the weakness of the defense to secure a conviction. [People v. Ola, L-47147 (July 3, 1987);
People v. Formentera, L-30892 (June 29, 1984), 130 SCRA 114; People v. Somontao, L-45366-68
(March 27, 1984), 128 SCRA 415; Duran v. CA, L-39758 (May 7, 1976), 71 SCRA 68]. Considering
that the evidence of the prosecution has not proven Gallo's guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the
trial court should have acquitted the appellant notwithstanding the weakness of his defense.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is hereby REVERSED. Pablo Gallo y Catanoy is
ACQUITTED of the crime charged.

SO ORDERED
20. People vs. Yatco. etc., et al., 97 Phil. 940, No. L-9181 November 28, 1955
Doctrines:
1,EVIDENCE; ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE; EXTRA-JUDICIAL CONFESSION; ADMISSIBLE AS
EVIDENCE OF DECLARANT'S GUILT.—Under the rule of multiple admissibility of evidence, even if an accused's
confession may not be competent as against his co-accused, being hearsay as to the latter, or to prove conspiracy
between them without the conspiracy being established by other evidence, the confession is nevertheless,
admissible as evidence of the declarant's own guilt (U. S. vs. Vega, 43 Phil.,. 41; People vs. Bande, 50 Phil., 37;
People vs. Buan, 64 Phil., 2,96)', and should be admitted as such.

2.lD.; ID.; ACT OR DECLARATION OF CONSPIRATOR; SECTION 12, RULE 123, Is NOT APPLICABLE TO
CONFESSIONS MADE AFTER CONSPIRACY HAS ENDED.—Section 12 of Rule 123, providing that "The act or
declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence may be given in evidence against
the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration," refers to
statements made by one conspirator during the pendency of the unlawful enterprise ("during its existence") and in
furtherance of its. object, and not to a confession made long after the conspiracy had; been brought to an end (U.
S. vs. Empeinado, 9 Phil., 613; U. S. vs. Raymundo, 14 Phil., 416; People vs. Badilla, 48 Phil,, 718; People vs.
Napkil, 52 Phil., 985).

3.ID.; ID.; OBJECTIONS, WAIVER OF; COURT HAS No POWER TO DIS-REGARD EVIDENCE "MOTU
PROPRIO."—The exclusion of the profered confessions was not made on the basis of the objection interposed by
defense counsel, but upon an altogether different ground, which the Court issued motu proprio. By so doing, the
Court overlooked that the right to object is a mere privilege which the parties may waive; and if the ground for
objection is known and not seasonably made, the objection is deemed waived and the Court has no power, on its
own motion, to disregard the evidence (Marella vs. Reyes, 12 Phil., 1).

4.ID ; ID. ; RULE ON ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE.—The practice of excluding evidence on doubtful

objections to its materiality or technical objections to the form of the questions should be avoided. In a case of
any intricacy it is impossible for a judge of first instance, in the early stages of the development of the proof,, to
know with any certainty whether testimony is relevant or not;, and where there is no indication of bad faith on the
part of the attorney offering the evidence, the court may as a rule safely accept the testimony upon the statement
of the attorney that the proof offered will be connected later." (Prats & Co. vs. Phoenix Insurance Co., 52 Phil.,
807, 816-817.) At any rate, in the final determination and consideration of the case, the trial Court should be able
to distinguish the admissible from the inadmissible, and reject what, under the rules of evidence, should be
excluded. There is greater reason to adhere to such policy in criminal cases where questions arise as to
admissibility of evidence for the prosecution, for the unjustified exclusion of evidence may lead to the erroneous
acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the charges, from which the People can no longer appeal.
Facts:
In an amended information filed by the City Attorney of Quezon City on March 22, 1955, Juan
Consunji, Alfonso Panganiban, and another whose identity is still unknown, were charged with
having conspired together in the murder of one Jose Ramos (Criminal Case No. Q-1637 of the
Court of First Instance of Quezon City). Trial of the case started on May 3, 1955, and in several
hearings the prosecution had been presenting its evidence. During the progress of the trial on
May 18, 1955, while the prosecution was questioning one of its witnesses, Atty. Arturo Xavier of
the National Bureau of Investigation, in connection with the making of a certain extra-judicial
confession (allegedly made before him) by defendant Juan Consunji to the witness, counsel for
the other defendant Alfonso Panganiban interposed a general objection to any evidence on such
confession on the ground that it was hearsay and therefore incompetent as against the other
accused Panganiban. The Court below ordered the exclusion of the evidence objected to, but on
an altogether different ground: that the prosecution could not be permitted to introduce the
confessions of defendants Juan Consunji and Alfonso Panganiban to prove conspiracy between
them, without prior proof of such conspiracy by a number of definite acts, conditions, and
circumstances. Thereafter, according to the transcript, the following remarks were made:

FISCAL LUSTRE:
 May we know from counsel if he is also objecting to the admissibility of the confession of
Consunji as against the accused Consunji himself?

COURT:

That would be premature because there is already a ruling of the Court that you cannot
prove a confession unless you prove first conspiracy thru a number of indefinite acts,
conditions and circumstances as required by law. Annex "B" of the petition, p. 9

The prosecution then moved in writing for a reconsideration of the order of exclusion, but again
the motion was denied. Wherefore, this petition for certiorari was brought before this Court by the
Solicitor General, for the review and annulment of the lower Court's order completely excluding
any evidence on the extrajudicial confessions of the accused Juan Consunji and Alfonso
Panganiban without prior proof of conspiracy.

We believe that the lower Court committed a grave abuse of discretion in ordering the complete
exclusion of the prosecution's evidence on the alleged confessions of the accused Juan Consunji
at the stage of the trial when the ruling was made.

Section 14, Rule 123, Rules of Court, is specific as to the admissibility of the extrajudicial
confession of an accused, freely and voluntarily made, as evidence against him.

SEC. 14. Confession. — The declaration of an accused expressly acknowledging the truth

of his guilt as to the offense charged, may be given in evidence against him.

Under the rule of multiple admissibility of evidence, even if Consunji's confession may not be
competent as against his co-accused Panganiban, being hearsay as to the latter, or to prove
conspiracy between them without the conspiracy being established by other evidence, the
confession of Consunji was, nevertheless, admissible as evidence of the declarant's own guilt (U.
S. vs. Vega, 43 Phil. 41; People vs. Bande, 50 Phil. 37; People vs. Buan, 64 Phil. 296), and should
have been admitted as such.

The rule cited by the Court below in support of its exclusion of the proffered evidence is Sec. 12
of Rule 123, providing that:

The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence
may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by
evidence other than such act or declaration.

Manifestly, the rule refers to statements made by one conspirator during the pendency of the
unlawful enterprises ("during its existence") and in furtherance of its object, and not to a
confession made, as in this case, long after the conspiracy had been brought to an end (U. S.  vs.
Empeinado, 9 Phil., 613; U. S. vs. Raymundo, 14 Phil., 416; People vs. Badilla, 48 Phil., 718;
People vs. Nakpil, 52 Phil., 985).

Besides, the prosecution had not yet offered the confessions to prove conspiracy between the two
accused, nor as evidence against both of them. In fact, the alleged confessions (both in writing
and in tape recordings) had not yet even been identified (the presentation of Atty. Xavier was
precisely for the purpose of identifying the confessions), much less formally offered in evidence.
For all we know, the prosecution might still be able to adduce other proof of conspiracy between
Consunji and Panganiban before their confessions are formally offered in evidence. Assuming,
therefore, that section 12 of Rule 123 also applies to the confessions in question, it was
premature for the respondent Court to exclude them completely on the ground that there was no
prior proof of conspiracy.

It is particularly noteworthy that the exclusion of the proferred confessions was not made on the
basis of the objection interposed by Panganiban's counsel, but upon an altogether different
ground, which the Court issued motu proprio. Panganiban's counsel objected to Consunji's
confession as evidence of the guilt of the other accused Panganiban, on the ground that it was
hearsay as to the latter. But the Court, instead of ruling on this objection, put up its own objection
to the confessions — that it could not be admitted to prove conspiracy between Consunji and
Panganiban without prior evidence of such conspiracy by a number of indefinite acts, conditions,
circumstances, etc. and completely excluded the confessions on that ground. By so doing, the
Court overlooked that the right to object is a mere privilege which the parties may waive; and if
the ground for objection is known and not reasonably made, the objection is deemed waived and
the Court has no power, on its own motion, to disregard the evidence (Marcella vs. Reyes, 12
Phil., 1).
Issue/s:

Ruling:
We see no need for the present to discuss the question of the admissibility of the individual
extrajudicial confessions of two or more accused for the purpose of establishing conspiracy
between them through the identity of the confessions in essential details. After all, the
confessions are not before us and have not even been formally offered in evidence for any
purpose. Suffice it to say that the lower Court should have allowed such confessions to be given
in evidence at least as against the parties who made them, and admit the same conditionally to
establish conspiracy, in order to give the prosecution a chance to get into the record all the
relevant evidence at its disposal to prove the charges. At any rate, in the final determination and
consideration of the case, the trial Court should be able to distinguish the admissible from the
inadmissible, and reject what, under the rules of evidence, should be excluded.

Once more, attention should be called to the ruling of this Court in the case of Prats &
Co. vs.  Phoenix Insurance Co., 52 Phil., 807, 816-817:

In the course of long experience we have observed that justice is most effectively and
expeditiously administered in the courts where trial objections to the admission of proof
are received with least favor. The practice of excluding evidence on doubtful objections to
its materiality or technical objections to the form of the questions should be avoided. In a
case of any intricacy it is impossible for a judge of first instance, in the early stages of the
development of the proof, to know with any certainty whether testimony is relevant or
not; and where there is no indication of bad faith on the part of the Attorney offering the
evidence, the court may as a rule safely accept the testimony upon the statement of the
attorney that the proof offered will be connected later. Moreover, it must be remembered
that in the heat of the battle over which the presides, a judge of first instance may
possibly fall into error in judging of the relevancy of proof where a fair and logical
connection is in fact shown. When such a mistake is made and the proof is erroneously
ruled out, the Supreme Court, upon appeal, often finds itself embarrassed and possibly
 unable to correct the effects of the error without returning the case for a new trial, — a
step which this Court is always very loath to take. On the other hand, the admission of
proof in a court of first instance, even if the question as to its form, materiality, or
relevancy is doubtful, can never result in much harm to either litigant, because the trial
judge is supposed to know the law; and it is duty, upon final consideration of the case, to
distinguish the relevant and material from the irrelevant and immaterial. If this course is
followed and the cause is prosecuted to the Supreme Court upon appeal, this Court then
has all the material before it necessary to make a correct judgment.

There is greater reason to adhere to such policy in criminal cases where questions arise as to
admissibility of evidence for the prosecution, for the unjustified exclusion of evidence may lead to
the erroneous acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the charges, from which the People can
no longer appeal.

Wherefore, the order excluding the confessions of the accused Juan Consunji and Alfonso
Panganiban is annulled and set aside and the Court below is directed to proceed with the trial in
accordance with law and this opinion. Costs against respondents Juan Consunji and Alfonso
Panganiban. So ordered.
21. Mercado vs. People, 599 SCRA 367, G.R. No. 161902 September 11, 2009
Doctrines:
Evidence; Witnesses; Out-of-Court Identification; Factors Considered; Photographic Identification;
Burden of Proof; The photographic identification must be free from any impermissible suggestions
that would single out a person to the attention of the witness making the identification; The burden
to prove that the out-of-court identification was unduly suggestive rests on the accused.— The Court,
in a long line of cases, has reiterated the totality of circumstance test set forth in People v. Teehankee, Jr., 249
SCRA 54, 96 (1995) which dictates that the following factors be considered in determining the reliability of the
out-of-court identification made by a witness, i.e., (1) the witness’ opportunity to view the criminal at the time of
the crime; (2) the witness’ degree of attention at the time of the crime; (3) the accuracy of any prior description
given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length of
time between the crime and the identification; and (6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure. To
prevent any undue suggestiveness in the identification process, it was held that the correct way is to: first,
present a series of photographs to the witness, not solely the photograph of the suspect; and second, when
showing a group of pictures to the witness, the arrangement and display of said photographs should give no
suggestion whatsoever which one of the pictures belongs to the suspect. The photographic identification must be
free from any impermissible suggestions that would single out a person to the attention of the witness making the
identification. However, as held in Teehankee, Jr., the burden to prove that the out-of-court identification was
unduly suggestive rests on the accused.
Facts:
This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, praying
that the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated December 23, 2003, be reversed and set
aside.

Petitioner was charged under the following Amended Informations in Criminal Case No. 97-18386
with Frustrated Homicide and Criminal Case No. 97-18387 with Homicide.

The Amended Information for Criminal Case No. 97-18386 reads as follows:

The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses ROMULO CABILES and EDGAR MERCADO alias
"TOMING" of the crime of FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE (Under Article 249, in relation to Article 6 of
the Revised Penal Code), committed as follows:

That on or about the 24th day of December 1996, in the City of Bacolod, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the herein accused, conspiring, confederating and acting
in concert, without any justifiable cause or motive, being then armed and provided with a bladed
weapon (knife), with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and stab with said weapon one JOHN B. GONZALES, thereby inflicting upon his person the
following injuries, to wit:

- Incised Wound 3 cm., Base of Thumb, Left with Transection of Extensor Pollices Longus
& Brevis Tendons;

- Incised Wound, 6 cm., Wrist, Right;

- Incised Wound 7 cm., Forehead

- Incised Wound 5 cm., Axilla, Left

Operation/Procedure Done: Tendon Repair;

Ligation of Bleeders & Suturing of Wounds

thus performing all the acts of execution which could have produced the crime of homicide, as a
consequence directly by overt acts, but nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of cause
independent of the will of the perpetrators, that is, due to the timely and able medical assistance
which saved the life of the victim.

Act contrary to law.2

The Amended Information for Criminal Case No. 97-18387 reads, thus:

The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses ROMULO CABILES and EDGAR MERCADO alias
"TOMING" of the crime of HOMICIDE (Under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code), committed
as follows:

That on or about the 24th day of December 1996, in the City of Bacolod, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the herein accused, conspiring, confederating and acting
in concert, without any justifiable cause or motive, being then armed and provided with an ice
pick, with intent to kill, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and
stab with said weapon one NELSON DOCTO, thereby inflicting upon the person of the latter
wounds, which directly caused his death, to wit:

- Wound, stab, .02 cm. in diameter, 7 inches deep at the 5th intercost space directed
medially downward hitting the right lung and liver.

- Wound, stab, 0.3 cm. in diameter, 7 inches deep at the left lower hypochoriac region
directed medially forward rupturing the abdominal aorta.

- Wound, stab, 0.2 cm in diameter, 7 inches at the upper left buttock directed forward
medially involving the intestines.

- Wound, stab, 0.3 cm. in diameter, 7 inches deep at the lower left buttock involving the
intestines.

Cause of Death: Cardio-respiratory arrest, hypovolemic shock ruptured abdominal aorta due to
multiple stab wounds.

Act contrary to law.3

Petitioner pleaded not guilty to the Amended Informations and the cases were tried jointly.

The prosecution evidence presents the following scenario:

Around 9 o’clock in the evening of December 23, 1996, brothers Nelson and Agaton Docto,
together with John Gonzales, were drinking beer in front of the sari-sari store owned by Sheila
Realista located at St. Francis Subdivision, Taculing, Bacolod City. Also drinking beer at the store
was another group comprised of Morito Piansay, Jose Ramos, and a certain Jesse and Monding.
After a while, an altercation broke out between Nelson Docto and Morito Piansay when the former
belittled the latter’s "magic" card tricks. Irked, Piansay left in a huff saying, "You just wait for me
here, I cannot fight back because I am old." Piansay’s companions also left with him. Nelson and
Agaton Docto, as well as John Gonzales, remained at the store and continued drinking.

Around 12 o’clock midnight of December 24, 1996, Nelson Docto sang "Bayang Magiliw." Soon
thereafter, Romulo Cabiles alias "Small" arrived at the store to buy beer. Sheila Realista initially
refused to sell beer to Cabiles but relented upon the insistence of Nelson Docto. After getting his
beer, Cabiles stood near the barbecue stand about one-and-a-half arms length away from Agaton
Docto. Agaton Docto [should be Nelson Docto] and John Gonzales continued their conversation
while Nelson Docto [should be Agaton Docto], who was by then heavily drunk, was almost dozing.

At this point, petitioner Edgar Mercado alias "Taming" arrived and also bought a bottle of beer.
Petitioner sat on the stool near John Gonzales. Engaging petitioner in a conversation, Gonzales
asked the former where he was from. Petitioner replied that he was from Barangay 29. Petitioner
then asked for his bill and paid it. After receiving his change, petitioner suddenly broke the beer
bottle he was holding in front of Realista, who cried out "Linti!" in surprise. Almost simultaneously,
Cabiles struck Agaton Docto with a wooden stool. At the time, Agaton Docto was almost asleep
and sitting with his head bowed. He slumped down on the table, unconscious, after being hit.

Cabiles then turned his attention to John Gonzales and repeatedly stabbed him with a stainless
knife. Gonzales tried to defend himself but was nevertheless hit on his forehead, hands and left
armpit. When Cabiles stabbed Gonzales in the armpit, Cabiles was sitting on top of Gonzales who
was lying supine on the ground. Witnessing the attack, Realista threw a stone at Cabiles in an
effort to stop him. The stone hit Cabiles on the neck, momentarily stunning him and affording
Gonzales a chance to escape. Cabiles, however, soon recovered and pursued the fleeing
Gonzales.

While Gonzales was being attacked by Cabiles, petitioner, after breaking the beer bottle, pulled
out a weapon called "tres cantos" and repeatedly stabbed Nelson Docto. Petitioner then joined
Cabiles in pursuing the fleeing Gonzales. Realista followed, but was unable to catch up with the
group.

John Gonzales and Nelson Docto were rushed to the Bacolod Sanitarium Hospital. Dr. Alan Nodal,
the attending physician, treated John Gonzales for the following injuries:

Incised wound 3 cm. base of thumb, left with Transection of Exterior Pollices Longus and
Brevis Tendons;

Incised wound, 6 cm., wrist, right;

Incised wound, 7 cm., forehead;

Incised wound, 5 cm., maxilla, left.

Nelson Docto died as a result of the injuries he sustained. His Certificate of Death states the
cause of his death as "Cardiopulmonary Arrest, Hypovolemic Shock due to multiple stab wounds
on the abdomen and chest."
The autopsy on the cadaver of Nelson Docto conducted by Dr. Johnnie V. Raito, Jr., City Health
Officer of Bacolod City, showed the following Post Mortem findings:

1. Wound, stab 0.2 cm. in diameter, 7 inches deep at the intercostal space, directed
medially downward hitting the right lung and liver;

2. Wound, stab, 0.3 cm. in diameter, 7 inches deep at the left lower hypochoriac region
directed medially forward rupturing the abdominal aorta;

3. Wound, stab, 0.3 cm. in diameter, 7 inches at the upper left buttocks directed forward
medially involving the intestines;

4. Wound, stab, 0.3 cm. in diameter, 7 inches deep at the lower left buttock involving the
intestines.4

On the other hand, petitioner maintains that he could not have been the malefactor because he
resides in Iloilo and only arrived in Bacolod between 7 and 8 o’clock in the morning of December
24, 1996. Petitioner presented his testimony and those of his aunt Milagros Vasquez, his sister-in-
law Catherine Mercado and his friend Rey Diorama. They all testified that petitioner, who resides
in Iloilo, only arrived in Bacolod City on the morning of December 24, 1996. Petitioner said he,
together with his wife and child, and a secretary of his wife, left Iloilo at 5:30 in the morning of
December 24, 1996 and they arrived at Banago wharf at around 7 o’clock in the morning of the
same day. It was already 8 o’clock in the morning of that day when they arrived in Bacolod.
Catherine Mercado stated that petitioner’s party arrived at their house in Bacolod between 7 and
8 o’clock in the morning of December 24, 1996; and that the ferry trip from Iloilo to Bacolod only
takes one hour. Rey Diorama testified that he only saw petitioner in Bacolod around 9 o’clock in
the morning of that day. Milagros Vasquez also said that at around 8:30 to 9 o’clock in the
morning of December 24, 1996, petitioner called her on the phone, informing her that they had
just arrived in Bacolod and they were bringing salad to the family reunion. Witness for the
accused SPO4 Ismail Tan only stated that he accompanied SPO3 Amador Versos to the Bacolod
Sanitarium and Hospital. It was the latter who interviewed the victim John Gonzales and the
available witnesses, so he could not say with certainty whether Versos asked questions about the
identity of the assailants. He, however, identified the Police Blotter Report where it was stated
that the attackers were "2 unidentified persons."

After the parties rested their case, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City, Branch 52
promulgated its Joint Decision5 on May 30, 2000. The dispositive portion thereof reads, thus:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing premises, the Court hereby finds both accused EDGAR
MERCADO alias "TOMING" and ROMULO CABILES alias "SMALL" GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt:

1. In Criminal Case No. 97-18387 for Homicide, and hereby sentences each accused to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and seven (7) months of prison mayor,
as minimum, to sixteen (16) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum; to jointly and
severally pay the amount of ₱50,000.00 for the death of Nelson Docto, Jr. and to pay the
cost of suit; and
 2. In Criminal Case No. 97-18386 for Frustrated Homicide, each accused is hereby
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of two (2) years and six (6) months of
prison correctional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and six (6) months of prison mayor, as
maximum, and also to pay for the cost of suit.

The two accused are entitled to the full credit of their preventive detention.

SO ORDERED.6

On appeal with the CA, said conviction was affirmed in toto.

Only petitioner Edgar Mercado availed of the remedy of the present petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, hence, as to Romulo Cabiles, the CA Decision has
become final and executory.
Issue/s:
In the present petition, petitioner alleges that:

A. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF THE LOWER
COURT SUSTAINING THE FINDINGS OF CONVICTION OF THE ACCUSED BASED ON THE
ALLEGED POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION BY THE PROSECUTORS’ TWO WITNESSES,
NAMELY: JOHN GONZALES AND SHEILA REALISTA;

B. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT SUSTAINED THE FACTUAL FINDINGS OF

THE LOWER COURT ON THE TESTIMONY OF THE TWO PROSECUTION WITNESSES,
NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT IT OVERLOOKED CERTAIN MATERIAL FACTS LIKE
THE CONFLICTING AND MATERIAL DISCREPANCIES IN THE TESTIMONIES OF THE TWO
(2) WITNESSES WHICH IF DULY CONSIDERED WOULD AFFECT THE RESULT OF THE
JUDGMENT;

C. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO CONSIDER THE DEFENSE OF

ALIBI BY THE ACCUSED NOTWITHSTANDING THE DOUBTFUL AND UNRELIABLE
IDENTIFICATION OF THE ACCUSED BY THE TWO (2) PROSECUTION WITNESSES. 7
Ruling:
The meat of petitioner’s argument is that the identification of petitioner made by prosecution
witnesses John Gonzales and Sheila Realista is fraught with defects, thus, unreliable and
insufficient to warrant a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He further points out that there
are inconsistencies between the witnesses’ statements in their affidavits and their testimony.

Petitioner’s arguments are baseless.

The Court, in a long line of cases, 8 has reiterated the totality of circumstance test set forth in
People v. Teehankee, Jr.,9 which dictates that the following factors be considered in determining
the reliability of the out-of-court identification made by a witness, i.e., (1) the witness’ opportunity
to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness’ degree of attention at the time of
the crime; (3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty
demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length of time between the crime and
the identification; and (6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure.
To prevent any undue suggestiveness in the identification process, it was held that the correct
way is to: first, present a series of photographs to the witness, not solely the photograph of the
suspect; and second, when showing a group of pictures to the witness, the arrangement and
display of said photographs should give no suggestion whatsoever which one of the pictures
belongs to the suspect. The photographic identification must be free from any impermissible
suggestions that would single out a person to the attention of the witness making the
identification.10 However, as held in Teehankee, Jr., 11 the burden to prove that the out-of-court
identification was unduly suggestive rests on the accused. 1avvphi1

Applying the totality of circumstance test in this case, the Court finds the out-of-court
identification made by Gonzales to be very reliable, thus, admissible. Gonzales had ample
opportunity to view petitioner at the time of the crime. From the time petitioner arrived at the
store where Gonzales’ group was drinking, petitioner stood very near Gonzales, about one-and-a-
half arm’s length away, and Gonzales even tried to start a conversation with him and Cabiles. The
latter had been able to observe petitioner buy a bottle of beer, pay for it, break said bottle then
draw his weapon and stab Nelson Docto. Gonzales’ unwavering testimony, even while being
grilled on cross-examination, reveals that petitioner’s startling attack on Nelson Docto had his full
attention. Even if Gonzales was also attacked and wounded, Cabiles’ attack on him only began
after petitioner had already stabbed Nelson Docto. Thus, Gonzales’ attention on petitioner was
unhampered.12 The Court acknowledged in Teehankee, Jr.,13 that:

Experience shows that precisely because of the unusual acts of bestiality committed before their
eyes, eyewitnesses, especially the victims to a crime, can remember with a high degree of
reliability the identity of criminals. We have ruled that the natural reaction of victims of criminal
violence is to strive to see the appearance of their assailants and observe the manner the crime
was committed. Most often, the face and body movements of the assailant create an impression
which cannot be easily erased from their memory. 14

Moreover, Gonzales also said that petitioner’s face had become familiar to him even before the
stabbing incident because he used to be a CVO of Barangay Mansilingan, and when he was on
duty, he often saw petitioner around said barangay. The identification was also done around
December 26, 1996 to December 31, 1996, still near the date of the incident. 15

On the other hand, petitioner had been unable to show any circumstance that would point to any
impermissible suggestion given to Gonzales during the identification of petitioner as one of the
assailants. Instead, Gonzales’ answers during cross-examination reveal that investigators complied
with the guidelines when Gonzales, one of the victims, was asked to identify the suspects from
several pictures, to wit:

ATTY. NATU-EL:

Q You said you identified specifically Toming Mercado by his picture shown to you by the
Police Investigator after you were released from the hospital, is that correct?

WITNESS:

A Yes, Sir.
 ATTY. NATU-EL:

Q And that was still December 1996 when the picture was shown to you?

WITNESS:

A Yes, Sir.

ATTY. NATU-EL:

Q By the way Mr. Witness, how many pictures were shown to you by the Police
Investigator of the person for you to identify the suspect or assailant?

WITNESS:

A Many Sir.

xxxx

ATTY. NATU-EL:

Q Mr. Witness, you said there were several pictures shown to you by the police. Could you
roughly estimate how many pictures were shown to you?

WITNESS:

A Nearly one hundred (100).16

Verily, with nearly a hundred photographs from which Gonzales may pick out and identify who his
assailant is, it is highly improbable for the witness to have been given impermissible suggestions.
Thus, Gonzales’ identification of petitioner as one of the assailants is highly reliable and should be
accorded great credence.

Gonzales’ identification of petitioner is already sufficient to prove that petitioner is the author of
the crime, justifying his conviction. Sheila Realista’s identification of the malefactors is merely
corroborating. Therefore, although the process through which Realista identified petitioner and
the other accused do not exactly comply with the aforementioned guidelines, i.e., only their
pictures were shown to Realista and the widow of Nelson Docto pointed out to her the two
accused before she testified in court, these defects are not enough to negatively affect in any way
the identification made by Gonzales.

Next, petitioner points out the supposed inconsistencies in Gonzales’ affidavit and his testimony in
court. Petitioner harps on the fact that in Gonzales’ Affidavit 17 dated February 1, 1997, he said
that "two unidentified men arrived" while he testified in court that even before that fateful night,
he had seen petitioner around Barangay Mansilingan, and he used to see accused Cabiles
everytime his passenger jeepney passed by the road junction. 18 An examination of the records
reveal that the alleged inconsistencies are more apparent than real. The statement in Gonzales’
affidavit calling the two accused as "two unidentified men" does not foreclose the fact that the
affiant is familiar with the faces of the assailants but cannot identify them by their names. In fact,
in his affidavit, Gonzales already mentioned that he remembered seeing accused Cabiles before as
the latter had a scar on his face. As stated in Decasa v. Court of Appeals, 19 to wit:

x x x [T]his Court had consistently ruled that the alleged inconsistencies between the testimony of
a witness in open court and his sworn statement before the investigators are not fatal defects to
justify a reversal of judgment. Such discrepancies do not necessarily discredit the witness since ex
parte affidavits are almost always incomplete. A sworn statement or an affidavit does not purport
to contain a complete compendium of the details of the event narrated by the affiant. Sworn
statements taken ex parte are generally considered to be inferior to the testimony given in open
court.

xxxx

The discrepancies in [the witness]’s testimony do not damage the essential integrity of the
prosecution’s evidence in its material whole. Instead, the discrepancies only erase suspicion that
the testimony was rehearsed or concocted. These honest inconsistencies serve to strengthen
rather than destroy [the witness]’s credibility. 20

Here, Gonzales’ statement in his affidavit that "two unidentified men arrived" cannot be taken to
mean that he cannot identify the assailants from mug shots or if he comes face to face with said
persons again. His candid, though, imprecise language in his affidavit merely bolsters his
credibility.

In the face of the credible and reliable positive identification made by Gonzales, petitioner’s
defense of alibi is absolutely unavailing. As held in People v. Tormis, 21 "the defense of alibi, being
inherently weak, cannot prevail over the clear and positive identification of the accused as the
perpetrator of the crime." Indeed, petitioner’s bare allegation that he arrived in Bacolod only on
the morning of December 24, 1996 cannot be given much credence since it is unsupported by
evidence of the time of his travel or the time he left Iloilo, such as a ticket from the ferry he
boarded. There is no evidence presented showing that petitioner was actually in Iloilo as of the
time of the commission of the crime. The witnesses petitioner presented only proved that they
saw him only on the morning of December 24, 1996, but this does not prove that petitioner could
not have been in Bacolod at an earlier time before they saw him.

In sum, petitioner failed to show any reason for the Court to overturn the findings of the RTC and
the CA.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated December 23, 2003 is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
22. Funk vs. US. 391
Doctrines:
1. In a federal court, the wife of the defendant on trial for a criminal offense is a competent witness in his behalf.
Hendrix v. United States, 219 U. S. 79, and Jin Fuey Moy v. United States, 254 U. S. 189, overruled on this point.
Pp. 290 U. S. 373, 290 U. S. 386.

2. In the absence of a federal statute governing the subject, the competency of witnesses in criminal trials in
federal courts is determined by the common law. P. 290 U. S. 379.

3. In the taking of testimony in criminal cases, the federal courts are not bound by the rules of the common law
as they existed at a specified time in the respective states; they are to apply those rules as they have been
modified by changed conditions. P. 290 U. S. 379.

4. The reasons anciently assigned for disqualifying a wife as a witness in behalf of her husband in criminal cases
can no longer be accepted in the federal courts in view of modern thought and legislation touching the subject. P.
290 U. S. 380.

5. The public policy of one generation may not, under changed conditions, be the public policy of another. P. 290
U. S. 381.

6. The federal courts have no power to amend or repeal a rule of the common law; but they have the power, and
it is their duty, in the absence of any congressional legislation on the subject, to disregard an old rule which is
contrary to modern experience and thought and is opposed in principle to the general current of legislation and
judicial opinion, and to declare and apply what is the present rule in the light of the new conditions. Pp. 290 U. S.
381-383.

7. The common law is not immutable, but flexible, and by its own principles adapts itself to varying conditions. P.
290 U. S. 383.

Certiorari to review the affirmance of a conviction upon an indictment for conspiracy to violate the National
Prohibition Law.

Facts:
MR. JUSTICE SUTHERLAND delivered the opinion of the Court.

The sole inquiry to be made in this case is whether, in a federal court the wife of the defendant on
trial for a criminal offense is a competent witness in his behalf. Her competency to testify against
him is not involved.

The petitioner was twice tried and convicted in a federal District Court upon an indictment for conspiracy to violate
the prohibition law. His conviction on the first trial was reversed by the Circuit Court of Appeals upon a ground not
material here. 46 F.2d 417. Upon the second trial, as upon the first, defendant called his wife to testify in his
behalf. At both trials, she was excluded upon the ground of incompetency. The Circuit Court of Appeals sustained
this ruling upon the first appeal, and also upon the appeal which followed the second trial. 66 F.2d 70. We granted
certiorari limited to the question as to what law is applicable to the determination of the competency of the wife of
the petitioner as a witness.

Both the petitioner and the government, in presenting the case here, put their chief reliance on prior decisions of
this Court. The government relies on United States v. Reid, 12 How. 361; Logan v. United States, 144 U. S. 263;
Hendrix v. United States, 219 U. S. 79, and Jin Fuey Moy v. United States, 254 U. S. 189. Petitioner contends that
these cases, if not directly contrary to the decisions in Benson v. United States, 146 U. S. 325, and Rosen v.
United States, 245 U. S. 467, are so in principle. We shall first briefly review these cases, with the exception of the
Hendrix case and the Jin Fuey Moy case, which we leave for consideration until a later point in this opinion.

In the Reid case, two persons had been jointly indicted for a murder committed upon the high seas. They were
tried separately, and it was held that one of them was not a competent witness in behalf of the other, who was
first tried. The trial was had in Virginia, and, by a statute of that state passed in 1849, if applicable in a federal
court, the evidence would have been competent. Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 declares that the laws of
the several states, except where the Constitution, treaties, or statutes of the United States otherwise provide, shall
be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law in the courts of the United States in cases where they
apply, but the court said that this referred only to civil cases, and did not apply in the trial of criminal offenses
against the United States. It was conceded that there was no act of Congress prescribing in express words the
rule by which the federal courts would be governed in the admission of testimony in criminal cases. "But," the
court said (p, 53 U. S. 363),

"we think it may be found with sufficient certainty, not indeed in direct terms, but by necessary
implication, in the acts of 1789 and 1790, establishing the courts of the United States, and providing for
the punishment of certain offences."
Issue/s:

Ruling:
The court pointed out that the Judiciary Act regulated certain proceedings to be had prior to impaneling the jury,
but contained no express provision concerning the mode of conducting the trial after the jury was sworn and
prescribed no rule in respect of the testimony to be taken. Obviously, however, it was said, some certain and
established rule upon the subject was necessary to enable the courts to administer the criminal jurisprudence of
the United States, and Congress must have intended to refer them to some known and established rule

"which was supposed to be so familiar and well understood in the trial by jury that legislation upon the
subject would be deemed superfluous. This is necessarily to be implied from what these acts of Congress
omit, as well as from what they contain."

P. 53 U. S. 365. The court concluded that this could not be the common law as it existed at the time of the
emigration of the colonists or the rule which then prevailed in England, and [therefore] the only known rule which
could be supposed to have been in the mind of Congress was that which was in force in the respective states
when the federal courts were established by the Judiciary Act of 1789. Applying this rule, it was decided that the
witness was incompetent.

In the Logan case, it was held that the competency of a witness to testify in a federal court sitting in one state
was not affected by his conviction and sentence for felony in another state, and that the competency of another
witness was not affected by his conviction of felony in a Texas state court, where the witness had since been
pardoned. The indictment was for an offense committed in Texas and there tried. The decision was based, not
upon any statute of the United States, but upon the ground that the subject

"is governed by the common law, which, as has been seen, was the law of Texas . . . at the time of the
admission of Texas into the Union as a state."

We next consider the two cases upon which petitioner relies. In the Benson case, two persons were jointly
indicted for murder. On motion of the government, there was a severance, and Benson was first tried. His
codefendant was called as a witness on behalf of the government. The Reid case had been cited as practically
decisive of the question. But the court, after pointing out what it conceived to be distinguishing features in that
case, said (p. 146 U. S. 335): "We do not feel ourselves therefore precluded by that case from examining this
question in the light of general authority and sound reason." The alleged incompetency of the codefendant was
rested upon two reasons -- first, that he was interested, and, second, that he was a party to the record, the basis
for the exclusion at common law being fear of perjury. "Nor," the court said,

"were those named the only grounds of exclusion from the witness stand. Conviction of crime, want of
religious belief, and other matters were held sufficient. Indeed, the theory of the common law was to
admit to the witness stand only those presumably honest, appreciating the sanctity of an oath,
unaffected as a party by the result, and free from any of the temptations of interest. The courts were
afraid to trust the intelligence of jurors. But the last 50 years have wrought a great change in these
respects, and today the tendency is to enlarge the domain of competency, and to submit to the jury for
 their consideration as to the credibility of the witness those matters which heretofore were ruled
sufficient to justify his exclusion. This change has been wrought partially by legislation and partially by
judicial construction."

Attention then is called to the fact that Congress, in 1864, had enacted that no witness should be excluded from
testifying in any civil action, with certain exceptions, because he was a party to or interested in the issue tried,
and that, in 1878 (c. 37, 20 Stat. 30), Congress made the defendant in any criminal case a competent witness at
his own request. The opinion then continues (p. 146 U. S. 337):

"Legislation of similar import prevails in most of the states. The spirit of this legislation has controlled the
decisions of the courts, and steadily, one by one, the merely technical barriers which excluded witnesses
from the stand have been removed, till now it is generally, though perhaps not universally, true that no
one is excluded therefrom unless the lips of the originally adverse party are closed by death, or unless
some one of those peculiarly confidential relations, like that of husband and wife, forbids the breaking of
silence."

". . . If interest and being party to the record do not exclude a defendant on trial from the witness stand,
upon what reasoning can a codefendant, not on trial, be adjudged incompetent?"

That case was decided December 5, 1892. Twenty-five years later, this Court had before it for consideration the
case of Rosen v. United States, supra. Rosen had been tried and convicted in a federal District Court for
conspiracy. A person jointly indicted with Rosen, who had been convicted upon his plea of guilty, was called as a
witness by the government and allowed to testify over Rosen's objection. This Court sustained the competency of
the witness. After saying that, while the decision in the Reid case had not been specifically overruled, its authority
was seriously shaken by the decisions in both the Logan and Benson cases, the Court proceeded to dispose of the
question, as it had been disposed of in the Benson case, "in the light of general authority and of sound reason."

"In the almost twenty [twenty-five] years," the Curt said,

"which have elapsed since the decision of the Benson case, the disposition of courts and of legislative
bodies to remove disabilities from witnesses has continued, as that decision shows it had been going
forward before, under dominance of the conviction of our time that the truth is more likely to be arrived
at by hearing the testimony of all persons of competent understanding who may seem to have
knowledge of the facts involved in a case, leaving the credit and weight of such testimony to be
determined by the jury or by the court, rather than by rejecting witnesses as incompetent, with the
result that this principle has come to be widely, almost universally, accepted in this country and in Great
Britain."

"Since the decision in the Benson case, we have significant evidence of the trend of congressional
opinion upon this subject in the removal of the disability of witnesses convicted of perjury, Rev. Stats. §
5392, by the enactment of the federal Criminal Code in 1909 with this provision omitted and § 5392
repealed. This is significant because the disability to testify of persons convicted of perjury survived in
some jurisdictions much longer than many of the other common law disabilities, for the reason that the
offense concerns directly the giving of testimony in a court of justice, and conviction of it was accepted
as showing a greater disregard for the truth than it was thought should be implied from a conviction of
other crime."

"Satisfied as we are that the legislation and the very great weight of judicial authority which have
developed in support of this modern rule, especially as applied to the competency of witnesses convicted
of crime, proceed upon sound principle, we conclude that the dead hand of the common law rule of 1789
should no longer be applied to such cases as we have here, and that the ruling of the lower courts on
this first claim of error should be approved."

It is well to pause at this point to state a little more concisely what was held in these cases. It will be noted, in the
first place, that the decision in the Reid case was not based upon any express statutory provision. The court found
from what the congressional legislation omitted to say, as well as from what it actually said, that in establishing
the federal courts in 1789, some definite rule in respect of the testimony to be taken in criminal cases must have
been in the mind of Congress, and the rule which the court thought was in the mind of that body was that of the
common law as it existed in the thirteen original states in 1789. The Logan case in part rejected that view, and
held that the controlling rule was that of the common law in force at the time of the admission of the state in
which the particular trial was had. Taking the two cases together, it is plain enough that the ultimate doctrine
announced is that, in the taking of testimony in criminal cases, the federal courts are bound by the rules of the
common law as they existed at a definitely specified time in the respective states, unless Congress has otherwise
provided.

With the conclusion that the controlling rule is that of the common law, the Benson case and the Rosen case do
not conflict, but both cases reject the notion, which the two earlier ones seem to accept -- that the courts, in the
face of greatly changed conditions, are still chained to the ancient formulae and are powerless to declare and
enforce modifications deemed to have been wrought in the common law itself by force of these changed
conditions. Thus, as we have seen, the court in the Benson case pointed to the tendency during the preceding
years to enlarge the domain of competency, significantly saying that the changes had been wrought not only by
legislation, but also "partially by judicial construction," and that it was the spirit (not the letter, be it observed) of
this legislation which had controlled the decisions of the courts and steadily removed the merely technical barriers
in respect of incompetency, until generally no one was excluded from giving testimony except under certain
peculiar conditions which are set forth. It seems difficult to escape the conclusion that the specific ground upon
which the court there rested its determination as to the competency of a codefendant was that, since the
defendant had been rendered competent, the competency of the codefendant followed as a natural consequence.

This view of the matter is made more positive by the decision in the Rosen case. The question of the testimonial
competency of a person jointly indicted with the defendant was disposed of, as the question had been in the
Benson case, "in the light of general authority and of sound reason." The conclusion which the court reached was
based not upon any definite act of legislation, but upon the trend of congressional opinion and of legislation (that
is to say. of legislation generally), and upon the great weight of judicial authority which, since the earlier
decisions, had developed in support of a more modern rule. In both cases, the court necessarily proceeded upon
the theory that the resultant modification which these important considerations had wrought in the rules of the old
common law was within the power of the courts to declare and make operative.

That the present case falls within the principles of the Benson and Rosen cases, and especially of the
latter, we think does not reasonably admit of doubt.

The rules of the common law which disqualified as witnesses persons having an interest long since, in the main,
have been abolished both in England and in this country, and what was once regarded as a sufficient ground for
excluding the testimony of such persons altogether has come to be uniformly and more sensibly regarded as
affecting the credit of the witness only. Whatever was the danger that an interested witness would not speak the
truth -- and the danger never was as great as claimed -- its effect has been minimized almost to the vanishing
point by the test of cross-examination, the increased intelligence of jurors, and perhaps other circumstances. The
modern rule which has removed the disqualification from persons accused of crime gradually came into force after
the middle of the last century, and is today universally accepted. The exclusion of the husband or wife is said by
this Court to be based upon his or her interest in the event. Jin Fuey Moy v. United States, supra. And whether by
this is meant a practical interest in the result of the prosecution or merely a sentimental interest because of the
marital relationship makes little difference. In either case, a refusal to permit the wife upon the ground of interest
to testify in behalf of her husband, while permitting him, who has the greater interest, to testify for himself,
presents a manifest incongruity.

Nor can the exclusion of the wife's testimony, in the face of the broad and liberal extension of the rules in respect
of the competency of witnesses generally, be any longer justified, if it ever was justified, on any ground of public
policy. It has been said that to admit such testimony is against public policy because it would endanger the
harmony and confidence of marital relations, and, moreover, would subject the witness to the temptation to
commit perjury. Modern legislation, in making either spouse competent to testify in behalf of the other in criminal
cases, has definitely rejected these notions, and, in the light of such legislation and of modern thought, they seem
to be altogether fanciful. The public policy of one generation may not, under changed conditions, be the public
policy of another. Patton v. United States, 281 U. S. 276, 281 U. S. 306.

The fundamental basis upon which all rules of evidence must rest -- if they are to rest upon reason -- is their
adaptation to the successful development of the truth. And, since experience is of all teachers the most
dependable, and since experience also is a continuous process, it follows that a rule of evidence at one time
thought necessary to the ascertainment of truth should yield to the experience of a succeeding generation
whenever that experience has clearly demonstrated the fallacy or unwisdom of the old rule.

It may be said that the court should continue to enforce the old rule, however contrary to modern experience and
thought and however opposed, in principle, to the general current of legislation and of judicial opinion it may have
become, leaving to Congress the responsibility of changing it. Of course, Congress has that power; but, if
Congress fail to act, as it has failed in respect of the matter now under review, and the court be called upon to
decide the question, is it not the duty of the court, if it possess the power, to decide it in accordance with present-
day standards of wisdom and justice, rather than in accordance with some outworn and antiquated rule of the
past? That this Court has the power to do so is necessarily implicit in the opinions delivered in deciding the Benson
and Rosen cases. And that implication, we think, rests upon substantial ground. The rule of the common law
which denies the competency of one spouse to testify in behalf of the other in a criminal prosecution has not been
modified by congressional legislation, nor has Congress directed the federal courts to follow state law upon that
subject, as it has in respect of some other subjects. That this Court and the other federal courts, in this situation
and by right of their own powers, may decline to enforce the ancient rule of the common law under conditions as
they now exist we think is not fairly open to doubt.

In Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516, 110 U. S. 530, this Court, after suggesting that it was better not to go too
far back into antiquity for the best securities of our liberties, said:

"It is more consonant to the true philosophy of our historical legal institutions to say that the spirit of personal
liberty and individual right which they embodied was preserved and developed by a progressive growth and wise
adaptation to new circumstances and situations of the forms and processes found fit to give, from time to time,
new expression and greater effect to modern ideas of self-government."

"This flexibility and capacity for growth and adaptation is the peculiar boast and excellence of the common law. . .

And as it was the characteristic principle of the common law to draw its inspiration from every foundation of
justice, we are not to assume that the sources of its supply have been exhausted. On the contrary, we should
expect that the new and various experiences of our own situation and system will mould and shape it into new
and not less useful forms."

Compare Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366, 169 U. S. 385-387.

To concede this capacity for growth and change in the common law by drawing "its inspiration from every
fountain of justice," and at the same time to say that the courts of this country are forever bound to perpetuate
such of its rules as, by every reasonable test, are found to be neither wise nor just, because we have once
adopted them as suited to our situation and institutions at a particular time, is to deny to the common law in the
place of its adoption a "flexibility and capacity for growth and adaptation" which was "the peculiar boast and
excellence" of the system in the place of its origin.

The final question to which we are thus brought is not that of the power of the federal courts to amend or repeal
any given rule or principle of the common law, for they neither have nor claim that power, but it is the question of
the power of these courts, in the complete absence of congressional legislation on the subject, to declare and
effectuate, upon common law principles, what is the present rule upon a given subject in the light of
fundamentally altered conditions, without regard to what has previously been declared and practiced. It has been
said so often as to have become axiomatic that the common law is not immutable, but flexible, and, by its own
principles, adapts itself to varying conditions. In Ketelsen v. Stilz, 184 Ind. 702, 111 N.E. 423, the supreme court
of that state, after pointing out that the common law of England was based upon usages, customs, and
institutions of the English people as declared from time to time by the courts, said (p. 707):

"The rules so deduced from this system, however, were continually changing and expanding with the
progress of society in the application of this system to more diversified circumstances and under more
advanced periods. The common law, by its own principles, adapted itself to varying conditions and
modified its own rules so as to serve the ends of justice as prompted by a course of reasoning which was
guided by these generally accepted truths. One of its oldest maxims was that, where the reason of a rule
 ceased, the rule also ceased, and it logically followed that, when it occurred to the courts that a
particular rule had never been founded upon reason, and that no reason existed in support thereof, that
rule likewise ceased, and perhaps another sprang up in its place which was based upon reason and
justice as then conceived. No rule of the common law could survive the reason on which it was founded.
It needed no statute to change it, but abrogated itself."

That court then refers to the settled doctrine that an adoption of the common law in general terms does not
require, without regard to local circumstances, an unqualified application of all its rules; that the rules, as declared
by the English courts at one period or another, have been controlling in this country only so far as they were
suited to and in harmony with the genius, spirit, and objects of American institutions, and that the rules of the
common law considered proper in the eighteenth century are not necessarily so considered in the twentieth.
"Since courts have had an existence in America," that court said (p. 708), "they have never hesitated to take upon
themselves the responsibility of saying what are the proper rules of the common law."

And the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, in Hanriot v. Sherwood, 82 Va. 1, 15, after pointing to the fact that
the common law of England is the law of that commonwealth except so far as it has been altered by statute or so
far as its principles are inapplicable to the state of the country, and that the rules of the common law had
undergone modification in the courts of England, notes with obvious approval that

"the rules of evidence have been in the courts of this country undergoing such modification and changes,
according to the circumstances of the country and the manner and genius of the people."

The Supreme Court of Connecticut, in Beardsley v. Hartford, 50 Conn. 529, 542, after quoting the
maxim of the common law, cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex, said:

"This means that no law can survive the reasons on which it is founded. It needs no statute to change it;
it abrogates itself. If the reasons on which a law rests are overborne by opposing reasons, which in the
progress of society gain a controlling force, the old law, though still good as an abstract principle, and
good in its application to some circumstances, must cease to apply as a controlling principle to the new
circumstances."

The same thought is expressed in People v. Randolph, 2 Park.Cr.R. 174, 177:

"Its rules [the rules of the common law] are modified upon its own principles, and not in violation of
them. Those rules being founded in reason, one of its oldest maxims is that, where the reason of the rule
ceases, the rule also ceases."

It was in virtue of this maxim of the common law that the Supreme Court of Nevada, in Reno Smelting Works v.
Stevenson, 20 Nev. 269, 21 P. 317, in a well reasoned opinion, held that the common law doctrine of riparian
rights was unsuited to conditions prevailing in the arid land states and territories of the West, and therefore was
without force in Nevada, and that, in respect of the use of water, the applicable rule was based upon the doctrine
of prior appropriation for a beneficial use.

In Illinois, it was held at an early day that the rule of the common law which required an owner of cattle to keep
them upon his own land was not in force in that state, notwithstanding its adoption of the common law of
England, being unsuited to conditions there in view of the extensive areas of land which had been left open and
unfenced and devoted to grazing purposes. Seeley v. Peters, 5 Gilman 130.

Numerous additional state decisions to the same effect might be cited, but it seems unnecessary to pursue the
matter at greater length.

It results from the foregoing that the decision of the court below, in holding the wife incompetent, is erroneous.
But that decision was based primarily upon Hendrix v. United States and Jin Fuey Moy v. United States, supra,
and, in fairness to the lower court, it should be said that its decision was fully supported by those cases.

In the Hendrix case, the opinion does not discuss the point; it simply recites the assignment of error to the effect
that the wife of Hendrix had not been allowed to testify in his behalf, and dismisses the matter by the laconic
statement, "The ruling was not error." In the Jin Fuey Moy case, it was conceded at the bar that the wife was not
a competent witness for all purposes, but it was contended that her testimony was admissible in that instance
because she was offered not in behalf of her husband -- that is, not to prove his innocence -- but simply to
contradict the testimony of government witnesses who had testified to certain matters as having transpired in her
presence. The court held the distinction to be without substance, as clearly it was, and thereupon disposed of the
question by saying that the rule which excludes a wife from testifying for her husband is based upon her interest
in the event, and applies without regard to the kind of testimony she might give. The point does not seem to have
been considered by the lower court to which the writ of error was addressed (253 F. 213), nor, as plainly appears,
was the real point as it is here involved presented in this Court. The matter was disposed of as one "hardly
requiring mention." Evidently the point most in the mind of the court was the distinction relied upon, and not the
basic rule which was not contested. Both the Hendrix and Jin Fuey Moy cases are out of harmony with the Rosen
and Benson cases and with the views which we have here expressed. In respect of the question here under
review, both are now overruled.

Judgment reversed.

MR. JUSTICE CARDOZO concurs in the result.

MR. JUSTICE McREYNOLDS and MR. JUSTICE BUTLER are of opinion that the judgment of the court below is right
and should be affirmed.
24. Garcia vs. Court of Appeals, 258 SCRA 446, G.R. No. 119845 July 5, 1996
Doctrines:
Commercial Law; Trust Receipts; A trust receipt is a security agreement to which a bank acquires a
“security interest” in the goods.—A trust receipt therefore is a security agreement, pursuant to which a bank
acquires a “security interest” in the goods. “It secures an indebtedness and there can be no such thing as security
interest that secures no obligation . . .” . . . as elucidated in Samo vs. People [footnote deleted] “a trust receipt is
considered as a security transaction intended to aid in financing importers and retail dealers who do not have
sufficient funds or resources to finance the importation or purchase of merchandise, and who may not be able to
acquire credit except through utilization, as collateral, of the merchandise imported or purchased.”

Same; Same; By virtue of the trust receipt agreement the bank theoretically acquired ownership of
the imported personal property.—Thus, by virtue of the trust receipt agreement, SBTC should proceed against
the trust receipt because the bank, through said trust receipt agreement theoretically acquired ownership of the
imported personal property.

Civil Law; Contracts; Statutory Construction; Ambiguous contracts are construed against the party
who caused the ambiguity.—The phrase “such other obligations” in the Indemnity Agreement is vague,
equivocal, and patently ambiguous. It raises doubt as to its real meaning. It is, therefore, subject to
interpretation. If the parties intended the 1982 SWAP loan to apply to and cover the 1980 EXPORT loan
transaction, SBTC should have clearly and categorically stated so in the said Indemnity Agreement. Respondent
bank failed in this regard. It is a well-stated legal principle that if there is any doubt on the terms and conditions
of the surety agreement, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the surety (Philippine National Bank vs. Court of
Appeals, 198 SCRA 767 [1991]). Ambiguous contracts are construed against the party who caused the ambiguity.

Same; Same; It is a basic principle in law that contracts can only bind the parties who had entered
into it and it cannot favor or prejudice a third person.—Finally, it should be noted that the chattel mortgage
was entered into by Dynetics and SBTC. Garcia was not a party to the chattel mortgage nor was he aware of the
contract or its provisions. It is a basic principle in law that contracts can only bind the parties who had entered
into it, and it cannot favor or prejudice a third person (Oreano vs. Court of Appeals, 211 SCRA 40 [1992]). Only
those who are parties to contracts are liable for their breach. Parties to a contract cannot thereby impose any
liability on one who, under its terms, is a stranger to the contract. And considering that it is Dynetics which
executed the chattel mortgage, the liability for the deficiency therefor, must be adjudged against Dynetics alone.
Facts:
This has reference to a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 12, 1994, in CA-G.R. No.
38329 entitled, "Security Bank and Trust Co. plaintiff-appellant vs. Dynetics, Inc., defendant-appellant and Antonio M. Garcia, defendant-
appellee", modifying the trial court's judgment dated March 9, 1992, in that said decision of the Court of Appeals held herein petitioner
Antonio M. Garcia jointly and severally liable with then defendant-appellant Dynetics, Inc. to plaintiff-appellant Security Bank and Trust
Co. for the unpaid obligation under the Export Loan Line in the amount of P24,743,935.35 and a Swap Loan Facility in the deficiency
balance of P3,596,758.72, both of which amounts appear to have now ballooned to P2 billion due to interests, penalties, and attorney's
fees (pp. 27-28, CA Decision; 175-176, Rollo). Dynetics, Inc. is not a petitioner herein and accepts its liability. The only issue is whether
petitioner Garcia is jointly and severally liable with Dynetics, Inc. for such loans.

The relevant facts of the case are as follows:

On November 19, 1980, respondent Security Bank and Trust Co. (SBTC) granted Dynetics, Inc. a
short-term EXPORT loan line in the amount of P25 million pursuant to an Advisory Letter-
Agreement (Exh. A, A-1). The loan was secured by a deed of assignment with pledge on export
letters of credit and/or purchase orders equivalent to 100% of their face value. The said credit
line was subsequently renewed on various dates and in various amounts, the last renewal having
been made on January 24, 1985 in the increased amount of P26 million evidenced by the Renewal
Credit Line Agreement (Exh. B).

Pursuant to said Renewal Credit Line Agreement, Dynetics availed itself of the export loan for the
period of February to May 1985 in the total amount of P25,074,906.16, executing and signing for
said purpose 34 promissory notes of various dates covering the aforementioned period (Exhs. C to
JJ), and trust receipts (pp. 7-8, CA Decision; pp. 155-156, Rollo).

Prior to this 1985 availment, particularly on April 20, 1982, Dynetics obtained another credit
accommodation or SWAP loan from SBTC in the amount of $700,000.00. To secure payment
thereof, petitioner Antonio Garcia, with Vicente B. Chuidian, executed an Indemnity Agreement in
favor of SBTC on April 26, 1982 (Exh. NN).

It appears that Dynetics did not avail itself of this SWAP loan. Subsequently, however, in 1983,
the SWAP loan facility was renewed in the reduced amount of $500,000.00 and it was this loan
which Dynetics availed of in 1985 and concerning which it issued a promissory note (Exh. PP).
The SWAP loan was renewed in 1984, this time on a quarterly basis, the last quarterly renewal
having been made on April 22, 1985. By this time, SBTC required Dynetics to execute a
continuing suretyship undertaking (Exh. OO, OO-1) in accordance with, and in pursuance of,
which petitioner Garcia bound himself jointly and severally with Dynetics to pay all the latter's
obligations with respondent SBTC. Subsequent thereto, however, and without the consent and
knowledge of Garcia, SBTC required Dynetics to execute a chattel mortgage over various pieces of
machinery to secure the SWAP loan (Exh. LL).

Dynetics failed to pay the SWAP loan upon its maturity on July 22, 1985, prompting SBTC to
foreclose on the chattel mortgage. The mortgaged chattels were sold at public auction on
September 15, 1985 to SBTC as highest bidder for the amount of P6,850,861.30. This amount
was applied as partial payment of the SWAP loan, leaving a deficiency balance of P3,596,758.72.

Dynetics also defaulted in the payment of the EXPORT loan which amounted to over P464 million,
exclusive of attorney's fees and costs, as of June 30, 1989 (Exh. KK).

In view of Dynetics' failure to settle its account with SBTC relative to the EXPORT loan and the
deficiency balance of the SWAP loan, despite repeated demands, a complaint was filed in court by
SBTC against Dynetics, petitioner Garcia, and his co-surety Vicente Chuidian for recovery of a sum
of money.

Dynetics, in its answer, contended that the promissory notes had no consideration; that the
names of the executive officers of SBTC were stamped on the blank promissory notes; and that
the chattel mortgage was not registered, hence it was converted into a pledge, thus barring
recovery of the deficiency balance of the obligation after foreclosure, as the principal obligation
was extinguished.

Petitioner Garcia, for his part, asserted that no prior or written demand was made by SBTC or its
counsel upon any of the defendants prior to the filing of the case in court; that the loans had long
been paid and extinguished; and that the chattel mortgage discarded the Indemnity Agreement
and the Continuing Suretyship.

After trial, Branch 58 of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region stationed
in Makati, rendered its judgment on March 9, 1992, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of

plaintiff and against defendant Dynetics Incorporated which is hereby ordered:
 1) to pay plaintiff the principal sum of P24,743,935.35 as consequence of and in
connection with the promissory notes (Exhs. C to JJ), plus accrued interests
thereon, compounded quarterly effective from their respective maturity dates until
fully paid, and monthly penalty charges of five percent (5%) of the total
outstanding obligation and accrued interests due and unpaid;

2) to pay plaintiff the sum of P3,596,758.72 (or its dollar equivalent of

US$187,550.97) as deficiency balance on the chattel mortgage (Exh. LL); and,

3) to pay plaintiff attorney's fees equivalent to twenty percent (20%) of the

aforestated entire amounts due and outstanding, litigation expenses of
P250,000.00, plus the costs of suit.

The case against defendant Antonio M. Garcia is hereby DISMISSED, together with
said defendant's counterclaim for damages. Plaintiff is however ordered to pay
defendant Garcia the amount of P100,000.00 as attorney's fees. Furthermore, the
writ of preliminary attachment dated September 8, 1989 insofar only as affecting
defendant Garcia's properties is hereby quashed, dissolved and/or lifted.

(p. 11, RTC Decision; p. 193, Rollo.)

SBTC, as well as defendant Dynetics, appealed to the Court of Appeals.

On August 12, 1994, the Court of Appeals rendered its now assailed decision modifying that of the
trial court by holding Garcia solidarily liable with Dynetics to SBTC for the unpaid balance under
the EXPORT loan and the deficiency balance on the SWAP loan, together with interests, attorney's
fees, litigation expenses, and costs. Disposed thus respondent court:

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the judgment of the court a quo is

hereby MODIFIED and defendant-appellant Dynetics and defendant-appellee
Antonio Garcia are hereby ordered to pay jointly and severally unto plaintiff-
appellee SBTC the following:

1) P24,743,935.35 representing the unpaid principal obligation under the

promissory notes sued upon, plus accrued interests, compounded quarterly
reckoned from the respective maturity dates of the promissory notes until fully
paid, and monthly penalty charges of 5% of the total outstanding obligation;

2) P3,596,758.72 representing deficiency balance on the chattel mortgage with

legal interest from 1 September 1989 (date of filing of complaint); and

3) attorney's fees equivalent to 20% of the amounts due and outstanding, and
litigation expenses of P100,000.00, plus costs.

The award of attorney's fees in favor of appellee Antonio Garcia is eliminated and
the writ of attachment issued by the court a quo over the shares of stock owned
by appellee Antonio Garcia in Chemphil is hereby declared to be valid and
 subsisting until full satisfaction of the aforementioned amounts.

(pp. 27-28, CA Decision; pp. 175-176, Rollo.)

A motion for reconsideration was seasonably filed by Garcia, but the same was denied by
respondent court on April 7, 1995.
Issue/s:
Hence, the instant petition filed on August 4, 1995, wherein Garcia assigns the following alleged
errors:

The Court of Appeals erred in holding Garcia liable as surety for the export loans
granted by SBTC to Dynetics because the suretyship he assumed was intended
only for another loan, the SWAP LOAN facility,

II

The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the chattel mortgage executed by
Dynetics on 26 April 1985 to secure the promissory note it issued upon availment
of the SWAP LOAN facility ($500,000.00) did not replace and extinguish the 1983
suretyship undertaking of Garcia for the same obligation.

III

On the assumption that the SBTC claim against Garcia as surety is partly or wholly
valid, the Court of Appeals erred in awarding so exorbitant amounts of damages,
that is P1,747,359,429.30 as penalty charges (5% monthly of total outstanding
obligation or 60% per year on the export loan, excluding those on the swap loan)
and P408,652,357.42 as attorney's fees (20% of the amounts due and
outstanding) on top of P267,558,663.80 as interest earning on the principal
obligation of only P24,743,935.35 as export loan and P3,596,758.72 as SWAP
LOAN.

Ruling:
Involved in the case at bar are two loans — an EXPORT loan and a SWAP loan obtained by
Dynetics from SBTC, with Garcia as surety in the SWAP loan. The controversy arose when
Dynetics failed to pay said loans, giving rise to the issue of whether or not petitioner Garcia as
surety is liable jointly and solidarily with Dynetics to SBTC for the unpaid obligations of Dynetics
under both the EXPORT loan and the SWAP loan, together with the interests, penalty charges,
attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs, by virtue of the Indemnity Agreement (Exh. NN)
and the Continuing Suretyship (Exh. OO, OO-1). In other words, does the liability of Garcia as
surety in the SWAP loan cover or extend to the EXPORT loan?

It is the stand of Garcia that he is not liable as surety to SBTC for the EXPORT loan because the
Indemnity Agreement and Continuing Suretyship he executed covered only the SWAP loan, which,
however, were later replaced and extinguished by the chattel mortgage executed by Dynetics in
favor of SBTC.

On the other hand, SBTC contends that Garcia is liable for both the EXPORT loan and SWAP loan
transactions by virtue of the comprehensive provisions of the Indemnity Agreement (Exh. NN) and
the Continuing Suretyship (Exh. OO, OO-1) he signed and executed jointly and severally with
Dynetics in favor of SBTC.

After a painstaking study of the records before us, we find for petitioner Garcia. We hold that he
is not liable for the EXPORT loan. Stated differently, Garcia's liability as surety for the SWAP loan
under the Indemnity Agreement and the Continuing Surety, if any at all, does not extend to the
EXPORT loan.

In holding Garcia liable for both the EXPORT loan and the SWAP loan, respondent Court of
Appeals relied heavily on the provisions of the Indemnity Agreement dated April 26, 1982
executed by Garcia together with Dynetics (Exh. NN) that:

. . . Antonio Garcia . . . hereby bind(s) himself/themselves jointly and severally

with the CLIENT in favor of the BANK for the payment, upon demand and without
benefit of excusion, of whatever amount or amounts the CLIENT may be indebted
to the BANK under and by virtue of aforesaid credit accommodation(s) including
the substitutions, renewals, extensions, increases, amendments, conversions and
revivals of the aforesaid credit accommodation(s), as well as of the amount or
amounts of such other obligations that the CLIENT may owe the BANK, whether
direct or indirect, principal or secondary, as appears in the accounts, books, and
records of the BANK, plus interest and expenses arising from any agreement or
agreements that may have heretofore been made or hereafter executed by and
between the parties. . . .

(p. 349, Rollo).

At first glance, from the words "as well as of the amount or amounts of such other
obligations, . . . that the client may owe the BANK", it would appear that SBTC was also referring
to the obligation of Dynetics under the EXPORT loan. But the above quoted phrase, to our mind,
and contrary to the claim of SBTC, did not impose on Garcia the obligation to pay the EXPORT
loan in addition to the SWAP loan. Particular attention must be paid to the statement appearing
on the face of the Indemnity Agreement (Exh. NN) "evidenced by those certain loan documents
dated April 20, 1982" (Exh. 1-B, Garcia). From this statement, it is clear that the Indemnity
Agreement refers only to the loan document of April 20, 1982 which is the SWAP loan. It did not
include the EXPORT loan. Hence, petitioner cannot be held answerable for the EXPORT loan.

The Indemnity Agreement specifically secured the $700,000.00 SWAP loan which was not availed
of. The Continuing Suretyship, on the other hand, specifically secured the reduced $500,000.00
SWAP loan. The Indemnity Agreement is not involved in the reduced SWAP loan. There was no
reason for SBTC to require the execution of the Continuing Suretyship if its intention were to have
the earlier Indemnity Agreement secure the SWAP loan in both the original and in the reduced
amounts. It may be added that the execution of this Continuing Suretyship for the reduced
amount of the SWAP loan confirms our conclusion that SBTC's "present and hereafter obligation"
clauses are not binding on Garcia, and that a particular collateral secures only such obligation
identified in the document evidencing the security.

Other important considerations negate respondent court's finding that petitioner's liability as
surety under the SWAP loan extends or covers the EXPORT loan.

Reviewing once more the record, it may be noticed that the EXPORT loan was secured by:

1. A Deed of Assignment with pledge on the export LC's and PO's equivalent to 100% of their face
value, (Par. 3, Letter-Agreement, Exh. A, pp. 242-243, Rollo), by virtue of which the right of the
assignor is transferred to the assignee, who would then be allowed to proceed against the debtor.
This assignment had the effect similar to that of a sale (Wyco Sales Corp. vs. BA Finance Corp.,
200 SCRA 637 [1991]).

2. Trust Receipts (Pars. 2 & 3, Exh. B, Renewal Credit Line, p. 246, Rollo) which is a separate and
independent security transaction intended to aid in financing importers whereby the imported
goods are held as security by the lending institution for the loan obligation.

In this regard, Justice Melencio-Herrera's statements in Vintola vs. Insular Bank of Asia and
America (150 SCRA 578 [1987]), later re-echoed in Nacu vs. Court of Appeals  (231 SCRA 237
[1994]), are instructional, to wit:

. . . A letter of credit-trust receipt arrangement is endowed with its own distinctive

features and characteristics. Under that set-up a bank extends a loan covered by
the letter of credit, with the trust receipt as a security for the loan. In other words,
the transaction involves a loan feature represented by the letter of credit and a
security feature which is the covering trust receipt.

xxx xxx xxx

A trust receipt therefore is a security agreement, pursuant to which

a bank acquires a "security interest" in the goods. "It secures an indebtedness and
there can be no such thing as security interest that secures no obligation . . ."

. . . as elucidated in Samo vs.  People [footnote deleted] "a trust receipt is

considered as a security transaction intended to aid in financing importers and
retail dealers who do not have sufficient funds or resources to finance the
importation or purchase of merchandise, and who may not be able to acquire
credit except through utilization, as collateral, of the merchandise imported or
purchased

(at pp. 583-584.)

Thus, by virtue of the trust receipt agreement, SBTC should proceed against the trust receipt
because the bank, through said trust receipt agreement theoretically acquired ownership of the
imported personal property (Nacu vs. Court of Appeals, supra.).

3. Thirty-four Promissory notes — (Exh. C to JJ, pp. 245-346, Rollo) signed by Dynetics' Vice-
President for Treasury and Finance, making the latter liable on its due date for the amount stated.

4. Hold-Out Arrangement Proviso (Par. 6, Exh. B) providing for the right of SBTC to apply even
without notice to the debtor, in payment of and all obligations of Dynetics, whatever funds or
property of Dynetics which may be under the control or possession of SBTC on deposit or
otherwise.

5. Deposit Balances — to be maintained subject to hold-out, authorizing SBTC to apply all deposit
funds of Dynetics in payment of its unpaid obligations.

Prescinding from the foregoing, it is obvious that the EXPORT loan was more than fully secured.
SBTC can proceed against these securities in payment of said loan.

The EXPORT loan transaction and SWAP loan transaction are totally alien to each other.
Noteworthy is the fact that the EXPORT loan, its renewal of credit line containing the trust
receipts and hold-out provisos were extended to Dynetics and the only participation of Garcia was
to sign in his capacity as President of Dynetics. The promissory notes were signed by the Vice-
President for Treasury and Finance Luvina Maglaya for Dynetics. On the other hand, the SWAP
loan was applied for and extended to Dynetics as principal, with Garcia as surety under the
Indemnity Agreement. While Garcia is a party in both transactions, he acted in different
capacities.

Clearly, the two loan transactions involved two sets of parties. The Indemnity Agreement signed
by Garcia is a distinct contract and can not in anyway be related to the EXPORT loan.

Even if we momentarily disregard the foregoing circumstances, and confine ourselves to the
provisions of the Indemnity Agreement, still the conclusion can not be escaped that the same
does not cover the EXPORT loan. To say otherwise would be to make the provision too
comprehensive and all-encompassing as to amount to absurdity.

The phrase "such other obligations" in the Indemnity Agreement is vague, equivocal, and patently
ambiguous. It raises doubt as to its real meaning. It is, therefore, subject to interpretation. If the
parties intended the 1982 SWAP loan to apply to and cover the 1980 EXPORT loan transaction,
SBTC should have clearly and categorically stated so in the said Indemnity Agreement.
Respondent bank failed in this regard.

It is a well-stated legal principle that if there is any doubt on the terms and conditions of the
surety agreement, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the surety (Philippine National Bank
vs. Court of Appeals 198 SCRA 767 [1991]). Ambiguous contracts are construed against the party
who caused the ambiguity (De Leon vs. Court of Appeals 186 SCRA 345 [1990]).

An additional point to consider is that the Indemnity Agreement is set out in a printed contract
form of SBTC. Its provisions appear to be the standard stipulations imposed by SBTC upon all
persons seeking to secure surety bonds. To this extent, the Indemnity Agreement is a contract of
adhesion, having been prepared by respondent SBTC. Consequently, any ambiguity is to be
taken contra proferentum, that is, construed against the party who caused the ambiguity which
could have avoided it by the exercise of a little more care (Orient Air Services and Hotel
Representatives vs. Court of Appeals, 197 SCRA 645 [1991]; Nacu vs. Court of Appeals, 231 SCRA
237 [1994]; De Leon vs. Court of Appeals, 186 SCRA 345 [1990]; Equitable Banking Corporation
vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 161 SCRA 518 [1988]; Eastern Assurance and Surety Corp. vs.
IAC, 179 SCRA 562 [1989]). To be more emphatic, any ambiguity in a contract whose terms are
susceptible of different interpretations must be read against the party who drafted it (Orient Air
Service and Hotel Representatives vs. Court of Appeals, supra.; Cadalin vs POEA's Administrator,
238 SCRA 721 [1994]).

The foregoing pronouncements are, of course, based on Article 1377 of the Civil Code which
provides:

Art. 1377. The interpretation of obscure words or stipulations in a contract shall

not favor the party who caused the obscurity.

On the matter of petitioner's liability for the deficiency balance under the SWAP LOAN, it is of
course correct to say that the chattel mortgage executed between Dynetics and SBTC was merely
for additional security which did not alter, affect, or modify the terms and conditions of the
Indemnity Agreement executed between Garcia and SBTC, even if, it must be admitted, the
chattel mortgage was entered into without the knowledge of or notice to Garcia. Hence, Garcia,
contrary to his submission, was not released as surety by virtue of execution of the
aforementioned chattel mortgage.

Nonetheless, under the prevailing facts of the case, we believe that Garcia still cannot be held
liable for the deficiency of P3,596,758.72, the reason being that SBTC expressly and judicially
waived the Indemnity Agreement (Exh. NN) and the Continuing Surety (Exh. OO) through no less
than Atty. Bello, counsel for SBTC, during the cross-examination by petitioner's lawyer of one of
SBTC's witnesses, thusly:

ATTY. GANGOSO:

But, I'm not asking what the counsel is after. I'm trying to show
that the Swap Agreement is not covered by a Continuing
Agreement of Mr. Garcia, because, the Swap Loan Agreement is . .
.

ATTY. BELLO:

But we are willing to admit, Your Honor.

ATTY. GANGOSO:

There was a statement, that the Continuing Agreement did not

cover the Swap Agreement.

ATTY. BELLO:

I'm admitting that as far as the Swap Loan is concerned, this was
secured; the chattel mortgage only secured the swap loan.
 ATTY. GANGOSO:

Considering then, for that matter that I will stop asking Mrs.
Marquez between the relations of the Swap Loan Agreement, and
the Continuing Suretyship.

ATTY. BELLO III:

I was saying that the chattel mortgage more or less, secures the
swap loan.

(tsn. May 10, 1991 p. 36-37)

In fine, insofar as the SWAP loan was concerned, SBTC did away with the Indemnity Agreement
and the Continuing Surety, opting instead to rely solely on the chattel mortgage. The aforequoted
declarations of Atty. Bello in the course of the trial are conclusive. Such admission is binding and
no amount of contradictory evidence can offset it.

. . . Judicial admissions verbal or written made by the parties in the pleadings or in

the course of the trial or other proceedings in the same case are conclusive, no
evidence being required to prove the same and cannot be contradicted unless
shown to have been made through palpable mistake or that no such admission
was made. (Philippine American General Insurance Co. Inc. vs. Sweet Lines Inc.,
212 SCRA 194; 204 [1992]).

We cannot allow SBTC at this time to water down the admission it made in open court, more so
after the opposing party relied upon such judicial admission and accordingly dispensed with
further proof of the fact already admitted. An admission made by a party in the course of the
proceedings does not require proof. The record here does not show any attempt on the part of
SBTC to contradict such judicial admission on the ground of palpable mistake.

Finally, it should be noted that the chattel mortgage was entered into by Dynetics and SBTC.
Garcia was not a party to the chattel mortgage nor was he aware of the contract or its provisions.
It is a basic principle in law that contracts can only bind the parties who had entered into it, and it
cannot favor or prejudice a third person (Oreano vs. Court of Appeals, 211 SCRA 40 [1992]). Only
those who are parties to contracts are liable for their breach. Parties to a contract cannot thereby
impose any liability on one who, under its terms, is a stranger to the contract. And considering
that it is Dynetics which executed the chattel mortgage, the liability for the deficiency therefor,
must be adjudged against Dynetics alone.

With the conclusions thus reached, we find it unnecessary to discuss the issue concerning the
reasonableness of the damages awarded, the penalty charges, and attorney's fees the Court of
Appeals ordered Garcia to pay SBTC.

WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Court of Appeals dated August 12, 1994 in its CA-G.R.
CV No. 38329 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as it held petitioner Antonio M. Garcia
jointly and severally liable with Dynetics, Inc. to SBTC, and a new decision is hereby entered
DISMISSING the complaint against petitioner Antonio M. Garcia.

SO ORDERED.
25. Gonzales-Saldana vs. Niamatali, 886 SCRA 479, G.R. No. 226587 November 21, 2018
Doctrines:
Remedial Law; Evidence; Judicial Admissions; A judicial admission is an admission, verbal or written,
made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, which dispenses with the need
for proof with respect to the matter or fact admitted.—A judicial admission is an admission, verbal or
written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, which dispenses with the need for
proof with respect to the matter or fact admitted. It may be contradicted only by showing that it was made
through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. A party who judicially admits a fact cannot later
challenge [the] fact as judicial admissions are a waiver of proof; production of evidence is dispensed with. A
judicial admission also removes an admitted fact from the field of controversy. Consequently, an admission made
in the pleadings cannot be controverted by the party making such admission and is conclusive as to such party,
and all proofs to the contrary or inconsistent therewith should be ignored, whether objection is interposed by the
party or not. The allegations, statements or admissions contained in a pleading are conclusive as against the
pleader. A party cannot subsequently take a position contrary to or inconsistent with what was pleaded.

Civil Law; Agency; Words and Phrases; By the contract of agency, a person binds himself to render
some service or to do something in representation or on behalf of another, with the consent or
authority of the latter.—By the contract of agency, a person binds himself to render some service or to do
something in representation or on behalf of another, with the consent or authority of the latter. Agency may be
express, or implied from the acts of the principal, from his silence or lack of action, or his failure to repudiate the
agency, knowing that another person is acting on his behalf without authority. Acceptance by the agent may also
be express, or implied from his acts which carry out the agency, or from his silence or inaction according to the
circumstances. A contract of agency may be inferred from all the dealings between petitioner and respondent-
spouses. The question of whether an agency has been created is ordinarily a question which may be established in
the same way as any other fact, either by direct or circumstantial evidence. The question is ultimately one of
intention. In this case, respondent-spouses communicated with petitioner as regards the purchase of the Las Piñas
property and they remitted Three Million Pesos (P3,000,000.00) to petitioner’s account for such purpose. For her
part, petitioner made inquiries with the DOLE Sheriff’s Office and even talked to the judgment creditor for the
purchase of the said property. Also, she received Three Million Pesos (P3,000,000.00) from respondent-spouses to
finalize the transaction. Thus, it is beyond dispute that an implied agency existed between petitioner and
respondent-spouses for the purpose of purchasing the Las Piñas property.

Same; Damages; Interest; Compensatory Interest; As a form of damages, compensatory interest is

due only if the obligor is proven to have failed to comply with his obligation. In this case, petitioner’s
principal obligation was to purchase the Las Piñas property for respondent-spouses.— As a form of
damages, compensatory interest is due only if the obligor is proven to have failed to comply with his obligation. In
this case, petitioner’s principal obligation was to purchase the Las Piñas property for respondent-spouses.
Consequently, when she was informed that the auction sale of the Las Piñas property would have to be cancelled,
petitioner should have simply returned the Three Million Pesos (P3,000,000.00) to respondent-spouses instead of
purchasing the Manila and Parañaque properties without the latter’s knowledge and consent. Moreover, she insists
that she would return such amount only after she successfully sells the Manila and Parañaque properties. Contrary
to petitioner’s argument, however, the obligation to return the amount is not dependent upon the sale of the
Manila and Parañaque properties. The obligation to return the money is a consequence of her failure to comply
with her principal obligation, the breach thereof entitles respondent-spouses to the payment of interest at the rate
of 6% per annum, which, as pronounced in Eastern Shipping Lines and subsequently reiterated in Nacar v. Gallery
Frames, 703 SCRA 439 (2013), is the rate of interest applicable in transactions involving the payment of
indemnities in the concept of damages arising from the breach or a delay in the performance of obligations in
general. The payment of interest should be reckoned from the date of filing of the Complaint or on March 6, 2006.
Facts:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari are the March 31, 2016 Decision1 and August
10, 2016 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 05172, which reversed
and set aside the March 11, 2014 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court, Kalibo, Aklan, Branch
6 (RTC) in Civil Case No. 7720, a case for recovery of sum of money.

The Antecedents

Sometime in January 2002, respondent-spouses Gordon and Amy Niamatali (respondent-

spouses), then residing in the United States of America, made known to petitioner Donabelle
Gonzales-Saldana (petitioner) their intention to acquire real properties in Metro Manila.
Petitioner, who was then working in the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE),
informed them that a certain parcel of land located in Las Piñas City would be sold in a public
auction conducted by the DOLE Sheriff's Office. 4

Thereafter, respondent-spouses asked petitioner to participate in the public auction on their

behalf. Consequently, on January 30, 2002, they remitted US$60,000.00 or P3,000,000.00 to
petitioner's bank account for the purchase of the Las Piñas property. In March 2002,
however, respondent spouses received from petitioner photocopies of Transfer Certificates of
Title (TCT) Nos. 105904 and 223102 covering properties located in Manila and Parañaque
contrary to their agreement that petitioner would purchase the Las Piñas property. Petitioner
explained to them that the auction sale of the Las Piñas property did not push through
because of a third-party claim, but the judgment creditor agreed to sell to her the Parañaque
and Manila properties which were also levied on execution. Upon their return to the
Philippines in July 2002, petitioner brought respondent-spouses to the Las Piñas property but
it was locked up and a signboard was posted, on which the words "Future Home of Lutheran
School and Community Center" were written. Thus, respondent-spouses informed petitioner
that they were no longer interested in acquiring the Las Piñas property and asked for the
return of the P3,000,000.00, to which petitioner acceded. She even sent to respondent-
spouses a letter wherein she acknowledged receipt of the P3,000,000.00 and promised to
return said amount on or before September 14, 2002.5

In her Answer, petitioner averred that the public bidding of the Las Piñas property was
cancelled because of a third-party claim. The DOLE Sheriff's Office, however, informed her
that other properties of the losing party would be put up in a public auction. Thus, petitioner
asked respondentspouses whether they were interested in buying the properties located in
Manila and Parañaque, but the latter did not respond. In good faith, and thinking that it
would be beneficial for respondent-spouses, petitioner requested her friend, Alninia L. Austria
(Austria), to participate in the bidding of the Manila and Parañaque properties. In both
auctions, Austria was declared the winning bidder. In July 2002, however, respondent-
spouses told petitioner that they were no longer interested in buying the Las Piñas property.
She then told them that she would return their money but she had to sell first the Manila and
Parañaque properties.6

Despite several demands from respondent-spouses, petitioner failed to return the

P3,000,000.00. Thus, on March 6, 2006, respondent-spouses filed a case for collection of
sum of money, moral damages and attorney's fees against petitioner. 7

The RTC Ruling

In a Decision dated March 11, 2014, the RTC ruled that respondent spouses' documentary
evidence, with the exception of the printouts of the e-mail correspondence between the
parties, failed to comply with the Best Evidence Rule. It declared that the uncertified
photocopies of the bank transfer, showing the remittance of P3,000,000.00 to petitioner's
account, were inadmissible as respondent-spouses failed to prove the loss of the original
thereof It noted that respondent Amy even testified that she could have secured the original
copy from her bank, but she neglected to do so. As regards the acknowledgment receipt or
promissory note allegedly executed by petitioner, the trial court adjudged that it was also
inadmissible because it was a private document executed without the intervention of a notary
public and no witness was presented to prove that petitioner signed the document.
The fallo reads:
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, for failure of plaintiffs to present preponderance of

evidence to support the allegations in the Complaint, the instant case is ordered DISMISSED.
The counterclaim is likewise dismissed.8
Aggrieved, respondent-spouses filed an appeal before the CA.

The CA Ruling

In a Decision, dated March 31, 2016, the CA held that respondent spouses need not prove
the fact that they sent money to petitioner because the latter's admission that the amount of
P3,000,000.00 was transmitted to her, having been made in her Answer, could be treated as
a judicial admission. It pronounced that petitioner's admission was sufficient to prove that
she received money from the respondent-spouses even without the documents presented by
the latter. The appellate court added that petitioner was legally bound to return the
P3,000,000.00 which she received from respondent-spouses considering that the purchase of
the Las Piñas property did not materialize. It disposed the case in this wise:
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 6 of
Kalibo, Aklan in Civil Case No. 7720 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new one is entered
ordering defendant-appellee Donabelle Gonzales-Saldana to pay plaintiffs-appellants the
amount of three million pesos (PhP 3,000,000.00) with interest at six percent (6%) per
annum from default until the finality of this Decision. From finality until full satisfaction, the
total amount due shall likewise earn interest at six percent (6%) per annum until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.9

Issue/s:
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied by the CA on August 10,
2016. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari wherein petitioner raises the following
assignment of errors:
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONSIDERING THAT

RESPONDENTS HAD ESTABLISHED THEIR CASE BY PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE BASED
ON INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE;

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPLYING THE RULES
ON JUDICIAL ADMISSION;

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ADMITTING THE ISSUE
OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT WHICH WAS RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL;

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPLYING THE

PRINCIPLE OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT; [and]

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT

INTEREST WAS DUE TO RESPONDENTS.10
Ruling:
Simply put, the issues to be resolved are 1) Whether the statements in petitioner's Answer
could be considered judicial admissions; 2) Whether petitioner should return the
P3,000,000.00 she received from respondent spouses for the purchase of the Las Piñas
property; and 3) Whether petitioner is liable for the payment of interest on the amount due.

Petitioner argues that the allegations in her Answer are not admissions, but are actually
defenses to show that the complaint states no cause of action; that the alleged admission,
with respect to her receipt of P3,000,000.00 from respondent-spouses, was taken out of
context because it actually pertains to the fact that the money remitted was intended for the
borrowed money from respondent-spouses; that the obligation to return the money is
demandable only upon sale of the Manila and Parañaque properties, thus, the principle of
unjust enrichment was not applicable; and that no interest was due because she did not
enter into a contract of loan with respondent-spouses and there was no agreement for the
payment of interest.11

In their Comment,12 respondent-spouses counter that petitioner should return the amount of

P3,000,000.00 considering that since 2002, she has not informed them of the status of the
property in Las Piñas; that a complaint for recovery of money is proper even if the contract
between the parties is not a contract of loan; and that legal interest must be imposed on the
amount due from petitioner because she already incurred in delay.

In her Reply,13 petitioner contends that she no longer informed respondent-spouses of the

status of the Las Piñas property because the latter had already abandoned their claim thereto
and opted for the return of their money; and that the award of interest is not proper because
the transaction between the parties is not a contract of loan and payment of monetary
interest is allowed only if there was an express stipulation for the payment of interest and the
agreement for the payment of interest was reduced in writing.

The Court's Ruling

The petition lacks merit.

Statements in the Answer constitute judicial admissions which bind petitioner.

A judicial admission is an admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the
proceedings in the same case, which dispenses with the need for proof with respect to the
matter or fact admitted. It may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through
palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. 14

A party who judicially admits a fact cannot later challenge [the] fact as judicial admissions are
a waiver of proof; production of evidence is dispensed with. A judicial admission also removes
an admitted fact from the field of controversy. Consequently, an admission made in the
pleadings cannot be controverted by the party making such admission and is cannot be
controverted by the party making such admission and is conclusive as to such party, and all
proofs to the contrary or inconsistent therewith should be ignored, whether objection is
interposed by the party or not. The allegations, statements or admissions contained in a
pleading are conclusive as against the pleader. A party cannot subsequently take a position
contrary to or inconsistent with what was pleaded. 15

Petitioner argues that the allegations in her Answer are not admissions, but are actually
defenses to show that the complaint states no cause of action; and that the alleged
admission, with respect to her receipt of the P3,000,000.00 from respondent-spouses, was
taken out of context because in that narration, she actually denied persuading respondent-
spouses to remit money for the purchase of the Las Piñas property.

A perusal, however, of petitioner's Answer leads to the conclusion that her arguments are
just a futile attempt to sow confusion in an otherwise indisputable case. In her Answer,
petitioner made the following statements:
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

x x x x

4. Defendant denies the allegations contained in items 4, 5, 6, and 7, [of the] complaint, that
defendant proposed and convinced the plaintiffs, the truth of the matter being that:
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

x x x x

f. Plaintiff knew what they were venturing into, the defendant fully explaining to them the
procedures. On their own accord, the plaintiffs sent money via bank-to-bank
transaction, contrary to their claim that plaintiffs caused to debit and remit the
amount of US$60,000.00 to defendant's account only upon the instruction of the
[defendant]. It cannot be overemphasized that the defendant is junior to the plaintiffs and
that she has no power to direct order on what to do with their money. x x x

x x x x

20. The complaint states no cause of action.

a. x x x Plaintiffs may have sent money to defendant but not in the form of loan.
The money was sent to invest in properties, primarily Las Piñas City. The money
sent was used to purchase properties for the plaintiffs, however, it happened that the
plaintiffs were not satisfied with the purchase, as such, as an afterthought, plaintiffs wanted
to get back the money from defendant. (Emphases supplied) 16
From the foregoing, it is incontrovertible that petitioner does not even deny that she received
P3,000,000.00 from respondent-spouses. What she simply denies is the allegation that it was
because of her insistence that respondent-spouses remitted money to her account. Petitioner,
however, fails to realize that whether or not she persuaded respondent-spouses to purchase
the Las Piñas property is beside the point. To resolve the controversy between the parties,
the issue simply boils down to whether petitioner received P3,000,000.00 from respondent-
spouses and as can be gleaned from her Answer, petitioner admitted such fact. She failed to
prove that the admission was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was
made. Her arguments, therefore, are mere desperate attempts to escape liability.

There is an implied agency between petitioner and respondent-spouses.

By the contract of agency, a person binds himself to render some service or to do something
in representation or on behalf of another, with the consent or authority of the latter. 17 Agency
may be express, or implied from the acts of the principal, from his silence or lack of action, or
his failure to repudiate the agency, knowing that another person is acting on his behalf
without authority.18 Acceptance by the agent may also be express, or implied from his acts
which carry out the agency, or from his silence or inaction according to the circumstances. 19

A contract of agency may be inferred from all the dealings between petitioner and
respondent-spouses. The question of whether an agency has been created is ordinarily a
question which may be established in the same way as any other fact, either by direct or
circumstantial evidence. The question is ultimately one of intention. 20 In this case,
respondent-spouses communicated with petitioner as regards the purchase of the Las Piñas
property and they remitted P3,000,000.00 to petitioner's account for such purpose. For her
part, petitioner made inquiries with the DOLE Sheriff's Office and even talked to the judgment
creditor for the purchase of the said property. Also, she received P3,000,000.00 from
respondent-spouses to finalize the transaction. Thus, it is beyond dispute that an implied
agency existed between petitioner and respondent-spouses for the purpose of purchasing the
Las Piñas property.

Petitioner, however, acted beyond the scope of her authority. It is worthy to note that it was
petitioner who introduced to respondent-spouses the idea of participating in the auction sale
of the Las Piñas property.21 When the parties came to an agreement as to the purchase of
the said property, petitioner was then unaware of other properties which were going to be
sold on auction. As a result, the parties never agreed on a substitute property to be
purchased in case the bidding of the Las Piñas property failed to materialize. As it happened,
the Las Piñas property could not be auctioned on account of a third-party claim. Thus, when
petitioner was informed that certain properties in Manila and Parañaque were to be auctioned
for the same judgment creditor, she proceeded to participate in the bidding and decided not
to wait for respondent-spouses' approval.22 It was only after the sale that petitioner informed
respondent-spouses that she already settled for the Manila and Parañaque properties, worth
more than P3,000,000.00 in valuation.23 Thus, even though petitioner may have been
motivated by good intentions and by a sincere belief that the purchase of the Manila and
Parañaque properties would benefit respondent-spouses, it cannot be gainsaid that she acted
outside the scope of the authority given to her, i.e., to purchase the Las Piñas property.
Hence, petitioner's failure to fulfill her obligation entitles respondent-spouses to the return of
the P3,000,000.00 which they remitted to her account.

Petitioner is liable for the payment of compensatory interest.

The kinds of interest that may be imposed in a judgment are the monetary interest and the
compensatory interest. In this regard, the Court has expounded in Siga-an v. Villanueva:24

Interest is a compensation fixed by the parties for the use or forbearance of money. This is
referred to as monetary interest. Interest may also be imposed by law or by courts as penalty
or indemnity for damages. This is called compensatory interest. The right to interest arises
only by virtue of a contract or by virtue of damages for delay or failure to pay the principal
loan on which interest is demanded.
Article 1956 of the Civil Code, which refers to monetary interest, specifically mandates that
no interest shall be due unless it has been expressly stipulated in writing. As can be gleaned
from the foregoing provision, payment of monetary interest is allowed only if: (1) there was
an express stipulation for the payment of interest; and (2) the agreement for the payment of
interest was reduced in writing. The concurrence of the two conditions is required for the
payment of monetary interest. Thus, we have held that collection of interest without any
stipulation therefor in writing is prohibited by law.

xxxx

There are instances in which an interest may be imposed even in the absence of express
stipulation, verbal or written, regarding payment of interest. Article 2209 of the Civil Code
states that if the obligation consists in the payment of a sum of money, and the debtor incurs
delay, a legal interest of 12% per annum may be imposed as indemnity for damages if no
stipulation on the payment of interest was agreed upon. Likewise, Article 2212 of the Civil
Code provides that interest due shall earn legal interest from the time it is judicially
demanded, although the obligation may be silent on this point.

All the same, the interest under these two instances may be imposed only as a penalty or
damages for breach of contractual obligations. It cannot be charged as a compensation for
the use or forbearance of money. In other words, the two instances apply only to
compensatory interest and not to monetary interest.
Clearly and contrary to petitioner's assertion, the interest imposed by the CA is not monetary
interest because aside from the fact that there is no use or forbearance of money involved in
this case, the subject interest was not one which was agreed upon by the parties in writing.
Further, the appellate court, after citing Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals,25 wherein the Court synthesized the rules on the award of interest, imposed an
interest of 6% per annum which finds application in transactions involving the payment of
indemnities in the concept of damages arising from breach or a delay in the performance of
obligations in general. Hence, there can be no other conclusion than that the interest
imposed by the appellate court is in the nature of compensatory interest.

As a form of damages, compensatory interest is due only if the obligor is proven to have
failed to comply with his obligation. 26 In this case, petitioner's principal obligation was to
purchase the Las Piñas property for respondent-spouses. Consequently, when she was
informed that the auction sale of the Las Piñas property would have to be cancelled,
petitioner should have simply returned the P3,000,000.00 to respondent-spouses instead of
purchasing the Manila and Parañaque properties without the latter's knowledge and consent.
Moreover, she insists that she would return such amount only after she successfully sells the
Manila and Parañaque properties. Contrary to petitioner's argument, however, the obligation
to return the amount is not dependent upon the sale of the Manila and Parañaque properties.
The obligation to return the money is a consequence of her failure to comply with her
principal obligation, the breach thereof entitles respondent-spouses to the payment of
interest at the rate of 6% per annum, which, as pronounced in Eastern Shipping Lines and
subsequently reiterated in Nacar v. Gallery Frames,27 is the rate of interest applicable in
transactions involving the payment of indemnities in the concept of damages arising from the
breach or a delay in the performance of obligations in general. 28 The payment of interest
should be reckoned from the date of filing of the Complaint or on March 6, 2006. 29

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The March 31, 2016 Decision and August 10, 2016
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 05172 are AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION in that the amount of P3,000,000.00 shall earn interest at the rate of 6%
per annum from the date of filing of the Complaint on March 6, 2006 until the Decision
becomes final and executory.

An interest of 6% per annum shall be further imposed on the amount from the finality of the
Decision until its satisfaction.

SO ORDERED.
26. Servicewide Specialists, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 257 SCRA 643, G.R. No. 117728 June 26, 1996
Doctrines:
Actions; Appeals; An appellate court is clothed with ample authority to review rulings even if they
are not assigned as errors in the appeal, and this is especially so if the court finds that their
consideration is necessary in arriving at a just decision of the case before it.—An appellate court is
clothed with ample authority to review rulings even if they are not assigned as errors in the appeal. This is
especially so if the court finds that their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just decision of the case before
it. We have consistently held that an unassigned error closely related to an error properly assigned or upon which
a determination of the question raised by the error properly assigned is dependent, will be considered by the
appellate court notwithstanding the failure to assign it as an error.

Same; Same; Dismissal of Actions; A dismissal or discontinuance of an action operates to annul

orders, rulings or judgments previously made in the case, as well as all proceedings had in
connection therewith and renders all pleadings ineffective.—A dismissal or discontinuance of an action
operates to annul orders, rulings or judgments previously made in the case. It also annuls all proceedings had in
connection therewith and renders all pleadings ineffective. A dismissal or nonsuit leaves the situation as though no
suit had ever been brought. Further proceedings in the action are arrested and what has been done therein is also
annulled, so that the action is as if it had never been. It carries down with it previous proceedings and orders in
the action, and all pleadings of both parties, and all issues with respect to the plaintiff’s claim.

Same; Same; Pleadings and Practice; Evidence not formally offered before the trial court cannot be
considered on appeal, for to consider them at this stage will deny the other parties their right to
rebut them.—The records do not show that petitioner adopted the “Answer to Third Party Complaint” and the
“Answer to Complaint in Intervention” filed by Binan Motors and Garcia, and the testimony of Bartina as part of its
evidence in the trial court. It cannot rely on them on appeal for evidence not formally offered before the trial court
cannot be considered. To consider them at this stage will deny the other parties their right to rebut them.

Same; Compromise Agreements; The compromise settlement of a claim or a cause of action is not an
admission that the claim is valid, but merely admits that there is a dispute, and that an amount is
paid to be rid of the controversy, nor is a compromise with one person an admission of any liability
to someone else.—We also hold that the compromise between Bartina and Garcia and Binan Motors cannot be
taken as an admission of Garcia’s liability. In civil cases, an offer of compromise is not an admission of any
liability. With more reason, a compromise agreement should not be treated as an admission of liability on the part
of the parties vis-a-vis a third person. The compromise settlement of a claim or cause of action is not an
admission that the claim is valid, but merely admits that there is a dispute, and that an amount is paid to be rid of
the controversy, nor is a compromise with one person an admission of any liability to someone else. The policy of
the law should be, and is, to encourage compromises. When they are made, the rights of third parties are not in
any way affected thereby.
Facts:
Petitioner Servicewide Specialists, Inc. seeks a review of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 20921 1 modifying the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch LIV, Manila in Civil Case No. 81-604. 2

The records show that on December 15, 1981, petitioner Servicewide Specialists, Inc.
(Servicewide) filed a complaint for replevin and/or sum of money with damages before the then
Court of First Instance Manila, Branch V against private respondents Eduardo and Felisa Tolosa
(Tolosa spouses) and one John Doe.   Servicewide alleged that on January 15, 1981, the Tolosa
3

spouses purchased from Amante Motor Works one (1) Isuzu passenger-type jeepney with Motor
No. C240-317331 and Serial No. CMCI-81063-C for the sum of P48,432.00 to be paid in 24
monthly installments;   that the spouses executed a promissory note and drew a deed of chattel
4

mortgage over the vehicle in favor of Amante Motor Works; that on the same day, Amante Motor
Works, with notice to the Tolosas, assigned the promissory note and chattel mortgage to Filinvest
Finance and Leasing Corporation; that Filinvest Finance and Leasing Corporation also assigned its
rights and interest in said promissory note and chattel mortgage to Filinvest Credit Corporation;
that Servicewide later acquired the rights and interests of Filinvest Credit Corporation over said
note and mortgage; that the Tolosa spouses failed to pay the installments due on the purchase
price despite several demands. In its prayer, Servicewide demanded from the spouses and John
Doe, the person in possession of the vehicle,
the return of the vehicle or the payment of the balance of P34,224.78 and damages.  5

On January 13, 1982, the trial court issued an order for the seizure of the vehicle subject of the
complaint.  6

The Tolosa spouses filed their Answer on March 22,1982. They claimed that they purchased one
jeepney unit from Binan Motor Sales Corporation (Binan Motors), not Amante Motor Works; that
in January 1981, they ordered another unit from the same corporation through the proddings of
its President and General Manager, Eduardo Garcia; that Garcia informed the spouses that the
additional unit shall be "house financed" by Binan Motors; that Eduardo Tolosa noticed that the
vendor indicated in the deed of sale was not Binan Motors but Amante Motor Works; that Garcia
explained to Tolosa that he (Garcia) was to make full payment on the jeepney to Amante Motor
Works and that he (Tolosa) was to pay Garcia the monthly installments thereon; that Tolosa
never received any notice from Binan Motors about the jeepney unit he ordered; that on
December 17, 1981, Tolosa received a receipt from Filinvest Finance and Leasing Corporation
about payment he allegedly made on a jeepney unit he purchased from Amante Motor Works;
that Garcia informed him he was in possession of the jeepney and said that he made the initial
payment on the vehicle and that he himself would pay its monthly amortization; that Garcia
prepared and executed a "Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage" where it appears that
Tolosa sold and transferred to Garcia the said jeepney. 
7

On June 10, 1982, Servicewide amended its complaint by adding Eduardo Garcia as the defendant
in place of John Doe. Servicewide alleged that the Tolosa spouses, without Servicewide's
knowledge and consent, executed and delivered to Eduardo Garcia a "Deed of Sale with
Assumption of Mortgage" over the jeepney sought to be recovered.  8

On June 16, 1982, the trial court admitted the amended complaint and ordered the issuance of
summons on Garcia as additional defendant.

On October 28, 1982, the Tolosa spouses filed an "Amended Answer with Third-Party Complaint"
impleading as third-party defendants Binan Motors and Eduardo Garcia. The trial court ordered
service of summons on the third-party defendants.

On January 18, 1983, the sheriff seized the subject vehicle from the possession of one Lourdes
Bartina.   Three days later, Bartina filed a "Third-Party Claim" and "Urgent Motion for Release"
9

alleging ownership of the jeepney. She claimed that she purchased the vehicle from Binan Motors
and regularly paid its subsequent installments to the Commercial Credit Corporation of Las
Pinas. 
10

On February 21, 1983, the trial court released the vehicle to Bartina on an indemnity bond of
P34,000.00. The court found that the documents supporting Bartina's ownership of the jeepney
were in due form and executed prior to the documents of the Tolosa spouses.

On March 2, 1983, Binan Motors and Eduardo Garcia filed their "Answer to Third-Party Complaint"
claiming that the third-party plaintiffs (Tolosa spouses) had no cause of action against them as it
was Amante Motor Works that invoiced the vehicle; that the Tolosa spouses purchased a jeepney
unit from them but their check for downpayment bounced; that they initiated a complaint for
violation of the Bouncing Checks Law against Eduardo Tolosa for which an information was filed
on December 2, 1982; that if the Tolosa spouses were prejudiced it was because of their
unreasonable neglect to make good their initial payment on the vehicle.   A reply was filed by the
11

Tolosa spouses.

Despite the court's order of February 21, 1983, the subject jeepney was not released to Bartina.
Thus, on June 14, 1984, Bartina filed her "Complaint in Intervention."   Third-party defendants
12

Garcia and Binan Motors filed their "Answer to Complaint in Intervention." They claimed that they
acquired the subject vehicle from the Tolosas "in consideration of the value of one Celeste
jeepney in the amount of P56,000.00" but that the Tolosas failed to pay the downpayment on the
vehicle; that they came to court with clean hands and that they are actually the victims of the
Tolosas.   Servicewide manifested that it was adopting its complaint in the principal case as its
13

comment or answer to the complaint-in-intervention.  14

At the pretrial conference of November 7, 1984, the trial court noted that summons and copy of
the amended complaint had not been served on Eduardo Garcia as additional defendant. It
deferred the pretrial until such service shall have been effected. 
15

On January 10, 1985, the trial court ordered Servicewide to turn over possession of the subject
jeepney to Bartina upon filing of the increased bond of P55,000.0. Pretrial was again scheduled on
February 27, 1985 but for one reason or another, was postponed several times until October 7,
1985.

On October 7, 1985, all parties, through their respective counsels, appeared except the Tolosas
and their counsel. The trial court declared the Tolosas as in default with respect to the principal
complaint and scheduled the reception of evidence for Servicewide. The Tolosas were likewise
declared nonsuited with respect to their third-party complaint against Binan Motors and Garcia.
With regard to the complaint-in-intervention, the trial court scheduled a pretrial conference, thus:

When this case was called for pretrial, Atty. Ocaya, for plaintiff, Atty. Alfred
Juntilla for Intervenor-Tolosas (sic)   and Atty. Manuel Ramirez for third-party
16

defendants appeared. However, defendants Eduardo and Felisa Tolosa failed to

appear notwithstanding due notice. For failure on the part of defendants to appear
notwithstanding due notice, upon motion of the plaintiff, defendants are hereby
declared as in default and let the reception of evidence insofar as said defendants
are concerned be reset on November 7, 1985 at 8:30 a.m.

Due to the absence of the defendant third-party plaintiff notwithstanding due

notice, upon motion of the third-party defendant, the third party complaint in so
far as the third-party defendant is concerned is hereby dismissed and likewise,
said defendant being third-party plaintiff is declared nonsuited without special
pronouncement as to costs.

In so far as the intervention is concerned which is directed against the Plaintiff

and considering that there is an on-going possibility of settlement between the
Intervenor and the Plaintiff, the pre-trial in so far as the Intervenor and Plaintiff
are concerned is hereby cancelled and reset on November 7, 1985 at 8:30 a.m.

Atty. Ocaya, Atty. A. Juntilla and Atty. Manuel Ramirez are notified of this order in
open Court and let a copy of this order be furnished defendants Tolosas.
 SO ORDERED.

Manila, October 7, 1985.

(SGD
.)
ERN
EST
O S.
TEN
GO
(Pairi
ng
Judg
e)  7
1

At the hearing of February 4, 1986 for reception of Servicewide's evidence, the Tolosas again
failed to appear despite due notice. Servicewide presented its legal accounts analyst, Ms.
Nannette Navea, who testified on the outstanding obligation of the Tolosas and Garcia.   It also
18

presented several documents consisting of the promissory note, deed of chattel mortgage, the
deed of assignment of the Tolosas' credit by Filinvest Finance and Leasing Corporation, and the
notice and demand letter to the Tolosas.   Servicewide then submitted the case for decision.
19

Pretrial for the complaint-in-intervention originally scheduled on November 7, 1985 was

postponed several times until March 1, 1988. The Tolosas were notified but again failed to appear
on said date. For the second time, the trial court declared them to have waived their right to
present evidence as against the complaint and dismissed with prejudice their third-party
complaint against Garcia and Binan Motors. The court also declared them as in default with
respect to the complaint-in-intervention of Bartina and scheduled the reception of Bartina's
evidence accordingly. The order reads as follows:

ORDER

Considering that counsel for the intervenor arrived in Court although late and pre-
trial proceedings were had as between the intervenor and the plaintiff; considering
the non-appearance of the defendants Eduardo and Felisa Tolosa, the said two
defendants are deemed to have waived their right to present evidence as against
the Complaint and also they are deemed to be as in default with respect to the
Complaint-in-Intervention of Lourdes Bartina; the Third-Party Complaint against
Eduardo Garcia is dismissed with prejudice and with costs against the said
defendants; this case is set for trial for the reception of intervenor's evidence on
April 27, 1988 and May 5, 1988 at 9:00 o'clock in the morning.

Notify Eduardo and Felisa Tolosa at their respective addresses it appearing that
their counsel has already withdrawn his appearance.

SO ORDERED.
 Given in open Court, March 1, 1988.

(SGD
.)
MAN
UEL
T.
MUR
O
Judg
e 20

On April 27, 1988, at the hearing for reception of evidence on Bartina's complaint-in-intervention,
the Tolosas again did not appear despite due notice. Intervenor Bartina testified that the vehicle
subject of the complaint was sold to her by Binan Motors owned by Eduardo Garcia and that the
vehicle was in her possession when it was seized by the sheriff and thereafter turned over to
Servicewide.   Bartina thereafter identified and offered various documents proving her ownership
21

of the subject vehicle.  22

On May 23, 1988, Bartina and the defendants-in-intervention Eduardo Garcia and Binan Motors,
with the assistance of their respective counsels, moved to dismiss the complaint-in-intervention.
They alleged that they had "arrived at an amicable settlement of their claims."   The court 23

granted the motion on May 24, 1988.  24

On August 3, 1988, a decision was rendered by the trial court. It ruled in favor of Servicewide
granting it the right to either foreclose the mortgage on the subject vehicle or to demand from
defendants, jointly and severally, payment of P34,224.78 plus interest and damages. The court
held:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in the alternative, for the plaintiff to

either foreclose the mortgage on the motor vehicle subject matter of this case
which is in its possession or to have the defendants jointly and severally pay
plaintiff the sum of P34,224.78, plus interest at 24% per annum from December
3, 1981 until fully paid, and in either case, for said defendants to pay plaintiff also
jointly and severally the sum of P18,385.68 as attorney's fees, liquidated
damages, bonding fees and other expenses incurred as well as the costs of the
suit. 
25

Defendant Eduardo Garcia moved for reconsideration and clarification of the decision on the
ground that he was not one of the defendants in the principal case. He claimed that the court did
not acquire jurisdiction over his person because he was never served nor did he receive summons
on the amended complaint naming him as an additional defendant.

In an order dated September 9, 1988, the trial court denied the motion for reconsideration. It
however amended the dispositive portion of the decision to include Eduardo Garcia as one of the
defendants liable to Servicewide, to wit:
 Re "Motion for Reconsideration and Clarification" dated August 20, 1988:

1. The dispositive portion of the Decision controls over the narration of facts and
discussion, hence all defendants are liable as per such dispositive portion;

2. The tenth line on page 2 of the Decision is hereby corrected to include Eduardo
Garcia, the omission of his name being thru inadvertence.  26

Eduardo Garcia appealed to the Court of Appeals.  7 In a decision dated October 27, 1994, the
2

appellate court found that no summons on the amended complaint had been served on Garcia;
however, since Garcia filed several pleadings as a third-party defendant in the trial court, he was
deemed to have submitted himself to its jurisdiction. Nonetheless, it found no sufficient evidence
to hold Garcia solidarily liable with the Tolosa spouses on the principal complaint. The Court of
Appeals therefore modified the trial court's decision and relieved Garcia from liability.

Hence this petition.

Issue/s:
Before us, petitioner submits that:

1. IT IS A SERIOUS ERROR FOR THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS

TO DWELL ON QUESTIONS NOT RAISED AS AN ERROR ON APPEAL BY THE
APPELLANT;

2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS PALPABLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT

THERE IS NO EVIDENCE ADDUCED TO HOLD EDUARDO GARCIA LIABLE IN THIS
CASE;

3. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS PALPABLY ERRED IN DISREGARDING

THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY INTERVENOR LOURDES BARTINA IN DECIDING THE
INSTANT CASE.

Ruling:
It is petitioner's claim that in releasing Eduardo Garcia from liability, the appellate court decided
an issue that was never raised by Garcia himself. On appeal, Garcia only contended that the trial
court erred "in finding him one of the defendants referred to in the dispositive portion of the
decision" because he was not a defendant in the principal complaint, jurisdiction not having been
acquired over him.   According to petitioner, the appellate court should have confined itself to the
29

sole issue of jurisdiction over Garcia's person and should not have determined his liability. 30

We reject petitioner's submission.

An appellate court is clothed with ample authority to review rulings even if they are not assigned
as errors in the appeal. This is especially so if the court finds that their consideration is necessary
in arriving at a just decision of the case before it. We have consistently held that an unassigned
error closely related to an error properly assigned or upon which a determination of the question
raised by the error properly assigned is dependent, will be considered by the appellate court
notwithstanding the failure to assign it as an error.  31

In ruling on the liability of Garcia, the respondent appellate court can hardly be said to have
treated an issue unrelated to those litigated before the trial court. On the basis of the records, the
appellate court found that Eduardo Garcia had submitted himself voluntarily to the jurisdiction of
the trial court. To avoid dispensing piecemeal justice, it proceeded to determine whether Garcia
was indeed liable on the obligation. The procedure followed by respondent court is in accord with
the desideratum that calls for a complete adjudication of a case to speed up the dispensation of
justice.

We come now to the main issue of whether there is sufficient evidence on record to hold Garcia,
together with the Tolosa spouses, solidarily liable to petitioner for the return of the subject motor
vehicle or payment of its equivalent value in money.

Petitioner insists that there is enough evidence to prove Garcia's liability, viz.: (1) the pleadings
filed by Garcia and Binan Motors, specifically, the "Answer" to the complaint and the "Answer to
Complaint in Intervention" where Garcia admitted selling the mortgaged vehicle to the Tolosas
which also show that he sold the same vehicle to Bartina during the effectivity of the mortgage;
(2) the testimony of Lourdes Bartina where she declared that the same mortgaged vehicle was
indeed sold to her by Garcia and Binan Motors; (3) Garcia's subsequent compromise with Bartina
which proves his liability for the obligation.

We do not agree.

Garcia and Binan Motors did not file an "Answer" to the complaint. The records of the case do not
show that both or either of them were served any summons on the amended complaint. This is
precisely why Garcia raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction. Garcia and Binan Motors however filed
an "Answer to Third Party Complaint" and "Answer to Complaint in Intervention."

It must be stressed that the third-party complaint filed by the Tolosas was dismissed twice by the
trial court -- first at the pretrial of October 7, 1985 for the principal complaint and second at the
pretrial of March 1, 1988 for the complaint-in-intervention. The second dismissal was with
prejudice. The complaint-in-intervention was, upon motion of the parties-in-intervention, also
dismissed by the trial court on May 24, 1988.

A dismissal or discontinuance of an action operates to annul orders, rulings or judgments

previously made in the case.   It also annuls all proceedings had in connection therewith and
32

renders all pleadings ineffective.   A dismissal or nonsuit leaves the situation as though no suit
33

had ever been brought. Further proceedings in the action are arrested and what has been done
therein is also annulled, so that the action is as if it had never been.   It carries down with it
34

previous proceedings and orders in the action, and all pleadings of both parties, and all issues
with respect to the plaintiff's claim.  35

The records do not show that petitioner adopted the "Answer to Third Party Complaint" and the
"Answer to Complaint in Intervention" filed by Binan Motors and Garcia, and the testimony of
Bartina as part of its evidence in the trial court. It cannot rely on them on appeal for evidence not
formally offered before the trial court cannot be considered.   To consider them at this stage will
36
deny the other parties their right to rebut them.

Assuming arguendo that the said pleadings of Garcia and Binan Motors and the evidence of
Bartina can be considered in favor of petitioner, still, they do not sufficiently prove Garcia's liability
on the matter.

For one, the motor vehicle described in the "Answer to Third-Party Complaint" has different motor
and serial numbers from the vehicle subject of the complaint. The subject vehicle is a galvanized
silver jeepney with Motor No. C240-317331 and Serial No. CMCI-81063-C while the vehicle in said
pleading is a red stainless jeepney with Motor No. C-221-443144 and Serial No. CMCI-81795-
C.   7 What Garcia and Binan Motors admittedly sold to the Tolosas was not the subject vehicle.
3

In the "Answer to the Complaint in Intervention," Garcia and Binan Motors admitted that they
acquired from the Tolosas the "vehicle subject of the complaint in consideration of one Celeste
jeepney valued at P56,000.00." The vehicle subject of the complaint was the one found in the
possession of Bartira. Under the two pleadings, however, what Garcia and Binan Motors sold to
the Tolosa spouses was a different vehicle from the one they acquired from said spouses and
which they allegedly sold to Bartina. A double sale of the same jeepney could not arise because
there appears to be two different jeepneys in the pleadings.

Even in the "Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage" where the Tolosa spouses allegedly sold
to Garcia the jeepney subject of the complaint, the vehicle described therein had different motor
and chassis numbers. The deed reveals that what the Tolosas sold to Garcia was a red jeepney
with Motor No. C240-328332 and Chassis No. CMCI-82062-C.  38

The documentary evidence of Bartina merely shows that the jeepney subject of the complaint was
indeed sold to her by Binan Motors represented by Juliet Garcia, Eduardo Garcia's daughter.
There is nothing to show that Eduardo Garcia sold to Bartina the vehicle that he previously sold to
the Tolosas.

We also hold that the compromise between Bartina and Garcia and Binan Motors cannot be taken
as an admission of Garcia's liability. In civil cases, an offer of compromise is not an admission of
any liability.   With more reason, a compromise agreement should not be treated as an admission
39

of liability on the part of the parties vis-a-vis a third person. The compromise settlement of a
claim or cause of action is not an admission that the claim is valid, but merely admits that there is
a dispute, and that an amount is paid to be rid of the controversy,   nor is a compromise with one
40

person an admission of any liability to someone else.   The policy of the law should be, and is, to
41

encourage compromises.   When they are made, the rights of third parties are not in any way
42

affected thereby.  43

On the whole, petitioner's evidence consists of the promissory note, the deed of chattel mortgage
and the deed of assignment and the notice and demand letter. The promissory note in favor of
Amante Motor Works was signed by the Tolosa spouses.   This same promissory note provides
44

that any payment thereon shall be made "to the order of Filinvest Finance and Leasing
Corporation."   Both spouses also signed as mortgagors the deed of chattel mortgage of the said
45

jeepney in favor of Amante Motor Works. Amante Motor Works assigned in the same deed all its
rights over the chattel mortgage to Filinvest Finance and Leasing Corporation.   Filinvest Finance
46

and Leasing Corporation likewise assigned its rights and interest over the promissory note and
deed of chattel mortgage to Filinvest Credit Corporation which in turn assigned it to
petitioner.   7 The Tolosa spouses defaulted on the obligation and refused to pay the installments
4

due despite notice to them. By no stretch of logic can they prove Garcia's solidary liability.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is denied and the Decision dated October 27, 1994 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 20921 is affirmed.

SO ORDERED.
27. People vs. Paule, 261 SCRA 649, G.R. Nos. 118168–70 September 11, 1996
Doctrines:
Constitutional Law; Custodial Investigations; Right to Counsel; The purpose of providing counsel to
a person under custodial investigation is to curb the uncivilized practice of extracting confession by
coercion.—The purpose of providing counsel to a person under custodial investigation is to curb the uncivilized
practice of extracting confession by coercion. Any form of coercion, whether physical, mental or emotional, in
extracting confession, stamps the confession with the taint of inadmissibility. We have stressed that in giving a
person under custodial investigation the right to counsel, the Constitution did not mean any kind of counsel but
effective and vigilant counsel.

Same; Same; Same; A police officer who only overheard snatches of conversation between counsel
and the accused is not in a position to give relevant and reliable information on whether said
counsel provided the accused effective and vigilant counsel in the course of the custodial
investigation of the accused.—It cannot be gainsaid that Lt. Esteban was not in a position to give relevant and
reliable information on whether Atty. Dela Cruz provided appellant effective and vigilant counsel in the course of
appellant’s custodial investigation. He only overheard snatches of conversation between Atty. Dela Cruz and
appellant. He admitted he was "... going out of my office for personal necessity” in the course of appellant’s
custodial interrogation. Thus, the records do not show whether Atty. Dela Cruz effectively counselled appellant
during the crucial aspects of his custodial interrogation. During these times, Atty. Dela Cruz could have been out
of sight and out of hearing distance.

Same; Same; Same; Burden of Proof; Where the prosecution fails to discharge the state’s burden of
proving with clear and convincing evidence that the accused enjoyed effective and vigilant counsel
before he extrajudicially admitted his guilt, the extrajudicial confession cannot be given any
probative value.—Given the circumstances of the case, Atty. Dela Cruz was the best witness to establish the
critical fact that he gave effective and vigilant counsel to the appellant. Unfortunately, the prosecution did not
present him for reasons difficult to divine. By this lapse, the prosecution failed to discharge the state’s burden of
proving with clear and convincing evidence that appellant enjoyed effective and vigilant counsel before he
extrajudicially admitted his guilt to the police authorities. Consequently, the extrajudicial confession of appellant
cannot be given any probative value.

Criminal Law; Murder; Evidence; Witnesses; Motive; Where no ill-motive could be attributed to the
witness for imputing a grave offense against the accused, his identification of the latter should be
given full faith and credit.—The probability that Manalo misidentified appellant is remote. The crime was
committed in broad daylight and Manalo was barely four (4) arms length away from appellant during the shooting
incident. Manalo was able to narrate the minute details on how appellant and his companions trailed the victim
and properly positioned themselves before gunning him down. The records show that no ill-motive could be
attributed to Manalo for imputing such a grave offense against appellant. His identification of appellant should be
given full faith and credit.

Same; Same; Same; Same; A truth-telling witness is not always expected to give an error-free
testimony, considering the lapse of time and the treachery of human memory—honest
inconsistencies on minor and trivial matters serve to strengthen, rather than destroy, the credibility of
witnesses, especially of witnesses to crimes shocking to conscience and numbing to senses.—These
inconsistencies cannot destroy the totality of Manalo’s testimony. A truth-telling witness is not always expected to
give an error-free testimony, considering the lapse of time and the treachery of human memory. Thus, we have
followed the rule in accord with human nature and experience that honest inconsistencies on minor and trivial
matters serve to strengthen, rather than destroy, the credibility of a witness, especially of witnesses to crimes
shocking to conscience and numbing to senses.

Same; Same; Same; Paraffin Tests; Scientific experts concur in the view that the paraffin test has
proved extremely unreliable in use.—Appellant cannot unduly capitalize on the paraffin test showing that he
was negative for nitrates. In the case of People vs. Teehankee, Jr., we held:”. . . Scientific experts concur in the
view that the paraffin test has '. . . proved extremely unreliable in use. The only thing that it can deliberately
establish is the presence or absence of nitrates or nitrites on the hand. It cannot be established from this test
alone that the source of the nitrates or nitrites was the discharge of a firearm. The person may have handled one
or more of a number of substances which give the same positive reaction for nitrates or nitrites, such as
explosives, fireworks, fertilizers, pharmaceuticals, and leguminous plants such as peas, beans and alfalfa. A person
who uses tobacco may also have nitrate or nitrite deposit on his hands since these substances are present in the
products of combustion of tobacco.’ In numerous rulings, we have also recognized several factors which may bring
about the absence of gunpowder nitrates on the hands of a gunman, viz: when the assailant washes his hands
after firing the gun, wears gloves at the time of the shooting, or if the direction of a strong wind is against the
gunman at the time of firing.”

Same; Same; Same; Same; Lack of nitrates on a suspect’s hands does not preclude a judgment of
conviction where the overwhelming evidence proves his guilt.—In People vs. Realon, we further held that
lack of nitrates on a suspect’s hands does not preclude a judgment of conviction where the overwhelming
evidence proves his guilt.

Same; Same; Same; Witnesses; No prejudicial inference can arise against a party who fails to call a
witness where the only object of presenting him would be to produce corroborative or cumulative
evidence.—Appellant also bewails the non-presentation of the witness who pointed to the appellant on board a
Bataan bound vehicle. The omission did not, however, materially dent the strength of the prosecution’s evidence.
His testimony would only be corroborative of the testimony of the arresting officers. No prejudicial inference can
arise against a party who fails to call a witness where the only object of presenting him would be to produce
corroborative or cumulative evidence.

Same; Same; Same; Same; No unfavorable inference can accrue against the prosecution where the
records show that it used the coercive process of subpoena to secure the presence of a witness at
the trial but said witness could not be found.—Also, no unfavorable inference can accrue against the
prosecution where the records show that it used the coercive process of subpoena to secure the presence of a
witness at the trial, but said witness could not be found. In this case, prosecution witness Rodolfo Susi was
ordered to appear in court but the subpoena was returned unsatisfied because he was no longer residing at his
given address.

Same; Same; Aggravating Circumstances; Treachery; There is treachery where the unarmed victim
was suddenly shot from behind and on his head, thus, rendering him totally defenseless against his
aggressors.—We now come to the correct categorization of the crime at bar. The prosecution successfully
proved that the crime was committed with treachery. There is treachery when, at the time of the attack, the
unsuspecting victim was not in a position to defend himself and the offenders consciously adopted the particular
means, method and form of attack employed by them. In this case, the unarmed victim was suddenly shot from
behind and on his head, thus, rendering him totally defenseless against his aggressors. Treachery qualified the
crime to murder. Considering the presence of treachery, appellant’s prison sentence is reclusion perpetua.
Facts:
Appellant REYNALDO PAULE Y DONATO was convicted of the crime of MURDER  by the Regional 1

Trial Court of Olongapo City (Branch 74), for the death of one Carlos Tubongbanua. 2

The information  against appellant, a certain alias "Glenn", and Conrado Matawaran, Jr., alias "Jun
3

Matawaran", reads;

That on or about the eighteenth (18th) day of October, 1990, in the City of
Olongapo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
abovenamed accused, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping
one another, armed with a gun, with intent to kill and with the qualifying
circumstance of treachery and the aggravating circumstance of evident
premeditation and that the crime was committed in consideration of a price,
reward, or promise, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously
assault, attack and shot therewith one Carlos Tubongbanua suffered Cardio
Respiratory Arrest, Cerebral Concussion and Hemorrhage due to Multiple Gunshot
Wounds which caused the death of said Carlos Tubongbanua, shortly thereafter,
to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the latter.
 CONTRARY TO LAW.

Upon his arraignment on May 14, 1990; appellant pleaded not guilty  and underwent trial. His co-
4

accused have remained at large.

The prosecution evidence reveals that at about 10 a.m. of October 18, 1990, Amos Manalo was
with a lady friend in the vicinity of the public market along Brill Street, Bajac-Bajac, Olongapo
City. Carlos Tabangbanua passed by and Manalo made a sales pitch to him saying: " Mamimili ka
na naman." Tubongbanua did not respond and walked by. Manalo noticed three (3) men following
Tubongbanua, one of whom was accused Reynaldo Paule. The three (3) men exchanged signals
with each other. They separately positioned themselves a few meters away from Tubongbanua
after the latter stopped in front of a store. One of them nodded at Paule who was about three (3)
or four (4) meters behind Tubongbanua. Paule then drew a .38 caliber revolver and fired at
Tubongbanua. The bullet hit the back of Tubongbanua's head. As Tubongbanua turned holding
his nape, Paule shot him a second time near the right temple of his head. Tubongbanua slumped
on the ground. Paule approached him, held his wrist and took his gold necklace. The dastardly
deed done, Paule ran towards the nearby tricycle parking lot while his companions fled towards
the 23rd Street.5

The Olongapo City police, led by Lieutenant Leonardo Esteban, repaired to the locus criminis a
few minutes after the shooting. They found the victim sprawled on the ground, blood oozing from
his left eye.  They gathered that the assailant wore a black gray checkered polo shirt and headed
6

towards the station of buses bound for Bataan. The group of Lt. Miguel Corpuz immediately
established a check point at the Los Viajeros Canteen, located along the national highway, to
watch vehicles leaving the Olongapo City proper. Another team of policemen checked on the
Bataan-bound buses at the Victory Liner and Saulog Transit terminals in Olongapo.

Between 11:00 a.m. and 11:30 a.m., of the same day, the police spotted a passenger jeepney at
the check point near the Los Viajeros Canteen. Among the three (3) male passengers in the
jeepney was Paule who was wearing a light cream yellow T-shirt. A witness  identified Paule as
7

the assailant of Tubongbanua.  Lt. Corpuz frisked Paule and found a fragmentation hand grenade
8

in his possession. Paule was arrested and brought to Olongapo City Police Station A for
investigation.

Paule was again bodily searched at the police station. The police recovered a gold necklace with
rectangular pendant hidden in the folded lower portion of Paule's maong pants.  Paule broke
9

down and admitted his complicity in the crime. He disclosed that he did his black gray checkered
polo shirt and the murder weapon in a house rented by his uncle at No. 63-A Elicano Street, East
Bajac-Bajac. The police fetched Paule's uncle from the market and they proceeded to his
residence. They found there a .38 caliber revolver, with serial number 1096046, two (2) empty
shells of the .38 caliber revolver, nine (9) live ammunitions, and Paule's black gray checkered polo
shirt.  The items were hidden between the beddings and the mat of a wooden bed ( "papag").
10

Paule was brought back to Police Station A. He was informed of his constitutional rights to remain
silent and to be assisted by counsel. When he said he could not afford a lawyer, the investigator,
Pfc. Leo Batinga, fetched Atty. Norberto Dela Cruz, when he executed an extrajudicial
confession,  dated October 18, 1990, admitting that he and a certain "Glenn" were hired by
11

Conrado Matawaran, Jr. to kill Tubongbanua for a fee of P5,000.00. He pointed to "Glenn" as the
triggerman. The confession was taken and signed in the presence of Lieutenant Leonardo
Esteban, Chief of the Investigation Division of Olongapo City Police Station A and Atty. Norberto
Dela Cruz. 12 It was duly acknowledged by Assistant City Prosecutor Carmelita Gutierrez Fruelda.

Dr. Richard Patilano, Medico-Legal Officer of Olongapo City, conducted the postmortem
examination of Tubongbanua. The result showed that the victim died due to "Cerebral Concussion
and Hemorrhage due to multiple gunshot wounds."   The point of entry of gunshot wound no. 1
13

was on the "right parietal area of the head." The point of entry of gunshot wound no. 2 was along
the "right ear carnal", and its point of exit was on the left eye.  Dr. Patalino opined that the victim
14

was shot at close range due to the presence of smudge around the points of entry of the gunshot
wounds. Based on the locations of the gunshot wounds, he added that the assailant (assuming he
is right handed) was standing behind or at the right side of the victim during the shooting
incident.  15

Paule denied the charge. He revealed that he was a former commander of the New People's Army
in Pampanga who quilt in 1989 to start a new life.

He alleged that he visited his uncle, Marcos Paule, in Bajac-Bajac, Olongapo City, a week before
the incident. His uncle sells cooked food a the public market in Bajac-Bajac. He stayed in his
uncle's rented house along Elicano Street.

On October 18, 1990 at about 11:00 a.m., he was in a minibus on his way to his hometown in
Dinalupihan, Bataan. Their vehicle was stopped and someone pointed to him. The police then
arrested him and took him to the city hall where he was mauled. They asked for his residence in
Olongapo and he led them to his uncle's house in Elicano Street. They ransacked the place but did
not find anything. He was brought back to the police station.  16

Paule disowned his written extrajudicial confession. He averred that it was obtained under duress
and without the assistance of counsel. He denied ownership of the polo shirt, the .38 caliber gun
and the hand grenade. He also submitted the paraffin test result showing that his left and right
hands were negative for nitrates. 17

Yolanda Ocampo, a sidewalk vendor in Bajac-Bajac public market, testified in favor of Paule. She
declared that shortly after the incident, the authorities arrived at the scene of the crime and took
the personal belongings of Tubongbanua, including the latter's gold necklace.

The trial court found Paule guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder and sentenced him to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the legal heirs of Carlos Tubongbanua the amount of
P50,000.00 as indemnity for his death, twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) for moral damages,
plus the costs of suit. 
18

Hence, the appeal.

Issue/s:
Appellant contends that the trial court erred: (1) in admitting his extrajudicial cofession which was
taken without the assistance of counsel; (2) in giving credence to the testimony of eyewitness
Amos Manalo; (3) in not considering the result of the paraffin test in his favor; and (4) in not
taking into consideration the weakness of the prosecution evidence in view of the non-
presentation of the alleged witness (Susi) who assisted the policemen in arresting him
Ruling:
Section 12 (1), Article III of the Constitution provides:
 Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the
right to be informed of his rights to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the
services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived
except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

The purpose of providing counsel to a person under custodial investigation is to curb the
uncivilized practice of extracting confession by coercion.  Any form of coercion, whether physical,
19

mental or emotional, in extracting confession, stamps the confession with the taint of
inadmissibility.  We have stressed that in giving a person under custodial investigation the right to
20

counsel, the Constitution did not mean any kind of counsel but effective and vigilant counsel  In 21

the case of People vs. Bacamante,  we elucidated:

22

The term "effective and vigilant counsel" necessarily and logically requires that the
lawyer be present and able to advise and assist his client from the time the
confessant answers the first question asked by the investigating officer until the
signing of the extrajudicial confession. Moreover, the lawyer should ascertain that
the confession is made voluntarily and that the person under investigation fully
understands the nature and consequence of his extrajudicial confession in relation
to his constitutional rights. A contrary rule would undoubtedly be antagonistic to
the constitutional rights to remain silent, to counsel and to be presumed innocent.

In this case, we have no doubt that Atty. Dela Cruz was called to assist the appellant during his
custodial investigation. Lieutenant Leonardo Esteban, Chief of the Investigation Division of
Olongapo City Police Station, testified that appellant was assisted by Atty. Dela Cruz. He identified
the signature on the left bottom portion of appellant's extrajudicial confession as that of Atty. Dela
Cruz.

The more important question, however, is whether Atty. Dela Cruz extended effective and vigilant
counsel to the appellant before the latter signed his extrajudicial confession. On this factual issue,
the only evidence given by the prosecutor is the testimony of Lt. Esteban who declared under
cross-examination: 23

(ATTY. MENDOZA):

Q: I would show you Exhibits "G" to "G-6", is this the written

admission of Paule having committed the charge of murder. . .?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Were you present when this alleged admission was taken by a

certain Pfc. Leo Batinga?

A: I was there, sir.

x x x           x x x          x x x
 Q: And in all the investigation conducted resulting to the execution
of this document Exhibit G, you were present?

A: Sometimes I am going out of my office for personal necessity.

x x x           x x x          x x x

(COURT):

Q: Before Atty. Dela Cruz assisted the accused in the preparation

of his statement, did they talk to one another?

(LT. ESTEBAN):

A: Yes, your Honor.

Q: Did you hear the conversation?

A: Partly, some parts only of the conversation.

Q: As far as can you recall, what was the conversation between

two?

A: Atty. Dela Cruz informed him to his constitutional rights like

saying, "mabigat ang kasong ito, nais kitang paalalahanan :  may
karapatan kang manahimik at kumuha ng abogado."

Q: And it was your impression that the accused was agreeable to

have Atty. Dela Cruz as his lawyer.

A: Yes, sir."

It cannot be gainsaid that Lt. Esteban was not in a position to give relevant and reliable
information on whether Atty. Dela Cruz provided appellant effective and vigilant counsel in the
course of appellant's custodial investigation. He only overhead snatches of conversation between
Atty. Dela Cruz and appellant. He admitted he was ". . . going out of my office for personal
necessity" in the course of appellant's custodial interrogation. Thus, the records do not show
whether Atty. Dela Cruz effectively counseled appellant during the crucial aspects of his custodial
interrogation. During these times, Atty. Dela Cruz could have been out of sight and out of hearing
distance. Given the circumstances of the case, Atty. Dela Cruz was the best witness to establish
the critical fact that he gave effective and vigilant counsel to the appellant. Unfortunately, the
prosecution did not present him for reasons difficult to divine. By this lapse, he prosecution failed
to discharge the state's burden of proving with clear and convincing evidence that appellant
enjoyed effective and vigilant counsel before he extrajudicially admitted his guilt to the police
authorities. Consequently, the extrajudicial confession of appellant cannot be given any probative
value.

Be that as it may, appellant cannot be acquitted in view of his positive identification as the
gunman. Eyewitness Amos Manalo testified as follows: 24

x x x           x x x          x x x

Q: Will you please tell this Honorable Court how or what you saw
at that time that Mr. Carlos Tubongbanua was shot?

x x x           x x x          x x x

A: On that date, October 18, 1990, that was Thursday, at 10:00

o'clock in the morning I saw Mr. Carlos Tubungbanua walking at
Brill Street and I called or told him, he is again going to the public
market and I noticed certain persons following him and I was or I
kept on observing their movements and I saw the person behind
him was pulling something from his wallet.

Q: Now, Mr. witness, how may persons did you see at that time, I
mean, did you at that time following Mr. Carlos Tubongbanua?

A: Three (3) persons, Ma'am.

Q: And will you please describe these persons that you saw
following Mr. Carlos Tubongbanua?

A: I just saw the one who shot or who killed him, Ma'am. (Witness
at the same time pointing to the accused.).

Q: Now, you saw two (2) other persons following Mr.

Tubongbanua of you have the chance to see these persons would
you able to identify them?

A: If I could see them again I could recognize and identify them.

x x x           x x x          x x x

Q: Now, Mr. Witness, how many times at that time or what was
your distance from the accused at that time you saw him shot Mr.
Carlos Tubongbanua?

A: Four to five (4-5) arms length, Ma'am.

Q: And how many shots were fired by the accused in this case, if
you can recall?

A: Two (2) Ma'am.

Q: Will you please describe what you saw when he fired the first
shot? Will you please describe?

A: At the first shot, Mr. Tubongbanua was shot on his or was hit
on his back of the head (witness is pointing at the back of the
head) and then he turned around and shot again Mr. Tubongbanua
hitting him on his temple (witness pointing to the right side of the
head).

ATTY. DAQUIS

Q: Now, what was the distance of the accused with reference to

Mr. Tubongbanua at the time he fired the first shot?

A: About that distance, Ma'am (witness pointing a distance).

COURT:

Can the parties agree on that distance pointed by the witness.

A: Between three and four (3 and 4) meters.

ATTY. DAQUIS

Q: Now, Mr. Witness, you said there were three (3) of them at that
time accused fired the first shot what happened to the other two
(2)?

A: One of the two gave a signal to the accused.

COURT

Q: Name that accused you are referring?

A: The accused Paule.

ATTY. DAQUIS

Q: And what happened next?

A: Then the other companion of accused Paule gave signal and

then he turned around and Reynaldo Paule approached the victim
and took something and even got hold of the wrist of the victim.

Q: And what did you see the accused took from the victim at that
time, Mr. Witness?
 A: The necklace, Ma'am.

COURT

Q: Whose necklace?

A: Necklace of Mr. Tubongbanua, sir.

ATTY. DAQUIS

Q: Now, what else, if any, did the other two companion of the
accused do at that time after the signal was give to Paule?

A: They just left.

Q: And in what direction did Paule follow after killing, Mr. Witness.

A: On the road where people passes and tricycle passes and then
he went towards the parking area of the tricycle.

Q: How about the two (2) other companions, in what direction did
they go?

A: I did not see them anymore."

On cross-examination,  Manalo further testified:

25

x x x           x x x          x x x

ATTY. MENDOZA

Q: You made mention that these three (3) persons were trailing
Mr. Tubongbanua but in this sketch you made, one (1) person
appear to be ahead (of) the other one who is just across the street
and Mr. Tubongbanua is behind, do you mean what the term
trailing mean they are in that kind (sic) of position?

ATTY. DAQUIS

The question is not clear. He mentioned about these two other

companions of Paule who across the street.

COURT

Q: You mentioned in the direct testimony that these three (3)

persons were trailing or following the deceased whereas in this
sketch three (3) persons were not actually trailing but situated
separately, how could you explain that?
 A: Because in this sketch Mr. Tubongbanua stopped and the three
(3) persons who were then trailing or following him separated each
other and behind him was left Mr. Paule and he drew his hand.

Q: The first time that you saw these three (3) persons what were
their positions in relation to Mr. Tubongbanua? The first time you
noticed them?

A: Actually the two (2) other companions of Reynaldo Paule were

standing at the corner of Brill Street, while Reynaldo Paule was
actually at the Brill Street and when they noticed Mr. Tubongbanua
the two (2) companions of Reynaldo Paule walked side by side and
touching their shoulder.

Q: You made mention a while ago that you shouted at Mr.

Tubongbanua and you made mention "mamimili ka na naman"
correct?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And this incident took place at 10:15 in the morning, how long
have you talked to Mr. Tubongbanua before the incident took place
at 10:15 in the morning.

A: We did not talk with each other, actually May. Tubongbanua

just passed by the place where I was standing and I did not notice
him immediately and he did not notice me. I just noticed him when
he was already four (4) arms length away from me and that was
the time I talked or rather that was the time I called him but I am
not sure whether he heard me or not.

Q: In short Mr. Tubongbanua did not make any response?

A: Yes, sir.

x x x           x x x          x x x

The probality that Manalo misidentified is remote. The crime was committed in broad daylight and
Manalo was barely (4) arms length away from appellant during the shooting incident. Manalo was
able to narrate the minute details on how appellant and his companions trailed the victim and
properly positioned themselves before gunning him down. The records show that no ill-motive
could be attributed to Manalo for imputing such a grave offense against appellant. His
identification of appellant should be given full faith and credit.
26

Appellant discredits Manalo on account of his inconsistent declarations on the number of times he
saw the gun. It is pointed out that Manalo testified in court that he saw the weapon twice — the
first time, during the shooting incident and the second time, when he was asked to identify it
during his testimony. He also averred that the gun was not shown to him during the investigation.
In contrast, he stated in his gown statement that, during the investigation, the gun was shown to
him by the investigator for identification purposes.

These inconsistencies cannot destroy the totality of Manalo's testimony. A truth-telling witness is
not always expected to give an error-free testimony, considering the lapse of time and the
treachery of human memory. Thus, we have followed the rule in accord with the human nature
and experience that honest inconsistencies on minor and trivial matters serve to strengthen,
rather than destroy, the credibility of a witness, especially of witnesses to crimes shocking to
conscience and numbing to senses. 27

More, Manalo's version of the incident is supported by the physical evidence of the case. His
testimony that the victim was shot twice from behind by appellant was corroborated by Dr.
Partilano who testified as follows: 28

(COURT):]

Q: Just a moment doctor, on the basis of the location and the

nature of the gunshot wound, what was the position of the
assailant in relation to the deceased?

A: . . . if the assailant was right handed, he must be standing at

the right side of the victim or at the back of the victim.

x x x           x x x          x x x

Q: How many gunshot wounds did you find?

A: There were two points of entry, your Honor.

Q: All in the head?

A: All in the head, your Honor.

Q: Both wounds fatal?

A: Yes, Your honor.

Appellant cannot unduly capitalize on the paraffin test showing that he was negative for nitrates.
In the case of People vs. Teehankee, Jr.,  we held:
29

. . . Scientific experts concur in the view that the paraffin test has ". . . proved
extremely unreliable in use. The only thing that it can deliberately establish is the
presence or absence of nitrates or nitrites on the hand. It cannot be established
from this test alone that the source of the nitrates or nitrites was the discharge of
a firearm. The person may have handled on or more of substances which give the
same positive reaction for nitrates or nitrites, such as explosives, fireworks,
fertilizers, pharmaceuticals, and leguminous plants such as peas, beans and
alfalfa. A person who uses tobacco." In numerous rulings, we have also
 recognized several factors which may bring about the absence of gunpowder
nitrates on the hands of a gunman, viz: when the assailant washes his hands after
firing the gun, wears gloves at the time of the shooting or if the direction of a
strong wind is against the gunman at the time of firing.

In People vs. Realon,  we further held that lack of nitrates on a suspect's hands does not preclude
30

a judgment of conviction where the overwhelming evidence proves his guilt.

Appellant also bewails the non-presentation of the witness   who pointed to the appellant on
31

board a Bataan bound vehicle. The omission did not, however, materially dent the strength of the
prosecution's evidence. His testimony would only be corroborative of the testimony of the
arresting officers. No prejudicial inference can arise against a party who fails to call a witness
where the only object of presenting him would be to produce corroborative or cumulative
evidence.  Also, no unfavorable inference can accrue against the prosecution where the records
32

show that it used the coercive process of subpoena to secure the presence of a witness at the
trial, but said witness could not be found.  In this case, prosecution witness Rodolfo Susi was
33

ordered to appear in court but the subpoena was returned unsatisfied because he was no longer
residing at his given address.
34

We now come to the correct categorization of the crime at bar. The prosecution successfully
proved that the crime was committed with treachery there is treachery when, at the time of the
attack, the unsuspecting victim was not in a position to defend himself and the offenders
consciously adopted the particular means, method and form of attack employed by them.  In this
35

case the unarmed victim was suddenly shot from behind and on his head, thus, rendering him
totally defenseless against his aggressors. Treachery qualified the crime to murder. Considering
the presence of treachery, appellant's prison sentence is reclusion perpetua. We need not pass
upon the question of whether the her aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and
commission of the crime in consideration of a price or award were properly appreciated by the
trial court as the same will not alter the prison sentence of appellant.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of the court  a quo, finding appellant REYNALDO PAULE y
DONATO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of MURDER is AFFIRMED. Costs against appellant.

SO ORDERED.
28. People vs. Pascua, Jr., 370 SCRA 599, G.R. No. 130963 November 27, 2001
Doctrines:
Criminal Law; Evidence; Witnesses; It is an established rule that when the issue concerns credibility
of witnesses, appellate courts generally will not overturn the findings of the trial courts.—Again, the
basic issues in the case at bar deal with the credibility of the prosecution witnesses. It is an established rule that
when the issue concerns credibility of witnesses, appellate courts generally will not overturn the findings of the
trial courts. The latter courts are in the best position to ascertain and measure the sincerity and spontaneity of
witnesses through their actual observation of the witnesses’ manner of testifying, demeanor and behavior in court.
In the case at bar, we find no basis to depart from the rule.

Same; Same; Same; Negative gunshot residue results do not conclusively mean that a subject did
not fire a gun and positive gunshot residue results do not prove someone fired a gun either; In our
jurisprudence, court has consistently held that paraffin tests are inconclusive.—To be sure, negative
gunshot residue results do not conclusively mean that a subject did not fire a gun, and positive gunshot residue
results do not prove someone fired a gun either. Thus, this test for residue on skin has been challenged in the
courts and fell into disfavor and disuse because of the ambiguity in conclusions whether an individual fired a
weapon or not. In our jurisprudence, we have consistently held that paraffin tests are inconclusive, to wit: “. . .
Scientific experts concur in the view that the paraffin test has . . . proved extremely unreliable in use. The only
thing that it can deliberately establish is the presence or absence of nitrates or nitrites on the hand. It cannot be
established from this test alone that the source of the nitrates or nitrites was the discharge of a firearm. The
person may have handled one or more of a number of substances which give the same positive reaction for
nitrates or nitrites, such as explosives, fireworks, fertilizers, pharmaceuticals, and leguminous plants such as peas,
beans and alfalfa. A person who uses tobacco may also have nitrate or nitrite deposit on his hands since these
substances are present in the products of combustion of tobacco.”

Same; Same; Same; Alibi; For this defense to prosper, it must preclude any doubt on the physical
impossibility of the accused-appellant to be at the locus criminis at the time of the incident.— The
stubborn truth is that accused-appellant came from Doña Imelda, Diffun before going to Barangay Sta. Cruz. We
are not convinced that it was physically impossible for him to be in Doña Imelda at the time of the incident
considering that it is only around four hours drive going to Barangay Sta. Cruz. The trite defenses of alibi and
denial proffered by accused-appellant cannot prevail over the positive and categorical statements of the
prosecution witnesses. For this defense to prosper, it must preclude any doubt on the physical impossibility of the
accused-appellant to be at the locus criminis at the time of the incident.

Same; Same; Same; Identification by the sound of the voice of the person identified is sufficient and
acceptable means of identification where it is established that the witness and the accused had
known each other personally and closely for a number of years.—Prosecution witnesses Sanita and Aileen
Quiming positively identified accused-appellant as the one who fired the third and last shot and killed the victim
Ernesto. Although accused-appellant was wearing a bonnet, his face was not totally covered because his eyes,
nose, mouth and beard were exposed. Sanita and Aileen were also able to recognize accused-appellant through
his voice and gestures. Identification by the sound of the voice of the person identified is sufficient and acceptable
means of identification where it is established that the witness and the accused had known each other personally
and closely for a number of years. It is not disputed that the prosecution witnesses and accused-appellant have
been longtime neighbors ever since the latter was a child. Besides, the house was illuminated by a kerosene lamp.

Same; Same; Same; Delay or vacillation in making an accusation does not impair the credibility of
the witness if such delay is satisfactorily explained.—During her cross examination, Sanita aptly explained
that she intentionally withheld the name of the real culprit because she feared that accused-appellant might
escape and hide. Delay or vacillation in making an accusation does not impair the credibility of the witness if such
delay is satisfactorily explained. Her apprehension was not absolutely baseless.

Same; Same; Same; Flight; It is a well-entrenched doctrine that, without satisfactory explanation,
flight is a clear and positive evidence of guilt.—Indeed, three days after the November 14 incident, accused-
appellant left his house and moved his family to Ricarte Norte. On that day, November 16, 1992, accused-
appellant was invited to the police headquarters and was informed by the Station Commander of Diffun that he
was a suspect in the killing of Ernesto Quiming. It is a well-entrenched doctrine that, without satisfactory
explanation, flight is a clear and positive evidence of guilt.
Same; Same; Same; Motive; Motive is proved by the acts or statements of the accused before or
immediately after the commission of the offense.—In addition, accused-appellant has failed to impute any
bad motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses in pointing to him as the culprit. In contrast, it is accused-
appellant who has a clear motive to want to kill the victim. It appears that during a meeting of barangay officials
sometime in August 1992, the victim and accused-appellant had a misunderstanding because the former wanted
to remove the latter from his position as barangay councilor. Accused-appellant told the victim that if he is no
longer deserving of the position, he will just go home. However, upon reaching home, accused-appellant felt
embarrassed and humiliated. According to him, he decided to go back to settle the matter with the victim.
Accused-appellant did try to settle it by throwing a hand grenade at the victim. When it did not explode, he tried
to shoot the victim but failed. Accused-appellant had every reason to want to get even. Motive is proved by the
acts or statements of the accused before or immediately after the commission of the offense, i.e., by deeds or
words that may express the motive or from which his reason for committing the offense may be inferred.

Same; Same; Same; Treachery; Treachery clearly attended the commission of the crime; The
treacherous manner in which accused-appellant and his cohorts perpetrated the crime was shown
by the sudden, deliberate and unexpected attack upon the unsuspecting victim.— Treachery clearly
attended the commission of the crime. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against
the person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to
ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. The
treacherous manner in which accused-appellant and his cohorts perpetrated the crime was shown by the sudden,
deliberate and unexpected attack upon the unsuspecting victim. It has been clearly established that Ernesto was
walking towards his house when one of the malefactors suddenly appeared from behind and shot him on the arm.
When Ernesto fell to the ground, accused-appellant came out of the house where he and his companions were
hiding, and shot the victim on the head.

Same; Same; Same; Abuse of Superior Strength; Abuse of superior strength and aid of armed men,
when present with treachery, are absorbed in the latter.—Considering the number of armed assailants
against the lone unarmed victim, there was also abuse of superior strength. In a long line of cases, we have held
that abuse of superior strength and aid of armed men, when present with treachery, are absorbed in the latter.
There being no mitigating and aggravating circumstances, the trial court correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
Facts:
This is an appeal from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cabarroguis, Quirino, Branch 32,
dated April 28, 1997, in Criminal Case No. 993, finding accused-appellant Mariano Pascua, Jr.
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua with all the accessory penalties inherent thereto, to indemnify the heirs of the victim the
amount of P120,000.00 as and for actual and moral damages, and to pay the costs without
subsidiary imprisonment case of insolvency.1

In an Information dated November 27, 1992, accused-appellant Mariano Pascua, Jr. alias "Pedro",
together with four John Does, was charged of Murder, committed as follows:

"That on or about 6:00 o'clock in the evening of November 14, 1992 in Barangay Doña
Imelda, Municipality of Diffun, Province of Quirino, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with intent to kill, armed with firearms
of unknown calibers and taking advantage of their superior strength and with the aid of
armed men and with treachery after conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
another did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot ERNESTO QUIMING,
a Barangay Captain of the said place, hitting the latter on the different parts of his body
that caused his instantaneous death.

CONTRARY TO LAW."2

Evidence for the prosecution shows that on November 14, 1992, at about 6:00 in the evening,
prosecution witness Sanita Quiming (Sanita), wife of the victim, Ernesto Quiming (Ernesto), was
gathering dry clothes in the yard of their house at Doña Imelda, Diffun, Quirino when a man
arrived looking for the house of the barangay captain. She answered "none sir" because she saw
that the man was holding a gun with his two hands. Then the man inquired about Ernesto and
she replied that he was attending a prayer meeting at Barangay Malayod together with their three
children but they will soon be back. Suddenly the man pointed his gun at her and pushed her
inside the house. She was told to keep quiet and was threatened that her children will be killed if
she talked.

Upon entering the house, Sanita was surprised to see three other armed men pointing their guns
at her two children. One of them, whose face was covered with a bonnet, spoke and Sanita was
startled when she heard the voice because it sounded familiar. For a moment, Sanita
surreptitiously stared at the man with the bonnet and she became apprehensive when she
recognized him to be herein accused-appellant because of the eyes, eyelids, nose, mouth, and
beard which were not covered. She knows accused-appellant well because they have been
neighbors ever since he was a child. Sanita also knows accused-appellant as the person who
threw a hand grenade at Ernesto during a barangay meeting. However, she pretended not to
recognize accused-appellant.

The man who approached Sanita in the yard told her that they want to get the .38 caliber gun of
Ernesto. When she told him that she did not know anything about it, herein accused-appellant got
angry, insisted that Ernesto had a gun and forced her to bring it out. At this point, two of the
Quiming children, Aileen and Elizabeth, arrived from the prayer meeting. The two were almost
near the fence of the house when they heard somebody whistle from behind. When they looked
back, a man poked a gun at them and ordered them to go inside the house and keep quiet. Aileen
recognized accused-appellant though he was wearing a bonnet since his face was not totally
covered. She has known accused-appellant from childhood and the latter's house is only 300
meters away from them. Not long after, her brother Jonathan followed and was likewise forced
into the house by one of the armed men.

Knowing that her husband Ernesto would not be far behind, Sanita stood up and peeped through
the jalousy of the window. They were still being heavily guarded by the four men inside the
house. It was then that she saw Ernesto walking towards the house, around ten meters away
from where she was standing. A man coming from the waiting shed located along the road going
to their house followed Ernesto and suddenly shot him on the right arm. Ernesto fell to the
ground facing downward. Upon seeing this, accused-appellant and his three companions
immediately ran outside. One of them shot Ernesto a second time. Accused-appellant fired the
third shot that hit Ernesto on the head. Ernesto's shoulder shook and then his body turned limp.
Sanita was so stunned that she kept jumping helplessly. The five malefactors hurriedly ran away.
Thereafter, Sanita and her children rushed to Ernesto but he was no longer moving. They brought
him to the Quirino Provincial Hospital where he was declared dead on arrival.

A few hours after the incident, several barangay officials and members of the PNP went to the
house of Sanita to investigate. When asked if she knew the identity of the assailants, she said
"nobody had killed my husband except the one who threw a hand grenade at my husband." It
was on November 26, 1992 that she gave her sworn statement 3 to the police and disclosed the
name and identity of accused-appellant as one of the assailants. According to Sanita, she was
afraid that accused-appellant might escape and hide if she immediately revealed his name before
a formal investigation could be conducted. On November 27, 1992, Aileen and Elizabeth executed
their joint affidavit.4

According to Sanita, during a meeting of barangay officials on August 30, 1992, Ernesto, a
barangay captain, and accused-appellant, a barangay councilman, had a misunderstanding and
the latter threw a hand grenade at the former. When the hand grenade did not explode, accused-
appellant tried to shoot Ernesto twice inside the latter's yard but failed. Sanita was present when
the first shooting incident happened.

Three days after the death of Ernesto, accused-appellant and his family left their house at Doña
Imelda, Diffun and moved to Ricarte Norte, Diffun. Sanita testified that she spent P20,000.00 for
the burial of Ernesto.

Prosecution witness Leslie Chambers-Maalat, a forensic chemist at the PNP Crime Laboratory
Service in Camp Crame, Quezon City, testified that as per her Chemistry Report No. C436-92
dated May 20, 1992, 5 the paraffin casts taken from both hands of accused-appellant gave positive
result to the tests for gunpowder nitrates because a blue reaction was produced. She concluded
that accused-appellant fired a gun. She said that matches, cigarettes and fertilizers can also test
positive for nitrate and produce a blue reaction just like gun powder nitrate. However, she
explained that matches and cigarettes produce positive result for nitrate only which is different
from gunpowder nitrate. Also, the blue reaction produced from nitrate contained in the former
does not have dots and tails whereas the blue reaction produced by gunpowder nitrate has dots
and tails.

The autopsy examination conducted by Dra. Mary Jean Baguioen, Medical Officer III at the
Quirino Provincial Hospital, showed the following postmortem findings as contained in Autopsy
Report No. 92-06-35-99:6

"Intrathoracic Findings:

= Penetrating wound, middle lobe, right lung.

= Base of the heart.

= Inferior lobe of left lung.

Intracranial Findings:

= Gunshot wound entry — right parietal bone.

= Orbital bone fractured, left.

= Bullet lodged at orbital area, inferior.

CAUSE OF DEATH:

Intrathoracic hemorrhage secondary to Gunshot Wound."

Dra. Baguioen explained that the victim suffered a penetrating wound on the right breast caused
by a gun shot. The right lung was fatally damaged. There was also a penetrating wound at the
base of the heart caused by a gunshot. These wounds sustained by the victim were the most
fatal. Another gunshot wound entry was found on the right parietal bone which is located on the
right side of the head. When they opened the skull of the victim, they recovered a slug inside.
The orbital bone located just below the lower left eyelid was also fractured and she discovered a
bullet lodged in this area. Finally, she testified that the victim suffered severe bleeding inside the
chest which caused his death.

The defense relied mainly on denial and alibi.

Accused-appellant testified that in the afternoon of November 14, 1992, he went to Barangay Sta.
Cruz, Benito Soliven, Isabela with his wife and two children to attend the wedding of the daughter
of his cousin, Ernesto Aquino. He drove his tricycle from the town proper of Diffun to Barangay
Sta. Cruz. It was almost dusk when they reached the place. On their way to the house of his
cousin, he saw Barangay Captain Sabino Carlos and invited the latter to the pre-nuptial party that
night. Accused-appellant parked his tricycle at the house of Kagawad Abraham Martin. There he
saw Barangay Secretary Francisco Viernes and several others in a drinking session. The group
invited accused-appellant for a drink to which he obliged. Shortly thereafter, they all proceeded to
the house of Ernesto Aquino where the pre-nuptial party was being held. The group of accused-
appellant drank at the party until 9:00 p.m. They had to stop when trouble erupted from a group
of guests who were also drinking. Accused-appellant decided to go upstairs and sleep.

The next day, November 15, 1992, the wedding ceremony was held which ended at around 12
o'clock in the afternoon. Thereafter, accused-appellant and his family left for Diffun town. They
passed by Santiago City to have the tricycle painted with the names of their children. Since it was
raining and the road going to their house was not passable because it was muddy and slippery,
they proceeded to Ricarte Norte and spent the night at the house of accused-appellant's uncle,
Fred Antonino. That night, accused-appellant was informed by his uncle about the killing of
Barangay Captain Ernesto Quiming.

The following day, November 16, 1992, accused-appellant left in the morning to ply his tricycle
from Ricarte to Diffun. He was at the parking area in Diffun when two policemen approached him
and invited him to the police station for questioning. At the police headquarters, the Station
Commander asked him if he already knew what happened to Ernesto and he answered that his
Uncle Fred told him about it the night before. Accused-appellant was informed that he is a
suspect in the killing because he was the person last known to have a grudge against the victim.
He was then brought to the Crime Laboratory Service in Cauayan, Isabela to undergo paraffin
test. That night, accused-appellant slept at Ricarte Norte and only his wife and children went
home. Since then, accused-appellant has never returned to Doña Imelda, Diffun.

Accused-appellant admitted that during a barangay meeting sometime in August 1992, he had a
misunderstanding with Barangay Captain Ernesto Quiming because the latter wanted to remove
him as barangay councilman. He felt embarrassed and humiliated before the barangay officials
and so he went home. But he went back to settle the matter with Ernesto. And it was at this time
when accused-appellant threw a hand grenade to the victim. He alleged that it was Ernesto who
shot him first and he only fired back. He stated that the matter was settled in October 1992 when
he asked for forgiveness from Ernesto in the presence of the barangay officials. Since then, he did
not have any misunderstanding with Ernesto anymore.
Defense witnesses Abraham Martin, Ernesto Aquino, Sabino Carlos and Francisco Viernes
corroborated the alibi that accused-appellant attended a wedding party at Barangay Sta. Cruz,
Benito Soliven, Isabela on that fateful day of November 14, 1992. They testified upon request of
the father of the accused-appellant.

In this appeal, accused-appellant insists that he was not positively identified by the prosecution
witnesses and that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime.
Issue/s:
Again, the basic issues in the case at bar deal with the credibility of the prosecution witnesses. It
is an established rule that when the issue concerns credibility of witnesses, appellate courts
generally will not overturn the findings of the trial courts. The latter courts are in the best position
to ascertain and measure the sincerity and spontaneity of witnesses through their actual
observation of the witnesses' manner of testifying, demeanor and behavior in court. In the case at
bar, we find no basis to depart from the rule.7
Ruling:
I. Accused-appellant assails the conclusion of the trial court that he committed the crime because
he tested positive for gunpowder nitrate. He claims that the testimony of forensic chemist Leslie
Chambers-Maalat shows that other substances like fertilizers, matches and cigarettes likewise
produce positive results for nitrate, to wit:

"Q: How many casts were given to you for examination, Mrs. Witness?

A:         Two paraffin casts, sir.

Q:         This (sic) paraffin casts were given to you for laboratory examination, is it not?

A:         Yes, sir.

Q:         And before you proceeded to the laboratory examination, did you conduct also a
physical examination on this case?

A:         No, sir.

Q:         In other words, you did not try to find out the presence of gun power nitrate
through physical examination, you did not do that?

A:         No, sir.

Q:         Is it not a fact that aside from gun powder nitrate, there are other particles which
also gave (sic) positive nitrates like for instance fertilizers?

A:         Yes, sir.

Q:         or matches?

A:         Yes, sir.
 Q:         and also cigarettes?

A:         Yes, sir.

Q:         Is there a different characteristic on blue reaction coming from fertilizers and gun
powders?

A:         Yes, sir. A nitrate/gun powder nitrate produced blue reaction with dot with tail;
while in the other source like fertilizers, matches and cigarettes, it only reacts blue
reaction but without dots or tail.

Q:         Did you indicate the appearance of blue reaction with tails in your findings?

A:         No, sir."

In an attempt to discredit the accuracy of the paraffin test conducted on him, accused-appellant
testified that while waiting for his paraffin test, he smoked a cigarette which he lighted with a
match. We are not convinced.

Accused-appellant failed to recite the complete testimony of the forensic chemist relevant to the
issue. Such selective quotation is unethical and will not exculpate accused-appellant. We quote
the relevant testimony of the forensic chemist to avoid its distortion, viz.:

"Q:         How many casts were given to you for examination, Mrs. Witness?

A:         Two paraffin casts, sir.

Q:         This (sic) paraffin casts were given to you for laboratory examination, is it not?

A:         Yes, sir.

Q:         And before you proceeded to the laboratory examination, did you conduct also a
physical examination on this case?

A:         No, sir.

Q:         In other words, you did not try to find out the presence of gun power nitrate
through physical examination, you did not do that?

A:         No, sir.

Q:         Because what you resulted to was the chemical test/diphenylamine test ?

A.         Yes, sir.

Q:         And you only concluded that the casts contains (sic) gun powder nitrate ?
A:         No, sir.

Q:         And you concluded, madam Witness, that because of the presence of gun
powder nitrate that produces blue reaction, is that correct?

A:         Yes, sir.

Q:         Now, you concluded madam Witness that the casts contains (sic) gun powder
nitrate just because of the blue reaction ?

A:         Yes, sir.

Q:         Is it not a fact that aside from gun powder nitrate, there are other particles which
also gave (sic) positive nitrates like for instance fertilizers?

A:         Yes, sir.

Q:         or matches?

A:         Yes, sir.

Q:         and also cigarettes?

A:         Yes, sir.

Q:         Now, when a person who have (sic) been contacted with this (sic) particles is
examined, is it not a fact that a blue reaction will also take place ?

A:         They would only give positive result for nitrate but not gun powder nitrate, sir .

Q:         But it remains, Madam Witness, that a gun powder nitrate create blue reaction, is
it not?

A:         Yes, sir.

Q:         In the same manner like fertilizers, matches and cigarettes?

A:         There is blue reaction but different characteristic, sir.

Q:         Is there a different characteristic on blue reaction coming from fertilizers and gun
powders?

A:         Yes, sir. A nitrate/gun powder nitrate produced blue reaction with dot with tail;
while in the other source like fertilizers, matches and cigarettes, it only reacts blue
reaction but without dots or tail.
 Q:         Did you indicate the appearance of blue reaction with tails in your findings?

A:         No, sir."8 (italics are the omitted portions)

The ability to determine whether an individual has fired a firearm is of great significance in the
investigation of both homicides and suicides. Thus, over the years a number of tests have been
developed in an attempt to fill this need. The first of such tests was the "paraffin test" also known
as the "Dermal Nitrate" or "diphenylamine test." In this test, the hands were coated with a layer
of paraffin. After cooling, the casts were removed and treated with an acid solution of
diphenylamine, a reagent used to detect nitrates and nitrites that originate from gunpowder and
may be deposited on the skin after firing a weapon. A positive test was indicated by the presence
of blue flecks in the paraffin. Although this test may give positive results on the hands of
individuals who fired weapons, it also gives positive results on the hands of individuals who have
not fired weapons because of the widespread distribution of nitrates and nitrites in our
environment.9 Thus, nitrates can also be found in many other materials, including cigarette
smoke, urine, fertilizers, and other kinds of chemicals such as oxidizing agents. 10

To be sure, negative gunshot residue results do not conclusively mean that a subject did not fire a
gun, and positive gunshot residue results do not prove someone fired a gun either. Thus, this test
for residue on skin has been challenged in the courts and fell into disfavor and disuse because of
the ambiguity in conclusions whether an individual fired a weapon or not. 11

In our jurisprudence, we have consistently held that paraffin tests are inconclusive, to wit:

". . . Scientific experts concur in the view that the paraffin test has . . . proved extremely
unreliable in use. The only thing that it can deliberately establish is the presence or
absence of nitrates or nitrites on the hand. It cannot be established from this test alone
that the source of the nitrates or nitrites was the discharge of a firearm. The person may
have handled one or more of a number of substances which give the same positive
reaction for nitrates or nitrites, such as explosives, fireworks, fertilizers, pharmaceuticals,
and leguminous plants such as peas, beans and alfalfa. A person who uses tobacco may
also have nitrate or nitrite deposit on his hands since these substances are present in the
products of combustion of tobacco."12

Be that as it may, the result of the paraffin test conducted on accused-appellant in the case at bar
still proves that he tested positive for gunpowder nitrates. The allegation of accused-appellant
that he smoked while waiting for his test is of no consequence. According to witness Dr.
Chambers-Maalat, the blue reaction produced by nitrate coming from cigarettes and matches has
a different characteristic from the blue reaction produced in gun powder nitrate, in that the
former does not have dots and tails which are present in the latter. It bears to stress too that the
fact that accused-appellant fired a gun is corroborated by the convincing, straightforward and
categorical testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.

II. Accused-appellant contends that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene
of the crime because on that fateful day he went to Sta. Cruz, Benito Soliven, Isabela to attend
the wedding of his cousin's daughter. This was corroborated by the defense witnesses who were
all barangay officials of Barangay Sta. Cruz.

There is no controversy that accused-appellant went to attend a wedding on November 14, 1992
at Barangay Sta. Cruz, Benito Soliven, Isabela. What is unclear and remains suspect, however, is
his allegation that before going to Barangay Sta. Cruz, he came from the house of his employer,
Board Member Natividad, in Diffun where he has allegedly been staying even before November
14, 1992. The other defense witnesses testified merely on the fact of his presence at the
wedding, but none was presented to prove that accused-appellant came from Diffun town.
Accused-appellant could have easily presented Board Member Natividad to corroborate his
testimony but he never did. If it were true that accused-appellant was already working for Board
Member Natividad at that time, it is perplexing why he did not return to his employer's house
after the wedding and instead stayed with his uncle at Ricarte Norte, Diffun on the pretext that he
was going to ply his tricycle to earn a living. Also, accused-appellant allegedly bought his tricycle
on October 29, 1992 but it is highly dubious that he started to use it for hire only on November
16, 1992 — the day he was invited to the police headquarters for questioning.

The stubborn truth is that accused-appellant came from Doña Imelda, Diffun before going to
Barangay Sta. Cruz. We are not convinced that it was physically impossible for him to be in Doña
Imelda at the time of the incident considering that it is only around four hours drive going to
Barangay Sta. Cruz. The trite defenses of alibi and denial proffered by accused-appellant cannot
prevail over the positive and categorical statements of the prosecution witnesses. For this defense
to prosper, it must preclude any doubt on the physical impossibility of the accused-appellant to be
at the locus criminis at the time of the incident.13

III. Accused-appellant avers that it was impossible for Sanita and Aileen Quiming to have
recognized him since according to them the assailant was wearing a bonnet. Moreover, when the
police arrived at the scene of the crime, Sanita failed to identify the assailant and it was only
several days thereafter, or on November 26, 1992, when she executed a sworn statement before
the police that she named the accused-appellant. We are not persuaded.

First, prosecution witnesses Sanita and Aileen Quiming positively identified accused-appellant as
the one who fired the third and last shot and killed the victim Ernesto. Although accused-appellant
was wearing a bonnet, his face was not totally covered because his eyes, nose, mouth and beard
were exposed. Sanita and Aileen were also able to recognize accused-appellant through his voice
and gestures. Identification by the sound of the voice of the person identified is sufficient and
acceptable means of identification where it is established that the witness and the accused had
known each other personally and closely for a number of years. 14 It is not disputed that the
prosecution witnesses and accused-appellant have been longtime neighbors ever since the latter
was a child. Besides, the house was illuminated by a kerosene lamp.

Second, when the police and barangay officials arrived at their house on that fateful day, Sanita
told them that "nobody killed my husband except the one who threw a hand grenade to my
husband." When accused-appellant testified in court, he openly admitted that he threw a hand
grenade at the victim during a meeting of barangay officials sometime in August 1992. It is
patently obvious that Sanita was referring to none other than accused-appellant when she made
that statement.

Third, during her cross examination, Sanita aptly explained that she intentionally withheld the
name of the real culprit because she feared that accused-appellant might escape and hide. Delay
or vacillation in making an accusation does not impair the credibility of the witness if such delay is
satisfactorily explained.15 Her apprehension was not absolutely baseless. Indeed, three days after
the November 14 incident, accused-appellant left his house and moved his family to Ricarte Norte.
On that day, November 16, 1992, accused-appellant was invited to the police headquarters and
was informed by the Station Commander of Diffun that he was a suspect in the killing of Ernesto
Quiming. It is a well-entrenched doctrine that, without satisfactory explanation, flight is a clear
and positive evidence of guilt.16

It bears to stress that of the five malefactors, it was only herein accused-appellant who was
wearing a bonnet. This is hardly surprising. Accused-appellant is a barangay councilor and
everybody in the barangay knows him. He had to make sure that he will not be exposed and that
it will be difficult to recognize him. And true enough, in trying to impugn the credibility of the
prosecution witnesses, the defense made capital of the fact that the face of the assailant was
covered with a bonnet. We accord greater weight however to the straightforward testimonies of
the prosecution witnesses that it was accused-appellant who shot the victim on the head. The
testimonies of prosecution witnesses Sanita and Aileen Quiming were clear, direct and categorical.
Their recollection of the gruesome event remained steadfast and unperturbed even under the
grueling cross examination by the defense.

In addition, accused-appellant has failed to impute any bad motive on the part of the prosecution
witnesses in pointing to him as the culprit. In contrast, it is accused-appellant who has a clear
motive to want to kill the victim. It appears that during a meeting of barangay officials sometime
in August 1992, the victim and accused-appellant had a misunderstanding because the former
wanted to remove the latter from his position as barangay councilor. Accused-appellant told the
victim that if he is no longer deserving of the position, he will just go home. However, upon
reaching home, accused-appellant felt embarrassed and humiliated. According to him, he decided
to go back to settle the matter with the victim. 17 Accused-appellant did try to settle it by throwing
a hand grenade at the victim. When it did not explode, he tried to shoot the victim but failed.
Accused appellant had every reason to want to get even. Motive is proved by the acts or
statements of the accused before or immediately after the commission of the offense, i.e., by
deeds or words that may express the motive or from which his reason for committing the offense
may be inferred.18 He attempts to remove this cloud of suspicion by testifying that he had already
asked for forgiveness from the victim. His statement is, at the least, self-serving and hence has no
probative value specially when it is not corroborated by other witnesses.

IV. The information charged that the killing was attended by treachery with the aid of armed men
and with abuse of superior strength. The trial court considered the last two circumstances to have
been absorbed in treachery, and imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua, there being no
mitigating and aggravating circumstances.

Treachery clearly attended the commission of the crime. There is treachery when the offender
commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods or forms in the
execution thereof which tend directly and specially to ensure its execution, without risk to himself
arising from the defense which the offended part might make. 19 The treacherous manner in which
accused-appellant and his cohorts perpetrated the crime was shown by the sudden, deliberate
and unexpected attack upon the unsuspecting victim. It has been clearly established that Ernesto
was walking towards his house when one of the malefactors suddenly appeared from behind and
shot him on the arm. When Ernesto fell to the ground, accused-appellant came out of the house
where he and his companions were hiding, and shot the victim on the head.

Considering the number of armed assailants against the lone unarmed victim, there was also
abuse of superior strength.20 In a long line of cases, we have held that abuse of superior strength
and aid of armed men, when present with treachery, are absorbed in the latter. 21 There being no
mitigating and aggravating circumstances, the trial court correctly imposed the penalty of
reclusion perpetua.

The trial court ordered accused-appellant to indemnify the heirs of the victim the sum of
P120,000.00 as and for actual and moral damages. This is erroneous. Prosecution witness Sanita
testified that she spent P20,000.00 for the wake of her husband, but there were no receipts
presented to support the same. It is axiomatic that a party seeking the award of actual damages
must produce competent proof or the best evidence obtainable to justify such award. 22 Since no
receipts of expenses were presented, actual damages should be disallowed. 23

On the other hand, the heirs of the victim are entitled to receive moral damages in the amount of
P50,000.00. This award is mandatory and does not require proof other than the death of the
victim.24 Under prevailing jurisprudence, civil indemnity should be awarded in the amount of
P50,000.00.25

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cabarroguis, Quirino, Branch 32, in
Criminal Case No. 993 finding accused-appellant MARIANO PASCUA, JR. @ PEDRO, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua is hereby
AFFIRMED subject to the MODIFICATION that accused-appellant is hereby ordered to pay the
heirs of the victim Ernesto Quiming the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00
as moral damages.

SO ORDERED.
29. People vs. Adoviso, 309 SCRA 1, G.R. Nos. 116196-97 June 23, 1999
Doctrines:
Criminal Law; Murder; Witnesses; Wicklamps, flashlights, even moonlight or starlight may, in proper
situations be considered sufficient illumination, making the attack on the credibility of witnesses
solely on that ground unmeritorious.—Visibility is indeed a vital factor in the determination of whether or not
an eyewitness could have identified the perpetrator of a crime. However, it is settled that when conditions of
visibility are favorable, and the witnesses do not appear to be biased, their assertion as to the identity of the
malefactor should normally be accepted. Illumination produced by kerosene lamp or a flashlight is sufficient to
allow identification of persons. Wicklamps, flashlights, even moonlight or starlight may, in proper situations be
considered sufficient illumination, making the attack on the credibility of witnesses solely on that ground
unmeritorious.

Same; Same; Same; It is the natural reaction of relatives of victims to strive to observe the faces
and appearance of the assailants, if not ascertain their identities, and the manner in which the crime
is committed.—The bamboo slats of the camalig could not have effectively obstructed the eyewitnesses’ view of
appellant, considering that the slats were built four (4) meters apart. Besides, it is the natural reaction of relatives
of victims to strive to observe the faces and appearance of the assailants, if not ascertain their identities, and the
manner in which the crime is committed. A relative will naturally be interested in identifying the malefactor to
secure his conviction to obtain justice for the death of his relative(s). It must be remembered that appellant was
not a complete stranger to the eyewitnesses. Bonifacio had known him for ten (10) years while Elmer had been
acquainted with him for four (4) years. Elmer recalled that appellant used to join the rabuz at the barracks.
Familiarity with appellant’s face and appearance minimized if not erased the possibility that they could have been
mistaken as to his identity.

Same; Same; Same; It is not contrary to human experience for a person to commit a crime before
the very eyes of people who are familiar to them.—Appellant’s allegation that it was “improbable” for him to
have committed the crimes without a mask, unlike the other participants, deserves scant consideration. It is not
contrary to human experience for a person to commit a crime before the very eyes of people who are familiar to
them. Indeed, some may even take pride in their identification as the perpetrator of a criminal act.

Same; Same; Same; The failure of a witness to reveal at once the identity of the accused as one of
the perpetrators of the crime does not affect, much less, impair his credibility as a witness.—Appellant
also considers as a “positive sign,” Bonifacio’s failure to immediately identify him as the perpetrator of the crime to
the police. The delay in reporting his participation to the police was however sufficiently explained by Bonifacio.
Bonifacio was afraid of appellant since the latter was a member of the CAFGU and, as such, was provided with a
gun. He was also hesitant in identifying appellant immediately lest he got wind of his impending arrest and
posthaste escaped the clutches of the law. The failure of a witness to reveal at once the identity of the accused as
one of the perpetrators of the crime does not affect, much less, impair his credibility as a witness. The general or
common rule is that witnesses react to a crime in different ways. There is no standard form of human behavioral
response to a strange, startling and frightful event, and there is no standard rule by which witnesses to a crime
must react.

Same; Same; Alibi; For an alibi to prosper, there must be proof that the defendant was not only
somewhere else when the crime was committed but that he could not be physically present at the
place of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission.—Appellant’s alibi thus
crumbles in the face of his positive identification as one of the perpetrators of the crimes. For an alibi to prosper,
moreover, there must be proof that the defendant was not only somewhere else when the crime was committed
but that he could not be physically present at the place of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the time of its
commission. Appellant did not prove the physical impossibility of his being in Sitio Tan-agan which is not exactly
remote from Sitio Palsong where he claimed to be when the incident happened. Both places are within the
Municipality of Bula. Appellant admitted that the distance between the two sitios could be negotiated in three
hours even without any means of transportation. On the other hand, his alleged companion in Sitio Palsong,
Antero Esteron, testified that the distance could be traveled in thirty-five (35) minutes by “trimobile” or private
vehicle.

Same; Same; Evidence; Polygraph Test; Words and Phrases; Polygraph Test, Explained; American
courts almost uniformly reject the results of polygraph tests when offered in evidence for the
purpose of establishing the guilt or innocence of one accused of a crime, whether the accused or the
prosecution seeks its introduction, for the reason that polygraph has not as yet attained scientific
acceptance as a reliable and accurate means of ascertaining truth or deception, a rule no different in
this jurisdiction.—A polygraph is an electromechanical instrument that simultaneously measures and records
certain physiological changes in the human body that are believed to be involuntarily caused by an examinee’s
conscious attempt to deceive the questioner. The theory behind a polygraph or lie detector test is that a person
who lies deliberately will have a rising blood pressure and a subconscious block in breathing, which will be
recorded on the graph. However, American courts almost uniformly reject the results of polygraph tests when
offered in evidence for the purpose of establishing the guilt or innocence of one accused of a crime, whether the
accused or the prosecution seeks its introduction, for the reason that polygraph has not as yet attained scientific
acceptance as a reliable and accurate means of ascertaining truth or deception. The rule is no different in this
jurisdiction. Thus, in People v. Daniel, stating that much faith and credit should not be vested upon a lie detector
test as it is not conclusive. Appellant, in this case, has not advanced any reason why this rule should not apply to
him.

Same; Same; Aggravating Circumstances; Treachery; There is treachery when the attack on an
unarmed victim who has not given the slightest provocation is sudden, unexpected and without
warning.—Appellant was therefore correctly adjudged guilty of two counts of Murder. Treachery qualified the
killings to murder. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing
means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution,
without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. In other words, there is
treachery when the attack on an unarmed victim who has not given the slightest provocation is sudden,
unexpected and without warning. The victims in this case were totally unaware of an impending assault—Rufino
was sleeping and Emeterio was going down the stairs when they were shot.
Facts:
Pablo Adoviso appeals from the Joint Judgment  of the Regional Trial Court of Camarines
1

Sur  declaring him guilty beyond reasonable doubt for two counts of Murder.
2

Appellant, allegedly a member of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU), was
originally charged with four unidentified persons who have, however, remained at large. The
information  charging appellant with the Murder of Rufino Agunos under Criminal Case No. P-2079
3

alleges:

That on or about the 18th day of February 1990 at about 8:00 o'clock [ sic] in the
evening at Sitio Tan-agan, Barangay Casugad, Municipality of Bula, Province of
Camarines Sur, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, while armed with assorted long firearms, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill and with
treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously shoot one Rufino Agunos several times with said firearms hitting the
latter on the different parts of his body which were the direct and immediate
cause of his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said Rufino
Agunos.

That the crime complained of against the accused is not service connected.

ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.

Except for the name of the victim, the information in Criminal Case No. P-2080 with respect to the
killing of Emeterio Vasquez, contains the same allegations. 4

Appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges. At the joint trial of Criminal Case Nos. P-2079 and P-
2080, the prosecution presented their version of the events that transpired on the evening of
February 18, 1990, as follows:
The spouses Emeterio and Anastacia Vasquez had two adjacent houses in Sitio Tan-agan,
Barangay Casugad, Bula, Camarines Sur. One of the houses was actually a camalig where they
stored harvested rice. The spouses preferred to live there because it was cooler. The living area of
the camalig had walls of bamboo called salsag. This area was elevated from the ground. Three
steps led down to an awning ( suyab) walled with bamboo slats. These slats were placed
horizontally approximately four to six inches apart. A portion of the awning was used as a kitchen
but another portion had a  papag  where the Vasquez' grandson, Rufino Agunos, son of their
daughter Virginia, would sleep whenever he tended the irrigation pump. The spouses son
Bonifacio occupied the other house eight (8) meters from the camalig  with his own son Elmer.

At around 8:00 in the evening of February 18, 1990, Emeterio Vazquez was preparing coffee as
his wife was about to retire for the night. Their grandson Rufino had already gone to sleep in the
papag. Anastacia had just finished spreading the sleeping mat when she heard three or four
gunshots. Emeterio then uttered that he had been shot. Seeing Emeterio, Anastacia exclaimed,
"Why should you not be hit when infact there are guns in front of you." Anastacia saw the
"protruding edge of the gun" on the wall near the stairs where Emeterio went down. A lamp near
the stairs where Emeterio drank coffee illuminated the camalig  but Anastacia failed to recognize
the persons who fired their guns at her husband.

The Vasquez' son Bonifacio was in the bigger house when he heard the gunshots. Earlier that
evening, Bonifacio was talking to Rufino regarding the engine of the irrigation pump. Bonifacio
was still talking when he noticed that Rufino had fallen asleep, the latter's back against the
bamboo wall. Bonifacio left Rufino snoring in the   papag and went to the other house. Only a
minute had passed after he had gone up when Bonifacio heard the gunshots. He and his 16-year-
old son Elmer immediately went down the front yard to investigate.

Bonifacio hid himself in the dark portion of the yard, behind a coconut tree. From a distance of
eight (8) meters, Bonifacio saw Rufino, who was inside the camalig, being shot by several persons
from the outside. Looking through the bamboo slats of the camalig wall. Bonifacio recognized one
of the assailants, with a large built and long hair, as appellant Pablo Adoviso because of the gas
lamp that was lighted inside the camalig. Of Rufino's assailants, only appellant was not wearing a
mask. Appellant was holding a long firearm wrapped inside a sack with its muzzle protruding and
directed where Rufino was sleeping. Appellant then fired hitting Rufino. At that moment, Bonifacio
heard his father Emeterio shout "Pino," (referring to his grandson Rufino) and saw his father go
down the stairs carrying a gas lamp. Appellant fired again, hitting Emeterio at the stomach.

For his part, Elmer, who rushed towards the camalig  with his father Bonifacio, saw five (5)
persons aiming their firearms at the camalig. Except for appellant, each of these persons had a
cover over their faces. Three (3) of them were positioned in a ditch near the camalig  while two
(2) others were near its door. Elmer saw these five (5) persons shoot his cousin Rufino who was
lying down on the  papag. Although his back was hit, Rufino was able to crawl under the   papag.
Elmer's grandfather was also hit on the stomach but he managed to up the camalig. When
appellant and his companion by the camalig  door saw Elmer, they fired at him then, with the
three others at the ditch, escaped to the banana plantation Elmer, on the other hand, fled
towards the coconut plantation.

Upon returning to the camalig, Elmer saw his father carrying his grandfather Emeterio. He also
found Rufino at the foot of a coconut tree near the river, lying on his side with his body curled.
Rufino told Elmer that he had been hit and, when Elmer failed to locate his wound, Rufino took
Elmer's hand and put it on his back. Elmer then moved Rufino "sidewise." Upon returning to
the camalig, Elmer carried his grandfather and bandaged his stomach with diapers.

In the meantime, Bonifacio went to the municipal building of Bula to fetch the police. Inspector
Antonio Lopez and Senior Police Officer 1 Claro Ballevar returned to the scene of the crime with
him. The police brought Emeterio and Rufino to the municipal hall of Bula and then to the Bicol
Regional Hospital. Both Emeterio and Rufino died early the next morning.

The certification  dated March 7, 1990 and signed by Dr. Janice Nanette Estrada, resident
5

physician of the Bicol Regional Hospital in Naga City, states that 35-year-old Rufino Agunos died
of four (4) gunshot wounds: at the inguinal area, the sacral area, the thigh and the abdomen. The
wounds at the inguinal area and the thigh bore contusion collars. The same physician certified
that Emeterio Vasquez, 88 years of age, sustained seven (7) gunshot wounds at the paraumbilical
area, lumbar area, hypogastrium, anterior aspect of the right forearm, anteromedial aspect of the
right forearm, anteromedial aspect left arm and anterolateral aspect of the left arm. Four (4) of
these gunshot wounds had contusion collars — at the paraumbilical area, the hypogastrium, the
right forearm and the left arm.6

Appellant Adoviso interposed alibi and denial as his defense.

Appellant claimed that he was a member of the CAFGU whose headquarters was located in
Barangay Palsong, Bula, Camarines Sur. At around 7:00 in the evening of February 18, 1990, he
was in Sitio Durabod, Palsong, about a kilometer away from the CAFGU headquarters. He,
together with Francisco Bislombre, Benjamin Alina, Jr. and PFC Antero Esteron, had some drinks
in the store of Honoria Tragante until around 11:00 p.m.

Honoria Tragante and Francisco Bislombre corroborated appellant's alibi. Antero Esteron likewise
testified that from 7:00 until past 11:00 that night of February 18, 1990, he and appellant had a
drinking spree at the Tragante store. He distinctly remembered that date because it was the fiesta
of Balatan.

To support his denial appellant presented Lt. Antonio Lopez, the deputy chief of police and SPO2
Claro Ballebar of the PNP Bula Police Station. Lopez identified a police certification  prepared by
7

Pfc. Ramon N. Canabe to the effect that the shooting incident was perpetrated "by unidentified
armed men." Lopez said that he (Lopez) was one of those who brought the victims to the hospital
who were then still conscious. The victims told him that they did not know who shot them or why
they were shot.

SPO2 Claro Ballebar, however testified that in the follow-up investigation he conducted several
days after the incident, Bonifacio Vasquez revealed to him that he (Bonifacio) "vividly saw the
incident and recognized" appellant as one of the perpetrators of the crime and that the killings
had some something to do with land dispute between Bonifacio's parents and the Galicia family.

The defense also offered in evidence the testimony of Ernesto A. Lucena, Polygraph Examiner II
of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in Manila, who conducted a polygraph test on
appellant. In Polygraph Report No. 900175,   Lucena opined that appellants ''polygrams revealed
8

that there were no specific reactions indicative of deception to pertinent questions relevant" to the
investigation of the crimes.

In rebuttal, Bonifacio Vasquez revealed that when he reported the incident to the police, he did
not identify appellant as one of the culprits because he was afraid of appellant who was a
member of the CAFGU. Nevertheless, Bonifacio did mention to the police that he recognized
appellant as one of the perpetrators of the crime although he told them that he did not recognize
appellant's four (4) companions. He did not mention to Lopez and Canabe appellant's identity
because he was "confused" about what had happened in their house.

On March 25, 1994, the trial court rendered a Joint Judgment finding appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for two (2) counts of murder and disposing of Criminal Case Nos. P-2079 and P-
2080 as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, joint judgment is hereby rendered:

In Criminal Case No. P-2079, finding the accused PABLO ADOVISO guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER and imposing upon him the penalty
of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to pay the legal heirs of Rufino Agunos, consisting
of the widow, Evelyn T. Agunos and their four (4) children the sum of FIFTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) Philippine Currency;

In Criminal Case No. P-2080, likewise finding said accused PABLO ADOVISO guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER and imposing upon him another
penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to pay the legal heirs of the late EMETERIO
VASQUEZ, consisting of Anastacia Vasquez and Bonifacio Vasquez, another sum of
FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) Philippine Currency with all the accessory
penalties provided therefore in both cases and to pay the costs in both instances.

SO ORDERED. 9

Appellant hinges his bid for exoneration on whether he was properly identified by the two (2)
eyewitnesses as one of the killers of the victims. He contends that eyewitnesses Bonifacio and
Elmer Vasquez presented an "incredible" story because it is "highly improbable" that they could
have "distinctly and positively recognized accused-appellant as one of the perpetrators of the
crimes."   According to appellant, Bonifacio, who was in the dark portion of the yard hiding
10

behind a coconut tree, could not have identified appellant by the light emanating from gas lamp
inside the  camalig  where Emeterio Vasquez and Rufino Agunos were staying at the time of the
incident. Neither could Elmer Vasquez, who declared that he saw his grandfather shot by
appellant, could have identified appellant because of the poor lighting coming from the gas lamp
being carried by his grandfather. Appellant claims that the gas lamp carried by Elmer's
grandfather was "a small can about two (2) inches tall and the wick is smaller than a cigarette"
and the lamp inside the camalig  "was placed inside a bigger can so that the direction of the light
emanating therefrom was upwards and not sidewise."  11

Visibility is indeed a vital factor in the determination of whether or not an eyewitness could have
identified the perpetrator of a crime. However, it is settled that when conditions of visibility are
favorable, and the witnesses do not appear to be biased, their assertion as to the identity of the
malefactor should normally be accepted.   Illumination produced by kerosene lamp or a flashlight
12

is sufficient to allow identification of persons.   Wicklamps, flashlights, even moonlight or starlight

13
may, in proper situations be considered sufficient illumination, making the attack on the credibility
of witnesses solely on that ground unmeritorious.  14

In this case, not one (1) but two (2) gas lamps illuminated the place — the one placed inside
the camalig  and that held by Emeterio as he descended from the stairs after the first volley of
gunfire. Appellant's contention therefore that one particular gas lamp could not have lighted the
place because it was placed inside a can is puerile. Besides, Elmer was not describing either of the
gas lamps during the incident. The defense counsel at the trial and appellant's counsel
misunderstood the testimonies of Elmer and his grandmother on that matter. Thus, Elmer
testified:

ATTY. CORTES:

Q Is it not that the lamp you said placed along the door, which is
already marked as lamp, is that not this lamp was placed inside a
kerosene can as testified to by your grandmother so that the cat
could not cause it to fall?

A It was placed just on the floor not inside the can .   (Emphasis
15

supplied.)

For her part, Anastacia testified as follows.

ATTY. CORTES:

x x x           x x x          x x x

Q Because you were already about to retire, the doors and

windows were already closed, is that correct?

A Yes, sir.

Q That you also shut down or closed the light, is that correct?

A No, sir, we even placed the kerosene lamp inside a can.

Q You said, you placed the lamp inside a can so that the light is
going up, is that correct?

A Yes, sir.

Q So, the light was not illuminating sidewise because it was inside
a can?

A When we left,  I got the kerosene lamp and brought it with me .

ATTY. CORTES:
 I think, the witness did not get the question right, Your Honor.

COURT:

Repeat the question.

ATTY. CORTES:

Q My question Madam Witness is, when you were about to retire?

A The lamp was placed on the floor where my husband was

drinking coffee.

COURT :

Q Who are the persons you are referring to as having left when
you placed the light inside the can?

A My son, Bonifacio, and the policemen, Your Honor, when the(y)
brought Emeterio and Rufino to the hospital.   (emphasis supplied).
16

Clearly then, the lamp inside the camalig  was placed on the floor and a can was placed over it
only after the incident when Anastacia left with her son and the police to bring the victims to the
hospital.

The bamboo slats of the camalig  could not have effectively obstructed the eyewitnesses' view of
appellant, considering that the slats were built four (4) meters apart. Besides, it is the natural
reaction of relatives of victims to strive to observe the faces and appearance of the assailants, if
not ascertain their identities, and the manner in which the crime is committed.    A relative will
17

naturally be interested in identifying the malefactor to secure his conviction to obtain justice for
the death of his relative(s).   It must remembered that appellant was not a complete stranger to
18

the eyewitnesses. Bonifacio had known him for ten (10) years   while Elmer had been acquainted
19

with him for four (4) years. Elmer recalled that appellant used to join the rabuz at the
barracks.   Familiarity with appellant's face and appearance minimized if not erased the possibility
20

that they could have been mistaken as to his identity.

Appellant's allegation that it was "improbable" for him to have committed the crimes without a
mask, unlike the other participants, deserves scant consideration. It is not contrary to human
experience for a person to commit a crime before the very eyes of people who are familiar to
them. Indeed, some may even take pride in their identification as the perpetrator of a criminal
act.

Appellant also considers as a "positive sign," Bonifacio's failure to immediately identify him as the
perpetrator of the crime to the police.   The delay in reporting his participation to the police was
21

however sufficiently explained by Bonifacio. Bonifacio was afraid of appellant since the latter was
a member of the CAFGU and, as such, was provided with a gun. He was also hesitant in
identifying appellant immediately lest he got wind of his impending arrest and posthaste escaped
the clutches of the law. The failure of a witness to reveal at once the identity of the accused as
one of the perpetrators of the crime does not affect, much less, impair his credibility as a
witness.   The general or common rule is that witnesses react to a crime in different
22

ways.   There is no standard form of human behavioral response to a strange, startling and
23

frightful event, and there is no standard rule by which witnesses to a crime must react.  24

Issue/s:

Ruling:
There is no merit in appellant's contention that Bonifacio had a motive in implicating him.
According to appellant, Bonifacio suspected that he was hired by the Galicia family to kill
Bonifacio's father who had earlier won in a land dispute with the Galicias. It is irrelevant here to
talk of motive on the part of Bonifacio inasmuch as to credible witnesses had positively identified
appellant as one of the participants in the killing of Emeterio Vasquez and Rufino Agunos.

Appellant's alibi thus crumbles in the face of his positive identification as one of the perpetrators
of the crimes.   For an alibi to prosper, moreover, there must be proof that the defendant was not
25

only somewhere else when the crime was committed but that he could not be physically present
at the place of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission.   Appellant did
26

not prove the physical impossibility of his being in Sitio Tan-agan which is not exactly remote from
Sitio Palsong where he claimed to be when the incident happened. Both places are within the
Municipality of Bula. Appellant admitted that the distance between the two sitios  could be
negotiated in three hours even without any means of transportation.   On the other hand, his
27

alleged companion in Sitio Palsong, Antero Esteron, testified that the distance could be traveled in
thirty-five (35) minutes by "trimobile" or private vehicle. 
28

Apart from the fact that appellant's alibi was inherently weak, he was not even sure where he was
and who were his companions at the time the crimes were committed. We quote the observation
of the trial court on this point:

On the premise that the trial court rendered the judgment of conviction on the basis of "mere
conjectures and speculations,"   appellant argues that the negative result of the polygraph test
29

should be given weight to tilt the scales of justice in his favor.

A polygraph is an electromechanical instrument that simultaneously measures and records certain

physiological changes in the human body that are believed to be involuntarily caused by an
examinee's conscious attempt to deceive the questioner.   The theory behind a polygraph or lie
30

detector test is that a person who lie deliberately will have rising blood pressure and a
subconscious block in breathing, which will be recorded on the graph.   However, American courts
31

almost uniformly reject the results of polygraphs tests when offered in evidence for the purposes
of establishing the guilt or innocence of one accused of a crime, whether the accused or the
prosecution seeks its introduction, for the reason that polygraph has not as yet attained scientific
acceptance as a reliable and ascertaining truth or deception.   The rule is no different in this
32

jurisdiction. Thus, in People v.  Daniel,   stating that much faith and credit should not be vested
33

upon a lie detector test as it is not conclusive. Appellant, in this case, has not advanced any
reason why this rule should not apply to him.

Appellant was therefore correctly adjudged guilty of two counts of Murder. Treachery qualified the
killing to murder. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the
person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and
specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which offended
party might make.   In other words, there is treachery when the attack on an unarmed victim
34

who has not given the slightest provocation is sudden, unexpected and without warning.   The
35

victims in this case were totally unaware of an impending assault — Rufino was sleeping and
Emetario was going down the stairs when they were shot.

WHEREFORE, the Joint Judgment of the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED. 1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.
32. Tijing vs. Court of Appeals, 354 SCRA 17, G.R. No. 125901 March 8, 2001
Doctrines:
Parent and Child; Custody; Habeas Corpus; The writ of habeas corpus is the proper legal remedy to
enable parents to regain the custody of a minor child even if the latter be in the custody of a third
person of his own free will.—The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention
by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the
person entitled thereto. Thus, it is the proper legal remedy to enable parents to regain the custody of a minor
child even if the latter be in the custody of a third person of his own free will. It may even be said that in custody
cases involving minors, the question of illegal and involuntary restraint of liberty is not the underlying rationale for
the availability of the writ as a remedy. Rather, it is prosecuted for the purpose of determining the right of custody
over a child. It must be stressed too that in habeas corpus proceedings, the question of identity is relevant and
material, subject to the usual presumptions including those as to identity of the person.

Same; Same; Same; Petitioners must convincingly establish that the minor in whose behalf the
application for the writ is made is the person upon whom they have rightful custody, and if there is
doubt on the identity of the minor in whose behalf the application for the writ is made, petitioners
cannot invoke with certainty their right of custody over the said minor.—In this case, the minor’s identity
is crucial in determining the propriety of the writ sought. Thus, it must be resolved first whether the Edgardo
Tijing, Jr., claimed by Bienvenida to be her son, is the same minor named John Thomas Lopez, whom Angelita
insists to be her offspring. We must first determine who between Bienvenida and Angelita is the minor’s biological
mother. Evidence must necessarily be adduced to prove that two persons, initially thought of to be distinct and
separate from each other, are indeed one and the same. Petitioners must convincingly establish that the minor in
whose behalf the application for the writ is made is the person upon whom they have rightful custody. If there is
doubt on the identity of the minor in whose behalf the application for the writ is made, petitioners cannot invoke
with certainty their right of custody over the said minor.

Appeals; Evidence; Where the conclusions of the Court of Appeals con- tradict those of the trial
court, the Supreme Court may scrutinize the evidence on the record to determine which findings
should be preferred as more conformable to the evidentiary facts.—True, it is not the function of this
Court to examine and evaluate the probative value of all evidence presented to the concerned tribunal which
formed the basis of its impugned decision, resolution or order. But since the conclusions of the Court of Appeals
contradict those of the trial court, this Court may scrutinize the evidence on the record to determine which
findings should be preferred as more conformable to the evidentiary facts.

Parent and Child; Civil Registry; Birth Certificates; Evidence; Under the law, the attending physician
or midwife in attendance at birth should cause the registration of such birth, and only in default of
the physician or midwife can the parent register the birth of his child; A false entry in a birth
certificate regarding the alleged marriage between the parents of the child puts to doubt the other
data in said birth certificate.—We find unusual the fact that the birth certificate of John Thomas Lopez was
filed by Tomas Lopez instead of the midwife and on August 4, 1989, four months after the alleged birth of the
child. Under the law, the attending physician or midwife in attendance at birth should cause the registration of
such birth. Only in default of the physician or midwife, can the parent register the birth of his child. The certificate
must be filed with the local civil registrar within thirty days after the birth. Significantly, the birth certificate of the
child stated Tomas Lopez and private respondent were legally married on October 31, 1974, in Hagonoy, Bulacan,
which is false because even private respondent had admitted she is a “common-law wife.” This false entry puts to
doubt the other data in said birth certificate.

Same; Filiation; Evidence; Resemblance between a minor and his alleged parent is competent and
material evidence to establish parentage.—The trial court observed several times that when the child and
Bienvenida were both in court, the two had strong similarities in their faces, eyes, eyebrows and head shapes.
Resemblance between a minor and his alleged parent is competent and material evidence to establish parentage.
Needless to stress, the trial court’s conclusion should be given high respect, it having had the opportunity to
observe the physical appearances of the minor and petitioner concerned.

Same; Same; Same; DNA (Deoxyribonucleic Acid) Test; Parentage will still be resolved using
conventional methods unless we adopt the modern and scientific ways available; Being a novel
scientific technique, the use of DNA test as evidence is still open to challenge, but eventually, as the
appropriate case comes, courts should not hesitate to rule on the admissibility of DNA evidence;
Courts should apply the results of science when competently obtained in aid of situations presented,
since to reject said result is to deny progress.—A final note. Parentage will still be resolved using
conventional methods unless we adopt the modern and scientific ways available. Fortunately, we have now the
facility and expertise in using DNA test for identification and parentage testing. The University of the Philippines
Natural Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis Laboratory has now the capability to conduct DNA
typing using short tandem repeat (STR) analysis. The analysis is based on the fact that the DNA of a child/person
has two (2) copies, one copy from the mother and the other from the father. The DNA from the mother, the
alleged father and child are analyzed to establish parentage. Of course, being a novel scientific technique, the use
of DNA test as evidence is still open to challenge. Eventually, as the appropriate case comes, courts should not
hesitate to rule on the admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was said, that courts should apply the results of
science when competently obtained in aid of situations presented, since to reject said result is to deny progress.
Though it is not necessary in this case to resort to DNA testing, in future it would be useful to all concerned in the
prompt resolution of parentage and identity issues.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; “DNA” and “DNA Testing,” Explained.—DNA
(deoxyribonucleic acid) refers to the chain of molecules found in every cell of the body, except in red blood cells,
which transmit hereditary characteristics among individuals. DNA testing is synonymous to DNA typing, DNA
fingerprinting,
Facts:
For review is the decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 6, 1996, in CA-G.R. SP No. 39056,
reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court in a petition for habeas corpus of Edgardo
Tijing, Jr., allegedly the child of petitioners.

Petitioners are husband and wife. They have six children. The youngest is Edgardo Tijing, Jr., who
was born on April 27, 1989, at the clinic of midwife and registered nurse Lourdes Vasquez in Sta.
Ana, Manila. Petitioner Bienvenida served as the laundrywoman of private respondent Angelita
Diamante, then a resident of Tondo, Manila.

According to Bienvenida in August 1989, Angelita went to her house to fetch her for an urgent
laundry job. Since Bienvenida was on her way to do some marketing, she asked Angelita to wait
until she returned. She also left her four-month old son, Edgardo, Jr., under the care of Angelita
as she usually let Angelita take care of the child while Bienvenida was doing laundry.

When Bienvenida returned from the market, Angelita and Edgardo, Jr., were gone. Bienvenida
forthwith proceeded to Angelita's house in Tondo, Manila, but did not find them there. Angelita's
maid told Bienvenida that her employer went out for a stroll and told Bienvenida to come back
later. She returned to Angelita's house after three days, only to discover that Angelita had moved
to another place. Bienvenida then complained to her barangay chairman and also to the police
who seemed unmoved by her pleas for assistance.

Although estranged from her husband, Bienvenida could not imagine how her spouse would react
to the disappearance of their youngest child and this made her problem even more serious. As
fate would have it, Bienvenida and her husband reconciled and together, this time, they looked
for their missing son in other places. Notwithstanding their serious efforts, they saw no traces of
his whereabouts.

Four years later or in October 1993, Bienvenida read in a tabloid about the death of Tomas Lopez,
allegedly the common-law husband of Angelita, and whose remains were lying in state in
Hagonoy, Bulacan.

Bienvenida lost no time in going to Hagonoy, Bulacan, where she allegedly saw her son Edgardo,
Jr., for the first time after four years. She claims that the boy, who was pointed out to her by
Benjamin Lopez, a brother of the late Tomas Lopez, was already named John Thomas Lopez. 1 She
avers that Angelita refused to return to her the boy despite her demand to do so.

Bienvenida and Edgardo filed their petition for habeas corpus with the trial court in order to
recover their son. To substantiate their petition, petitioners presented two witnesses, namely,
Lourdes Vasquez and Benjamin Lopez. The first witness, Vasquez, testified that she assisted in the
delivery of one Edgardo Tijing, Jr. on April 27, 1989 at her clinic in Sta. Ana, Manila. She
supported her testimony with her clinical records. 2 The second witness, Benjamin Lopez, declared
that his brother, the late Tomas Lopez, could not have possibly fathered John Thomas Lopez as
the latter was sterile. He recalled that Tomas met an accident and bumped his private part
against the edge of a banca causing him excruciating pain and eventual loss of his child-bearing
capacity. Benjamin further declared that Tomas admitted to him that John Thomas Lopez was
only an adopted son and that he and Angelita were not blessed with children. 3

For her part, Angelita claimed that she is the natural mother of the child. She asserts that at age
42, she gave birth to John Thomas Lopez on April 27, 1989, at the clinic of midwife Zosima
Panganiban in Singalong, Manila. She added, though, that she has two other children with her
real husband, Angel Sanchez.4 She said the birth of John Thomas was registered by her common-
law husband, Tomas Lopez, with the local civil registrar of Manila on August 4, 1989.

On March 10, 1995, the trial court concluded that since Angelita and her common-law husband
could not have children, the alleged birth of John Thomas Lopez is an impossibility. 5 The trial
court also held that the minor and Bienvenida showed strong facial similarity. Accordingly, it ruled
that Edgardo Tijing, Jr., and John Thomas Lopez are one and the same person who is the natural
child of petitioners. The trial court decreed:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the

petition for Habeas Corpus, as such, respondent Angelita Diamante is ordered to
immediately release from her personal custody minor John Thomas D. Lopez, and turn
him over and/or surrender his person to petitioners, Spouses Edgardo A. Tijing and
Bienvenida R. Tijing, immediately upon receipt hereof.

Branch Sheriff of this Court, Carlos Bajar, is hereby commanded to implement the decision
of this Court by assisting herein petitioners in the recovery of the person of their minor
son, Edgardo Tijing Jr., the same person as John Thomas D. Lopez.

SO ORDERED.6

Angelita seasonably filed her notice of appeal.7 Nonetheless, on August 3, 1994, the sheriff
implemented the order of the trial court by taking custody of the minor. In his report, the sheriff
stated that Angelita peacefully surrendered the minor and he turned over the custody of said child
to petitioner Edgardo Tijing.8

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision rendered by the trial court.
The appellate court expressed its doubts on the propriety of the habeas corpus. In its view, the
evidence adduced by Bienvenida was not sufficient to establish that she was the mother of the
minor. It ruled that the lower court erred in declaring that Edgardo Tijing, Jr., and John Thomas
Lopez are one and the same person,9 and disposed of the case, thus:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the lower court dated March 10, 1995 is
hereby REVERSED, and a new one entered dismissing the petition in Spec. Proc. No. 94-
71606, and directing the custody of the minor John Thomas Lopez to be returned to
respondent Angelita Diamante, said minor having been under the care of said respondent
at the time of the filing of the petition herein.

SO ORDERED.10
Issue/s:
Petitioners sought reconsideration of the abovequoted decision which was denied. Hence, the
instant petition alleging:

THAT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR WHEN IT

DECLARED THAT THE PETITIONERS' ACTION FOR HABEAS CORPUS IS MERELY
SECONDARY TO THE QUESTION OF FILIATION THAT THE PETITIONERS HAD LIKEWISE
PROVEN.

II

THAT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF

THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR "HABEAS CORPUS" AND
DIRECTING THAT THE CUSTODY OF THE MINOR JOHN THOMAS LOPEZ WHO WAS
PROVEN TO THE SAME MINOR AS EDGARDO R. TIJING, JR., BE RETURNED TO THE
PRIVATE RESPONDENT.11

In our view, the crucial issues for resolution are the following:

(1) Whether or not habeas corpus is the proper remedy?

(2) Whether or not Edgardo Tijing, Jr., and John Thomas Lopez are one and the same
person and is the son of petitioners?

Ruling:
We shall discuss the two issues together since they are closely related.

The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any
person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from
the person entitled thereto.12 Thus, it is the proper legal remedy to enable parents to regain the
custody of a minor child even if the latter be in the custody of a third person of his own free will.
It may even be said that in custody cases involving minors, the question of illegal and involuntary
restraint of liberty is not the underlying rationale for the availability of the writ as a remedy.
Rather, it is prosecuted for the purpose of determining the right of custody over a child. 13 It must
be stressed too that in habeas corpus proceedings, the question of identity is relevant and
material, subject to the usual presumptions including those as to identity of the person.

In this case, the minor's identity is crucial in determining the propriety of the writ sought. Thus, it
must be resolved first whether the Edgardo Tijing, Jr., claimed by Bienvenida to be her son, is the
same minor named John Thomas Lopez, whom Angelita insists to be her offspring. We must first
determine who between Bienvenida and Angelita is the minor's biological mother. Evidence must
necessarily be adduced to prove that two persons, initially thought of to be distinct and separate
from each other, are indeed one and the same. 14 Petitioners must convincingly establish that the
minor in whose behalf the application for the writ is made is the person upon whom they have
rightful custody. If there is doubt on the identity of the minor in whose behalf the application for
the writ is made, petitioners cannot invoke with certainty their right of custody over the said
minor.

True, it is not the function of this Court to examine and evaluate the probative value of all
evidence presented to the concerned tribunal which formed the basis of its impugned decision,
resolution or order.15 But since the conclusions of the Court of Appeals contradict those of the trial
court, this Court may scrutinize the evidence on the record to determine which findings should be
preferred as more conformable to the evidentiary facts.

A close scrutiny of the records of this case reveals that the evidence presented by Bienvenida is
sufficient to establish that John Thomas Lopez is actually her missing son, Edgardo Tijing, Jr.

First, there is evidence that Angelita could no longer bear children. From her very lips, she
admitted that after the birth of her second child, she underwent ligation at the Martinez Hospital
in 1970, before she lived with Tomas Lopez without the benefit of marriage in 1974. Assuming
she had that ligation removed in 1978, as she claimed, she offered no evidence she gave birth to
a child between 1978 to 1988 or for a period of ten years. The midwife who allegedly delivered
the child was not presented in court. No clinical records, log book or discharge order from the
clinic were ever submitted.

Second, there is strong evidence which directly proves that Tomas Lopez is no longer capable of
siring a son. Benjamin Lopez declared in court that his brother, Tomas, was sterile because of the
accident and that Tomas admitted to him that John Thomas Lopez was only an adopted son.
Moreover, Tomas Lopez and his legal wife, Maria Rapatan Lopez, had no children after almost
fifteen years together. Though Tomas Lopez had lived with private respondent for fourteen years,
they also bore no offspring.

Third, we find unusual the fact that the birth certificate of John Thomas Lopez was filed by Tomas
Lopez instead of the midwife and on August 4, 1989, four months after the alleged birth of the
child. Under the law, the attending physician or midwife in attendance at birth should cause the
registration of such birth. Only in default of the physician or midwife, can the parent register the
birth of his child. The certificate must be filed with the local civil registrar within thirty days after
the birth.16 Significantly, the birth certificate of the child stated Tomas Lopez and private
respondent were legally married on October 31, 1974, in Hagonoy, Bulacan, which is false
because even private respondent had admitted she is a "common-law wife". 17 This false entry puts
to doubt the other data in said birth certificate.

Fourth, the trial court observed several times that when the child and Bienvenida were both in
court, the two had strong similarities in their faces, eyes, eyebrows and head shapes.
Resemblance between a minor and his alleged parent is competent and material evidence to
establish parentage.18 Needless to stress, the trial court's conclusion should be given high respect,
it having had the opportunity to observe the physical appearances of the minor and petitioner
concerned.

Fifth, Lourdes Vasquez testified that she assisted in Bienvenida's giving birth to Edgardo Tijing,
Jr., at her clinic. Unlike private respondent, she presented clinical records consisting of a log book,
discharge order and the signatures of petitioners.

All these considered, we are constrained to rule that subject minor is indeed the son of
petitioners. The writ of habeas corpus is proper to regain custody of said child.

A final note. Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt the
modern and scientific ways available. Fortunately, we have now the facility and expertise in using
DNA test19 for identification and parentage testing. The University of the Philippines Natural
Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis Laboratory has now the capability to conduct
DNA typing using short tandem repeat (STR) analysis. The analysis is based on the fact that the
DNA of a child/person has two (2) copies, one copy from the mother and the other from the
father. The DNA from the mother, the alleged father and child are analyzed to establish
parentage.20 Of course, being a novel scientific technique, the use of DNA test as evidence is still
open to challenge.21 Eventually, as the appropriate case comes, courts should not hesitate to rule
on the admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was said, that courts should apply the results of
science when competently obtained in aid of situations presented, since to reject said result is to
deny progress.22 Though it is not necessary in this case to resort to DNA testing, in future it would
be useful to all concerned in the prompt resolution of parentage and identity issues.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed DECISION of the Court of Appeals is
REVERSED and decision of the Regional Trial Court is REINSTATED. Costs against the private
respondent.

SO ORDERED.
 RULE 129 (WHAT NEED NOT BE PROVED)
33. In Re: Petition for Adoption of Jan Aurel Bulayo, October 1, 2019
Doctrines:

Facts:
The petitioners implore us to determine whether or not the illegitimate child of the spouse of
an adopting alien falls within the ambit of the clause "relative by consanguinity or affinity
within the fourth civil degree" contained in Section 7 (b)(i) and (iii), Article III, of Republic
Act No. 8552, otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998, which pertinently
provides:

SEC. 7. Who May Adopt. - The following may adopt:

xxxx

(b) Any alien possessing the same qualifications as above stated for Filipino nationals:
Provided, That his/her country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the Philippines,
that he/she has been living in the Philippines for at least three (3) continuous years prior to
the filing of the application for adoption and maintains such residence until the adoption
decree is entered, that he/she has been certified by his/her diplomatic or consular office or
any appropriate government agency that he/she has the legal capacity to adopt in his/her
country, and that his/her government allows the adoptee to enter his/her country as his/her
adopted son/daughter: Provided, further, That the requirements on residency and
certification of the alien's qualification to adopt in his/her country may be waived
for the following:

(i) a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative within the fourth (4th) degree
of consanguinity or affinity; or

(ii) one who seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of his/her Filipino spouse; or

(iii) one who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his/her
spouse a relative within the fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity of the
Filipino spouses; x x x. (Bold underscoring supplied for emphasis)

The Case

This appeal seeks to reverse and undo the judgment and order by the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 33, in Davao City on February 14, 20121 and January 22, 2013,2 respectively,
dismissing their petition for the adoption of the minor Jan Aurel Maghanoy Bulayo (Jan Aurel)
in SP. Proc. No. 10, 718-2010, and denying their motion for reconsideration.

Antecedents
The antecedent facts are as follows:

Spouses Mary Jane B. Kimura, a Filipino national, and Yuichiro Kimura, a Japanese national,
got married on June 12, 2004.

Prior thereto, petitioner Mary Jane gave birth to her son Jan Aurel on November 24, 1997.
However, she was not married to her son's biological father, Jun Baldoza, thus making Jan
Aurel her illegitimate child. Her last communication with the minor's father was when she was
four (4) months pregnant with [Jan Aurel]. From then on, she has no knowledge of his
whereabouts.

On March 15, 2009, petitioners filed a joint petition for adoption of Jan Aurel seeking, among
others, to have him declared as their legitimate son, enjoying the rights and observing the
duties of an adopted child as provided by law.

During trial, petitioners presented the Department of Social Welfare and Development Minor's
Case Study and Home Study Report which recommended approval of said petition.

Likewise, petitioners presented the following documents to show that they are in possession
of full civil capacity and legal rights to adopt, of good moral character, have not been
convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude, and emotionally and psychologically capable
of caring for children, x x x.3

Specifically, the petitioners presented the following documents to support their petition for
adoption, namely; (1) the marriage contract of the petitioners; (2) the permanent registration
in Japan of petitioner Yuichiro Kimura (Yuichiro); (3) the medical certificates issued to the
petitioners; (4) the neuro-psychological reports for the petitioners; (5) the certificates of
attendance in adoption orientation conducted by Department of Social Welfare and
Development (DSWD); (6) the NBI clearances issued to the petitioners; (7) the police
clearances of the petitioners; (8) the Prosecutor's clearances issued to the petitioners; (9) the
court clearances of the petitioners; (10) the income tax return of Yuichiro; (11) the certificate
of employment Yuichiro.

Nonetheless, on February 14, 2012, the RTC denied the petition for adoption because
Yuichiro, being a Japanese citizen, did not comply with the requirements laid down under
Section 7 of R.A. No. 8552 and Section 7 of Administrative Matter No. 02-6-02-SC. 4 The RTC
observed that Yuichiro was not exempt from the residency and certification requirements
under Section 7(b) of R.A. No. 8552 because Jan Aurel was the illegitimate child of co-
petitioner Mary Jane Kimura (Mary Jane).5

Hence, this direct appeal by petition for review on certiorari.

Issue/s:
Issues
The petitioners hereby raise the following questions of law, to wit:

(1) Whether or not an illegitimate child is within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity
in the contemplation of Section 7(b)(iii) of R.A. No. 8552;

(2) Whether or not an illegitimate child is contemplated in Section 7(b)(ii) of R.A. No. 8552;
and,

(3) Whether or not the existence of diplomatic relations between the Philippines and Japan is
within judicial notice of the courts.6

Decisive is the correct interpretation of Section 7(b)(i) and (iii) of R.A. No. 8552, particularly
the clause "a relative within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity" ?
Ruling:
Ruling of the Court

The appeal has merit.

I.
Section 7(b)(i) and (iii) of R.A. 8552 should
extend and apply even to illegitimate children

In contending that the RTC should have granted their petition for adoption, the petitioners
emphasize that they are exempt from the requirements for the reason that Jan Aurel was a
relative by consanguinity within the fourth civil degree of Mary Jane. They insist that Section
7 necessarily includes all relatives – whether legitimate or illegitimate – within the fourth
degree of consanguinity or affinity; that an illegitimate child is a relative within the first
degree of consanguinity of the biological mother or father; that excluding an illegitimate child
from the contemplation of Section 7(b)(i) and (iii) of R.A. No. 8552 is tantamount to saying
that it is easier for an alien spouse to jointly adopt with the Filipino spouse the latter's cousin,
a relative within the fourth degree, or the nephew or niece, a relative. within the third degree
of consanguinity or affinity,7 than the Filipino spouse's own biological child.

The petitioners' insistence is upheld.

A relative is either a "kinsman" or "a person connected with another by blood or

affinity."8 Under the Civil Code, the degree of relationship is determined as follows:

Relationship

ARTICLE 963. Proximity of relationship is determined by the number of generations. Each

generation forms a degree.

ARTICLE 964. A series of degrees forms a line, which may be either direct or collateral.

A direct line is that constituted by the series of degrees among ascendants and descendants.

xxxx

ARTICLE 965. The direct line is either descending or ascending.

xxxx

ARTICLE 966. In the line, as many degrees are counted as there are generations or persons,
excluding the progenitor.

In the direct line, ascent is made to the common ancestor. Thus, the child is one degree
removed from the parent, two from the grandfather, and three from the great-grandparent.

Pursuant to the foregoing, an illegitimate child is a relative within the first civil degree of
consanguinity of his biological mother. Unlike a nephew and niece, an illegitimate child
belongs to the direct maternal lineage, which is never uncertain, 9 and which is not as remote
as the nephew and niece. The word "child" referred to in Article 966 of the Civil Code is used
in a general term and is without qualification. This is so because the provision contemplates
blood relation, not status. When the provision does not distinguish between legitimate and
illegitimate relatives, we, too, must not. Let us adhere to the Latin maxim that declares: ubi
lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguera debemus (where the law does not distinguish, nor the
interpreter must distinguish).

To put more clarity on the legislative intent, we refer to the deliberations on Senate Bill No.
1523 (now, R.A. No. 8552) in identifying who can adopt and who may be adopted under
Section 7(b), Article III, of R.A. No. 8552, to wit:

The President. x x x

In respect to former Filipino citizen referred to in line 2 of page 6-- meaning the exception
where aliens may adopt-- why are relatives here limited to those by consanguinity and it does
not include those who are so by affinity?

Senator Santiago. This is a reflection of a native cultural bias, or prejudice in favor of blood

relations. This is a peculiarly Asian world view.

The President. So, the committee has no intention of expanding this to include relatives by
affinity.

Senator Santiago. If there are reasonable grounds for advancing an argument, the
committee would be happy to consider it.
The President. Up to what degree of relatives by consanguinity or affinity, up to what
degree?

Senator Santiago. Generally, in trial courts, this phrase is construed in an open-ended

way. As long as there is a tie of consanguinity, no matter how remote, then it falls
under the coverage of this exception.

The President. Is that the clear intention of this provision?

Senator Santiago. Yes, Mr. President.

xxxx

Senator Maceda. x x x

Now, I support the stand of the Senate President on the question of consanguinity or affinity,
especially if this former Filipino citizen is probably going to leave again. If the idea is, as
stated, to try to encourage more adoptions, especially for those who have some relations, the
matter of allowing relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth degree, in my
opinion, should be allowed.

So if the Senate President will propose that amendment, I shall certainly support it.

Now, still on page 6 (b) and (c), I see the difference here. It says:

"(b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child OR CHILDREN of his or her Filipino spouse;
[or]

"(c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his or her spouse
a relative by consanguinity of the latter."

This is basically the same except, probably, the difference is the joint adoption. Would that
be correct?

Senator Santiago. Under paragraph (b), the subject is only the legitimate child. But under
paragraph (c), the subject is a bigger group, because it covers relatives by consanguinity who
do not necessarily have to be children.

Senator Maceda. Exactly, Mr. President. On the other hand, a legitimate child is also within
the ambit of relative by consanguinity. Is that not correct?

Senator Santiago. That is correct, Mr. President.

x x x x10 (Emphasis supplied)

GONZALES AMENDMENTS
May the Chair offer this amendment? In line 3, delete the semicolon (;) and add the following
phrase: OR, AFFINITY WITHIN THE FOURTH CIVIL DEGREE.

Senator Santiago. May I please just clarify? It would now read: "...who seeks to adopt
a relative by consanguinity OR AFFINITY WITHIN THE FOURTH CIVIL DEGREE." So
the limitation on civil degree will apply to both consanguinity and affinity?

The President. That is correct. That is the intention of the amendment.

Senator Santiago. I am delighted to accept the amendment, Mr. President.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the amendment is

approved.11

Although Senate Bill No. 1523 originally indicated that the exception should only cover
relatives by consanguinity, the lawmakers were in agreement during the period of individual
amendments to include the phrase "or affinity within the fourth civil degree"  in order to
expand the coverage to more children or relatives under the preferential exception embodied
in Section 7. The reason was stated in Section 2 of the law, which declares that it is the
State's policy "to ensure that every child remains under the care and custody of his/her
parent(s) and be provided with love, care, understanding and security towards the full and
harmonious development of his/her personality."

R.A. No. 8552 undoubtedly intended to include Jan Aurel, the biological child of Mary Jane, in
the term "relatives" under Section 7(b)(iii) because he was her relative within the first civil
degree. Finding otherwise would engender a situation where the alien adopter would be able
to undergo a speedy and less expensive adoption process by being able to adopt, say, his
Filipina spouse's nephew or niece instead of the Filipino spouse's own child.

It is relevant to note that the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) joins the petitioners'
position, and emphasizes that "if the law exempts the alien adopter from residency and
certification requirements if he/she will adopt the brother/sister, nephew/niece or cousin of
his/her Filipino spouse (who are within the 4th civil degree of consanguinity or affinity), then
there is no reason to exclude the application of the said exemption if the adoptee is the
illegitimate child of the said Filipino spouse." 12

At any rate, had the legislators intended that only the legitimate children were contemplated
by Section 7(b)(i) and (iii), then Congress should have been written the law as explicitly.
Indeed, Congress did so in Section 7(b)(ii)13 by including the term "legitimate" to describe the
children contemplated by that clause. Section 7(b)(i) and (iii) clearly covered both legitimate
and illegitimate relatives as long as they were within the fourth civil degree of
consanguinity or affinity.

II
Courts may take judicial notice
 of the existence of diplomatic relations
between the Philippines and Japan

The petitioners assert that their petition for adoption has indicated the existence of the
diplomatic relations between Philippines and Japan, but they did not anymore prove the same
during the trial because the existence of such diplomatic relations was within the judicial
notice of the courts.14

The OSG has not refuted the petitioners' assertion.

Section 1 and Section 2, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court state:

Section 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. — A court shall take judicial notice, without the
introduction of evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states, their political
history, forms of government and symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty
and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political constitution and history of the
Philippines, the official acts of legislative, executive and judicial departments of the
Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the geographical divisions. (1a)

Section 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary. — A court may take judicial notice of matters
which are of public knowledge, or are capable to unquestionable demonstration, or ought to
be known to judges because of their judicial functions.

The courts of the Philippines are bound to take judicial notice of the existence of the
diplomatic relations between our country and Japan pursuant to both Section 1 and Section
2, supra. Diplomatic relations form part of the official acts of the Executive Department of our
Government. They are also matters of public knowledge.

There is no dispute, indeed, that the Philippines and Japan have had a long history of
diplomatic relations.15 In 1888, Japan already established a diplomatic office in Manila, and
expanded it as a Consulate General in 1919. Eventually, Japan declared its office in Manila an
embassy in 1943 during the Japanese occupation of the country. Both countries were also
signatories to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, an indication that they wished
to have a more prominent diplomatic presence in each other by sending of diplomatic
missions. This further shows that both countries, being signatories to the Vienna Convention,
aimed to have the representation of the interests of the sending state and promoting friendly
relations with the receiving state.16 The countless efforts to maintain their diplomatic relations
no longer required the presentation of proof of the existence of diplomatic relations.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for review

on certiorari; REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the judgment and order rendered, respectively,
on February 14, 2012 and January 22, 2013 by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33, in Davao
City in SP. Proc. No. 10, 718-2010; GRANTS the petition for adoption; DECLARES that
henceforth, JAN AUREL MAGHANOY BULAYO, is freed from all legal obligations of
obedience and maintenance with respect to his biological father, and shall be, to all intents
and purposes, the child of the Spouses Mary Jane B. Kimura and Yuichiro Kimura, with his
surname to be changed to KIMURA.

Let a copy of this decision be each furnished to the Office of the Solicitor General; the
Department of Social Welfare and Development, Regional Office, Region XI, in Davao City;
and the Local Civil Registrar of Davao City.

No pronouncement on costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.