G.R. No.

179267, June 25, 2013

JESUS C. GARCIA, Petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE RAY ALAN T. DRILON, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT-BRANCH 41, BACOLOD CITY, AND ROSALIE JAYPE-GARCIA, FOR
HERSELF IN BEHALF OF MINOR CHILDREN, NAMELY: JO-ANN, JOSEPH AND
EDUARD, JESSE ANTHONE, ALL SURNAMED GARCIA, Respondents.

ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 9262 is discriminatory, unjust, and violative of the equal protection clause

FACTS:
 Petitioner Jesus Garcia (husband) admitted having an affair with a bank manager. His
infidelity emotionally wounded private respondent which spawned several quarrels
that left respondent wounded. Petitioner also unconscionably beat up their daughter,
Jo-ann.

 The private respondent was determined to separate from petitioner. But she was
afraid he would take away their children and deprive her of financial support. He
warned her that if she pursued legal battle, she would not get a single centavo from
him. After she confronted him of his affair, he forbade her to hold office. This
deprived her of access to full information about their businesses. Hence, no source of
income.

 Thus, the RTC found reasonable ground to believe there was imminent danger of
violence against respondent and her children and issued a series of Temporary
Protection Orders (TPO) pursuant to RA 9262.

 Republic Act No. 9262 is a landmark legislation that defines and criminalizes acts of
violence against women and their children (VAWC) perpetrated by women's intimate
partners.

 Petitioner hence, challenged the constitutionality of RA 9262 on making a gender-

based classification.
RULING:
No. The equal protection clause in our Constitution does not guarantee an absolute prohibition
against classification. The non-identical treatment of women and men under RA 9262 is justified
to put them on equal footing and to give substance to the policy and aim of the state to ensure the
equality of women and men in light of the biological, historical, social, and culturally endowed
differences between men and women.

RA 9262, by affording special and exclusive protection to women and children, who are
vulnerable victims of domestic violence, undoubtedly serves the important governmental
objectives of protecting human rights, ensuring gender equality, and empowering women. The
gender-based classification and the special remedies prescribed by said law in favor of women
and children are substantially related, in fact essentially necessary, to achieve such objectives.
Hence, said Act survives the intermediate review or middle-tier judicial scrutiny. The gender-
based classification therein is therefore not violative of the equal protection clause embodied in
the 1987 Constitution.

***Excerpt from Ms. Manilao’s Reference Copy 😊 ***

R.A. 9262 is based on a valid classification and, as such, did not

violate the equal protection clause by favoring women over men as

victims of violence and abuse to whom the State extends its

protection.

1. The unequal power relationship between women and men;

the fact that women are more likely than men to be victims of

violence; and the widespread gender bias and prejudice

against women all make for real differences justifying the

classification under the law;

2. The distinction between men and women is germane to the

purpose of R.A. 9262, which is to address violence

committed against women and children, spelled out in its

Declaration of Policy;

3. The application of R.A. 9262 is not limited to the existing

 conditions when it was promulgated, but to future conditions

as well, for as long as the safety and security of women and

their children are threatened by violence and abuse.

4. R.A. 9262 applies equally to all women and children who

suffer violence and abuse.

G.R. No. 179267, June 25, 2013

JESUS C. GARCIA, Petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE RAY ALAN T. DRILON,

PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT-BRANCH 41, BACOLOD CITY,
AND ROSALIE JAYPE-GARCIA, FOR HERSELF IN BEHALF OF MINOR
CHILDREN, NAMELY: JO-ANN, JOSEPH AND EDUARD, JESSE ANTHONE, ALL
SURNAMED GARCIA, Respondents.
DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Hailed as the bastion of Christianity in Asia, the Philippines boasts of 86.8 million Filipinos -or
93 percent of a total population of 93.3 million - adhering to the teachings of Jesus Christ.1 Yet,
the admonition for husbands to love their wives as their own bodies just as Christ loved the
church and gave himself up for her2 failed to prevent, or even to curb, the pervasiveness of
violence against Filipino women. The National Commission on the Role of Filipino Women
(NCRFW) reported that, for the years 2000-2003, "female violence comprised more than 90% of
all forms of abuse and violence and more than 90% of these reported cases were committed by
the women's intimate partners such as their husbands and live-in partners.”3

Thus, on March 8, 2004, after nine (9) years of spirited advocacy by women's groups, Congress
enacted Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, entitled “An Act Defining Violence Against Women and
Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor,
and for Other Purposes.” It took effect on March 27, 2004.4

R.A. 9262 is a landmark legislation that defines and criminalizes acts of violence against women
and their children (VAWC) perpetrated by women's intimate partners, i.e, husband; former
husband; or any person who has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom the woman
has a common child.5 The law provides for protection orders from the barangay and the courts to
prevent the commission of further acts of VAWC; and outlines the duties and responsibilities of
barangay officials, law enforcers, prosecutors and court personnel, social workers, health care
providers, and other local government officials in responding to complaints of VAWC or
requests for assistance.

A husband is now before the Court assailing the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 as being violative
of the equal protection and due process clauses, and an undue delegation of judicial power to
barangay officials.
The Factual Antecedents

On March 23, 2006, Rosalie Jaype-Garcia (private respondent) filed, for herself and in behalf of
her minor children, a verified petition6 (Civil Case No. 06-797) before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Bacolod City for the issuance of a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) against her
husband, Jesus C. Garcia (petitioner), pursuant to R.A. 9262. She claimed to be a victim of
physical abuse; emotional, psychological, and economic violence as a result of marital infidelity
on the part of petitioner, with threats of deprivation of custody of her children and of financial
support.7

Private respondent's claims

Private respondent married petitioner in 2002 when she was 34 years old and the former was
eleven years her senior. They have three (3) children, namely: Jo-Ann J. Garcia, 17 years old,
who is the natural child of petitioner but whom private respondent adopted; Jessie Anthone J.
Garcia, 6 years old; and Joseph Eduard J. Garcia, 3 years old.8

Private respondent described herself as a dutiful and faithful wife, whose life revolved around
her husband. On the other hand, petitioner, who is of Filipino-Chinese descent, is dominant,
controlling, and demands absolute obedience from his wife and children. He forbade private
respondent to pray, and deliberately isolated her from her friends. When she took up law, and
even when she was already working part time at a law office, petitioner trivialized her ambitions
and prevailed upon her to just stay at home. He was often jealous of the fact that his attractive
wife still catches the eye of some men, at one point threatening that he would have any man
eyeing her killed.9

Things turned for the worse when petitioner took up an affair with a bank manager of Robinson's
Bank, Bacolod City, who is the godmother of one of their sons. Petitioner admitted to the affair
when private respondent confronted him about it in 2004. He even boasted to the household help
about his sexual relations with said bank manager. Petitioner told private respondent, though,
that he was just using the woman because of their accounts with the bank.10
Petitioner's infidelity spawned a series of fights that left private respondent physically and
emotionally wounded. In one of their quarrels, petitioner grabbed private respondent on both
arms and shook her with such force that caused bruises and hematoma. At another time,
petitioner hit private respondent forcefully on the lips that caused some bleeding. Petitioner
sometimes turned his ire on their daughter, Jo-Ann, who had seen the text messages he sent to
his paramour and whom he blamed for squealing on him. He beat Jo-Ann on the chest and
slapped her many times. When private respondent decided to leave petitioner, Jo-Ann begged her
mother to stay for fear that if the latter leaves, petitioner would beat her up. Even the small boys
are aware of private respondent's sufferings. Their 6- year-old son said that when he grows up,
he would beat up his father because of his cruelty to private respondent.11

All the emotional and psychological turmoil drove private respondent to the brink of despair. On
December 17, 2005, while at home, she attempted suicide by cutting her wrist. She was found by
her son bleeding on the floor. Petitioner simply fled the house instead of taking her to the
hospital. Private respondent was hospitalized for about seven (7) days in which time petitioner
never bothered to visit, nor apologized or showed pity on her. Since then, private respondent has
been undergoing therapy almost every week and is taking anti-depressant medications.12

When private respondent informed the management of Robinson's Bank that she intends to file
charges against the bank manager, petitioner got angry with her for jeopardizing the manager's
job. He then packed his things and told private respondent that he was leaving her for good. He
even told private respondent's mother, who lives with them in the family home, that private
respondent should just accept his extramarital affair since he is not cohabiting with his paramour
and has not sired a child with her.13

Private respondent is determined to separate from petitioner but she is afraid that he would take
her children from her and deprive her of financial support. Petitioner had previously warned her
that if she goes on a legal battle with him, she would not get a single centavo.14
Petitioner controls the family businesses involving mostly the construction of deep wells. He is
the President of three corporations – 326 Realty Holdings, Inc., Negros Rotadrill Corporation,
and J-Bros Trading Corporation – of which he and private respondent are both stockholders. In
contrast to the absolute control of petitioner over said corporations, private respondent merely
draws a monthly salary of P20,000.00 from one corporation only, the Negros Rotadrill
Corporation. Household expenses amounting to not less than P200,000.00 a month are paid for
by private respondent through the use of credit cards, which, in turn, are paid by the same
corporation together with the bills for utilities.15

On the other hand, petitioner receives a monthly salary of P60,000.00 from Negros Rotadrill
Corporation, and enjoys unlimited cash advances and other benefits in hundreds of thousands of
pesos from the corporations.16 After private respondent confronted him about the affair,
petitioner forbade her to hold office at JBTC Building, Mandalagan, where all the businesses of
the corporations are conducted, thereby depriving her of access to full information about said
businesses. Until the filing of the petition a quo, petitioner has not given private respondent an
accounting of the businesses the value of which she had helped raise to millions of pesos.17

Action of the RTC of Bacolod City

Finding reasonable ground to believe that an imminent danger of violence against the private
respondent and her children exists or is about to recur, the RTC issued a TPO18 on March 24,
2006 effective for thirty (30) days, which is quoted hereunder:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

Respondent (petitioner herein), Jesus Chua Garcia, is hereby:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

a) Ordered to remove all his personal belongings from the conjugal dwelling or family home
within 24 hours from receipt of the Temporary Restraining Order and if he refuses, ordering that
he be removed by police officers from the conjugal dwelling; this order is enforceable
notwithstanding that the house is under the name of 236 Realty Holdings Inc. (Republic Act No.
9262 states “regardless of ownership”), this is to allow the Petitioner (private respondent herein)
to enter the conjugal dwelling without any danger from the Respondent.

After the Respondent leaves or is removed from the conjugal dwelling, or anytime the Petitioner
decides to return to the conjugal dwelling to remove things, the Petitioner shall be assisted by
police officers when re-entering the family home.
The Chief of Police shall also give the Petitioner police assistance on Sunday, 26 March 2006
because of the danger that the Respondent will attempt to take her children from her when he
arrives from Manila and finds out about this suit.

b) To stay away from the petitioner and her children, mother and all her household help and
driver from a distance of 1,000 meters, and shall not enter the gate of the subdivision where the
Petitioner may be temporarily residing.

c) Not to harass, annoy, telephone, contact or otherwise communicate with the Petitioner,
directly or indirectly, or through other persons, or contact directly or indirectly her children,
mother and household help, nor send gifts, cards, flowers, letters and the like. Visitation rights to
the children may be subject of a modified TPO in the future.

d) To surrender all his firearms including a .9MM caliber firearm and a Walther PPK and
ordering the Philippine National Police Firearms and Explosives Unit and the Provincial Director
of the PNP to cancel all the Respondent's firearm licenses. He should also be ordered to
surrender any unlicensed firearms in his possession or control.

e) To pay full financial support for the Petitioner and the children, including rental of a house for
them, and educational and medical expenses.

f) Not to dissipate the conjugal business.

g) To render an accounting of all advances, benefits, bonuses and other cash he received from all
the corporations from 1 January 2006 up to 31 March 2006, which himself and as President of
the corporations and his Comptroller, must submit to the Court not later than 2 April 2006.
Thereafter, an accounting of all these funds shall be reported to the court by the Comptroller,
copy furnished to the Petitioner, every 15 days of the month, under pain of Indirect Contempt of
Court.

h) To ensure compliance especially with the order granting support pendente lite, and
considering the financial resources of the Respondent and his threat that if the Petitioner sues she
will not get a single centavo, the Respondent is ordered to put up a BOND TO KEEP THE
PEACE in the amount of FIVE MILLION PESOS, in two sufficient sureties.
On April 24, 2006, upon motion19 of private respondent, the trial court issued an amended
TPO,20 effective for thirty (30) days, which included the following additional
provisions:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

i) The petitioners (private respondents herein) are given the continued use of the Nissan Patrol
and the Starex Van which they are using in Negros Occidental.

j) The petitioners are given the continued use and occupation of the house in Parañaque, the
continued use of the Starex van in Metro Manila, whenever they go to Manila.

k) Respondent is ordered to immediately post a bond to keep the peace, in two sufficient sureties.

l) To give monthly support to the petitioner provisionally fixed in the sum of One Hundred Fifty
Thousand Pesos (Php 150,000.00) per month plus rental expenses of Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php
50,000.00) per month until the matter of support could be finally resolved.

Two days later, or on April 26, 2006, petitioner filed an Opposition to the Urgent Ex-Parte
Motion for Renewal of the TPO21 seeking the denial of the renewal of the TPO on the grounds
that it did not (1) comply with the three-day notice rule, and (2) contain a notice of hearing. He
further asked that the TPO be modified by (1) removing one vehicle used by private respondent
and returning the same to its rightful owner, the J-Bros Trading Corporation, and (2) cancelling
or reducing the amount of the bond from P5,000,000.00 to a more manageable level at
P100,000.00.

Subsequently, on May 23, 2006, petitioner moved22 for the modification of the TPO to allow
him visitation rights to his children.

On May 24, 2006, the TPO was renewed and extended yet again, but subject only to the
following modifications prayed for by private respondent:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
a) That respondent (petitioner herein) return the clothes and other personal belongings of Rosalie
and her children to Judge Jesus Ramos, co-counsel for Petitioner, within 24 hours from receipt of
the Temporary Protection Order by his counsel, otherwise be declared in Indirect Contempt of
Court;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

b) Respondent shall make an accounting or list of furniture and equipment in the conjugal house
in Pitimini St., Capitolville Subdivision, Bacolod City within 24 hours from receipt of the
Temporary Protection Order by his counsel;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

c) Ordering the Chief of the Women's Desk of the Bacolod City Police Headquarters to remove
Respondent from the conjugal dwelling within eight (8) hours from receipt of the Temporary
Protection Order by his counsel, and that he cannot return until 48 hours after the petitioners
have left, so that the petitioner Rosalie and her representatives can remove things from the
conjugal home and make an inventory of the household furniture, equipment and other things in
the conjugal home, which shall be submitted to the Court.

d) Deliver full financial support of Php200,000.00 and Php50,000.00 for rental and
Php25,000.00 for clothes of the three petitioners (sic) children within 24 hours from receipt of
the Temporary Protection Order by his counsel, otherwise be declared in indirect contempt of
Court;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

e) That respondent surrender his two firearms and all unlicensed firearms to the Clerk of Court
within 24 hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by his
counsel;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

f) That respondent shall pay petitioner educational expenses of the children upon presentation of
proof of payment of such expenses.23

Claiming that petitioner continued to deprive them of financial support; failed to faithfully
comply with the TPO; and committed new acts of harassment against her and their children,
private respondent filed another application24 for the issuance of a TPO ex parte. She alleged
inter alia that petitioner contrived a replevin suit against himself by J-Bros Trading, Inc., of
which the latter was purportedly no longer president, with the end in view of recovering the
Nissan Patrol and Starex Van used by private respondent and the children. A writ of replevin was
served upon private respondent by a group of six or seven policemen with long firearms that
scared the two small boys, Jessie Anthone and Joseph Eduard.25

While Joseph Eduard, then three years old, was driven to school, two men allegedly attempted to
kidnap him, which incident traumatized the boy resulting in his refusal to go back to school. On
another occasion, petitioner allegedly grabbed their daughter, Jo-Ann, by the arm and threatened
her.26 The incident was reported to the police, and Jo-Ann subsequently filed a criminal
complaint against her father for violation of R.A. 7610, also known as the “Special Protection of
Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act.”

Aside from the replevin suit, petitioner's lawyers initiated the filing by the housemaids working
at the conjugal home of a complaint for kidnapping and illegal detention against private
respondent. This came about after private respondent, armed with a TPO, went to said home to
get her and her children's belongings. Finding some of her things inside a housemaid's (Sheryl
Jamola) bag in the maids' room, private respondent filed a case for qualified theft against
Jamola.27

On August 23, 2006, the RTC issued a TPO,28 effective for thirty (30) days, which reads as
follows:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

Respondent (petitioner herein), Jesus Chua Garcia, is hereby:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

1) Prohibited from threatening to commit or committing, personally or through another, acts of

violence against the offended party;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

2) Prohibited from harassing, annoying, telephoning, contacting or otherwise communicating in

any form with the offended party, either directly or indirectly;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
3) Required to stay away, personally or through his friends, relatives, employees or agents, from
all the Petitioners Rosalie J. Garcia and her children, Rosalie J. Garcia's three brothers, her
mother Primitiva Jaype, cook Novelita Caranzo, driver Romeo Hontiveros, laundrywoman
Mercedita Bornales, security guard Darwin Gayona and the petitioner's other household helpers
from a distance of 1,000 meters, and shall not enter the gate of the subdivision where the
Petitioners are temporarily residing, as well as from the schools of the three children;
Furthermore, that respondent shall not contact the schools of the children directly or indirectly in
any manner including, ostensibly to pay for their tuition or other fees directly, otherwise he will
have access to the children through the schools and the TPO will be rendered
nugatory;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

4) Directed to surrender all his firearms including .9MM caliber firearm and a Walther PPK to
the Court;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

5) Directed to deliver in full financial support of Php200,000.00 a month and Php50,000.00 for
rental for the period from August 6 to September 6, 2006; and support in arrears from March
2006 to August 2006 the total amount of Php1,312,000.00;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

6) Directed to deliver educational expenses for 2006-2007 the amount of Php75,000.00 and
Php25,000.00;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

7) Directed to allow the continued use of a Nissan Patrol with Plate No. FEW 508 and a Starex
van with Plate No. FFD 991 and should the respondent fail to deliver said vehicles, respondent is
ordered to provide the petitioner another vehicle which is the one taken by J Bros
Tading;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

8) Ordered not to dissipate, encumber, alienate, sell, lease or otherwise dispose of the conjugal
assets, or those real properties in the name of Jesus Chua Garcia only and those in which the
conjugal partnership of gains of the Petitioner Rosalie J. Garcia and respondent have an interest
in, especially the conjugal home located in No. 14, Pitimini St., Capitolville Subdivision,
Bacolod City, and other properties which are conjugal assets or those in which the conjugal
partnership of gains of Petitioner Rosalie J. Garcia and the respondent have an interest in and
listed in Annexes “I,” “I-1,” and “I-2,” including properties covered by TCT Nos. T-186325 and
T-168814;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

9) Ordered that the Register of Deeds of Bacolod City and E.B. Magalona shall be served a copy
of this TEMPORARY PROTECTION ORDER and are ordered not to allow the transfer, sale,
encumbrance or disposition of these above-cited properties to any person, entity or corporation
without the personal presence of petitioner Rosalie J. Garcia, who shall affix her signature in the
presence of the Register of Deeds, due to the fear of petitioner Rosalie that her signature will be
forged in order to effect the encumbrance or sale of these properties to defraud her or the
conjugal partnership of gains.

In its Order29 dated September 26, 2006, the trial court extended the aforequoted TPO for
another ten (10) days, and gave petitioner a period of five (5) days within which to show cause
why the TPO should not be renewed, extended, or modified. Upon petitioner's manifestation,30
however, that he has not received a copy of private respondent's motion to modify/renew the
TPO, the trial court directed in its Order31 dated October 6, 2006 that petitioner be furnished a
copy of said motion. Nonetheless, an Order32 dated a day earlier, October 5, had already been
issued renewing the TPO dated August 23, 2006. The pertinent portion is quoted
hereunder:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

xxxx

x x x it appearing further that the hearing could not yet be finally terminated, the Temporary
Protection Order issued on August 23, 2006 is hereby renewed and extended for thirty (30) days
and continuously extended and renewed for thirty (30) days, after each expiration, until further
orders, and subject to such modifications as may be ordered by the court.

After having received a copy of the foregoing Order, petitioner no longer submitted the required
comment to private respondent's motion for renewal of the TPO arguing that it would only be an
“exercise in futility.”33

Proceedings before the CA

During the pendency of Civil Case No. 06-797, petitioner filed before the Court of Appeals (CA)
a petition34 for prohibition (CA-G.R. CEB- SP. No. 01698), with prayer for injunction and
temporary restraining order, challenging (1) the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 for being violative
of the due process and the equal protection clauses, and (2) the validity of the modified TPO
issued in the civil case for being “an unwanted product of an invalid law.”

On May 26, 2006, the appellate court issued a 60-day Temporary Restraining Order35 (TRO)
against the enforcement of the TPO, the amended TPOs and other orders pursuant thereto.
Subsequently, however, on January 24, 2007, the appellate court dismissed36 the petition for
failure of petitioner to raise the constitutional issue in his pleadings before the trial court in the
civil case, which is clothed with jurisdiction to resolve the same. Secondly, the challenge to the
validity of R.A. 9262 through a petition for prohibition seeking to annul the protection orders
issued by the trial court constituted a collateral attack on said law.

His motion for reconsideration of the foregoing Decision having been denied in the Resolution37
dated August 14, 2007, petitioner is now before us alleging that –

The Issues

I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION ON THE THEORY

THAT THE ISSUE OF CONSTITUTIONALITY WAS NOT RAISED AT THE EARLIEST
OPPORTUNITY AND THAT, THE PETITION CONSTITUTES A COLLATERAL ATTACK
ON THE VALIDITY OF THE LAW.

II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN FAILING TO CONCLUDE

THAT R.A. 9262 IS DISCRIMINATORY, UNJUST, AND VIOLATIVE OF THE EQUAL
PROTECTION CLAUSE.

III.

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE MISTAKE IN NOT FINDING THAT

R.A. 9262 RUNS COUNTER TO THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION.
IV.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE LAW DOES VIOLENCE
TO THE POLICY OF THE STATE TO PROTECT THE FAMILY AS A BASIC SOCIAL
INSTITUTION.

V.

THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT DECLARING R.A. No. 9262 AS
INVALID AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT ALLOWS AN UNDUE
DELEGATION OF JUDICIAL POWER TO THE BARANGAY
OFFICIALS.38nadcralavvonlinelawlibrary

The Ruling of the Court

Before delving into the arguments propounded by petitioner against the constitutionality of R.A.
9262, we shall first tackle the propriety of the dismissal by the appellate court of the petition for
prohibition (CA-G.R. CEB-SP. No. 01698) filed by petitioner.

As a general rule, the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity so
that if not raised in the pleadings, ordinarily it may not be raised in the trial, and if not raised in
the trial court, it will not be considered on appeal.39 Courts will not anticipate a question of
constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it.40

In defending his failure to attack the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 before the RTC of Bacolod
City, petitioner argues that the Family Court has limited authority and jurisdiction that is
“inadequate to tackle the complex issue of constitutionality.”41

We disagree.

Family Courts have authority and jurisdiction

to consider the constitutionality of a statute.

At the outset, it must be stressed that Family Courts are special courts, of the same level as
Regional Trial Courts. Under R.A. 8369, otherwise known as the “Family Courts Act of 1997,”
family courts have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of domestic violence
against women and children.42 In accordance with said law, the Supreme Court designated from
among the branches of the Regional Trial Courts at least one Family Court in each of several key
cities identified.43 To achieve harmony with the first mentioned law, Section 7 of R.A. 9262
now provides that Regional Trial Courts designated as Family Courts shall have original and
exclusive jurisdiction over cases of VAWC defined under the latter law,
viz:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

SEC. 7. Venue. – The Regional Trial Court designated as a Family Court shall have original and
exclusive jurisdiction over cases of violence against women and their children under this law. In
the absence of such court in the place where the offense was committed, the case shall be filed in
the Regional Trial Court where the crime or any of its elements was committed at the option of
the complainant. (Emphasis supplied)

Inspite of its designation as a family court, the RTC of Bacolod City remains possessed of
authority as a court of general original jurisdiction to pass upon all kinds of cases whether civil,
criminal, special proceedings, land registration, guardianship, naturalization, admiralty or
insolvency.44 It is settled that RTCs have jurisdiction to resolve the constitutionality of a
statute,45 “this authority being embraced in the general definition of the judicial power to
determine what are the valid and binding laws by the criterion of their conformity to the
fundamental law.”46 The Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to declare
the constitutionality or validity of a law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential
decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation not only in this Court, but in all RTCs.47 We
said in J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v. CA48 that, “[p]lainly the Constitution contemplates that the
inferior courts should have jurisdiction in cases involving constitutionality of any treaty or law,
for it speaks of appellate review of final judgments of inferior courts in cases where such
constitutionality happens to be in issue.” Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution reads in
part as follows:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

SEC. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

xxx
2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of
Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

a. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive
agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is
in question.

xxxx

Thus, contrary to the posturing of petitioner, the issue of constitutionality of R.A. 9262 could
have been raised at the earliest opportunity in his Opposition to the petition for protection order
before the RTC of Bacolod City, which had jurisdiction to determine the same, subject to the
review of this Court.

Section 20 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the Rule on Violence Against Women and Their Children,
lays down a new kind of procedure requiring the respondent to file an opposition to the petition
and not an answer.49 Thus:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

SEC. 20. Opposition to petition. – (a) The respondent may file an opposition to the petition
which he himself shall verify. It must be accompanied by the affidavits of witnesses and shall
show cause why a temporary or permanent protection order should not be issued.

(b) Respondent shall not include in the opposition any counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party
complaint, but any cause of action which could be the subject thereof may be litigated in a
separate civil action. (Emphasis supplied)

We cannot subscribe to the theory espoused by petitioner that, since a counterclaim, cross-claim
and third-party complaint are to be excluded from the opposition, the issue of constitutionality
cannot likewise be raised therein. A counterclaim is defined as any claim for money or other
relief which a defending party may have against an opposing party.50 A cross- claim, on the
other hand, is any claim by one party against a co-party arising out of the transaction or
occurrence that is the subject matter either of the original action or of a counterclaim therein.51
Finally, a third-party complaint is a claim that a defending party may, with leave of court, file
against a person not a party to the action for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other
relief, in respect of his opponent's claim.52 As pointed out by Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De
Castro, the unconstitutionality of a statute is not a cause of action that could be the subject of a
counterclaim, cross-claim or a third-party complaint. Therefore, it is not prohibited from being
raised in the opposition in view of the familiar maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius.

Moreover, it cannot be denied that this issue affects the resolution of the case a quo because the
right of private respondent to a protection order is founded solely on the very statute the validity
of which is being attacked53 by petitioner who has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a
result of its enforcement. The alleged unconstitutionality of R.A. 9262 is, for all intents and
purposes, a valid cause for the non-issuance of a protection order.

That the proceedings in Civil Case No. 06-797 are summary in nature should not have deterred
petitioner from raising the same in his Opposition. The question relative to the constitutionality
of a statute is one of law which does not need to be supported by evidence.54 Be that as it may,
Section 25 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC nonetheless allows the conduct of a hearing to determine
legal issues, among others, viz:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

SEC. 25. Order for further hearing. - In case the court determines the need for further hearing, it
may issue an order containing the following:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

(a) Facts undisputed and admitted;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

(b) Factual and legal issues to be resolved;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

(c) Evidence, including objects and documents that have been marked and will be
presented;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

(d) Names of witnesses who will be ordered to present their direct testimonies in the form of
affidavits; and

(e) Schedule of the presentation of evidence by both parties which shall be done in one day, to
the extent possible, within the 30-day period of the effectivity of the temporary protection order
issued. (Emphasis supplied)
To obviate potential dangers that may arise concomitant to the conduct of a hearing when
necessary, Section 26 (b) of A.M. No. 04-10-11- SC provides that if a temporary protection order
issued is due to expire, the trial court may extend or renew the said order for a period of thirty
(30) days each time until final judgment is rendered. It may likewise modify the extended or
renewed temporary protection order as may be necessary to meet the needs of the parties. With
the private respondent given ample protection, petitioner could proceed to litigate the
constitutional issues, without necessarily running afoul of the very purpose for the adoption of
the rules on summary procedure.

In view of all the foregoing, the appellate court correctly dismissed the petition for prohibition
with prayer for injunction and temporary restraining order (CA-G.R. CEB - SP. No. 01698).
Petitioner may have proceeded upon an honest belief that if he finds succor in a superior court,
he could be granted an injunctive relief. However, Section 22(j) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC
expressly disallows the filing of a petition for certiorari, mandamus or prohibition against any
interlocutory order issued by the trial court. Hence, the 60-day TRO issued by the appellate court
in this case against the enforcement of the TPO, the amended TPOs and other orders pursuant
thereto was improper, and it effectively hindered the case from taking its normal course in an
expeditious and summary manner.

As the rules stand, a review of the case by appeal or certiorari before judgment is prohibited.
Moreover, if the appeal of a judgment granting permanent protection shall not stay its
enforcement,55 with more reason that a TPO, which is valid only for thirty (30) days at a time,56
should not be enjoined.

The mere fact that a statute is alleged to be unconstitutional or invalid, does not of itself entitle a
litigant to have the same enjoined.57 In Younger v. Harris, Jr.,58 the Supreme Court of the
United States declared, thus:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

Federal injunctions against state criminal statutes, either in their entirety or with respect to their
separate and distinct prohibitions, are not to be granted as a matter of course, even if such
statutes are unconstitutional. No citizen or member of the community is immune from
prosecution, in good faith, for his alleged criminal acts. The imminence of such a prosecution
even though alleged to be unauthorized and, hence, unlawful is not alone ground for relief in
equity which exerts its extraordinary powers only to prevent irreparable injury to the plaintiff
who seeks its aid. (Citations omitted)

The sole objective of injunctions is to preserve the status quo until the trial court hears fully the
merits of the case. It bears stressing, however, that protection orders are granted ex parte so as to
protect women and their children from acts of violence. To issue an injunction against such
orders will defeat the very purpose of the law against VAWC.

Notwithstanding all these procedural flaws, we shall not shirk from our obligation to determine
novel issues, or issues of first impression, with far-reaching implications. We have, time and
again, discharged our solemn duty as final arbiter of constitutional issues, and with more reason
now, in view of private respondent's plea in her Comment59 to the instant Petition that we
should put the challenge to the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 to rest. And so we shall.

Intent of Congress in enacting R.A. 9262.

Petitioner claims that since R.A. 9262 is intended to prevent and criminalize spousal and child
abuse, which could very well be committed by either the husband or the wife, gender alone is not
enough basis to deprive the husband/father of the remedies under the law.60

A perusal of the deliberations of Congress on Senate Bill No. 2723,61 which became R.A. 9262,
reveals that while the sponsor, Senator Luisa Pimentel-Ejercito (better known as Senator Loi
Estrada), had originally proposed what she called a “synthesized measure”62 – an amalgamation
of two measures, namely, the “Anti-Domestic Violence Act” and the “Anti- Abuse of Women in
Intimate Relationships Act”63 – providing protection to “all family members, leaving no one in
isolation” but at the same time giving special attention to women as the “usual victims” of
violence and abuse,64 nonetheless, it was eventually agreed that men be denied protection under
the same measure. We quote pertinent portions of the deliberations:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

Wednesday, December 10, 2003

Senator Pangilinan. I just wanted to place this on record, Mr. President. Some women's groups
have expressed concerns and relayed these concerns to me that if we are to include domestic
violence apart from against women as well as other members of the household, including
children or the husband, they fear that this would weaken the efforts to address domestic
violence of which the main victims or the bulk of the victims really are the wives, the spouses or
the female partners in a relationship. We would like to place that on record. How does the good
Senator respond to this kind of observation?

Senator Estrada. Yes, Mr. President, there is this group of women who call themselves “WIIR”
Women in Intimate Relationship. They do not want to include men in this domestic violence. But
plenty of men are also being abused by women. I am playing safe so I placed here members of
the family, prescribing penalties therefor and providing protective measures for victims. This
includes the men, children, live-in, common-law wives, and those related with the family.65

xxxx

Wednesday, January 14, 2004

xxxx

The President Pro Tempore. x x x

Also, may the Chair remind the group that there was the discussion whether to limit this to
women and not to families which was the issue of the AWIR group. The understanding that I
have is that we would be having a broader scope rather than just women, if I remember correctly,
Madam sponsor.

Senator Estrada. Yes, Mr. President.

As a matter of fact, that was brought up by Senator Pangilinan during the interpellation period.

I think Senator Sotto has something to say to that.

Senator Legarda. Mr. President, the reason I am in support of the measure. Do not get me wrong.
However, I believe that there is a need to protect women's rights especially in the domestic
environment.

As I said earlier, there are nameless, countless, voiceless women who have not had the
opportunity to file a case against their spouses, their live-in partners after years, if not decade, of
battery and abuse. If we broaden the scope to include even the men, assuming they can at all be
abused by the women or their spouses, then it would not equalize the already difficult situation
for women, Mr. President.
I think that the sponsor, based on our earlier conversations, concurs with this position. I am sure
that the men in this Chamber who love their women in their lives so dearly will agree with this
representation. Whether we like it or not, it is an unequal world. Whether we like it or not, no
matter how empowered the women are, we are not given equal opportunities especially in the
domestic environment where the macho Filipino man would always feel that he is stronger, more
superior to the Filipino woman.

xxxx

The President Pro Tempore. What does the sponsor say?

Senator Estrada. Mr. President, before accepting this, the committee came up with this bill
because the family members have been included in this proposed measure since the other
members of the family other than women are also possible victims of violence. While women are
most likely the intended victims, one reason incidentally why the measure focuses on women,
the fact remains that in some relatively few cases, men also stand to be victimized and that
children are almost always the helpless victims of violence. I am worried that there may not be
enough protection extended to other family members particularly children who are excluded.
Although Republic Act No. 7610, for instance, more or less, addresses the special needs of
abused children. The same law is inadequate. Protection orders for one are not available in said
law.

I am aware that some groups are apprehensive about granting the same protection to men, fearing
that they may use this law to justify their abusive behavior against women. However, we should
also recognize that there are established procedures and standards in our courts which give
credence to evidentiary support and cannot just arbitrarily and whimsically entertain baseless
complaints.

Mr. President, this measure is intended to harmonize family relations and to protect the family as
the basic social institution. Though I recognize the unequal power relations between men and
women in our society, I believe we have an obligation to uphold inherent rights and dignity of
both husband and wife and their immediate family members, particularly children.
While I prefer to focus mainly on women, I was compelled to include other family members as a
critical input arrived at after a series of consultations/meetings with various NGOs, experts,
sports groups and other affected sectors, Mr. President.

Senator Sotto. Mr. President.

The President Pro Tempore. Yes, with the permission of the other senators.

Senator Sotto. Yes, with the permission of the two ladies on the Floor. The President Pro
Tempore. Yes, Sen. Vicente C. Sotto III is recognized. Senator Sotto. I presume that the effect of
the proposed amendment of

Senator Legarda would be removing the “men and children” in this particular bill and focus
specifically on women alone. That will be the net effect of that proposed amendment. Hearing
the rationale mentioned by the distinguished sponsor, Sen. Luisa “Loi” Ejercito Estrada, I am not
sure now whether she is inclined to accept the proposed amendment of Senator Legarda.

I am willing to wait whether she is accepting this or not because if she is going to accept this, I
will propose an amendment to the amendment rather than object to the amendment, Mr.
President.

xxxx

Senator Estrada. The amendment is accepted, Mr. President. The President Pro Tempore. Is there
any objection?

xxxx

Senator Sotto. x x x May I propose an amendment to the amendment. The President Pro
Tempore. Before we act on the amendment? Senator Sotto. Yes, Mr. President.

The President Pro Tempore. Yes, please proceed.

Senator Sotto. Mr. President, I am inclined to believe the rationale used by the distinguished
proponent of the amendment. As a matter of fact, I tend to agree. Kung may maaabuso, mas
malamang iyong babae kaysa sa lalake. At saka iyong mga lalake, puwede na talagang magulpi
iyan. Okey lang iyan. But I cannot agree that we remove the children from this particular
measure.

So, if I may propose an amendment –

The President Pro Tempore. To the amendment.

Senator Sotto. – more than the women, the children are very much abused. As a matter of fact, it
is not limited to minors. The abuse is not limited to seven, six, 5-year-old children. I have seen
14, 15-year-old children being abused by their fathers, even by their mothers. And it breaks my
heart to find out about these things.

Because of the inadequate existing law on abuse of children, this particular measure will update
that. It will enhance and hopefully prevent the abuse of children and not only women.

SOTTO-LEGARDA AMENDMENTS

Therefore, may I propose an amendment that, yes, we remove the aspect of the men in the bill
but not the children.

Senator Legarda. I agree, Mr. President, with the Minority Leader.

The President Pro Tempore. Effectively then, it will be women AND CHILDREN.

Senator Sotto. Yes, Mr. President.

Senator Estrada. It is accepted, Mr. President.

The President Pro Tempore. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the amendment,
as amended, is approved.66

It is settled that courts are not concerned with the wisdom, justice, policy, or expediency of a
statute.67 Hence, we dare not venture into the real motivations and wisdom of the members of
Congress in limiting the protection against violence and abuse under R.A. 9262 to women and
children only. No proper challenge on said grounds may be entertained in this proceeding.
Congress has made its choice and it is not our prerogative to supplant this judgment. The choice
may be perceived as erroneous but even then, the remedy against it is to seek its amendment or
repeal by the legislative. By the principle of separation of powers, it is the legislative that
determines the necessity, adequacy, wisdom and expediency of any law.68

We only step in when there is a violation of the Constitution. However, none was sufficiently
shown in this case.

R.A. 9262 does not violate the

guaranty of equal protection
of the laws.

Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated
alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. The oft-repeated disquisition in
the early case of Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union69 is
instructive:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of the
laws upon all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the
constitutional prohibition against inequality, that every man, woman and child should be affected
alike by a statute. Equality of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation on
persons merely as such, but on persons according to the circumstances surrounding them. It
guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution does not require that things which are
different in fact be treated in law as though they were the same. The equal protection clause does
not forbid discrimination as to things that are different. It does not prohibit legislation which is
limited either in the object to which it is directed or by the territory within which it is to operate.
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. Classification in
law, as in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in
speculation or practice because they agree with one another in certain particulars. A law is not
invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it
goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of
constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which
means that the classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real
differences; that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to
existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the class. This Court
has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a reasonable
foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary. (Emphasis supplied)

Measured against the foregoing jurisprudential yardstick, we find that R.A. 9262 is based on a
valid classification as shall hereinafter be discussed and, as such, did not violate the equal
protection clause by favoring women over men as victims of violence and abuse to whom the
State extends its protection.

I. R.A. 9262 rests on substantial distinctions.

The unequal power relationship between women and men; the fact that women are more likely
than men to be victims of violence; and the widespread gender bias and prejudice against women
all make for real differences justifying the classification under the law. As Justice McIntyre
succinctly states, “the accommodation of differences ... is the essence of true equality.”70

A. Unequal power relationship between men and women

According to the Philippine Commission on Women (the National Machinery for Gender
Equality and Women's Empowerment), violence against women (VAW) is deemed to be closely
linked with the unequal power relationship between women and men otherwise known as
“gender-based violence”. Societal norms and traditions dictate people to think men are the
leaders, pursuers, providers, and take on dominant roles in society while women are nurturers,
men's companions and supporters, and take on subordinate roles in society. This perception leads
to men gaining more power over women. With power comes the need to control to retain that
power. And VAW is a form of men's expression of controlling women to retain power.71

The United Nations, which has long recognized VAW as a human rights issue, passed its
Resolution 48/104 on the Declaration on Elimination of Violence Against Women on December
20, 1993 stating that “violence against women is a manifestation of historically unequal power
relations between men and women, which have led to domination over and discrimination
against women by men and to the prevention of the full advancement of women, and that
violence against women is one of the crucial social mechanisms by which women are forced into
subordinate positions, compared with men.”72

Then Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno traced the historical and social context of gender-based
violence and developments in advocacies to eradicate VAW, in his remarks delivered during the
Joint Launching of R.A. 9262 and its Implementing Rules last October 27, 2004, the pertinent
portions of which are quoted hereunder:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

History reveals that most societies sanctioned the use of violence against women. The patriarch
of a family was accorded the right to use force on members of the family under his control. I
quote the early studies:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

Traditions subordinating women have a long history rooted in patriarchy – the institutional rule
of men. Women were seen in virtually all societies to be naturally inferior both physically and
intellectually. In ancient Western societies, women whether slave, concubine or wife, were under
the authority of men. In law, they were treated as property.

The Roman concept of patria potestas allowed the husband to beat, or even kill, his wife if she
endangered his property right over her. Judaism, Christianity and other religions oriented
towards the patriarchal family strengthened the male dominated structure of society.

English feudal law reinforced the tradition of male control over women. Even the eminent
Blackstone has been quoted in his commentaries as saying husband and wife were one and that
one was the husband. However, in the late 1500s and through the entire 1600s, English common
law began to limit the right of husbands to chastise their wives. Thus, common law developed
the rule of thumb, which allowed husbands to beat their wives with a rod or stick no thicker than
their thumb.

In the later part of the 19th century, legal recognition of these rights to chastise wives or inflict
corporeal punishment ceased. Even then, the preservation of the family was given more
importance than preventing violence to women.
The metamorphosis of the law on violence in the United States followed that of the English
common law. In 1871, the Supreme Court of Alabama became the first appellate court to strike
down the common law right of a husband to beat his wife:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

The privilege, ancient though it may be, to beat one's wife with a stick, to pull her hair, choke
her, spit in her face or kick her about the floor, or to inflict upon her like indignities, is not now
acknowledged by our law... In person, the wife is entitled to the same protection of the law that
the husband can invoke for himself.

As time marched on, the women's advocacy movement became more organized. The temperance
leagues initiated it. These leagues had a simple focus. They considered the evils of alcoholism as
the root cause of wife abuse. Hence, they demonstrated and picketed saloons, bars and their
husbands' other watering holes. Soon, however, their crusade was joined by suffragette
movements, expanding the liberation movement's agenda. They fought for women's right to vote,
to own property, and more. Since then, the feminist movement was on the roll.

The feminist movement exposed the private invisibility of the domestic violence to the public
gaze. They succeeded in transforming the issue into an important public concern. No less than
the United States Supreme Court, in 1992 case Planned Parenthood v. Casey,
noted:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

In an average 12-month period in this country, approximately two million women are the victims
of severe assaults by their male partners. In a 1985 survey, women reported that nearly one of
every eight husbands had assaulted their wives during the past year. The [American Medical
Association] views these figures as “marked underestimates,” because the nature of these
incidents discourages women from reporting them, and because surveys typically exclude the
very poor, those who do not speak English well, and women who are homeless or in institutions
or hospitals when the survey is conducted. According to the AMA, “researchers on family
violence agree that the true incidence of partner violence is probably double the above estimates;
or four million severely assaulted women per year.”

Studies on prevalence suggest that from one-fifth to one-third of all women will be physically
assaulted by a partner or ex-partner during their lifetime... Thus on an average day in the United
States, nearly 11,000 women are severely assaulted by their male partners. Many of these
incidents involve sexual assault... In families where wife beating takes place, moreover, child
abuse is often present as well.
Other studies fill in the rest of this troubling picture. Physical violence is only the most visible
form of abuse. Psychological abuse, particularly forced social and economic isolation of women,
is also common.

Many victims of domestic violence remain with their abusers, perhaps because they perceive no
superior alternative...Many abused women who find temporary refuge in shelters return to their
husbands, in large part because they have no other source of income... Returning to one's abuser
can be dangerous. Recent Federal Bureau of Investigation statistics disclose that 8.8 percent of
all homicide victims in the United States are killed by their spouses...Thirty percent of female
homicide victims are killed by their male partners.

Finally in 1994, the United States Congress enacted the Violence Against Women Act.

In the International front, the women's struggle for equality was no less successful. The United
States Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights affirmed the equality of all human
beings. In 1979, the UN General Assembly adopted the landmark Convention on the Elimination
of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). In 1993, the UN General Assembly
also adopted the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women. World conferences
on the role and rights of women have been regularly held in Mexico City, Copenhagen, Nairobi
and Beijing. The UN itself established a Commission on the Status of Women.

The Philippines has been in cadence with the half – and full – steps of all these women's
movements. No less than Section 14, Article II of our 1987 Constitution mandates the State to
recognize the role of women in nation building and to ensure the fundamental equality before the
law of women and men. Our Senate has ratified the CEDAW as well as the Convention on the
Rights of the Child and its two protocols. To cap it all, Congress, on March 8, 2004, enacted
Rep. Act No. 9262, entitled “An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children,
Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties therefor and for other
Purposes.” (Citations omitted)

B. Women are the “usual” and “most likely”

victims of violence.

At the time of the presentation of Senate Bill No. 2723, official statistics on violence against
women and children show that –
x x x physical injuries had the highest number of cases at 5,058 in 2002 representing 55.63% of
total cases reported (9,903). And for the first semester of 2003, there were 2,381 reported cases
out of 4,354 cases which represent 54.31%. xxx (T)he total number of women in especially
difficult circumstances served by the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD)
for the year 2002, there are 1,417 physically abused/maltreated cases out of the total of 5,608
cases. xxx (T)here are 1,091 DSWD cases out of a total number of 3,471 cases for the first
semester of 2003. Female violence comprised more than 90% of all forms of abuse and violence
and more than 90% of these reported cases were committed by the women's intimate partners
such as their husbands and live-in partners.73

Recently, the Philippine Commission on Women presented comparative statistics on violence

against women across an eight-year period from 2004 to August of 2011 with violations under
R.A. 9262 ranking first among the different VAW categories since its implementation in 2004,74
thus:cralavvonlinelawlibrary