EN BANC

[ B.M. No. 2796, February 11, 2020 ]

ENRIQUE JAVIER DE ZUZUARREGUI, COMPLAINANT, V. ANTHONY DE ZUZUARREGUI, RESPONDENT.

RESOLUTION

INTING, J.:

This bar matter refers to the complaint filed by Enrique Javier de Zuzuarregui (complainant) before the Office of the Bar
Confidant (OBC) against Anthony de Zuzuarregui (respondent), his nephew and one of the bar applicants for the 2013
Bar Examinations.

The Antecedents

On October 2, 2013, the OBC received a Letter1 dated September 15, 2013 from complainant, thru his counsel, Atty.
Nicholas A. Aquino, informing the Court that he was filing a complaint against respondent, then an applicant for the 2013
Bar Examinations for being a person of questionable moral character given the four criminal charges that the latter was
facing before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City, namely:

(1) Criminal Case No. XV-03-INV-13D-03569 - Enrique de Zuzuarregui v. Anthony de Zuzuarregui, et al., for Estafa under
Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC);

(2) Criminal Case No. XV-03-INV-13F-05581 - Enrique de Zuzuarregui v. Anthony de Zuzuarregui, et al., for Estafa thru
Falsification of Public Documents under Article 315 of the RPC;

(3) Criminal Case No. XV-INV-13G-06821 - Enrique de Zuzuarregui v. Anthony de Zuzuarregui, et al., for Falsification of
Public Documents and Use of Falsified Documents under Article 172 of the RPC; and

(4) Criminal Case No. XV-03-INV-13F-06052 - Enrique de Zuzuarregui v. Anthony de Zuzuarregui, et al., for Falsification
of Public Documents under Article 172 of the RPC.

It appears that respondent himself had disclosed in his Petition to Take the 2013 Bar Examinations2 that there were four
pending criminal cases against him at the time:

(1) Criminal Case No. XV-03-INV-13D-03569 - Enrique de Zuzuarregui v. Anthony de Zuzuarregui, et al., for Estafa;

(2) Criminal Case No. XV-03-INV-13E-04905 - Azucena Locsin Garcia v. Anthony de Zuzuarregui, et al., for violation of
Article 312 (Occupation of Real Property or Usurpation of Real Rights in Property) and Article 313 (Altering Boundaries or
Landmarks) of the RPC;

(3) Criminal Case No. XV-03-INV-13F-06052 - Enrique de Zuzuarregui v. Anthony de Zuzuarregui, et al., for Falsification
of Public Documents; and

(4) Criminal Case No. XV-03-INV-13F-05581 - Enrique de Zuzuarregui v. Anthony de Zuzuarregui, et al., for Estafa thru
Falsification of Public Documents.

In view of the pending criminal cases against respondent, the Court provisionally allowed him to take the 2013 Bar
Examinations, subject to the condition that, should he pass, he shall not be allowed to take the Lawyer's Oath and sign
the Roll of Attorneys until he is cleared of the charges against him.3

Respondent thereafter passed the 2013 Bar Examinations. Consequently, he filed a Verified Petition to Take the Lawyer's
Oath4 dated April 24, 2014 before the OBC. In his petition, he claimed that the pending criminal cases against him had
already been dismissed by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City as evidenced by the Orders of
Dismissal5 attached thereto. To prove that he was morally fit to become a lawyer, respondent also submitted the following
certifications of good moral character from:

(a) Atty. Ma Venarisse V. Verga of Lee Venturanza Verga Law Office;6

(b) Atty. Viviana Martin-Paguirigan, then Associate Dean of the Far Eastern University - Institute of Law;7

(c) Rev. Fr. Noel B. Magtaas, OSJ, then Provincial Superior of the Oblates of St. Joseph - Philippine Province;8 and

(d) Attys. Gregorio S. Daproza and Voltaire P. Agas.9

In its Resolution10 dated July 1, 2014, the Court required respondent to explain why he failed to disclose the pendency of
Criminal Case No. XV-INV-13G-06821 in his application to take the 2013 Bar Examinations and to submit a certification of
the status of the case, if still pending, or order of dismissal, if already dismissed.

On August 14, 2014, respondent submitted his Verified Compliance11 wherein he explained that he was not able to
declare Criminal Case No. XV-INV-13G-06821 in his application because, at the time of filing of his Petition to Take the
2013 Bar Examinations on July 12, 2013, he was not yet aware of the existence of the case. He further averred that he
only received a copy of the subpoena12 in relation to the case on August 15, 2013, or more than a month after he filed his
application to take the bar examinations.13

Thus, in its Resolution14 dated September 23, 2014, the Court required respondent to submit a copy of the order of
dismissal in Criminal Case No. XV-INV-13G-06821 as well as Prosecutor's and Court's clearances, and additional
certifications of good moral character.1a₩phi1

On November 14, 2014, the Court received respondent's Second Verified Compliance15 dated November 7, 2014
wherein respondent submitted the following documents:

(a) Order of Dismissal in Criminal Case No. XV-INV-13G-06821;16

(b) Clearance from the Quezon City Regional Trial Court dated October 22, 2014;17

(c) Clearance from the Quezon City Metropolitan Trial Court dated October 27, 2014;18

(d) Prosecutor's Certifications19 dated October 20, 2014 showing the dismissal of:

(1) XV-03-INV-13K-12145 to 46;

(2) XV-03-INV-13D-03569;

(3) XV-03-INV-13F-6059;*

(4) XV-03-INV-13F-05581;

(5) XV-03-INV-13E-04905;

(e) Certification of Good Moral Character dated November 13, 2014 issued by Pasig City Councilor Hon. Richard C.
Eusebio; 20

(f) Certification of Good Moral Character dated November 12, 2014 signed by Atty. Carlos G. Buendia; 21

(g) Certification of Good Moral Character dated November 13, 2014 signed by Atty. Paul Nicomedes L. Roldan;22

(h) Certification of Good Moral Character dated April 25, 2014 signed by Atty. Ma. Venarisse V. Verga;23

(i) Certification of Good Moral Character dated April 25, 2014 signed by Associate Dean Viviana Martin-Paguirigan;24

(j) Certification of Good Moral Character dated April 26, 2014 signed by Rev. Fr. Noel B. Magtaas, OSJ; 25

(k) Testimonial of Good Character dated April 29, 2014 signed by Atty. Gregorio S. Daproza, Jr.;26 and

(l) Certification of Good Moral Character signed by Atty. Voltaire P. Agas.27

Per the Resolution28 dated March 10, 2015, the Court referred respondent's Second Verified Compliance to the OBC for
evaluation, report, and recommendation. The OBC, however, recommended that respondent's Petition to Take the
Lawyer's Oath be held in abeyance in view of the other criminal charges still pending against him before the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Quezon City.29 The Court adopted the OBC's recommendation in its Resolution30 dated November
16, 2015.

Three years later, respondent filed his Verified Second Motion most respectfully praying that [respondent] be allowed to
take his Lawyer's Oath and sign the Roll of [Attorneys]31 dated October 3, 2018 before the OBC wherein he notified the
Court of the dismissal of all the criminal charges filed against him.32 In his motion, he averred that while he was able to
completely wipe out all the cases filed against him by complainant, he feared that a new round of fabricated criminal
complaints will be forthcoming to further prevent him from becoming a full-fledged lawyer.33

Report and Recommendation of the OBC

In its Report34 dated October 28, 2019, the OBC recommended that:

Hence, in view of the dismissal of the cases filed against him and finding the attestations made in his favor to be credible
and sincere, we are inclined to recommend the granting of respondent's prayer for admission to the Philippine Bar as we
see no other cogent reason or ground to rule otherwise. In allowing respondent to take the lawyer's oath, we recognize
that respondent is not intrinsically of bad moral fiber. On a final note, we are also giving respondent the benefit of the
doubt that he is morally fit to become a member of the Philippine Bar and that the certifications made in his favor truly
reflect his good moral character. With that, we are convinced that he possesses the san1e as a pre requisite for
admission to our noble profession.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that ANTHONY R DE ZUZUA[R]REGUI be

ALLOWED to take the Lawyer's Oath and Sign the Roll of Attorneys on a date set by the Court upon payment of the
appropriate legal fees.35

Thus, the Court, in its Resolution36 dated November 19, 2019, resolved, upon the OBC's recommendation, to allow
respondent to take the Lawyer's Oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys.

Upon his payment of the required fees,37 respondent's oath-taking was scheduled on January 20, 2020, at 4:30 p.m.,
before Associate Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr.38 However, before respondent could take the Lawyer's Oath, the Court
received a Letter39 dated January 8, 2020 from complainant stating his strong objection to allow respondent to take the
oath "due to questionable moral integrity, honesty and uprightness,"40 given the 10 criminal cases still pending against
him before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City, viz.:

(a) Criminal Case No. XV-03-INV-14F-05666 for Falsification of Public Documents;

(b) Criminal Case No. XV-03-INV-14F-05667 for Falsification of Public Documents;

(c) Criminal Case No. XV-03-INV-15D-04249 for Estafa thru Falsification of Public Documents;

(d) Criminal Case No. XV-03-INV-16B-62233 for 59 counts of Estafa;

(e) Criminal Case No. XV-05-INV-16S-10647 for Estafa thru Falsification of Public Documents;

(f) Criminal Case No. XV-03-INV-16J-10252 for Estafa;

(g) Criminal Case No. XV-03-INV-16J-10509 for Falsification of Public Documents;

(h) Criminal Case No. XV-03-INV-17J-08273 for violation of Presidential Decree No. 1096, or the National Building Code
of the Philippines;

(i) Criminal Case No. XV-03-INV-17G-06688 for Estafa; and

(j) Criminal Case No. XV-03-INV-19F-05312 for Estafa.

Consequently, the Court, thru Chief Justice Diosdado M. Peralta, suspended respondent's scheduled oath-taking until the
Court En Banc has decided on the matter.41
In his Letter42 dated January 19, 2020 addressed to the Chief Justice, respondent explained that nine out of the 10
criminal cases mentioned in complainant's Letter had already been dismissed tor lack of probable cause, but the
10th case is still pending as it was just recently filed in 2019.43 He averred that the new case had been purposely
instituted by complainant to further delay his oath-taking. He prays that he finally be allowed to take the Lawyer's Oath
and sign the Roll of Attorneys as the numerous criminal complaints filed by his uncle against him are mere harassment
suits specifically designed to prevent him from becoming a full-fledged lawyer.44

The Court's Ruling

Section 2 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. — Every applicant for admission as a member of the bar
must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral character, and a resident of the
Philippines; and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and that no
charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines.

In this case, respondent's admission to the Philippine Bar has long been held in abeyance due to the criminal cases
pending against him before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City. Per the rollo, it appears that all criminal
charges against him has been dismissed except for the most recent one filed in 2019. The timing of the filing of this case,
however, is highly suspect as it came just as the other criminal charges against respondent were dismissed on June 28,
2018,45 January 4, 2019,46 and October 15, 2019.47 Thus, it can no longer be denied that the manifest intention of
complainant in successively filing these criminal cases against respondent is to prevent him from taking the Lawyer's Oath
and signing the Roll of Attorneys—the last two steps needed to be undertaken by respondent to become a full-fledged
lawyer.

The dismissal of all the other criminal charges against respondent, coupled with the various certifications of good moral
character in his favor, is sufficient for the Court to conclude that respondent possesses the moral qualifications required of
lawyers. Though it is true that the practice of law is not a right but a privilege, the Court will not unjustifiably withhold this
privilege from respondent, who has clearly shown that he is both intellectually and morally qualified to join the legal
profession.48 And so, after almost six years of waiting, the Court finally grants respondent's prayer for admission to the
Philippine Bar.

WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to:

(a) NOTE the Letter dated January 19, 2020 and the Report dated January 21, 2020 of the Office of the Bar Confidant;
and

(b) ALLOW Anthony de Zuzuarregui to take the Lawyer's Oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys on a date set by the Court
and upon payment of the appropriate legal fees, if any.

Complainant Enrique Javier de Zuzuarregui and his counsel, Atty. Nicholas A. Aquino, are severely WARNED not to file
any more frivolous criminal complaints against respondent under pain of contempt.

SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC

A.C. No. 11316, July 12, 2016

PATRICK A. CARONAN, Complainant, v. RICHARD A. CARONAN A.K.A. "ATTY. PATRICK A.

CARONAN," Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

For the Court's resolution is the Complaint-Affidavit 1 filed by complainant Patrick A. Caronan (complainant), before the
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), against respondent "Atty. Patrick A.
Caronan," whose real name is allegedly Richard A. Caronan (respondent), for purportedly assuming complainant's identity
and falsely representing that the former has the required educational qualifications to take the Bar Examinations and be
admitted to the practice of law.

The Facts

Complainant and respondent are siblings born to Porferio 2 R. Caronan, Jr. and Norma A. Caronan. Respondent is the
older of the two, having been born on February 7, 1975, while complainant was born on August 5, 1976. 3 Both of them
completed their secondary education at the Makati High School where complainant graduated in 1993 4 and respondent in
1991.5 Upon his graduation, complainant enrolled at the University of Makati where he obtained a degree in Business
Administration in 1997.6 He started working thereafter as a Sales Associate for Philippine Seven Corporation (PSC), the
operator of 7-11 Convenience Stores.7 In 2001, he married Myrna G. Tagpis with whom he has two (2)
daughters.8 Through the years, complainant rose from the ranks until, in 2009, he was promoted as a Store Manager of
the 7-11 Store in Muntinlupa.9

Meanwhile, upon graduating from high school, respondent enrolled at the Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila (PLM),
where he stayed for one (1) year before transferring to the Philippine Military Academy (PMA) in 1992. 10 In 1993, he was
discharged from the PMA and focused on helping their father in the family's car rental business. In 1997, he moved to
Nueva Vizcaya with his wife, Rosana, and their three (3) children. 11 Since then, respondent never went back to school to
earn a college degree.12

In 1999, during a visit to his family in Metro Manila, respondent told complainant that the former had enrolled in a law
school in Nueva Vizcaya.13 Subsequently, in 2004, their mother informed complainant that respondent passed the Bar
Examinations and that he used complainant's name and college records from the University of Makati to enroll at St.
Mary's University's College of Law in Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya and take the Bar Examinations. 14 Complainant brushed
these aside as he did not anticipate any adverse consequences to him. 15

In 2006, complainant was able to confirm respondent's use of his name and identity when he saw the name "Patrick A.
Caronan" on the Certificate of Admission to the Bar displayed at the latter's office in Taguig City. 16 Nevertheless,
complainant did not confront respondent about it since he was pre-occupied with his job and had a family to support. 17

Sometime in May 2009, however, after his promotion as Store Manager, complainant was ordered to report to the head
office of PSC in Mandaluyong City where, upon arrival, he was informed that the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
was requesting his presence at its office in Taft Avenue, Manila, in relation to an investigation involving respondent who,
at that point, was using the najne "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan." 18 Accordingly, on May 18, 2009, complainant appeared
before the Anti-Fraud and Computer Crimes Division of the NBI where he was interviewed and asked to identify
documents including: (1) his and respondent's high school records; (2) his transcript of records from the University of
Makati; (3) Land Transportation Office's records showing his and respondent's driver's licenses; (4) records from St.
Mary's University showing that complainant's transcript of records from the University of Makati and his Birth Certificate
were submitted to St. Mary's University's College of Law; and (5) Alumni Book of St. Mary's University showing
respondent's photograph under the name "Patrick A. Caronan."19 Complainant later learned that the reason why he was
invited by the NBI was because of respondent's involvement in a case for qualified theft and estafa filed by Mr. Joseph G.
Agtarap (Agtarap), who was one of the principal sponsors at respondent's wedding. 20

Realizing that respondent had been using his name to perpetrate crimes and commit unlawful activities, complainant took
it upon himself to inform other people that he is the real "Patrick A. Caronan" and that respondent's real name is Richard
A. Caronan.21 However, problems relating to respondent's use of the name "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan" continued to hound
him. In July 2013, PSC received a letter from Quasha Ancheta Pena & Nolasco Law Offices requesting that they be
furnished with complainant's contact details or, in the alternative, schedule a meeting with him to discuss certain matters
concerning respondent.22 On the other hand, a fellow church-member had also told him that respondent who, using the
name "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan," almost victimized his (church-member's) relatives. 23 Complainant also received a phone
call from a certain Mrs. Loyda L. Reyes (Reyes), who narrated how respondent tricked her into believing that he was
authorized to sell a parcel of land in Taguig City when in fact, he was not. 24 Further, he learned that respondent was
arrested for gun-running activities, illegal possession of explosives, and violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP) 22.25

Due to the controversies involving respondent's use of the name "Patrick A. Caronan," complainant developed a fear for
his own safety and security.26 He also became the subject of conversations among his colleagues, which eventually forced
him to resign from his job at PSC.27 Hence, complainant filed the present Complaint-Affidavit to stop respondent's alleged
use of the former's name and identity, and illegal practice of law. 28

In his Answer,29 respondent denied all the allegations against him arid invoked res judicata as a defense. He maintained
that his identity can no longer be raised as an issue as it had already been resolved in CBD Case No. 09-2362 where the
IBP Board of Governors dismissed30 the administrative case31 filed by Agtarap against him, and which case had already
been declared closed and terminated by this Court in A.C. No. 10074. 32 Moreover, according to him, complainant is being
used by Reyes and her spouse, Brigadier General Joselito M. Reyes, to humiliate, disgrace, malign, discredit, and harass
him because he filed several administrative and criminal complaints against them before the Ombudsman. 33

On March 9, 2015, the IBP-CBD conducted the scheduled mandatory conference where both parties failed to
appear.34 Instead, respondent moved to reset the same on April 20, 2015. 35 On such date, however, both parties again
failed to appear, thereby prompting the IBP-CBD to issue an Order 36 directing them to file their respective position papers.
However, neither of the parties submitted any.37

The IBP's Report and Recommendation

On June 15, 2015, IBP Investigating Commissioner Jose Villanueva Cabrera (Investigating Commissioner) issued his
Report and Recommendation,38 finding respondent guilty of illegally and falsely assuming complainant's name, identity,
and academic records.39 He observed that respondent failed to controvert all the allegations against him and did not
present any proof to prove his identity.40 On the other hand, complainant presented clear and overwhelming evidence that
he is the real "Patrick A. Caronan."41

Further, he noted that respondent admitted that he and complainant are siblings when he disclosed upon his arrest on
August 31, 2012 that: (a) his parents are Porferio Ramos Caronan and Norma Atillo; and (b) he is married to Rosana
Halili-Caronan.42 However, based on the Marriage Certificate issued by the National Statistics Office (NSO), "Patrick A.
Caronan" is married to a certain "Myrna G. Tagpis," not to Rosana Halili-Caronan. 43

The Investigating Commissioner also drew attention to the fact that .the photograph taken of respondent when he was
arrested as "Richard A. Caronan" on August 16, 2012 shows the same person as the one in the photograph in the IBP
records of "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan."44 These, according to the Investigating Commissioner, show that respondent indeed
assumed complainant's identity to study law and take the Bar Examinations. 45 Since respondent falsely assumed the
name, identity, and academic records of complainant and the real "Patrick A. Caronan" neither obtained the bachelor of
laws degree nor took the Bar Exams, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that the name "Patrick A. Caronan"
with Roll of Attorneys No. 49069 be dropped and stricken off the Roll of Attorneys. 46 He also recommended that
respondent and the name "Richard A. Caronan" be barred from being admitted as a member of the Bar; and finally, for
making a mockery of the judicial institution, the IBP was directed to institute appropriate actions against
respondent.47chanrobleslaw
On June 30, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XXI-2015-607, 48 adopting the Investigating
Commissioner's recommendation.

The Issues Before the Court

The issues in this case are whether or not the IBP erred in ordering that: (a) the name "Patrick A. Caronan" be stricken off
the Roll of Attorneys; and (b) the name "Richard A. Caronan" be barred from being admitted to the Bar.

The Court's Ruling

After a thorough evaluation of the records, the Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the findings and recommendations
of the IBP.

As correctly observed by the IBP, complainant has established by clear and overwhelming evidence that he is the real
"Patrick A. Caronan" and that respondent, whose real name is Richard A. Caronan, merely assumed the latter's name,
identity, and academic records to enroll at the St. Mary's University's College of Law, obtain a law degree, and take the
Bar Examinations.

As pointed out by the IBP, respondent admitted that he and complainant are siblings when he disclosed upon his arrest
on August 31, 2012 that his parents are Porferio Ramos Caronan and Norma Atillo. 49 Respondent himself also stated that
he is married to Rosana Halili-Caronan.50 This diverges from the official NSO records showing that "Patrick A. Caronan" is
married to Myrna G. Tagpis, not to Rosana Halili-Caronan. 51 Moreover, the photograph taken of respondent when he was
arrested as "Richard A. Caronan" on August 16, 2012 shows the same person as the one in the photograph in the IBP
records of "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan."52 Meanwhile, complainant submitted numerous documents showing that he is the
real "Patrick A. Caronan," among which are: (a) his transcript of records from the University of Makati bearing his
photograph;53 (b) a copy of his high school yearbook with his photograph and the name "Patrick A. Caronan" under
it;54 and (c) NBI clearances obtained in 2010 and 2013.55

To the Court's mind, the foregoing indubitably confirm that respondent falsely used complainant's name, identity, and
school records to gain admission to the Bar. Since complainant - the real "Patrick A. Caronan" - never took the Bar
Examinations, the IBP correctly recommended that the name "Patrick A. Caronan" be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.

The IBP was also correct in ordering that respondent, whose real name is "Richard A. Caronan," be barred from
admission to the Bar. Under Section 6, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, no applicant for admission to the Bar Examination
shall be admitted unless he had pursued and satisfactorily completed a pre-law course, viz.:

Section 6. Pre-Law. - No applicant for admission to the bar examination shall be admitted unless he presents a certificate
that he has satisfied the Secretary of Education that, before he began the study of law, he had pursued
and satisfactorily completed in an authorized and recognized university or college, requiring for admission thereto the
completion of a four-year high school course, the course of study prescribed therein for a bachelor's degree in arts
or sciences with any of the following subject as major or field of concentration: political science, logic, english, Spanish,
history, and economics. (Emphases supplied)

In the case at hand, respondent never completed his college degree. While he enrolled at the PLM in 1991, he left a year
later and entered the PMA where he was discharged in 1993 without graduating. 56 Clearly, respondent has not completed
the requisite pre-law degree.

The Court does not discount the possibility that respondent may later on complete his college education and earn a law
degree under his real name. However, his false assumption of his brother's name, identity, and educational records
renders him unfit for admission to the Bar. The practice of law, after all, is not a natural, absolute or constitutional right to
be granted to everyone who demands it.57 Rather, it is a privilege limited to citizens of good moral character.58 In In the
Matter of the Disqualification of Bar Examinee Haron S. Meling in the 2002 Bar Examinations and for Disciplinary Action
as Member of the Philippine Shari'a Bar, Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez,59 the Court explained the essence of good moral
character:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Good moral character is what a person really is, as distinguished from good reputation or from the opinion generally
entertained of him, the estimate in which . he is held by the public in the place where he is known. Moral character is not a
subjective term but one which corresponds to objective reality. The standard of personal and professional integrity is not
satisfied by such conduct as it merely enables a person to escape the penalty of criminal law. Good moral character
includes at least common honesty.[60] (Emphasis supplied)

Here, respondent exhibited his dishonesty and utter lack of moral fitness to be a member of the Bar when he assumed the
name, identity, and school records of his own brother and dragged the latter into controversies which eventually caused
him to fear for his safety and to resign from PSC where he had been working for years. Good moral character is essential
in those who would be lawyers.61 This is imperative in the nature of the office of a lawyer, the trust relation which exists
between him and his client, as well as between him and the court. 62

Finally, respondent made a mockery of the legal profession by pretending to have the necessary qualifications to be a
lawyer. He also tarnished the image of lawyers with his alleged unscrupulous activities, which resulted in the filing of
several criminal cases against him. Certainly, respondent and his acts do not have a place in the legal profession where
one of the primary duties of its members is to uphold its integrity and dignity. 63

WHEREFORE, respondent Richard A. Caronan a.k.a. "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan" (respondent) is found GUILTY of falsely
assuming the name, identity, and academic records of complainant Patrick A. Caronan (complainant) to obtain a law
degree and take the Bar Examinations. Accordingly, without prejudice to the filing of appropriate civil and/or criminal
cases, the Court hereby resolves that:

(1) the name "Patrick A. Caronan" with Roll of Attorneys No. 49069 is ordered DROPPED and STRICKEN OFF the Roll of
Attorneys;

(2) respondent is PROHIBITED from engaging in the practice of law or making any representations as a lawyer;

(3) respondent is BARRED from being admitted as a member of the Philippine Bar in the future;

(4) the Identification Cards issued by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to respondent under the name "Atty. Patrick A.
Caronan" and the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education Certificates issued in such name
are CANCELLED and/or REVOKED; and 

(5) the Office of the Court Administrator is ordered to CIRCULATE notices and POST in the bulletin boards of all courts of
the country a photograph of respondent with his real name, " Richard A. Caronan," with a warning that he is not a member
of the Philippine Bar and a statement of his false assumption of the name and identity of "Patrick A. Caronan."

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the
Office of the Court Administrator.

SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC

B.M. NO. 2540, SEPTEMBER 24, 2013

IN RE: PETITION TO SIGN IN THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS MICHAEL A. MEDADO, Petitioner.

RESOLUTION

SERENO, C.J.:

We resolve the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys filed by petitioner Michael A. Medado (Medado).

Medado graduated from the University of the Philippines with the degree of Bachelor of Laws in 1979 1 and passed the
same year’s bar examinations with a general weighted average of 82.7.

On 7 May 1980, he took the Attorney’s Oath at the Philippine International Convention Center (PICC) together with the
successful bar examinees.3 He was scheduled to sign in the Roll of Attorneys on 13 May 1980, 4 but he failed to do so on
his scheduled date, allegedly because he had misplaced the Notice to Sign the Roll of Attorneys 5 given by the Bar Office
when he went home to his province for a vacation.

Several years later, while rummaging through his old college files, Medado found the Notice to Sign the Roll of Attorneys.
It was then that he realized that he had not signed in the roll, and that what he had signed at the entrance of the PICC
was probably just an attendance record.

By the time Medado found the notice, he was already working. He stated that he was mainly doing corporate and taxation
work, and that he was not actively involved in litigation practice. Thus, he operated “under the mistaken belief [that] since
he ha[d] already taken the oath, the signing of the Roll of Attorneys was not as urgent, nor as crucial to his status as a
lawyer”;8 and “the matter of signing in the Roll of Attorneys lost its urgency and compulsion, and was subsequently
forgotten.”

In 2005, when Medado attended Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) seminars, he was required to provide his
roll number in order for his MCLE compliances to be credited. 10 Not having signed in the Roll of Attorneys, he was unable
to provide his roll number.

About seven years later, or on 6 February 2012, Medado filed the instant Petition, praying that he be allowed to sign in the
Roll of Attorneys.

The Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) conducted a clarificatory conference on the matter on 21 September 2012 12 and
submitted a Report and Recommendation to this Court on 4 February 2013. 13 The OBC recommended that the instant
petition be denied for petitioner’s gross negligence, gross misconduct and utter lack of merit. 14 It explained that, based on
his answers during the clarificatory conference, petitioner could offer no valid justification for his negligence in signing in
the Roll of Attorneys.

After a judicious review of the records, we grant Medado’s prayer in the instant petition, subject to the payment of a fine
and the imposition of a penalty equivalent to suspension from the practice of law.

At the outset, we note that not allowing Medado to sign in the Roll of Attorneys would be akin to imposing upon him the
ultimate penalty of disbarment, a penalty that we have reserved for the most serious ethical transgressions of members of
the Bar.

In this case, the records do not show that this action is warranted.

For one, petitioner demonstrated good faith and good moral character when he finally filed the instant Petition to Sign in
the Roll of Attorneys. We note that it was not a third party who called this Court’s attention to petitioner’s omission; rather,
it was Medado himself who acknowledged his own lapse, albeit after the passage of more than 30 years. When asked by
the Bar Confidant why it took him this long to file the instant petition, Medado very candidly replied:

Mahirap hong i-explain yan pero, yun bang at the time, what can you say? Takot ka kung anong mangyayari sa ‘yo, you
don’t know what’s gonna happen. At the same time, it’s a combination of apprehension and anxiety of what’s gonna
happen. And, finally it’s the right thing to do. I have to come here … sign the roll and take the oath as necessary. 16

For another, petitioner has not been subject to any action for disqualification from the practice of law, 17 which is more than
what we can say of other individuals who were successfully admitted as members of the Philippine Bar. For this Court,
this fact demonstrates that petitioner strove to adhere to the strict requirements of the ethics of the profession, and that he
has prima facie shown that he possesses the character required to be a member of the Philippine Bar.

Finally, Medado appears to have been a competent and able legal practitioner, having held various positions at the Laurel
Law Office,18 Petron, Petrophil Corporation, the Philippine National Oil Company, and the Energy Development
Corporation.

All these demonstrate Medado’s worth to become a full-fledged member of the Philippine Bar. While the practice of law is
not a right but a privilege,20 this Court will not unwarrantedly withhold this privilege from individuals who have shown
mental fitness and moral fiber to withstand the rigors of the profession.

That said, however, we cannot fully exculpate petitioner Medado from all liability for his years of inaction.

Petitioner has been engaged in the practice of law since 1980, a period spanning more than 30 years, without having
signed in the Roll of Attorneys.21 He justifies this behavior by characterizing his acts as “neither willful nor intentional but
based on a mistaken belief and an honest error of judgment.”

We disagree.

While an honest mistake of fact could be used to excuse a person from the legal consequences of his acts 23 as it negates
malice or evil motive,24 a mistake of law cannot be utilized as a lawful justification, because everyone is presumed to know
the law and its consequences.25 Ignorantia facti excusat; ignorantia legis neminem excusat.

Applying these principles to the case at bar, Medado may have at first operated under an honest mistake of fact when he
thought that what he had signed at the PICC entrance before the oath-taking was already the Roll of Attorneys. However,
the moment he realized that what he had signed was merely an attendance record, he could no longer claim an honest
mistake of fact as a valid justification. At that point, Medado should have known that he was not a full-fledged member of
the Philippine Bar because of his failure to sign in the Roll of Attorneys, as it was the act of signing therein that would
have made him so.26 When, in spite of this knowledge, he chose to continue practicing law without taking the necessary
steps to complete all the requirements for admission to the Bar, he willfully engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.

Under the Rules of Court, the unauthorized practice of law by one’s assuming to be an attorney or officer of the court, and
acting as such without authority, may constitute indirect contempt of court, 27 which is punishable by fine or imprisonment
or both.28 Such a finding, however, is in the nature of criminal contempt 29 and must be reached after the filing of charges
and the conduct of hearings.30 In this case, while it appears quite clearly that petitioner committed indirect contempt of
court by knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law, we refrain from making any finding of liability for indirect
contempt, as no formal charge pertaining thereto has been filed against him.

Knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law likewise transgresses Canon 9 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which provides:

CANON 9 – A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice of law.

While a reading of Canon 9 appears to merely prohibit lawyers from assisting in the unauthorized practice of law, the
unauthorized practice of law by the lawyer himself is subsumed under this provision, because at the heart of Canon 9 is
the lawyer’s duty to prevent the unauthorized practice of
law. This duty likewise applies to law students and Bar candidates. As aspiring members of the Bar, they are bound to
comport themselves in accordance with the ethical standards of the legal profession.

Turning now to the applicable penalty, previous violations of Canon 9 have warranted the penalty of suspension from the
practice of law.31 As Medado is not yet a full-fledged lawyer, we cannot suspend him from the practice of law. However,
we see it fit to impose upon him a penalty akin to suspension by allowing him to sign in the Roll of Attorneys one (1) year
after receipt of this Resolution. For his transgression of the prohibition against the unauthorized practice of law, we
likewise see it fit to fine him in the amount of P32,000. During the one year period, petitioner is warned that he is not
allowed to engage in the practice of law, and is sternly warned that doing any act that constitutes practice of law before he
has signed in the Roll of Attorneys will be dealt with severely by this Court.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys is hereby GRANTED. Petitioner Michael A. Medado
is ALLOWED to sign in the Roll of Attorneys ONE (1) YEAR after receipt of this Resolution. Petitioner is
likewise ORDERED to pay a FINE of P32,000 for his unauthorized practice of law. During the one year period, petitioner
is NOT ALLOWED to practice law, and is STERNLY WARNED that doing any act that constitutes practice of law before
he has signed in the Roll of Attorneys will be dealt with severely by this Court.

Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the
Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC

B. M. No. 1036. June 10, 2003

DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE, complainant, vs. EDWIN L. RANA, respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before one is admitted to the Philippine Bar, he must possess the requisite moral integrity for membership in the legal
profession. Possession of moral integrity is of greater importance than possession of legal learning. The practice of law is
a privilege bestowed only on the morally fit. A bar candidate who is morally unfit cannot practice law even if he passes the
bar examinations.

The Facts

Respondent Edwin L. Rana (respondent) was among those who passed the 2000 Bar Examinations.

On 21 May 2001, one day before the scheduled mass oath-taking of successful bar examinees as members of the
Philippine Bar, complainant Donna Marie Aguirre (complainant) filed against respondent a Petition for Denial of Admission
to the Bar. Complainant charged respondent with unauthorized practice of law, grave misconduct, violation of law, and
grave misrepresentation.

The Court allowed respondent to take his oath as a member of the Bar during the scheduled oath-taking on 22 May 2001
at the Philippine International Convention Center. However, the Court ruled that respondent could not sign the Roll of
Attorneys pending the resolution of the charge against him. Thus, respondent took the lawyers oath on the scheduled
date but has not signed the Roll of Attorneys up to now.

Complainant charges respondent for unauthorized practice of law and grave misconduct. Complainant alleges that
respondent, while not yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel for a candidate in the May 2001 elections before the Municipal
Board of Election Canvassers (MBEC) of Mandaon, Masbate. Complainant further alleges that respondent filed with the
MBEC a pleading dated 19 May 2001 entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in Some
Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor. In this pleading, respondent represented himself as counsel for and in behalf of
Vice Mayoralty Candidate, George Bunan, and signed the pleading as counsel for George Bunan (Bunan).

On the charge of violation of law, complainant claims that respondent is a municipal government employee, being a
secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mandaon, Masbate. As such, respondent is not allowed by law to act as counsel
for a client in any court or administrative body.

On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, complainant accuses respondent of acting as counsel for vice
mayoralty candidate George Bunan (Bunan) without the latter engaging respondents services. Complainant claims that
respondent filed the pleading as a ploy to prevent the proclamation of the winning vice mayoralty candidate.

On 22 May 2001, the Court issued a resolution allowing respondent to take the lawyers oath but disallowed him from
signing the Roll of Attorneys until he is cleared of the charges against him. In the same resolution, the Court required
respondent to comment on the complaint against him.

In his Comment, respondent admits that Bunan sought his specific assistance to represent him before the MBEC.
Respondent claims that he decided to assist and advice Bunan, not as a lawyer but as a person who knows the law.
Respondent admits signing the 19 May 2001 pleading that objected to the inclusion of certain votes in the canvassing. He
explains, however, that he did not sign the pleading as a lawyer or represented himself as an attorney in the pleading.

On his employment as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan, respondent claims that he submitted his resignation on 11
May 2001 which was allegedly accepted on the same date. He submitted a copy of the Certification of Receipt of
Revocable Resignation dated 28 May 2001 signed by Vice-Mayor Napoleon Relox. Respondent further claims that the
complaint is politically motivated considering that complainant is the daughter of Silvestre Aguirre, the losing candidate for
mayor of Mandaon, Masbate. Respondent prays that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit and that he be allowed
to sign the Roll of Attorneys.

On 22 June 2001, complainant filed her Reply to respondents Comment and refuted the claim of respondent that his
appearance before the MBEC was only to extend specific assistance to Bunan. Complainant alleges that on 19 May 2001
Emily Estipona-Hao (Estipona-Hao) filed a petition for proclamation as the winning candidate for mayor. Respondent
signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao in this petition. When respondent appeared as counsel before the MBEC,
complainant questioned his appearance on two grounds: (1) respondent had not taken his oath as a lawyer; and (2) he
was an employee of the government.

Respondent filed a Reply (Re: Reply to Respondents Comment) reiterating his claim that the instant administrative case is
motivated mainly by political vendetta.

On 17 July 2001, the Court referred the case to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) for evaluation, report and
recommendation.

OBCs Report and Recommendation

The OBC found that respondent indeed appeared before the MBEC as counsel for Bunan in the May 2001 elections. The
minutes of the MBEC proceedings show that respondent actively participated in the proceedings. The OBC likewise found
that respondent appeared in the MBEC proceedings even before he took the lawyers oath on 22 May 2001. The OBC
believes that respondents misconduct casts a serious doubt on his moral fitness to be a member of the Bar. The OBC
also believes that respondents unauthorized practice of law is a ground to deny his admission to the practice of law. The
OBC therefore recommends that respondent be denied admission to the Philippine Bar.

On the other charges, OBC stated that complainant failed to cite a law which respondent allegedly violated when he
appeared as counsel for Bunan while he was a government employee. Respondent resigned as secretary and his
resignation was accepted. Likewise, respondent was authorized by Bunan to represent him before the MBEC.

The Courts Ruling

We agree with the findings and conclusions of the OBC that respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and
thus does not deserve admission to the Philippine Bar.

Respondent took his oath as lawyer on 22 May 2001. However, the records show that respondent appeared as counsel
for Bunan prior to 22 May 2001, before respondent took the lawyers oath. In the pleading entitled Formal Objection to the
Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor dated 19 May 2001, respondent
signed as counsel for George Bunan. In the first paragraph of the same pleading respondent stated that he was
the (U)ndersigned Counsel for, and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate, GEORGE T. BUNAN. Bunan himself
wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he had authorized Atty. Edwin L. Rana as his counsel to represent him before the
MBEC and similar bodies.

On 14 May 2001, mayoralty candidate Emily Estipona-Hao also retained respondent as her counsel. On the same date,
14 May 2001, Erly D. Hao informed the MBEC that Atty. Edwin L. Rana has been authorized by REFORMA LM-PPC as
the legal counsel of the party and the candidate of the said party. Respondent himself wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001
that he was entering his appearance as counsel for Mayoralty Candidate Emily Estipona-Hao and for the REFORMA
LM-PPC. On 19 May 2001, respondent signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao in the petition filed before the MBEC praying
for the proclamation of Estipona-Hao as the winning candidate for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate.

All these happened even before respondent took the lawyers oath. Clearly, respondent engaged in the practice of law
without being a member of the Philippine Bar.

In Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava,1 the Court elucidated that:

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and
other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of
clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveyancing. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for
them in matters connected with the law, incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an
appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and
insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been
held to constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the
determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jur. p. 262, 263). (Italics
supplied) x x x

In Cayetano v. Monsod,2 the Court held that practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the
application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform
acts which are usually performed by members of the legal profession. Generally, to practice law is to render any kind of
service which requires the use of legal knowledge or skill.

Verily, respondent was engaged in the practice of law when he appeared in the proceedings before the MBEC and filed
various pleadings, without license to do so. Evidence clearly supports the charge of unauthorized practice of law.
Respondent called himself counsel knowing fully well that he was not a member of the Bar. Having held himself out as
counsel knowing that he had no authority to practice law, respondent has shown moral unfitness to be a member of the
Philippine Bar.

The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a privilege. It is limited to persons of good moral
character with special qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The exercise of this privilege presupposes possession
of integrity, legal knowledge, educational attainment, and even public trust 4 since a lawyer is an officer of the court. A bar
candidate does not acquire the right to practice law simply by passing the bar examinations. The practice of law is a
privilege that can be withheld even from one who has passed the bar examinations, if the person seeking admission had
practiced law without a license.5

The regulation of the practice of law is unquestionably strict. In Beltran, Jr. v. Abad,6 a candidate passed the bar
examinations but had not taken his oath and signed the Roll of Attorneys. He was held in contempt of court for practicing
law even before his admission to the Bar. Under Section 3 (e) of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, a person who engages in
the unauthorized practice of law is liable for indirect contempt of court. 7

True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the lawyers oath. However, it is the signing in the Roll
of Attorneys that finally makes one a full-fledged lawyer. The fact that respondent passed the bar examinations is
immaterial. Passing the bar is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law. 8 Respondent should know that two
essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his lawyers oath to be administered by this
Court and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys.

On the charge of violation of law, complainant contends that the law does not allow respondent to act as counsel for a
private client in any court or administrative body since respondent is the secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan.

Respondent tendered his resignation as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan prior to the acts complained of as
constituting unauthorized practice of law. In his letter dated 11 May 2001 addressed to Napoleon Relox, vice- mayor and
presiding officer of the Sangguniang Bayan, respondent stated that he was resigning effective upon your
acceptance.10 Vice-Mayor Relox accepted respondents resignation effective 11 May 2001. 11 Thus, the evidence does not
support the charge that respondent acted as counsel for a client while serving as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan.

On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, evidence shows that Bunan indeed authorized respondent to
represent him as his counsel before the MBEC and similar bodies. While there was no misrepresentation, respondent
nonetheless had no authority to practice law.

WHEREFORE, respondent Edwin L. Rana is DENIED admission to the Philippine Bar.

SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC

B.M. No. 712 July 13, 1995

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADMISSION TO THE BAR AND OATH-TAKING OF SUCCESSFUL BAR APPLICANT AL C.
ARGOSINO, petitioner.

RESOLUTION

FELICIANO, J.:

A criminal information was filed on 4 February 1992 with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 101, charging
Mr. A.C. Argosino along with thirteen (13) other individuals, with the crime of homicide in connection with the death of one
Raul Camaligan on 8 September 1991. The death of Raul Camaligan stemmed from the infliction of severe physical
injuries upon him in the course of "hazing" conducted as part of university fraternity initiation rites. Mr. Argosino and his
co-accused then entered into plea bargaining with the prosecution and as a result of such bargaining, pleaded guilty to the
lesser offense of homicide through reckless imprudence. This plea was accepted by the trial court. In a judgment dated 11
February 1993, each of the fourteen (14) accused individuals was sentenced to suffer imprisonment for a period ranging
from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years.

Eleven (11) days later, Mr. Argosino and his colleagues filed an application for probation with the lower court. The
application for probation was granted in an Order dated 18 June 1993 issued by Regional Trial Court Judge Pedro T.
Santiago. The period of probation was set at two (2) years, counted from the probationer's initial report to the probation
officer assigned to supervise him.

Less than a month later, on 13 July 1993, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition for Admission to Take the 1993 Bar Examinations.
In this Petition, he disclosed the fact of his criminal conviction and his then probation status. He was allowed to take the
1993 Bar Examinations in this Court's En Banc Resolution dated 14 August 1993.1 He passed the Bar Examination. He
was not, however, allowed to take the lawyer's oath of office.

On 15 April 1994, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition with this Court to allow him to take the attorney's oath of office and to admit
him to the practice of law, averring that Judge Pedro T. Santiago had terminated his probation period by virtue of an Order
dated 11 April 1994. We note that his probation period did not last for more than ten (10) months from the time of the
Order of Judge Santiago granting him probation dated 18 June 1993. Since then, Mr. Argosino has filed three (3) Motions
for Early Resolution of his Petition for Admission to the Bar.

The practice of law is not a natural, absolute or constitutional right to be granted to everyone who demands it. Rather, it is
a high personal privilege limited to citizens of good moral character, with special educational qualifications, duly
ascertained and certified.2 The essentiality of good moral character in those who would be lawyers is stressed in the
following excerpts which we quote with approval and which we regard as having persuasive effect:

In Re Farmer: 3

xxx xxx xxx

This "upright character" prescribed by the statute, as a condition precedent to the applicant's right to receive a license to
practice law in North Carolina, and of which he must, in addition to other requisites, satisfy the court, includes all the
elements necessary to make up such a character. It is something more than an absence of bad character. It is the good
name which the applicant has acquired, or should have acquired, through association with his fellows. It means that he
must have conducted himself as a man of upright character ordinarily would, or should, or does. Such character
expresses itself, not in negatives nor in following the line of least resistance, but quite often, in the will to do the
unpleasant thing if it is right, and the resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it is wrong. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

And we may pause to say that this requirement of the statute is eminently proper. Consider for a moment the duties of a
lawyer. He is sought as counsellor, and his advice comes home, in its ultimate effect, to every man's fireside. Vast
interests are committed to his care; he is the recipient of unbounded trust and confidence; he deals with is client's
property, reputation, his life, his all. An attorney at law is a sworn officer of the Court, whose chief concern, as such, is to
aid the administration of justice. . . .

xxx xxx xxx4

In Re Application of Kaufman,5 citing Re Law Examination of 1926 (1926) 191 Wis 359, 210 NW 710:

It can also be truthfully said that there exists nowhere greater temptations to deviate from the straight and narrow path
than in the multiplicity of circumstances that arise in the practice of profession. For these reasons the wisdom of requiring
an applicant for admission to the bar to possess a high moral standard therefore becomes clearly apparent, and the board
of bar examiners as an arm of the court, is required to cause a minute examination to be made of the moral standard of
each candidate for admission to practice. . . . It needs no further argument, therefore, to arrive at the conclusion that the
highest degree of scrutiny must be exercised as to the moral character of a candidate who presents himself for admission
to the bar. The evil must, if possible, be successfully met at its very source, and prevented, for, after a lawyer has once
been admitted, and has pursued his profession, and has established himself therein, a far more difficult situation is
presented to the court when proceedings are instituted for disbarment and for the recalling and annulment of his license.

In Re Keenan:6

The right to practice law is not one of the inherent rights of every citizen, as in the right to carry on an ordinary trade or
business. It is a peculiar privilege granted and continued only to those who demonstrate special fitness in intellectual
attainment and in moral character. All may aspire to it on an absolutely equal basis, but not all will attain it. Elaborate
machinery has been set up to test applicants by standards fair to all and to separate the fit from the unfit. Only those who
pass the test are allowed to enter the profession, and only those who maintain the standards are allowed to remain in it.

Re Rouss:7

Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions, and a fair private and professional character is one of
them; to refuse admission to an unworthy applicant is not to punish him for past offense: an examination into character,
like the examination into learning, is merely a test of fitness.

Cobb vs. Judge of Superior Court:8

Attorney's are licensed because of their learning and ability, so that they may not only protect the rights and interests of
their clients, but be able to assist court in the trial of the cause. Yet what protection to clients or assistance to courts could
such agents give? They are required to be of good moral character, so that the agents and officers of the court, which
they are, may not bring discredit upon the due administration of the law, and it is of the highest possible consequence that
both those who have not such qualifications in the first instance, or who, having had them, have fallen therefrom, shall not
be permitted to appear in courts to aid in the administration of justice.

It has also been stressed that the requirement of good moral character is, in fact, of greater importance so far as the
general public and the proper administration of justice are concerned, than the possession of legal learning:

. . . (In re Applicants for License, 55 S.E. 635, 143 N.C. 1, 10 L.R.A. [N.S.] 288, 10 Ann./Cas. 187):

The public policy of our state has always been to admit no person to the practice of the law unless he covered an upright
moral character. The possession of this by the attorney is more important, if anything, to the public and to the proper
administration of justice than legal learning. Legal learning may be acquired in after years, but if the applicant passes the
threshold of the bar with a bad moral character the chances are that his character will remain bad, and that he will
become a disgrace instead of an ornament to his great calling — a curse instead of a benefit to his community — a Quirk,
a Gammon or a Snap, instead of a Davis, a Smith or a Ruffin. 9

All aspects of moral character and behavior may be inquired into in respect of those seeking admission to the Bar. The
scope of such inquiry is, indeed, said to be properly broader than inquiry into the moral proceedings for disbarment:

Re Stepsay: 10
The inquiry as to the moral character of an attorney in a proceeding for his admission to practice is broader in scope than
in a disbarment proceeding.

Re Wells: 11

. . . that an applicant's contention that upon application for admission to the California Bar the court cannot reject him for
want of good moral character unless it appears that he has been guilty of acts which would be cause for his disbarment or
suspension, could not be sustained; that the inquiry is broader in its scope than that in a disbarment proceeding, and the
court may receive any evidence which tends to show the applicant's character as respects honesty, integrity, and general
morality, and may no doubt refuse admission upon proofs that might not establish his guilt of any of the acts declared to
be causes for disbarment.

The requirement of good moral character to be satisfied by those who would seek admission to the bar must of necessity
be more stringent than the norm of conduct expected from members of the general public. There is a very real need to
prevent a general perception that entry into the legal profession is open to individuals with inadequate moral qualifications.
The growth of such a perception would signal the progressive destruction of our people's confidence in their courts of law
and in our legal system as we know it.12

Mr. Argosino's participation in the deplorable "hazing" activities certainly fell far short of the required standard of good
moral character. The deliberate (rather than merely accidental or inadvertent) infliction of severe physical injuries which
proximately led to the death of the unfortunate Raul Camaligan, certainly indicated serious character flaws on the part of
those who inflicted such injuries. Mr. Argosino and his co-accused had failed to discharge their moral duty to protect the
life and well-being of a "neophyte" who had, by seeking admission to the fraternity involved, reposed trust and confidence
in all of them that, at the very least, he would not be beaten and kicked to death like a useless stray dog. Thus,
participation in the prolonged and mindless physical beatings inflicted upon Raul Camaligan constituted evident rejection
of that moral duty and was totally irresponsible behavior, which makes impossible a finding that the participant was then
possessed of good moral character.

Now that the original period of probation granted by the trial court has expired, the Court is prepared to consider de
novo the question of whether applicant A.C. Argosino has purged himself of the obvious deficiency in moral character
referred to above. We stress that good moral character is a requirement possession of which must be demonstrated not
only at the time of application for permission to take the bar examinations but also, and more importantly, at the time of
application for admission to the bar and to take the attorney's oath of office.

Mr. Argosino must, therefore, submit to this Court, for its examination and consideration, evidence that he may be now
regarded as complying with the requirement of good moral character imposed upon those seeking admission to the bar.
His evidence may consist, inter alia, of sworn certifications from responsible members of the community who have a good
reputation for truth and who have actually known Mr. Argosino for a significant period of time, particularly since the
judgment of conviction was rendered by Judge Santiago. He should show to the Court how he has tried to make up for the
senseless killing of a helpless student to the family of the deceased student and to the community at large. Mr. Argosino
must, in other words, submit relevant evidence to show that he is a different person now, that he has become morally fit
for admission to the ancient and learned profession of the law.

Finally, Mr. Argosino is hereby DIRECTED to inform this Court, by appropriate written manifestation, of the names and
addresses of the father and mother (in default thereof, brothers and sisters, if any, of Raul Camaligan), within ten (10) day
from notice hereof. Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished to the parents or brothers and sisters, if any, of Raul
Camaligan.
BAR MATTER NO. 730 June 13, 1997

Gentlemen:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of the Court En Banc dated June 10, 1997.

IN RE: NEED THAT LAW STUDENT PRACTICING UNDER RULE 138-A BE ACTUALLY SUPERVISED DURING TRIAL
(BAR MATTER NO. 730).

The issue in this Consulta is whether a law student who appears before the court under the Law Student Practice Rule
(Rule 138-A) should be accompanied by a member of the bar during the trial. This issue was raised by retired Supreme
Court Justice Antonio P. Barredo, counsel for the defendant in Civil Case No. BCV-92-11 entitled Irene A. Caliwara v.
Roger T. Catbagan filed before the Regional Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite.

The records show that the plaintiff in civil Case No. BCV-92-11 was represented by Mr. Cornelio Carmona, Jr., an intern
at the Office of Legal Aid, UP-College of Law (UP-OLA). Mr. Carmona conducted hearings and completed the
presentation of the plaintiff's evidence-in-chief without the presence of a supervising lawyer. Justice Barredo questioned
the appearance of Mr. Carmona during the hearing because the latter was not accompanied by a duly accredited lawyer.
On December 15, 1994, Presiding Judge Edelwina Pastoral issued an Order requiring Mr. Carmona to be accompanied
by a supervising lawyer on the next hearing. In compliance with said Order, UP-OLA and the Secretary of Justice
executed a Memorandum of Agreement directing Atty. Catubao and Atty. Legayada of the Public Attorney's Office to
supervise Mr. Carmona during the subsequent hearings.

Justice Barredo asserts that a law student appearing before the trial court under Rule 138-A should be accompanied by a
supervising lawyer. 1 On the other hand, UP-OLA, through its Director, Atty. Alfredo F. Tadiar, submits that "the matter of
allowing a law intern to appear unaccompanied by a duly accredited supervising lawyer should be . . . left to the sound
discretion of the court after having made at least one supervised appearance." 2

For the guidance of the bench and bar, we hold that a law student appearing before the Regional Trial Court under Rule
138-A should at all times be accompanied by a supervising lawyer. Section 2 of Rule 138-A provides.

Sec. 2. Appearance. — The appearance of the law student authorized by this rule, shall be under the direct supervision
and control of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly accredited by the law school. Any and all pleadings,
motions, briefs, memoranda or other papers to be filed, must be signed the by supervising attorney for and in behalf of the
legal clinic.

The phrase "direct supervision and control" requires no less than the physical presence of the supervising lawyer during
the hearing. This is in accordance with the threefold rationale behind the Law Student Practice Rule, to wit: 3

1. to ensure that there will be no miscarriage of justice as a result of incompetence or inexperience of law students, who,
not having as yet passed the test of professional competence, are presumably not fully equipped to act a counsels on
their own;

2. to provide a mechanism by which the accredited law school clinic may be able to protect itself from any potential
vicarious liability arising from some culpable action by their law students; and

3. to ensure consistency with the fundamental principle that no person is allowed to practice a particular profession
without possessing the qualifications, particularly a license, as required by law.

The matter of allowing a law student to appear before the court unaccompanied by a supervising lawyer cannot be left to
the discretion of the presiding judge. The rule clearly states that the appearance of the law student shall be under the
direct control and supervision of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly accredited by law schools. The
rule must be strictly construed because public policy demands that legal work should be entrusted only to those who
possess tested qualifications, are sworn to observe the rules and ethics of the legal profession and subject to judicial
disciplinary control. 4 We said in Bulacan v. Torcino: 5

Court procedures are often technical and may prove like snares to the ignorant or the unwary. In the past, our law has
allowed non-lawyers to appear for party litigants in places where duly authorized members of the bar are not available
(U.S. vs. Bacansas, 6 Phil. 539). For relatively simple litigation before municipal courts, the Rules still allow a more
educated or capable person in behalf of a litigant who cannot get a lawyer. But for the protection of the parties and in the
interest of justice, the requirement for appearances in regional trial courts and higher courts is more stringent.

The Law Student Practice Rule is only an exception to the rule. Hence, the presiding judge should see to it that the law
student appearing before the court is properly guided and supervised by a member of the bar.

The rule, however, is different if the law student appears before an inferior court, where the issues and procedure are
relatively simple. In inferior courts, a law student may appear in his personal capacity without the supervision of a lawyer.
Section 34 Rule 138 provides;

Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. — In the court of a justice of the peace, a party may conduct his litigation in
person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other
court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or
by a duly authorized member of the bar.

Thus, a law student may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a party without the supervision of a
member of the bar.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, we hold that a law student appearing before the Regional Trial Court under the authority of Rule
138-A must be under the direct control and supervision of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly
accredited by the law school and that said law student must be accompanied by a supervising lawyer in all his
appearance.

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 154464, September 11, 2008]

FERDINAND A. CRUZ, 332 EDANG ST., PASAY CITY, Petitioner, v. JUDGE PRISCILLA MIJARES, PRESIDING
JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 108, PASAY CITY, METRO MANILA, PUBLIC, Respondents.
BENJAMIN MINA, JR., 332 EDANG ST., PASAY CITY, Private Respondents..

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

This is a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus, with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. It was directly filed with this Court assailing the Resolutions dated May 10, 2002 1 and July 31,
20022 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 108, Pasay City, which denied the appearance of the plaintiff Ferdinand A.
Cruz, herein petitioner, as party litigant, and the refusal of the public respondent, Judge Priscilla Mijares, to voluntarily inhibit
herself from trying the case. No writ of preliminary injunction was issued by this Court.

The antecedents:

On March 5, 2002, Ferdinand A. Cruz (petitioner) sought permission to enter his appearance for and on his behalf, before the
RTC, Branch 108, Pasay City, as the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 01-0410, for Abatement of Nuisance. Petitioner, a fourth year law
student, anchors his claim on Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court 3 that a non-lawyer may appear before any court and
conduct his litigation personally.

During the pre-trial, Judge Priscilla Mijares required the petitioner to secure a written permission from the Court Administrator
before he could be allowed to appear as counsel for himself, a party-litigant. Atty. Stanley Cabrera, counsel for Benjamin Mina,
Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss instead of a pre-trial brief to which petitioner Cruz vehemently objected alleging that a Motion to
Dismiss is not allowed after the Answer had been filed. Judge Mijares then remarked, "Hay naku, masama `yung marunong pa
sa Huwes. Ok?" and proceeded to hear the pending Motion to Dismiss and calendared the next hearing on May 2, 2002.

On March 6, 2002, petitioner Cruz filed a Manifestation and Motion to Inhibit, 4 praying for the voluntary inhibition of Judge
Mijares. The Motion alleged that expected partiality on the part of the respondent judge in the conduct of the trial could be
inferred from the contumacious remarks of Judge Mijares during the pre-trial. It asserts that the judge, in uttering an uncalled for
remark, reflects a negative frame of mind, which engenders the belief that justice will not be served. 5

In an Order6 dated April 19, 2002, Judge Mijares denied the motion for inhibition stating that throwing tenuous allegations of
partiality based on the said remark is not enough to warrant her voluntary inhibition, considering that it was said even prior to the
start of pre-trial. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration 7 of the said order.

On May 10, 2002, Judge Mijares denied the motion with finality. 8 In the same Order, the trial court held that for the failure of
petitioner Cruz to submit the promised document and jurisprudence, and for his failure to satisfy the requirements or conditions
under Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court, his appearance was denied.

In a motion for reconsideration,9 petitioner reiterated that the basis of his appearance was not Rule 138-A, but Section 34 of
Rule 138. He contended that the two Rules were distinct and are applicable to different circumstances, but the respondent judge
denied the same, still invoking Rule 138-A, in an Order 10 dated July 31, 2002.

On August 16, 2002, the petitioner directly filed with this Court, the instant petition and assigns the following errors:

I.
THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED THE
APPEARANCE OF THE PETITIONER, FOR AND IN THE LATTER'S BEHALF, IN CIVIL CASE NO. 01-0401 [sic] CONTRARY
TO RULE 138, SECTION 34 OF THE RULES OF COURT, PROVIDING FOR THE APPEARANCE OF NON-LAWYERS AS A
PARTY LITIGANT;

II.
THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DID NOT VOLUNTARILY INHIBIT
DESPITE THE ADVENT OF JURISPRUDENCE [sic] THAT SUCH AN INHIBITION IS PROPER TO PRESERVE THE
PEOPLE'S FAITH AND CONFIDENCE TO THE COURTS.
The core issues raised before the Court are: (1) whether the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under
Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court may issue; and (2) whether the respondent court acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it denied the appearance of the petitioner as party litigant and when the judge
refused to inhibit herself from trying the case.

This Court's jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction is not exclusive; it has concurrent
jurisdiction with the RTCs and the Court of Appeals. This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as an absolute,
unrestrained freedom to choose the court where the application therefor will be directed. 11 A becoming regard of the judicial
hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against the RTCs should be filed with the
Court of Appeals.12 The hierarchy of courts is determinative of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs; and
only in exceptional cases and for compelling reasons, or if warranted by the nature of the issues reviewed, may this Court take
cognizance of petitions filed directly before it. 13

Considering, however, that this case involves the interpretation of Section 34, Rule 138 and Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court,
the Court takes cognizance of herein petition. Nonetheless, the petitioner is cautioned not to continue his practice of filing
directly before this Court petitions under Rule 65 when the issue raised can be resolved with dispatch by the Court of Appeals.
We will not tolerate litigants who make a mockery of the judicial hierarchy as it necessarily delays more important concerns
before us.

In resolving the second issue, a comparative reading of Rule 138, Section 34 and Rule 138-A is necessary.

Rule 138-A, or the Law Student Practice Rule, provides:

RULE 138-A LAW STUDENT PRACTICE RULE

Section 1. Conditions for Student Practice. - A law student who has successfully completed his 3rd year of the regular four-year
prescribed law curriculum and is enrolled in a recognized law school's clinical legal education program approved by the
Supreme Court, may appear without compensation in any civil, criminal or administrative case before any trial court, tribunal,
board or officer, to represent indigent clients accepted by the legal clinic of the law school.

Sec. 2. Appearance. - The appearance of the law student authorized by this rule, shall be under the direct supervision and
control of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly accredited by the law school. Any and all pleadings,
motions, briefs, memoranda or other papers to be filed, must be signed by the supervising attorney for and in behalf of the legal
clinic.

The respondent court held that the petitioner could not appear for himself and on his behalf because of his failure to comply with
Rule 138-A. In denying petitioner's appearance, the court a quo tersely finds refuge in the fact that, on December 18, 1986, this
Court issued Circular No. 19, which eventually became Rule 138-A, and the failure of Cruz to prove on record that he is enrolled
in a recognized school's clinical legal education program and is under supervision of an attorney duly accredited by the law
school.

However, the petitioner insisted that the basis of his appearance was Section 34 of Rule 138, which provides:

Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. - In the court of a justice of the peace, a party may conduct his litigation in person, with
the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may
conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized
member of the bar.

and is a rule distinct from Rule 138-A.

From the clear language of this provision of the Rules, it will have to be conceded that the contention of the petitioner has merit.
It recognizes the right of an individual to represent himself in any case to which he is a party. The Rules state that a party may
conduct his litigation personally or with the aid of an attorney, and that his appearance must either be personal or by a duly
authorized member of the Bar. The individual litigant may personally do everything in the course of proceedings from
commencement to the termination of the litigation.14 Considering that a party personally conducting his litigation is restricted to
the same rules of evidence and procedure as those qualified to practice law, 15Petitioner, not being a lawyer himself, runs the risk
of falling into the snares and hazards of his own ignorance. Therefore, Cruz as plaintiff, at his own instance, can personally
conduct the litigation of Civil Case No. 01-0410. He would then be acting not as a counsel or lawyer, but as a party exercising
his right to represent himself.
The trial court must have been misled by the fact that the petitioner is a law student and must, therefore, be subject to the
conditions of the Law Student Practice Rule. It erred in applying Rule 138-A, when the basis of the petitioner's claim is Section
34 of Rule 138. The former rule provides for conditions when a law student may appear in courts, while the latter rule allows the
appearance of a non-lawyer as a party representing himself.

The conclusion of the trial court that Rule 138-A superseded Rule 138 by virtue of Circular No. 19 is misplaced. The Court never
intended to repeal Rule 138 when it released the guidelines for limited law student practice. In fact, it was intended as an
addendum to the instances when a non-lawyer may appear in courts and was incorporated to the Rules of Court through Rule
138-A.

It may be relevant to recall that, in respect to the constitutional right of an accused to be heard by himself and counsel, 16 this
Court has held that during the trial, the right to counsel cannot be waived. 17 The rationale for this ruling was articulated in People
v. Holgado,18 where we declared that "even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science of law,
particularly in the rules of procedure, and without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty but because he does
not know how to establish his innocence."

The case at bar involves a civil case, with the petitioner as plaintiff therein. The solicitous concern that the Constitution accords
the accused in a criminal prosecution obviously does not obtain in a civil case. Thus, a party litigant in a civil case, who insists
that he can, without a lawyer's assistance, effectively undertake the successful pursuit of his claim, may be given the chance to
do so. In this case, petitioner alleges that he is a law student and impliedly asserts that he has the competence to litigate the
case himself. Evidently, he is aware of the perils incident to this decision.

In addition, it was subsequently clarified in Bar Matter 730, that by virtue of Section 34, Rule 138, a law student may appear as
an agent or a friend of a party litigant, without need of the supervision of a lawyer, before inferior courts. Here, we have a law
student who, as party litigant, wishes to represent himself in court. We should grant his wish.

Additionally, however, petitioner contends that the respondent judge committed manifest bias and partiality by ruling that there is
no valid ground for her voluntary inhibition despite her alleged negative demeanor during the pre-trial when she said: "Hay naku,
masama `yung marunong pa sa Huwes. Ok?" Petitioner avers that by denying his motion, the respondent judge already
manifested conduct indicative of arbitrariness and prejudice, causing petitioner's and his co-plaintiff's loss of faith and confidence
in the respondent's impartiality.

We do not agree.

It must be noted that because of this incident, the petitioner filed an administrative case 19 against the respondent for violation of
the Canons of Judicial Ethics, which we dismissed for lack of merit on September 15, 2002. We now adopt the Court's findings
of fact in the administrative case and rule that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of Judge Mijares when she did
not inhibit herself from the trial of the case.

In a Motion for Inhibition, the movant must prove the ground for bias and prejudice by clear and convincing evidence to
disqualify a judge from participating in a particular trial,20 as voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of conscience and
addressed to the sound discretion of the judge. The decision on whether she should inhibit herself must be based on her rational
and logical assessment of the circumstances prevailing in the case before her. 21 Absent clear and convincing proof of grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the judge, this Court will rule in favor of the presumption that official duty has been regularly
performed.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed Resolution and Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
108, Pasay City are MODIFIED. Regional Trial Court, Branch 108, Pasay City is DIRECTED to ADMIT the Entry of Appearance
of petitioner in Civil Case No. 01-0410 as a party litigant.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. NO. 154207 : April 27, 2007]

FERDINAND A. CRUZ, Petitioner, v. ALBERTO MINA, HON. ELEUTERIO F. GUERRERO and HON. ZENAIDA
LAGUILLES, Respondents.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, grounded on pure questions of law, with
Prayer for Preliminary Injunction assailing the Resolution dated May 3, 2002 promulgated by the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 116, Pasay City, in Civil Case No. 02-0137, which denied the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
against the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 45, Pasay City, in Criminal Case No. 00-1705; 1 and the RTC's Order
dated June 5, 2002 denying the Motion for Reconsideration. No writ of preliminary injunction was issued by this Court.

The antecedents:

On September 25, 2000, Ferdinand A. Cruz (petitioner) filed before the MeTC a formal Entry of Appearance, as private
prosecutor, in Criminal Case No. 00-1705 for Grave Threats, where his father, Mariano Cruz, is the complaining witness.

The petitioner, describing himself as a third year law student, justifies his appearance as private prosecutor on the bases
of Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and the ruling of the Court En Banc in Cantimbuhan v. Judge Cruz,
Jr.2 that a non-lawyer may appear before the inferior courts as an agent or friend of a party litigant. The petitioner
furthermore avers that his appearance was with the prior conformity of the public prosecutor and a written authority of
Mariano Cruz appointing him to be his agent in the prosecution of the said criminal case.

However, in an Order dated February 1, 2002, the MeTC denied permission for petitioner to appear as private prosecutor on the
ground that Circular No. 19 governing limited law student practice in conjunction with Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court (Law
Student Practice Rule) should take precedence over the ruling of the Court laid down in Cantimbuhan; and set the case for
continuation of trial.3

On February 13, 2002, petitioner filed before the MeTC a Motion for Reconsideration seeking to reverse the February 1, 2002
Order alleging that Rule 138-A, or the Law Student Practice Rule, does not have the effect of superseding Section 34 of Rule
138, for the authority to interpret the rule is the source itself of the rule, which is the Supreme Court alone.

In an Order dated March 4, 2002, the MeTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration.

On April 2, 2002, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction
and Temporary Restraining Order against the private respondent and the public respondent MeTC.

After hearing the prayer for preliminary injunction to restrain public respondent MeTC Judge from proceeding with Criminal Case
No. 00-1705 pending the Certiorari proceedings, the RTC, in a Resolution dated May 3, 2002, resolved to deny the issuance of
an injunctive writ on the ground that the crime of Grave Threats, the subject of Criminal Case No. 00-1705, is one that can be
prosecuted de oficio, there being no claim for civil indemnity, and that therefore, the intervention of a private prosecutor is not
legally tenable.

On May 9, 2002, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Motion for Reconsideration. The petitioner argues that nowhere does the
law provide that the crime of Grave Threats has no civil aspect. And last, petitioner cites Bar Matter No. 730 dated June 10,
1997 which expressly provides for the appearance of a non-lawyer before the inferior courts, as an agent or friend of a party
litigant, even without the supervision of a member of the bar.

Pending the resolution of the foregoing Motion for Reconsideration before the RTC, the petitioner filed a Second Motion for
Reconsideration dated June 7, 2002 with the MeTC seeking the reversal of the March 4, 2002 Denial Order of the said court, on
the strength of Bar Matter No. 730, and a Motion to Hold In Abeyance the Trial dated June 10, 2002 of Criminal Case No. 00-
1705 pending the outcome of the certiorari proceedings before the RTC.

On June 5, 2002, the RTC issued its Order denying the petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.

Likewise, in an Order dated June 13, 2002, the MeTC denied the petitioner's Second Motion for Reconsideration and his Motion
to Hold in Abeyance the Trial on the ground that the RTC had already denied the Entry of Appearance of petitioner before the
MeTC.
On July 30, 2002, the petitioner directly filed with this Court, the instant Petition and assigns the following errors:

I.

the respondent regional trial court abused its discretion when it resolved to deny the prayer for the writ of injunction of the herein
petitioner despite petitioner having established the necessity of granting the writ;

II.

THE RESPONDENT TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION, TANTAMOUNT TO IGNORANCE OF THE LAW, WHEN IT
RESOLVED TO DENY THE PRAYER FOR THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND THE SUBSEQUENT MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE HEREIN PETITIONER ON THE BASIS THAT [GRAVE] THREATS HAS NO CIVIL
ASPECT, FOR THE SAID BASIS OF DENIAL IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE LAW;

III.

THE RESPONDENT METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED THE MOTION TO HOLD
IN ABEYANCE TRIAL, WHEN WHAT WAS DENIED BY THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IS THE ISSUANCE
OF THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION and WHEN THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IS YET TO
DECIDE ON THE MERITS OF THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI;

IV.

THE RESPONDENT COURT[s] ARE CLEARLY IGNORING THE LAW WHEN THEY PATENTLY REFUSED TO HEED TO [sic]
THE CLEAR MANDATE OF THE LAPUT, CANTIMBUHAN AND BULACAN CASES, AS WELL AS BAR MATTER NO. 730,
PROVIDING FOR THE APPEARANCE OF NON-LAWYERS BEFORE THE LOWER COURTS (MTC'S). 4

This Court, in exceptional cases, and for compelling reasons, or if warranted by the nature of the issues reviewed, may take
cognizance of petitions filed directly before it. 5

Considering that this case involves the interpretation, clarification, and implementation of Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court, Bar Matter No. 730, Circular No. 19 governing law student practice and Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court, and the ruling
of the Court in Cantimbuhan, the Court takes cognizance of herein petition.

The basic question is whether the petitioner, a law student, may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a party
litigant.

The courts a quo held that the Law Student Practice Rule as encapsulated in Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court, prohibits the
petitioner, as a law student, from entering his appearance in behalf of his father, the private complainant in the criminal case
without the supervision of an attorney duly accredited by the law school.

Rule 138-A or the Law Student Practice Rule, provides:

RULE 138-A LAW STUDENT PRACTICE RULE

Section 1. Conditions for Student Practice. - A law student who has successfully completed his 3rd year of the regular four-year
prescribed law curriculum and is enrolled in a recognized law school's clinical legal education program approved by the
Supreme Court, may appear without compensation in any civil, criminal or administrative case before any trial court, tribunal,
board or officer, to represent indigent clients accepted by the legal clinic of the law school.

Sec. 2. Appearance. - The appearance of the law student authorized by this rule, shall be under the direct supervision and
control of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly accredited by the law school. Any and all pleadings, motions,
briefs, memoranda or other papers to be filed, must be signed by the supervising attorney for and in behalf of the legal clinic.

However, in Resolution6 dated June 10, 1997 in Bar Matter No. 730, the Court En Banc clarified:

The rule, however, is different if the law student appears before an inferior court, where the issues and procedure are relatively
simple. In inferior courts, a law student may appear in his personal capacity without the supervision of a lawyer. Section 34, Rule
138 provides:
Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. - In the court of a justice of the peace, a party may conduct his litigation in person,
with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may
conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized
member of the bar.

Thus, a law student may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a party without the supervision of a member of
the bar.7 (Emphasis supplied)cralawlibrary

The phrase "In the court of a justice of the peace" in Bar Matter No. 730 is subsequently changed to "In the court of a
municipality" as it now appears in Section 34 of Rule 138, thus: 8

SEC. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. - In the Court of a municipality a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the
aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct
his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of
the bar. (Emphasis supplied)cralawlibrary

which is the prevailing rule at the time the petitioner filed his Entry of Appearance with the MeTC on September 25, 2000. No
real distinction exists for under Section 6, Rule 5 of the Rules of Court, the term "Municipal Trial Courts" as used in these Rules
shall include Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.

There is really no problem as to the application of Section 34 of Rule 138 and Rule 138-A. In the former, the appearance of a
non-lawyer, as an agent or friend of a party litigant, is expressly allowed, while the latter rule provides for conditions when a law
student, not as an agent or a friend of a party litigant, may appear before the courts.

Petitioner expressly anchored his appearance on Section 34 of Rule 138. The court a quo must have been confused by the fact
that petitioner referred to himself as a law student in his entry of appearance. Rule 138-A should not have been used by the
courts a quo in denying permission to act as private prosecutor against petitioner for the simple reason that Rule 138-A is not
the basis for the petitioner's appearance.

Section 34, Rule 138 is clear that appearance before the inferior courts by a non-lawyer is allowed, irrespective of whether or not
he is a law student. As succinctly clarified in Bar Matter No. 730, by virtue of Section 34, Rule 138, a law student may appear, as
an agent or a friend of a party litigant, without the supervision of a lawyer before inferior courts.

Petitioner further argues that the RTC erroneously held that, by its very nature, no civil liability may flow from the crime of Grave
Threats, and, for this reason, the intervention of a private prosecutor is not possible.

It is clear from the RTC Decision that no such conclusion had been intended by the RTC. In denying the issuance of the
injunctive court, the RTC stated in its Decision that there was no claim for civil liability by the private complainant for damages,
and that the records of the case do not provide for a claim for indemnity; and that therefore, petitioner's appearance as private
prosecutor appears to be legally untenable.

Under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable except in instances
when no actual damage results from an offense, such as espionage, violation of neutrality, flight to an enemy country, and crime
against popular representation.9 The basic rule applies in the instant case, such that when a criminal action is instituted, the civil
action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with criminal action, unless the
offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal
action.10

The petitioner is correct in stating that there being no reservation, waiver, nor prior institution of the civil aspect in Criminal Case
No. 00-1705, it follows that the civil aspect arising from Grave Threats is deemed instituted with the criminal action, and, hence,
the private prosecutor may rightfully intervene to prosecute the civil aspect.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution and Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 116, Pasay
City are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 45, Pasay City is DIRECTED to ADMIT the Entry of
Appearance of petitioner in Criminal Case No. 00-1705 as a private prosecutor under the direct control and supervision of the
public prosecutor. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
[G.R. Nos. L-51813-14. November 29, 1983.]

ROMULO CANTIMBUHAN, NELSON B. MALANA, and ROBERT V. LUCILA, Petitioners, v. HON. NICANOR J.

CRUZ, JR., Presiding Judge of the Municipal Court of Parañaque, Metro Manila, and FISCAL LEODEGARIO C.
QUILATAN, Respondents.

DECISION

RELOVA, J.:

Appeal from the Order, dated August 16, 1979, of respondent Judge Nicanor J. Cruz, Jr., of the then Municipal Court of
Parañaque, Metro Manila, disallowing the appearances of petitioners Nelson B. Malana and Robert V. Lucila as private
prosecutors in Criminal Cases Nos. 58549 and 58550, both for less serious physical injuries, filed against Pat. Danilo San
Antonio and Pat. Rodolfo Diaz, respectively, as well as the Order, dated September 4, 1979, denying the motion for
reconsideration holding, among others, that "the fiscal’s claim that appearances of friends of party-litigants should be
allowed only in places where there is a scarcity of legal practitioner, to be well founded. For, if we are to allow non-
members of the bar to appear in court and prosecute cases or defend litigants in the guise of being friends of the litigants,
then the requirement of membership in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the additional requirement of paying
professional taxes for a lawyer to appear in court, would be put to naught." (p. 25, Rollo)

Records show that on April 6, 1979, petitioner Romulo Cantimbuhan filed separate criminal complaints against Patrolmen
Danilo San Antonio and Rodolfo Diaz for less serious physical injuries, respectively, and were docketed as Criminal
Cases Nos. 58549 and 58550 in the then Municipal Court of Parañaque, Metro Manila.

Petitioners Nelson B. Malana and Robert V. Lucila, in 1979, were senior law students of the U.P. College of Law where,
as part of the curriculum of the university they were required to render legal assistance to the needy clients in the Office of
the Legal Aid. Thus, in August 1979, petitioners Malana and Lucila filed their separate appearances, as friends of
complainant-petitioner Cantimbuhan. Herein respondent Fiscal Leodegario C. Quilatan opposed the appearances of said
petitioners, and respondent judge, in an Order dated August 16, 1979, sustained the respondent fiscal and disallowed the
appearances of petitioners Malana and Lucila, as private prosecutors in said criminal cases. Likewise, on September 4,
1979, respondent Judge issued an order denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.

Hence, this petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition with prayers, among others, that the Orders of respondent
judge, dated August 16, 1979 and September 4, 1979, be set aside as they are in plain violation of Section 34, Rule 138
of the Rules of Court and/or were issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Upon motion, the
Court, on November 8, 1979, issued a temporary restraining order "enjoining respondent judge and all persons acting for
and in his behalf from conducting any proceedings in Criminal Cases Nos. 58549 (People of the Philippines v. Danilo San
Antonio) and 58559 (People of the Philippines v. Rodolfo Diaz) of the Municipal Court of Parañaque, Metro Manila on
November 15, 1979 as scheduled or on any such dates as may be fixed by said respondent judge."

Basis of this petition is Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court which states:
"SEC. 34. By whom litigation conducted. — In the court of a justice of the peace a party may conduct his litigation in
person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other
court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or
by a duly authorized member of the bar."

Thus, a non-member of the Philippine Bar — a party to an action is authorized to appear in court and conduct his own
case; and, in the inferior courts, the litigant may be aided by a friend or agent or by an attorney. However, in the Courts of
First Instance, now Regional Trial Courts, he can be aided only by an attorney.

On the other hand, it is the submission of the respondents that pursuant to Sections 4 and 15, Rule 110 of the Rules of
Court, it is the fiscal who is empowered to determine who shall be the private prosecutor as was done by respondent
fiscal when he objected to the appearances of petitioners Malana and Lucila. Sections 4 and 15, Rule 110 of the Rules of
Court provide:
"SEC. 4. Who must prosecute criminal actions. — All criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by information
shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal.

"SEC. 15. Intervention of the offended party in criminal action. — Unless the offended party has waived the civil action or
expressly reserved the right to institute it separately from the criminal action, and subject to the provisions of section 4
hereof, he may intervene, personally or by attorney, in the prosecution of the offense."

And, they contend that the exercise by the offended party to intervene is subject to the direction and control of the fiscal
and that his appearance, no less than his active conduct of the case later on, requires the prior approval of the fiscal.

We find merit in the petition. Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, clearly provides that in the municipal court a party
may conduct his litigation in person with the aid of an agent appointed by him for the purpose. Thus, in the case of Laput
v. Bernabe, 55 Phil. 621, a law student was allowed to represent the accused in a case pending before the then Municipal
Court, the City Court of Manila, who was charged for damages to property through reckless imprudence. "It is accordingly
our view that error was committed in the municipal court in not allowing Crispiniano V. Laput to act as an agent or friend of
Catalino Salas to aid the latter in conducting his defense." The permission of the fiscal is not necessary for one to enter
his appearance as private prosecutor. In the first place, the law does not impose this condition. What the fiscal can do, if
he wants to handle the case personally is to disallow the private prosecutor’s participation, whether he be a lawyer or not,
in the trial of the case. On the other hand, if the fiscal desires the active participation of the private prosecutor, he can just
manifest to the court that the private prosecutor, with its approval, will conduct the prosecution of the case under his
supervision and control. Further, We may add that if a non-lawyer can appear as defense counsel or as friend of the
accused in a case before the municipal trial court, with more reason should he be allowed to appear as private prosecutor
under the supervision and control of the trial fiscal.

In the two criminal cases filed before the Municipal Court of Parañaque, petitioner Cantimbuhan, as the offended party,
did not expressly waive the civil action nor reserve his right to institute it separately and, therefore, the civil action is
deemed impliedly instituted in said criminal cases. Thus, said complainant Romulo Cantimbuhan has personal interest in
the success of the civil action and, in the prosecution of the same, he cannot be deprived of his right to be assisted by a
friend who is not a lawyer.

WHEREFORE, the Orders issued by respondent judge dated August 16, 1979 and September 4, 1979 which disallowed
the appearances of petitioners Nelson B. Malana and Robert V. Lucila as friends of party-litigant petitioner Romulo
Cantimbuhan, are hereby SET ASIDE and respondent judge is hereby ordered to ALLOW the appearance and
intervention of petitioners Malana and Lucila as friends of Romulo Cantimbuhan. Accordingly, the temporary restraining
order issued on November 8, 1979 is LIFTED.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-12426. February 16, 1959.]

PHILIPPINE LAWYER’S ASSOCIATION, Petitioner, v. CELEDONIO AGRAVA, in his capacity as Director of the

Philippines Patent Office, Respondent.

DECISION

MONTEMAYOR, J.:

This is a petition filed by the Philippine Lawyer’s Association for prohibition and injunction against Celedonio Agrava, in his
capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent Office.

On May 27, 1957, respondent Director issued a circular announcing that he had scheduled for June 27, 1957 an
examination for the purpose of determining who are qualified to practice as patent attorneys before the Philippines Patent
Office, the said examination to cover patent law and jurisprudence and the rules of practice before said office. According
to the circular, members of the Philippine Bar, engineers and other persons with sufficient scientific and technical training
are qualified to take the said examination. It would appear that heretofore, respondent Director has been holding similar
examinations.

It is the contention of the petitioner Philippine Lawyer’s Association that one of the petitioner Philippine Lawyer’s
Association that one who has passed the bar examinations and is licensed by the Supreme Court to practice law in the
Philippines and who is in good standing, is duly qualified to practice before the Philippines Patent Office, and that
consequently, the act of the respondent Director requiring members of the Philippine Bar in good standing to take and
pass an examination given by the Patent Office as a condition precedent to their being allowed to practice before said
office, such as representing applicants in the preparation and prosecution of applications for patent, is in excess of his
jurisdiction and is in violation of the law.

In his answer, respondent Director, through the Solicitor General, maintains that the prosecution of patent cases "does not
involve entirely or purely the practice of law but includes the application of scientific and technical knowledge and training,
so much so that, as a matter of actual practice, the prosecution of patent cases may be handled not only by lawyers, but
also by engineers and other persons with sufficient scientific and technical training who pass the prescribed examinations
as given by the Patent Office; . . . that the Rules of Court do not prohibit the Patent Office, or any other quasi-judicial body
from requiring further condition or qualification from those who would wish to handle cases before such bodies, as in the
prosecution of patent cases before the Patent Office which, as stated in the preceding paragraph, requires more of an
application of scientific and technical knowledge than the mere application of provisions of law; . . . that the action taken
by the respondent is in accordance with Republic Act No. 165, otherwise known as the Patent Law of the Philippines,
which is similar to the United States Patent Law, in accordance with which the United States Patent Office has also
prescribed a similar examination as what prescribed by Respondent. . . . ."

Respondent further contends that just as the Patent Law of the United States of America authorizes the Commissioner of
Patents to prescribe examinations to determine as to who may practice before the United States Patent Office, the
respondent, is similarly authorized to do so by our Patent Law, Republic Act No. 165.

Although as already stated, the Director of Patents, in the past, would appear to have been holding tests or examinations
the passing of which was imposed as a required qualification to practice before the Patent Office, to our knowledge, this is
the first time that the right of the Director of Patents to do so, specially as regards members of the bar, has been
questioned formally, or otherwise put in issue. And we have given it careful thought and consideration.

The Supreme Court has the exclusive and constitutional power with respect to admission to the practice of law in the
Philippines 1 and any member of the Philippine Bar in good standing may practice law anywhere and before any entity,
whether judicial or quasi-judicial or administrative, in the Philippines. Naturally, the question arises as to whether or not
appearance before the Patent Office and the preparation and prosecution of patent applications, etc., constitutes or is
included in the practice of law.

"The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings
and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf
of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for
them in matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an
appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor’s claim in bankruptcy and
insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been
held to constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the
determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions." (5 Am. Jur. p. 262, 263). (Italics
supplied)

"Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of any court and having no immediate
relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and the preparation
and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs. Although these
transactions may have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in litigation. They
require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult
and complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the administration of
justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part of the
work of the lawyer which involves appearance in court and that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is
of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate
learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all
attorneys." (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 (1953 ed.) , p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the Justices (Mass.) , 194 N.
E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. (R. I.) 179 A. 139, 144). (Emphasis supplied)

In our opinion, the practice of law includes such appearance before the Patent Office, the representation of applicants, oppositors, and
other persons, and the prosecution of their applications for patent, their oppositions thereto, or the enforcement of their rights in patent
cases. In the first place, although the transaction of business in the Patent Office involves the use and application of technical and
scientific knowledge and training, still, all such business has to be conducted and all orders and decisions of the Director of Patents
have to be rendered in accordance with the Patent Law, as well as other laws, including the Rules and Regulations promulgated by the
Patent Office in accordance with law. Not only this, but practice before the Patent Office involves the interpretation and application of
other laws and legal principles, as well as the existence of facts to be established in accordance with the law of evidence and
procedure. For instance: Section 8 of our Patent Law provides that an invention shall not be patentable if it is contrary to public order or
morals, or to public health or welfare. Section 9 says that an invention shall not be considered new or patentable if it was known or used
by others in the Philippines before the invention thereof by the inventor named in the application for patent, or if it was patented or
described in any printed publication in the Philippines or any foreign country more than one year before the application for a patent
therefor, or if it had been in public use or on sale in the Philippines for more than one year before the application for the patent therefor.
Section 10 provides that the right to the patent belongs to the true and actual inventor, his heirs, legal representatives or assigns, and
Section 12 says that an application for a patent may be filed only by the inventor, his heirs, legal representatives or assigns. Section 25
and 26 refer to correction of any mistake in a patent. Section 28 enumerates the grounds for cancellation of a patent; that although any
person may apply for such cancellation, under Section 29, the Solicitor General is authorized to petition for the cancellation of a patent.
Section 30 mentions the requirements of a petition for cancellation. Sections 31 and 32 provide for a notice of hearing of the petition for
cancellation of the patent by the Director of Patents in case the said cancellation is warranted. Under Section 34, at any time after the
expiration of three years from the day the patent was granted, any person may apply for the grant of a license under a particular patent
on several grounds, such as, if the patented invention is not being worked in the Philippines on a commercial scale, or if the demand for
the patented article in the Philippines is not being met to an adequate extent and reasonable terms, or if by reason of the patentee’s
refusal to grant a license on reasonable terms or by reason of the conditions attached by him to the license, purchase, lease or use of
the patented article or working of the patented process or machine of production, the establishment of a new trade or industry in the
Philippines is prevented; or if the patent or invention relates to food or medicine or is necessary to public health or public safety. All
these things involve the application of laws, legal principles, practice and procedure. They call for legal knowledge, training and
experience for which a member of the bar has been prepared.

In support of the proposition that much of the business and many of the acts, orders and decisions of the Patent Director
involve questions of law or a reasonable and correct evaluation of facts, the very Patent Law, Republic Act No. 165,
Section 61, provides that:

". . . . The applicant for a patent or for the registration of a design, any party to a proceeding to cancel a patent or to obtain
a compulsory license, and any party to any other proceeding in the Office may appeal to the Supreme Court from any final
order or decision of the Director."
In other words, the appeal is taken to this Tribunal. If the transaction of business in the Patent Office and the acts, orders
and decisions of the Patent Director involved exclusively or mostly technical and scientific knowledge and training, then
logically, the appeal should be taken not to a court or judicial body, but rather to a board of scientists, engineers or
technical men, which is not the case.

Another aspect of the question involves the consideration of the nature of the functions and acts of the Head of the Patent
Office.

". . . . The Commissioner, in issuing or withholding patents, in reissues, interferences, and extensions, exercises quasi-judicial
functions. Patents are public records, and it is the duty of the Commissioner to give authenticated copies to any person, on payment of
the legal fees." (40 Am. Jur. 537). (Emphasis supplied).." . . . The Commissioner has the only original initiatory jurisdiction that exists up
to the granting and delivering of a patent, and it is his duty to decide whether the patent is new and whether it is the proper subject of a
patent; and his action in awarding or refusing a patent is a judicial function. In passing on an application the commissioner should
decide not only questions of law, but also questions of fact, as whether there has been a prior public use or sale of the article
invented. . . . ." (60 C. J. S. 460). (Emphasis supplied).

The Director of Patents, exercising as he does judicial or quasi-judicial functions, it is reasonable to hold that a member of the bar,
because of his legal knowledge and training, should be allowed to practice before the Patent Office, without further examination or
other qualification. Of course, the Director of Patents, if he deems it advisable or necessary, may require that members of the bar
practising before him enlist the assistance of technical men and scientists in the preparation of papers and documents, such as, the
drawing or technical description of an invention or machine sought to be patented, in the same way that a lawyer filing an application for
the registration of a parcel of land on behalf of his client, is required to submit a plan and technical description of said land, prepared by
a licensed surveyor.

But respondent Director claims that he is expressly authorized by the law to require persons desiring to practice or to do
business before him to submit to an examination, even if they are already members of the bar. He contends that our
Patent Law, Republic Act No. 165, is patterned after the United States Patent Law; and that the U. S. Patent Office in its
Rules of Practice of the United States Patent Office in Patent Cases prescribes an examination similar to that which he
(respondent) has prescribed and scheduled. He invites our attention to the following provisions of said Rules of Practice:

"Registration of attorneys and agents. — A register of attorneys and a register of agents are kept in the Patent Office on
which are entered the names of all persons recognized as entitled to represent applicants before the Patent Office in the
preparation and prosecution of applications for patent. Registration in the Patent Office under the provisions of these rules
shall only entitle the person registered to practice before the Patent Office.

"(a) Attorneys at law. — Any attorney at law in good standing admitted to practice before any United States Court or the
highest court of any State or Territory of the United States who fulfills the requirements and complied with the provisions
of these rules may be admitted to practice before the Patent Office and have his name entered on the register of
attorneys.

"(c) Requirement for registration. — No person will be admitted to practice and register unless he shall apply to the
Commissioner of Patents in writing on a prescribed form supplied by the Commissioner and furnish all requested
information and material; and shall establish to the satisfaction of the Commissioner that he is of good moral character
and of good repute and possessed of the legal and scientific and technical qualifications necessary to enable him to
render applicants for patent valuable service, and is otherwise competent to advise and assist him in the presentation and
prosecution of their application before the Patent Office. In order that the Commissioner may determine whether a person
seeking to have his name placed either of the registers has the qualifications specified, satisfactory proof of good moral
character and repute, and of sufficient basic training in scientific and technical matters must be submitted and an
examination which is held from time to time must be taken and passed. The taking of an examination may be waived in
the case of any person who has served for three years in the examining corps of the Patent Office."

Respondent states that the promulgation of the Rules of Practice of the United States Patent Office in Patent Cases is
authorized by the United States Patent Law itself, which reads as follows:

"The Commissioner of Patents, subject to the approval of the Secretary of Commerce may prescribe rules and regulations governing
the recognition of agents, attorneys, or other persons representing applicants or other parties before his office, and may require of such
persons, agents, or attorneys, before being recognized as representatives of applicants or other persons, that they shall show they are
of good moral character and in good repute, are possessed of the necessary qualifications to enable them to render to applicants or
other persons valuable service, and are likewise competent to advise and assist applicants or other persons in the presentation or
prosecution of their applications or other business before the Office. The Commissioner of Patents may, after notice and opportunity for
a hearing, suspend or exclude, either generally or in any particular case, from further practice before his office any person, agent, or
attorney shown to be incompetent or disreputable, or guilty of gross misconduct, or who refuses to comply with the said rules and
regulations, or who shall, with intent to defraud in any manner, deceive, mislead, or threaten any applicant or prospective applicant, or
other person having immediate or prospective business before the office, by word, circular, letter, or by advertising. The reasons for any
such suspension or exclusion shall be duly recorded. The action of the Commissioner may be reviewed upon the petition of the person
so refused recognition or so suspended or excluded by the district court of the United States for the District of Columbia under such
conditions and upon such proceedings as the said court may by its rules determine." (Emphasis supplied).

Respondent Director concludes that Section 78 of Republic Act No. 165 being similar to the provisions of law just
reproduced, then he is authorized to prescribe the rules and regulations requiring that persons desiring to practice before
him should submit to and pass an examination. We reproduce said Section 78, Republic Act No. 165, for purposes of
comparison:

SEC. 78. Rules and regulations. — The Director subject to the approval of the Secretary of Justice, shall promulgate the
necessary rules and regulations, not inconsistent with law, for the conduct of all business in the Patent Office."

The above provisions of Section 78 certainly and by far, are different from the provisions of the United States Patent Law as
regards authority to hold examinations to determine the qualifications of those allowed to practice before the Patent Office. While
the U. S. Patent Law authorizes the Commissioner of Patents to require attorneys to show that they possess the necessary
qualifications and competence to render valuable service to and advise and assist their clients in patent cases, which showing
may take the form of a test or examination to be held by the Commissioner, our Patent Law, Section 78, is silent on this
important point. Our attention has not been called to any express provision of our Patent Law, giving such authority to determine
the qualifications of persons allowed to practice before the Patent Office.

Section 551 of the Revised Administrative Code authorizes every chief of bureau to prescribe forms and make regulations or
general orders not inconsistent with law, to secure the harmonious and efficient administration of his branch of the service and to
carry into full effect the laws relating to matters within the jurisdiction of his bureau. Section 608 of Republic Act 1937, known as
the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines, provides that the Commissioner of Customs shall, subject to the approval of the
Department Head, make all rules and regulations necessary to enforce the provisions of said code. Section 338 of the National
Internal Revenue Code, Commonwealth Act No. 466 as amended, states that the Secretary of Finance, upon recommendation
of the Collector of Internal Revenue, shall promulgate all needful rules and regulations for the effective enforcement of the
provisions of the code. We understand that rules and regulations have been promulgated not only for the Bureaus of Customs
and Internal Revenue, but also for other bureaus of the Government, to govern the transaction of business in and to enforce the
law for said bureaus.

Were we to allow the Patent Office, in the absence of an express and clear provision of law giving the necessary sanction, to
require lawyers to submit to and pass on examination prescribed by it before they are allowed to practice before said Patent
Office, then there would be no reason why other bureaus specially the Bureaus of Internal Revenue and Customs, where the
business in the same area are more or less complicated, such as the presentation of books of accounts, balance sheets, etc.,
assessments exemptions, depreciation, these as regards the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and the classification of goods,
imposition of customs duties, seizures, confiscation, etc., as regards the Bureau of Customs, may not also require that any
lawyer practising before them or otherwise transacting business with them on behalf of clients, shall first pass an examination to
qualify.

In conclusion, we hold that under the present law, members of the Philippine Bar authorized by this Tribunal to practice law, and
in good standing, may practice their profession before the Patent Office, for the reason that much of the business in said office
involves the interpretation and determination of the scope and application of the Patent Law and other laws applicable, as well
as the presentation of evidence to establish facts involved; that part of the functions of the Patent Director are judicial or quasi-
judicial, so much so that appeals from his orders and decisions are, under the law, taken to the Supreme Court.

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for prohibition is granted and the respondent Director is hereby prohibited from requiring
members of the Philippine Bar to submit to an examination or tests and pass the same before being permitted to appear and
practice before the Patent Office. No costs.
 EN BANC

[G.R. No. 100113. September 3, 1991.]

RENATO L. CAYETANO, Petitioner, v. CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON

APPOINTMENTS, and HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and
Management, Respondents.

DECISION

PARAS, J.:

We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions While ostensibly only legal issues are involved, the
Court’s decision in this case would indubitably have a profound effect on the political aspect of our national existence.

The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1(1), Article IX-C:

"There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born
citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college
degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding elections. However, a
majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice
of law for at least ten years." (Emphasis supplied)

The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section 1(1), Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution which similarly provides:

"There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and eight Commissioners who shall
be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age and holders
of a college degree. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who
have been engaged in the practice of law for al least ten years." (Emphasis supplied)

Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what constitutes practice of law as a legal qualification to
an appointive office.

Black defines "practice of law" as:

"The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and technique to serve the
interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of
litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings,
conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all
advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the law. An attorney engages in the practice of
law by maintaining an office where he is held out to be an attorney, using a letterhead describing himself as an attorney,
counseling clients in legal matters, negotiating with opposing counsel about pending litigation, and fixing and collecting
fees for services rendered by his associate." (Black’s Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.).

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken, 129 Ohio
St. 23, 193 N.E. 650) A person is also considered to be in the practice of law when he:

". . . for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms, associations or corporations as to their
rights under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending or prospective,
before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle
controversies and there, in such representative capacity performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or
defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages in the
business of advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or
outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law." (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v. C.S. Dudley and Co., 102
S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852).
This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava, (105 Phil. 173, 176-177) stated:

"The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings
and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf
of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for
them in matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an
appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor’s claim in bankruptcy and
insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been
held to constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the
determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions." (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis
supplied)

"Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of any court and having no
immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of
subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations
and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are always
subject to become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with
men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These customary functions of an
attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so
far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which
involves appearance in court and that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of
importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be performed by persons possessed of
adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients
which rests upon all attorneys." (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1953 ed.], p. 665-666, citing In re
Opinion of the Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A.
139, 144). (Emphasis ours).

The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing for new lawyers (1974-1975) listed the
dimensions of the practice of law in even broader terms as advocacy, counseling and public service.

"One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in the profession. If what he does exacts
knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual for attorneys engaging in the active practice of their profession, and he follows
some one or more lines of employment such as this he is a practicing attorney at law within the meaning of the statute."
(Barr D. Cardell, 155 NW 312).

Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge,
training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the
profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the
use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill." (111 ALR 23).

The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that it has adopted a liberal interpretation of the term
"practice of law." 
"MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make a manifestation which I forgot to do during our review of the
provisions on the Commission on Audit. May I be allowed to make a very brief statement?

"THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).

The Commissioner will please proceed.

"MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the members of the Commission on Audit. Among others, the
qualifications provided for by Section 1 is that ‘They must be Members of the Philippine Bar’ — I am quoting from the
provision — ‘who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.’"

"To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding members of the Bar who are now employed in the COA
or Commission on Audit, we would like to make the clarification that this provision on qualifications regarding members of
the Bar does not necessarily refer or involve actual practice of law outside the COA. We have to interpret this to mean that
as long as the lawyers who are employed in the COA are using their legal knowledge or legal talent in their respective
work within COA, then they are qualified to be considered for appointment as members or commissioners, even chairman,
of the Commission on Audit.

"This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional Commissions and Agencies and we deem it important to
take it up on the floor so that this interpretation may be made available whenever this provision on the qualifications as
regards members of the Philippine Bar engaging in the practice of law for at least ten years is taken up.

"MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one question.

"MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

"MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the COA by a lawyer is equivalent to the requirement of a law practice
that is set forth in the Article on the Commission on Audit?"

MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of COA although it is auditing, will necessarily involve legal work; it will
involve legal work. And, therefore, lawyers who are employed in COA now would have the necessary qualifications in
accordance with the provision on qualifications under our provisions on the Commission on Audit. And, therefore, the
answer is yes.

"MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this is that this is equivalent to the practice of law.

"MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

"MR. OPLE. Thank you."cralaw virtua1aw library

. . . (Emphasis supplied)

Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides, among others, that the Chairman and two Commissioners of
the Commission on Audit (COA) should either be certified public accountants with not less than ten years of auditing
practice, or members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. (Emphasis
supplied)

Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which is in many ways synonymous with the word "lawyer." Today,
although many lawyers do not engage in private practice, it is still a fact that the majority of lawyers are private
practitioners. (Gary Munneke, Opportunities in Law Careers [VGM Career Horizons: Illinois), 1986], p. 15]).

At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as commonly understood, means "an individual or
organization engaged in the business of delivering legal services." (Ibid.). Lawyers who practice alone are often called
"sole practitioners." Groups of lawyers are called "firms." The firm is usually a partnership and members of the firm are the
partners. Some firms may be organized as professional corporations and the members called shareholders. In either
case, the members of the firm are the experienced attorneys. In most firms, there are younger or more inexperienced
salaried attorneys called "associates." (Ibid.).

The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologies, unhelpful
defining the practice of law as that which lawyers do. (Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics [West Publishing Co.:
Minnesota, 1986], p. 593). The practice of law is defined as "the performance of any acts . . . in or out of court, commonly
understood to be the practice of law. (State Bar Ass’n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140 A. 2d 863,
870 [1958] [quoting Grievance Comm. v. Payne, 128 Conn. 325, 22 A. 2d 623, 626 [1941]). Because lawyers perform
almost every function known in the commercial and governmental realm, such a definition would obviously be too global
to be workable. (Wolfram, op. cit.)
The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once the most publicly familiar role for lawyers as well as
an uncommon role for the average lawyer. Most lawyers spend little time in courtrooms, and a large percentage spend
their entire practice without litigating a case. (Ibid., p. 593). Nonetheless, many lawyers do continue to litigate and the
litigating lawyer’s role colors much of both the public image and the self-perception of the legal profession. (Ibid.).

In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public mind reflects history, not reality. (Ibid.). Why is this so? Recall
that the late Alexander Sycip, a corporate lawyer, once articulated on the importance of a lawyer as a business counselor
in this wise: "Even today, there are still uninformed laymen whose concept of an attorney is one who principally tries
cases before the courts. The members of the bench and bar and the informed laymen such as businessmen, know that in
most developed societies today, substantially more legal work is transacted in law offices than in the courtrooms. General
practitioners of law who do both litigation and non-litigation work also know that in most cases they find themselves
spending more time doing what [is] loosely describe[d] as business counseling than in trying cases. The business lawyer
has been described as the planner, the diagnostician and the trial lawyer, the surgeon. I[t] need not [be] stress[ed] that in
law, as in medicine, surgery should be avoided where internal medicine can be effective." (Business Star, "Corporate
Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

In the course of a working day the average general practitioner will engage in a number of legal tasks, each involving
different legal doctrines, legal skills, legal processes, legal institutions, clients, and other interested parties. Even the
increasing numbers of lawyers in specialized practice will usually perform at least some legal services outside their
specialty. And even within a narrow specialty such as tax practice, a lawyer will shift from one legal task or role such as
advice-giving to an importantly different one such as representing a client before an administrative agency. (Wolfram,
supra, p. 687).

By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the relatively rare types — a litigator who
specializes in this work to the exclusion of much else. Instead, the work will require the lawyer to have mastered the full
range of traditional lawyer skills of client counselling, advice-giving, document drafting, and negotiation. And increasingly
lawyers find that the new skills of evaluation and mediation are both effective for many clients and a source of
employment. (Ibid.).

Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in litigation work that is constrained in very important ways, at least
theoretically, so as to remove from it some of the salient features of adversarial litigation. Of these special roles, the most
prominent is that of prosecutor. In some lawyers’ work the constraints are imposed both by the nature of the client and by
the way in which the lawyer is organized into a social unit to perform that work. The most common of these roles are
those of corporate practice and government legal service. (Ibid.).

In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily, herein below quoted are emerging trends in corporate law
practice, a departure from the traditional concept of practice of law.

We are experiencing today what truly may be called a revolutionary transformation in corporate law practice. Lawyers and
other professional groups, in particular those members participating in various legal-policy decisional contexts, are finding
that understanding the major emerging trends in corporation law is indispensable to intelligent decision-making.

Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today requires an accurate understanding of the nature and
implications of the corporate law research function accompanied by an accelerating rate of information accumulation. The
recognition of the need for such improved corporate legal policy formulation, particularly "model-making" and contingency
planning," has impressed upon us the inadequacy of traditional procedures in many decisional contexts.

In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be processed, the sorting and weighing of significant conditional
factors, the appraisal of major trends, the necessity of estimating the consequences of given courses of action, and the
need for fast decision and response in situations of acute danger have prompted the use of sophisticated concepts of
information flow theory, operational analysis, automatic data processing, and electronic computing equipment.
Understandably, an improved decisional structure must stress the predictive component of the policy-making process,
wherein a model", of the decisional context or a segment thereof is developed to test projected alternative courses of
action in terms of futuristic effects flowing therefrom.
Although members of the legal profession are regularly engaged in predicting and projecting the trends of the law, the
subject of corporate finance law has received relatively little organized and formalized attention in the philosophy of
advancing corporate legal education. Nonetheless, a cross-disciplinary approach to legal research has become a vital
necessity.

Certainly, the general orientation for productive contributions by those trained primarily in the law can be improved
through an early introduction to multi-variable decisional contexts and the various approaches for handling such problems.
Lawyers, particularly with either a master’s or doctorate degree in business administration or management, functioning at
the legal policy level of decision-making now have some appreciation for the concepts and analytical techniques of other
professions which are currently engaged in similar types of complex decision-making.

Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance problems would require the services of an astute attorney
because of the complex legal implications that arise from each and every necessary step in securing and maintaining the
business issue raised. (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is assiduously referred to as the "abogado de campanilla." He is the
"big-time" lawyer, earning big money and with a clientele composed of the tycoons and magnates of business and
industry.

Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many people could not explain what it is that a corporate lawyer does.
For one, the number of attorneys employed by a single corporation will vary with the size and type of the corporation.
Many smaller and some large corporations farm out all their legal problems to private law firms. Many others have in-
house counsel only for certain matters. Other corporation have a staff large enough to handle most legal problems in-
house.

A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a lawyer who handles the legal affairs of a corporation. His areas of
concern or jurisdiction may include, inter alia: corporate legal research, tax laws research, acting out as corporate
secretary (in board meetings), appearances in both courts and other adjudicatory agencies (including the Securities and
Exchange Commission), and in other capacities which require an ability to deal with the law.

At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities other than the legal affairs of the business of the corporation
he is representing. These include such matters as determining policy and becoming involved in management. (Emphasis
supplied.)

In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of being isolated from the action, or not understanding how one’s
work actually fits into the work of the organization. This can be frustrating to someone who needs to see the results of his
work first hand. In short, a corporate lawyer is sometimes offered this fortune to be more closely involved in the running of
the business.

Moreover, a corporate lawyer’s services may sometimes be engaged by a multinational corporation (MNC). Some large
MNCs provide one of the few opportunities available to corporate lawyers to enter the international law field. After all,
international law is practiced in a relatively small number of companies and law firms. Because working in a foreign
country is perceived by many as glamorous, this is an area coveted by corporate lawyers. In most cases, however, the
overseas jobs go to experienced attorneys while the younger attorneys do their "international practice" in law libraries.
(Business Star, "Corporate Law Practice," May 25, 1990, p. 4).

This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer in the realm of finance. To borrow the lines of Harvard-educated
lawyer Bruce Wassertein, to wit: "A bad lawyer is one who fails to spot problems, a good lawyer is one who perceives the
difficulties, and the excellent lawyer is one who surmounts them." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11,
1989, p. 4).

Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a "shot in the arm," so to speak. No longer are we talking of the
traditional law teaching method of confining the subject study to the Corporation Code and the Securities Code but an
incursion as well into the intertwining modern management issues.

Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with three (3) types of learning: (1) acquisition of insights into
current advances which are of particular significance to the corporate counsel; (2) an introduction to usable disciplinary
skills applicable to a corporate counsel’s management responsibilities; and (3) a devotion to the organization and
management of the legal function itself.

These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting circles, with a shared area linking them. Otherwise known as
"intersecting managerial jurisprudence," it forms a unifying theme for the corporate counsel’s total learning.

Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences affect the counsel’s role. For that matter, the corporate lawyer
reviews the globalization process, including the resulting strategic repositioning that the firms he provides counsel for are
required to make, and the need to think about a corporation’s strategy at multiple levels. The salience of the nation-state
is being reduced as firms deal both with global multinational entities and simultaneously with sub-national governmental
units. Firms increasingly collaborate not only with public entities but with each other — often with those who are
competitors in other arenas.

Also, the nature of the lawyer’s participation in decision-making within the corporation is rapidly changing. The modern
corporate lawyer has gained a new role as a stockholder — in some cases participating in the organization and operations
of governance through participation on boards and other decision-making roles. Often these new patterns develop
alongside existing legal institutions and laws are perceived as barriers. These trends are complicated as corporations
organize for global operations. (Emphasis supplied).

The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with governmental policies toward the promotion and management of
technology. New collaborative arrangements for promoting specific technologies or competitiveness more generally
require approaches from industry that differ from older, more adversarial relationships and traditional forms of seeking to
influence governmental policies. And there are lessons to be learned from other countries. In Europe, Esprit, Eureka and
Race are examples of collaborative efforts between governmental and business Japan’s MITI is world famous. (Emphasis
supplied)

Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of the Corporate Counsel comprises a distinct group within the
managerial structure of all kinds of organizations. Effectiveness of both long-term and temporary groups within
organizations has been found to be related to indentifiable factors in the group-context interaction such as the groups
actively revising their knowledge of the environment, coordinating work with outsiders, promoting team achievements
within the organization. In general, such external activities are better predictors of team performance than internal group
processes.

In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the corporate lawyer vis-a-vis the managerial mettle of
corporations are challenged. Current research is seeking ways both to anticipate effective managerial procedures and to
understand relationships of financial liability and insurance considerations. (Emphasis supplied)

Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel, three factors are apropos:

First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics has been found an effective tool for new managerial thinking
regarding both planning and pressing immediate problems. An understanding of the role of feedback loops, inventory
levels, and rates of flow, enable users to simulate all sorts of systematic problems — physical, economic, managerial,
social, and psychological. New programming techniques now make the systems dynamics principles more accessible to
managers — including corporate counsels. (Emphasis supplied).

Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make better decisions involving complexity and uncertainty. In the
context of a law department, it can be used to appraise the settlement value of litigation, aid in negotiation settlement, and
minimize the cost and risk involved in managing a portfolio of cases. (Emphasis supplied)

Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. Computer-based models can be used directly by parties and mediators in all
kinds of negotiations. All integrated set of such tools provide coherent and effective negotiation support, including hands-
on on instruction in these techniques. A simulation case of an international joint venture may be used to illustrate the
point.

[Be this as it may,] the organization and management of the legal function, concern three pointed areas of consideration,
thus:

Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires special skills that comprise a major part of the general counsel’s
responsibilities. They differ from those of remedial law. Preventive lawyering is concerned with minimizing the risks of
legal trouble and maximizing legal rights for such legal entities at that time when transactional or similar facts are being
considered and made.

Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within which are undertaken those activities of the firm to which legal
consequences attach. It needs to be directly supportive of this nation’s evolving economic and organizational fabric as
firms change to stay competitive in a global, interdependent environment. The practice and theory of "law" is not adequate
today to facilitate the relationships needed in trying to make a global economy work.

Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel’s Office. The general counsel has emerged in the last decade as
one of the most vibrant subsets of the legal profession. The corporate counsel hear responsibility for key aspects of the
firm’s strategic issues, including structuring its global operations, managing improved relationships with an increasingly
diversified body of employees, managing expanded liability exposure, creating new and varied interactions with public
decision-makers, coping internally with more complex make or by decisions.

This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing corporate law is not enough to make one a good general
corporate counsel nor to give him a full sense of how the legal system shapes corporate activities. And even if the
corporate lawyer’s aim is not the understand all of the law’s effects on corporate activities, he must, at the very least, also
gain a working knowledge of the management issues if only to be able to grasp not only the basic legal "constitution" or
make-up of the modern corporation. "Business Star, The Corporate Counsel," April 10, 1991, p. 4).

The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is to have more than a passing knowledge of financial law
affecting each aspect of their work. Yet, many would admit to ignorance of vast tracts of the financial law territory. What
transpires next is a dilemma of professional security: Will the lawyer admit ignorance and risk opprobrium?; or will he feign
understanding and risk exposure? (Business Star, "Corporate Finance law," Jar. 11, 1989, p. 4).

Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of Chairman of the
COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner
opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been engaged
in the practice of law for at least ten years.

On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC.
On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC.

Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod’s nomination, petitioner as a
citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for Certiorari and Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the
consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void.

Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of 1960 with a grade of
86.55%. He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He
has also been paying his professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten years. (p. 124, Rollo).

After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod worked in the law office of his
father. During his stint in the World Bank Group (1963-1970), Monsod worked as an operations officer for about two years
in Costa Rica and Panama, which involved getting acquainted with the laws of member-countries, negotiating loans and
coordinating legal, economic, and project work of the Bank. Upon returning to the Philippines in 1970, he worked with the
Meralco Group, served as chief executive officer of an investment bank and subsequently of a business conglomerate,
and since 1986, has rendered services to various companies as a legal and economic consultant or chief executive
officer. As former Secretary-General (1986) and National Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL. Monsod’s work involved being
knowledgeable in election law. He appeared for NAMFREL in its accreditation hearings before the Comelec. In the field of
advocacy, Monsod, in his personal capacity and as former Co-Chairman of the Bishops Businessmen’s Conference for
Human Development, has worked with the under privileged sectors, such as the farmer and urban poor groups, in
initiating, lobbying for and engaging in affirmative action for the agrarian reform law and lately the urban land reform bill.
Monsod also made use of his legal knowledge as a member of the Davide Commission, a quasi-judicial body, which
conducted numerous hearings (1990) and as a member of the Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and Chairman of
its Committee on Accountability of Public Officers, for which he was cited by the President of the Commission, Justice
Cecilia Muñoz-Palma for "innumerable amendments to reconcile government functions with individual freedoms and
public accountability and the party-list system for the House of Representative." (pp. 128-129 Rollo) (Emphasis supplied)

Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty. Monsod used to be a member.

In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts as a team, and which is adequately constituted to meet the
various contingencies that arise during a negotiation. Besides top officials of the Borrower concerned, there are the legal
officer (such as the legal counsel), the finance manager, and an operations officer (such as an official involved in
negotiating the contracts) who comprise the members of the team. (Guillermo V. Soliven, "Loan Negotiating Strategies for
Developing Country Borrowers," Staff Paper No. 2, Central Bank of the Philippines, Manila, 1982, p. 11). (Emphasis
supplied)

After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country’s Constitution; it lays down the law as far as the loan transaction is
concerned. Thus, the meat of any Loan Agreement can be compartmentalized into five (5) fundamental parts: (1)
business terms; (2) borrower’s representation; (3) conditions of closing; (4) covenants; and (5) events of default. (Ibid., p.
13)

In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt restructuring program. For aside from performing the tasks of
legislative drafting and legal advising, they score national development policies as key factors in maintaining their
countries’ sovereignty. (Condensed from the work paper, entitled "Wanted: Development Lawyers for Developing
Nations," submitted by L. Michael Hager, regional legal adviser of the United States Agency for International
Development, during the Session on Law for the Development of Nations at the Abidjan World Conference in Ivory Coast,
sponsored by the World Peace Through Law Center on August 26-31, 1973). (Emphasis supplied).

Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more so than purely re negotiation policies, demand expertise in the
law of contracts, in legislation and agreement drafting and in re negotiation. Necessarily, a sovereign lawyer may work
with an international business specialist or an economist in the formulation of a model loan agreement. Debt restructuring
contract agreements contain such a mixture of technical language that they should be carefully drafted and signed only
with the advise of competent counsel in conjunction with the guidance of adequate technical support personnel. (See
International Law Aspects of the Philippine External Debts, an unpublished dissertation, U.S.T. Graduate School of Law,
1987, p. 321). (Emphasis supplied).

A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract construction is the set of terms and conditions which determines
the contractual remedies for a failure to perform one or more elements of the contract. A good agreement must not only
define the responsibilities of both parties, but must also state the recourse open to either party when the other fails to
discharge an obligation. For a complete debt restructuring represents a devotion to that principle which in the ultimate
analysis is sine qua non for foreign loan agreements — an adherence to the rule of law in domestic and international
affairs of whose kind U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. once said: ‘They carry no banners, they beat
no drums; but where they are, men learn that bustle and bush are not the equal of quiet genius and serene mastery.’ (See
Ricardo J. Romulo, "The Role of Lawyers in Foreign Investments," Integrated Bar of the Philippine Journal, Vol. 15, Nos. 3
and 4, Third and Fourth Quarters, 1977, p. 265).

Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term "practice of law", particularly the modern concept of law
practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction intended by the framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod s
past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator
of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor — verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement
— that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327, the Court said:

"Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in which it is vested according to
his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. If he does,
then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified who should have been
preferred. This is a political question involving considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide."
(Emphasis supplied).

No less emphatic was the Court in the case of Central Bank v. Civil Service Commission, 171 SCRA 744) where it stated:

"It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this case, and all the other legal requirements are satisfied, the
Commission has no alternative but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Law. The Commission
has no authority to revoke an appointment on the ground that another person is more qualified for a particular position. It
also has no authority to direct the appointment of a substitute of its choice. To do so would be an encroachment on the
discretion vested upon the appointing authority. An appointment is essentially within the discretionary power of
whomsoever it is vested, subject to the only condition that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by
law." (Emphasis supplied).

The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar, consists of four (4) stages: (1) nomination; (2)
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; (3) issuance of a commission (in the Philippines, upon submission by
the Commission on Appointments of its certificate of confirmation, the President issues the permanent appointment; and
(4) acceptance e.g., oath-taking, posting of bond, etc. . . . (Lacson v. Romero, No. L-3081, October 14, 1949; Gonzales,
Law on Public Officers, p. 200)

The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the
Commission on Elections is mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-Article C, Article IX of the Constitution which provides:

"The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments for a term of seven years without re appointment. Of those first appointed, three Members shall hold office
for seven years, two Members for five years, and the last Members for three years, without re appointment. Appointment
to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or
designated in a temporary or acting capacity."

Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla’s separate opinion, suffice it to say that his definition of the practice of law is the traditional
or stereotyped notion of law practice, as distinguished from the modern concept of the practice of law, which modern
connotation is exactly what was intended by the eminent framers of the 1987 Constitution. Moreover, Justice Padilla’s
definition would require generally a habitual law practice, perhaps practiced two or three times a week and would outlaw
say, law practice once or twice a year for ten consecutive years. Clearly, this is far from the constitutional intent.

Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz states that in my written opinion, I made use of a
definition of law practice which really means nothing because the definition says that law practice." . . is what people
ordinarily mean by the practice of law." True I cited the definition but only by way of sarcasm as evident from my
statement that the definition of law practice by "traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologous" or defining a
phrase by means of the phrase itself that is being defined.

Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all situations, most individuals, in making use of
the law, or in advising others on what the law means, are actually practicing law. In that sense, perhaps, but we should
not lose sight of the fact that Mr. Monsod is a lawyer, a member of the Philippine Bar, who has been practicing law for
over ten years. This is different from the acts of persons practicing law, without first becoming lawyers.
Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an elected President of the Philippines, say, on the
ground that he lacks one or more qualifications. This matter, I greatly doubt. For one thing, how can an action or petition
be brought against the President? And even assuming that he is indeed disqualified, how can the action be entertained
since he is the incumbent President?

We now proceed:

The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted during the public hearings on Monsod’s confirmation, implicitly
determined that he possessed the necessary qualifications as required by law. The judgment rendered by the
Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference except only upon a clear
showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus,
only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the Commission’s judgment. In
the instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court’s corrective power, since no abuse, much less a grave
abuse of discretion, that would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the writs
prayed, for has been clearly shown.

Additionally, consider the following:

(1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by the President, may the Supreme Court reverse the
Commission, and thus in effect confirm the appointment? Clearly, the answer is in the negative.

(2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee, whom the Commission has confirmed? The answer is likewise
clear.

(3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in the U.S. Congress) decides to confirm a Presidential
nominee, it would be incredible that the U.S. Supreme Court would still reverse the U.S. Senate.

Finally, one significant legal maxim is:

"We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth life."cralaw virtua1aw library

Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the procurator of Judea asked Delilah (who was Samson’s
beloved) for help in capturing Samson. Delilah agreed on condition that — "No blade shall touch his skin; No blood shall
flow from his veins."

When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the procurator placed an iron rod burning white-hot two or three
inches away from in front of Samson’s eyes. This blinded the man. Upon hearing of what had happened to her beloved,
Delilah was beside herself with anger, and fuming with righteous fury, Accused the procurator of reneging on his word.
The procurator calmly replied: "Did any blade touch his skin? Did any blood flow from his veins?" The procurator was
clearly relying on the letter, not the spirit of the agreement.

In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC

[B.M. No. 553. June 17, 1993.]

MAURICIO C. ULEP, Petitioner, v. THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC., Respondent.

RESOLUTION

REGALADO, J.:

Petitioner prays this Court "to order the respondent to cease and desist from issuing advertisements similar to or of the
same tenor as that of Annexes `A’ and `B’ (of said petition) and to perpetually prohibit persons or entities from making
advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law profession other than those allowed by law." 

The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are as follows:

Annex A

SECRET MARRIAGE?

P560.00 for a valid marriage.

Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.

ANNULMENT. VISA.

THE Please call: 521-0767,

LEGAL 5217232, 5222041

CLINIC, INC. 8:30 am-6:00 pm

7-Flr. Victoria Bldg.UN Ave., Mla.

Annex B

GUAM DIVORCE

DON PARKINSON

an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic beginning Monday to Friday
during office hours.

Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special Retiree’s Visa.
Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign Visa for Filipina
Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.

THE 7 F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave.

LEGAL Ermita, Manila nr. US Embassy

CLINIC, INC. 1 Tel. 521-7232521-7251

522-2041; 521-0767

It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above reproduced are champertous, unethical, demeaning of the
law profession, and destructive of the confidence of the community in the integrity of the members of the bar and that, as
a member of the legal profession, he is ashamed and offended by the said advertisements, hence the reliefs sought in his
petition as herein before quoted.

In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said advertisements at its instance, but claims
that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of "legal support services" through paralegals with the use
of modern computers and electronic machines. Respondent further argues that assuming that the services advertised are
legal services, the act of advertising these services should be allowed supposedly in the light of the case of John R. Bates
and Van O’Steen v. State Bar of Arizona, 2 reportedly decided by the United States Supreme Court on June 7, 1977.

Considering the critical implications on the legal profession of the issues raised herein, we required the (1) Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP), (2) Philippine Bar Association (PBA), (3) Philippine Lawyers’ Association (PLA), (4) U.P. Women
Lawyers’ Circle (WILOCI), (5) Women Lawyers Association of the Philippines (WLAP), and (6) Federation International de
Abogadas (FIDA) to submit their respective position papers on the controversy and, thereafter, their memoranda. 3 The
said bar associations readily responded and extended their valuable services and cooperation of which this Court takes
note with appreciation and gratitude.

The main issues posed for resolution before the Court are whether or not the services offered by respondent, The Legal
Clinic, Inc., as advertised by it constitutes practice of law and, in either case, whether the same can properly be the
subject of the advertisements herein complained of.

Before proceeding with an in-depth analysis of the merits of this case, we deem it proper and enlightening to present
hereunder excerpts from the respective position papers adopted by the aforementioned bar associations and the
memoranda submitted by them on the issues involved in this bar matter.

1. Integrated Bar of the Philippines:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Notwithstanding the subtle manner by which respondent endeavored to distinguish the two terms, i.e., "legal support
services" vis-a-vis "legal services", common sense would readily dictate that the same are essentially without substantial
distinction. For who could deny that document search, evidence gathering, assistance to layman in need of basic
institutional services from government or non-government agencies like birth, marriage, property, or business registration,
obtaining documents like clearance, passports, local or foreign visas, constitute practice of law?

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) does not wish to make issue with respondent’s foreign citations. Suffice it to
state that the IBP has made its position manifest, to wit, that it strongly opposes the view espoused by respondent (to the
effect that today it is alright to advertise one’s legal services).

The IBP accordingly declares in no uncertain terms its opposition to respondent’s act of establishing a "legal clinic" and of
concomitantly advertising the same through newspaper publications.

The IBP would therefore invoke the administrative supervision of this Honorable Court to perpetually restrain respondent
from undertaking highly unethical activities in the field of law practice as aforedescribed 4 .

A. The use of the name "The Legal Clinic, Inc." gives the impression that respondent corporation is being operated by
lawyers and that it renders legal services.

While the respondent repeatedly denies that it offers legal services to the public, the advertisements in question give the
impression that respondent is offering legal services. The Petition in fact simply assumes this to be so, as earlier
mentioned, apparently because this (is) the effect that the advertisements have on the reading public.

The impression created by the advertisements in question can be traced, first of all, to the very name being used by
respondent — "The Legal Clinic, Inc." Such a name, it is respectfully submitted connotes the rendering of legal services
for legal problems, just like a medical clinic connotes medical services for medical problems. More importantly, the term
"Legal Clinic" connotes lawyers, as the term medical clinic connotes doctors.
Furthermore, the respondent’s name, as published in the advertisements subject of the present case, appears with (the)
scale(s) of justice, which all the more reinforces the impression that it is being operated by members of the bar and that it
offers legal services. In addition, the advertisements in question appear with a picture and name of a person being
represented as a lawyer from Guam, and this practically removes whatever doubt may still remain as to the nature of the
service or services being offered.

It thus becomes irrelevant whether respondent is merely offering "legal support services" as claimed by it, or whether it
offers legal services as any lawyer actively engaged in law practice does. And it becomes unnecessary to make a
distinction between "legal services" and "legal support services," as the respondent would have it. The advertisements in
question leave no room for doubt in the minds of the reading public that legal services are being offered by lawyers,
whether true or not.

B. The advertisements in question are meant to induce the performance of acts contrary to law, morals, public order and
public policy.

It may be conceded that, as the respondent claims, the advertisements in question are only meant to inform the general
public of the services being offered by it. Said advertisements, however, emphasize a Guam divorce, and any law student
ought to know that under the Family Code, there is only one instance when a foreign divorce, is recognized, and that is:

Article 26. . . .

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry
under Philippine Law.

It must not be forgotten, too, that the Family Code (defines) a marriage as follows:

Article 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with
law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution
whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage
settlements may fix the property relation during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code.

By simply reading the questioned advertisements, it is obvious that the message being conveyed is that Filipinos can
avoid the legal consequences of a marriage celebrated in accordance with our law, by simply going to Guam for a divorce.
This is not only misleading, but encourages, or serves to induce, violation of Philippine law. At the very least, this can be
considered "the dark side" of legal practice, where certain defects in Philippine laws are exploited for the sake of profit. At
worst, this is outright malpractice.
Rule 1.02. — A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the
legal system.

In addition, it may also be relevant to point out that advertisements such as that shown in Annex "A" of the Petition, which
contains a cartoon of a motor vehicle with the words "Just Married" on its bumper and seems to address those planning a
"secret marriage," if not suggesting a "secret marriage," makes light of the "special contract of permanent union," the
inviolable social institution," which is how the Family Code describes marriage, obviously to emphasize its sanctity and
inviolability. Worse, this particular advertisement appears to encourage marriages celebrated in secrecy, which is
suggestive of immoral publication of applications for a marriage license.

If the article "Rx for Legal Problems" is to be reviewed, it can readily be concluded that the above impressions one may
gather from the advertisements in question are accurate. The Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion example alone confirms
what the advertisements suggest. Here it can be seen that criminal acts are being encouraged or committed (a bigamous
marriage in Hong Kong or Las Vegas) with impunity simply because the jurisdiction of Philippine courts does not extend to
the place where the crime is committed.
Even if it be assumed, arguendo, that the "legal support services" respondent offers do not constitute legal services as
commonly understood, the advertisements in question give the impression that respondent corporation is being operated
by lawyers and that it offers legal services, as earlier discussed. Thus, the only logical consequence is that, in the eyes of
an ordinary newspaper reader, members of the bar themselves are encouraging or inducing the performance of acts
which are contrary to law, morals, good customs and the public good, thereby destroying and demeaning the integrity of
the Bar.

It is respectfully submitted that respondent should be enjoined from causing the publication of the advertisements in
question, or any other advertisements similar thereto. It is also submitted that respondent should be prohibited from
further performing or offering some of the services it presently offers, or, at the very least, from offering such services to
the public in general.

The IBP is aware of the fact that providing computerized legal research, electronic data gathering, storage and retrieval,
standardized legal forms, investigators for gathering of evidence, and like services will greatly benefit the legal profession
and should not be stifled but instead encouraged. However, when the conduct of such business by non-members of the
Bar encroaches upon the practice of law, there can be no choice but to prohibit such business.

Admittedly, many of the services involved in the case at bar can be better performed by specialists in other fields, such as
computer experts, who by reason of their having devoted time and effort exclusively to such field cannot fulfill the exacting
requirements for admission to the Bar. To prohibit them from "encroaching" upon the legal profession will deny the
profession of the great benefits and advantages of modern technology. Indeed, a lawyer using a computer will be doing
better than a lawyer using a typewriter, even if both are (equal) in skill.

Both the Bench and the Bar, however, should be careful not to allow or tolerate the illegal practice of law in any form, not
only for the protection of members of the Bar but also, and more importantly, for the protection of the public. Technological
development in the profession may be encouraged without tolerating, but instead ensuring prevention of, illegal practice.

There might be nothing objectionable if respondent is allowed to perform all of its services, but only if such services are
made available exclusively to members of the Bench and Bar. Respondent would then be offering technical assistance,
not legal services. Alternatively, the more difficult task of carefully distinguishing between which service may be offered to
the public in general and which should be made available exclusively to members of the Bar may be undertaken. This,
however, may require further proceedings because of the factual considerations involved.

It must be emphasized, however, that some of respondent’s services ought to be prohibited outright, such as acts which
tend to suggest or induce celebration abroad of marriages which are bigamous or otherwise illegal and void under
Philippine law. While respondent may not be prohibited from simply disseminating information regarding such matters, it
must be required to include, in the information given, a disclaimer that it is not authorized to practice law, that certain
course of action may be illegal under Philippine law, that it is not authorized or capable of rendering a legal opinion, that a
lawyer should be consulted before deciding on which course of action to take, and that it cannot recommend any
particular lawyer without subjecting itself to possible sanctions for illegal practice of law.

If respondent is allowed to advertise, advertising should be directed exclusively at members of the Bar, with a clear and
unmistakable disclaimer that it is not authorized to practice law or perform legal services.

The benefits of being assisted by paralegals cannot be ignored. But nobody should be allowed to represent himself as a
"paralegal" for profit, without such term being clearly defined by rule or regulation, and without any adequate and effective
means of regulating his activities. Also, law practice in a corporate form may prove to be advantageous to the legal
profession, but before allowance of such practice may be considered, the corporation’s Articles of Incorporation and By-
laws must conform to each and every provision of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Rules of Court 5

2. Philippine Bar Association:

Respondent asserts that it "is not engaged in the practice of law but engaged in giving legal support services to lawyers
and laymen, through experienced paralegals, with the use of modern computers and electronic machines" (pars. 2 and 3,
Comment). This is absurd. Unquestionably, respondent’s acts of holding out itself to the public under the trade name "The
Legal Clinic, Inc.," and soliciting employment for its enumerated services fall within the realm of a practice which thus
yields itself to the regulatory powers of the Supreme Court. For respondent to say that it is merely engaged in paralegal
work is to stretch credulity. Respondent’s own commercial advertisement which announces a certain Atty. Don Perkinson
to be handling the fields of law belies its pretense. From all indications, respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc." is offering and
rendering legal services through its reserve of lawyers. It has been held that the practice of law is not limited to the
conduct of cases in court, but includes drawing of deeds, incorporation, rendering opinions, and advising clients as to their
legal rights and then take them to an attorney and ask the latter to look after their case in court (See Martin, Legal and
Judicial Ethics, 1948 ed., p. 39).

It is apt to recall that only natural persons can engage in the practice of law, and such limitation cannot be evaded by a
corporation employing competent lawyers to practice for it. Obviously, this is the scheme or device by which respondent
"The Legal Clinic, Inc." holds out itself to the public and solicits employment of its legal services. It is an odious vehicle for
deception, especially so when the public cannot ventilate any grievance for malpractice against the business conduit.
Precisely, the limitation of practice of law to persons who have been duly admitted as members of the Bar (Sec. 1, Rule
138, Revised Rules of Court) is to subject the members to the discipline of the Supreme Court. Although respondent uses
its business name, the persons and the lawyers who act for it are subject to court discipline. The practice of law is not a
profession open to all who wish to engage in it nor can it be assigned to another (See 5 Am. Jur. 270). It is a personal
right limited to persons who have qualified themselves under the law. It follows that not only respondent but also all the
persons who are acting for respondent are the persons engaged in unethical law practice. 6

3. Philippine Lawyers’ Association:

The Philippine Lawyers’ Association’s position, in answer to the issues stated herein, are, to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library

1. The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law;

2. Such practice is unauthorized;

3. The advertisements complained of are not only unethical, but also misleading and patently immoral; and

4. The Honorable Supreme Court has the power to suppress and punish the Legal Clinic and its corporate officers for its
unauthorized practice of law and for its unethical, misleading and immoral advertising.

Respondent posits that it is not engaged in the practice of law. It claims that it merely renders "legal support services" to
lawyers, litigants and the general public as enunciated in the Primary Purpose Clause of its Article(s) of Incorporation.
(See pages 2 to 5 of Respondent’s Comment). But its advertised services, as enumerated above, clearly and convincingly
show that it is indeed engaged in law practice, albeit outside the court.

As advertised, it offers the general public its advisory services on Persons and Family Relations Law, particularly
regarding foreign divorces, annulment of marriages, secret marriages, absence and adoption; Immigration Laws,
particularly on visa related problems, immigration problems; the Investment Law of the Philippines and such other related
laws.

Its advertised services unmistakably require the application of the aforesaid laws, the legal principles and procedures
related thereto, the legal advises based thereon and which activities call for legal training, knowledge and experience.

Applying the test laid down by the Court in the aforecited Agrava Case, the activities of respondent fall squarely and are
embraced in what lawyers and laymen equally term as "the practice of law." 7

4. U.P. Women Lawyers’ Circle:

In resolving the issues before this Honorable Court, paramount consideration should be given to the protection of the
general public from the danger of being exploited by unqualified persons or entities who may be engaged in the practice
of law.

At present, becoming a lawyer requires one to take a rigorous four-year course of study on top of a four-year bachelor of
arts or sciences course and then to take and pass the bar examinations. Only then, is a lawyer qualified to practice law.

While the use of a paralegal is sanctioned in many jurisdictions as an aid to the administration of justice, there are in those
jurisdictions, courses of study and/or standards which would qualify these paralegals to deal with the general public as
such. While it may now be the opportune time to establish these courses of study and/or standards, the fact remains that
at present, these do not exist in the Philippines. In the meantime, this Honorable Court may decide to take measures to
protect the general public from being exploited by those who may be dealing with the general public in the guise of being
"paralegals" without being qualified to do so.

In the same manner, the general public should also be protected from the dangers which may be brought about by
advertising of legal services. While it appears that lawyers are prohibited under the present Code of Professional
Responsibility from advertising, it appears in the instant case that legal services are being advertised not by lawyers but
by an entity staffed by "paralegals." Clearly, measures should be taken to protect the general public from falling prey to
those who advertise legal services without being qualified to offer such services." 8

A perusal of the questioned advertisements of Respondent, however, seems to give the impression that information
regarding validity of marriages, divorce, annulment of marriage, immigration, visa extensions, declaration of absence,
adoption and foreign investment, which are in essence, legal matters, will be given to them if they avail of its services. The
Respondent’s name — The Legal Clinic, Inc. — does not help matters. It gives the impression again that Respondent will
or can cure the legal problems brought to them. Assuming that Respondent is, as claimed, staffed purely by paralegals, it
also gives the misleading impression that there are lawyers involved in The Legal Clinic, Inc., as there are doctors in any
medical clinic, when only "paralegals" are involved in The Legal Clinic, Inc.

Respondent’s allegations are further belied by the very admissions of its President and majority stockholder, Atty.
Nogales, who gave an insight on the structure and main purpose of Respondent corporation in the aforementioned
"Starweek" article." 9

5. Women Lawyer’s Association of the Philippines:

Annexes "A" and "B" of the petition are clearly advertisements to solicit cases for the purpose of gain which, as provided
for under the above cited law, (are) illegal and against the Code of Professional Responsibility of lawyers in this country.

Annex "A" of the petition is not only illegal in that it is an advertisement to solicit cases, but it is illegal in that in bold letters
it announces that the Legal Clinic, Inc., could work out/cause the celebration of a secret marriage which is not only illegal
but immoral in this country. While it is advertised that one has to go to said agency and pay P560 for a valid marriage it is
certainly fooling the public for valid marriages in the Philippines are solemnized only by officers authorized to do so under
the law. And to employ an agency for said purpose of contracting marriage is not necessary.

No amount of reasoning that in the USA, Canada and other countries the trend is towards allowing lawyers to advertise
their special skills to enable people to obtain from qualified practitioners legal services for their particular needs can justify
the use of advertisements such as are the subject matter of this petition, for one (cannot) justify an illegal act even by
whatever merit the illegal act may serve. The law has yet to be amended so that such as act could become justifiable.

We submit further that these advertisements that seem to project that secret marriages and divorce are possible in this
country for a fee, when in fact it is not so, are highly reprehensible.

It would encourage people to consult this clinic about how they could go about having a secret marriage here, when it
cannot nor should ever be attempted, and seek advice on divorce, where in this country there is none, except under the
Code of Muslim Personal Laws in the Philippines. It is also against good morals and is deceitful because it falsely
represents to the public to be able to do that which by our laws cannot be done (and) by our Code of Morals should not be
done.
In the case (of) In re Taguda, 53 Phil. 37, the Supreme Court held that solicitation for clients by an attorney by circulars of
advertisements, is unprofessional and offenses of this character justify permanent elimination from the Bar. 10

6. Federacion International de Abogadas:

1.7 That entities admittedly not engaged in the practice of law, such as management consultancy firms or travel agencies,
whether run by lawyers or not, perform the services rendered by Respondent does not necessarily lead to the conclusion
that Respondent is not unlawfully practicing law. In the same vein, however, the fact that the business of respondent
(assuming it can be engaged in independently of the practice of law) involves knowledge of the law does not necessarily
make respondent guilty of unlawful practice of law.

". . . Of necessity, no one . . . acting as a consultant can render effective service unless he is familiar with such statutes
and regulations. He must be careful not to suggest a course of conduct which the law forbids. It seems . . . clear that (the
consultant’s) knowledge of the law, and his use of that knowledge as a factor in determining what measures he shall
recommend, do not constitute the practice of law . . .. It is not only presumed that all men know the law, but it is a fact that
most men have considerable acquaintance with the broad features of the law . . .. Our knowledge of the law — accurate
or inaccurate — moulds our conduct not only when we are acting for ourselves, but when we are serving others. Bankers,
liquor dealers and laymen generally possess rather precise knowledge of the laws touching their particular business or
profession. A good example is the architect, who must be familiar with zoning, building and fire prevention codes, factory
and tenement house statutes, and who draws plans and specifications in harmony with the law. This is not practicing law.

"But suppose the architect, asked by his client to omit a fire tower, replies that it is required by the statute. Or the industrial
relations expert cites, in support of some measure that he recommends, a decision of the National Labor Relations Board.
Are they practicing law? In my opinion, they are not, provided no separate fee is charged for the legal advice or
information, and the legal question is subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal problem.

"It is largely a matter of degree and of custom.

"If it were usual for one intending to erect a building on his land to engage a lawyer to advise him and the architect in
respect to the building code and the like, then an architect who performed this function would probably be considered to
be trespassing on territory reserved for licensed attorneys. Likewise, if the industrial relations field had been pre-empted
by lawyers, or custom placed a lawyer always at the elbow of the lay personnel man. But this is not the case. The most
important body of industrial relations experts are the officers and business agents of the labor unions and few of them are
lawyers. Among the larger corporate employers, it has been the practice for some years to delegate special responsibility
in employee matters to a management group chosen for their practical knowledge and skill in such matters, and without
regard to legal training or lack of it. More recently, consultants like the defendant have tendered to the smaller employers
the same service that the larger employers get from their own specialized staff.

"The handling of industrial relations is growing into a recognized profession for which appropriate courses are offered by
our leading universities. The court should be very cautious about declaring [that] a widespread, well-established method
of conducting business is unlawful, or that the considerable class of men who customarily perform a certain function have
no right to do so, or that the technical education given by our schools cannot be used by the graduates in their business.

"In determining whether a man is practicing law, we should consider his work for any particular client or customer, as a
whole. I can imagine defendant being engaged primarily to advise as to the law defining his client’s obligations to his
employees, to guide his client along the path charted by law. This, of course, would be the practice of the law. But such is
not the fact in the case before me. Defendant’s primary efforts are along economic and psychological lines. The law only
provides the frame within which he must work, just as the zoning code limits the kind of building the architect may plan.
The incidental legal advice or information defendant may give, does not transform his activities into the practice of law. Let
me add that if, even as a minor feature of his work, he performed services which are customarily reserved to members of
the bar, he would be practicing law. For instance, if as part of a welfare program, he drew employees’ wills.

"Another branch of defendant’s work is the representation of the employer in the adjustment of grievances and in
collective bargaining, with or without a mediator. This is not per se the practice of law. Anyone may use an agent for
negotiations and may select an agent particularly skilled in the subject under discussion, and the person appointed is free
to accept the employment whether or not he is a member of the bar. Here, however, there may be an exception where the
business turns on a question of law. Most real estate sales are negotiated by brokers who are not lawyers. But if the value
of the land depends on a disputed right-of-way and the principal role of the negotiator is to assess the probable outcome
of the dispute and persuade the opposite party to the same opinion, then it may be that only a lawyer can accept the
assignment. Or if a controversy between an employer and his men grows from differing interpretations of a contract, or of
a statute, it is quite likely that defendant should not handle it. But I need not reach a definite conclusion here, since the
situation is not presented by the proofs.

"Defendant also appears to represent the employer before administrative agencies of the federal government, especially
before trial examiners of the National Labor Relations Board. An agency of the federal government, acting by virtue of an
authority granted by the Congress, may regulate the representation of parties before such agency. The State of New
Jersey is without power to interfere with such determination or to forbid representation before the agency by one whom
the agency admits. The rules of the National Labor Relations Board give to a party the right to appear `in person, or by
counsel, or by other representative.’ Rules and Regulations, September 11th, 1946, S. 203.31. `Counsel’ here means a
licensed attorney, and `other representative’ one not a lawyer. In this phase of his work, defendant may lawfully do
whatever the Labor Board allows, even arguing questions purely legal." (Auerbacher v. Wood, 53 A. 2d 800, cited in
Statsky, Introduction to Paralegalism [1974], at pp. 154-156.).

1.8 From the foregoing, it can be said that a person engaged in a lawful calling (which may involve knowledge of the law)
is not engaged in the practice of law provided that:

(a) The legal question is subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal problem;

(b) The services performed are not customarily reserved to members of the bar;

(c) No separate fee is charged for the legal advice or information.

All these must be considered in relation to the work for any particular client as a whole.

1.9. If the person involved is both lawyer and non-lawyer, the Code of Professional Responsibility succinctly states the
rule of conduct:

"Rule 15.08 — A lawyer who is engaged in another profession or occupation concurrently with the practice of law shall
make clear to his client whether he is acting as a lawyer or in another capacity."

1.10. In the present case, the Legal Clinic appears to render wedding services (See Annex "A", Petition). Services on
routine, straightforward marriages, like securing a marriage license, and making arrangements with a priest or a judge,
may not constitute practice of law. However, if the problem is as complicated as that described in Rx for Legal Problems"
on the Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion-Richard Gomez case, then what may be involved is actually the practice of law.
If a non-lawyer, such as the Legal Clinic, renders such services, then it is engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.

1.11. The Legal Clinic also appears to give information on divorce, absence, annulment of marriage and visas (See
Annexes "A" and "B", Petition). Purely giving informational materials may not constitute practice of law. The business is
similar to that of a bookstore where the customer buys materials on the subject and determines by himself what courses
of action to take.

It is not entirely improbable, however, that aside from purely giving information, the Legal Clinic’s paralegals may apply
the law to the particular problem of the client, and give legal advice. Such would constitute unauthorized practice of law.

"It cannot be claimed that the publication of a legal text which purports to say what the law is amounts to legal practice. And the mere
fact that the principles or rules stated in the text may be accepted by a particular reader as a solution to his problem does not affect this.
. . . Apparently it is urged that the conjoining of these two, that is, the text and the forms, with advice as to how the forms should be
filled out, constitutes the unlawful practice of law. But that is the situation with many approved and accepted texts. Dacey’s book is sold
to the public at large. There is no personal contact or relationship with a particular individual. Nor does there exist that relation of
confidence and trust so necessary to the status of attorney and client. THIS IS THE ESSENTIAL OF LEGAL PRACTICE — THE
REPRESENTATION AND ADVISING OF A PARTICULAR PERSON IN A PARTICULAR SITUATION. At most the book assumes to
offer general advice on common problems, and does not purport to give personal advice on a specific problem peculiar to a designated
or readily identified person. Similarly the defendant’s publication does not purport `to give personal advice on a specific problem
peculiar to a designated or readily identified person in a particular situation — in the publication and sale of the kits, such publication
and sale did not constitute the unlawful practice of law . . .. There being no legal impediment under the statute to the sale of the kit,
there was no proper basis for the injunction against defendant maintaining an office for the purpose of selling to persons seeking a
divorce, separation, annulment or separation agreement any printed material or writings relating to matrimonial law or the prohibition in
the memorandum of modification of the judgment against defendant having an interest in any publishing house publishing his
manuscript on divorce and against his having any personal contact with any prospective purchaser. The record does fully support,
however, the finding that for the charge of $75 or $100 for the kit, the defendant gave legal advice in the course of personal contacts
concerning particular problems which might arise in the preparation and presentation of the purchaser’s asserted matrimonial cause of
action or pursuit of other legal remedies and assistance in the preparation of necessary documents (The injunction therefore sought to)
enjoin conduct constituting the practice of law, particularly with reference to the giving of advice and counsel by the defendant relating
to specific problems of particular individuals in connection with a divorce, separation, annulment of separation agreement sought and
should be affirmed." (State v. Winder, 348, NYS 2d 270 [1973], cited in Statsky, supra at p. 101.)

1.12. Respondent, of course, states that its services are "strictly non-diagnostic, non-advisory." It is not controverted,
however, that if the services "involve giving legal advice or counselling," such would constitute practice of law (Comment,
par. 6.2). It is in this light that FIDA submits that a factual inquiry may be necessary for the judicious disposition of this
case.

2.10. Annex "A" may be ethically objectionable in that it can give the impression (or perpetuate the wrong notion) that
there is a secret marriage. With all the solemnities, formalities and other requisites of marriages (See Articles 2, et seq.,
Family Code), no Philippine marriage can be secret.

2.11. Annex "B" may likewise be ethically objectionable. The second paragraph thereof (which is not necessarily related to
the first paragraph) fails to state the limitation that only "paralegal services" or "legal support services", and not legal
services, are available." 11

A prefatory discussion on the meaning of the phrase "practice of law" becomes exigent for a proper determination of the
issues raised by the petition at bar. On this score, we note that the clause "practice of law" has long been the subject of
judicial construction and interpretation. The courts have laid down general principles and doctrines explaining the meaning
and scope of the term, some of which we now take into account.

Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedures, knowledge,
training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristic of the
profession. Generally, to practice law is to give advice or render any kind of service that involves legal knowledge or skill.
12

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It includes legal advice and counsel, and the preparation
of legal instruments and contracts by which legal rights are secured, although such matter may or may not be pending in a
court. 13

In the practice of his profession, a licensed attorney at law generally engages in three principal types of professional
activity: legal advice and instructions to clients to inform them of their rights and obligations, preparation for clients of
documents requiring knowledge of legal principles not possessed by ordinary layman, and appearance for clients before
public tribunals which possess power and authority to determine rights of life, liberty, and property according to law,
inorder to assist in proper interpretation and enforcement of law. 14

When a person participates in a trial and advertises himself as a lawyer, he is in the practice of law. 15 One who confers
with clients, advises them as to their legal rights and then takes the business to an attorney and asks the later to look after
the case in court, is also practicing law. 16 Giving advice for compensation regarding the legal status and rights of another
and the conduct with respect thereto constitutes a practice of law. 17 One who renders an opinion as to the proper
interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is, to that extent, practicing law. 18
In the recent case of Cayetano v. Monsod, 19 after citing the doctrines in several cases, we laid down the test to
determine whether certain acts constitute "practice of law," thus:

Black defines "practice of law" as:

"The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and technique to serve the
interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of
litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings,
conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all
advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the law."

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken, 129 Ohio
St. 23, 193 N.E. 650). A person is also considered to be in the practice of law when he:

". . . for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising persons, firms, associations or corporations as to their
rights under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings, pending or prospective,
before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle
controversies and there, in such representative capacity, performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or
defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages in the
business of advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or
outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v. C.S. Dudley and Co., 102
S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852)."

This Court, in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava (105 Phil. 173, 176-177), stated:

"The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings
and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of, such actions and proceedings on
behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken
for them in matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating
an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor’s claim in bankruptcy and
insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been
held to constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the
determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263).

"Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of any court and having no
immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of
subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations
and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are always
subject to become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with
men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These customary functions of an
attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so
far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which
involves appearance in court and that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of
importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be performed by persons possessed of
adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients
which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1973 ed.], pp. 665-666, citing In Re
Opinion of the Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A.
139, 144)."

The practice of law, therefore, covers a wide range of activities in and out of court. Applying the aforementioned criteria to
the case at bar, we agree with the perceptive findings and observations of the aforestated bar associations that the
activities of respondent, as advertised, constitute "practice of law."

The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services can neither be seriously considered nor
sustained. Said proposition is belied by respondent’s own description of the services it has been offering, to wit:

"Legal support services basically consist of giving ready information by trained paralegals to laymen and lawyers, which
are strictly non-diagnostic, non-advisory, through the extensive use of computers and modern information technology in
the gathering, processing, storage, transmission and reproduction of information and communication, such as
computerized legal research; encoding and reproduction of documents and pleadings prepared by laymen or lawyers;
document search; evidence gathering; locating parties or witnesses to a case; fact finding investigations; and assistance
to laymen in need of basic institutional services from government or non-government agencies, like birth, marriage,
property, or business registrations; educational or employment records or certifications, obtaining documentation like
clearances, passports, local or foreign visas; giving information about laws of other countries that they may find useful,
like foreign divorce, marriage or adoption laws that they can avail of preparatory to emigration to that foreign country, and
other matters that do not involve representation of clients in court; designing and installing computer systems, programs,
or software for the efficient management of law offices, corporate legal departments, courts, and other entities engaged in
dispensing or administering legal services." 20

While some of the services being offered by respondent corporation merely involve mechanical and technical know-how,
such as the installation of computer systems and programs for the efficient management of law offices, or the
computerization of research aids and materials, these will not suffice to justify an exception to the general rule.

What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information to laymen and lawyers. Its contention that
such function is non-advisory and non-diagnostic is more apparent than real. In providing information, for example, about
foreign laws on marriage, divorce and adoption, it strains the credulity of this Court that all that respondent corporation will
simply do is look for the law, furnish a copy thereof to the client, and stop there as if it were merely a bookstore. With its
attorneys and so called paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain to the client the intricacies of the law and advise him
or her on the proper course of action to be taken as may be provided for by said law. That is what its advertisements
represent and for which services it will consequently charge and be paid. That activity falls squarely within the
jurisprudential definition of "practice of law." Such a conclusion will not be altered by the fact that respondent corporation
does not represent clients in court since law practice, as the weight of authority holds, is not limited merely to court
appearances but extends to legal research, giving legal advice, contract drafting, and so forth.

The aforesaid conclusion is further strengthened by an article published in the January 13, 1991 issue of the
Starweek/The Sunday Magazine of the Philippine Star, entitled "Rx for Legal Problems," where an insight into the
structure, main purpose and operations of respondent corporation was given by its own "proprietor," Atty. Rogelio P.
Nogales:

This is the kind of business that is transacted everyday at The Legal Clinic, with offices on the seventh floor of the Victoria
Building along U.N. Avenue in Manila. No matter what the client’s problem, and even if it is as complicated as the Cuneta-
Concepcion domestic situation, Atty. Nogales and his staff of lawyers, who, like doctors, are "specialists" in various fields,
can take care of it. The Legal Clinic, Inc. has specialists in taxation and criminal law, medico-legal problems, labor,
litigation and family law. These specialists are backed up by a battery of paralegals, counsellors and attorneys.

Atty. Nogales set up The Legal Clinic in 1984. Inspired by the trend in the medical field toward specialization, it caters to
clients who cannot afford the services of the big law firms.

The Legal Clinic has regular and walk-in clients. "When they come, we start by analyzing the problem. That’s what doctors
do also. They ask you how you contracted what’s bothering you, they take your temperature, they observe you for the
symptoms, and so on. That’s how we operate, too. And once the problem has been categorized, then it’s referred to one
of our specialists."

There are cases which do not, in medical terms, require surgery or follow-up treatment. These The Legal Clinic disposes
of in a matter of minutes. "Things like preparing a simple deed of sale or an affidavit of loss can be taken care of by our
staff or, if this were a hospital, the residents or the interns. We can take care of these matters on a while you wait basis.
Again, kung baga sa ospital, out-patient, hindi kailangang ma-confine. It’s just like a common cold or diarrhea," explains
Atty. Nogales.
Those cases which require more extensive "treatment" are dealt with accordingly. "If you had a rich realtive who died and
named you her sole heir, and you stand to inherit millions of pesos of property, we would refer you to a specialist in
taxation. There would be real estate taxes and arrears which would need to be put in order, and your relative is even
taxed by the state for the right to transfer her property, and only a specialist in taxation would be properly trained to deal
with that problem. Now, if there were other heirs contesting your rich relative’s will, then you would need a litigator, who
knows how to arrange the problem for presentation in court, and gather evidence to support the case." 21

That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry out its services is not controlling. What is important is that it is
engaged in the practice of law by virtue of the nature of the services it renders which thereby brings it within the ambit of
the statutory prohibitions against the advertisements which it has caused to be published and are now assailed in this
proceeding.

Further, as correctly and appropriately pointed out by the U.P. WILOCI, said reported facts sufficiently establish that the
main purpose of respondent is to serve as a one-stop-shop of sorts for various legal problems wherein a client may avail
of legal services from simple documentation to complex litigation and corporate undertakings. Most of these services are
undoubtedly beyond the domain of paralegals, but rather, are exclusive functions of lawyers engaged in the practice of
law. 22

It should be noted that in our jurisdiction the services being offered by private respondent which constitute practice of law
cannot be performed by paralegals. Only a person duly admitted as a member of the bar, or hereafter admitted as such in
accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court, and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law.
23

Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified in education and
character. The permissive right conferred on the lawyers is an individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he
fails to maintain proper standards of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the
client and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the
disciplinary control of the court. 24

The same rule is observed in the American jurisdiction where from respondent would wish to draw support for his thesis.
The doctrines there also stress that the practice of law is limited to those who meet the requirements for, and have been
admitted to, the bar, and various statutes or rules specifically so provide. 25 The practice of law is not a lawful business
except for members of the bar who have complied with all the conditions required by statute and the rules of court. Only
those persons are allowed to practice law who, by reason of attainments previously acquired through education and
study, have been recognized by the courts as possessing profound knowledge of legal science entitling them to advise,
counsel with, protect, or defend the rights, claims, or liabilities of their clients, with respect to the construction,
interpretation, operation and effect of law. 26 The justification for excluding from the practice of law those not admitted to
the bar is found, not in the protection of the bar from competition, but in the protection of the public from being advised
and represented in legal matters by incompetent and unreliable persons over whom the judicial department can exercise
little control. 27

We have to necessarily and definitely reject respondent’s position that the concept in the United States of paralegals as
an occupation separate from the law profession be adopted in this jurisdiction. Whatever may be its merits, respondent
cannot but be aware that this should first be a matter for judicial rules or legislative action, and not of unilateral adoption
as it has done.

Paralegals in the United States are trained professionals. As admitted by respondent, there are schools and universities
there which offer studies and degrees in paralegal education, while there are none in the Philippines. 28 As the concept of
the "paralegal" or "legal assistant" evolved in the United States, standards and guidelines also evolved to protect the
general public. One of the major standards, or guidelines was developed by the American Bar Association which set up
Guidelines for the Approval of Legal Assistant Education Programs (1973). Legislation has even been proposed to certify
legal assistants. There are also associations of paralegals in the United States with their own code of professional ethics,
such as the National Association of Legal Assistants, Inc. and the American Paralegal Association. 29
In the Philippines, we still have a restricted concept and limited acceptance of what may be considered, as paralegal
service. As pointed out by FIDA, some persons not duly licensed to practice law are or have been allowed limited
representation in behalf of another or to render legal services, but such allowable services are limited in scope and extent
by the law, rules or regulations granting permission therefor. 30

Accordingly, we have adopted the American judicial policy that, in the absence of constitutional or statutory authority, a
person who has not been admitted as an attorney cannot practice law for the proper administration of justice cannot be
hindered by the unwarranted intrusion of an unauthorized and unskilled person into the practice of law. 31 That policy
should continue to be one of encouraging persons who are unsure of their legal rights and remedies to seek legal
assistance only from persons licensed to practice law in the state. 32

Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a
lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information or statement
of facts. 33 He is not supposed to use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-
laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services. 34 Nor shall he pay or give something
of value to representatives of the mass media in anticipation of, or in return for, publicity to attract legal business. 35 Prior
to the adoption of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Canons of Professional Ethics had also warned that
lawyers should not resort to indirect advertisements for professional employment, such as furnishing or inspiring
newspaper comments, or procuring his photograph to be published in connection with causes in which the lawyer has
been or is engaged or concerning the manner of their conduct, the magnitude of the interest involved, the importance of
the lawyer’s position, and all other like self-laudation. 36

The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer’s advertisement of his talents. A lawyer cannot, without
violating the ethics of his profession, advertise his talents or skills as in a manner similar to a merchant advertising his
goods. 37 The proscription against advertising of legal services or solicitation of legal business rests on the fundamental
postulate that the practice of law is a profession. Thus, in the case of The Director of Religious Affairs v. Estanislao R.
Bavot 38 an advertisement, similar to those of respondent which are involved in the present proceeding, 39 was held to
constitute improper advertising or solicitation.

The pertinent part of the decision therein reads:

It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by the respondent of the ethics of his
profession, it being a brazen solicitation of business from the public. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides among
other things that "the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or thru paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice." It is highly unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant
advertises his wares. Law is a profession and not a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his profession who stoops to
and adopts the practices of mercantilism by advertising his services or offering them to the public. As a member of the
bar, he defiles the temple of justice with mercenary activities as the money-changers of old defiled the temple of Jehovah.
The most worthy and effective advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, . . . is the establishment of a well-merited
reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but must be the outcome of character and
conduct." (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.)

We repeat, the canons of the profession tell us that the best advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation
for professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the outcome of character and conduct. Good and
efficient service to a client as well as to the community has a way of publicizing itself and catching public attention. That
publicity is a normal by-product of effective service which is right and proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs no
artificial stimulus to generate it and to magnify his success. He easily sees the difference between a normal by-product of
able service and the unwholesome result of propaganda. 40

Of course, not all types of advertising or solicitation are prohibited. The canons of the profession enumerate exceptions to
the rule against advertising or solicitation and define the extent to which they may be undertaken. The exceptions are of
two broad categories, namely, those which are expressly allowed and those which are necessarily implied from the
restrictions. 41
The first of such exceptions is the publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the standards of conduct
imposed by the canons, of brief biographical and informative data. "Such data must not be misleading and may include
only a statement of the lawyer’s name and the names of his professional associates; addresses, telephone numbers,
cable addresses; branches of law practiced; date and place of birth and admission to the bar; schools attended with dates
of graduation, degrees and other educational distinction; public or quasi-public offices; posts of honor; legal authorships;
legal teaching positions; membership and offices in bar associations and committees thereof, in legal and scientific
societies and legal fraternities; the fact of listings in other reputable law lists; the names and addresses of references; and,
with their written consent, the names of clients regularly represented." 42

The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a mere supplemental feature of a
paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical which is published principally for other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer
may not properly publish his brief biographical and informative data in a daily paper, magazine, trade journal or society
program. Nor may a lawyer permit his name to be published in a law list the conduct, management or contents of which
are calculated or likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar, or to lower the dignity or standing of the profession. 43

The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain only a statement of his name, the
name of the law firm which he is connected with, address, telephone number and special branch of law practiced. The
publication of a simple announcement of the opening of a law firm or of changes in the partnership, associates, firm name
or office address, being for the convenience of the profession, is not objectionable. He may likewise have his name listed
in a telephone directory but not under a designation of special branch of law. 44

Verily, taking into consideration the nature and contents of the advertisements for which respondent is being taken to task,
which even includes a quotation of the fees charged by said respondent corporation for services rendered, we find and so
hold that the time definitely do not and conclusively cannot fall under any of the above-mentioned exceptions.

The ruling in the case of Bates, Et. Al. v. State Bar of Arizona, 45 which is repeatedly invoked and constitutes the
justification relied upon by respondent, is obviously not applicable to the case at bar. Foremost is the fact that the
disciplinary rule involved in said case explicitly allows a lawyer, as an exception to the prohibition against advertisements
by lawyers, to publish a statement of legal fees for an initial consultation or the availability upon request of a written
schedule of fees or an estimate of the fee to be charged for the specific services. No such exception is provided for,
expressly or impliedly, whether in our former Canons of Professional Ethics or the present Code of Professional
Responsibility. Besides, even the disciplinary rule in the Bates case contains a proviso that the exceptions stated therein
are "not applicable in any state unless and until it is implemented by such authority in that state." 46 This goes to show
that an exception to the general rule, such as that being invoked by herein respondent, can be made only if and when the
canons expressly provide for such an exception. Otherwise, the prohibition stands, as in the case at bar.

It bears mention that in a survey conducted by the American Bar Association after the decision in Bates, on the attitude of
the public about lawyers after viewing television commercials, it was found that public opinion dropped significantly 47
with respect to these characteristics of lawyers:

Trustworthy from 71% to 14%

Professional from 71% to 14%

Honest from 65% to 14%

Dignified from 45% to 14%

Secondly, it is our firm belief that with the present situation of our legal and judicial systems, to allow the publication of
advertisements of the kind used by respondent would only serve to aggravate what is already a deteriorating public
opinion of the legal profession whose integrity has consistently been under attack lately by media and the community in
general. At this point in time, it is of utmost importance in the face of such negative, even if unfair, criticisms at times, to
adopt and maintain that level of professional conduct which is beyond reproach, and to exert all efforts to regain the high
esteem formerly accorded to the legal profession.

In sum, it is undoubtedly a misbehavior on the part of the lawyer, subject to disciplinary action, to advertise his services
except in allowable instances 48 or to aid a layman in the unauthorized practice of law. 49 Considering that Atty. Rogelio
P. Nogales, who is the prime incorporator, major stockholder and proprietor of The Legal Clinic, Inc. is a member of the
Philippine Bar, he is hereby reprimanded, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts which are involved in
this proceeding will be dealt with more severely.

While we deem it necessary that the question as to the legality or illegality of the purpose/s for which the Legal Clinic, Inc.
was created should be passed upon and determined, we are constrained to refrain from lapsing into an obiter on that
aspect since it is clearly not within the adjudicative parameters of the present proceeding which is merely administrative in
nature. It is, of course, imperative that this matter be promptly determined, albeit in a different proceeding and forum,
since, under the present state of our law and jurisprudence, a corporation cannot be organized for or engage in the
practice of law in this country. This interdiction, just like the rule against unethical advertising, cannot be subverted by
employing some so-called paralegals supposedly rendering the alleged support services.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad

The remedy for the apparent breach of this prohibition by respondent is the concern and province of the Solicitor General
who can institute the corresponding quo warranto action, 50 after due ascertainment of the factual background and basis
for the grant of respondent’s corporate charter, in light of the putative misuse thereof. That spin-off from the instant bar
matter is referred to the Solicitor General for such action as may be necessary under the circumstances.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN herein respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., from issuing
or causing the publication or dissemination of any advertisement in any form which is of the same or similar tenor and
purpose as Annexes "A" and "B" of this petition, and from conducting, directly or indirectly, any activity, operation or
transaction proscribed by law or the Code of Professional Ethics as indicated herein. Let copies of this resolution be
furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Office of the Solicitor General for
appropriate action in accordance herewith.