Lead Case Civil No.

3:02CV1423 (MRK)
United States District Court, D. Connecticut

Cashman v. Ricigliano
Decided Aug 25, 2004

Lead Case Civil No. 3:02CV1423 (MRK). 1 The cases were consolidated by order of

the Court on March 5, 2003 [doc. #23]

August 25, 2004 upon determination that the Plaintiffs assert
claims against the same Defendants under
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION the FDCPA and raise common questions of
law and fact. See Order [doc. # 23], at 1.

MARK KRAVITZ, District Judge

I. Background
This case arises from claimed violations of the The pertinent facts are drawn from the parties'
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA"), 15 pleadings submitted in connection with the
U.S.C. § 1692, the Connecticut Creditor pending motions.2 The parties explicitly
Collection Practices Act, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 36a- represented to the Court at oral argument that, for
645, the Consumer Collection Agency Act, Conn. 3 the *3 purpose of the pending motions, the record
Gen. Stat. § 36a-800, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-568, is complete and no further discovery is necessary.
and the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act There are only a small number of uncontested
("CUTPA"), Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42-110a. The facts that are relevant to the key issue raised by the
Plaintiff, Christopher Cashman, filed a Complaint parties' summary judgment motions, which is
[doc. #1] against Michael Ricigliano, Jr. and the whether the Defendants3 qualify as "debt
law firm of Margiotta Ricigliano (collectively,
collectors" under the FDCPA.
"the Defendants") on August 15, 2002, followed
2 The parties' submissions consist of the
by an Amended Complaint [doc. #4] ("Am.
Compl.") on December 5, 2002. Mr. Cashman's is following pleadings: Plaintiffs'

the lead case in a consolidated action against the Memorandum in Support of Summary
Judgment [doc. #66] ("Mem. in Supp. of
Defendants that includes the following actions:
Summ. J."); Plaintiffs' Local Rule 56(a)1
Kelly Jackson (Civ. No. 3:02cv1424 (MRK));
Statement [doc. #67] ("Pls.' 56(a)1
Kathleen Strozeski (Civ. No. 3:02cv1426 (MRK));
Statement"); Plaintiffs' Reply in Support of
Janet B. Montville (Civ. No. 3:02cv1427 (MRK));
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
and Luciano Petrolito (Civ. No. 3:02cv1822 [doc. #76] ("Pls.' Reply"); Defendants'
(MRK)) (collectively, "the Plaintiffs").1 Presently Motion for Summary Judgment [doc. #72];
before the Court are cross motions for summary Memorandum of Law in Opposition to
judgment — Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary
2 Summary *2 Judgment [doc. #65] and Defendants' Judgment and In Support of Defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment [doc. #72] — as Motion for Summary Judgment [doc. #73]
well as Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike Affidavit [doc. ("Defs.' Mem. of Law"); Defendants' Local

#75]. Rule 9(c)1 Statement [doc. #74] ("Defs.'

9(c)1 Statement"); Plaintiffs' Opposition to
Defendants' Motion for Summary

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 Cashman v. Ricigliano Lead Case Civil No. 3:02CV1423 (MRK) (D. Conn. Aug. 25...

Judgment [doc. #78] ("Pls.' Opp. to Mot. Each statement of material fact . .
for Summ. J."); Plaintiffs' Local Rule . by an opponent in a Local Rule
56(a)2 Statement [doc. #79] ("Pls.' 56(a)2 56(a)2 Statement, and each denial
Statement"). in an opponent's Local Rule
Defendants did not file a Local Rule 56(a)2 56(a)2 Statement, must be
Statement in response to Plaintiffs' Local followed by a specific citation to
Rule 56(a)1 Statement [doc. #67] filed in (1) the affidavit of a witness
support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial competent to testify as to the facts
Summary Judgment [doc. #65]. Local Rule at trial and/or (2) evidence that
56(a)2 states that would be admissible at trial . . .
Counsel . . . are hereby notified
[T]he papers opposing a motion that failure to provide specific
for summary judgment shall citations to evidence in the record
include a document entitled as required by this Local Rule
`Local Rule 56(a)2 Statement,' may result in sanctions, including
which states in separately . . . when the opponent fails to
numbered paragraphs comply, an order granting the
corresponding to the paragraphs motion.
contained in the moving party's
Local Rule 56(a)1 Statement
whether each of the facts asserted Since, "all material facts set forth in [the
by the moving party is admitted movant's Rule 56(a)(1) Statement] will be
or denied. The Local Rule 56(a)2 deemed admitted unless controverted by
Statement must also include in a the statement required to be filed and
separate section entitled served by the opposing party in accordance
`Disputed Issues of Material Fact' with Local Rule 56(a)(2)," D. Conn. L.
a list of each issue of material fact Civ. R. 56(a)(1), the Plaintiffs' factual
as to which it is contended there assertions in their Rule 56(a)(1) Statement
is a genuine issue to be tried. will be deemed admitted. See S.E.C. v.
Global Telecom Servs., L.L.C., No. 3:03
CV 418 (PCD), 2004 WL 1638045, at *7
In addition, Local Rule 56(a)3 states that (D. Conn. July 19, 2004).

3 Defendants are treated together for liability

purposes since a partnership is liable for

the actions of its partners taken within the
scope of employment. See, e.g., Bartlett v.
Heibl, 128 F.3d 497, 499-500 (7th Cir.
1997) ("If [defendant] were being sued for
conduct within the scope of his agency or
employment as a partner or an associate of
a law firm, the firm could be named along
with him as a defendant, because it would
be liable jointly with him for that
conduct."); Dinco v. Dylex Ltd., 111 F.3d
964, 969 (1st Cir. 1997) ("Every partner is
an agent of the partnership for the purposes
of the business, and the act of every partner
including the execution and the partnership

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 Cashman v. Ricigliano Lead Case Civil No. 3:02CV1423 (MRK) (D. Conn. Aug. 25...

name of any instrument or apparently Whereas, Attorney desires to perform

carrying on in the usual way the business certain legal collections for Client as set
of the partnership of which he or she is a forth in this Agreement, and Client desires
member binds the partnership unless the
Attorney to undertake such collections
partner so acting has in fact no authority to
pursuant to the terms herein . . .
act for the partnership in the particular
manner and the person with whom he is I. SCOPE OF ENGAGEMENT
dealing has knowledge of the fact that he
has no authority.").
A. Client will place accounts with
Attorney for litigation and collections
Margiotta Ricigliano ("MR") is a small, four- purposes and Attorney will undertake legal
attorney, law firm with its principal office in representation on each account placed by
Garden City, New York. Defs.' 9(c)1 Statement ¶ Client by commencing action within 45
1; Pls.' 56(a)2 Statement ¶ 1. Mr. Ricigliano, Jr. days of receipt of such accounts. Attorney
was at all relevant times the only attorney at MR shall have sole discretion whether or not to
who is admitted to practice in the State of proceed with litigation. In such cases
Connecticut. Defs.' 9(c)1 Statement ¶ 2; Pls.' where suit is filed and Client is not the
56(a)2 Statement ¶ 2. In or about the fall of 2001, creditor, Client recognizes that the creditor
MR was retained by Arrow Financial Services is the "Client" within such lawsuit . . .
LLP ("Arrow") pursuant to a written retainer Client warrants that it has authority from
agreement to render legal services on behalf of all other relevant creditors to place such
Arrow in connection with various allegedly accounts for litigation with Attorney under
outstanding consumer credit card debts which had this Agreement.
been assigned to Arrow. Defs.' 9(c)1 ¶ 8; Pls.'
B. Attorney will represent Client and
56(a)2 ¶ 8. At all relevant times, Arrow was
creditors in all phases of litigation as
4 licensed as a collection agency by the *4
related the accounts placed with Attorney,
Connecticut Banking Department. Pls.' 56(a)1
including, but not limited to, institution of
Statement [doc. #67] ¶ 7. The agreement, entitled
suit, court appearances, obtaining and
"Agreement for Legal Collection Service,"
enforcing judgments, and all other
("Agreement") provides, in part, the following:
associated matters.
This Agreement is made and entered into
...
as of ____, by and between ARROW
FINANCIAL SERVICES, LLC ("Client") . III. GENERAL MATTERS
. . and MARGIOTTA RICIGLIANO
("Attorney"). ...

WHEREAS, Client and Attorney agree C. This Agreement shall be effective as of

that certain accounts identified herein and the date hereof and continue in effect until
placed by Client with Attorney shall be terminated as herein provided. Either party
governed by the terms and conditions of may terminate this Agreement by giving
this Agreement; the other party at least thirty (30) days
prior written notice of the date of
termination . . .

5 *5 See Exhibits attached to doc. #67.4

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 Cashman v. Ricigliano Lead Case Civil No. 3:02CV1423 (MRK) (D. Conn. Aug. 25...

4 Regrettably, counsel has not paginated, Please make payment in care of this office.
tabbed or otherwise identified for ease of If there is any reason why you are unable
reference the numerous exhibits attached to to make immediate full payment, or it you
Plaintiffs' 56(a)1 Statement. Therefore,
dispute this account, kindly contact the
only general references to "doc. #67" will
undersigned.
be made when citing or describing an
exhibit accompanying Plaintiffs' 56(a)1 This office shall assume all portions of this
Statement. debt to be valid unless disputed in writing
within thirty (30) days of the date of this
It is undisputed that during the period from about
notice. Should you notify our office that
October 2001 through February 2002, a total of
the debt or any portion thereof is disputed
five months, Defendants opened over 90
we will obtain verification and forward
collection matters for Arrow in which they sent
same to you.
collection letters to debtors. Affidavit of Michael
Ricigliano, Jr. [doc. #72] at 5. Defendants stated at In the event this amount is not paid, we
oral argument that Mr. Ricigliano, Jr. and will have no alternative but to institute
paralegals handled the collection matters for the legal action against you, which can result
firm. The letterhead on the demand letters listed in additional liability by way of interest on
"Margiotta Ricigliano," followed by "Attorneys at the debt and court costs.
Law" and a Uniondale, New York address. To the
See Exhibits attached to doc. #67. The letter is
right of the letterhead was a post office box
signed by a "Christine Raffa, Paralegal," and
address and telephone number for an office in
"Collections Department" appears beneath the
Madison, Connecticut. See Exhibits attached to
name. Id. However, there was no "Collections
doc. #67. The Madison, Connecticut post office
Department" at the law firm when the letters were
box address on the letter was opened and used
sent out. Pls.' 56(a)1 Statement ¶ 15. At the lower
solely for the Arrow collections. Id. ¶ 13. The
portion of the letter, in upper case, bold face print,
Connecticut telephone number on the letter was
was the following:
also opened and used solely for the Arrow
collections. Id. ¶ 14. To the left of the letterhead is 5 There are five sample letters included in

a list of four names: Joseph M. Margiotta, Michael Plaintiffs' exhibits, the bodies of which are
J. Ricigliano, Ellen Savino McCormack, and identically worded. Exhibits attached to

Michael Ricigliano, Jr. An asterisk after Mr. doc. #67.

Ricigliano, Jr.'s name notes that he is "admitted in

PLEASE BE ADVISED THAT THIS
NY CT." See Exhibits attached to doc. #67.
OFFICE IS ATTEMPTING TO
The contents of the letter addressed to Mr. COLLECT A DEBT AND ANY
Cashman, and dated October 29, 2001, is as INFORMATION OBTAINED BY US
follows:5 FROM YOU OR ABOUT YOU WIL BE
USED FOR THAT PURPOSE. WE ARE
Our Client, Arrow Financial Services, has NOT ATTEMPTING TO COLLECT
referred to us your open account for MONEY FROM ANYONE WHO HAS
collection. There is currently due and DISCHARGED THE DEBT UNDER U.S.
owing to Arrow Financial Services, BANKRUPTCY LAWS.
Assignee of Capital One the sum of
$1,348.18 credit card debt. See Exhibits attached to doc. #67. Defendants
admit to having initiated civil actions against at
6 *6 least 53 of the individuals to whom it sent

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collection letters. See List of Actions Commenced when "a reasonable jury could return a verdict for
by Margiotta Ricigliano on Behalf of Arrow the nonmoving party," and facts are material to the
Financial Services [doc. #72], Ex. D. However, outcome if the substantive law renders them so.
Defendants indicated that they have withdrawn, Andersen v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
filed motions to withdraw from, or discontinued 251-52 (1986). The moving party bears the burden
most of the 53 cases.6 See id. of demonstrating that no genuine issue exists as to
any material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
6 Defendants' withdrawals and
U.S. 317, 323-25 (1986). If the moving party
discontinuances were filed or granted after
carries its burden, the party opposing summary
February 2002. For example, at least 15
lawsuits were discontinued in mid to late
judgment "may not rest upon mere allegations or
March of 2002, Defendants were relieved denials," rather the opposing party must "set forth
as counsel in approximately 6 suits in May specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue
of 2002. Defendants conceded that, as of for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). The Court must draw
March 2004, motions to withdraw all ambiguities and inferences in favor of the
remained pending in 24 cases. 8 plaintiffs. *8 See Andersen, 477 U.S. at 255.
However, to defeat a motion for summary
For the year ending December 31, 2001, the
judgment, the nonmoving party "must do more
7 Defendants report that their revenues *7 resulting
than simply show that there is some metaphysical
from its work on behalf of Arrow totaled
doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec.
approximately $371 and that the firm's total
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
revenues for 2002 were $732, 154. Defs.' Mem. of
586 (1986). "If the evidence is merely colorable,
Law at 11. For the year ending December 31,
or is not significantly probative, summary
2002, Defendants' revenue from work on behalf of
judgment may be granted." Andersen, 477 U.S. at
Arrow yielded approximately $3,010, while total
249-50.
revenues for 2002 totaled approximately
$703,957. III. Discussion
Plaintiffs filed their suits against Defendants Defendants did not contest either in their briefs or
alleging that Defendants were "debt collectors" at argument that their actions violated the FDCPA,
under the terms of the FDCPA, and that, among assuming they are subject to suit under FDCPA.
other things, Defendants sent collection letters that Rather, Defendants oppose Plaintiffs' motion for
were deceptive and misleading, and that partial summary judgment, and cross-move
Defendants filed lawsuits against Plaintiffs based themselves for summary judgment, based on their
on false allegations. Plaintiffs contend that contention that the undisputed facts show that they
Defendants' actions violated the FDCPA and are not "debt collectors," and consequently the
Connecticut state statutory law. See Mem. in Supp. FDCPA does not apply to them. Defs.' Mem. of
of Summ. J. at 5-16. Law at 3, 8. Therefore, the sole question for the
purposes of determining liability and deciding the
II. Summary Judgment Standard pending motions is whether Defendants qualify as
Summary judgment is appropriate only when "the "debt collectors" under the FDCPA.
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
The FDCPA "applies to attorneys `regularly'
and admissions on file, together with the
engaging in debt collection activity, including
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine
such activity in the nature of litigation." Goldstein
issue as to any material fact and that the moving
v. Hutton, Ingram, Yuzek, Gainen, Carroll
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
Bertolotti, 374 F.3d 56, 60 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(b). A genuine issue of fact exists
Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 299 (1995). As it

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 Cashman v. Ricigliano Lead Case Civil No. 3:02CV1423 (MRK) (D. Conn. Aug. 25...

applies to this action, the term "debt collector" judgment, finding that the defendant could
means "any person who uses any instrumentality reasonably be regarded as a debt collector subject
of interstate commerce or the mails in any to suit under the FDCPA. In reversing the district
business the principal purpose of which is the court's grant of summary judgment, the Second
collection of any debts, or who regularly collects Circuit emphasized that, "[W]e believe that the
or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts decision below should have focused on the
owed or due or asserted to be owed to due regularity of [defendant's] debt collection activity
another." 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). At the time the rather than principally on the proportion its
parties in this case briefed their motions and 10 business devoted to debt *10 collection."
9 appeared before the Court to argue their *9 Goldstein, 374 F.3d at 60 (emphasis added).
positions, the Second Circuit had not squarely
Of particular importance to the present case is the
addressed the issue of what constitutes "regularly"
Second Circuit's observation that considerations of
collecting debts within the meaning of § 1692a(6).
the percentage of resources dedicated to, and
However, on July 1, 2004, the Second Circuit
revenues derived from, debt collection work, as
issued its decision in Goldstein, which set forth an
well as whether a firm marketed itself as a debt
analytical framework and guidance for
collector or had a regular client relationship with a
determining who qualifies as a "debt collector"
debt collecting business:
under the FDCPA. The Court finds this case to be
controlled by Goldstein and concludes that [w]hile not irrelevant to a regularity
Defendants are "debt collectors" under FDCPA for inquiry (clearly, an entity devoting a
the same reasons that the Second Circuit substantial part of its resources, or deriving
concluded that the defendant law firm in Goldstein substantial revenues from, debt collecting,
was a debt collector. or actively soliciting such business, would
likely perform such work with a degree of
As the Second Circuit explained in Goldstein,
regularity), are more pertinent to the first
"The FDCPA establishes two alternative
prong of the statutory debt collector
predicates for `debt collector' status — engaging
definition — debt collection as principal
in such activity as the `principal purpose' of the
business — than to the question of whether
entity's business and `regularly' engaging in such
the entity engages regularly in debt
activity." Goldstein, 374 F.3d at 61; see 15 U.S.C.
collection.
§ 1692a(6). As in this case, there was no
contention in Goldstein that the defendant's Id. at 61. As the Second Circuit noted, "[f]ocusing
business principally involved debt collection. a regularity inquiry primarily on the proportion of
Golstein, 374 F.3d at 61. Rather, the relevant issue overall work or firm revenue, a factor easily
was what constituted "regular" debt collection affected by the size and service pricing
activity. In Goldstein, the defendant, a New York determinations of the law practice, blurs the
law firm that represented a non-party client in distinction between the `principal purpose' and
connection with landlord-tenant matters, moved `regularity' aspects of the statutory definition of
for summary judgment, in part based on its debt collector." Id. at 61.
contention that, as in this case, it was not a debt
Instead, the Second Circuit held, the question
collector under the FDCPA. Goldstein, 374 F.3d at
whether a lawyer or law firm "regularly" engages
59. The district court granted summary judgment
in debt collection activity within the meaning of §
based on its conclusion that the defendant was not
1692a(6) must be assessed on a "case-by-case
a debt collector within the meaning of the FDCPA.
basis in light of factors bearing on the issue of
Id. The Second Circuit vacated the district court's
regularity." Id. at 62. The plaintiff in an FDCPA

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 Cashman v. Ricigliano Lead Case Civil No. 3:02CV1423 (MRK) (D. Conn. Aug. 25...

action bears the burden of proving the defendant's month period relevant to this case, or nearly 20 per
debt collector status, and the factors relevant to month, a number that exceeds that which the
that inquiry are as follows: Second Circuit stated was a "large" number that
demonstrated regularity in Goldstein. Id. at 63
Most important in the analysis is the
(firm issued more than 10 notices a month in 7
assessment of facts closely relating to
months and 15 notices in 3 months). Moreover, it
ordinary concepts of regularity, including
is undisputed that Defendants initiated 53
(1) the absolute number of debt collection
collection lawsuits in connection with their
communications issued, and/or collection-
collection efforts.
related litigation matters pursued, over the
relevant period(s), (2) the frequency of Second, the frequency and pattern of Defendants
such communications and/or litigation debt collection activity supports a conclusion of
activity, including whether any patterns of "regularity." During a relatively short period of
such activity are discernable, (3) whether time, Defendants issued a very large number of
the entity has personnel specifically collection letters and then filed lawsuits against a
assigned to work on debt collection sizeable percentage (53 out of 97, or about one-
activity, (4) whether the entity has systems half) of those individuals to whom Defendants had
or contractors in place to facilitate such sent letters.
activity, and (5) whether the activity is
Third, a single paralegal signed all of the letters,
undertaken in connection with ongoing
12 which were all drafted by Mr. *12 Ricigliano, Jr.
client relationships with entities that have
Moreover, at argument, Defendants represented to
11 *11 retained the lawyer or firm to assist in
the Court that Mr. Ricigliano, Jr. was the only
the collection of outstanding consumer
lawyer in the firm who pursued debt collection
debt obligations.
activity. Therefore, it appears that certain
Goldstein, 374 F.3d at 62-63. Finally, the court personnel in the firm were devoted, at least in part,
noted that facts relating to the role debt collection to debt collection activity.
plays in the practice as a whole and whether the
Fourth, Defendants put in place facilities designed
law practice seeks debt collection business by
expressly to facilitate its debt collection activity.
marketing itself as having debt collection
For example, Defendants established a
expertise, may also be relevant indicators of the
Connecticut phone number and post office address
regularity of the firm's debt collection work. Id. at
specifically for the purposes of servicing debt
63.
collection activities.7
Examining the record as a whole in light of the
7 The deposition of Mr. Ricigliano contains
factors identified in Goldstein as bearing on the
the following exchange:
issue of "regularity," this Court concludes that
during the relevant time period involved in this Q: The upper right-hand corner of
case, Defendants were "regularly" engaged in debt the letter has a P.O. Box in
collection activity and therefore they are debt Madison, Connecticut?
collectors within the meaning of FDCPA. First, the
absolute number of debt collection
A: Correct.
communications issued by Defendants during the
Q: And who maintains that? Who
relevant period demonstrate regularity. The parties
pays for that P.O. Box?
have stipulated that Defendants issued 97
collection letters during the approximately five-

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 Cashman v. Ricigliano Lead Case Civil No. 3:02CV1423 (MRK) (D. Conn. Aug. 25...

collections purposes," "Attorney will represent

A: I believe the office paid for the P.O. Client and creditors in all phases of litigation as
Box. related the accounts placed with Attorney," and
... that "[t]his Agreement shall be effective as of the
Q: Did you have that P.O. Box date hereof and continue in effect until terminated
just for the purpose of these as herein provided." See Agreement at 1-3.
letters?
The Court is unmoved by Defendants' insistence
that the paramount consideration in determining
A: Yes. whether they are debt collectors should be the
... proportion that debt collection work bears to the
Q: There is a Connecticut phone firm's overall work. See Defs.' Mem. of Law at 8-
number up there, and where did 12. The Second Circuit explicitly stated that "
the telephone number — [f]acts relating to the role debt collection work
plays in the practice as a whole should be
A: It went to like a voice mail, I
considered to the extent they bear on the question
believe, that — someone called
of regularity of debt collection activity."
into that number. We could check
Goldstein, 374 F.3d at 63 (emphasis added). In
that, you know, voice mail to see
who called.
this case, the frequency and indicia of
commitment to efforts on behalf of Arrow
demonstrate that Defendants did not casually or
... perfunctorily undertake their debt collection work.
Q: And was that number
Defendants admitted at argument that during the
established for the purpose of this
lawsuit?
two years leading up to and including the five
months relevant to this motion, Defendants
handled a total of 1200 matters. This translates to
A: No. It wasn't established. 600 matters in the one-year window that includes
Q: Not for this, for your representation for Defendants' retention by Arrow, and 250 matters
Arrow? over the five months during which the 97 demand
A: Yes. letters were issued in connection with debt
Deposition of Michael Ricigliano, Jr. [doc. collection matters. As a percentage, then, the 97
#67], Exhibits, at 88-90. debt collection matters constituted approximately
39% of the 250 matters handled by the firm during
Fifth, Defendants' debt collection activity was
the relevant five months. The fact that Defendants
undertaken in connection with an ongoing
filed 53 lawsuits illustrates both the considerable
relationship with Arrow, a licensed collection
time and frequency of their attention to debt
agency. Id. at 62. Given the volume of letters sent
collection work. Defendants argue that the
and lawsuits filed on Arrow's behalf in such a
lawsuits should be disregarded since Defendants
short period of time, it is apparent that Defendant's
have either withdrawn from, moved to be relieved
activity was more than a sporadic or sparse
as counsel in, or have discontinued many of these
commitment to servicing debt collection matters
cases. See List of Actions Commenced by
on behalf of Arrow. The Agreement between
14 Margiotta *14 Ricigliano on Behalf of Arrow
Defendants and Arrow only underscores this
Financial Services [doc. #72], Ex. C; see also
13 point, *13 providing as it does that "Client will
Defs.' Mem. of Law at 10. The Court disagrees.
place accounts with Attorney for litigation and
While the lawsuits might have arisen from the

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same matters as the demand letters and therefore determined that they are debt collectors under the
perhaps should not contribute to the absolute FDCPA, Defendants are not entitled to summary
number of debt collection matters opened by judgment and instead Plaintiffs are entitled to
Defendants during the five-month period, the partial summary judgment on liability under
lawsuits undoubtedly required additional attention 15 FDCPA and Connecticut *15 statutory law.8
and constituted additional work that added to the
8 Defendants conceded at argument that they
overall volume and frequency of debt collection
did not submit a substantive objection to
activity handled by Defendants. Therefore, the
Plaintiffs' claims that Defendants violated
Court concludes that: (1) the absolute number of various state statutory laws. Defendants'
communications and/or collection-related only position with regard to the state law
litigation over the five-month period; (2) the claims was simply that if Defendants were
frequency over the relevant period; (3) the not determined to be debt collectors, then
existence of personnel specifically assigned to the Court should decline to exercise
work on debt collection activity; (4) the supplemental jurisdiction over the state law
establishment of a P.O. Box address and telephone claims. Defs.' Mem of Law at 12-13.
number solely for the purposes of debt collection Defendants further conceded that,

matters; (5) Defendants' undertaking of debt consequently, if the Court concluded that

collection activity in connection with an ongoing they are debt collectors, then Plaintiffs are
entitled to partial summary judgment on
client relationship with a client, Arrow, that
the state law claims.
retained Defendants to assist in the collection of
outstanding consumer debt obligations; and (6) the IV. Conclusion
percentage of debt collection work to the overall
For the reasons stated herein, the Court GRANTS
volume of the firm's work, support a conclusion of
Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
"regularity", whether those factors are considered
[doc. #65] and DENIES Defendants' Motion for
collectively or individually.
Summary Judgment [doc. #72]. Having ruled in
Of course, as Goldstein implicitly suggests, no one favor of Plaintiffs on the question of liability, the
factor should be determinative of the regularity Court DENIES as moot Plaintiffs' Motion to
inquiry. However, here, all of the factors point to Strike Affidavit [doc. #75].
only one conclusion — that Defendants were
Damages will be determined by Magistrate Judge
regularly involved in debt collection activity
Garfinkel at a hearing he will convene for that
during the relevant time period and therefore, they
purpose.
are debt collectors within the meaning of FDCPA.
Since Defendants have conceded that Plaintiffs IT IS SO ORDERED.
would prevail on liability in the event the Court