Municipality of Dasmariñas v. Campos, G.R. No. 232675, July 17, 2019
Municipality of Dasmariñas v. Campos, G.R. No. 232675, July 17, 2019
FACTS:
Dr. Campos was the absolute owner of certain parcels of land
situated in Dasmariñas, Cavite. 7 On July 28, 1976, Dr. Campos executed a
Deed of Donation (First Deed of Donation) in favor of the NHA, involving a
parcel of land with an area of 12,798 square meters. 8
Under the Deed of Donation, the donee NHA WAS TO CONSTRUCT
A 36-METER-WIDE ACCESS ROAD from Highway 17 to the Dasmariñas
Resettlement Project. It is also hereby stipulated that should the DONEE fail to
use the area or part of it for the 36-meter access road, or should its
development be delayed, the DONOR reserves the right to use it until such a
time that DONEE is in a position to use the said parcel of properties.
In an attempt to comply with the provisions of the Deed of
Donation, the NHA constructed a 20-m-wide access road, in lieu of the
stipulated 36-m-wide access road. The NHA reasoned that the volume of
the traffic at that time did not justify the outright construction of the 36-
m-wide access road, and that it had reserved the remaining 16 m for road
widening purposes. The NHA also promised that the property had not
been diverted or used for any other purpose.
However, on June 13, 1993, without any notice to Dr. Campos, the
NHA donated the subject property to the Municipality of Dasmariñas. This
was done allegedly pursuant to Section 31 of P.D. No. 957.
Due to the failure of the NHA to fully comply with the provisions in
the Deed of Donation despite the long lapse of time, and due to the
foregoing transaction between the petitioners, on November 13, 2001, Dr.
Campos filed an action for Revocation of Donation against the NHA with
the RTC of Dasmariñas, Branch 90. Dr. Campos claimed that the NHA
failed to comply with the condition attached to the donation and construct
the 36-m-wide access road. He also alleged that the NHA further violated
the parties' agreement by subsequently donating the subject property to
the Municipality of Dasmariñas.
Proceedings in the Trial Court
The Issues
The issues in this case are as follows:
First, as to the procedural aspect of the case, whether or not the
action to revoke the Deed of Donation has prescribed and/or is barred by
laches.
Second, as to the substantial merits, whether or not the CA gravely
erred when it affirmed the decision of the RTC that the NHA violated the
terms of the Deed of Donation, said violations authorizing the partial
revocation of the property donated, specifically the unused 16 m, and
whether or not petitioners have proffered any valid justification to show
any infirmity in the decision.
ETHIDa
In addition, the fact that the case was filed within the prescriptive
period of 10 years aptly removes the case from the clutches of possible
laches.
To note, the petitioners themselves point out that nothing in the
Deed of Donation gives an exact timeline for the NHA to complete the
building of the access road, saying that "[t]he construction of the exactly
[36-m-wide] access road is NOT TIME-BOUND," 61 which means that, for
the time NHA was in control of the property, the respondents-heirs' cause
of action could not have arisen. This would explain the relatively long
period before which the late Dr. Campos filed a complaint for
Revocation of Donation, because before the subsequent donation to the
Municipality of Dasmariñas, the respondents-heirs, in their generosity,
gave the NHA leeway to hopefully deliver on its pledge to complete the
construction. Unfortunately, the second donation completely eradicated
any vestiges of hope that would be fulfilled, prompting respondents to
take action, well within the time allowed by the statute.
As to the Revocation of the Deed of
Donation
. At the onset, the Court notes that the factual findings that the NHA
failed to comply with the express stipulations contained in the Deed of
Donation are consistent and parallel with that of the trial court, as well as
the CA. Thus, these findings of fact are binding on the Court of last resort
unless there was an oversight or misinterpretation on the part of the
lower courts.
The Court finds that the petitioners were unable to prove the
presence of any possible oversight that would create doubt on the
findings of fact of the trial court and the CA. The Court's own review of the
evidence on record will show that indeed, a SUBSTANTIAL BREACH, and
not just a slight breach, was committed by the NHA that would validate a
revocation of the donation and a rescission of the subject contract
between the NHA and the respondents-heirs necessitating the immediate
return of the unused property back to the respondents-heirs.
Axiomatically, the general rule is that rescission will not be permitted for a slight or casual
breach of the contract, but only for such breaches as are so substantial and fundamental as to defeat
the object of the parties in making the agreement. Substantial breaches, unlike slight or casual
breaches of contract, are fundamental breaches that defeat the object of the parties in entering into
an agreement, and the question of whether the breach is slight or substantial is largely determined
by the attendant circumstances.
DECISION
CAGUIOA, J : p
Issue
CAGUIOA, J :
p
The CA in its Decision dated October 28, 2014 granted the appeal.
The CA held that the defense of prescription could not be sustained.
Respondents Navares' complaint for reconveyance was not barred by
prescription because of their actual possession of Lot No. 8467-B based
on petitioners Tomakin's admission that most of respondents Navares are
living in the said Lot and leasing portions thereof to tenants. 19
The CA disagreed with the RTC's negation of the transfer of 1/2 of
Lot No. 8467 in favor of respondents Navares based on their alleged
failure to adduce evidence that the condition contained in the 1955 Deed
of Absolute Sale with Condition (1955 Deed of Sale) in their favor was
complied with. Contrary to the ruling of the RTC, the CA did not construe
the proviso on the reservation of the right to the fruits or products of the
property conveyed by Quirina Badana to respondents Navares'
predecessors during her lifetime as a condition on the ground that the
1955 Deed of Sale did not in express terms provide that the non-
fulfillment of the obligation to deliver the fruits would prevent the transfer
of ownership of the property in question. 20 Even if petitioners Tomakin's
argument that the proviso partook of the nature of a condition were to be
sustained, the CA stated that they lacked personality to assail the same
because they were not privies to the 1955 Deed of Sale. 21 According to
the CA, only Quirina Badana, as the vendor, had a cause of action to assail
the non-fulfillment of the condition, and her failure to institute any action
regarding the alleged condition during her lifetime constituted a waiver of
whatever cause of action she might have had thereon. 22
The CA upheld the validity of the February 23, 1955 sale covering
the 1/2 portion of Lot No. 8647 (known as Lot No. 8647-B and covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 131499) executed by Quirina Badana in
favor of respondents Navares' predecessors and the December 6, 1957
sale executed by Severina Badana in favor of petitioners Tomakin's
predecessors but only to the extent of her 1/2 share of Lot No. 8647. 23 caITAC
SO ORDERED.
• James v. Eurem Realty Development Corp., G.R. No. 190650, October 14, 2013
The petitioners cannot be expected to file the action after the issuance of
Lopez's title since at that time, the appeal in Civil Case No. 1447, the case
between their predecessor Gorgonio and his siblings as against their other
sibling Primitivo, WAS STILL PENDING and was only resolved with finality by
the CA only on November 7, 1978.
DECISION
REYES, J :p
In this case, the RTC dismissed the petitioners' complaint with the
bare statement that "the title of the [respondent's] predecessor Eufracio
Lopez was issued on October 11, 1972 and the same has not as yet been
judicially declared null and void by any competent court up to the present,
as against [petitioners'] complaint which was filed with [the RTC] only on
September 26, 2003, or more than thirty (30) years have lapsed before
[petitioners] instituted [the] present action." 16 The RTC simply reckoned
the commencement of the prescriptive period on the issuance of Lopez's
title on October 11, 1972, as alleged by the respondent in its answer. In
their complaint, however, the petitioners disputed the validity of the
respondent's title, alleged bad faith on the part of Lopez and the
respondent, and reiterated the existence of the final and executory
decision of the CA in Civil Case No. 1447. The petitioners also alleged in
their complaint and appellants' brief that they are holders of TCT No.
18833 issued on September 20, 1999 pursuant to the CA decision in Civil
Case No. 1447. 17 Thus, the petitioners prayed, both in their complaint and
in their appellant's brief, that the respondent's title be set aside and their
own title upheld. While the existence of different titles over the same
property is an established fact, the allegations in the petitioners'
complaint and appellants' brief as to the antecedent facts that led to the
issuance of the titles create an uncertainty regarding the applicability of
prescription and call for a calibration of the evidence on hand. This
constitutes a question of fact and not a run-of-the-mill question of law as
the CA would like to present it; more so since the petitioners charge the
respondent and its predecessors-in-interest with bad faith. "[T]he
question of whether a person acted with good faith or bad faith in
purchasing and registering real property is a QUESTION OF
FACT, . . . ."18 It is evidentiary and has to be established by the claimant
with clear and convincing evidence, and this necessitates an examination
of the evidence of all the parties. 19 In Macababbad, Jr., the Court also
ruled that prescription is a question of fact where there is a need to
determine the veracity of factual matters such as the date when the
period to bring the action commenced to run. 20
Given the mixed question of fact and law raised, the petitioners
properly elevated the RTC decision to the CA on ordinary appeal
under Rule 41, Section 2 of the Rules of Court. 21 The CA, therefore,
committed a reversible error in dismissing the petitioners' appeal.
Normally, the Court would remand the case to the CA for proper
disposition of the petitioners' appeal. Considering, however, that a
remand would further delay Civil Case No. 5877 which is yet to reach the
trial stage, the Court will resolve the issue of whether the RTC committed
a reversible error in dismissing the same on ground of prescription
without touching on the substantial merits of the case. 22
The period for the filing of Civil
Case No. 5877 has not yet
prescribed
THERE WAS YET TO BE A TRIAL ON THE MERITS but the RTC
merely relied on the averments in the complaint and answer and
forthwith dismissed the case. While trial courts have authority and
discretion to dismiss an action on the ground of prescription, it may only
do so when the parties' pleadings or other facts on record show it to be
indeed time-barred. "If the issue of prescription is one involving
evidentiary matters REQUIRING A FULL-BLOWN TRIAL on the merits, it
cannot be determined in a motion to dismiss."
Parenthetically, there are TWO KINDS OF PRESCRIPTION provided in the Civil Code. One is
acquisitive, i.e., the acquisition of a right by the lapse of time; the other is extinctive, whereby rights
and actions are lost by the lapse of time. 26 The kind of prescription raised by the respondent pertains
to EXTINCTIVE PRESCRIPTION. aTcIEH