MA THESIS

“NOW IS THE TIME TO KILL

ALL CHINESE!”
Social Revolution and the Massacre of
Chinese in Tangerang, 1945-1946.

Ravando
Supervisor: Prof. Gert Oostindie Cosmopolis Program
Second Reader: Dr. Alicia Schrikker
Colonial and Global
History

[email protected]
1
15 August 2014
 CONTENTS

GLOSSARY OF FOREIGN TERMS, ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ............................. 2

LIST OF TABLES, FIGURES, AND MAPS.......................................................................................... 6
INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................................................... 6
Case Study: Tangerang.......................................................................................................................... 9
Previous Related Studies..................................................................................................................... 12
Sources and Methodology .................................................................................................................. 14
Chapter Descriptions ........................................................................................................................... 15

CHAPTER I
ROOTS OF ANTI-CHINESE VIOLENCE IN INDONESIA .......................................................... 16
1.1. Chinese Communities in Southeast Asia ................................................................................... 16
1.2. Dutch Colonial Period .................................................................................................................. 18
1.3. Indonesian National Movements................................................................................................ 22
1.4. The Japanese Occupation ............................................................................................................. 26
1.5. The Indonesian Revolution.......................................................................................................... 29
1.6. Conclusion ..................................................................................................................................... 32

CHAPTER II
THE SOCIO-POLITICAL HISTORY OF TANGERANG 1945-1946 ............................................. 35
2.1. ‘Tangerang di Persimpangan’: The Transition from the Japanese to the Indonesian
Government .......................................................................................................................................... 36
2.2. Tangerang after the Proclamation of Independence ................................................................ 41
2.3. Social Revolution in Tangerang, 1945 ........................................................................................ 47
2.5. Tangerang under Chaerun’s Administration ........................................................................... 50
2.6. The Return of the Tangerang Republic ...................................................................................... 55
2.7. Conclusion ..................................................................................................................................... 58

CHAPTER III
“NOW IS THE TIME TO KILL ALL CHINESE!”: THE MASSACRE OF CHINESE IN
TANGERANG, 1946 ............................................................................................................................... 61
3.1. Battle of Pesing and Cengkareng ................................................................................................ 61

2
 3.2. Pre-Massacre: Internal Meetings................................................................................................. 63
3.3. The Outbreak of the Massacre..................................................................................................... 67
3.4. The Losses ...................................................................................................................................... 75
3.5. Different Accounts, Different Interpretations ........................................................................... 77
3.6. Responses of Chinese-Indonesians Communities and Press .................................................. 82
3.7. Responses of Indonesian Officials .............................................................................................. 86
3.8. Responses of the Chinese Government...................................................................................... 91
3.9. Arms from China?......................................................................................................................... 96
3.10. Friend or foe: The Emergence of Pao An Tui in Java ............................................................. 98

EPILOGUE ............................................................................................................................................. 104

CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................................................... 114
BIBLIOGRAPHY................................................................................................................................... 120
APPENDIX ............................................................................................................................................. 126

3
 GLOSSARY OF FOREIGN TERMS, ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

Badan Perjuangan Struggle organization

Bapak Father
Barisan Banteng Wild Buffalo Corps
Bersiap To be ready, vigilant (used to characterize the early period
of the revolution)
BKR (Badan Keamanan Rakyat) People’s Security Coprs
Bupati Administrative head of kabupaten or regency
Camat Sub-district head, below wedana
Dewan Rakyat People’s Council
Guncho Sub-district level administration under Japanese
Haji Somebody who do pilgrimage to Mecca
Heiho Indonesian auxiliary forces under Japanese
Hizbullah Army of Allah (militia attached to Masyumi Party)
Hokokai Service association under Japanese
Jawara Bandit (Banten and Tangerang); lenggaong (Tiga Daerah)
Jus Sanguinis Nationality by descent
Kabupaten Regency, administrative division above district, under a
bupati
Kecamatan Administrative division, sub-district level, under a camat
Kedaulatan Rakyat People’s sovereignty
Kenpeitai Japanese military police
Kewedanaan District, administrative division, under a wedana
KNIP (Komite Nasional Indonesian National Committee
Indonesia Pusat)
KNIL (Koninklijke Nederlandsch Royal Netherlands Indies Army
Indisch Leger)
KNIDT (Komite Nasional Indonesia Indonesian National Committee of Region Tangerang
Daerah Tangerang
Kyai Title of respect for orthodox Moslem scholar or teacher
LPBM (Laskar Pasukan Berani Mati) Suicide army
Laskar Militia
Lurah Village chief
Merah-Putih Red and white, the Indonesian Republic’s flag

4
NICA Netherlands Indies Civil Administratiom
ORI (Oeang Republik Indonesia) Republic of Indonesia currency
Peranakan Chinese Indonesian of mixed ancestry; Indonesian-born
Chinese
Pangreh Pradja Administrative corps on Java
Perang Sabil Holy War
PARI (Partai Republik Indonesia) Republic of Indonesia Party
PARINDRA (Partai Indonesia Raya) Greater Indonesia Party
Patih Chief Minister of regent
Pemuda Youth, young people
Penghulu Head of religious officials at regency level (Java); lineage
head (West Sumatra)
Pesantren Religious boarding school
Perjuangan Struggle
Pesindo (Pemuda Sosialis Indonesia) Indonesian Socialist Youth
PETA (Pembela Tanah Air) Defenders of the Fatherland (volunteer army on Java
under Japanese)
PNI (Partai Nasional Indonesia) Indonesian Nationalist Party
Rakyat People
Sabilillah Path of Allah (Moslem militia)
Santri Strict or devout Moslem, also pupil in pesantren
SI (Sarekat Islam) Islamic League or Union
Seinendan Youth Corps (under Japanese)
Totok Pure Chinese; China-born Chinese
TKR (Tentara Keamanan Rakyat) People’s Security Army, People’s Salvation Army (name of
official Republican armed forces from October 1945-
January 1946)
TRI (Tentara Republik Indonesia) Army of the Indonesian Republic (name of official
Republican armed forces from January 1946-May 1947)
Ulama Islamic scholar
Wedana District head

5
 LIST OF TABLES, FIGURES, AND MAPS

Map 1. Location of Chinese Officers in the Netherlands Indies, 1867. .............................................................. 21

Map 2. Sarekat Islam membership, 1912-1916. ..................................................................................................... 23

Map. 3. Japanese conquest of the Netherlands Indies. ........................................................................................ 26
Map 4. Map showing the Japanese invasion to Tangerang, 1-7 March 1942. ................................................... 37
Map 5. Map of Tangerang made by Star Weekly when the massacre was still going on. ............................... 73

Figure 1. Announcement issued by People’s Council to encourage Indonesians with Japanese Military
training to join BKR. ................................................................................................................................................. 53
Figure 2. An official decree issued by TKR informing Readers of the return of Tangerang to the Indonesian
Republic………………………………………………………………………………………………………...……57

Figure 3. The remnants of Chinese dwellings in Tangerang. ............................................................................. 71

Figure 4. The remnants of a house in the interior of Tangerang. ....................................................................... 71
Figure 5. Chinese Refugees in Curug. .................................................................................................................... 74
Figure 6. An advertisement published in Star Weekly calling for the mourning of all Victims in Tangerang.
..................................................................................................................................................................................... 82
Figure 7. Consul General Tsiang Chia Tung……………………………………………………………………..92

Figure 8. The advertisement from Dutch newspaper about fancy fair in Batavia for the Chinese victims and
Pao An Tui. .............................................................................................................................................................. 100
Figure 9. The symbol of Pao An Tui. .................................................................................................................... 102
Figure 10. A caricature about Tangerang massacre published in Star Weekly. ............................................. 112

Table 1. Total Population of Tangerang (1930) ..................................................................................................... 35

Table 2. Information on Specific Areas in the Tangerang District until 16 June 1946 ..................................... 76
Table 3. The Chronology of Tangerang Occupation as Written by Ibrahim Abdoellah ................................. 77
Table 4. A List of Newspapers from the Indonesian Revolutionary Period Used ........................................... 79

6
 INTRODUCTION

“Tidak ada revolusi yang memakai sarung tangan sutra dan beludru.” 1

Anti-Chinese violence is not a new phenomenon in Indonesia, its roots traceable even
prior to to the birth of Indonesian nationalism in the early 20th century.2 Since the Dutch VOC
period, Chinese were often convenient scapegoats for the nation’s problems, becoming frequent
targets of rioting or robbery. Burning, looting and confiscating Chinese property was frequently
carried out by militant groups and ordinary Indonesians, whose hatred of the Chinese
transformed them into “a violent mob.”3 Several historians mark the Chinese massacre dating
back to 1740, when more than 10,000 Chinese were massacred in Batavia, as the beginning of a
series anti-Chinese violence in the later period of Indonesian history.

Thomas Lindblad and Freek Colombijn write of Indonesia as 'a violent country,' with anti-
Chinese violence within the country as an important issue to examine in the history of violence
in Indonesia. According to them, Chinese Indonesians suffered recurrent violent treatment
perpetrated both by state or society under various political regimes in the colonial and post-
colonial period.4

Violence against Chinese also marked the transition from the Dutch to the Japanese
government in Indonesia. During the vacuum of power that existed between the retreat of the
Dutch and the consolidation of Japanese rule, Indonesian extremists plundered, burned, and

1 “There is no such thing as a revolution using silk gloves and velvet.” Persahabatan Indonesia Tionghoa.
(Jakarta: Kementerian Penerangan, April 1946), 2.
2 Based on the definition given by the Merriam Wesbter Dictionary violence is interpreted with two
definitions: 1) Exertion of physical force so as to injure or abuse; 2) Injury by or as if by distortion,
infringement, or profanation.
3 Abidin Kusno, “Remembering/Forgetting the May Riots: Architecture, Violence and the Making of
‘Chinese Cultures in Post-1998 Jakarta,” Public Culture, Vol. 15. No. 1, (2003), 150.
4Freek Colombijn & J. Thomas Lindblad, “Introduction”, in Freek Colombijn & J. Thomas Lindblad (eds.),
Roots of Violence in Indonesia (Leiden: KITLV, 2002), 14-15.

7
looted Chinese homes and establishments en masse, aggravated by the ‘scorched-earth’ tactics of
the Dutch military.5 In Tangerang, such acts were termed penggedoran by the local people.6

The Indonesian Revolution years of 1945-1949 are considered the most violent eras in
modern Indonesian history. Taufik Abdullah describes the period as ‘multi-complex,’ as it was
not merely a period of decolonization, but also a time of “revolution full of social tensions and
political conflicts between social classes.”7 During this period, violence erupted unexpectedly in
many parts of the country. The main cities of Java and Sumatra became scenes of countless
kidnappings, disappearances, shootings, thefts, street fights, and murders, with former Dutch
internees systematically attacked and fired upon.8 For Leo Suryadinata, the Indonesian
revolutionary period was the genesis of modern anti-Chinese movements in Indonesia: “The
government had changed and were now in the hands of the ‘indigenous’ population, but the
economic factor, at the root of past conflicts, remained.”9

As a ‘remembered history,’ the Indonesian revolution is often remembered as a period of

upheaval (in Javanese, gegeran), marked by ousters, takeovers, and annexations, besides being
glorified as a moment of unified struggle in Indonesian history. Sartono posits that conflicts
between groups were inevitable, given the political crisis, and the government’s subsequent
inability to guarantee the safety of its citizens.10 Most contemporary Indonesian history textbooks
portray this episode as a heroic revolution, which saw the deaths of many revolutionaries at the
hands of the Allied Forces. While these facts are partially correct, these books are biased, and
indeed hide one of the darkest chapters of Indonesia’s struggle for independence, as they

5 Mary Somers Heidhues, “Anti-Chinese Violence in Java during the Indonesian Revolution, 1945-49,”
Journal of Genocide Research, Vol. 14, 383.
6 Herwin Sumarda, “Tangerang 1945-46: Pemerintahan dan Rakyat,” Skripsi Sarjana FSUI, (1969), 43.
7In Soejatno & Benedict Anderson, “Revolution and Social Tensions in Surakarta 1945-1950,” Indonesia, No.
17, (April 1974), 104.
8Peter Post, "Historical Overview: Introduction," in Peter Post (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Indonesia in the
Pacific War (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2010), 20
9Leo Suryadinata, “Anti-Chinese Actions in Southeast Asia: In Search of Causes and Solutions,” in Dewi
Fortuna Anwar (eds.), Violent Internal Conflicts in Asia Pacific (Jakarta: Yayasan Obor Indonesia, 2005), 155.
10Sartono Kartodirdjo, “Wajah Revolusi Indonesia Dipandang dari Perspektivisme Struktural”, Prisma,
Vol. X, No. 8, (August 1981), 3.

8
conveniently omit the fact that radical Indonesian nationalists were also involved in assaulting,
kidnapping and murdering civilians, particularly the Chinese and Indo-Europeans.

A number of scholars have tried to seek a comprehensive explanation concerning why

Chinese were specifically targeted, instead of other ethnic groups. Various historians have put
forth the ‘middleman minorities’ theory. The theory argues that Chinese were positioned as a
buffer or intermediary between colonial elite and society, as they engaged in trading and
distributing merchandise produced by members of the dominant group to other customers.11 As
a result, the Chinese were often used as scapegoats by the elite to prevent riots. The Chinese
middleman became a perfect target because they were seen as ‘elite-collaborators,’ ‘a powerless
community,’ and in some cases ‘infidels.’ 12 According to the theory, the position of Chinese
Indonesians as the trading class and persecuted minority is similar to that of the Jews in Europe,
the Indians in East Africa, the Arabs in West Africa, and the Vietnamese in the former Indo-
China.13

Case Study: Tangerang

On 15 May 1946 the Allied Forces dropped pamphlets from the air onto onderdistrict
Serpong, ordering people who lived near the Cisadane River to move at least two kilometers to
the west by 17 May 1946. Several meetings were held by Komite Nasional Indonesia Tangerang
(Indonesian National Committee of Tangerang/KNIT), together with Laskar Rakyat and Tentara

11Mely Tan argues that the concept of "middleman minority" has been developed by Blalock, Jr. These are
minorities who "occupy intermediate positions owing to a competitive advantage or a high adaptive
capacity. Such minorities are often associated with special occupational niches by virtue of a combination
of circumstances, plus a cultural heritage that has been used as an adaptive mechanism over a prolonged
period." As examples of this group he mentions the history of the Jews in Europe, the Chinese in Southeast
Asia, East Indians in Burma and South Africa. Blalock's ideas have been further developed in Turner and
Bonacich, in which they propose a composite theory developing 9 propositions to account for the
conditions promoting the (1) concentration of ethnic populations in middle-rank economic roles, (2)
development of patterns of intragroup solidarity, (3) hostility from the non-ethnic population. These
propositions can be applied to the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia, at least for the beginning of the formation
of the community. See Huber M. Blalock, Toward a Theory of Minority Group Relations (Wiley and Sons, 1967);
Jonathan Turner and Edna Bonacich, "Toward a Composite Theory of Middleman Minorities," Ethnicity,
(1980), 144-58.
12 Jemma Purdey, Anti-Chinese Violence in Indonesia, 1996-1999 (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2005), 24-25.
13Mely G. Tan, "The Role of Ethnic Chinese Minority in Development: The Indonesian Case," Southeast
Asian Studies, Vol. 25. No. 3. (December 1987), 66.

9
Republic Indonesia (the Army of Indonesian Republic/TRI) to discuss the possible courses of
action regarding the Dutch order to turn the area by the Cisadane River into a Niemandsland (no
man’s land). On 28 May 1946, several Muslim groups, together with laskar, jawara, and the
Tangerang locals decided to carry out a ‘Perang Sabil’ (Holy War).14

Following the occupation of Tangerang by Allied troops, the situation of Chinese in the
interior of Tangerang worsened, with many of them robbed, raped and even killed.15 Residences
were looted, and residents burned alive in their homes.16 Every grown man was slain in the most
heavily populated Chinese town in Tangerang. In almost every suburb of Tangerang, the rights
of innocent Chinese were violated.17

This thesis focuses on the Tangerang massacre between late May and June 1946, whose
victims were mainly Chinese. To date, no one has taken up the challenge of specifically studying
this event. While the massacre is briefly acknowledged in various publications, it has never been
analyzed thoroughly.18 Therefore, this thesis aims to fill that historiographical gap and outline
the complex background of the massacre.

Two questions will be raised in this thesis: (1) What factors caused the Tangerang
massacre?; and (2) Why were Chinese the primary target of the massacre? This thesis attempts to
compare and reconcile the ways that numerous accounts interpret the massacre. Why, for
instance, were the number of casualties given by Republican and Dutch accounts different? To
answer those questions, I will try to examine the background of Tangerang and the relationship
between the Chinese and the local population in the period leading up to and during the
Indonesian revolution time.

14 Algemene Secretarie en de Daarbij Gedeponeerde Archieven (1942-1950). Inv. Nr. 5521

15 Star Weekly, 9 June 1946.
16 Star Weekly, 9 June 1946.
17 Star Weekly, 16 June 1946
18Some authors like Mary Somers Heidhues, Richard McMillan or Matia Madjiah write a small piece about
Tangerang massacre in their books. See Mary Somers Heidhues, "Citizenship and Identity: Ethnic Chinese
and the Indonesian Revolution," in Jennifer Cushman and Wang Gungwu (eds.), Changing Identities of the
Southeast Asian Chinese since World War II (Hongkong: Hongkong University Press, 1988); Richard
McMillan, The British Occupation of Indonesia, 1945-1946 (London and New York: Routledge, 2005); Matia
Madjiah, Kisah Seorang Dokter Gerilya dalam Revolusi Kemerdekaan di Banten (Jakarta: Sinar Harapan, 1986)

10
 This thesis argues that several factors contribute to the outbreak of the violence. The roots
of violence were embedded among the different communities in Tangerang. Furthermore, this
study places the violence against Chinese in Tangerang in a broader paradigm of violence by
tracing the roots of anti-Chinese violence in Indonesia to the colonial period. Ultimately, it argues
that anti-Chinese violence in Indonesia cannot be understood from a single perspective.

The Tangerang massacre is a curious and interesting event for many reasons: First, the
Chinese are usually considered an apolitical community, and thus seen only as the victims in
many riots. However, the case of Tangerang is unique because it led to the emergence of Pao An
Tui (Chinese Security Force, PAT), a semi-military army, just a few months after the massacre
occurred. Several Chinese organizations also attempted to bring the issue to the attention of the
UN thus strengthening China’s relations with Chinese-Indonesians. Thus, it subverts the notion
that the Chinese were a powerless community that could not speak for themselves.

Second, most of the books and articles written on the subject point to the Chinese
collaboration with the Dutch as the sole motive for the massacre.19 Was it true that many Chinese
involved were willing to serve the Dutch? If so, was it for prestige, economy, or safety?

Third, the Tangerang incident also triggered worldwide responses. China, who considered
Chinese Indonesians as their citizens based on the principle of jus sanguinis20, started to pay more
attention to the plight of the Chinese community in Indonesia. At the same time, both Republicans
and Allies attempted to justify what already happened in Tangerang. Those responses will be
examined in this thesis.

19See Rosihan Anwar, Kisah-kisah Zaman Revolusi: Kenang-kenangan Seorang Wartawan 1946-1949 (Jakarta:
Pustaka Jaya, 1975); Herwin Sumarda, “Tangerang 1945-46: Pemerintahan dan Rakyat,” Skripsi Sarjana
FSUI, 1969.
20At the beginning of the 19th century China started to realize and pay attention to the fate of Chinese
overseas (hoakiao), particularly in Southeast Asia. The Chinese Emperor made a number of laws to regulate
this policy, which in fact was quite contrary with the policy of the former Chinese emperors. The act is
based on the principle jus sanguinis that recognizes every Chinese person, both inside and outside the
country, as a citizen of China. Leo Suryadinata, Politik Tionghoa Peranakan di Jawa (Jakarta: Sinar Harapan,
1994), 25.

11
Previous Related Studies

The study of anti-Chinese violence is unpopular among Indonesian scholars and does not
get vast attention of foreign scholars either. Nevertheless, some exceptions should be pointed out,
such as the works of Jamie Mackie,21 Mary Somers Heidhues,22 and Jemma Purdey.23

Leo Suryadinata has been prolific in his study of the role of the Chinese during the colonial
period. In his book Peranakan Chinese Politics in Java 1917-42,24 Suryadinata provides a useful
chronological approach to the development of three Chinese political streams in Indonesia. The
first was the China-oriented Sin Po group, which began its political activities with the creation in
Batavia in October 1910 of a weekly called Sin Po or ‘The New Newspaper’ (becoming a daily in
1912 soon after the establishment of the Republic of China). The second was the Dutch Indies-
oriented Chung Hwa Hui (CHH) or ‘Chinese Association’, which was founded by Dutch-
educated and well-to-do peranakan Chinese in 1928, and began its life as a Semarang-based
political organization. The third was the Indonesia-oriented Partai Tionghoa Indonesia (PTI)
formed by Liem Koen Hian in 1932 in Surabaya. Suryadinata analyzes the rise, development and
rivalries of these three political streams that characterized the political life of the Javanese Chinese
peranakan society between the two World Wars. His work focuses on the struggle among them,
and analyzes the difficult relationship between peranakan and the Indonesian nationalist
movement.

Both W.F. Wertheim and The Siauw Giap argue that economic competition—particularly
the role of Chinese Indonesians as middlemen—was the sole cause of anti-Chinese violence in
Indonesia.25 Wertheim says that economic factors dominated relations between Chinese
Indonesians and the Indonesian majority, and concludes that anti-Chinese violence occurred

21 J.A.C. Mackie (eds.), The Chinese in Indonesia Five Essays (Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, 1976).
22Mary Somers Heidhues, "Anti-Chinese in Java during the Indonesian Revolution," Journal of Genocide
Research, Vol. 14, No. 3-4, (1 November 2012), 381-401.
23Jemma Purdey, Anti-Chinese Violence in Indonesia, 1996–1999 (Singapore: Singapore University Press,
2006).
24Leo Suryadinata, Peranakan Chinese Politics in Java, 1917-1942 (Singapore: Singapore University Press,
1981)
25Wim Wertheim, East-West Parallels (Van Hoeve: The Hague, 1964); The Siauw Giap, "Group Conflict in a
Plural Society, Anti-Chinese Riots in Indonesia: The Sukabumi (1963) and Kudus (1918) Incidents," Revue
du Sudest Asiatique, Vol. 2, (1966), 1-31.

12
predominantly during periods of economic crisis or transition: "It is economic competition,
institutionalized in line with the traditional patterns of group definition, which is at the root of
our problem.”26

Mary Somers Heidhues’s work devotes a small section of her book to anti-Chinese
violence in Tangerang in 1946. Like Wertheim, she argues that the anti-Chinese incidents from
the 1940s-1960s were often triggered by economic exploitation, competition, or jealousy.
However, according to Somers, the methods employed within Indonesian society to stir up anti-
Chinese sentiment were more varied, and included religion, tribalism, and nationalism. She
concludes that converting anti-Chinese sentiment into violent attacks on Chinese-owned
property, “to them the symbol of Chinese economic power,” demonstrated the dominance of
economic factors.27

Many academics have conducted research on the social revolution in Indonesia. In his
book, Bandung in the Early Revolution, 1945-1946, John Smail attempts to see the Revolution from
a local vantage point: the city of Bandung and the surrounding rural areas. Smail deals
extensively with the social changes and shifts in power in Bandung, which was accompanied by
the kidnappings and murders of Eurasians and Chinese, along with a steady influx of refugees.
Ultimately he argues that the Indonesian Revolution was not only a nationalist, anti-colonial
struggle, but a revolution within the revolution as well, with strong social undertones.28

Michael Williams, in his book Communism, Religion and Revolt in Banten, attributes the
Banten revolts of 1988, 1926 and 1945 to the potent combination of communism and religion. The
greater part of the book is devoted to the 1926 uprising, which according to Williams related to
economic aspects like poor soil, low yielding land, and heavy taxation. The book argues that
opposition to taxation escalated into rebellion out of the belief that the colonial
oppressors/infidels could be overthrown, and taxation ended under the promised new order.
Williams shows how Islam played an important role in the proliferation of ideas in Banten

26
Wim Wertheim, East-West Parallels…81.
27
Mary Somers, Peranakan Chinese Politics in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University, Modern Indonesia
Project, 1964), 46.
28John Smail, Bandung in the Early Revolution, 1945-1946: A Study in the Social History of the Indonesian
Revolution (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1964).

13
society, with many hajj in Banten residing in the Middle East before returning to Banten with pan-
Islamic, anti-colonial, and anti-imperialist ideas.29

Sources and Methodology

Most of the sources used in this thesis come from memoranda, newspapers, and other
archival records. The archival records used in this research include: Algemene Secretarie van de
Nederlands-Indische Regering en de daarbij Gedeponeerde archieven, (1922) 1944-1950, 2.10.14;
Procureur-Generaal bij het Hooggerechtshof van Nederlands-Indië, (1936) 1945-1949 (1969), 2.10.17;
Ministerie van Koloniën: Dossierarchief 1945-1963, 2.10.54; Marine en Leger Inlichtingendienst, de
Netherlands Forces Intelligence Service en de Centrale Militaire Inlichtingendienst in Nederlands-Indië,
2.10.62; Strijdkrachten in Nederlands-Indië, (1938 - 1939) 1941 - 1957 [1960], 2.13.132.

Different Dutch, Chinese, and Indonesian newspapers are used in this paper because
when public records and state archives were ‘silenced’, there is one type of source which does not
suffer from any of the restrictions that kept death records hidden from public scrutiny:
newspapers. Sin Po, Keng Po, Star Weekly, the ‘Chinese peranakan newspaper’30 are used to see
Chinese responses to the massacre; De Vrije Pers, De Locomotief, Het Nieuws van den Dag, and Het
Dagblad, Dutch newspapers with their headquarters in Indonesia, are used to see Dutch
responses. For Indonesian responses, newspapers written in the vernacular will be examined,
such as Merdeka, Soeloeh Merdeka and Gelora Rakyat. For other perspectives, Australian and
Singaporean newspapers such as The Straits Times, The Singaporean Free Press, and Sydney Morning
Herald, will be examined. This paper does not intend to discredit Indonesians or their roles during
the revolution, but to offer an alternative analysis of the Tangerang massacre, and to eliminate
the misconceptions that the Chinese were ‘economic animals’ with no political power.

29 Michael Williams, Communism, Religion and Revolt in Banten (Athens: Ohio University Center for
International Studies, 1990).
30Peranakan newspapers were owned by Chinese born in Indonesia, who often of mixed Chinese and
Indonesian descent and to some degree assimilated to local culture. Leo Suryadinata, “Pre-War Indonesian
Nationalism & the Peranakan Chinese”, Indonesia, (Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1971), 83-84.

14
Chapter Descriptions

This thesis is divided into three chapters. The first chapter will contextualize the roots of
anti-Chinese violence in Indonesia by tracing the socioeconomic positions of Chinese in the
colonial period. It attempts to show that violence against Chinese is not incidental, as its roots
were already embedded within the community.

The second chapter seeks to examine the sociopolitical transition of Tangerang from the
late Japanese occupation until the restoration of the Republic in Tangerang. This chapter will
elaborate on the complexity of the area, and the significant role of Islamic groups in Tangerang.

The third chapter reconstructs the events of the Tangerang massacre. The chapter is
divided chronologically, discussing events prior to the massacre, during the massacre, and
afterwards. The response of Chinese peranakan, Dutch, Republican, and foreign media regarding
the massacre itself will also be examined. Furthermore, the political responses of the Chinese
community in Indonesia, the Dutch, Indonesian, and Chinese governments will be explored in
this chapter. This chapter will end with an examination of Pao An Tui (Chinese Security Corps)
that proliferated in Java soon after the massacre.

15
 CHAPTER I

ROOTS OF ANTI-CHINESE VIOLENCE IN INDONESIA

The Chinese in Indonesia were, and are, a small, heterogeneous, and complex minority.
They are as diverse as the Indonesian archipelago itself. According to Anthony Reid, the Chinese
were already residing in Indonesia as early as the end of the 13th century, part of the invading
Mongol army that entered Java in 1293. Some of the troops opted to remain in Java, and were
among the first Chinese that settled in this Island.31 In the colonial era, they served as
intermediaries between the Indonesians and Dutch, purchasing goods for resale to the latter for
export, and buying products from Dutch importers for resale to the Indonesians. Peter Carey
argues that before the coming of the Dutch to Indonesia, the Chinese Indonesian community had
a harmonious relationship with indigenous Indonesians, and contributed to agricultural and
culinary development in Indonesia.32

As already mentioned in introduction, the history of Chinese in Indonesia is also

inseparable from persecution and violence. Thus, this chapter aims to see why violence against
Chinese was so prevalent in Indonesia. In order to answer this, the position of the colonial state
must be seen juxtaposed with the local Indonesian communities. Furthermore this chapter also
outlines several anti-Chinese riots during the colonial period, and the roots of and catalysts for
these riots. In order to understand how physical violence operated within the political system,
some background knowledge of colonial society is necessary, as is an understanding of the
Chinese Indonesian communities in Indonesia under the Dutch colonizers, during the Indonesian
National Movement, the Japanese occupation, and the Indonesian revolutionary period.

1.1. Chinese Communities in Southeast Asia

Historians have attempted to draw parallels between the Chinese community in

Indonesia with Chinese communities elsewhere in Southeast Asia. Leo Suryadinata points out

31Anthony Reid, “The Rise and Fall of Sino-Javanese Shipping,” in Geoff Wade (eds.) China and Southeast
Asia. (London: Routledge, 2009), 74.
32Peter Carey, "Changing Javanese Perceptions of the Chinese Communities in Central Java, 1755-1825,"
Indonesia, Vol. 37, (1984), 3-5.

16
that in the entirety of Southeast Asia, cases of anti-Chinese violence have taken place most
frequently in Indonesia. This statement is echoed by Onghokham, who adds that that Indonesia’s
postwar history has been more violent than those of its neighbors: Singapore, Malaysia and
Thailand.33 However, it must be noted that the majority of conflicts during the colonial period
were primarily between the Dutch East Indies authorities and the Chinese. Conflicts between
Chinese and native population are considerably less common.34

Charles Coppel’s work draws comparisons between the Chinese in Indonesia and the
Chinese in the Philippines. In the Philippines, the Spanish colonial government created four main
racial classifications: (1) Spanish and mestizo Spanish; (2) Indios; (3) Chinese; and (4) Mestizo
Chinese. Mestizo Chinese35 were separated from ‘pure’ Chinese, though they were afforded
certain privileges, such as property ownership and the freedom to live wherever they desired.36

Unlike in the Philippines, where the ethnic Chinese were treated as a ‘special kind of
native’ by the Spanish colonials, in the Dutch East Indies they were treated as a ‘special kind of
Chinese.’37 Chinese in Indonesia were included in one category by the Indies government,
without differentiating between their roots as Chinese 'totok' or 'peranakan.'38

33 Onghokham, “Anti-Chinese Roots, Jakarta Post, 1 June 1998.

34The most notorious violence that perpetrated by colonizers perhaps the 1740 massacre in Batavia and the
1762 Red Christmas Affair in the Philippines. In the Philippines the riot was triggered by a decision of the
Spanish authorities to introduce heavy taxes and strict rules on the Chinese community. The Chinese in
Guagua (Pampanga), collaborated with the British soldiers, prepared to launch attack to massacre the
Spaniards on 24 December 1762. The plan was revealed by the Spaniards and Governor General Simon de
Anda led his troops to Guagua to crush the Chinese Rebels. A similar situation also occurred in Batavia
where the Dutch decided to implement harsh measures against the Chinese during the time of economic
crisis in Batavia. In both affairs, thousands of Chinese were slaughtered after being accused of planning a
rebellion against the colonial government. Christine Halili, Philippine History (Manila: Rex Book Store,
2004), 100; Leonard Blusse, Strange Company: Chinese Settlers, Mestizo Women and the Dutch in VOC Batavia
(Amsterdam: Foris Publications, 1986), 94-96.
‘Mestizo’ was a racial term used to denote a person of mixed parentage, who had at least one parent who
35

was Spanish.
36Charles Coppel “Kendala-kendala Sejarah dalam Penerimaan Etnis Cina di Indonesia yang
Multikultural” in Antropologi Indonesia. (Jakarta: University Indonesia, 2003), 16-18.
37As cited in Filomeno Aguilar, “Citizenship, Inheritance, and the Indigenizing of “Orang Chinese” in
Indonesia.” Positions (3), (2001), 505. The original idea was introduced by Mary Somers Heidhues.
38Peranakan Chinese are Chinese born in Indonesia (often of mixed Chinese and Indonesian descent), and
they are to some degree assimilated to local culture. Totok Chinese, by contrast, are recent immigrants, and

17
 In the case of Malaysia, there have been fewer anti-Chinese riots than in other former
colonies in Southeast Asia. The biggest riot was the May 1969 riot that took place after the general
elections, owing to the fact that “the Malay-dominated Alliance Party won but with a reduced
margin, while the Chinese-based opposition parties picked up additional votes and seats.”
Physical clashes resulted in about 200 casualties and another several hundred seriously injured.39

1.2. Dutch Colonial Period

It is imperative to understand the economic context of the Chinese in Indonesia during

the colonial period in order to understand their political position. The Chinese, it is generally
acknowledged, were important trading partners of the Dutch since the early days of the Dutch
East Indies Company (VOC). Their position as middlemen and retailers were extremely
important to the Dutch.

The 17th century marked what Anthony Reid calls the emergence of the Chinese as
‘brokers to the expanding state.’40 Not only did they function as intermediary businessmen, some
of them were also involved in revenue farming, a system that reached its peak in the 19 th
century.41 Between 1677 and 1777 the Dutch East Indies Company extended its political and
economic domination over Java, and the Dutch colonials used the ethnic Chinese to collect taxes
from the indigenous population, and to run colonial enterprises. Interestingly, “the system of
assigning farming revenues to Chinese appears to have been copied by Javanese rulers in the
1680s directly from the Dutch practice, no doubt encouraged by the Chinese entrepreneurs who
spread inland from the Dutch-governed coastal towns.”42

they remain culturally and linguistically oriented toward China. Leo Suryadinata, “Pre-War Indonesian
Nationalism & The Peranakan Chinese”, Indonesia, Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, (1971), 83-84.
39Leon Comber, 13 May 1969: A Historical Survey of Sino Malay Relations (Kuala Lumpur: Heinemann Asia,
1983).
40Anthony Reid, “Entrepreneurial Minorities, Nationalism, and the State,” in Daniel Chirot and Anthony
Reid, (eds.) Essential Outsiders: Chinese and Jews in the Modern Transformation of Southeast Asia and Central
Europe (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997), 43.
41 Anthony Reid, “Entrepreneurial Minorities…” 44.
42 Anthony Reid, “Entrepreneurial Minorities…” 45.

18
 Subsequently, economic policy during this period still favored the Chinese, and they
would again play an important role in accelerating the Indies economy, with Chinese retailers
and entrepreneurs spread throughout the whole Island. The indebtedness of the peasantry to the
figure of the Chinese moneylender was also apparent, and saw an increase during this period.
The colonizers also gave the Chinese shares in the lucrative opium trade at the expense of native
entrepreneurs.1 The Chinese also received privileges in other fields, such as running gambling
houses or ferries. Many of them also involved in money lending and the supply of rural credit.2

By the early 1900s, a few years after the ‘ethical policy’3 had been implemented by the
Dutch, many Chinese businesses were forced to close, and hundreds of Chinese lost their jobs as
a consequence of the termination of the revenue farming system by the Dutch.4 This ethical policy
became a catalyst for the creation of new political changes. The Chinese were no longer needed
as tax collectors nor as financiers. By 1904, the tables had been turned, with the Dutch depriving
the Chinese of their monopolies on leases, pawn shops, and the opium trade, and implementing
a policy of protection for the native peasantry. Travel and residence restrictions implemented by
the Indies Government were only lifted between 1904 and 1911, and only due to continuing
pressure from the Chinese. Moreover, the Chinese became more vulnerable due to the jealousy
from the native population, as they were deemed to be the main obstacle to the economic
advancement of the native population.5

1 Robert Hefner, “Introduction: Multiculturalism and Citizenship in Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia’
in Robert Hefner (ed.), The Politics of Multiculturalism, Pluralism and Citizenship in Malaysia, Singapore, and
Indonesia (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2001), 17-19.
2 Charles Coppel, “Patterns of Political Activity in Indonesia,” in J.A.C. Mackie (eds.), The Chinese in
Indonesia: Five Essays (Melbourne: Nelson, 1976), 24.
3This policy highlighted the moral duty of the colonial government to the people of the Netherlands Indies
and introduced further government involvement in economic and social affairs. Ethical policy included
improvements to education, health care and irrigation, most of these changes, however, were aimed at
meeting the needs of Dutch capital in Indonesia, instead of genuinely advancing the Indonesian society.
See Chee Kiong Tong, Identity and Ethnic Relations in Southeast Asia: Racializing Chineseness (Springer, 2011),
114.
4 Lea Williams, Overseas Chinese Nationalism: The Genesis of the Pan-Chinese Movement in Indonesia, 1900–1916
(IL: Free Press, 1960), 26-27.
5Pramoedya Ananta Toer, The Chinese in Indonesia: An English translation of Hoakiau di Indonesia, translated
into English by M. Lane; M. Redway, T.D. Feng (eds.); with contributed essays from K.S. Jomo et al.,
(Singapore: Select Pub, 2007), 139.

19
 In addition, one reason that may also explain the prevalence of animosity against the
Chinese in Indonesia was the purposeful racial segregation of Chinese from other ethnic groups,
which classified them as 'Foreign Orientals,' a term that, according to Coppel6 emphasized the
‘foreignness’ of Chinese people.7 This system of class stratification started in Batavia, and soon
spread to other cities in Java; by 1850, it was already a fixture in Javanese society.8

Onghokham views the segregation as “…an embryonic form of what later became known
in South Africa as apartheid, and which now has pariah status among the world’s political
ideologies.”9 Daniel Lev argues that segregation only accelerated the process of categorizing the
ethnic Chinese as a minority in Indonesia,10 but, according to Furnivall, did not bring about an
integrated society, instead forming a three-tiered plural society that was divided by economic
class and role. Furnivall defined a ‘plural society’ as one with “…different sections of the
community living side by side, but separately, within the same political unit.”11 Under this social
system, Chinese Indonesians’ interactions with the indigenous populations were limited.

6Charles Coppel, “The Indonesian Chinese: ‘Foreign Orientals’, Netherlands Subjects, and Indonesian
Citizens,” in M. Barry Hooker (eds.), Law and the Chinese in Southeast Asia (Singapore: ISEAS, 2002), 133.
7 The racial classifications was based on the regeeringsreglement of 1854, subjecting Chinese as Vreemde
Oosterlingen (Foreign Orientals), together with Arabs, Indians, Japanese, and other foreign Asians. Based
on that law, Europeans were placed on the top of the social layer with a legal status different from those
categorized as Native. The latter formed the lowest strata in the society in Java during that period.
Meanwhile, the Chinese, together with the Arabs and the Indians, were categorized as ‘those equated to
the Natives.’ The Chinese shared the same public law as 'natives' and were tried in the same courts with
regard to criminal procedure. Eric Tagliocozzo argues that this legal bifurcation showed that in the eyes of
the colonial state, the 'Foreign Orientals' are both to be feared and controlled, and at the same time engaged
for commercial profit. Eric Tagliocozzo, Secret Trades, Porous Borders: Smuggling and States along a Southeast
Asian Frontier 1865-1915 (Yale University Press, 2009), 130.
8Wim Wertheim, Indonesian Society in Transition: A Study of Social Change (The Hague: Van Hoeve, 1959),
137.
9 Onghokham, “Anti-Chinese Roots,” Jakarta Post, 1 June 1998.
10Daniel Lev, "Politik Minoritas: Minoritas Dalam Politik" [Minority Politics: Minorities in Politics] part of
a seminar entitled Orang Indonesia-Tionghoa: Manusia dan Kebudayaannya [Chinese Indonesians: Their
Humanity and Culture], Jakarta 31 October to 2 November 2000.
J.S. Furnivall, Colonial Policy and Practice: A Comparative Study of Burma and Netherlands India (Cambridge:
11

Cambridge University Press, 1948), 304.

20
 Moreover, according to Robert Hefner, the ethnic distinction in the Dutch East Indies
became one of the most enduring legacies that has affected Indonesian society until the present.12

In assigning different ethnic groups to specialized positions in everything from agriculture to the
opium trade, the Europeans crystallized the most essential of supra-ethnic categories: the
distinction between indigenous Melayu-Indonesian “children of the soil” (Malay, bumiputera,
Indonesian, pribumi) and “non-indigenous” or immigrant Asians (Indians and, especially,
Chinese). This latter distinction was to be one of the most enduring categorical legacies of the
colonial era (Hefner 2001:19).

Following the 1740 Chinese uprising in Batavia, the colonial government began to apply
a policy that made it easier to control Chinese activities. The policy was called wijkenstelsel, and
forbade the Chinese from settling in areas outside the district specifically designed for them. In
the case of Batavia, the Chinese were relocated to Glodok, a district to the south of the city. Every
‘ghetto’ was led by a Chinese leader called kapitan and usually the kapitan came from a noble
Chinese family. The wijkenstelsel was not abolished until 1905.13

Map 1. Location of Chinese Officers in the Netherlands Indies, 1867. Source: Robert Cribb, Historical Atlas
of Indonesia (NIAS Press, 2000). Map Number: 4.40.

12Robert Hefner, ‘Introduction: Multiculturalism and Citizenship in Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia’
in Robert Hefner, (eds.) The Politics of Multiculturalism, Pluralism and Citizenship in Malaysia, Singapore, and
Indonesia (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2001), 19.
13Mona Lohanda, The Kapitan Cina of Batavia, 1837-1942: A History of Chinese Establishment on Colonial Society
2nd edition. (Jakarta: Penerbit Djambatan, 2001), 18-19.

21
The policy of segregation also dictated such symbolic and bodily matters as dress. The Chinese
were forbidden to dress like Europeans or the natives. Men were forced to wear their hair in the
Manchu queue style, and both sexes were required to wear traditional Chinese clothing. These
racial distinctions were constructed openly in Dutch colonial society. Additionally, a passenstelsel
(pass system) was required for Chinese to travel outside their allocated zone. Constraining the
Chinese in a ghetto resulted in the development of Chinatowns, and this ghettoization greatly
contributed to the stereotyping of the Chinese as ‘the other’. The separation policy inevitably
strengthened the animosity between each ethnic group.

1.3. Indonesian National Movements

The perceived othering of the Chinese is intimately linked with the evolution of the
Indonesian nationalist movements in the first half of the 20th century. Although this period is
crucial, as it marked the emergence of indigenous social organizations and groups such as Budi
Utomo (Noble Endeavour), Pemuda Indonesia (Indonesian Youth), and Sarekat Islam (SI, Islamic
Union), it is telling that they did not permit Chinese Indonesians to join as regular members. Even
the PNI (Nationalist Party) formed by Sukarno in 1926 admitted Chinese only as observers. The
exceptions to this exclusivity were the Indische Partij of Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo, Douwes
Dekker, Ki Hajar Dewantara, and Amir Syarifuddin’s left-wing Partindo (Partai Indonesia),
which accepted Chinese and other ethnic minorities as members.

On the one hand, the idea of Indonesia as it began to be imagined in the first decades of
the 20th century emphasized ‘the notion of an Indonesian ‘racial identity’ that exclusively
included the ‘indigenous Indonesians,’14 but on the other hand the nationalist movements of this
period emphasized racial differences, and encouraged competition between ethnic Chinese and
non-Chinese.15 As a consequence of being largely excluded from the Indonesian political sphere,

14 Robert Elson, The Idea of Indonesia: A History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 78.
15Mary Somers Heidhues, "Indonesia" in Lynn Pan (ed.) Encyclopedia of the Chinese Overseas (Surrey:
Curzon, 1999), 184.

22
Liem Koen Hian decided to establish Partai Tionghoa Indonesia (PTI/Chinese Indonesian Party)
in order to expedite the progress of the independence movement.16

Sarekat Islam (Islamic Union), established in 1912 partly as a response to Chinese economic
domination, exacerbated already tense relationships between the Chinese and the indigenous
population.17 The organization aimed to promote indigenous business, and sought to protect
‘indigenous’ traders from the Chinese, who were ‘harming’ their businesses, particularly in the
batik and kretek cigarette industries.18 Membership was limited to the Javanese; needless to say,
Chinese Indonesians were not permitted to join.19 By 1918 Sarekat Islam had more than two
million members throughout the archipelago.20

Map 2. Sarekat Islam Membership, 1912-1916. Source: Robert Cribb, Historical Atlas of Indonesia (NIAS
Press, 2000). Map Number: 4.75.

16Leo Suryadinata, Peranakan Chinese Politics in Java, 1917-42 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Studies),
1976.
17The original name of the movement was Sarekat Dagang Islam (SDI), or Islamic Trade Union, which
reflects the non-political beginnings of the organization. SDI was founded by Haji Samanhudi, a
businessman, in 16 October 1905.
18Mary Somers Heidhues, "Indonesia" in Lynn Pan (ed.) Encyclopedia of the Chinese Overseas (Surrey:
Curzon, 1999), 154-155; Judith Nagata “Post Orde Baru: Can Religion Contribute to a New Civil Society in
Indonesia?’ in Andi Faisal Bakti (eds.), Good Governance and Conflict Resolution in Indonesia (Jakarta: IAIN
Press, 2000), 227.
19Leo Suryadinata, Pribumi Indonesians, The Chinese Minority and China (Singapore: Heinemann Asia, 1992),
15.
Audrey Kahin, “Introduction,” in Audrey Kahin (eds.), Regional Dynamics of the Indonesian Revolution:
20

Unity from Diversity (Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press, 1985), 3.

23
 Sarekat Islam’s existence was an indicator of the deep-set problems between the Chinese
and the Indonesians. George Kahin explains that SI "was seen by Indonesians in general,
regardless of their economic function, as a symbol of religious -and thereby of Indonesian- unity
against foreigners, at first especially Chinese."21 According to Kees van Dijk, it was a time when
“slumbering anti-Chinese feelings manifested themselves in a concrete form all over Java for the
first time in the twentieth century.”22 As the group’s influence grew in Indonesia, anti-Chinese
violence was taking place in Solo and Surabaya. Under this antagonistic relationship, previously
existing interethnic engagement and cooperation between Chinese and indigenous Indonesians
disintegrated.

The first of the massive clashes between SI and the Chinese occurred on 31 October 1918
in the town of Kudus. An outbreak of Spanish influenza made the Chinese community in Kudus
initiate a toapekong procession to counter the disease. According to SI, the Chinese had mocked
Islam by dressing in the hajj uniform, while the Chinese argued that SI had mocked their ritual
procession first. This resulted in a massive riot which killed 16 people on both sides. SI then
incited people to burn and loot the houses of the Chinese. 40 houses were destroyed, including
some Chinese temples.23

The rise of SI, with its anti-Chinese character, is arguably related to a wider emergence of
violence against the Chinese community in Indonesia. Prior to the founding of the organization,
no significant anti-Chinese disturbances occurred. Reports from Dutch officials suggest this:
“before the founding of SI the relation between Javanese and Chinese were cordial, and were
characterized by mutual help and toleration.”24

Sartono Kartodirdjo attributes the antagonism against the ethnic Chinese in the early 20th
century and the anti-Chinese rhetoric of the SI to the rise of Muslim traders and the ideology
espoused by SI. As Muslim Javanese traders began to establish themselves in Surakarta and other

21George McTurnan Kahin. Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell Univerity Press, 1952),
67.
22Kees Van Dijk, “The Good, The Bad and The Ugly. Explaining the Unexplainable: amuk massa in
Indonesia.” In Roots of Violence in Indonesia, edited by Freek Colombijn and J. Thomas Lindblad (Leiden:
KITLV Press, 2002), 277-297.
23 Benny Setiono, Tionghoa dalam Pusaran Politik (Jakarta: TransMedia Pustaka, 2008), 383–387.
Sartono Kartodirdjo, Protest Movements in Rural Java: A Study of Agrarian Unrest in the Nineteenth and Early
24

Twentieth Centuries (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1973), 151 & 161.

24
cities on Java at the beginning of the 20th century, they felt threatened by their Chinese
competitors who dominated typical Javanese industries, such as Batik. As this coincided with the
widespread consciousness of Indonesian nationalism among the indigenous population, these
Javanese traders regarded their competition with the Chinese as a competition between
Indonesians and foreign people.25

Moreover, the situation was aggravated by a growing discourse on religious divisions

between Muslims and Non-Muslims, which was also promoted by the SI. It was further
exacerbated by the attitudes of some Chinese, who, in the aftermath of the founding of the
Republic of China in 1911, hoped that this would elevate the status of Chinese in Indonesia to
that of the Europeans.26

Lynn Pan’s work discusses the divisions of Chinese in Southeast Asia through speech
groups, firstly by their hometowns in China, then by their occupational affiliations.27 The Qing
government attempted to transform these fluid identities into a fixed sense of ‘Chineseness,’
which only reinforced boundaries between Chinese and non-Chinese.28 Any Chinese person who
was born in Indonesia automatically became a Chinese citizen, as long as they did not reject
Indonesian citizenship and opted for Chinese citizenship. Compounded with the Chinese policy
of jus sanguinis29, this automatic acceptance of the ethnic Chinese as citizens, according to Jamie
Mackie and Charles Coppel, raised doubts in the mind of indigenous Indonesians about the
loyalty of the Chinese.30

25 Sartono Kartodirdjo…151-162.
26 Ibid.
27Lynn Pan, "Definitions" in Lynn Pan (ed.) The Encyclopedia of the Chinese Overseas (Surrey: Curzon Press,
1998).
28Prasenjit Duara, "Nationalists among Transnationals: Overseas Chinese and the Idea of China, 1900-1911"
in Aihwa Ong and Donald M. Nonini (eds.) Ungrounded Empires: The Cultural Politics of Modern Chinese
Transnationalism (New York and London: Routledge, 1997), 40-41.
29 Mary Somers Heidhues, "Indonesia"…9.
30 J. A. C Mackie,
and Charles Coppel, "A Preliminary Survey" in J. A. C. Mackie (ed.) The Chinese in Indonesia
(Melbourne: Thomas Nelson, 1976), 10.

25
1.4. The Japanese Occupation

On 14 February 1942, the Japanese invaded South Sumatra. Less than a month later, on 1
March 1942, they had already landed on Java. The Dutch Commander in Chief of Allied Forces,
Lt. Gen. Ten Poorten, on behalf of all the Allied Forces in Java, surrendered to the Japanese on 9
March 1942, despite the fact that approximately 8,000 British and American troops stationed in
Java, led by the British Major General Sitwell, were still willing to continue fighting the Japanese.
Ter Poorten, it was later revealed, had surrendered without even consulting the British or the
Americans.31 The Japanese would soon take over the entirety of Indonesia.

Map. 3. Japanese Conquest of the Netherlands Indies. Source: Robert Cribb, Historical Atlas of Indonesia
(NIAS Press, 2000). Map Number: 5.01.

The Japanese occupation in Indonesia is rightly defined as a watershed in modern

Indonesian history. This period marked not only the end of the colonial regime, but also the

31 George McTurnan Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia…100-101.

26
breaking down of the traditional social relations at the village level, and laid the groundwork for
a national and social revolution.32

The Dutch defeat, according to Kahin, entailed two long-term consequences. First, many
Indonesians no longer saw the Netherlands as an imperial superpower. Second, many
Indonesians became convinced that after the Japanese capitulation, as long as they were armed,
they could fight for Indonesian independence.33 A wave of violence and chaos immediately swept
across Java. As Karl Jackson argues, the transition to the Japanese government was followed by:

“…the internment of the colony’s functional elite (the Dutch), the rampant inflation, the massive
forced rice deliveries, the famine, black-marketeering and corruption, and the impressment and
forced exportation of tens of thousands of Indonesian peasants to feed the labor demands of the
imperial Japanese war machine. The situation led to an unprecedented level of social and economic
disruption on Java.”34

The Japanese government attempted to create a good impression to Indonesians by

implementing several important policies. The Japanese permitted the Indonesian national
anthem Indonesia Raya (Great Indonesia) to be sung, and the national flag to be flown.35 They
also established a unified educational system; Indonesian schools replaced Dutch schools, Bahasa
Indonesia became the common language. Freedom of religion was maintained for Moslems in the
archipelago and, moreover, the Japanese authorities promised to give them more freedom in
politics.36 In order to enlist the support of the prominent nationalist leaders for their war effort,
including Sukarno and his future vice-President Mohammad Hatta, the Japanese promised that

32 According to Aiko Kurosawa during the late Dutch period (mid-19th century to 1942) basic colonial
policy toward the village was to give the rural society autonomy and leave it intact as much as possible.
While under the Japanese occupation the village institutions were more directly connected to outer world
in the political and economic sense. Aiko Kurosawa, “Forced Delivery of Paddy and Peasant Uprisings in
Indramayu, Indonesia,” The Developing Economies, (March 2007), 52
33 Kahin, 101.
Karl Jackson, Traditional Authority, Islam, and Rebellion: A Study of Indonesian Political Behavior (Berkeley:
34

University of California Press, 1980), 7.

35 Leo Suryadinata, Interpreting Indonesian Politics. (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1998), 76.
36R. de Bruin, Islam en Nationalisme in door Japan Bezet Indonesie 1942-1945 (‘s-Gravenhage: Rijksinstituut
voor Oorlogsdocumentatie, 1982), 99-100.

27
self-government would ultimately be granted.37 The Investigating Committee for the Preparation
of Indonesian Independence was even established in 1945.

Under the Japanese occupation (1942-1945) Islamic community emerged as a newly robust
political force. Islam’s prestige as a traditional defense against colonial penetration combined
with the past prominence of ulama in leading or quashed rebellions, played a vital role of people’s
mobilization in traditional villages. The Islamic party groups like Laskar Rakyat, Sabilillah and
Hizbullah emerged as an important paramilitary groups throughout Java. Their political
movement most of the time were based on traditional anti-colonial spirit of Islamic religious
teachers (ulama or kyai) “into an instrument for instigating Holy War (jihad) against the infidel
Dutch.”38 Furthermore, the Japanese administration introduced military and paramilitary
training for thousands of young Indonesians and the promise of independence for Indonesia.

On the contrary, Chinese communities experienced violence not just from the
Indonesians, but from the Japanese as well. Chinese-Indonesian relations were adversely affected
by several factors: (1) The memories of the atrocities that had been committed against the Chinese
community was still fresh; (2) A ferocity of economic competition due to Japanese support of
Indonesians taking over economic positions traditionally held by the Chinese; (3) Political
differences due to the pro-Allies Chinese and the pro-Japanese Indonesians; (4) The abuse of
power of certain Indonesian officials who gained favor with the Japanese.39

Chinese newspapers and leaders were vocal of their criticism of the Japanese occupation
in China, and as a result were seen as threats that needed to be silenced. Ordinances were
implemented in order to suppress Chinese communities, such as press censorship, which saw the
closing of all Chinese-Indonesian newspapers (with the exception of Hong Po) and the interment
of 500 pre-war Chinese leaders in Java, some of whom were executed.40

37 George McTurnan Kahin, 106.

38 Karl Jackson, 8.
39Memorandum Outlining Acts of Violence and Humanity Perpetrated by Indonesian Bands on Innocent Chinese
before and after the Dutch Police Action was enforced on July 21, 1947 (Batavia: Chung Hua Tsung Hui, 1947),
3
40 Leo Suryadinata, Peranakan Politics in Java….

28
 The Japanese regime in Indonesia officially ended after Emperor Hirohito announced the
surrender of Japan via radio at noon on 15 August 1945. Indonesia was subsequently placed
under the Allied SEAC (Southeast Asia Command). To the Indonesian youth, the Japanese
surrender gave them the opportunity and momentum to proclaim the independence of Indonesia.
They pushed Indonesian nationalist leaders to use the momentum created by the vacuum of
power to campaign for Indonesian independence, which they did on 17 August 1945, with
Sukarno and Muhammad Hatta as its proponents. The transitional period following the
proclamation marked the beginning of the Indonesian revolution. The Japanese were tasked by
the Allies to maintain law and order until British and Australian forces could take over from
them. However, in many towns and rural areas both in Java and Sumatra, Republicans were
already firmly in charge.

1.5. The Indonesian Revolution

The beginning of the revolutionary period (1945-1946) is also referred to as a ‘power

vacuum’ in Indonesia.41 During this period, Dutch colonial NICA agents, as part of the Allied
military forces, carried out their activities in various parts of Indonesia. The Dutch slowly
achieved and consolidated control of Jakarta, Semarang, Surabaya, and Bandung until the end of
1946, when the islands outside the Indonesian Republican sphere of Java and Sumatra were also
seized by the Dutch. Yet the Dutch could not completely control the whole area, usually only
controlling the main cities, with the periphery remaining under the Republican army.

A report issued by the Federation of Chinese Associations (CHCH) following the

proclamation of Indonesian independence optimistically assumed that the new republic would
adopt a conciliatory attitude towards the Chinese, for several reasons: (1) A rumor was circulating
that Chiang Kai Shek had, in a radio speech, promised to back those countries which had not yet
won their independence; (2) The assumption that China had become a powerful, influential and
well-organized country; (3) A rumor circulating in Indonesia that if Chinese were molested, the

41It is usually a political situation that can occur when a government has no identifiable central authority.
In a power vacuum, much like a physical vacuum, other forces will tend to "rush in" to fill the vacuum as
soon as it is created, perhaps in the form of an armed militia or insurgents, military coup, warlord or
dictator. http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/british/power-vacuum

29
Allies would respond accordingly.42 All these factors contributed to the safety of Chinese in
Indonesia during the beginning of Indonesian revolution.

Nonetheless, it later became apparent that China was not yet strong nor domestically
peaceful, and was in no position to assist Chinese overseas. Therefore, China could not really
guarantee the safety of Chinese in Indonesia. Anti-Chinese collaborators were not immediately
arrested. Japanese arms fell into the hands of Indonesian extremists. It became increasingly
apparent that both the Indonesian army and the Allied Forces could not maintain law and order,
especially in the interior regions of Indonesia.43

Robert Cribb calls the months of October and November 1945 as ‘jaman bersiap’ or
‘bersiap tijd’ (the ‘get-ready’ period), a period when the Allied (British) forces were still too few
to maintain order and the Dutch had not yet returned in force. According to Kahin, the first year
of the Indonesian Republic had been an unpleasant one for most of the 1.5 million Indies Chinese,
many of whom, politically and economically, had intertwined their destinies with the Dutch.44
Cribb characterizes this period as a time of massacre among not only Eurasians and Chinese, but
also other minority groups like Arabs, Ambonese, and Timorese.45 Systematic killings of Chinese
did not occur during the beginning of ‘bersiap’ period, hence in the first months after the
declaration of independence. At that time Chinese were considered friends of Indonesia, at least
until the eruption of Surabaya battle on November 1945.46

42 Memorandum Outlining Acts of Violence…3

43 Ibid.
44George McTurnan Kahin, "The Chinese in Indonesia," Far Eastern Survey. Vol. 15, No. 21, (October
1946), 326-329.
45Robert Cribb, “The Brief Genocide of Eurasians in Indonesia, 1945/46,” in A. Dirk Moses (ed.), Empire,
Colony, Genocide: Conquest, Occupation and Subaltern Resistance in World History. (New York: Berghahn
Books, 2008), 424-439. However, the term ‘bersiap’ itself has multiple interpretations, for non-Indonesian
the word means that they need to ‘be prepared!’ or ‘shun,’ because after the word was echoed then it was
usually followed by horror situation like robbery, kidnapping, or murdering, but for Indonesian troops
they considered it as a call to defend their nation. Interview with Ibrahim Isa (83), a former Indonesian
troop who witnessed and participated during the Indonesian revolution (3 December 2013). Johanes
Herlijanto, "Emulating China: Representation of China and the Contemporary Critique of Indonesia," PhD
Dissertation Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, (2013), 95.
46However, people also should bear in mind that a considerable number of leftist Chinese fought alongside
the Indonesians against the British in Surabaya. Sumarsono, a former commander of the Indonesian troops,
had a company of 250 leftist Chinese Indonesians in his troops.

30
 From the Indonesian perspective, the Chinese were not neutral during the Indonesian-
Dutch conflicts. Although some Chinese organizations like Sin Ming Hui and CHCH announced
their neutrality, this did not satisfy Indonesians who wanted the Chinese to side with the
Indonesians, and to enforce an economic boycott against the Dutch and not supply them with
goods. This fell on deaf ears, with the Chinese continuing trade relations with the Dutch, and
some Chinese even receiving monetary and material aid from the Dutch government. A number
of them worked in Dutch offices and joined NICA’s army. Increasingly, the Chinese group in
general began to be seen as Dutch collaborator.47

During the revolution, many people called themselves pejuang (combatant), although no
clear lines could be drawn between pejuang and bandits, as some of them were also involved in
perpetrating violence against minority groups.

“Youth groups were formed everywhere without central control, seizing Japanese arms, occupying
public buildings, and claiming to speak for the revolution in each local area. The society had come
undone, change was everywhere in the air, everything seemed equally plausible and
implausible.”48

In Central Java, for instance, some members of the Barisan Pemberontak Republik
Indonesia (Republic’s Revolutionary Army/BPRI) under Mardjuki committed robberies in
various places in Salatiga, Ungaran, and Boyolali. Some members of the Angkatan Laut Republik
Indonesia (ALRI/Indonesian Navy) in Surakarta did likewise.49

Social protests during the revolution were usually accompanied by vandalism and
violence. Chinese were repeatedly harmed, threatened, robbed, and murdered in every way
imaginable by Indonesians, because they were seen as contemptible representatives of the
bourgeoisie class. These atrocities usually started with a minor incident that escalated into mass
riots, very often ending by targeting and murdering members of a specific ethnic group—
Chinese, Europeans, Arabs, or Eurasians.50 Most acts of lawlessness occurred in areas that lacked

47 Memorandum Outlining Acts of Violence…3

48 Karl Jackson, 7.
49 Soejatno, 107.
50Those minor incidents for instances are flag removal, dispute at market, random shootings, searching for
kampung, etc. Cribb, 54.

31
government surveillance or weapons control, where unofficial militia organizations and
gangsters flourished. The proximity of a black market made firearms readily available to citizens.
In addition, the surrender and subsequent withdrawal of the Japanese also provided the pemuda
with Japanese arms.

Bad economic conditions from the beginning of 1946 also contributed to the violence
against Chinese, as these became catalysts for the spread of corruption, embezzlement of state
assets, and anarcho-syndicalism in the region controlled by the Republic of Indonesia.51 The
Sjahrir Cabinet did not enforce a determined economic plan and financial policy, which led to the
increase in the price of rice from f.1,60 to f.15 per liter.52 Wertheim posits that such dismal
economic conditions also spawned an increase in banditry, robbery, and chaos.53 This was
aggravated by a lack of communication between the Chinese people in affected areas and those
outside, due to the prohibition of the usage of Chinese characters for correspondence, and
technical difficulties with communication between Jakarta and the interior of Java. Thien Sung, a
Kuomintang-affiliated newspaper that utilized Chinese characters, criticized the restrictions on
the Chinese language, and hoped for its swift removal.54

Apparently the level of violence against Chinese was perceived as very disturbing. Many
Chinese deplored the number of human rights violations that the Indonesians committed against
them in the pursuit of their independence; though they had weathered discrimination and
violence against them in regimes past, this was arguably one of the worst period for Chinese in
Indonesian history.

1.6. Conclusion

Social interaction between Chinese and indigenous Indonesians during the Dutch colonial
period was limited and restricted to economic transactions. Under the Dutch, the differences in

51 Sukarno, Dibawah Bendera Revolusi (Jakarta: Panitia Penerbit Dibawah Bendera Revolusi, 1965), 11-12.
52 Ministerie van Buitelandse Zaken, NEFIS/CMI 1942-1949. Inv. Nr: 01857.
53 W.F. Wertheim, Indonesian Society in Transition (Bandung and The Hague: Van Hoeve, 1956), 144.
54Thien Sung (Voice from Heaven) is a daily Chinese-Indonesian newspaper written in Chinese characters.
Published by Thien Sung Yit Po, the circulation reached 9,000, and made Thien Sung as the largest Chinese
characters newspaper in Jakarta. Thien Sung, 19 April 1946.

32
ethnicity and religion brought about the negative stereotyping of Chinese Indonesians, which
would severely damage their relations with the indigenous population after Indonesian
sovereignty was attained in 1949. As a result, Chinese Indonesians were generally excluded from
the process of building a nation-state.

One reason that may explain the prevalence of animosity against the Chinese in Indonesia
was the purposeful racial segregation of Chinese from other ethnic groups, which classified them
as 'Foreign Orientals.'55 The othering of the Chinese was only furthered by their role as
middlemen in intermediary trade, which afforded them economic privileges in the Dutch East
Indies. This in turn only served to create a huge gap between pribumi and Chinese.

As Benedict Anderson argues, ‘the apartheid’ of the Dutch colonial policies that placed
Chinese as intermediary traders eventually led to Chinese segregation from the rest of the
population.56 In some areas (such as in legal matters), the Chinese enjoyed a higher status than
the indigenous population, they lived in segregated areas, and their children attended Chinese-
language schools.57 This has only reinforced the Chinese’s image throughout history as an
outsider, a foreigner, and an alien.

Such treatment only continued during the Japanese occupation. The conditions of the
Chinese even worsened as the Japanese classified them as the lowest on the social stratification
ladder, together with Europeans. Moreover, the Japanese also encouraged all Chinese to return
to their Chinese roots, which further distanced Chinese from the native population.58

55The racial classifications was based on the regeeringsreglement of 1854, subjecting Chinese as Vreemde
Oosterlingen (Foreign Orientals), together with Arabs, Indians, Japanese, and other foreign Asians. Based
on that law, the Chinese shared the same public law as 'natives' and were tried in the same courts with
regard to criminal procedure. Eric Tagliocozzo argues that this legal bifurcation showed that in the eyes of
the colonial state, the 'Foreign Orientals' are both to be feared and controlled, and at the same time engaged
for commercial profit. Eric Tagliocozzo, Secret Trades, Porous Borders: Smuggling and States along a Southeast
Asian Frontier 1865-1915 (Yale University Press, 2009), 130.
Benedict Anderson, The Spectre of Comparison: Nationalism, Southeast Asia and the World (London and New
56

York: Verso, 1998), 13-14.

57 Adam Schwarz, A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia in the 1990s (St. Leonards: Allen & Unwin, 1999), 102.
58Didi Kwartanada uses the term ‘resinifikasi’ to describe the policy of Japanese that try to encourage
Chinese to go back to their Chinese roots. Didi Kwartanada, "Kolaborasi dan Resinifikasi: Komunitas Cina
Kota Yogyakarta pada Jaman Jepang, 1942-1945," Undergraduate Thesis, Yogyakarta, Gadjah Mada
University, 1997.

33
 The Chinese were typically affluent in their communities, assuming the roles of rent-
collectors or landowners, which played a vital role in alienating the Chinese from the natives.
Wertheim argues that economic factors dominated relations between ethnic Chinese and the
majority of the population, and therefore anti-Chinese violence occurs predominantly during
periods of economic transition. The role of Chinese as traders and middlemen in society, which
created to serve the interests of the elite, made their position vulnerable to hostility and violence.59

All those factors inevitably played a role in the clash that ensued between Indonesians
and Chinese, including the Tangerang massacre in the late May 1946. The following chapter will
contextualize the background of Tangerang during the transition from the Japanese government
to the proclamation of and struggle for Indonesian independence in order to see the Chinese’s
position in Tangerang during the regimes transition. It seeks to elucidate on the complexity of
Tangerang as a region and examine the roots of violence against Chinese within that region.

59 Wim Wertheim, East-West Parallels (Van Hoeve: The Hague, 1964).

34
 CHAPTER II

THE SOCIO-POLITICAL HISTORY OF TANGERANG 1945-1946

Tangerang's social, religious and cultural history is complex. Tangerang is a very

ethnically mixed area, Chinese and other ethnic groups having settled in this region for centuries.
According to a Sundanese manuscript 'Tina Layang Parahyang' (Notes from Parahyangan), the
Chinese community of Tangerang and Batavia had been in existence since at least 1407, with the
majority working as farmers or fishermen. Intermarriage with pribumi was also quite common in
Tangerang, sometimes it is quite difficult to distinguish them from the natives since most of them
no longer possess distinct Chinese features.

The number of inhabitants in Tangerang grew significantly since the colonial times. In
1894 the total inhabitants in Tangerang was 307,349, growing to 414,500 in 1917 and 512,076 in
1930. Before the Indonesian revolution in 1945, approximately 650,000 people lived in
Tangerang.60 Meanwhile, the Chinese population of the town of Tangerang and its surroundings
was estimated to be about 25,000-40,000 in mid-1946.61

Table 1. Total Population of Tangerang (1930)62

District Onderdistrict Natives Europeans Chinese Arabs Total

Tangerang Tangerang 47,553 191 2,934 62 50,740
Djati 28,774 32 3,419 - 32,225
Serpong 46,450 17 5,394 43 51,904
Cengkareng 42,188 8 4,687 27 46,910
Curug 31,968 2 3,300 - 35,270
TOTAL 196,933 250 19,734 132 217,049
Balaraja Balaraja 39,081 7 2,396 - 41,484
Kresek 4,952 4 558 - 5,514
Tigaraksa 55,971 18 1,738 - 57,727
TOTAL 100,004 29 4,692 - 104,725
Mauk Mauk 91,457 13 10,813 29 102,312
Teluknaga 38,985 - 5,184 16 44,185
TOTAL 130,442 13 15,997 45 146.497
TOTAL POPULATION 427,379 292 40,423 177 468,271

60 Sejarah Kabupaten Tangerang, 36.

61In 1930, the Chinese minority in the Netherland East Indies numbered about 1,2 million or about two per
cent of the population. 580,000 of them settled in Java. By 1945 the total may have been about 1,5 million
with 700,000 of them were concentrated in Java. See Department van Economische Zaken, Volkstelling 1930.
(Batavia: Landsdrukkerij, 1935), Vol.7, ‘Chineezen en andere Vreemde Oosterlingen in Nederlandsch-
Indie.’; Louis de Jong, Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden in de tweeder wereldoorlog (Leiden/Den Haag:
Nijhoff/Staatsuitgeverij, 1969-1991), 745-746.
62
Volkstelling 1930, I, (1933).

35
 This second chapter examines the situation in Tangerang during the transition from
Japanese rule to the Indonesian Republic, the emergence of ‘Dewan Rakyat’ (People’s Council)
under Haji Achmad Chaerun, and eventually the return of Tangerang to the hands of Indonesian
Republic. Furthermore, this chapter contextualizes the sociopolitical situation in Tangerang in
order to examine why the area was a hotbed of violence during the Indonesian Revolution.

Although the primary aim of this thesis is to shed light on the 1946 massacre of Chinese
in Tangerang, this chapter is necessary as it provides the background regarding the roots of the
anti-Chinese violence in Tangerang. The massacre of Chinese in 1946, this chapter argues, is
inseparable from the complex, multi-faceted historical background of Tangerang.

This chapter also examines the sociopolitical conditions within Tangerang, as well as the
general condition of Chinese during the different political transitions in Tangerang. The
proliferation of resistance movements in Tangerang will also be discussed.

Several questions will be raised in this chapter: How was the transitional process
following Sukarno's proclamation of Indonesian independence implemented in Tangerang?
Moreover, this chapter outlines the period from Agus Padmanegara to the establishment of
Chaerun’s government until its subsequent turnover to the TKR. What significant events
occurred in Tangerang during his regency? Why did the TKR take over the government? How
was the condition of Chinese during those different regimes transition? The answers to these
questions will be detailed in a critical examination of every regime transition in Tangerang from
the Japanese occupation, the beginning of Indonesian Revolution, the establishment of Haji
Achmad Chaerun’s government, and, lastly, the TKR/TRI government. By answering these
questions, this chapter aims to explain the sociopolitical uniqueness of Tangerang as an area, as
well as the roots of violence in Tangerang.

2.1. ‘Tangerang di Persimpangan’: The Transition from the Japanese to the Indonesian
Government

On 1 March 1942, the very day of the arrival of Japanese military in Java, the Dutch
military headquarters in Tangerang sounded an alert at 23.00, informing all inhabitants
(Europeans, Eurasians, Javanese and Chinese) in the city of Tangerang to take refuge in the
hinterlands. They had received intelligence that the Japanese army was moving to Tangerang. On

36
3 March 1942, the Japanese army easily occupied Tangerang without any resistance from the
Dutch troops that had already left Tangerang for Jakarta the day before.63 Their subsequent
occupation of Tangerang from 1942-1945 would bring fundamental changes to the city’s
government.

Map 4. Map showing the Japanese invasion to Tangerang, 1-7 March 1942. Source: Edi Ekadjati, Sejarah
Kabupaten Tangerang (Tangerang: Pemerintah Kabupaten Tangerang, 2004), 256.

Just a few weeks before the arrival of the Japanese soldiers in Tangerang, the Chinese
residing in Karawaci, Cilongok, Pasar Baru, Sepatan and Kramat left their companies, seeking
protection in Jakarta. The local inhabitants, together with jawara Tangerang used this opportunity
to plunder and burn Chinese dwellings, only ceasing when Japanese soldiers entered
Tangerang.64

Following the occupation, the Japanese government faced difficulty in restoring order in
Indonesia, eventually deciding to suppress every anti-Japanese activity in Indonesia. All

63 Herwin Sumarda, 42.

64 Sejarah Kabupaten Tangerang, 140-141.

37
regulations implemented in Indonesia were recorded in Oendang-Oendang dari Pembesar Bala
Tentara Dai Nippon. One of the regulations (Article 3) reads:

"Strictly forbidden to take, steal, or rob belongings although it is not owned or protected by
anybody. Anybody who committed those actions will be given severe punishment. Any violator
has to return the possessions he stole to their original owner. If it has been returned, he/she will
be forgiven."65

The regulations were generally effective in restoring law and order in Tangerang. After
Article 3 was introduced in Tangerang, many looters placed all goods they had stolen on the road,
as they were afraid of being executed by the Kenpeitai (Japanese police). Anyone who committed
acts of looting, arson, murder, or other illegal activities were summarily executed by the Japanese.
Many jawara (criminal gang leaders) were used to show an example of Japanese ruthlessness;
they were beheaded by the Kenpeitai and their corpses drowned in the Cisadane River.66

Although Tangerang was already under Japanese control, it did not mean that the safety
of Chinese was completely secured. The segregation policy against the Chinese still continued
during this period.67 The Japanese government decided to amend the social stratification, which
was applicable for all regions in Indonesia. Naturally, the Japanese occupied the highest
positions, replacing the Dutch/Europeans. The native inhabitants, who had always occupied the
lowest positions, were replaced by the Chinese and Europeans.68 The Japanese also forced
Chinese to study in schools established by the Japanese, which used Chinese as the medium of
instruction in the classroom. Moreover, Chinese were forced to speak Chinese in their daily
activities.69

The Japanese government also removed policies regarding private land ownership in
Tangerang, which had favored the Chinese since the colonial period. The lands were transferred
by the Japanese government from Chinese to ‘rakyat’ for maintenance under the government’s

65 Oendang-Oendang dari Pembesar Bala Tentara Dai Nippon, No. 20, Dai Nippon Gunseibu, Betawi, 1942.
66 Herwin Sumarda, 45.
67
Leo Suryadinata, Ethnic Chinese in Contemporary Indonesia (Singapore: ISEAS, 2008), 58-59.
68 Hardjasaputra, 78.
69Leo Suryadinata, Pribumi Indonesians, Chinese Minority and China (Kuala Lumpur: Heinemann
Educational Books, 1978), 147.

38
surveillance. Plantations previously owned by Chinese and other foreign companies were also
taken over by the Japanese government and given to ‘rakyat.’70

Despite a dramatic decrease in the crime rate across Indonesia, many Chinese were still
interned all over Java and Sumatra, their treatment subject to the mood of the local Japanese
commander. In some regions of Indonesia, Chinese were brutalized, tortured, and even killed.
However, because of their sheer numbers –over two million- the Japanese could not intern all the
Chinese in Indonesia. Most of them were permitted to continue working as they had before. Some
were recruited for espionage purposes, which worsened their image among Indonesians, as they
were seen as Japanese collaborators.71

Meanwhile in Tangerang, the first major decision undertaken by the Japanese government
was to embrace the local religious leaders. Thus they were also given key roles in the local
government.72 Like In Cilongok for instance, where Haji Nafis chosen as the leader.73 The second
decision was to establish a semi-military organization in Tangerang. A training center for pemuda
called Seinen Dojo was erected in January 1943, starting with only six boys.74 However, it did not
last long, closing its doors in October 1943 and producing only 100 students.75 In the beginning
of 1944, a semi-military organization called ‘Barisan Banteng’ was established by local people in

70 Asia Raya, 2 May 1942; Tjahaja, 10 June 1942.

Stuart Person, Bittersweet: The Memoir of a Chinese Indonesian Family in the Twentieth Century (NUS Press &
71

Ohio University Press, 2008), 79-81

72 Else Ensering, "Banten in Times of Revolution," Archipel, Vol. 50, (1995), 144.
73 Harry Benda, in his book, The Crescent and the Rising Sun. Indonesian Islam under the Japanese Occupation
1942-1945, argues that the Japanese followed a policy towards Islam nearly the reverse of the Dutch. They
called themselves as the 'liberators and defenders of Indonesian Islam.' The Japanese tried to mobilize Islam
for their own purposes, assisting them to fight off the threatened return of the Dutch. In return, Indonesian
leaders were able to obtain important concessions. The Japanese authorities rewarded ulama, the religious
teachers in the villages, for their collaboration, by increasing their local power and prestige at the expense
of the hereditary officials. As a result of that policy, the Islamic movement was growing rapidly and the
position of grassroots Moslem leaders also elevated as strong rivals of the secular nationalist leader. Harry
J. Benda, The Crescent and the Rising Sun. Indonesian Islam under the Japanese Occupation 1942-1945 (The Hague
and Bandung, W. van Hoeve, 1958).
74Shigeru Sato, "Gatot Mangkupraja, PETA, and the Origins of the Indonesian National Army," Bijdragen
tot de Taal, Land en Volkenkunde, Vol. 166, (2010), 194.
75The alumni of this organization known as predecessor of Pembela Tanah Air (PETA/Fatherland Defence
Force).

39
Tangerang, located at Menteng 31 Jakarta.76 It was led by Haji Achmad Chaerun and Syekh
Abdullah, with Deos, a member of Partai Republik Indonesia (PARI), and one of Tan Malaka's
followers, as the instructors. However, because of their suspicious activities, Barisan Banteng
Tangerang was forbidden to operate during the Japanese occupation.77

Another important decision, undertaken on 9 November 1943 by the Gunseikanbu (central

government) in Jakarta, was to change the status of Tangerang from 'kewedanaan' (district) to
'kabupaten’ (regency), thus elevating Tangerang’s status.78 There were two reasons behind that
decision: First, Jakarta was already chosen as Tokubetsusi (Kotapraja Istimewa/Special
Municipality); Second, the Jakarta Regency was considered ineffective in carrying out its duties. 79
This was authorized in 27 December 1943, and Atik Soeardi who had previously served as a
deputy of R. Pandu Suradiningrat,80 was selected as its first regent,81 replacing Mas Mochamad
Hapid Wiradinata.82 Following that decision, Tangerang was no longer considered as merely
‘Jakarta’s periphery.’

76Menteng 31 group was led by Sukarni and Chaerul Saleh, two figures who often spread propaganda
around Tangerang. Menteng 31 known very active in preparing and educating young cadres in Tangerang,
particularly among jawara and Islamic clerics. Herwin Sumarda, 47-48.
77Barisan Banteng Tangerang had 4,000-5,000 active members, with its main headquarter in Sepatan. The
main figures like Haji Achmad Chaerun, Syekh Abdullah, Usman and Dulloh were arrested by Kenpetai,
while the rest were fleeing to Menteng 31 to seek for shelter. This group emerged again during the
Indonesian Revolution and became one of the most notorious and violent organization at that time. Herwin
Sumarda, 47-48.
78Initially Tangerang was part of ‘Regentschap Batavia’ together with four other districts, namely Balaraja,
Curug, Batavia, and Weltevreden. “Verslagen van de Inlichtingendienst van het Territoriaal tevens
Troepencommando B-Divisie over West-Java, Maart-Mei.” Ministerie van Defensie Collectie Archieven
Strijkrachten in Ned. Indie. Inv. Nr: 132.
79 Asia Raya, 4 January 1944.
80R. Pandu Suradiningrat was a deputy of Gunseibu or ‘local government’ in West Java. See Kan Po, No.
34, 1944.
81Atik Soeardi then replaced by Agus Padmanegara, who originally from Sumedang, West Java, just before
Japan's defeat in Pacific War. Herwin Sumarda, 51-53
“Verslagen van de Inlichtingendienst van het Territoriaal tevens Troepencommando B-Divisie over
82

West-Java, maart-mei.” Ministerie van Defensie Collectie Archieven Strijkrachten in Ned. Indie. Inv. Nr: 132.

40
2.2. Tangerang after the Proclamation of Independence

The Japanese rule in Indonesia, nevertheless, could neither stop nor restrain the growth
of Indonesian nationalism. All military training given by Japanese to pemuda, in fact, was
instrumental in fostering the growth of patriotism among the Indonesians.83 By the Japanese
strong emphasis on youth training, and particularly by establishing these military organizations,
“the Japanese thus made an important contribution to the development of an incipient new elite
group which was to come to sudden prominence in the early days of the revolution.”84

The situation reached its climax when the Republic of Indonesia, through Sukarno and
Hatta, eventually proclaimed its independence on 17 August 1945, only two days after Japan
surrendered. This event marked the culmination of the political desire of the Indonesian
nationalists to attain sovereignty for their nation. Like a tidal wave, it carried every Indonesian
along with it.85 Thus began the revolutionary period in Indonesia.

News about the proclamation of Indonesian independence only arrived a day later in
Tangerang, despite its proximity to Jakarta. Two representatives from Jakarta, Mr. Sumanang and
Mr. Datuk Djamin, forwarded the news to Martosugriwo and Abdel Hanan. Copies of the
proclamation were given, to be disseminated amongst the residents of Tangerang.86

On Monday morning, 20 August 1945, all Tangerang pangreh-pradja (general

administrative corps) held a meeting to discuss the proclamation, as well as the Red-White flag

83During the Japanese occupation special attention given to organizing and indoctrinating the youth. A
number of youth military organizations were established namely, Seinendan (Youth Corps) and Gakutotai
(Student Service Corps). The members were composed of students in secondary and higher school, and
given some military drill and was prepared for light labor. In 1943 the Japanese took a further step by
forming PETA (Pembela Tanah Air/Defenders of the Fatherland), a voluntary army created to strengthen
the defenses of Java, Sumatra and Bali. Just a year later two subsidiary semi-military organizations were
formed and given training by PETA units: Hizbullah (Army of God) and Barisan Pelopor (Pioneer Corps).
Harry J. Benda, The Crescent and the Rising Sun: Indonesian Islam under the Japanese Occupation 1942–1945 (The
Hague and Bandung, W. van Hoeve, 1958), 252.
John Smail, Bandung in the Early Revolution: A Study in the Social History of the Indonesian Revolution (Ithaca:
84

Modern Indonesia Project Cornell University, 1964), 14.

85 The Voice of Free Indonesia, November 1945.
86Sumo Atmodjo, who at that time was the head of irrigation in Tangerang District, was also known as
Gerindo activist in Tangerang who often made correspondence with Amir Syarifuddin. His house in Kebon
Djahe was often used as meeting point for Menteng 31 members, namely Deos, Sukarni, Abdul Muluk,
Suryawinata, etc. Herwin Sumarda, 51-53.

41
sent by Sumo Atmodjo from Jakarta. The letter contained several instructions, which were as
follows: (1) The raising of the Red-White flag in the Tangerang District courtyard; (2) The
swearing of allegiance of all Japanese government employees in Tangerang to the Indonesian
Republic; (3) The immediate takeover of all government offices in Tangerang, which would be
recognized through the seal 'Hak Milik Republik Indonesia' (the property of Republic
Indonesia).87

Martosugriwo and Mohammad Tabi’ie, civil servants in the Tangerang government, were
assigned to carry out those mandates. The Hinomaru flag of Japan was removed and then replaced
by Red-White flag sent by Sumo Atmodjo. Agus Padmanegara, a prestigious government official
during the Japanese occupation, was powerless, unable to do anything but watch.88

Furthermore, in order to restore the government structure in Tangerang, the Komite

Nasional Indonesia Daerah Tangerang (KNIDT, Indonesian National Committee of Tangerang)
was established on 26 August 1945, chaired by R.M. Koesoemo and his second in command,
Suryoseputro. On the same day, Badan Keamanan Rakyat (BKR, People's Security Corps) was
also formed.89 R. Soetedjo, a coworker of Sumo Atmodjo’s in the Irrigation Department in
Tangerang during the Japanese occupation was chosen to lead the organization. The regent
position was still occupied by Agus Padmanegara.90

Although Agus Padmanegara was the official regent of Tangerang, he never truly fulfilled
his actual function in Tangerang.91 Since the proclamation of the Indonesian Republic, the KNIDT

87 Herwin Sumarda, 54
88 Herwin Sumarda, 56.
89BKR was a militia organization funded by 'Fonds Kemerdekaan' (Independence Charity). The structure
BKR was different compared with the official structure of Indonesian military, because the leader and rank
structure were not really clear. BKR was also formed without evident law procedure, thus its constitution
and household budget were also not clear. Most of BKR were just fragment of ex-PETA battalion unit. The
similar structure also applied for Barisan Rakyat (Volksfront/People's Band), which flourishing after the
Indonesian independence.89 However, the influence of both organizations did not last for a long time,
because of the emergence of local powerful people, who usually known as jawara, jago, bromocorah, etc. See
Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, Netherlands Forces Intelligence Service/Centrale Militaire Inlichtingendienst
(NEFIS/CMI) 1942-1949. Inv. Nr: 03122
90 Herwin Sumarda, 55-57
91The same problem also happened with police force in Tangerang, which supposed to sustain the civil
government. One example was in Curug, the police office there led by Ali Djaja but never considered
themselves as part of Tangerang government.

42
ran the government in order to avoid a ‘vacuum of power' in Tangerang. In line with this, they
established Badan Fonds Kemerdekaan Tangerang (Organization of Donation for
Independence)92 led by Haji Entong and R. Acang; created Barisan Pelopor, led by Mohammad
Tabiih; and formed Badan Lalu Lintas Sosial (Organization of Social Traffic), chaired by
Djojoprayitno and Abdel Hanan. In practice, these groups did not have any significant impact in
Tangerang, as evidenced by the conflicts between the Barisan Banteng Merah and the Barisan
Pelopor.93

The political situation in Tangerang was complicated by the emergence of three main
groups, namely the ‘Bureaucratic’ group, the ‘Barisan Banteng Merah’ (Red Buffalo’s Corps)
group, and the ‘Sangiang’ group. The Bureaucratic group consisted of people who cooperated
with the government during the Japanese occupation. This group, whose key figures include
Suryoseputro, Martosugriwo, and R.M. Koesoemo, was mainly comprised of police, Hokokai staff,
and civil servants. The Bureaucratic group played an important role during the transition of
power from the Japanese government to the Indonesian Republic, as they were responsible for
maintaining law and order in Tangerang. While they never received the sympathy of the
Tangerang residents, they were supported by most civil servants in the area.

The second group was Barisan Banteng Merah led by Deos. The majority of the members
of this group, which had Kampung Tanah Merah in Sepatan as its headquarters, were from
Barisan Banteng Tangerang, which had been dissolved during the Japanese occupation. In
September 1945, Deos commanded Barisan Banteng Tangerang to attack Japanese defenses in
Cikoleang-Bogor, in order to seize Japanese armaments. The attack was a failure, and it earned
the group a reputation as a radical and aggressive organization. Only on 19 September 1945 was
that tainted image slowly restored, as Barisan Banteng Merah decided to take part in a meeting
between Sukarno and his people at Lapangan Ikada (Ikatan Atletik Jakarta, Jakarta Athletic
Union). Barisan Banteng Tangerang successfully mobilized thousands of their supporters to

92Haji Sa’roni was appointed as the chair of this Fonds Kemerdekaan in Tangerang. He instructed to all
local leaders in Tangerang to create the Fonds in order to support Indonesian struggle. Just within few
months, Fonds Kemerdekaan was established in different locations in Tangerang, like in Cengkareng for
instance, where Haji Moekri and Haji Abdulradjak became the leader and vice. Procureur-Generaal bij het
Hooggerechtshof Ned. Indie, 1945-1950. Inv. nr. 1056.
93 Herwin Sumarda, 63.

43
participate in that event. Ikada is also considered the first united action of the residents of
Tangerang after the proclamation of Indonesian independence.94

Sangiang was the third politically active group, with over half of its members coming from
Barisan Banteng Tangerang, and led by Haji Achmad Chaerun, a known revolutionary leader in
Tangerang since the 1920s.95 With its Islamic approach, the group attracted many new followers,
especially amongst clerics, Islamic boarding schools students, and other Islamic scholars in
Tangerang. Haji Achmad Chaerun also offered lessons on ‘ilmu kebatinan’ (mysticism) to his
followers at his house in Kampung Sangiang. Many people who attended these classes aspired
to possess the power of ‘ilmu kebal' (invulnerability).96 First offered to his followers on 21
September 1945, thousands of people flocked to Achmad Chaerun's house for lessons thereafter,
with students coming not only from Tangerang, but also from Jakarta, Bekasi, Bogor and
Krawang.97 Later Chaerun would play an important role in organizing a social revolution against
the old regime (bureaucratic group) together with Barisan Banteng Merah.

The beginning period of Indonesian Revolution was also marked by the emergence of
militia organizations in Tangerang. The military training that they received during the Japanese
occupation made them more confident to fight for ‘kemerdekaan 100%’ (100% sovereign and

94 Prior to the Ikada meeting, dozens of resistance movements (strijdorganisaties) had emerged in many
cities, among them ‘Laskar Rakyat,’ (People’s Army) whose members were ex-PETA soldiers and the
common folk. Herwin Sumarda, 57-59.
95Haji Achmad Chaerun was the son of Kiai Chaerun, a prominent ulama in Banten. Chaerun completed
his studies in Mecca in 1920, where he also followed the teachings of Abdulkarim Banten. He received his
initial education in the pesantren Doyong, but soon he was committed to the care of Asnawi in, from 1908-
1913, in Caringin. He assumed the leadership of Sarekat Islam Tangerang from Said Usman Alasgaf in
1921 after accusing him of being too soft with the Dutch. Chaerun was known as a mysticism expert who
had involved in Tangerang rebellion in 12 November 1926. Strong support came by Moslem groups in
Tangerang and also many hajj who decided to become his followers. He managed to mobilize all the masses
through the network of Tangerang underground, for which the colonial government punished him by
exiling him for ten years to Sumenep, East Java. See Else Ensering, "Banten in Times of Revolution,"
Archipel, Vol. 50, (1995), 144; Nana Suryana (eds,) Sejarah Kabupaten Tangerang. (Tangerang: LPPM UNIS
Tangerang, 1992), 91-93.
96According to Onghokham the ideas of mysticism were inseparable from Javanese people. People who
were aware of oppression and exploitation, responded to this situation which took the form of belief in
amulets, supernatural powers, and prophecies, together with form of panic. Ideas developed which were
inseparable from this primitive class consciousness, such as seeing rich as devils or in the possession of
imps (tuyul), or seeing the Chinese merchant minority as infidels who ate pork, and so forth. Onghokham,
“Encounter with the West: Reaction & Results”, Prisma, (September 1984).
97 Herwin Sumarda, 61.

44
free). They disdained diplomatic action and negotiation, believing that as an independent country
they had their own right to determine their own future; thus negotiation, considered a ‘soft’
approach, was unnecessary.98 In Tangerang, these were Angkatan Pemuda Indonesia (Youth Force
of Indonesia/API) led by Sutejo, Barisan Pelopor, and Laskar Hitam.99

The KNIL, Heiho, and PETA, who had experienced Dutch or Japanese military training,
were encouraged to join BKR. Those who had not were entreated to join Laskar Rakyat. On 30
October 1945, the army headquarters in Yogyakarta issued a general statement to form ‘Laskar
Rakyat,’100 with the purpose that later on this organization could be used to fight the enemy with
the TKR.101

The main purpose of the establishment of Laskar Rakyat, in essence, was to give
information, education, and military training to Indonesian men and women, so that in the future
they could be united within a single army in order to defend the Indonesian Republic. This semi-
military organization consisted of four to five platoons with one battalion consisting of four to
five companies. Initially, Laskar Rakyat was intended to be a Territorial Army unit, while TKR
functioned as a mobile unit. Laskar Rakyat also formed ‘Barisan Laskar Rakyat’ (Laskar Rakyat’s
Band), who were tasked to fight enemies who threatened Indonesian independence. Together
with the TKR, they also planned war strategies, which however were never implemented.102 In

98 Srimastuti Purwaningsih, 96.

99 Matia Madjiah, 46-47.
100In English, ‘laskar’ can be translated as soldier, militia, or army. However, during the revolution, the
term was also interpreted as a private army, usually allied with certain political organizations. When the
national army was established on October 1945, the position of laskar in the structure of the Indonesian
Republic triggered a serious debate. Many laskar did not want to join the national army, seeing it as a
‘mercenary army,’ which to them resembled the Dutch colonial or Japanese army. On the other hand,
professional military personnel, who typically had proper military education and official army status,
tended to see laskar as a bunch of undisciplined and ineffective amateurs. Their existence was seen as a
huge obstacle to maintaining order in Indonesia. The subsequent friction between the laskar and the
national army is therefore unsurprising. Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, NEFIS/CMI 1945-49. Inv. Nr:
03129.
The months September to December 1945 were the period of the proliferation of laskar in Indonesia. They
101

were initially subsumed in the Badan Keamanan Rakyat (BKR/People's Security Corps). Soejatno,
"Revolution and Social Tensions in Surakarta 1945-1950," Indonesia, No. 17 (April 1974), 102
102Benedict Anderson, Java in the Time of Revolution, 268; A.H. Nasution, Tentara Nasional Indonesia I
(Bandung: Ganaco, 1963), 146-8; Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, NEFIS/CMI 1945-49. Inv. Nr: 03129.

45
principle, anybody could join this organization, as long as they were willing to fight. Funding for
this organization came from ‘Fonds Kemerdekaan’ fundraisers and charity events.103

Laskar Rakyat expanded quickly, particularly in Jakarta, but also in smaller cities like
Bekasi and Tangerang. However, as Robert Cribb argues, this type of organization, in principle,
was formed from a social core which had existed before, in local jawara, bandit, Islamic clerics,
ethnic groups, school groups, semi-skilled labor groups, youth groups, neighborhood
associations, and other outlaw groups. According to Audrey Kahin these groups “had long
existed on the periphery of the colonial society in rural areas.”104 The majority of its membership,
though nationalistic, did not have any political affiliation. They were just eager to participate in
the ideal of the ‘Republic.’105

In Tangerang, Laskar Rakyat was established almost in every desa. The initiative usually
came from influential groups or persons within the area. Therefore, many hajj or jawara were
chosen to lead this militia organization, as people believed that they were invincible. The role of
‘Rukun Tetangga’ (tonarigumi/neighboring associations), which had existed during Japanese
occupation and maintained during the revolutionary period, controlled and mobilized masses,
and facilitated the establishment of Laskar Rakyat in the interior Tangerang. Thus, by December
1945, it attracted more than 5,000 followers in Tangerang. Laskar Rakyat Tangerang was led by
Haji Arsjoedin, with Mohammad Tabi’ie and Haji Gias as the military instructors.106

On 30 October 1945, a 600-man strong Laskar Rakyat, led by Chaerun, attacked NICA's107
headquarters in Kebayoran Lama. Chaerun and his army were forced to retreat after

103 Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, NEFIS/CMI 1945-49. Inv. Nr: 03129.
104 Audrey Kahin, “Introduction…” 16
105 Cribb, 51-52.
106Srimastuti Purwaningsih, “Kerusuhan Anti Cina Tangerang 1913-1946,” Master Thesis, (Jakarta:
Fakultas Sastra Universitas Indonesia, 2000), 91.
107 NICA (Netherlands Indies Civil Administration) was a semi-military organization, established on 3
April 1944 in Australia, for civil administration and judicial affairs in the parts of the Netherlands East
Indies. NICA was intended to restore Dutch authority in the Netherlands East Indies and functioned as the
liaison between the government of the Netherlands East Indies and the Allied Supreme Commander of the
South West Pacific Area. Although NICA consisted solely of Netherlands Indies personnel, it was really an
Allied organization. For more information about NICA see Elly Touwen-Bouwsma en Petra Groen, Tussen
Banzai en Bersiap. De afwikkeling van de Tweede Wereldoorlog in Nederlands-Indië. (Den Haag: Sdu, 1996); G.C.
Zijlmans, Eindstrijd en Ondergang van de Indische Bestuursdienst: Het Corps Binnenlands Bestuur op Java 1945-
1950 (Amsterdam: Bataafsche Leeuw, 1985).

46
encountering NICA troops on patrol, without ever reaching Kebayoran Lama. This further
tarnished the image of the Tangerang Council, resulting in the residents of Tangerang losing
respect for their government and questioning the power wielded by Chaerun. In order to restore
its tainted image, the Tangerang Council decided to cooperate with its counterpart in Banten.
This partnership was marked by a large meeting in Tangerang on 11 November 1945, which was
attended by thousands of Tangerang and Banten residents. Here it was decided that both
governments would cooperate to face all threats from the Dutch and the British.108

However, later it became clear that the proliferation of Laskar Rakyat and other militia
armies in Tangerang was the cause of instability in Tangerang. The conditions in the area were
beyond the control of the local government, and gave an opportunity to these militia groups to
loot, rape, burn, or confiscate property in the name of ‘perjuangan’, the Chinese usually becoming
the victims. As they were seen as a powerless and defenseless community, the logic was that it
would be difficult for them to fight back against their oppressors. This period was just the
beginning of all anti-Chinese violence in this region. The situation only worsened for Chinese in
Tangerang during the two other regime transitions in Tangerang: Chaerun’s government and
TKR/TRI government.

2.3. Social Revolution in Tangerang, 1945

The situation in Tangerang deteriorated significantly soon after the proclamation of

Indonesian independence. The Sjahrir Cabinet seemed uncertain or apathetic about how to solve
problems in the interior parts of Indonesia.109 Moreover, shortages of food and clothing in
Tangerang became particularly acute. During the six months following the declaration of
Indonesian independence, Tangerang, supposedly under Republican control, merely
reappointed most of the pre-existing office holders once they had pledged their allegiance to the
Republic. The years 1945 and 1946 were marked by a strong social revolutionary impulse,
demonstrated by the overthrow of the old administrative structure. The withdrawal of Japanese
forces and widespread fears among people in Tangerang that the local administration was

108 Herwin Sumarda, 80-81 & 88.

109 Ministerie van Buitelandse Zaken, NEFIS/CMI 1942-1949. Inv. Nr: 01857.

47
preparing to welcome back the Dutch, also contributed to the sparking of social revolution in
Tangerang.

From the beginning of October 1945, a series of upheavals occurred in interior Tangerang.
Headed by local jawara, a mob attacked civil servants and Chinese, who were considered as an
obstacle in their struggle. Assassinations of government officials occurred in Tangerang, but these
were less brutal in comparison to the social unrest taking place elsewhere, such as East Sumatra
or 'Tiga Daerah' (Three Regions: Brebes, Tegal, Pemalang), as most officials and senior police
officers had taken the precaution of leaving Tangerang for their own safety.110

The dysfunction of traditional institutions during the colonial period combined with
Dutch or Chinese landlord oppression contributed to the growing of anti-Chinese sentiment in
Tangerang. Many Chinese were blacklisted as Dutch henchmen by the natives, or used as
convenient scapegoats to explain the miserable conditions in Tangerang.111 This anti-Chinese
sentiment intensified with the arrival of Allied Forces that followed by Dutch NICA in
Tangerang.

Srimastuti Purwaningsih argues that the violent actions in Tangerang were probably
based on ill feelings that local people had as a result of previous colonial experiences. From the
perspective of the people, ‘pangreh pradja’ and Chinese were seen as nothing more than the
henchmen of the colonialists. On 22 September 1945, the sub-district chief of Sepatan, Tubagus D.
Karia, was killed by a member of Barisan Banteng Merah after being accused of protecting a
jawara from Sepatan named Kho Sim Tek. A week after the Sepatan incident, the chief of Kresek
sub-district, Iskandar, was exposed, shamed, and paraded around the village, though he was later
able to escape with his family. This practice was known as ‘dombreng’ in Tangerang, and ‘daulat’
in Banten. In Kampung Parangkuda, Haji Muhur with his men forced the village chief to
withdraw from his position, with Laut bin Pitak serving as his replacement. Very often the actions
escalated into racism, with Chinese targeted because of their image as capitalists. As the result of

110 Srimastuti Purwaningsih, 104.

111 Srimastuti Purwaningsih, 96.

48
'daulat', many government officials and Chinese living in central Tangerang, fearing for their
safety, fled to Jakarta.112

After hearing about the turmoil and violence in Sepatan and other districts of Tangerang,
a Jakarta resident named Sewaka visited Tangerang in order to conduct an investigation. He
arrived at the conclusion that every government sector had been occupied by Achmad Chaerun,
except TKR, which remained loyal to the Indonesian government.113 A meeting was held by
KNIDT on 6 October 1945 and ‘daulat’ became a main topic of discussion apart from other social
unrest, such as arson and robbery, committed against Chinese in Sepatan, Kedaung, Kresek and
Kronjo. These incidents were blamed on the ineffectual leadership of Agus Padmanegara, and
the administration recommended his immediate replacement by Haji Achmad Chaerun, as the
latter was seen to have more power and charisma in Tangerang. Agus Padmanegara himself was
not present at the meeting.114

Haji Achmad Chaerun accepted the new position, and on 9 October 1945, moved to a
building in Karawaci that was owned by Oey Kiat Djin.115 Agus Padmanegara, who was legally
still serving as official regent of Tangerang, worried that his replacement by Chaerun would cause
people to ‘daulat’ him in public. As a response to this, Padmanegara gathered all jawara from Batu
Ceper and Rawa Bokor, led by Haji Taung, to protect his house and family. This action, seen as
an act of aggression, only worsened the situation, as it heightened the mistrust that people in
Tangerang had for him. Another meeting, held on 16 October 1945 by Chaerun, decided that
'daulat' would be performed on Padmanegara, but in an orderly way.

112During this period of revolution, the word ‘kedaulatan’ (sovereignty or authority) was linked to the
work ‘rakyat’ (the people), thus creating the new word 'mendaulat,' a word that could be interpreted in a
number of ways: deposition, humiliation, kidnapping, or murder of hated officials or other representatives
of authority, usually carried out by groups of armed pemuda. See Benedict Anderson, 334.
113A. Sobana Hardjasaputra, “Pemerintah Daerah Jawa Barat pada Masa Revolusi Fisik (September 1945-
Juni 1948): Tinjauan Mengenai Peranannya dalam Mempertahankan Proklamasi 17 Agustus 1945,”
Skripsi, (Bandung: Fakultas Sastra Universitas Padjajaran, 1980), 110.
114 Abdel Hanan, 10.
115There are at least two political factors that make KNIDT chose Haji Ahmad Chaerun as regent of
Tangerang and put himself in Karawaci. First, to prevent the coalition of Sangiang and Barisan Banteng
Merah group which would be dangerous for Bureaucratic group. Second, by removing Haji Achmad
Chaerun to Karawaci of course would make KNIDT's task to keep an eye on both of the groups became
easier. Herwin Sumarda, 67.

49
 The declaration of independence by the government had been followed by the order to
take over authority from the previous administration, with the transfer of power in
administrative posts carried out by Haji Achmad Chaerun. On 18 October 1945, in Curug,
southwest of Tangerang, Chaerun named himself 'Bapak Rakyat' (Vader des Volks), and
consolidated a rebellion in order to overthrow the remnants of the old regime in Tangerang.
Thousands of people from Karawaci and Sepatan, led by Soetedjo, moved towards Agus
Padmanegara's house to carry out the ‘daulat’. Padmanegara was coerced by the mob to sign a
letter that acknowledged the transfer of power from himself to Soetedjo, who at that time served
as the leader of the BKR.

On the same day, in Sumo Atmodjo's house in Kebon Djahe, Soetedjo bestowed the letter
to Chaerun and Atmodjo. Starting Thursday, 18 October 1945 at 16.30, the positions of civil
servants and police in Tangerang were transferred to ‘rakyat jelata’ (common people). New
officials were elected, and most of the strategic positions occupied by ulama.116

2.5. Tangerang under Chaerun’s Administration

One of the most important developments during Chaerun’s regency was the division of
the political structure of Tangerang by the Council of Tangerang into three regional levels, or
‘Daerah Tingkat’. 'Kewedanaan' (district) became 'Daerah Tingkat I,' 'Kecamatan' (sub-district)
became 'Daerah Tingkat II', and 'Kelurahan' (village) became 'Daerah Tingkat III.' Regional chiefs,
known as 'wedana,' (district officer) 'camat,' (sub-district officers) and 'lurah,' (headman) were
also renamed 'Kepala Daerah Tingkat I,' 'Kepala Daerah Tingkat II,' and 'Kepala Daerah Tingkat
III.'

The system of ‘Pemerintahan Bapak Rakyat’ (Father of People’s Government) was used
to elect these regional chiefs, with Chaerun at the top117; Kepala Daerah Tingkat III was elected

116“Laporan Jabatan 'Jawatan Pekerjaan Umum Jawa Barat' selama pemerintahan sementara Tangerang
sejak 18 Oktober 1945 - 13 Januari 1946.” Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, NEFIS/CMI 1945-49. Inv. Nr:
03129
117At the end of October 1945 the position of Kepala Daerah Tingkat II and III had been occupied, and only
the position of Kepala Daerah Tingkat I still vacant. The Council then divided Tangerang into 4 Daerah
Tingkat II (Tangerang, Curug, Mauk dan Balaraja) and 13 Daerah Tingkat III (Tangerang, Teluk Naga,
Batuceper, Serpong, Curug, Legog, Cikupa, Balaraja, Tigaraksa, Kresek, Mauk, Rajeg and Sepatan). From

50
by the people; Kepala Daerah Tingkat II was chosen by Kepala Daerah Tingkat III and several
community leaders; and Kepala Daerah Tingkat II and several community leaders chose Kepala
Daerah Tingkat I. Apart from these Kepala Daerah Tingkat, however, there were other leaders
called “Bapak Rakyat Tangerang,” one of them being Soewono.

The first meeting was held just a day after the transfer of power, and Atmodjo argued that
the new government in Tangerang was 'Pemerintahan Rakyat' (people’s government) and would
be run by Badan Direktorium Dewan Pusat (BDDP, Board Directory of Central Council), with its
board members being: Haji Achmad Chaerun (Chairman), Sumo Atmodjo, Suwono, and Abbas.
However, although the new government structure was occupied by several hajj, there was no
clear line of Islamic orientation in the new government. Several important decisions were taken
by the board, for instance to dissolve old government structures from village to regency levels,
and to disband the KNIDT. BKR was the only government organization that was not dissolved.
The relationship between Tangerang and the central government in Jakarta was temporarily
severed by People’s Council.118

Tangerang decided not to cooperate with the Republican government in Jakarta for
several reasons. The decline of Tangerang’s economy, combined with the return of Islamic
scholars who quickly gained prestige among people in Tangerang, triggered a distrust of the new
Republican government. The separation from the Indonesian Republic showed the radicalism in
their new government, which followed the ‘for the people, by the people’ ideology.119 Tangerang
became a state within a state, though that in itself was not novel; in 1926 many Islamic leaders in
Tangerang had worked together with Islamic leaders in Banten to launch a rebellion against the
colonial government in Banten.120 The close relationship between Banten and Tangerang was re-

the 13 names of Kepala Daerah Tingkat III, only two people who had background in government, Kepala
Daerah Tangerang and Teluk Naga, the rest were jawara or Islamic scholars. See Herwin Sumarda, 73-77.
118 Herwin Sumarda, 69-71
119 Srimastuti Purwaningsih, 106.
120The Banten uprising was intended to be part of a nationwide Communist attack against the Dutch
colonial government. The key to the rebellion, as Michael Williams argues, was mounting discontent with
the socioeconomic and political conditions in Banten at the time: the declining economy, the tax burden,
the repressive Dutch measures against political opposition, and the alienation of religious leaders. These
reasons were more than sufficient, for both the participants and the author, to claim the uprising as a holy
war, albeit under the Communist leadership. See Michael Williams, Sickle and Crescent: The Communist

51
established during 1945-1946, again with the sole purpose of repelling the Dutch from Tangerang,
but in a more radical manner. During Chaerun’s government, Tangerang’s leadership and
political direction often created friction between the regional leaders and the Republican
authorities in Jakarta because most of the time it did not correspond with the diplomatic principle
of the central government.121

The issue of the relationship with the central government had been discussed by the chief
of the Department of Public Works in West Java with one member of ‘Bapak Rakyat’ named
Soewono. The chief was subsequently appointed as a member of central economic board in
Tangerang, as well as the head of central irrigation and travel department, public works, and
public transportation. The conversation between them heated when the chief proposed that
Tangerang should cooperate with Indonesian central government in Jakarta, his suggestion was
rejected by the ‘Bapak Rakyat’.122

Another decision of Chaerun’s was to form militia organizations. On 8 November 1945,

the Board of Government of Tangerang, on behalf of ‘Rakyat Jelata’ (common people), issued an
announcement to encourage all ex-members of military organizations like PETA (Pembela Tanah
Air/Defenders of the Fatherland), Heiho (Auxiliary Troops), Kaigun Heiho (Naval Auxiliaries),
Seinendan (Youth Troops), Keibodan (Auxiliary Police Troops), Pelopor (Pioneer Corps) and also
other pemuda to register themselves as members of BKR and TKR Tangerang. All recruits had to
be young, strong, and healthy, between the ages of 18-35, and, if possible, literate. District officers
(wedana) in Tangerang coordinated and corresponded with each other concerning recruitment.123

Revolt of 1926 in Banten. (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University), Modern Indonesia Project, Southeast Asia
Program (Monograph Series no. 61), 1982.
121 Abdul Haris Nasution, Di Sekitar Perang Kemerdekaan (Bandung: Angkasa, 1977), 514.
122“Laporan Jabatan 'Jawatan Pekerjaan Umum Jawa Barat' selama pemerintahan sementara Tangerang
sejak 18 Oktober 1945 - 13 Januari 1946.” Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, NEFIS/CMI 1945-49. Inv. Nr:
03129
123 Procureur-Generaal bij het Hooggerechtshof Ned. Indie, 1945-1950. Inv. nr. 1056.

52
 Figure 1. Announcement issued by People’s Council to encourage Indonesians with Japanese military
training to join BKR. Source: Procureur-Generaal bij het Hooggerechtshof Ned. Indie, 1945-1950. Inv. Nr. 1057.

Another ‘Bapak Rakyat’ named Sumo Atmodjo also instructed Syekh Abdullah to
establish Laskar Pasukan Berani Mati (Suicide Army/LPBM), with Abdullah himself as the
leader, Mudjitaba as his deputy, and Usman, Dulloh, Lampung and Kyai Saadulloh as the
commanders. The majority of the members came from jawara groups and Islamic boarding
schools, and were usually pemuda recruited by local leaders from kampung or desa, whose
sympathies lay with the Tangerang government. The members of LPBM wore black uniforms to
represent jawara, while Abdullah, their leader, wore a green uniform to represent Islam. They also
wore black conical hats ('diubel-ubel'), which led to their monikers 'Laskar Hitam' or 'Laskar
Ubel-Ubel.' Oey Giok Kun's house in Pasar Baru, Tangerang, served as the LPBM headquarters.124

The political situation in Tangerang worsened due to the emergence of several militia
corps such as the LPBM, causing many clashes in different parts of Tangerang. The social tension
was aggravated by the deployment of guns bought at the black market among Indonesians,
especially among the pemuda. As a result, people in Tangerang no longer heeded the instruction
from the Indonesian army, and began acting on their own. Many pemuda considered themselves
experts with weaponry and military strategy due to the mere fact that they possessed a gun. Their

124 Herwin Sumarda, 74-77.

53
assumption was that they could maintain law and order in Tangerang, even without the TKR's
intervention.125

Meanwhile, a rice shortage from November to December 1945 saw a spike in the social
tension in Tangerang. According to an agreement between ‘Bapak Rakyat’ and the Tangerang
working class, the latter would receive rice from their own kampong, which would be placed in
the village barn to ensure an ample supply of rice for the poorer residents. However, the stock
was frequently inadequate, causing people to buy rice at traditional markets, where a liter of rice
cost f.3.50—too expensive for most.126 A decree was issued to control the price of rice in the
market. However, as soon as the regulation was implemented, rice started to disappear from
Tangerang. Many people had to go from one kampung to another to find it, with inflated prices of
f.4.50-f.5.50/liter. Due to the scarcity, some civil servants proposed that the sale of rice in the
periphery of Tangerang should be allowed. This proposal was rejected by the Minister of
Prosperity of Tangerang, because Klender, one of the biggest rice-producing areas in Indonesia,
was under the jurisdiction of the Tangerang government. Chaerun insisted that the rice problem
could be solved within a few months. It became apparent, however, that Chaerun’s government
was unable to control the rice market in Tangerang. By January 1946, a liter of rice cost f.10.50 in
Tangerang.127

A firsthand account from a Doctor Gambiro, who had been stationed in Tangerang since
the Japanese occupation, reports on the worsening conditions in the area:

“The new Tangerang government is really cruel. They act arbitrarily to people because they feel
having power. People’s sovereignty is abandoned. There are no more judicious court in Tangerang.
They often rob and rape women. The security is no longer available in Tangerang.” 128

Under Chaerun’s government, the condition of the Chinese in Tangerang became worse
than before, with Chaerun’s name and influence often misused by Laskar Hitam in order to

125 Procureur-Generaal bij het Hooggerechtshof Ned. Indie, 1945-1950. Inv. nr. 1056.
126The military officer and lower officer in Tangerang only received f.60/month and f.40/month. The
amount was definitely not sufficient to buy rice, the price of which kept increasing on a daily basis, and
especially to feed a family. "Stukken Betreffende Economische Politieke en Militaire Gegevens over het
Gebied Tangerang, 1945-1946," NEFIS/CMI, 1942-1949. Inv. Nr: 03130
127 Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, NEFIS/CMI 1945-49. Inv. Nr: 03129
128 Srimastuti Purwaningsih, 72.

54
oppress the Chinese. Chinese shops and dwellings were often robbed by Laskar Hitam,
supposedly to find guns or any firearms. If none could be found, they would just pilfer anything
that was of value. If a gun was found, the head of the family would be taken and then imprisoned
as NICA’s spy most of them never returning.129 A boycott by the natives of all Chinese products
and shops also led to a downturn in their fortunes. Chinese organizations were forced to give up
their savings, while rich Chinese had to give thousands of guldens in the name of ‘perjuangan.’130

Meanwhile, Achmad Chaerun was disinterested in preventing the spread of such action.
The sovereignty of the people was no longer his main objective. Laskar Hitam often retaliated
against those who were still loyal to the Indonesian government.131 Between November-
December 1945 many Chinese who lived in Sepatan, Mauk, Kronjo and Kresek, together with
former members of Tangerang’s civil administration, escaped to Tangerang City, at that time
considered an autonomous state within Indonesia. The central government in Jakarta, located
only 25 kilometers away, was unable to do anything.132

2.6. The Return of the Tangerang Republic

The Republican government in Jakarta could not ignore the situation in Tangerang, and
worried that social revolutions in Tangerang and, to a lesser extent, Banten, might spill over to
the Jakarta hinterland. Such an outcome would be dangerous for the image of the newly-created
Indonesian Republic, because it would give the British and Dutch an opportunity to demonstrate

129 Herwin Sumarda, 93-94.

130Many Chinese residents in various places have supported (or being forced) the Indonesian movement.
In Palembang, the Chinese residents contributed f.100,000 every month to the Indonesian Social Bureau for
Relief Purposes. They also imported large quantities of rice from Siam and then sold it to the Indonesian
Economic Department of the Municipal Government with a low price, adding to the saving of Indonesian
government for f.1,000,000. The Palembang resident also tried elevate foreign trade in Palembang by
exempting imports, as a result, the foreign trade of Chinese in Palembang became the largest and the most
frequent in Sumatra. Sin Po, 22-23 April 1946; Mary Somers Heidhues, “Anti-Chinese…” 385; Srimastuti
Purwaningsih, 124.
131 Srimastuti Purwaningsih, 109.
132 Cribb, 44.

55
the Republic’s lack of governing ability and acumen.133 Thus, the government, through the
Tangerang regiment, decided to take the initiative in order to control the situation in Tangerang.

Upon his return from Yogyakarta, Daan Yahya brought a mandate from General Urip
Sumoharjo to form several military regiments in Tangerang, Bogor and Cikampek. The
Tangerang regiment, a Republican institution, was set up from the BKR unit in Jakarta, and its
proponents were former Pembela Tanah Air (Defenders of Motherland/PETA) officers.134 Most
of its members had previously served in PETA during the Japanese occupation, many of them
medical students who, during the war, had often corresponded with Hatta and Sjahrir. Perhaps
due to the Dutch education they received in school, their political views tended to be very
internationalist and westernized. The regiment played an important role in establishing the
Tangerang Military Academy chaired by Daan Mogot, subsequently becoming an important
political tool of Sjahrir in dealing with Allied forces and Dutch enemy soldiers.135

In contrast to the regiments of other cities, the Tangerang regiment was radical in action
and ideology. Their main task was to perform surveillance on Haji Achmad Chaerun from across
the Citarum River. In January 1946, after two months of intelligence gathering, they arrested two
of Chaerun’s henchmen, and occupied several key areas of Tangerang. Several key members of
the Indonesian army, as well as the Republican regent of Jakarta, Singgih, decided to meet with
Chaerun in order to convince him to disband all militia corps in Tangerang, and to allow the
Indonesian army to maintain peace and order within the city. Chaerun’s agreeability secured his
position as Tangerang regent, with some of his henchmen, such as Syekh Abdullah, appointed in
a committee for security.136

133Michael Williams, “Rice Debts will be Repaid with Rice, Blood Debts with Blood,” in Audrey Kahin
(eds.), Regional Dynamics of the Indonesian Revolution (Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press, 1985), 69.
BKR was officially merged into TKR on 5 October 1945, but its unit reorganization in Jakarta was
134

implemented after all troops withdrawn from Jakarta.

135Tangerang Regiment was a Sjahrir’s most reliable unit. However, its loyalty to central government
getting stronger when the old commander, Lieutenant Colonel Singgih, ousted in a bloodless coup at the
end of April 1946 by several officers like Daan Jahja and Kemal Idris. Singgih, ex-PETA officer in Jakarta,
known as a person who had strong sympathy towards Laskar Rakyat. Conversely with his replacement,
Daan Jahja, known as an intellectual who had strong connection with Partai Sosialis (Socialist Party). Cribb,
52 & 106
136 Procureur-Generaal bij het Hooggerechtshof Ned. Indie, 1945-1950. Inv. nr. 1056.

56
 In a decree issued by TKR Tangerang, Singgih declared that starting 14 January 1946, the
government of Tangerang would be under TKR’s protection. People were urged to continue to
perform their duties to their country, and to follow all instructions from the new government.
Patriotism was also encouraged, with all residents required to display the Indonesian flag in front
of their houses, offices, and other buildings. TKR’s aim was to prosecute all traitors to the
Indonesian republic, as well as to severely punish crimes such as instigation, murder, robbery-
kidnapping, theft, and arson.137

Figure 2. An official decree issued by TKR informing readers of the return of Tangerang to the Indonesian
Republic. Source: Procureur-Generaal bij het Hooggerechtshof Ned. Indie, 1945-1950. Inv. nr. 1057.

On 16 January 1946, the chief regiment of TKR Tangerang issued another decree stating
that all regulations from the previous government were still valid, as long as they not conflict
with the current government’s regulations.138 That compromise did not last long.139 On March

137 Ibid.
138 Ibid.
139A rumor spread in some villages in Tangerang that Haji Achmad Chaerun was imprisoned by TKR.
After receiving the news, Chaerun’s followers held an urgent meeting and decided to spread that news to

57
1946 the Indonesian army captured Haji Achmad Chaerun, Syekh Abdullah, and other members
of their underground movement, perceiving them as threats to political stability in Tangerang.
Achmad Chaerun, Haji Alibasyah, Syekh Abdullah, Haji Muhur, Haji Arsyad, Haji Saelan, and
Abbas were captured by TKR and exiled to Selabintana, Sukabumi, in West Java, under the
surveillance of Didi Kartasasmita.140 The People’s Council of Tangerang then reorganized, a new
regent was chosen, and the power of Republic was slowly restored in Tangerang.141 The position
of regent was occupied by Achyat Pena, who previously had served as vice-regent.142 However,
it did not mean that the situation of Tangerang was already secure; within a few months after the
regime transition, TKR Tangerang was rocked by a series of events that would forever alter the
landscape of Indonesian history: The battle of Pesing and Cengkareng against the Dutch,
followed by one of the most notorious events in Chinese Indonesian history: the massacre of
Chinese in Tangerang, which would place the Indonesian government in a difficult position.

2.7. Conclusion

This chapter has shown the anti-Chinese violence in Tangerang existed even prior to the
Indonesian revolution. However, the structure of violence during the Japanese occupation and
Indonesian revolution, as argued in this chapter, were different. During the Japanese occupation,
the involvement of Japanese government was clear, with many Chinese interned following
command from the top. Thus it was obvious during this period the anti-Chinese violence was

other villages in Tiga Raksa Kronjo, Balaraja, Kresek, Sepatan, Mauk, and Sangiang. Herwin Sumarda, 98-
99.
Didi Kartasasmita was the Chief Commandment of West Java. Propinsi Jawa Barat (Jakarta: Kementerian
140

Penerangan Republik Indonesia, 1953), 154.

141Cribb, 86; Ra’jat, 7 Maret 1946; Republik Indonesia Propinsi Jawa Barat. (Jakarta: Kementerian Penerangan,
1952), .153-154; Sewaka, Tjorat-tjoret dari Djaman ke Djaman. (Bandung, 1956), 88-89. A similar situation also
occurred in Banten, a few kilometers away from Tangerang. A rumor spread that Banten intended to
declare itself independent, the resulting Council of Banten would challenge the legitimacy of the rule of
President Sukarno, and the Bantenese sultanate would be restored. By late October 1945, these rumors had
began to appear in the Jakarta press. The rumor was taken seriously by Banten officials, and caused
members of the Djajadiningrat family to leave the region following the death of Raden Soekrawardi in
August 1946 and the imprisonment of Hilman Djajadiningrat in October 1946. Others would follow suit,
including former officials, policemen, and PETA officers. See Michael Williams, “Rice Debts will be Repaid
with Rice, Blood Debts with Blood,” in Audrey Kahin (eds.), Regional Dynamics of the Indonesian Revolution
(Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press, 1985), 69.
142 Herwin Sumarda, 98-99.

58
inflicted by the state or state organs. This condition, however, did not only apply for the Chinese,
but also for local population.

Tangerang, ultimately, was beyond the control of Indonesian government during the
revolutionary period. The transition of power within Tangerang was followed by the
proliferation of militia groups, and the termination of the relationship with the central
government of Indonesia, which revolutionary groups in Tangerang thought was nothing but an
extension of old bourgeois or princely groups. This only encouraged the emergence of a state
within a state under the rule of Haji Achmad Chaerun. Although in principle, the main task of
these militia armies was to assist the central government in defending Indonesian independence,
in reality they acted on their own. Very often Chinese became victims of their ‘perjuangan’. They
were often violated and turned into scapegoats regarding the economic situation in Tangerang.
Once again, the Chinese were trapped in a quandary.

Filomeno Aguilar argues that the “alienness of Chinese can be understood as the
ideological product of socio-historical processes specific to Indonesia, particularly in its
construction of nationhood.”143 Therefore, this thesis attempts to use a similar approach. Besides
examining the sociopolitical conditions of Tangerang during the revolution, this chapter has also
discussed the major events in Tangerang during the various transfers of power, which could
possibly shed light on the extremity of violence in Tangerang during the revolution.

During the Japanese occupation, the positions of the two dominant social groups in
Tangerang, the ulama and the pangreh praja, changed significantly. The Japanese made use of
religious leaders and nationalists, as well as the bureaucratic elite. Religious and nationalist
leaders occupied key positions in such Japanese-organized organizations as Putera (Center of
People’s Power) or Barisan Pelopor (Pioneer Corps). In Tangerang, the ulama and jawara coalition
successfully changed the order at the village and district levels as well. In the transitional period
after the Japanese capitulation, they collaborated in creating the new government, electing their
own leaders and even forming representative councils.

This chapter has shown that the social revolution in Tangerang initially aimed to remove
the bureaucratic elite that had ruled during the Dutch colonial period, and to replace it with an

143Filomeno Aguilar, “Citizenship, Inheritance, and the Indigenizing of “Orang Chinese” in Indonesia.”
Positions (3), (2001), 505.

59
Indonesian government, radically different in values and attitudes. Popular leaders of political
movements attempted to install a more egalitarian system, hence the new system, ‘Pemerintahan
Bapak Rakyat’ (The government of people’s father).

However, it later became apparent that the Chaerun’s government politically and
organizationally had been unable to develop sustainable structures and programs in the face of
local and national opposition. The dissolution of the government did not stop the social
revolutionaries in Tangerang. Chinese were still victimized and violated as the result of
government’s lack of control in Tangerang, with Laskar Rakyat and other militia groups sowing
social unrest.

On the other hand, the central government in Jakarta did not take firm action to solve the
problem in an interior area like Tangerang Thus, within a short time, social revolution easily
spread from one area to another, aggravated by the emergence of many local militia
organizations. People could easily get arms to form their own militia group for their own political
purposes. The police force also failed to suppress the numerous acts of violence, with some
factions even refusing to acknowledge the existence of the new local government of Tangerang.144

1946 was a significant year in Tangerang, marking the unfolding of two major events: the
Indonesian Republic’s successful takeover of Tangerang from Chaerun, and the massacre of
Chinese residents around Tangerang districts that occurred on June 1946. Just within few weeks
after the return of Tangerang to the hands of Republic, Tangerang Regiment received another
‘severe blow’ when the Dutch could occupy the city of Tangerang without serious Indonesian
resistance. Many houses owned by Chinese and Indonesian kampung were set alight, and several
areas situated on the north and southwest of Tangerang were burnt to the ground. The friction
between the Chinese and local inhabitants in Tangerang erupted in massive killings of Chinese
in the interior of Tangerang, regarded in Indonesian history as the worst massacre of Chinese
during the Indonesian Revolutionary period. This topic will be discussed further in the next
chapter.

144 Abdel Hanan, 37.

60
 CHAPTER III

“NOW IS THE TIME TO KILL ALL CHINESE”

THE MASSACCRE OF CHINESE IN TANGERANG 1946

This chapter outlines one of the most infamous incidents of anti-Chinese violence during
the Indonesian Revolution: the Tangerang massacre. The first two sub-chapters will depict two
important events: Pesing and Cengkareng incidents, leading up to the ‘Perang Sabil’ (Holy War)
against the Dutch, and the subsequent massacre not of Dutch but rather of Chinese. This
information is based on the minutes of seven pre-massacre meetings between executive members
of the Indonesian Republican Cabinet (Badan Pekerdja K.N.I), several Muslim groups (including
Laskar Rakyat), jawara, and locals held in Tangerang from 17-28 May 1946. The obvious conflict
of interests during the meetings also demonstrates that not all parties on the Republican side
agreed with a decision of such an aggressive nature.

The following sub-chapter will discuss the massacre itself. The chronology of the
massacre, the perpetrators, and also the result of the massacre will be given, based on different
accounts. How did the numerous parties react to the massacre? What kinds of solutions did they
provide?

The final sub-chapter will analyze why the Chinese were specifically targeted in the
massacre. By answering these questions, this chapter aims to provide the background details of
the massacre from untapped sources in order to arrive at a fuller understanding of the event.

3.1. Battle of Pesing and Cengkareng

At the beginning of April 1946, at the request of the British Army, the Tangerang Regiment
agreed to hold negotiations about the changing of the demarcation line in Pesing, situated just a
few kilometers from the West of Jakarta.145 During the initial agreement, Indonesia decided to
withdraw its troops from Pesing, as long as they received orders from the Commander in Chief
of the Indonesian Armed Forces, General Sudirman. However, while the problem was discussed

The western parts of Jakarta and Pesing still officially belonged to the Indonesian government. Matia
145

Madjiah, 45.

61
in Yogyakarta on 15 April 1946, 100 Dutch troops suddenly attacked and occupied Pesing. Even
though TRI had been assisted by Laskar Rakyat, they could not defend Pesing.146 Gelora Rakjat
reported that 80 Indonesian pemuda were killed, and their corpses thrown into river. After the
incident, TRI withdrew to Cengkareng, but several clashes still occurred along the way to Pesing
and Cengkareng.147 Starting 25 May 1946, Dutch soldiers continuously launched attacks on
Cengkareng-Rawabuaya. In Cengkareng, despite Banten Police Army support (led by Ali
Amangku), TRI remained unable to defend Cengkareng and were forced to evacuate the area.148

The occupation was clearly a direct violation of the instructions given by British to the
Dutch. Colonel S. de Waal, a commander in the Dutch army, received an official reprimand from
the Allied forces, but responded by stating that he could not obey the instruction. Pesing was
finally occupied by the Dutch, and did not return into the hands of Republic until much later.
This case indicates the dualistic nature of Dutch interactions with Indonesia, with diplomatic
meetings on one hand, and betrayal of Indonesian trust on the other.149

The incident in Pesing was just the beginning of the chaos that would unfold in
Tangerang. In April 1946 Kranji and Ujung Menteng were occupied by pemuda, with hundreds of
the Chinese in these areas executed. Around 100 members of TKR, armed with klewang and
carbines, took over Mauk after the wedana (district officer) was killed. Meanwhile, more than 5,000
armed soldiers remained in Tangerang, the majority of them pemuda led by Chaerul Saleh, a
member of ‘Bapak Rakyat’ from Serang, and the founder of ‘Barisan Pelopor-Jawa Hokokai.’
Tangerang fortified its defenses with 35 mortars, two panzers, 40 trucks, and 30 cars, with mines
spread along the road from Kedaung to Tangerang and a barricade erected near the Kalideres
Bridge. By this time, the majority of the Chinese and Indo-European residents were already
imprisoned by Indonesian extremists.150

The tension between the Indonesians and Dutch authorities increased after the collapse of
Pesing. The Chinese fell under suspicion, especially after the local inhabitants received

146 Since 25 January 1946 the name of TKR was changed into TRI.
147 Gelora Rakjat, 23 April 1946
148 Matia Madjiah, 45.
149 Gelora Rakjat, 23 April 1946; Persatoean, 3 May 1946; Het Dagblad, 24 April 1946.
150 Procureur-Generaal bij het Hooggerechtshof Ned. Indie, 1945-1950. Inv. Nr. 1056.

62
information that hundreds of Chinese had joined KNIL. Hundreds of Chinese in Tangerang were
captured, shot, and tortured by TRI and Laskar Rakyat after being accused of being NICA spies.
The Tangerang government imprisoned thousands of Chinese in Tangerang, and instituted travel
bans from April 1946 onwards. The Chinese had to obtain TRI-issued travel letters, and were
given a short window of time for travel. Chinese residents who stayed away from Tangerang for
one or two weeks were automatically considered NICA spies.151 If they did not come back in time,
their family members would be imprisoned.152

3.2. Pre-Massacre: Internal Meetings153

On 15 May 1946, following those incidents, the Allied Forces dropped pamphlets from
the air onto onderdistrict Serpong, ordering people who lived near the Cisadane River to move at
least two kilometers to the west by 17 May 1946. The area by the Cisadane River would become
Niemandsland (no man’s land).154 Residents of Serpong had mixed reactions to the pamphlets.
Some believed that it was just a provocation from the enemy, while others believed those
pamphlets were legal and had been approved by the Republican government.

K.H. Djoenaedi, the head of the religious department of Tangerang, was himself uncertain
of the legitimacy of the pamphlets, as he had not received any information from the regent of
Tangerang. On 16 May 1946, at 13.00, Radio Republik Indonesia (RRI/Radio Network of Republic
Indonesia) in Yogyakarta announced that those pamphlets were illegal, an announcement that
they would make throughout the day. Despite repeated attempts to contact the vice-regent of
Tangerang for a possible course of action, the latter did not respond, hence delaying meetings
regarding the fate of Tangerang.

The first meeting was held on 17 May 1946 at 16.00. It was at this meeting where the
pamphlets were pronounced legal, and that they had been approved by the Republic. Two KNI
members, Djoenaedi and Raden Partakoesoema, would be sent to Langkang-West in order to

151 Sin Po, 29 April 1946.

152 Srimastuti Purwaningsih, 124.
Most of information in the first part of this sub-chapter are based on an archive Algemene Secretarie en de
153

Daarbij Gedeponeerde Archieven (1942-1950). Inv. Nr. 5521.

The Niemandsland was from the west of Cisadane River to the east of Citarum River. TRI and Laskar
154

Rakyat had to move their troops four kilometers north of Jakarta-Serpong railway on 17 May 1946 at 18.00.

63
disseminate the information to the people about the pamphlets. They were also tasked to
cooperate with the village chief of Serpong to mobilize the people, and to maintain law and order
in the area.

The second meeting occurred on 18 May, and clarified that the Allied Forces would not
invade Tangerang on 21 May 1946, but on the 28th of May instead. Furthermore, the Allied Forces
requested the cooperation of the people, saying that failure to comply would result in the
bombing of Tangerang. TRI and Laskar Rakyat were ordered to move out of Tangerang, at least
to 5 kilometers from the west of the Cisadane River, before Tuesday, 28 May 1946 at 06.00.

TRI decided to let the Allied Forces occupy the Eastern part of Cisadane River without
any resistance. However, Laskar Rakyat and some KNI members refused to surrender. Tensions
heightened when Djoenaedi, with the backing of his followers, expressed his displeasure with
Laskar Rakyat’s decision to fight the enemy on behalf of the Religious Affairs Department of
Tangerang. Laskar Rakyat, Djoenaedi pointed out, were supposed to be subordinate to the TRI:
“TRI has agreed to retreat and Laskar Rakyat has to respect that decision! And if Laskar Rakyat
is still not satisfied with the result of this meeting and if they feel they would be able to fight the
enemy, everything is up to them. However, it needs to be discussed with other Laskar Rakyat’s
leaders in every village.” Furthermore, they lacked the sufficient military equipment and
manpower to successfully fend off the enemy. Finally, he added that it would be wise if the
Tangerang government followed the ultimatum in order to prevent any unnecessary bloodshed.

The leader of Laskar Rakyat, K.H. Arsjoedin, argued that it would be a jihad war against
the infidel. This was refuted by Djoenaedi, who said that jihad had to fulfill several
requirements—the sufficiency of weapons, an army consisting of men who were not slaves, the
effectiveness of war strategy, and moekallaf (the state of being physically and mentally healthy)—
which in his opinion, Laskar Rakyat did not. Djoenaedi’s decision is clear, “…the power of our
Laskar is not sufficient yet to fight the enemy armed with sophisticated weapons.” If Arsjoedin
insisted on a jihad, the matter should also be discussed with other Laskar Rakyat leaders in
Tangerang: “I personally do not agree with Laskar Rakyat’s decision to defend Tangerang,

64
because TRI is the official army in Tangerang!” Djoenaedi’s arguments almost made him a victim
of ‘daulat’, although Muchtar Brata interfered before the situation got out of hand.155

Two other meetings were carried out on 19 and 20 May 1946, attended by the chief of the
Tangerang Regiment, officials in Tangerang, and TRI and Laskar Rakyat leaders.156 Laskar Rakyat
remained obstinate in their desire for a jihad, and elaborated that such an action would not affect
daily life in the district of Tangerang. Vital elements, such as the financial office and all
confidential letters of Tangerang, would be moved to a secret location somewhere in Jatiuwung,
which was five kilometers away from Tangerang. The Office of Religious Affairs and Education
would remain in the city, as they were not directly related with the tense political situation. The
Tangerang police would also remain in the city in order to maintain security there. For
governmental purposes, some other civil institutions were temporarily moved to Balaraja. All the
male residents were asked to stay, except for those who were afraid of explosions from bombs,
cannons, and mortars. Women and children were to be evacuated.

The final meeting was held on Sunday, 27 May 1946. TRI was represented by Lieutenant
Kaharudin Nasution, and attended by all Laskar Rakyat leaders from Tangerang, Curug,
Cengkareng, Teluk Naga, Mauk, Serpong, Legok, et. al. The meeting was led by Soetedjo, an
executive member of the Indonesian Republican Cabinet (BPKNIP Tangerang), who suggested
that all Laskar Rakyat leaders allow the Allied Forces to enter Tangerang without the TRI, saying:
“Although we lose in terms of weapons, we are strong in terms of morals.”157 Nasution added:
“with the mobilization of Allied Forces to the East of the Cisadane River, TRI has to be disciplined
and move forward.”158 K.H. Arsjoedin, representing Laskar Rakyat, stated: “Laskar Rakyat will

155 Herwin Sumarda, 112.

156“Als jullie in mij nog jullie geestelijke vader zien, als jullie mij nog beschouwen als maatschappelijke
voorman, weet dan dat ik geen toestemming geef om weerstand te bieden tenzij de TRI ook gaat blijven.
Vinden jullie het zelf niet raar dat waar de TRI met haar zoveel betere uitrusting ervan door gaat, jullie zelf
gaan blijven?” (Djoenaedi). See “De Tangerangsche ultimo Mei 1946.”Algemene Secretarie en de Daarbij
Gedeponeerde Archieven (1942-1950). Inv. Nr. 5521.
“Alle laskarleden en hun leiders dienen weerstand te bieden aan de oprukkende bezettingstroepen van
157

de geallieerden, indien nodig dient dit verzet onafhankelijk van de TRI te worden geboden. Wij zijn
verplicht om op te komen voor de onafhankelijkheid van het land en ons volk, al mogen wij materieel bij
de geallieerden achter staan, moreel dienen wij zeer zeker niet ten achter te staan.” (Soetedjo). See “De
Tangerangsche ultimo Mei 1946.”Algemene Secretarie en de Daarbij Gedeponeerde Archieven (1942-1950). Inv.
Nr. 5521.
158“De TRI zal zich terug trekken in de richting van de westelijke oever van de Cisadane, want wij hebben
daartoe bevel gekregen van het hoofdkwartier, en militairen dienen zich aan orders van boven te

65
defend Tangerang from Allied Forces, even if TRI withdraws their army. People from South
Tangerang will assist us, but perhaps a few days after the battle.” The meeting culminated in the
election of K.H. Arsjoedin bin Haji Arsjad as the head of the rebellion159, and with the agreement
that Laskar Rakyat would attack the Allied Forces, as long as they were fighting on behalf of
‘Rakyat’ (people).

Laskar Rakyat, together with several Moslem groups (like Hizbullah or Sabilillah, for
example), jawara, and Barisan Pelopor, decided to carry out a ‘Perang Sabil’ (Holy War).160
Tangerang residents who insisted on fighting moved towards the frontlines in Rawabuaya,
Cengkareng, Pakulonan, Bendungan Palar, Cipondoh, and Serpong, who confronted enemies
coming from Jakarta and Kebayoran.161 They disregarded the instructions given by the
commander of ‘Tentara Repoeblik Indonesia’ (Indonesian Republic Army) to establish a no-man’s
land in line with the agreement reached with the Dutch.162

onderwerpen. Wat de laskars echter met Tangerang denken te moeten doen, zijn de zaken van de laskars
zelve.” (Nasution, Wakil Kepala Resimen/Onder-regimentscommandant). See “De Tangerangsche ultimo
Mei 1946.”Algemene Secretarie en de Daarbij Gedeponeerde Archieven (1942-1950). Inv. Nr. 5521.
159“Indien de laskars zich door de leger discipline gebonden voelen, de strijd ook zou kunnen worden
voortgezet uit naam van de ‘Rajat’ zelve, en herhaalde ‘dus op naam van het volk’ en ‘niet op naam van de
Laskar Rakjat.” Net had hij deze worden geuit, of daar klonk de kreet “Berontak” (revolteert) uit de mond
van Moedjitaba, commandant van de LR van Teluknaga. Moehamad Noer bin H. Bermawi (Goeber),
commandant van de LR van Jati, schreeuwde “Perang Sabil.” See “De Tangerangsche ultimo Mei
1946.”Algemene Secretarie en de Daarbij Gedeponeerde Archieven (1942-1950). Inv. Nr. 5521.
160 Jawara and jago were gangs of bandits who were central in the struggle against Dutch colonial rule, along
with youths who joined irregular militias, known as laskar. During colonial times jawara and jago acted as
powerbrokers for the colonial and indigenous elite. These gangs often emerged as sites of rebellion such as
in the Banten peasant uprising in 1888. During Indonesian revolution, these gangs and militias were
recruited by the nationalists but often also pursued their own interests. The jago gangs who moved into
this new power vacuum were those who tied their personal ambitions to the establishment of the Republic.
According to John Smail, the jago band is an accepted, though deviant, social institution. It has its
justificatory myths and a collective mystique and is headed by a leader marked by strong charisma, though
it is only parochial in scope. The individual jago characteristically carried an amulet which usually convers
invulnerability on him. John Smail, Bandung in the Early Revolution, 1945-1946: A Study in the Social History
of the Indonesian Revolution (Ithaca: Cornell Southeast Asia Program Publications, 1964), 88; Robert Cribb,
Gangsters and Revolutionaries: The Jakarta People’s Militia and the Indonesian Revolution 1945-1949 (Sydney:
Allen and Unwin, 1991). On the relationship between the jago and the colonial state, see Henk Schulte
Nordholt, ‘The Jago in the Shadow: Crime and “Order” in the Colonial State in Java’, in RIMA, (25)1: (1991),
74-91.
161 Sejarah Kabupaten Tangerang, 203.
162 Memorandum Outlining Acts of Violence and Humanity…5.

66
 Laskar Rakyat would implement guerilla warfare strategies by Akhyad Pena, Captain H.
Effendi, Irawan, Moh. Tabi’ie and Muhtar Brata. Furthermore, TRI would equip Laskar Rakyat
with hand grenades163, allowing them to contribute to the struggle but not directly engage in the
battles. On the other hand, TRI continued to follow instructions from the highest authorities to
withdraw from Tangerang.

3.3. The Outbreak of the Massacre

"Our possessions have gone up in smoke. The honor of our wives and daughters were violated.
They attacked and violated our freedom. The Indonesian Freedom Flag has been tainted by the killings of
thousands innocent Chinese people." –Pouw Kioe An-164

One of the main reasons for NICA’s desire to occupy Tangerang was because of its
strategic location between Banten and Jakarta. NICA also considered West Java as the nest of
terrorists and extremists, and Tangerang a part of that. Thus, the Dutch soldiers under Admiral
Conrad Helfrich felt that they had the right to restore law and order in West Java, with Tangerang
as the starting point. Helfrich ordered his army to assist the British soldiers in carrying out the
plan, with the Dutch hunting down the TRI and Laskar Rakyat. The resulting battle, which
initially took place in the city, slowly moved to the interior as the result of Laskar Rakyat and
TRI’s guerilla tactics.165

Based on the agreement between NICA and TRI, the area northwest of Jakarta would be
handed over from the Allies to the Dutch. The Indonesian Republican Army would then
withdraw to the west of Cisadane River, leaving the town which had been their headquarters for
approximately nine months. After the signing of the agreement, all civilians were evacuated from
the town to Jakarta, Banten, or other evacuation points in Tangerang like Tanah Tinggi or Mauk.
However, most of the Chinese preferred to stay for various reasons, mostly economic. The head
of CHCH Tangerang, Tjoa Boen Lie, on behalf of Chinese population in Tangerang, rejected the
offer. He was afraid of the reoccurrence of a similar incident in 1942, when Chinese properties
were robbed by extremists. Unfortunately for the Tionghoa, their refusal was interpreted by the

163 Matia Madjiah, 63-64.

164 “Waarom wij Chinezen de Pao An Tui oprichtten!” De Vrije Pers, 18 March 1949
165 Abdul Haris Nasution, 191.

67
Indonesians as an alliance with the Dutch.166 Rumors also circulated in Tangerang that the
Chinese in the area opted to stay as they were truly on the side of the Dutch. The situation
worsened when some eyewitnesses stated that they had seen several Chinese soldiers among the
advancing Dutch troops.167

Following the withdrawal of TRI from Tangerang, Dutch troops successfully occupied
Serpong without significant resistance from Laskar Rakyat. Dozens of Laskar Rakyat were killed,
among them A. Dimyati (Chief of Laskar Pasar Baru) and Haji Ali (Chief of Laskar Cipondoh).168
Nonetheless, TRI’s withdrawal contributed to the spread of violence in Tangerang, as Laskar
Rakyat assumed TRI’s duty to maintain law and order in Tangerang, but were indifferent to the
plight of the Chinese community there. There were no official force to maintain peace or
guarantee the people’s safety in Tangerang, nor any laws.

When the Dutch troops entered Tangerang on the night of 28 May 1946, Laskar Rakyat
had prepared a huge amount of kerosene in order to launch scorched-earth tactics in Tangerang,
though the plan was never carried out because of heavy rain. The arrival of the Dutch in
Tangerang brought relief to the Chinese community, as they felt that their presence would
increase their security. A Laskar Rakyat-initiated revolt was easily quelled by the Dutch. There
were no significant damages in the city of Tangerang, only a prison and residential building that
had been burned by Indonesians before they withdrew.169

Following the occupation of Tangerang by Allied troops, Laskar Rakyat commenced

attacking the Chinese population in West Tangerang on the night of 2 June, armed with bamboo
spears, rifles, carbines and Japanese swords. Residences were looted, and the residents burned
alive in their homes.170 They swept down on the most-Chinese town of Tangerang and killed
every grown man. In almost every suburb of Tangerang, innocent Chinese were violated. In
Kampung Prahoe, only two Chinese of 350 survived the massacre, while 76 were killed in
Kampung Ceplak. Sometimes the violence was gendered: men were forcibly circumcised, and

166
Herwin Sumarda, 119.
167 The Voice of Free Indonesia, Volume 20, (8 June 1946), 5.
168 Herwin Sumarda, 113.
169 Srimastuti Purwaningsih, 132.
170 Star Weekly, 9 June 1946.

68
women and girls raped.171 Forced circumcision is also examined in one of Star Weekly’s article. It
said that many Chinese residents in Lontar, both men and women, were forcedly circumcised by
an extremist group in that area.172 In Curug and Balaraja, Chinese were brought to mosques to be
circumcised in front of an ulama. Women were bathed and their hair cut to symbolize their
conversion to Islam. Married couples had to undergo a marriage ceremony in front of a penghulu
in order to show that they had been converted.173

The majority of Tangerang’s Tionghoa victims lived on the west of Cisadane River, an
area notorious for anti-Chinese violence even before it was occupied by the Dutch. Jawara had a
strong influence in the area, with their targets usually Chinese, possibly due to the lack of
surveillance either from the Dutch or TRI. Anti-Chinese violence was not a new phenomenon in
that area.

Sin Po, a prominent Chinese peranakan newspaper, described instances looting, arson and
murder committed in and around Tangerang. The newspaper describes how 11 Chinese were
burned to death in a house in Sabi, about one mile from Tangerang, and how in Bajoer, another
village nearby, 50 children were locked in a house and burned to death while their parents were
forced to look on.174 Moreover, Sin Po also reported that most of the victims in the incident were
children and women.175

“Not long after the clash, many Chinese fled from Kampung Bayur, Kali Sabi, Rawa Lele, Rawa
Rengas, Rawa Bamban, Rawa Saban, Pisangan, Bendah Ngarak, Laban Bulan, Cadas, Malelah,
Rawa Beureum, Sulang, Kosambi, Sepatan, and Kedaung Ujung. Most of them were children and
women. Based on the survivors’ account, their houses were burnt, their properties were robbed,
and the men were massacred by Indonesians.” (Sin Po, 4 June 1946)

Based on the report compiled by ‘Chung Hua Tsung Hui’ (Federation of Chinese
Associations, CHTH), on 3 June 1946 at the village of Panggang (Tjilongok), an old Chinese of 71
years, Lim Tjiauw Hie, a girl of 20 years, Lim Tjoen Nio, and a child of 3 years, Lim Tiang Tjeng,

171 Mary Somers Heidhues, “Anti-Chinese…” 386.

172 Star Weekly, 16 June 1946
173 Herwin Sumarda, 123-124
174“Children Burnt to Death by Indonesian People’s Army: 600 Chinese Murdered,” Cairns Post, 12 June
1946.
175 Sin Po, 4 June 1946.

69
were burnt alive. At Rawa Tjina, a woman in pregnancy had her womb cut open resulting in
untimely birth and death of the child. In Sepatan, the baby of Oey Hap Sioe was snatched from
the mother, and thrown into the fire. Until 5 June 1946, there were 28 incidents of arson around
Tangerang in which Chinese were burnt alive.176 According to an Indonesian priest, about four
hundred Chinese females, including old people, children and babies were driven into a big house
by TRI and Laskar Rakyat in order to be burnt alive. However, two hours before the execution,
they were saved by the Dutch troops and the executioners fled.177

Following the arrival of Dutch troops in Tangerang, British soldiers guarded the Bridge
of Cisadane River, barring the Dutch from proceeding any further. Thus Chinese residents to the
west of the river were left to fend for themselves, until Consul-General Tsiang Chia Tung
requested the Allied Forces to cross the Cisadane River to rescue the Chinese people there. At a
conference in Batavia, Sin Ming Hui issued three orders. First, Tsiang Chia Tung would be
requested to draw the attention of the Indonesian Republican government to the Tangerang
incident, and urge the Allied Forces to protect the security of the Chinese residents. Second, a
report about the situation in the district of Tangerang would be cabled to various newspapers in
China. Third, foreign pressmen would be urged to pay attention to the matter.178

The area between Djati and Serpong became a battleground of Dutch and TRI. From this
point until the Cisadane River, a vast, empty area was visible—remnants of Chinese dwellings
that had been decimated by the Indonesian extremists. Residents were only able to check on their
belongings in the daytime, as this was the only time it was safe; Laskar Rakyat could appear from
anywhere and attack them at any time.179

176 Memorandum Outlining Acts of Violence and Humanity…5.

177 “Dutch Rescue 2500 Chinese in Java,” Townsville Daily Bulletin, 13 June 1946.
178 Sin Po, 5 June 1946.
179 Star Weekly, 16 June 1946

70
Figure 3. The remnants of Chinese dwellings in Tangerang. Source: Algemene Secretarie en de Daarbij
Gedeponeerde Archieven (1942-1950). Inv. Nr. 5521.

Figure 4. The remnants of a house in the interior of Tangerang. Source: Star Weekly, 30 June 1946.

71
 In the first few days of the violence (2-3 June 1946) 3,600 Chinese fled into the Dutch lines
at central Tangerang, although they were denied passage by Laskar Rakyat. Thereafter they were
concentrated in the villages southwest of Tangerang, including 1,200 in the police barracks of
Curug.180 Meanwhile, the situation of Chinese in the interior of Tangerang also worsened, with
many of Chinese robbed, raped and even killed.181 By 12 June 1946 it was estimated that over 600
Chinese had been murdered.

All Chinese residents in Sepatan, Radjeg, and the surrounding areas were ordered by TRI
through chief villages to take refuge temporarily in Mauk on 2 June. Indonesian authorities
promised that the Chinese would be housed in protected areas far from Pamong Pradja (civil
servants) and TRI. In Mauk, more than 2,500 refugees were placed in six Chinese-owned
buildings.182 Seven refugee centers in Mauk housed 984 Chinese. Based on their accounts, they
were robbed blind by the extremists, and some of them had witnessed family members being
executed.183

The Chinese condition in Mauk went from bad to worse. They were often tortured by TRI
and Laskar Rakyat. 1,000 men in Mauk prison were left without food for four days.184 Moreover,
based on a statement of a Chinese survivor from Mauk, Chinese were slaughtered on a daily
basis. Until 10 June 1946, there were more than 2,000 Chinese in the refugee centers.185

“Monday, 10 June 1946. Since 07.00 an emergency alarm had been continuously sounded in
Tangerang. Intermittently, we heard that people shouted Siap! Siap! (Get ready!). Member of
Laskar Rakyat were flocking on the road with their weapon unsheathed. They kept shouting and
look really confused. We also became confused and really scared. Maybe there was another riot
and we would again become a victim. This vacillation lasted for almost two hours. And
approximately at 09.00 we heard a fire. Initially we heard that sound from faraway, but then it
became closer and closer. Suddenly our door was smashed. We saw a group of armed soldiers
together with 4-5 Chinese among them went inside. They purposely came to Mauk in order to
liberate Chinese people who were captured by extremists.” (Star Weekly, 16 June 1946.)

"Wekelijkse Inlichtingenrapporten van 23th Indian Division over Java, April-Juli." Ministerie van Defensie
180

Collectie Archieven Strijdkrachten in Ned. Indie (1938-1939) 1941-1957) [1960]. Inv. Nr: 147.
181 Star Weekly, 9 June 1946.
182 Merdeka, 14 June 1946.
183 Zaman Baroe, 26 June 1946.
184 Townsville Daily Bulletin, 13 June 1946.
185 Thien Sung, 7 June 1946.

72
 Map 5. Map of Tangerang made by Star Weekly when the massacre was still going on. Source: Star
Weekly, 9 June 1946.

Within a week (15-22 June), from an area west of Tangerang, more than 1,000 Chinese
were evacuated from Mauk to Tangerang, including hundreds or women and children.
Nevertheless, many Chinese were still trapped in Kendal, Kemiri, Pengalengan, Werabas, and in
the surrounding areas of Mauk. In Curug and Jati Betung more than 1,200 Tionghoa were still
imprisoned by Laskar Rakyat and TRI.186 A stream of thousands of Chinese refugees continuously
flowed into the cities of Tangerang or Jakarta.187 Star Weekly likened the Chinese in Tangerang to
“an animal ready for slaughter, its meat to be distributed to citizens and soldiers.”188

186 Zaman Baroe, 11 June 1946.

187 Star Weekly, 23 June 1946.
188 Star Weekly, 30 June 1946.

73
 Figure 5. Chinese Refugees in Curug. Source: Star Weekly, 23 June 1946.

There was no significant information that could explain the situation in Curug, Cikupa,
Legok, and the district of Serpong, because communication with the government in Tangerang
was temporarily cut off. The Tangerang district was quite safe, with only Teluk Naga suffering a
minor incident. Four barracks were established in Tangerang to accommodate 3,500 refugees,
while 1,500 others lived with their relatives. Many opted to flee to Jakarta or Krawang because
both areas were not affected by the tragedy. In Cikupa, where the Chinese numbered over 1,700,
the district officer promised to protect lives and property of the Chinese people. Until 11 June
1946, more than 2,400 Chinese sought refuge in Jakarta, two-thirds of them women and children.
1,300 of them would be placed in seven different refugee camps, some of them in Chinese-owned
storage warehouses—Alaydroeslaan, Laan Songsi, along the way of Laan Songsi, Mangga Dua,
Toko Tiga Seberang, Kampung Malaka 45, and Tangsi Polisi Glodok, while the remainder stayed
with their relatives in Jakarta.189

Transporting was not without its difficulties. Many Chinese were still captured or
‘secured’ by Indonesian extremists, who controlled the border, which made Chinese hesitant to

189 Star Weekly, 16 June 1946

74
stray from their hiding places. In Mauk, Dutch troops and Chinese volunteers evacuated Chinese
who had been left behind. Meanwhile in Gandu, thousands of Chinese refugees from Cilongok
and Pasar Kemis had to wait until ‘Komite Penolong Keselamatan Korban Tionghoa’ sent 55
Chinese pemuda to rescue them. The Chinese in Gandu were lucky, as the village chief was willing
to help them; this was not always the case.

3.4. The Losses

The Tangerang affair created a massive loss for Chinese. However, an intriguing fact
about the tragedy is the different number of casualties given by Indonesians, Chinese, and the
Dutch. Based on the narrative of the Chinese survivors, the number of casualties of Tangerang
incident from 3-15 June was 177 men, 92 women, and 97 children were killed; 59 men, 40 women
and 70 children were missing; and 864 men, 960 women and 1312 children flee to Jakarta.190

According to the official report received by Jang Seng Ie Red Cross in Batavia, about 653
Chinese were murdered around Tangerang, including 136 females and 36 children. About 1,269
Chinese houses were burnt down and 236 ruined, with approximately 25,000 refugees in Batavia
from the suburbs of Tangerang.191 Another source also mentioned that the number of casualties
in Tangerang reached 1,800, including 385 women and 291 children.192

Star Weekly reported on the damages in Tangerang: 40-50 kampung were devastated; 1,200
dwellings looted and flattened; 700 Chinese massacred, 200 of them women and children; 200
Chinese missing; material damages in excess of 7 million rupiah (Japanese notes).193 Meanwhile
Merdeka reported ‘only’ 132 Chinese killed in Tangerang until 14 June 1946 and 100 houses were
razed in Sepatan, Rajeg, Cilongok, Karawaci, Jati, Kramat, Bajoerkali, Rawasaban, Sangean, etc.194

190 Soember Penerangan, 22 June 1946.

191Memorandum Outlining Acts of Violence and Humanity Perpetrated by Indonesian Bands on Innocent Chinese
before and after the Dutch Police Action was enforced on July 21, 1947 (Batavia: Chung Hua Tsung Hui, 1947),
5-6. Meanwhile according to Indonesian Information Minister, Mohammed Natsir, ‘only’ 100 Chinese
houses were burnt by Indonesians, 140 Chinese were killed, 40 were missing and 2,000 were "under
protective custody of the Republican Army." “Natsir Talks on the Massacre,” The Straits Times, 14 June 1946;
The Sydney Morning Herald, 15 June 1946.
192 "Stop this Slaughter: Appeal by Chinese," The Singapore Free Press, 16 August 1947.
193 Star Weekly, 16 June 1946
194 Merdeka, 14 June 1946.

75
Merdeka’s estimation became the official statistics issued by the government of Indonesia, which
was far lower than the estimation issued by the Dutch or Chinese.

The Chinese Committee also issued a number of casualties in Tangerang. From 3 June to
1 July 1946, about 573 Chinese were killed, 212 missing and 11,035 flee to Jakarta.195The Federation
of Chinese Associations (Chung Hua Chung Hui) of the Central Committee in Jakarta, as quoted
from Aneta, reported that 703 men, 239 women and 143 children (1085 in total) died as a result of
massacre in Tangerang. Meanwhile, 78 men, 51 women, and 84 children (213 in total) were still
missing. More than 15,300 had escaped to from Tangerang to Jakarta. This number was based on
a report from 3 June up to 15 July 1946.196

Based on a report compiled by Komite Tionghoa Pembantu Keamanan Umum Jakarta to

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Indonesian Republic, details of victims of Tangerang Affairs
from 3 June-9 July 1946 were as follows: 703 men, 239 women and 143 children were killed; 78
men, 51 women, and 84 children were still missing; and the number of Chinese refugees who
arrived safely in Jakarta were 4,085 men, 4,353 women, and 6,862 children.197

Table 2. Information on Specific Areas in the Tangerang District until 16 June 1946 198

Area/Neighborhood Onderdistrict Severely Minor Unclear Safe

Damaged Damaged
Kemiri Mauk V
Kosambi Mauk V
Karang Serang Mauk V
Patra Menggala Mauk V
Mauk Mauk V
Keboen Baroe Mauk V
Ketapang Mauk V
Tandjung Kait Mauk V
Kendal Mauk V
Cadas Sepatan V
Kali Baroe Sepatan V
Rawa Sabab Sepatan V
Rawa Beureum Sepatan V
Bajoer Sepatan V
Sewan Kebon Sepatan V

195 Pandji Ra’jat, 19 July 1946.

196 Soeloeh Ra’jat, 22 July 1946
197 Algemene Secretarie en de Daarbij Gedeponeerde Archieven (1942-1950). Inv. Nr. 5521.
198The table made based on data given by Star Weekly. Some areas/neighborhoods are not mentioned by
the source. See Star Weekly, 16 June 1946.

76
 Gandoe Sepatan V
Etek Sepatan V
Kelapa Dua Curug V
Kelapa Satu Curug V
Rawacana Curug V
Sabi Curug V
Curug Curug V
Cikupa Cikupa V
Legok Legok V
Cisauk Serpong V
Lengkong Kulon Serpong V
Pondok Jagung Serpong V
Teluk Naga Tangerang V
Karawaci Ilir Tangerang V
Lengkong Tangerang V
Kebon Nanas Tangerang V
Pekulonan Tangerang V
Source: Star Weekly, 16 June 1946

3.5. Different Accounts, Different Interpretations

Table 3. The Chronology of Tangerang Occupation as Written by Ibrahim Abdoellah 199

Date Information

20 May 1946 People panicked and fled Serpong after NICA fired a mortar.

22 May 1946 Serpong locals protested the decision of TRI.

23 May 1946 An order to withdraw to the west of Cisadane was issued by the TRI headquarters.

24 May 1946 Most locations around Tangerang were empty, with only a TRI and Laskar Rakyat
presence.

26 May 1946 Laskar Rakyat and the Police Army captured an informant, who alleged that many
Chinese worked as spies for NICA.

27 May 1946 TRI left Tangerang following heavy shelling from NICA forces.

28 May 1946 A blast was heard from Tangerang. NICA moved forward to Batuceper. Many people,
including members of Laskar Rakyat who lived across Cisadane River, decided to flee.
NICA occupied Tangerang at 13.00.

199Ibrahim Abdullah was a member of Indonesian Republican Army (TRI). "Tentara," Documenten
Balaradja, Zakboekje van Ibrahim Abdoellah, NEFIS Document No. 1891.

77
 2 June 1946 A battle broke out in nearby Djati. NICA bombarded Kampung Cimone and Kampung
Cibodas before entering Djati. TRI, with the help of the locals, banded together to fight
NICA, who were forced to withdraw to Tangerang. Several kampung in Pabuaran were
burned. Many Chinese were killed by 'rakyat.'

3 June 1946 Laskar Rakyat, with the help of the locals, indiscriminately killed Chinese people
around Djati, as they were thought to be NICA spies.

7 June 1946 A 'Civil Investigation Base' was established, which oversaw the outsiders who entered
the village, and investigate the Chinese community.

The diary of Ibrahim Abdoellah shows, chronologically, that the occupation of Tangerang
was related to the involvement of Laskar Rakyat and TRI. Although TRI had to withdraw from
the city of Tangerang, the situation in the interior of Tangerang remained under their jurisdiction
and responsibility. Laskar Rakyat refused to leave the city, and aimed to die defending it. The
situation in the interior of Tangerang grew increasingly dire, as many Chinese were killed. The
diary also mentions that Laskar Rakyat successfully incited the local population to loot Chinese
buildings or to kill Chinese. The involvement of both Laskar Rakyat and TRI in the Tangerang
massacre, despite being glaringly obvious, remains silenced in Indonesian historiography.

Different accounts naturally interpret the massacre differently. The heightened tension
during the revolution provided an opportunity for the Dutch to lay the blame on the Indonesian
government for not being able to maintain law and order within its regions. Conversely, the
Indonesian government accused both the Dutch and the Chinese for causing the massacre. With
these inherent biases and motives in play, it is difficult to find neutral media information
provided during the revolutionary period. In this sub-chapter, I provide information on
prominent newspapers who reported on the massacre, in order to obtain further data and to
understand the politics behind their reportage.

78
 Table 4. A List of Newspapers from the Indonesian Revolutionary Period Used

Publisher/Printing
Newspapers Language City Orientation Circulation
House

Aneta Persbureau Aneta Dutch Jakarta Dutch ---

Stichting Nederlandse
Het Dagblad Dutch Jakarta Dutch 21,000
Dagblad Pers Batavia

Badan Penerbit
Merdeka Merdeka/Pemandang Indonesian Jakarta Republic 6,000
an

The Voice of Free

--- English Jakarta Republic ---
Indonesia

Thien Sung Yit Po Thien Sung Yit Po Chinese Jakarta Kuomintang 9,000

Het Inzicht --- Dutch Jakarta Republic ---

Sin Po200 Sin Po Indonesian/Chinese Jakarta --- 30,523

Star Weekly
Keng Po Indonesian Jakarta --- 8,500
(Weekly)

Soeloeh Merdeka --- Indonesian Pematang Siantar Republic ---

New China Times Sin Chung Hwa Indonesian Medan --- 3,000

Soeloeh Ra’jat Locomotief Indonesian Semarang Dutch 5,000

Vrije Pers De Vrije Pers Dutch Surabaya Dutch 10,000

Chinese Consulate Red

Daily Telegraph Chinese Makassar Kuomintang 1,350
Yu Chian Kuo

Anti-
Lee Ming Pao Lee Ming Press Chinese Pontianak 1,500-2,000
Kuomintang

Zaman Baroe Rumah Frater Padang Indonesian Padang --- ---

Source: Perslijst Indonesië (Jakarta: Regerings Voorlichtings Dienst, 1949).

200
*Chinese and Indonesian Edition

79
 As the biggest radio and news agency of the Indonesian Republic during the
revolutionary period, Antara played an important role in disseminating news to the Indonesian
public. During the revolution time, Antara became an important tool of the Indonesian Republic
to spread anti-Dutch propaganda. Antara used the Tangerang massacre to blame the Dutch of
endangering lives in the name of Dutch military strategy. Antara accused the Chinese of assisting
the Dutch under the group name ‘NICA-Chinese’, to oppress the local population.201 These
accusations by Antara were then used as the main reference point of other Republican newspapers
like Merdeka, Oetoesan Sumatera or Soeloeh Merdeka. Zaman Baroe criticized Antara to spread hoax
news by saying it was the Dutch who committed all crimes in Tangerang and for trying to twist
all the truths by showing to the world how cruel the Dutch and the Chinese were.202

Antara lauded the effort of TRI Banten, who informed the local people that the Chinese
were not enemies of the Republic quickly, so that by 8 June 1946, the situation in Tangerang was
already under control. Chinese residents were reported that they felt safe under the protection of
Laskar Rakyat, Indonesian soldiers, and Police Army.203 However, if we compare the news with
reports from Chinese, Australian, and Dutch newspapers, it was obvious that the first two weeks
of Dutch occupation in Tangerang were the tensest period for the Chinese refugees. Both Star
Weekly and Sin Po published articles that reported that the Chinese feared Laskar Rakyat. All
across Tangerang, murders, arson, and robberies continued. If Star Weekly and Sin Po were correct
in their assumption that Laskar Rakyat was the main perpetrator of the incident, it is highly
unlikely that the Chinese residents felt safe under Laskar Rakyat’s protection. It is highly likely
that this was merely Merdeka propaganda to show the Indonesian public that the Republic could
control the situation in Tangerang.

Meanwhile, Het Inzicht, a weekly pro-Indonesia magazine published in Dutch, described

the Tangerang incident as a demonstration of vicious vengeance and retaliation against the
Dutch. Just like Merdeka and other Republican newspapers, Het Inzicht also blamed the Dutch for
the tragedy.

Ministerie van Defensie Collectie Archieven Strijdkrachten in Ned. Indie (1938-1939) 1941-1957) [1960]. Inv.
201

Nr: 147.
202 Zaman Baroe, 22 June 1946.
203 Merdeka, 10 June 1946.

80
 "Only a third party, the Dutch reactionaries who want Indonesia to revert to a colony, will reap
benefit from such troubles. And the profit they make consists not only of thousands of Chinese
soldiers who join the NICA for revenge, but also political propaganda to reoccupy Indonesia." 204

Merdeka reported at least six reasons why Chinese were attacked in Tangerang. First, there
was a Chinese who removed the Indonesian flag. Second, Chinese were armed by NICA, who
then attacked civilians on the West of the Cisadane River. Third, these armed Chinese fired upon
elders and children. Fourth, the Chinese were used as NICA’s henchmen to find Laskar Rakyat
and other Indonesian pemuda. Fifth, the Chinese allegedly spread a rumor that the Indonesian
nation would last only three days. Sixth, NICA burnt people’s dwellings in Djati, and rumors
spread that the action was committed by Chinese NICA agents.205

Furthermore, Merdeka also reported that the tragedy in Tangerang was triggered by the
Chinese themselves: “Some Chinese groups secretly or openly assisted the Dutch troops and what
they did harmed the Indonesian Republic.”206 The day afterwards, Merdeka published another
accusatory article that pointed to “the involvement of Chinese who fought in the Dutch side as
the main cause.” The article went on to say: “People who saw that some Chinese had sided with
NICA started to lose control…It was obvious, more or less, that the disorder was triggered by a
few Chinese who held NICA weapons.”207

Rosihan Anwar, a Merdeka journalist, had done his own investigation in Tangerang, and
arrived at several observations. He classified the society in Tangerang into two categories:
powerful landlords and poor farmers. Landlords were usually Chinese, who Rosihan categorizes
as capitalist-bourgeois who only exploited farmers, casting them out from their lands once that
they had taken their daughters. This situation was possible because the Chinese were protected
by notorious Dutch ‘marechaussee’ and ‘veldpolitie’ in Tangerang. Such an image became deeply
entrenched in people’s minds, eventually resulting in uprisings, like in the cases of Tangerang
(1916) and Batuceper (1934). Poverty in Tangerang also contributed to the growing violence in

204 As quoted in Persahabatan Indonesia-Tionghoa (Jakarta: Kementerian Penerangan, April 1946).

205 Merdeka, 11 June 1946.
206 Merdeka, 6 June 1946.
207 Merdeka, 7 June 1946.

81
Tangerang, with robberies and penggedoran becoming commonplace.208 Moreover, according to
Rosihan, the Indonesians in Tangerang were a mixed race descended from soldier-convicts and
pirates from Bugis and Siam, who had been committing various crimes in Tangerang for several
centuries ago. The Tangerang area itself had been used as a dumping ground for those convicts.209

3.6. Responses of Chinese-Indonesians Communities and Press

At a meeting of the Daily Affairs Council of the Chinese General Association in Jakarta on
7 June 1946, it was decided that 11 June 1946 would be a day of mourning for the victims of the
Tangerang massacre. In accordance with this, all Chinese residents of Batavia would not report
for work on the said day. Their announcement, released on 8 June 1946, outlines the points of
their protest: “(1) To express our grief for our brothers in Tangerang who suffered greatly; (2) To
protest the many atrocities and unlawful actions in Tangerang; and (3) To bemoan the failure of
the authorities of the Allied Forces and TRI to fulfill their responsibility in protecting the Chinese
residents.”210 This call to protest was echoed by the Federation of Chinese Associations (CHTH)
in Batavia.211

Figure 6. An advertisement published in Star Weekly calling for the mourning of all victims in
Tangerang. Source: Star Weekly, 9 June 1946.

208 Merdeka, 13 June 1946.

209 Merdeka, 13 June 1946.
210 Sin Po, 6 June 1946.
211 "Request to be Protected," The Straits Times, 11 June 1946.

82
 Several Chinese organizations also made several decisive actions, among them forming a
12-man investigative committee to inquire into the Tangerang massacre. Within a week of the
incident, the committee traveled to Tangerang to collect evidence, assess the situation, and ease
tensions. While the committee promoted Sino-Indonesian friendship in Tangerang, miles away,
the lives and property of 10,000 Chinese residents remained in the hands of TRI. Their condition,
as Sin Po wrote, could hardly be imagined.212

On 16 June 1946, Dr. Thung Sin Nio called a meeting of women of various ethnicities at
her home at Kramat 99, Jakarta. During the meeting, it was decided that a protest would be
launched against the massacre of hundreds innocent men, women, and children. The protest
would not merely to show their grief for the victims of the Tangerang massacre, but also to raise
awareness about similar incidents in Semarang, Surabaya, Ambarawa, Bandung, and Bekasi. The
women’s meeting also produced a petition that urged the United Nations to expedite peace
negotiations between the Netherlands and Indonesia.213

In Malang, lawyers Oei Yong Tjioe and Tan Po Goan spoke at a meeting of Malang
Chinese, appealing for cooperation between the Chinese and Indonesians. The following
resolutions were adopted: (1) The Indonesian government would be requested to protect the
security of various nationals within their country; (2) The British and Dutch military authorities
would be requested to cease all military action in order to prevent further harm against the
Chinese community in Indonesia; (3) A committee dedicated to handling the affairs concerning
Tangerang refugees would be established.214

CHTH attempted to rally support from the United Nations Security Council (U.N.). The
CHTH chairman in Batavia, Hung Yuan, made an appeal to the U.N. in the name of humanity
and justice to call upon the Republican Government to release thousands of Chinese civilians who
remained Republican prisoners. The U.N, Hung Yuan suggested, should call on the Republic to
pay indemnification worth 100 million guilders, and to severely punish Indonesians who had a

212 Sin Po, 13 June 1946.

213 Sin Po, 22 June 1946.
214 Thien Sung Yit Po, 25 June 1946.

83
part in the atrocities. "If Indonesians feel that they have a right to independence, the Chinese have
full right not to be treated as animals," Hung Yuan remarked.215

The Tangerang massacre triggered vast responses from Chinese newspapers in Indonesia.
Almost all of them deplored the massacre, and demanded that the Indonesian government claim
responsibility for such a heinous crime. Chinese newspapers sharply countered all allegations
hurled by their Indonesian counterparts. Sin Po, the most prominent peranakan newspaper in
Indonesia at that time, wrote in an article titled “Sad and Indignant City”, that Indonesian
extremists in Tangerang were as cruel as the former Japanese invaders.216 Pandji Ra’jat even called
this Republic as Republic ‘Made in Japan’ and ‘Fascist Republic’ because the protection system
for Chinese people was fallible and vulnerable.217

On 8 June 1946, an article published in Sin Po stated that the Tangerang tragedy was not
merely a misfortune to mankind, but also one of the greatest misfortunes to the ‘weaker race.’218
The Tangerang tragedy, according to the article, exposed the weak points of the Indonesian race,
and was detrimental to the Indonesian fight for independence. Furthermore, an apology was
insufficient to amend all the wrongs done to the Chinese community in Indonesia. The article
advised a thorough investigation of the tragedy, the prosecution and severe punishment of
perpetrators, and a guarantee of safety for all Chinese persons and property. Only after fulfilling
these three suggestions could a peaceful coexistence between Chinese and Indonesians occur.219

A rumor about the involvement of Chinese in NICA already spread rapidly, justifying the
capture or killing of any Chinese who was considered suspicious. This was heavily criticized by
Star Weekly: “If it was true that several Chinese served as Dutch soldiers (maybe because one of
their relatives was executed by Indonesian extremists), why were only Chinese targeted?”
Furthermore, Star Weekly questioned why many innocent Chinese children and women were also
executed. Just like ‘bersiap’ held negative connotations for minority groups, ‘merdeka’ (freedom)

215 "U.N.O Receives Complaint from Indonesia,” The Straits Times, 11 August 1946.
216 Sin Po, 6 June 1946.
217 Pandji Ra’jat, 2 July 1946.
218The term was specifically addressed by Sin Po to describe the miserable conditions of Chinese who were
victimized during the Dutch occupation of Tangerang.
219 Sin Po, 7 June 1946.

84
also had negative connotation to the Chinese. To them, it was a warning that they might get
raped, robbed, killed or become a victim of other kinds of violence.220 Meanwhile, Sin Po, the
biggest peranakan newspaper in Indonesia, said that the articles published by Merdeka had no basis
in fact.221

Star Weekly attempted to address the numerous rumors and hearsay circulating about the
Tangerang massacre. It rejected all Rosihan’s accusations, and claimed that the Red-White flag in
the office of Tangerang district was not removed by the Chinese, as Merdeka reported, but by a
Dutchman who replaced that flag with the Dutch flag. Star Weekly boasted eyewitnesses who
could confirm their statements. Furthermore, as there were no Chinese in NICA, it would be
impossible for Chinese to be involved in the burning of Indonesian dwellings. While Star Weekly
did not deny that Chinese landlords did oppress Indonesians during the colonial period, it said
that fellow Chinese as well as Indonesians were subject to the oppression of the Chinese landlord.
Thus, it would be very odd if Chinese, of whom the majority were poor, were victimized. In
response to a claim that local people in Tangerang were a mixture of pirates and convicts, Star
Weekly cited other areas like Sumatra, Ambarawa, Bandung, and Surabaya, where Chinese also
suffered greatly. The weekly adds: "The rumor that a Chinese has removed Indonesian flag has
never been clarified by the Indonesian government, as if they intend to mislead people. How
many Chinese flags have been torn and trampled by Indonesians in Jakarta? Everybody already
knew about that.222

Sin Po heavily criticized Indonesian newspapers, particularly Merdeka, for their glaring
lack of journalistic integrity, and for frequently manipulating facts: “It is regrettable that the
Indonesian pressmen have not fulfilled their responsibility of printing the truth. Merdeka
newspaper, a vessel for Indonesian propaganda, blamed the Dutch for the tragedy in Tangerang
while neglecting to mention the involvement of TRI and Laskar Rakyat.223 Merdeka articles, Sin Po
said, were nothing but lies.224

220 Star Weekly, 9 June 1946.

221 Sin Po, 7 June 1946
222 Star Weekly, 16 June 1946.
223 Sin Po, 10 June 1946.
224 Sin Po, 7 June 1946

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3.7. Responses of Indonesian Officials

After the Tangerang massacre, Sukarno and Sutan Sjahrir, the Indonesian Prime Minister
(1945-47), apologized on the behalf of the Indonesian people, and promised to increase protection
for foreign residents. At the same, they released an official statement blaming the Dutch for the
atrocities in Tangerang. Sukarno and Sjahrir, unlike Merdeka and other Republican newspapers,
noticeably did not explicitly blame the Chinese of siding with NICA. Neither did they mention
the involvement of Laskar Rakyat or TRI in the massacre.

An official apology issued by Sutan Sjahrir was broadcast on the radio a week after the
incident. Sjahrir expressed his regret and sorrow regarding the situation in Tangerang, and to the
victimized Chinese in Tangerang. He said that the massacre occurred because the Indonesian
army was forced to leave Tangerang, adding: “Our struggle is not only to defend external attacks,
but the most important thing is to improve internal safety in our own country and also to be free
from atrocities and arbitrary actions.”225

“I express my regret and condolences to all the victims in Tangerang. The incident was a result of
the retreat of Indonesian soldiers from an area that was supposed to be under their guard. I
personally address my sorrow to Chinese people who were severely abused in the tragedy.”
(Merdeka, 7 June 1946).

Sjahrir admitted that he was unable to control the situation. He blamed Dutch troops for
having cut the Indonesian government's communication lines with the Republican troops in the
vicinity of Tangerang, and accused the Allies of using heavy mortars and artillery during their
occupation.226 Moreover, according to Sjahrir, the Indonesians who committed the massacre were
'under nobody's control' and were 'pure gangsters with no motive other than thirst for blood.'227
The Republican Government also blamed the Allies because of their tactics of advancing and then
falling back, leaving formerly captured areas to the Republican army.228

225"Perjuangan kita bukan merupakan perjuangan pertahanan terhadap keluar, tetapi juga lebih penting
lagi ialah menyempurnakan keamanan dalam negeri sendiri juga lepas dari kekejaman dan perbuatan
sewenang-wenang." Zaman Baroe, 8 June 1946.
226 “Indonesians said to be Massing: Java Situation Deteriorates,” The Argus, 8 June 1946.
227 "Dutch Failed to Stop Massacre," The Straits Times, 7 June 1946.
228 “Batavia Press on Status of Chinese,” The Straits Times, 19 June 1946

86
 Sjahrir’s argument was supported by the Minister of Information of Indonesia,
Mohammed Natsir (1946-47). Yet, interestingly, Natsir put the blame on the Tionghoa massacre
on both the Dutch and the Chinese themselves. The Dutch, according to Natsir, 'forced' the
Republican Army to leave a four-mile deep no man's land west of the Cisadane River,229 making
it impossible to maintain law and order in this zone, where the greater part of the anti-Chinese
incidents occurred.230 Prior to the incident, he noted that Dutch troops had crossed the Cisadane
River several times and razed more than 100 houses. To add insult to injury, Tionghoa had been
armed by the Dutch to search for extremists near Tangerang,231 and took down the Indonesian
flag from Tangerang at the instigation of the Dutch. Natsir’s statement again did not mention any
involvement of Laskar Rakyat, TRI or Police-Army as the main perpetrators. Republican
newspapers systematically downplayed their roles in the killings. Moreover, Natsir also charged
Chinese with taking down the Indonesian flag from Tangerang at the instigation of the Dutch.232
His official statement regarding the involvement of Chinese in NICA made Natsir the first
Indonesian official who alluded to the issue.

The accusation regarding Chinese collaboration with enemy troops existed even prior to
the Tangerang massacre. Findings from the Indonesian Intelligence Department revealed that
many Chinese indeed welcomed the restoration of the Dutch administration.233 Sukarno later
addressed the issue of Chinese collaboration during a meeting in Yogyakarta, expressing his
regret that many Chinese in Jakarta, Surabaya, Semarang, and Bandung had directly assisted the
Dutch troops in destroying the monetary and economic structure of Indonesia.234 Discontent was
widespread even in the popular media. Pro-Indonesian newspapers such as 'Ra'jat' and 'Merdeka'
revealed their dissatisfaction with Chinese residents in Java, accusing them of assisting NICA
troops. Sin Po indirectly admitted that some Chinese might have been collaborators: "Although

229Cisadane River separated Dutch and Indonesian controlled territories during the battle. “Java Massacre
of Chinese Reported,” The Straits Times, 6 June 1946.
230 “Batavia Press on Status of Chinese,” The Straits Times, 19 June 1946.
231 Soember Penerangan, 15 June 1946; Zaman Baroe, 18 June 1946.
232 The Straits Times, 14 June 1946; The Sydney Morning Herald, 15 June 1946.
233 Sin Po, 23 March 1946.
234 Sin Po, 23 March 1946.

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the action of the Indonesian youths towards the Chinese residents in many places is improper
and not necessary, we have to admit our own faults."235

Sukarno, as aforementioned, used the Tangerang tragedy as propaganda, accusing NICA

and the Dutch government of masterminding it. According to him, the arrival of Dutch forces in
Tangerang arose the anger of the people, resulting in the massacre: “The Tangerang invasion by
the Dutch soldiers was only a phase in our struggle. The Dutch should be responsible for all
murder and robberies of Chinese in that area!”236 However, Sukarno also admitted to the
dysfunction of the Tangerang government in a speech he gave on Antara Radio: “As a result of
the absence of the state, the Chinese in Tangerang were attacked by our people…I deeply regret
the sad incident because it contradicts with our spirit of Chinese-Indonesian friendship.”237 In
closing, he encouraged all parties to respect the lives and property of Chinese in Indonesia.

“I instruct to all government officials, to all civil servants, to army, to police, to all militia
organizations, and to all Indonesian people, to protect and respect the lives and property of
Chinese and other foreign nations in our Republican territory.” (Merdeka, 10 June 1946)

Sukarno apologized yet again to all Chinese victims during the CHCH congress (8-11
March 1947) in Solo, Central Java. It was a momentous occasion for him to publicly declare his
sympathy for the Chinese victims, especially since the Tangerang massacre was followed by other
such massacres in Palembang and Bagan Siapi-Api. The congress had many important
delegates— Sjamsoeri, the mayor of Solo; Raden Pandji Soeroso, representatives from the
Ministry of Home Affairs and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; the General Consulate of China;
and members of San Min Chu I Tsing Nien Tua. Also present at the congress were representatives
of CHCH’s Java and Madura chapters, CHCH being the organization that represented the voice
of the Chinese community in Indonesia. Thus, it was of utmost importance for Sukarno to attract

235In a majority of cases, the 'improper' actions were their involvement in a black market, smuggled Dutch
notes from the interior. Most of them believed in Dutch soldiers’ protection, instead of Indonesian troops.
However, many of Chinese also sided with the Indonesians, such as John Lie or Siauw Giok Tjhan, and
some of them did not have any choice than supporting the Indonesians, since over 80% of the Chinese
residents in Java were living in regions under the control of the Indonesians. See Sin Po, 23 March 1946.
236 Merdeka, 10 June 1946.
237 Merdeka, 10 June 1946.

88
Chinese sympathy, and to show the world that Indonesia cared about the welfare of the Chinese.
Before the meeting officially started, Sukarno declared:

“There is no one who deeply regrets what happened in Tangerang, Palembang and Bagan Siapi-
api more than me. Together with this, I would like to apologize... To all my people, I would like to
say that the Indonesia nation indeed has killed and robbed Tionghoa with amok in Tangerang,
Palembang and Bagan Siapi-Api. It is a stain on the Indonesia nation! I call all Indonesians to hold
your honor firmly! Ultimately, as a head of state, I call all audience to shout together: “Long live
Republic of China! Long live the Republic of Indonesia! Long live the China-Indonesia unity!”238

As a consequence of internal and external pressure, the Republican Government acted to

resolve the tension between Indonesians and Chinese. A committee was established by the
Indonesian government in order to investigate the cause of the Tangerang massacre. It consisted
of Mohammad Natsir, Nugroho, Lim Hok Soei, Mr. Masrin, Tubagus Aksan, all from the Ministry
of Information; Kadir Said of Antara Newspaper; Rosihan Anwar of Merdeka Newspaper; Lee
Soei Ke of Sin Po; Oey Kim Sen & Go King Liong of Sin Ming Hui; two TRI Officers, and a
representative from the Ministry of Interior. Investigations formally commenced a week after the
Tangerang massacre. From Jakarta, the committee traveled to Bogor, Jasinga, Rangkasbitung,
Serang, Pontang, Lontar, Mauk and Rajeg. In Jasinga, they talked with an ex-chief of Tangerang,
who was one of the refugees who had managed to escape from Tangerang. He explained his
confusion regarding the massacre, as, prior to it, relationships between Chinese and Indonesians
gave no indication of any hostility. Many Chinese supported 'Fonds Kemerdekaan' and the
Indonesian Red Cross, and had even established a restaurant catering especially to TRI. While in
the same area, the committee also met with Dudung Patrnosukarto, a battalion commander of
TRI in Jasinga. When he was questioned about the Tangerang massacre, Dudung pointed to the
involvement of Polisi Tentara in that massacre. He said that the group had a negative reputation,

238Tidak seorang lebih menyesal atas kejadian di Tangerang, Palembang dan Bagan Siapi-api selain saya.
Begitulah di sini saya menghaturkan maaf saya… Kepada rakyat saya, saya mengatakan bahwa bangsa
Indonesia ketika terjadinya peristiwa Tangerang, Palembang dan Bagan Siapi-Api, benar telah merampok
dan membunuh bangsa Tionghoa secara mata gelap. Ini merupakan satu noda bagi bangsa Indonesia! Saya
menyerukan kepada bangsa Indonesia, peganglah teguh kehormatanmu! Pada akhirnya sebagai Kepala
Negara dengan sangat gembira saya menyerukan kepada semua hadirin supaya bersama bersorak:
Hiduplah Republik Tiongkok! Hiduplah Republik Indonesia! Hiduplah Persatuan Tionghoa-Indonesia!”
See Soeloeh Ra’jat, 11 & 13 March 1947.

89
and that they were notorious for stealing from Chinese residents, and in some cases for acting
crueler than the Japanese soldiers.239

A meeting between Chinese and Indonesians was held as soon as the committee arrived
in Rangkasbitung. The Minister of Information of Indonesia, Mohammed Natsir (1946-47) stated
that freedom could not be interpreted as a call to rob or kill Chinese: “We have a duty to guarantee
lives and property of Chinese and foreign residents who are not the Republic’s enemy. The
Chinese are a nation that have been living in Indonesia for more than 300 years, thus they are not
our enemy but our brother.”240

An organization called the Chinese-Indonesian Committee for Relief of Tangerang

Refugees was established in Jakarta on 18 June 1946 in order to facilitate refugees from Tangerang
who escaped to Jakarta.241 Meanwhile in Krawang, a joint Sino-Indonesian association was
formed on 18 June 1946 in order to promote friendship between Indonesians and Chinese. The
aim of this organization was to supply food to the Chinese refugees from Tangerang and to
strengthen friendship and cooperation between the two races.242

Furthermore, Sjahrir also chose Tan Po Goan, a 35-year-old Chinese barrister born in Java,
to become a Cabinet Minister. Tan’s main task was to close the breach between Chinese and
Indonesians. To achieve that, Tan planned to establish a national Chinese society with a two-fold
purpose. First, it would attempt to explain the political sentiments of the Indonesians to the
Indonesian Chinese, and to clarify the goals that Indonesian nationalism hoped to achieve.
Second, it would provide unified opposition to any anti-Chinese measures which local authorities
or groups might take. Tan argued that both individuals at the Chinese and Indonesian sides, not
the Republican Government, were at fault, and that the Tangerang incident was the result of
jealousy over the economic prosperity enjoyed by the Chinese: "The Republican Government is
very friendly to the Chinese but the Indonesian masses do not share that feeling."243

239 Star Weekly, 16 June 1946.

240 Star Weekly, 16 June 1946.
241 Thien Sung Yit Po, 19 June 1946.
242 Democratic Daily News, 21 June 1946.
243 "Mr. Tan Tries to Heal the Breach," The Singapore Free Press, 20 February 1947

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3.8. Responses of the Chinese Government

The involvement of the Chinese government in dealing with overseas Chinese crisis in
Indonesia became more apparent with the placing of seven Nationalist Chinese Consuls in Jakarta
and several other cities. Tsiang Chia Tung (Jiang Jiadong)244 was personally sent to Jakarta in
January 1946 in order to assert and champion the neutrality of the Chinese during a war between
Dutch-Indonesian. As China did not recognize the independence of Indonesia, Tsiang was sent
to liaise with the government of the Netherlands.245

However, communication between China and Indonesia continued, arousing Dutch

suspicion. The Dutch had become increasingly concerned with preventing any international
recognition of Indonesian sovereignty, and were aware that the Kuomintang was sympathetic to
the anti-colonial struggle in Southeast Asia. Tsiang assured the Dutch government that he needed
the Republic's cooperation simply to protect Chinese nationals. However, it became another point
of controversy because for the Dutch government, persons born in the Indies were Dutch subjects,
even if they were of Chinese descent, and as such were not within the jurisdiction of Chinese
diplomats.246

244Tsiang Chia Tung was only 41 years old when he was appointed as Chinese counselor for Indonesia.
Tsiang came from Suchow, Kiangsu, but he was born in Kiukiang, Kiangsi. Soon after he graduated from
Futan University in Shanghai, he worked in Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China (Waichiaopu). He was
appointed as Chinese counselor for Australia, where he worked until 1933. From 1933-1935 he worked as
the Chinese counselor in Sandakan, North Borneo, until he assumed the same position in Makassar. He
spent five years as counselor in Fiji, then Bombay from 1940-1944. When he arrived in Jakarta, Tsiang
immediately corresponded with General Christison and the Indonesian government about the political
position of Chinese during a war between the Dutch and Indonesia. He went to Surabaya to see Chinese
people's condition there, then to Yogyakarta to meet Sukarno. Liberty, 1 February 1946.
245 After 1947, the vice-consul was in Yogyakarta. Mary Somers, 394.
246 Somers, “Citizenship and Identity,” 119-120

91
 Figure 7. Consul General Tsiang Chia Tung. Source: Star Weekly, 13 October 1946.

China’s concern regarding the Chinese in Indonesia reached an apex immediately after
the Tangerang Massacre, especially since such an event was unanticipated. Just a few days prior,
a visiting consul from China, Lin Chi Ming, expressed his admiration for the Indonesian struggle
for independence. Lin even persuaded the Chinese in Indonesia to support and take part in the
Indonesians’ pursuit of independence.247 The massacre made China doubt the abilities of both the
Indonesian Republic and the Dutch in protecting the lives and properties of Chinese in Indonesia.

In a press conference, Li Ti Chun, the head representative from China, announced that
China initially had been very sympathetic with the Indonesian struggle for independence.
However, within a few months after the declaration of Indonesian independence, many instances
of anti-Chinese atrocities were committed that provoked the anger of the Chinese government.248

China’s involvement was seen by communist newspapers in China as an excuse for

territory expansion. The allegation was refuted by the Chinese government, who argued that

247 "Persahabatan Tionghoa-Indonesia Erat,” Merdeka, 20 May 1946.

248 Soeloeh Ra’jat, 23 October 1946.

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overseas Chinese represented an important tool for extending China’s economic and political
influence in Indonesia. Thus, the action taken by the government to protect the interests of
overseas Chinese should be seen as a humanitarian effort.249

The reaction of the Chinese government to Tangerang Massacre was immediate and
severe. A telegram from Nanking dated 5th June was sent by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek to
Jakarta. The telegram made clear the position of Chinese government; it would urge Indonesian
authorities to admit responsibility for the massacre.

"We are of course a strong nation, and the lives and the properties of a strong nation should be
protected by the country. Hence, when anything happens abroad, which brings danger and losses
to the lives and properties of the overseas Chinese, our government authorities should pay full
attention to it and if necessary bring the matter before the UN. In case we fail to obtain any solution,
we should take decisive action." (Nankuang Batavia, No. 7, 16 June 1946)

The Minister of Foreign Affairs of China, Wang Shih Chieh, immediately cabled Tsiang
Chia Tung, the Chinese Consul-General in Batavia, on 7 June 1946 and ordered him to launch an
official protest against the Indonesian Republic. On behalf of the Chinese government, Wang
published an article in Sin Po that showed China’s concern with overseas Chinese: "…regarding
the massacre in Tangerang, the whole nation [of China] is greatly concerned. The Chinese
government pays great attention to it.” Moreover, Wang also highlighted three important points
for the Indonesian government to take: (1) Punish all those involved in the massacre; (2)
Compensate the Chinese for all losses of life and property; (3) Guarantee the safety of Chinese in
Indonesia.250

The Chinese government launched an official protest precisely to the Indonesian

government regarding the Tangerang tragedy, because this was an area that was supposedly
under the surveillance and protection of the Indonesian government. The Chinese government
also criticized the British Army, which had been tasked to maintain law and order in Indonesia.
The British authority replied that they did not have a sufficient army to maintain law and order

249 NEFIS/CMI 1942-1949. Inv. Nr: 03130.

250 Sin Po, 10 June 1946.

93
in all regions of Indonesia. This excuse did not pacify many parties, especially since the British
had volunteered their roles as peacekeepers.251

On the same day, Kan Nai Kwang, the Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs of China, and Taik
K'uei Sheng, Vice-Chief of the Overseas Department, held a conference with all overseas Chinese
leaders from Java to discuss how to deal with the Tangerang tragedy. At 17.00 they met with
representatives of the Dutch embassy in China in order to arrive at possible measures in
safeguarding the Chinese community in Indonesia.252 In the same meeting, the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of China urged the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia, Sutan Sjahrir, to take
concrete action by ratifying a policy to protect the overseas Chinese.253

Consul-General Tsiang Chia Tung was immediately recalled to Nanking in order to

negotiate with the Chinese government. Prior to his departure, Tsiang proposed to General
Mansergh254 that troops be sent to Tangerang in order to evacuate all Chinese people from the
area.255 In a press conference, Tsiang said:

"I have been ordered to come to the South (Indonesia) to handle Chinese overseas affairs. It is my
duty to protect the Chinese residents... Regarding the conditions here (Indonesia), I have
repeatedly cabled my reports to the government. Now I have been ordered to return to China to
give a report. I am determined to convey in details the real conditions here and the difficulties of
our residents. On the eve of my departure from Java, the Tangerang tragedy has arisen. This
tragedy is deplorable. After the Bandung tragedy, the Allied authorities expressed their intent of
preventing another incident, while the Indonesian government showed their deepest condolences
to all Chinese victims, and promised to punish all perpetrators to prevent a similar tragedy. Now
the Tangerang tragedy has arisen. These authorities can hardly be free from responsibility. As a
result of negotiations during the past few days, the various parties involved have consented to take
immediate steps to provide our residents with proper protection. I will report in detail to the
government. I am determined to come back to the South in the shortest possible time. I hope our
residents will keep calm, unite and cooperate to overcome all the difficulties." (Sin Po, 6 June 1946)

251 Star Weekly, 23 June 1946.

252 Sin Po, 10 June 1946.
253 Sin Po, 15 June 1946
254During his military career Robert Mansergh served in 144th Field Regiment RA (5th Indian Division) in
Eritrea (March-May 1941), of 11th East African Division in Burma (early 1945) and of 5th Indian Division
during the final stages of the Burma campaign (February-May 1945), the liberation of Singapore (August-
September 1945) and the occupation of Java (October 1945-March 1946), and between April-November 1946
Mansergh was appointed as Commander-in-Chief of Allied Forces in the Netherlands East Indies.
255 Sumber Penerangan, 7 June 1946.

94
 Upon Tsiang’s arrival in Nanking on 9 June 1946, he immediately held another press
conference. He pressured the Indonesian government to quickly improve the situation for the
Chinese in Indonesia in order to avoid another tragedy. He accused both the Allied Forces, and
implicitly the Dutch, as well as the Indonesians for being the cause of violence against the Chinese
in Tangerang.

"If the present situation in the East Indies does not improve quickly and the administrative power
there cannot be made into one, it is feared that a repetition of the tragedy like Tangerang can hardly
be avoided. The Chinese residents in various places of the East Indies, whose number is 2 million,
are now in a most difficult position. Wherever there is conflict between the Indonesian troops and
the Allied Forces, injury to the interests of our overseas brethren can hardly be avoided." (Thien
Sung Yit Po, 20 June 1946)

More Chinese government officials stepped forward to air their opinions on the
Tangerang Massacre. Another telegram was sent by the Commission on Overseas Affairs in
China to the Chinese Consulate-General in Batavia on 17th June. It stated: "To our overseas
brethren in the East Indies: Regarding the slaughter of Chinese residents in the East Indies, we
feel greatly concerned. Besides having requested the organizations concerned to discuss
solutions, we are sending you this telegram to console you."256 China also instructed Tung Lin,
Chinese Ambassador to the Netherlands, to appeal to the Netherlands to heighten security for all
Chinese residents in Indonesia. The Dutch chargé d'affaires, Jan van der Berg, promised to relay
the sentiments of the Chinese to the Netherlands government.257

The Chinese Foreign Office announced that the Dutch and the Indonesians would be held
jointly responsible for any damage to Chinese lives and property, and that the protection of
overseas Chinese interests was “one of the most important tasks of the Chinese government.” Li
Ti Chun suggested that all Chinese in Indonesia maintain their neutrality, and reminded them
that the Chinese government remained concerned about their welfare. In another occasion, Li
suggested both Chinese totok and peranakan to unite. “Totok and peranakan should unite together,
because both of them come from Chinese descent.”258 Li also stated: Republic of China would be

256 Sin Po, 21 June 1946.

257 "Request to be Protected," The Straits Times, 11 June 1946.
258“Totok dan peranakan harus bersatu, karena biar bagaimana mereka adalah turunan Tionghoa.” Sumber
Penerangan, 5 November 1946.

95
the first country to officially recognize the independence of Indonesia. When he was asked by
‘Antara’ why China had not given significant aid to Indonesia, Li answered that the internal
situation in China, as a result of their war with Japan for 8 years, forced China to solve that
problem first.259

Strong allegations also came from newspapers in China such as Ho Ping Daily News. In an
article titled “Sad Words on the Tragedy of Tangerang” and written in kuo you, the Nanking-
based newspaper commented on the slaughter of Chinese residents in Tangerang, and discussed
Chinese relations with the Javanese. According to the article, despite the long history of Chinese
support for the Indonesian government and their non-cooperation with the Japanese, the Chinese
were repaid with ingratitude. 260 The article circulated across China, New Zealand, Australia, and
various other Southeast Asian countries. Thus, the world would know about the massacre of
Tangerang.

Last but not least, to ensure that laws would be passed to protect Chinese residents in
Indonesia, the Republic of China sent a representative to Indonesia in order to facilitate the
creation of such policy, according to an article published by Thien Sung Yit Po. The article also
proposed the creation of a neutral zone for Chinese in Indonesia.261

3.9. Arms from China?

“Are the lives of the oversea citizens of China -one of the Big Five country in the world- so mean
as the flesh on the plate or a lamb under the knife? No! We are neither timid nor weak, but, as a
matter of fact, we are too peace-loving, so others do not treat us with friendliness. On the
contrary, we are given unreasonable treatment, and what is worse, inhumanly slaughtered! Are
we going to be forever with this condition and not quickly think of a plan for self-defense?"
(Daily Telegraph Makassar, 11 June 1946)

When violence against Chinese reached its culmination, the Chinese Consuls in Jakarta
proposed a number of measures to protect Chinese in Indonesia, one of them was to encourage
the formation of Chinese security forces. This issue had been brought up several times after the

259“Republik Tiongkok adalah negeri yang pertama yang akan akui Republik Indonesia Merdeka secara
resmi.”Sumber Penerangan, 26 November 1946.
260 Ho Ping Daily News, 14 June 1946.
261 Thien Sung Yit Po, 20 June 1946.

96
Surabaya incident,262 however the issue became stronger after the Tangerang massacre. The
Republic of China sent a 'mission of mercy' to Indonesia in September-December 1946 in order to
show to the both conflicting parties, the Dutch and Indonesian, that Chinese stayed neutral and
were non-combatants in the war.263

Tsiang also brought up the issue of Chinese neutrality by arguing that "towards the
dispute between the Indonesian and the Dutch, our residents have strictly maintained, and are
strictly maintaining a neutral attitude." He criticized the Dutch and the Indonesian Republic
authorities for their lack of sincerity in protecting the Chinese and their interests, despite repeated
requests for increased security for the Chinese community that went unheeded: "The Indonesian
authorities have no power to control the extremists."264 He even threatened the possibility of
Chinese military intervention:

"I truly think that the Indonesian government must have secretly implemented this cruel policy
towards the Chinese residents in order to coerce help spiritually and substantially from our
Government. Under present circumstances, our country needs only to send two battleships, ten
airplanes and 5,000 well-trained soldiers to Indonesia. They will be sufficient to face all sorts of
disturbances. You must not say 5,000 soldiers are too small as there are thousands of angry Chinese
here who are willing to volunteer." (The Youth Weekly Batavia, 17 June 1946)

According to Tsiang, the strongest measures should be taken to protect the Chinese,
particularly those in Java, and suggested supplying them with arms to defend themselves:

“We are not going to fight a war for the Dutch nor do the Dutch need or expect us to do so. I tell
you this because we do it in the most open manner for the most obvious purpose…I request the
Republican Government to prove their sincerity in their proclamation of giving security to the
Chinese population in their territories by taking the same action as the Dutch have done.”265

262The Battle of Surabaya occurred between pro-independence Indonesian soldiers and militia against
Allied Forces. The battle was the heaviest single battle of the Indonesian revolution and became a national
symbol of Indonesian resistance. The battle erupted when 6,000 Indian troops perished alongside British
commander, Brigadier A. W. S. Mallaby, on 30 October. The British retaliated with a punitive sweep that
began on 10 November, under the cover of air attacks. Surabaya was devastated while casualties were
immense, taking of more than 40,000 lives, mostly civilians like Eurasian or Indonesian minority (Chinese,
Arabs, Ambonese or Timorese). See Abdul Wahid, “The Untold Story of the Surabaya Battle of 1945,”
Jakarta Post, 12 November 2013; Merle Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia since c. 1300 (Palgrave and
Stanford University Press, 1993), 217.
263 Somers, “Citizenship and Identity” 120.
264 Thien Sung Yit Po, 20 June 1946.
265 “Chinese Appeal to Jogjakarta,” The Singapore Free Press, 25 August 1947.

97
 China fully supported Tsiang’s suggestions. The Chinese naval headquarters in China
even considered a proposal to send warships to Indonesia on a fact-finding mission, and to
protect Chinese nationals who still feared mistreatment of Indonesian troops.266

However, strong protests came from Indonesia. Merdeka blamed the request of the
Chinese consul-general to the Allied command in Indonesia as an added impetus to the
worsening of the relations between Chinese and local inhabitants. It said: "Such a request for the
supply of arms to the Chinese here for the protection of their lives and properties will make the
situation develop from bad to worse. It will spur them to take revenge, and it is just these
retaliatory actions and further revenge from the Indonesian side that have to be suppressed."267
Arms supply became a real issue when several Chinese communities in Java decided to form Pao
An Tui (Chinese Security Corps) for self-protection. As already predicted, there were a lot of
controversies behind the decision and it will be discussed in the next sub-chapter.

3.10. Friend or foe: The Emergence of Pao An Tui in Java

“We have no political aspirations and we are sympathetic with the principle of independence of
Indonesia. But of course we do not agree if because of this freedom our life is taken away."
– Tsiang Chia Tung-

The Tangerang incident inexorably put Chinese living in Indonesia in a potentially

horrific and miserable situation. What was very disappointing to the Chinese was the fact that
the power of the Republic did not extend to those areas where extremists ruled. Moreover,
although Sukarno, Sjahrir, Natsir and a few other Indonesian authorities condemned the
massacre, they took no significant steps to protect the Chinese from the perpetrators and the
criminals. Criminal activity still occurred, despite Republican politicians giving their assurances
to the Chinese.268 According to Mr. Tsiang, the Republican government gave no indication of

266 "U.N.O Receives Complaint from Indonesia, The Straits Times, 11 August 1946.
267 Merdeka, 13 June 1946.
It was according to a report compiled by CHTH. See Memorandum Outlining Acts of Violence and
268

Humanity…p.6.

98
investigating the atrocities after the Tangerang massacre, but rather suggested that these
atrocities might continue. Thus, many Chinese lost their faith in the Republican Government.

The Tangerang massacre became a turning point for Chinese community in Indonesia to
take a political action. The miserable condition encouraged 1,000 of the 10,000 Chinese who were
in Allied-held Tangerang to request arms for self-protection. Tsiang, proposed an idea to the
Republicans to establish their own self-defense organization.269

“To prove to the whole world the truthfulness of our motive, I now ask the Republican
Government to do the same by also allowing the Chinese community in Republican territories to
form a security organization and to give them arms adequate for carrying out their mission. This
request is made since I heard that a committee was set up in Jogjakarta for the protection of foreign
life and property.”270

From Radio-Batavia, Mr. Tsiang specifically declared to President Sukarno and Prime
Minister Amir Sjarifuddin (the successor of Sutan Sjahrir) that Pao An Tui units would be
established and funded exclusively by Chinese.271 The Republican government, which initially
had not agreed with the idea, eventually gave approval of the establishment Pao An Tui within
the Republic. The Republicans would also consider Tsiang's proposal to arm this organization.272
Vale Kan Yun, the head of the Department of Overseas Affair Commission of the Chinese
government, also agreed to send arms, ammunition and instructors for PAT from China as long
as the Chinese government could benefit from this organization. Mr. Kan also said that China
would provide full support for the victims and that any Chinese desirous to return to China
would be facilitated.273

The idea of creating a self-defense organization was finally realized with the
establishment of Pao An Tui (PAT) or Chinese Security Corps on 28 August 1947. PAT emerged
after 31 delegations of the CHTH from every province in Indonesia (except CHTH Yogyakarta

269 "Dutch Failed to Stop Massacre," The Straits Times, 7 June 1946.
270 “Chinese Appeal to Jogjakarta,” The Singapore Free Press, 25 August 1947.
“Chinezen gaan zich wapenen: Vorming van eenheden, Nederlandse overheid verstrekt wapens,” Het
271

Dagblad, 19 August 1947.

272 “Oprichting Pao An Tui in de Republiek,” De Locomotief, 8 January 1948.
273 “Wapens uit China,” Het Dagblad, 19 November 1947.

99
dan Solo) assembled in Jakarta for a three days conference from 24-26 August 1947.274 As the
result of the conference, PAT was founded as a homegrown solution from the Chinese
community in order to protect the life and property of Chinese people (both totok and peranakan)
in Java and Sumatra. The regulations of this semi-military organization were regulated in Military
Ordinance No.516. They also agreed to give relief to the Chinese victims through a collective or
personal donation. Many Chinese were enthusiastic with the emergence of this organization and
when PAT got military barracks located at Mangga Besar 47, Jakarta, they tried to show their
support by donating tables, cooking utensils, cutlery, etc.275 PAT got their funding from fund
raising among local Chinese and also from Chinese families directly paying for protection.276
Fancy fair, sport activities, art exhibition, and movie screening were held regularly in order to
ensure income and hence the continuity of this organization.

Figure 8. The advertisement from Dutch newspaper about fancy fair in Batavia for the Chinese
victims and Pao An Tui. Het Dagblad, 24 October 1947.

274At that time, Solo and Yogyakarta were part of the Indonesian Republic. The Indonesian authority
argued that law and order in both regions was under the jurisdiction of the Indonesian Republic, thus PAT
was not needed in these areas. 274 Sulardi, “Pao An Tui Jakarta 1947-1949,” Skripsi Universitas Indonesia,
(1994), 80-81.
275The official name of the barracks was ‘Pao An Tui Chung Pu.’ “Pao An Tui krijgt kazerne,” De Locomotief,
8 September 1947.
276 Sulardi, “Pao An Tui Jakarta 1947-1949…” 80-81.

100
 Lieutenant-General Spoor, the Dutch army commander in Indonesia, recognized the Pao
An Tui as an official organization with its headquarters located in Batavia and other branches
spread in different provinces, except Yogyakarta and Solo. Spoor realized how strategic this
organization could be to assist the Dutch army, therefore he wished not to let the PAT turn into
a ‘foreign army.’277 Dutch military authorities agreed to provide the corps with weapons on loan,
military uniforms (with a special PAT badge -crossed Chinese swords surrounded by a chain,
representing unity) and military training for the cadres in the police school in Cimahi.278
Moreover, the Dutch through ‘Stichting Holland Helpt Indië, also gave f 100,000 to help the
continuity of the PAT.279 By February 1949 the PAT had branch units in at least three dozen cities
and towns. This corps would have the task of protecting Chinese business and houses in Java and
Sumatra. However, PAT was not allowed to interfere in military operations and its function was
different from the police.280

277“Verslag over de reis naar Oost Java van Major A. Roskam en 1e Luitenant Tan Gwan Djiang, 29
February 1948”, NL-HaNA, Defence/Armed Forces, 1396, in Roel Frakking (2012) ‘Who wants to cover
everything, covers nothing’: the organization of indigenous security forces in Indonesia, 1945–50, Journal of
Genocide Research, 14:3-4, 337-358.
278Since the uniforms of the PAT were similar like KNIL (Royal Netherlands Indies Army) uniforms except
for the insignia, it must have appeared to outsiders that the PAT was part of the Dutch army. But this
regulation did not apply to the PAT Medan. Jennifer Cushman and Wang Gungwu, Changing Identities of
the Southeast Asian Chinese since World War II (Hong Kong University Press, 1988) pp.126-8
279 “Hulp aan de Chinezen,” Leeuwarder Courant, 9 August 1947.
280 “Generaal Spoor erkent Pao An Tui,” De Locomotief, 17 September 1947.

101
Figure 9. The symbol of Pao An Tui. Source: Procureur-Generaal bij het Hooggerechtshof van Nederlands-Indië,
(1936) 1945-1949 (1969). Inv. Nr: 679.

Initially PAT was created to be an entirely independent body. The PAT was not
subordinate to neither the Dutch nor the Republican administration and should not be involved
in any military or political movement.281 Its primary purpose was to assist the Chinese
community leaders in the task of maintaining peace and order and for the preservation of lives
and property of the Chinese inhabitants against violence of ‘unscrupulous elements.’282 In fact,
however, although the PAT was supposed to be neutral in the Dutch-Indonesia conflict, in reality
it received arms from the Dutch.283 The PAT was used as a tool by Dutch to fight the Republicans.
The organization was used for military operations by the Dutch army, and allowed to carry
weapon.284 Moreover, during its development, PAT was also used for another purpose by
wealthy Chinese. A lot of them recruited PAT members as bodyguards to protect the plantation

281Anne van der Veer, “The Pao An Tui Medan: A Chinese Security Force in Dutch Occupied Indonesia,
1945-1948.” Master Thesis, Utrecht University, (2013), 48.
282 “Free Netherlands East Indies Trade Likely: Consul,” The Singapore Free Press, 24 November 1947.
Mary Somers, Peranakan Chinese Politics in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project Interim
283

Report Series, 1968), 120

284Roel Frakking, ‘Who wants to cover everything, covers nothing’: the organization of indigenous security
forces in Indonesia, 1945–50, Journal of Genocide Research, 14:3-4, (2012), 347.

102
area from the attacks of Indonesian gangsters.285 Thus, it created a fierce debate among
Indonesians, and one critic came from a prominent Javanese aristocrat, Noto Soeroto. He
condemned the Dutch authorities for giving permission for the establishment of Chinese Security
Guards (Pao An Tui) which he believed would only worsen the relationship between Indonesia
and the Chinese. He was afraid that Chinese would use this corps to take revenge. Such a thought
not only came from himself but also from other prominent Indonesian leaders.286 The local Malay
press, Sinar Deli, even assumed that the PAT was merely a disguise for an anti-Indonesian
struggle group. However, pro-opinion also came from Soegardo Poerbakawatja, one of the
committee of the Hollandsch-Inlandsche School. Writing in the Sedar magazine he argued that
the Chinese had the right to defend their property and life, especially during the national
revolution. Therefore, the emergence of Pao An Tui could be justified because no one could
protect the Chinese people, and the Indonesian Republic could not do anything to assure their
safety.287

Although some Republican leaders were willing to recognize the PAT, opposition to them
came from the leftist trade unions, from more anti-Chinese leaders, and also from leading Chinese
supporters of the Republic, such as Tjoa Sik Ien and Tan Ling Djie (both were the members of
Sjahrir’s Indonesia Socialist Party).288 The main reason why the PAT was opposed by these groups
was because of their close ties to Kuomintang. It was also suspected of being pro-Dutch and the
Republican Government at first took a firm stand against them. Moreover, a lot of PAT members
were reputedly used by Chinese capitalists to maintain their assets. Within the Chinese
community there was therefore a good deal of controversy over the PAT. And even among those
who favored them, there were accusations that they were being misused for the benefit of special
groups. In any case, there were no further large-scale outbreaks of violence against the Chinese
in Java, and the PAT were finally disbanded in the spring of 1949.289

285 Roel Frakking, 347.

286 “Politieke Zondebokken,” in De Locomotief, 25 March 1949.
287 “Waarom wij Chinezen de Pao An Tui oprichtten!” De Vrije Pers, 18 March 1949.
288 Sin Po, 15 Dec 1947
289 Donald Wilmott, The National Status of the Chinese in Indonesia 1900-1958 (Itacha: New York, 1961), 38-40

103
 The PAT was intrinsically an organization designed to be temporary. Once the Chinese
would no longer have to fear for their safety, the corps would naturally lose its role and
function.290 Chinese feeling toward the Indonesians was improved since the ‘Cheribon draft’291
signed both by the Netherlands Commission-General and the Indonesian Prime Minister, Sutan
Sjahrir. Before the draft was signed on 15 November 1946, a Dutch-Indonesian agreement had
been announced on March 15, under which the armed forces of both sides were to retire two
kilometers behind their previously existing lines as a preliminary to the completion of
negotiations.292

On March 1949, the Federation of Chinese Associations (CHTH) indeed decided to

terminate Pao An Tui in Java because the CHTH claimed that peace and order in that area had
been restored.293 In Tangerang the PAT had already been dissolved in May 1948.294 The main
reason behind the decision was not the return of safety alone, but also the loss of financial support.
The funding for this organization got cut off because the wealthier Chinese merchants were no
longer feeling under attack and hence discontinued their financial support.295

EPILOGUE

A cursory glance at the minutes of the meeting of KNIDT (Indonesian National

Committee of Region Tangerang) shows that there is no mention of the Chinese. All of Laskar
Rakyat’s actions concerned the elimination of the Dutch, so why did the Tangerang massacre
occur?296 Analyzing the context of Tangerang and the socioeconomic position of the Chinese in

290 Anne van der Veer, “The Pao An Tui Medan…” 48-49.
291The draft provided recognition of the Republic of Java, Sumatra and Madura islands for de facto and
the setting up of the United States of Indonesia and Netherlands Indonesian Union by 1949. "Agreement in
the N.E.I," Kalgoorlie Miner, 26 March 1947.
292 "Agreement in the N.E.I," Kalgoorlie Miner, 26 March 1947.
293 “Pao An Tui op Java wordt opgeheven,”De Locomotief, 12 March 1949.
294 “Pao An Tui Ontbonden,” De Locomotief, 1 May 1948.
295 “Chinees Corps ontbonden,” Het Nieuws Algemeen Dagblad, 9 April 1949.
296I have found few cases where some Indonesians were also killed during the affair. Most of them worked
for Chinese family. When a group of extremists entered a house of Chinese their primary target was to kill
the Chinese inside. However, in some cases they were also executed because of their effort to protect their
master. Algemene Secretarie en de Daarbij Gedeponeerde Archieven 1942-1950. Inv.nr: 5520.

104
Tangerang at that time will provide the answers to this vital question. By answering it, this sub-
chapter seeks to elucidate the complexity of the riot itself. The riot was not only sparked by the
matter of Chinese involvement in NICA, as Indonesian newspapers suggest, but it was also
influenced by some other factors. This chapter will outline those main factors.

As was mentioned in the previous chapter, the sudden collapse of the Japanese colonial
government in Indonesia and major structural changes in Tangerang contributed to the chaos in
Tangerang. When the institutional mechanisms in Tangerang ceased to function, the local
government faced a turbulent political and economic transition. As George Brunner argues,
“during the political transition the old no longer works while the new will not yet function and
the social costs grow."297 What resulted was a vacuum of instability and uncertainty about the
political, social, and economic future of the communities, or—to use Lake and Rothchild’s term–
“collective fears of the future.”298 Such a situation facilitates animosity amongst ethnic groups, as
was the case in Tangerang.

The rhetoric of fear, blame, and hate were used by Laskar Rakyat as a tool for mass
mobilization and control. As Stuart Kaufman explains, “belligerent leaders stoke mass hostility;
hostile masses support belligerent leaders, and both together threaten other groups, creating a
‘security dilemma’299 which in turn encourages even more mass hostility and leadership
belligerence.”300 In the case of Tangerang, Laskar Rakyat manipulated the people’s spirit of anti-
colonialism into the mass killings of Chinese. A slogan, “Bikin habis semua Cina sebab mereka
anjing NICA” (kill all Chinese because they are NICA’s dogs) was used by Laskar Rakyat to incite
people’s anger.301 Additionally, Tangerang locals were heavily influenced by the political culture
of Banten, an area associated with religious fanaticism, where the ‘ulama’ (Islamic cleric)’s word

Georg Brunner, Nationality Problems and Minority Conflicts in Eastern Europe. (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann
297

Foundation Publishers, 1996), 92.

David A.Lake and Donald Rothchild, “Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic
298

Conflict,” International Security, Vol. 21, No. 2, (Fall 1996), 41.

I borrow this term from Monica Duffy Toft, The Geography of Ethnic Violence. (Princeton: Princeton
299

University Press, 2003), 8.

300Stuart J. Kaufman, “Spiraling to Ethnic War: Elite, Masses, and Moscow in Moldova’s Civil War,”
International Security, Vol. 21, No. 2, (Fall 1996), 109.
301 Procureur-Generaal bij het Hooggerechtshof Ned. Indie 1945-1950. Inv. Nr: 1053.

105
was more influential than that of the government’s, which also made mass mobilization in
Tangerang possible.302

In times of political and economic duress, people typically feel victimized, and blame their
misfortune on other ethnic groups, leading to inter-ethnic competition.303 The immediate roots of
the political unrest in Tangerang can be traced to the announcement from the Indonesian
government encouraging Indonesians to exchange their Japanese money for Republican money,
an action which inflated the price of goods drastically. Many traders, who were mostly Chinese,
were not allowed to sell rice at prices higher than 15 cents per liter. Selling rice at such a price
would bankrupt the traders, they said, and as such they refused to sell their goods. Rice became
extremely scarce, with people resorting to purchasing it from black market, where the price was
ten times more expensive than the government-dictated rate.304 The Chinese who controlled most
of the rice market in Tangerang, were accused of hoarding, and were seen as responsible for the
price increase in Tangerang, making rice unaffordable for many people.305

The situation in Tangerang was aggravated by the decline of authority, and owing to that,
the failure of the central regime to protect the interests of ethnic groups in Tangerang. As Bojana
Blagojevic explains for the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, “once decolonization took place, the
absence of old institutional mechanisms of group control allowed for ethnic emotions to surface
and ethnic intolerance to take place.”306 The instability and feelings of uncertainty in Tangerang
resulting from numerous major structural transitions (from the Japanese, to “Bapak Rakyat”, and

302The area of Banten, according to Sartono had been known as a troublesome area even before the days of
colonial rule. It had long been noted for its intense religious feelings, which was more firmly embedded
among the rural elements of Banten than was the case in most parts of Java. The most interesting of Banten
is its persistent tradition of revolt, which Sartono traces through the entire 19th century and into the
Communist revolt of 1926. Like some other parts of Java, Banten appears to provide an illustration of the
symbiosis or convergence between various kinds of 'traditional' or 'primitive' phenomena of social revolt,
notably the tradition of social banditry rising at times to armed rebellion, and that of millennial preaching
and expectation. The traditional rebel families (dispossessed noblemen, rural gentry, wandering bands of
outlaws, brigands, and exiles) were increasingly replenished through the rise of religious leaders, who
continued to remain important even after the independence. Star Weekly, 30 June 1946; Sartono Kartodirdjo,
The Peasants Revolt of Banten in 1888: Its Conditions, Course and Sequel (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966).
See also Else Ensering, "Banten in Times of Revolution," Archipel, Vol. 50, (1995).
303 Stuart J. Kaufman…109-110.
304 Soeloeh Ra’jat, 29 November 1946.
305 Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, NEFIS/CMI 1945-49. Inv. Nr: 03129.
306 Bojana Blagojevic, 8-9.

106
then to the Tangerang Regiment) and the institutional inability to regulate inter-ethnic relations
provided the perfect conditions in which Laskar Rakyat could manipulate ethnic emotions in
order to mobilize groups for their own political purposes. Bojana Blagojevic posits that “certain
parties often exploit ethnic differences by drawing upon historical memories of grievances and
‘whip up’ hatred in order to gain or strengthen their power.”307 The massacre of Chinese in
Tangerang was not only triggered by a single factor, but was an accumulation of pre-existing
grievances embedded in the intertwined histories of these ethnic groups.

According to Crawford, whether or not identity politics turns into violent conflict
depends on the functioning of state institutions: "Where identity politics is practiced, states can
channel it in peaceful political competition as long as they can make credible commitments to
shape and uphold agreements made among culturally defined political actors."308 It is evident
from the emergence of the Tangerang Council, as well as the 'daulat' action against Agus
Padmanegara, that the spirit of social revolution was widespread in Tangerang. All the old
elements that reminded people of their former colonial masters, the Dutch and the Japanese, were
eliminated and replaced by leaders chosen by the ‘rakyat’ of Tangerang. All loyal Native
Government Civil Servants fled, were kidnapped or even murdered.309

In addition, the breakdown in communication with Jakarta since October 1945 worsened
the situation in Tangerang-Jakarta border. People could easily be accused of being members of
Laskar Hitam or NICA spies. Someone could be killed if they wore Red-White-Blue clothes. A
house could be set alight if its residents possessed Dutch currency. Moreover, with the emergence
of Laskar Hitam in Tangerang, whose members were jawara, the situation in Tangerang’s interior
spiraled out of control. Meanwhile, most chosen 'Bapak Rakyat' did not have prior experience in
government administration and hence were not able to control the situation.310

The Chinese composed around 4-6% of Tangerang’s total population. The majority of
them were poor, illiterate farmers who did not have any interest in politics. After the Tangerang

307 Bojana Blagojevic, 9.

308Beverly Crawford, “The Causes of Cultural Conflict: An Institutional Approach” in Beverly Crawford
and Ronnie D. Lipschutz, (eds.), The Myth of “Ethnic Conflict, International and Area Studies Research
Series/Number 98, (Berkeley: University of California, 1998), 517.
309 Ministerie van Buitelandse Zaken, NEFIS/CMI, 1942-1949. Inv Nr: 01899.
310 NEFIS/CMI 1942-1949, Inv. Nr: 01899.

107
Regiment under Singgih took over Tangerang from Haji Achmad Chaerun, the Chinese residents
also supported the Indonesian Republic by making monetary donations. However, it was also
possible that they were compelled to contribute for their safety, lest they be accused of being
'mata-mata musuh' (enemy's spy). Based on a report of the center of Fonds Kemerdekaan
Kabupaten Tangerang from 4 March-30 April 1946, it is apparent that the Chinese community in
Tangerang contributed great sums of money to support the Indonesian independence movement.
In Kresek, Lie Soen Hiong donated f.200, Kerondjo and Pasilian donated f.750 out of the f.1,152
total donations, and Tangerang donated f.288,05.311

However, many other Chinese refused to support the Indonesians, and rejected political
engagement. Such a decision only fanned the flames of anti-Chinese sentiment amongst the local
Indonesians, resulting in occasional attacks on Chinese dwellings, especially in areas that the
Republican, British, and Dutch had failed to control. The Tangerang massacre is just one example
of other, numerous instances of anti-Chinese violence in Indonesia. The fact that at least a small
number of Chinese had fought on the Indonesian side, as in the case of a leftist Chinese group in
Surabaya during the battle against the British, did not do much to mitigate the popular perception
of Chinese as disloyal to the struggle for Indonesian independence.312

Instances of anti-Chinese violence had occurred in Tangerang several weeks before the
Japanese occupation, but most of the perpetrators then were executed by the Japanese authorities.
Without a firm authority cracking down on those who committed acts of anti-Chinese violence,
perpetrators could abuse the Chinese with impunity, and that is what happened in Tangerang in
1946.

The already volatile situation was aggravated by the increasing number of arms
transactions between British soldiers and Indonesian extremists. In previous cases of anti-Chinese
violence in Tangerang, the extremists attacked the Chinese with sharp weapons, like machetes or
bamboo spears. By 1946, most of them possessed rifles, revolvers, carbines, and other firearms
purchased at the black market or confiscated from Japanese soldiers313, although bamboo spears

311 NEFIS/CMI 1942-1949, Inv. Nr: 01899.

312 Memorandum Outlining Acts of Violence and Humanity…5-7.
313 Star Weekly, 9 June 1946.

108
were still used.314 Cases of robberies and murders that occurred prior to May 1946 forced the
Chinese to take the initiative in arming themselves in order to protect their family or property.
They sought training from Dutch soldiers, but their appeal was rejected by Dutch authorities.315
In a report signed by the chief information officer of the Netherlands, H. Agerbeek, violence
against Chinese, was said to worsen because of the attitudes of British soldiers who did not do
anything to help the Chinese, despite their headquarters being only a few kilometers from
Tangerang.316

Attacks on Chinese-owned property in Tangerang were considered a symbolic attack on

Chinese economic power and dominance. The violence against ethnic Chinese in Tangerang bore
'the characteristics of a Holy War against the infidel,' as many victims were forcibly circumcised
by followers of a radical Islamic group that had previously attempted to drive out elite civil
servants.317 The establishment of Islamic Council in Tangerang also showed that the massacre
more or less had something to do with the breakdown of morality of people in Tangerang, at least
from perspective of the local government.318

The stigma of being Dutch collaborators was not new for the Chinese in Tangerang, such
an attitude having been in existence even prior to the Tangerang tragedy. After the Pesing affair
in April 1946, the local government encouraged the speedy elimination of anyone under
suspicion of being a NICA spy. Many Chinese from two villages, Blimbing and Cengklong were
particularly victimized, their properties confiscated and many of them slaughtered. In Mauk and
Kedaung Timur, the TRI launched attacks on Chinese properties after the Chinese were accused
of being enemy spies.

Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, Netherlands Forces Intelligence Service/Centrale Militaire Inlichtingendienst
314

(NEFIS/CMI) 1942-1949. Inv. Nr: 03068

315 Algemene Secretarie en de Daarbij Gedeponeerde Archieven 1942-1950. Inv.Nr: 5486.
316 Procureur-Generaal bij het Hooggerechtshof Ned. Indie 1945-1950. Inv. Nr: 1053.
317Mary Somers, Peranakan Chinese Politics in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University, Modern Indonesia
Project, 1964), 45-6.
318The task of this organization was to rehabilitate people’s spiritual and also religion in Tangerang. Raden
H. Djoenaedi was appointed as the chair of this organization. The Islamic Council was the first Islamic
Council that established in an area occupied by Dutch/NICA in Java. The same council had already existed
in Makassar and also Borneo. Sumber Penerangan, 14 November 1946.

109
 The tense political situation, combined with a strong sense of nationalism made the spy
issue extremely sensitive for both Chinese and Indonesian alike. Based on a NEFIS report,
Chinese accused of being enemy spies were discouraged from returning to their villages, lest they
be killed. Some of the accused were captured by TRI and disappeared thereafter, sparking rumors
that they had been executed by TRI. Until April 1946, approximately 4,000-5,000 Chinese fled
from Tangerang to Jakarta. Most of them did not come from central Tangerang, but from areas in
Tangerang’s periphery, such as Mauk, Kedaung, Balaraja, Curug, etc.319

What happened in Tangerang cannot be separated from the legacy of colonial political
systems. In contrast with the Portuguese, the Spanish, the British, or the French, the Dutch,
according to Robert Cribb, “were generally rather reluctant to bring their indigenous subjects
under the umbrella of European law…and the legal system constructed within the Netherlands
Indies over several centuries.”320 The colonial system that used a “divide and rule” strategy to
create or separate groups along ethnic lines in order to strengthen the power of the colonial
system, was still strongly embedded in Indonesian society. The Dutch colonial regime’s special
treatment towards the Chinese has provided a contentious legacy for the Chinese community in
Indonesia.321

The colonial ‘apartheid’ stratification also stimulated the relationship between the state
and strongmen.322 Henk Schulte Nordholt argues that the long-standing use of thugs as vigilantes
by politicians and administrators was and remains “a concubinage of crime and the state”. The
state also resorted to intimidation and criminal gangs to maintain a regime of fear for the rest of
the colonial era.323 During the Indonesian revolution, gangsters teamed up with radical young

319 Algemene Secretarie en de Daarbij Gedeponeerde Archieven (1942-1950). Inv. Nr. 5521
320Robert Cribb, “Legal Pluralism, Decentralisation and the Roots of Violence in Indonesia,” in Dewi
Fortuna Anwar (eds.), Violent Internal Conflicts in Asia Pacific: Histories, Political Economies and Policies
(Yayasan Obor Indonesia: Jakarta, 2005), 45 & 56.
321Thung Ju Lan, “LIPI Conflict Management and Transformation Program,” in Dewi Fortuna Anwar
(eds.), Violent Internal Conflicts in Asia Pacific: Histories, Political Economies and Policies (Yayasan Obor
Indonesia: Jakarta, 2005), 77.
Freek Colombijn and Thomas Lindblad, “Introduction,” in Freek Colombijn and Thomas Lindblad (eds),
322

Roots of Violence in Indonesia (Singapore: ISEAS, 2002).

323 Henk Schulte Nordholt, “The Genealogy of Violence,” 40.

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nationalists to form militia groups in Jakarta, sharing a belief in action, heroism, and resistance
against a hegemonic power.324

Soeloeh Ra’jat gave two opinions regarding Chinese position in Indonesia. First, even
though many Chinese received a lot of concessions from the colonial government, it took a long
time before they saw those benefits. And second, the political status of Chinese as ‘foreign
orientals’ still gave them an alien status in Indonesia, which would lead to stereotypes that the
Chinese would find difficult to free themselves from.325

The legacy of gangsters, revolutionaries, and ‘apartheid’ remained strong in Tangerang.

Jawara and jago Tangerang, who had been oppressed during the Japanese occupation, flourished
in Tangerang after the proclamation of independence, particularly in the interior of Tangerang,
which was not monitored by the government. The jawara and other extremists began to replace
old government positions, leading to a regime of banditry, pitting not only extremists against the
old government, but also extremists against local people and even other extremists.326

Several propaganda materials that were disseminated during the massacre, such as
“sekarang waktunya buat mampuskan semua Cina-cina!” (Now this is the time to kill all the
Chinese!) and “Berbagi dengan yang miskin!” (Share with the poor!), also show that anti-Chinese
sentiment were deeply embedded in the Indonesian psyche. Akin to a bomb, it just needed the
right conditions and time to explode. Mely G. Tan characterizes this relationship as a love-hate
relationship, because while the Chinese played an important role in developing local economies,
they were also accused of being an ‘exclusive community’ with no firm national identity.327

Robert Cribb, Gangsters and Revolutionaries: The Jakarta People’s Militia and the Indonesian Revolution 1945-
324

1949. (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1991).

325 Soeloeh Ra’jat, 6 August 1946.
326 Ministerie van Buitelandse Zaken, NEFIS/CMI, 1942-1949. Inv Nr: 01899.
327 Mely G. Tan, Etnis Tionghoa di Indonesia (Jakarta: Yayasan Obor Indonesia, 2008), 24.

111
 Figure 10. A caricature about Tangerang massacre published in Star Weekly. The first column said
“sekarang waktunya buat mampusin semua Cina-cina” (now is the time to kill all Chinese).
Source: Star Weekly, 9 June 1946.

The Chinese community found it difficult to shake off accusations of being NICA spies.
Because of the political tension between Dutch and Indonesia, the Chinese were in a very
precarious situation. Some of them felt that they should be neutral, owing to the fact that the
Indonesians lived and intermingled with Chinese for hundreds of years. Others hoped for aid
from their Fatherland, China:

"It seems that we are in the midst of unfriendliness from both parties. No outsiders will accept our
sympathy and friendship. Then how should we govern ourselves? We must quickly request the
government of our Fatherland to frame a policy for the protection of overseas Chinese as soon as
possible. Simultaneously, we have to request the Dutch and the Indonesian people to understand
more of the inherent national morality of the Chinese. Whenever and wherever, Chinese
Indonesian will not hurt others."328

Neutrality was not always an effective strategy. During that period of chaos, there was no
grey area, only two possible options: pro-Dutch or pro-Indonesian. Thus, the Chinese faced a
dilemma:

"Our neutrality has already lost, our patience has also a limit. In the meantime, we also want to
remind our own people to stand together whatever happens and to always bear in mind our
compatriots who are still in very precarious situations."329

328 Lee Ming Pao, 2 April 1946.

329 Thien Sung, 30 March 1946

112
 The Tangerang incident become a basis for Chinese to re-think their ‘vulnerable position’
in Indonesia. In less than one year's time the Chinese had been victimized several times and they
did not believe if the Republican government could protect them. No wonder that the Chinese
were overjoyed and received the Dutch as their rescuers. Thus, they had to choose which side
they wanted to support. And since many Chinese had become victims of violence at Indonesian
hands during revolution, some of them decided to support the Allied troops.

Chinese collaboration with the NICA or the Dutch army heightened the tensions between
the Chinese and Indonesians. However, the background behind their involvement in
NICA/Dutch forces has never been properly analyzed. Traditional Indonesian historiography
paints this in broad, one-sided strokes, with the Chinese simply as traitors. The reasons for
Chinese collaboration with the Dutch have to be further examined and questioned. This was a
complex issue, especially during the revolutionary period.

Perhaps it is true that some Chinese served as NICA soldiers. However, we also have to
bear in mind that NICA not only consisted of Chinese or Eurasian soldiers, but also many
Ambonese, Timorese, and even Javanese, all of whom served the queen.330 If we also acknowledge
that most Chinese did not join NICA, I still hesitate that the friction between Indonesians and
Chinese over this period would disappear.

330 Star Weekly, 16 June 1946.

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CONCLUSION

This thesis has examined the massacre of Chinese in Tangerang that occurred between
May-June 1946, following the Dutch occupation in Serpong, Tangerang. More than a thousand
Chinese men, women, and children were killed in various places in the interior of Tangerang.
This thesis argues that the massacre was not an incidental event, but had its roots in the social
disorganization, economic instability, and the collapse of authority occasioned by the Dutch
colonial regime and Japanese occupation.

This thesis has reminded us that systematic acts of anti-Chinese violence began in
Indonesia during the period of Dutch colonial rule, and increased in scale during the Indonesian
Revolution. As shown in Chapter 1, the legacy of ‘othering’ the Chinese emerged during the
colonial period and continued during the Japanese occupation and Indonesian Revolution. All
these experiences inevitably contributed in alienating Chinese from Indonesians. This legacy of
‘othering’ even continued with the Sukarno and Suharto regimes, when Chinese maintained an
exclusively ethnic-based business network, and were treated as ‘economic animals.’ Both
regimes, especially Suharto’s New Order, had forced Chinese to withdraw themselves from
society and to start living exclusively.

The significant role that the Chinese have played in the Indonesian economy, primarily
as middlemen in colonial intermediary trade in the Dutch East Indies, was instrumental in
creating the gap between Chinese and Indonesians. The notion that the Chinese were
economically more privileged than the native Indonesians was encouraged by the Dutch colonial
authorities, and naturally incurred the jealousy and ire of the locals. The ‘Foreign Oriental’ legacy
during the Dutch colonial period that separated Chinese from other racial/ethnic groups also
contributed to the further alienation of Chinese within the schema of Indonesian society.

In the case of Indonesia, economic turmoil and instability, combined with widespread
suffering during the Japanese occupation, had pushed large sections of Indonesia’s population,
especially those in rural Java, to support a revolution that rejected traditional—that is to say,
Dutch colonial—rulers, as well as their local accomplices. In particular, the Chinese and to a lesser
extent Eurasians were accused of profiting from the colonial system.

The initial wave of the revolution shattered the fragile Republican state structure, paving
the way for the national leadership to take over Tangerang from the Japanese and Dutch-trained

114
bureaucratic elite. The first year of the Indonesian struggle for independence was rocky, with
Tangerang experiencing a destabilization of its local government helmed by Haji Achmad
Chaerun. Jawara groups emerged, revolutionary groups began to prepare for combat, and
authority was increasingly shunned and disregarded. All elements of the old regime, such as the
pangreh praja and the pre-existing police were eliminated, with revolutionaries determined to start
afresh in the absence of any pro-Republican leadership.

This thesis also argues that in order to get better understanding about the massacre, it is
necessary to examine Tangerang’s historical context. Chapter 2 of this thesis shows that
Tangerang is characterized as a region with a strong Islamic tradition and with a long history of
resistance to external authority. The traditions of political resistance and Islamic identity were
further reinforced during the Indonesian Revolution. The most important revolutionary groups
in Tangerang had histories of anti-colonial, nationalist activity dating back to the early 20th
century. Haji Achmad Chaerun was not a new political player who simply emerged during the
revolution; he had already been involved in the communist rebellion in Banten in 1926.

Chaerun's government, however, was marked by extremely heavy-handed interventions

from ulama and jawara of his regime, including the termination of their relationship with the
central government of Indonesia. Thus, a state within a state was created. The situation forced
Sjahrir to decide to take over Chaerun’s government, though this did not change the fact that
violence continued in Tangerang, aggravated by the killings of hundreds of Chinese. State control
over the interior of Tangerang was negligible at best.

Regime changes in Indonesia, history shows, Indonesia have often been accompanied by
fierce anti-Chinese violence.1 Such was the case with the overthrowing of the Dutch colonial
regime in 1942 and the Japanese in 1945; the Indonesian revolutionary period from 1945-49; the
transition period from Sukarno to Suharto in 1966 (preceded by the killings of anywhere between
half a million and perhaps a few millions of Indonesian Communist Party sympathizers and
alleged communists); and the fall of Suharto in 1998. A similar situation also occurred in

1Mary Somers, Peranakan Chinese Politics in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project Interim
Report Series, 1968); Charles Coppel, Indonesian Chinese in Crisis (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press,
1983); Jemma Purdey, Anti-Chinese Violence in Indonesia : 1996-1999 (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2006); Takashi
Shiraishi, Zaman Bergerak : Radikalisme Rakyat di Jawa 1912-1926 (Jakarta: Pustaka Utama Grafiti, 1997);
Twang Peck Yang, The Chinese Business Elite in Indonesia and the Transition to Independence, 1940-1950 (Kuala
Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1998).

115
Tangerang, following the declaration of Indonesian independence, which provided the catalyst
for an atrocity on such a massive scale.

So why were the Chinese especially targeted in the massacre? To answer this question I
would like to refer to Blagojevic, who said: “ethnic conflict occurs when a particular set of factors
and conditions converge: a major structural crisis; presence of historical memories of inter-ethnic
grievances; institutional factors that promote ethnic intolerance; manipulation of historical
memories by political entrepreneurs to evoke emotions such as fear, resentment, and hate toward
the “other.”2 The Tangerang massacre fits in this case, especially if when we look back to the
situation of the region at that time. Localized social and political tensions also had a part to play
in the bloodshed.

As shown in Chapter 3, the roots of resentment towards the Chinese erupted following
the shortage of rice and cloth in Tangerang, a condition which worsened during the political
transitions between 1945-46. During this period of uncertainty, the Chinese were easy scapegoats
for the violence and economic problems in Tangerang. Moreover, the anti-Chinese sentiment,
already deeply rooted in Tangerang since the colonial period, also helped transform the peoples’
sentiment into a massive revolution under the flag of ‘perjuangan.’

Although outbursts of violence in Indonesia have a long history, the Tangerang massacre
is a unique case, as it was targeted at a specific population, and it was perpetrated by a specific
religious group. Moreover, jawara was also included in local patterns of violence and played a
useful role of intimidation of those considered a problem of local government. Perpetrators of
anti-Chinese violence in Tangerang justified their actions by saying that the Chinese were aliens
in the community, as well as non-believers.

The presence of Chinese in Indonesia was like a ‘time-bomb’ that could explode anytime
and anywhere. Owing to the Indonesian Chinese being ‘socially thin’, as Benedict Anderson
suggests3, the stigmatization of Chinese was inevitable during the revolutionary period. In
Tangerang’s case, Chinese were labelled as ‘triple-minorities.’ They were depicted as actual

2Bojana Blagojevic, "Causes of Ethnic Conflict: A Conceptual Framework," Journal of Global Change and
Governance, Vol. III, (Winter 2009), 3.
3 Frederick Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler, Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World.
(California: University of California, 1997), 223.

116
puppets in colonial hands and profiteers of colonial rule; as capitalists; and as non-Muslims. They
were never seen as asli (genuine) and therefore could never be 'true Indonesians.’

Freek Colombijn classifies violence in Indonesia into four levels: (1) Violence inflicted by
the state or state organs (including the army); (2) Violence by communities (defined by inter-
ethnic, inter-religious or inter-village boundaries); (3) Violence by gangs and militias; and (4)
Violence by individuals loosely congregated in temporary crowds.4 Based on Colombijn’s
classification, the Tangerang massacre falls under the second and third category.

Although TRI as a state apparatus was also involved in the massacre, this thesis did not
find any evidence that showed the involvement of the Indonesian government in the tragedy,
and perhaps it would be impossible or at least very difficult to find the direct chain of command
in a massacre. Based on numerous primary resources, this thesis argues that it was purely the
incapability –or the absence-- of Indonesia as a new state to control its apparatus. The central
government could not do anything to prevent the Tangerang massacre because the Indonesian
government had to face threats from other places near Jakarta. However it must be noted that the
anti-revolutionary Sjahrir Cabinet did not alter the structure of the government, police, or army.5

During the vacuum of power and uncertain conditions which combined with frequent
provocations from local leaders, the hatred of local people towards Chinese in Tangerang that
had rooted since a long time ago, erupted again. Although it is difficult to say that state played a
role in the massacre, it was apparent that the massacre occurred in the areas that supposedly were
under Indonesian control. The transfer of sovereignty from Chaerun to TKR/TRI marked the fact
that the Indonesian government in principle should be responsible for what happened in
Tangerang.

The continuing violence suggested a depth of community resentment and hostility that
left many ethnic Chinese wary of an independent state. Security was of paramount importance
to the Chinese. The massacres of Chinese by Indonesian extremists in Bandung, Surabaya, and
Tangerang, along with the burning of their dwellings and confiscation of their possessions in the

4Freek Colombijn, “A Cultural Practice of Violence in Indonesia: Lessons from History,” in Dewi Fortuna
Anwar (ed.), Violent Internal Conflicts in Asia Pacific: Histories, Political Economy and Policies (Jakarta: Yayasan
Obor, 2005), 264.
5 Ministerie van Buitelandse Zaken, NEFIS/CMI 1942-1949. Inv. Nr: 01857.

117
name of ‘freedom’ made them realize how vulnerable they were. Although the Chinese in
Indonesia felt that they should be neutral, many remained friendly to the Dutch, as they felt
personally and economically secure with the Dutch than with the Republic.

"We have no objection for Holland with her old sovereignty to come back and rule the Netherlands
Indies, especially when the friendship of an old ally still lingers in our mind." (Sin Po, 23 March
1946.)

Therefore, whoever could best guarantee their safety would have the loyalty of the
Chinese, regardless of political background. In this case, it was not the Indonesian government,
but the Dutch.6 Their decision to aid the Dutch led and still leads to quick generalizations about
the Chinese being traitors during the Indonesian revolution. In some documents this is apparent,
as some Chinese did benefit from their closeness with the Dutch troops, as they were better able
to secure their wealth and property. In the last chapter, it is evident that the Chinese took
advantage of their Dutch ties in order to supply arms to PAT. However, their motivations behind
those decisions are barely analyzed. It is impossible to simply generalize that all Chinese were
allies of the Dutch, as many Chinese also actively fought on the Republican side, with others even
entering Republican politics.

Heavily reported by the Indonesian press, the massacre was subject to interpretations by
pundits, all from different perspectives—Indonesian (Republican), Dutch, and Chinese. China
became involved in the conflict by denouncing both the Dutch and the Indonesians for
incompetence in protecting the Chinese citizens. This brought the massacre to international
attention, as China enjoyed a prestigious position as part of the Big Five (the USSR, the United
States, France, and Britain being the other four), as well as a permanent seat in the United Nations
Security Council. The massacre left a stain which made it more difficult for the Indonesian
Republic to gain recognition from the international community at that time, as it was seen as a
weak state unable to protect its citizens against barbaric mass violence.

The Tangerang massacre was only one in a long series of cases of anti-Chinese violence
all over Java, in which both the Dutch and the Indonesian Republic failed to protect the lives of
the Chinese population during the Indonesian Revolutionary period. Although considerable

6Chinese in Sragen, Central Java even formed a committee to welcome the Dutch troops which was called
the ‘ontvangst committee.’Soejatno, 107.

118
efforts were made by the Republic to protect the Chinese in order to enlist their support, the
Republic's military forces were insufficient to prevent hostile acts by extremist elements whose
animosity had been directed against the Chinese. Soon after the massacre in Tangerang, more
cases of anti-Chinese violence emerged in other parts of Indonesia: Bagan Siapi-Api (1946),
Cirebon (1947), Cibadak (1947), and Cilimus (1947). To date, no specific research has been
conducted to examine the communal violence in those areas.

William Frederick says that “the Indonesian Revolution is one of the most important and
successful of the postwar anticolonial revolutions, but it is also a complex phenomenon that,
despite considerable study, we still do not understand very clearly.”379 Therefore, further
examination about the Indonesian revolution is necessary in order to deconstruct the prevalent
historiography, which mainly glorifies the struggle of Indonesian combatants who expelled the
Dutch from Indonesia with only bamboo spears, without shedding light on the atrocities suffered
by powerless communities such as the Chinese, Eurasians, Timorese or Arabs. Therefore, further
research about this period need to be conducted in order to reveal other facts that have been
silenced under the New Order regime.

Indonesia has to start to make peace with its own history. The Indonesian government
should cover both sides of the revolution including the violence perpetrated by Indonesians. The
roots of violence must be studied in order to understand the roles held by the victimizers as well
as the victims, but also those of the seemingly innocent bystanders and the international
community at large. By studying this topic, we are also developing a complex understanding of
mass murder, ethnic cleansing, and other cruel forms of eradication of ethnic groups. With this
knowledge, we can work collaboratively to develop models and policies towards early warning,
prevention, peaceful conflict resolution, reconciliation and reconstruction based on history.

379 William Frederick, "Review," The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 47, No. 2 (May 1988), 426-427.

119
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 APPENDIX

Figure 1. Depiction of the part of Batavia where the terrible slaughter of the Chinese happened after the
discovery of their treason on 9 October 1740. INALCO Library, Paris. Taken from Claudine Salmon, "The
Massacre of 1740 as Reflected in a Contemporary Chinese Narrative," Archipel, Vol. 77, (2009), 153.

. Figure 2. Sketch of Chinese inhabitants in Java in the early nineteenth century with their Manchu queque
(pigtails) and special style of dress. Sketch by the Belgian artist, A.A. J. Payen (1792-1853). Photograph
from the A.A.J. Payen Collection (Sketchbook E) by courtesy of the Rijksmuseum voor Volkenkunde,
Leiden. Taken from Peter Carey, “Changing Javanese Perceptions of the Chinese Communities in Central
Java, 1755-1825,” Indonesia, Vol. 37; (1984), 1.

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Map 1. Allied re-occupation of Indonesia, August 1945-March 1946. Source: Robert Cribb, Historical Atlas
of Indonesia (NIAS Press, 2000). Map Number: 5.06.

Map 2. Social Revolutions in Java, 1945-1946. Source: Robert Cribb, Historical Atlas of Indonesia (NIAS
Press, 2000). Map Number: 5.08.

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 Map 3. Map of Tangerang during Colonial period (since 1860). Source: Edi Ekadjati (eds.), Sejarah
Kabupaten Tangerang (Tangerang: Pemerintah Kabupaten Tangerang, 2004), 254.

Figure 3. Registration card for Tentara Keamanan Rakyat (TKR/People’s Security Corps) Jakarta. Source:
Marine en Leger Inlichtingendienst, de Netherlands Forces Intelligence Service en de Centrale Militaire
Inlichtingendienst in Nederlands-Indië. Inv. Nr: 03284.

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Map 4. Map of Tangerang 1942. Source: http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/ams/java_and_madura/

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