2022.05.19 Usavsussmann-Am

825
1 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
2
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3 THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Criminal Action No.
4 Plaintiff, 1:21-cr-00582-CRC-1
Thursday, May 19, 2022
5 vs. 9:09 a.m.
6 MICHAEL A. SUSSMANN, *MORNING SESSION*
7 Defendant.
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8
____________________________________________________________
9
TRANSCRIPT OF JURY TRIAL
10 HELD BEFORE THE HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER R. COOPER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
11 ____________________________________________________________
APPEARANCES:
12
For the United States: ANDREW DeFILIPPIS, ESQ.
13 JONATHAN EDGAR ALGOR, IV, ESQ.
BRITTAIN SHAW, ESQ.
14 SPECIAL COUNSEL'S OFFICE
145 N Street Northeast
15 Washington, DC 20002
(212) 637-2231
16
For the Defendant: SEAN M. BERKOWITZ, ESQ.
17 MICHAEL BOSWORTH, ESQ.
CATHERINE YAO, ESQ.
18 NATALIE HARDWICK RAO, ESQ.
LATHAM & WATKINS LLP
19 1271 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10020
20 (212) 906-1200
21
Court Reporter: Lisa A. Moreira, RDR, CRR
22 Official Court Reporter
U.S. Courthouse, Room 6718
23 333 Constitution Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20001
24 (202) 354-3187
25
826
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WITNESS PAGE
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JAMES A. BAKER
4 (By Ms. DeFilippis)............................... 832
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1 P R O C E E D I N G S
2 THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: Your Honor, we're back on
3 the record for Criminal Case 21-582, United States of
4 America vs. Michael Sussmann.
5 MS. SHAW: Good morning, Your Honor.
6 THE COURT: Good morning.
7 MS. SHAW: Brittain Shaw on behalf of the United
8 States. I'm joined at counsel table by Jonathan Algor,
9 Andrew DeFilippis, Kori Arsenault, and John Durham.
10 THE COURT: Good morning.
11 MR. BERKOWITZ: Good morning, Your Honor; Sean
12 Berkowitz, Michael Bosworth, Natalie Rao, Catherine Yao on
13 behalf of Mr. Sussmann, who is present in court.
14 THE COURT: Good morning, everybody.
15 MR. BERKOWITZ: Good morning.
16 THE COURT: All right.
17 Mr. Berkowitz, I received your motion last night
18 on the motion to strike. Do you want to be heard further?
19 MR. BERKOWITZ: Your Honor, we very much
20 appreciate your counsel. We had time to thoughtfully
21 deliberate, and I think that our motion speaks for itself.
22 If you have questions, we're here to answer them.
23 THE COURT: Okay. You say that Mr. Sussmann
24 hasn't made a decision to testify yet. Is the motion
25 conditional on that decision? Do we need to do anything if

828
1 he chooses to testify?
2 MR. BERKOWITZ: I don't think we need to do
3 anything if he chooses to testify, Your Honor.
4 THE COURT: Okay.
5 Mr. DeFilippis? Ms. Shaw.
6 MS. SHAW: Me again, I'm afraid. Thank you, Your
7 Honor.
8 THE COURT: You're his counsel.
9 MS. SHAW: I guess so by default.
10 Your Honor, it would be the government's position
11 that certainly the motion for a mistrial is not needed in
12 this case. As Your Honor noted yesterday, this was a
13 nonresponsive answer to a question elicited by defense
14 counsel, and it would certainly be within the Court's
15 discretion to strike certain portions of that and perhaps
16 make necessary instruction concerning the nonresponsiveness
17 at some point, but we don't believe it rises to the level of
18 anything that warrants a mistrial, Your Honor.
19 THE COURT: Okay. The Court will deny the
20 defense's motion for a mistrial, to the extent it has made
21 one, but is prepared to strike the nonresponsive portions of
22 the transcript. And it is routine for parties to highlight
23 portions of the transcript in closings, and the defense --
24 and both sides would be able to do that based on the revised
25 transcript in the event Mr. Sussmann chooses not to testify,

829
1 okay?
2 MS. SHAW: Thank you, Your Honor.
3 I just wanted to flag a few things for Your
4 Honor --
5 THE COURT: Sure.
6 MS. SHAW: -- before we started this morning.
7 First, during Mr. Baker's testimony we plan to
8 offer our first stipulation so, you know, the jury may
9 not -- you know, may need an instruction on what a
10 stipulation would be.
11 And then additionally, we plan to be offering the
12 notes of Mr. Priestap and Ms. Anderson through Mr. Baker,
13 and I understand that defense counsel's been consulted on
14 this matter and consents to this. So I just wanted to flag
15 that for Your Honor.
16 THE COURT: So how is it going to come in? He has
17 not seen those notes, correct?
18 MS. SHAW: Yes, he has seen those notes. It's my
19 understanding he's seen those notes.
20 THE COURT: So you're refreshing his recollection
21 with the notes or what's the -- how are you going to use
22 them?
23 MS. SHAW: Perhaps Mr. DeFilippis should outline
24 that.
25 Thank you, Your Honor.

830
1 MR. DeFILIPPIS: Yes, Your Honor. So the parties
2 have been discussing both these notes and the notes from the
3 March 6th of '17 meeting, and the parties have agreed that
4 both notes -- both sets of notes will come in and be shown
5 to the jury, subject, of course, to Your Honor. So we
6 thought, for purposes of efficiency, to put it in through
7 Mr. Baker, essentially subject to connection or foundation
8 when Mr. Priestap and Ms. Anderson testify.
9 The defense doesn't have an objection to that. I
10 expect they may want to show him the March 6, '17, notes. I
11 don't want to presume, but I think that was the idea, is
12 that if all these notes are going to come in anyway, the
13 jury might as well see them now.
14 But I'm happy to let defense give their thoughts
15 as well.
16 MR. BERKOWITZ: Just briefly, Your Honor.
17 Mr. DeFilippis has correctly stated the parties' agreement.
18 And since the notes will come in, for efficiency purposes,
19 rather than go through the charade of me impeaching him and
20 them coming back and doing it, he can do it on direct and
21 not confront it.
22 THE COURT: That sounds great. I appreciate the
23 cooperation on this issue as well as the cooperation on the
24 privilege issues that were implicated yesterday. I thought
25 that was handled very smoothly, and we didn't have to deal

831
1 with objections on the fly. So I appreciate the cooperation
2 that both sides have shown on those issues.
3 MR. BERKOWITZ: Thank you, Your Honor.
4 THE COURT: All right. We had a jury note that we
5 gave to both sides. I may just hold her back at the break,
6 and we can talk about it at the beginning of the first
7 break. I don't see an issue, but I have a couple of
8 questions for her.
9 Anything else, Counsel?
10 MR. DeFILIPPIS: No, Your Honor.
11 MR. BERKOWITZ: Judge, one minute.
12 THE COURT: Sure.
13 (Pause)
14 MR. BERKOWITZ: We're good, Your Honor.
15 THE COURT: All right. We can bring Mr. Baker
16 back.
17 Welcome back, sir. Have a seat. You can have a
18 seat until the jury comes in.
19 MR. BERKOWITZ: Your Honor, we have the 3500
20 material for Mr. Baker, if you want it now. I don't know if
21 it will come up, but we're happy to provide it to you.
22 THE COURT: You can give it to me now.
23 MR. BERKOWITZ: Apparently we gave it to
24 Ms. Jenkins already, Your Honor.
25 THE COURT: Yes, it's here.

832
1 (Pause)
2 (Jury enters courtroom)
3 THE COURT: Welcome back, everyone. Everyone have
4 a nice night?
5 Good.
6 We are ready to get started with Mr. Baker again.
7 Mr. DeFilippis. The floor is yours.
8 Mr. Baker, I would remind you that you're still
9 under oath.
10 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
11 THE COURT: And you can slip your mask off.
12 MR. DeFILIPPIS: Thank you, Your Honor.
13 JAMES BAKER, Resumed
14 DIRECT EXAMINATION, Continued
15 BY MR. DeFILIPPIS:
16 Q. And good morning, Mr. Baker.
17 A. Good morning.
18 Q. Mr. Baker, when we left off yesterday, we were talking
19 about an outreach that Mr. Sussmann made to you on September
20 18th of 2016. Do you recall that?
21 A. Yes.
22 MR. DeFILIPPIS: And, Ms. Arsenault, if we can
23 just bring up the relevant page of Government Exhibit 1500.
24 Q. Mr. Baker, do you recall reading this text message to
25 the jury yesterday?

833
1 A. Yes, I do.
2 Q. Now, Mr. Baker, you had testified that you first
3 retrieved this text message in the context of this matter
4 back a few months ago. I think you may have said it was
5 March.
6 A. That's the best of my recollection, yes.
7 Q. And was it your testimony that you did that in response
8 from a request that the government made to help comply with
9 its obligations to turn over your statements to the defense?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. Now, just so the jury can understand exactly how you
12 retrieve these messages, first, do you -- what kind of cell
13 phone did you have? What brand?
14 A. It's an Apple iPhone. I think it's a 13 Max Pro.
15 Q. And when the government asked you and you then went to
16 look for any text messages you might have, was the message
17 right there on the screen in your chain with Mr. Sussmann,
18 or was it -- in other words, was it readily available, or
19 did you have to kind of go back further?
20 A. What I recall is Mr. Durham asked me to look for
21 material like that. I went to my -- after we completed that
22 all, I went to my phone. I looked for emails, and then I
23 looked -- did a search of text -- for texts.
24 I typed in Mr. Sussmann's name in the search bar.
25 A text string came up. iMessages, to be accurate.

834
1 And then -- it started with the most recent first,
2 and then I started to scroll through it to go back to the
3 beginning. And as I scrolled, there were various pauses as
4 it was, in my estimation, being downloaded from my iCloud
5 account.
6 Q. Got it. So you have an iCloud --
7 A. I have an iCloud account with Apple.
8 Yes, so the material downloaded as I went, and
9 there were pauses, and then I kept going until I got to the
10 beginning -- or I got to the point where it wouldn't
11 download anymore. And then this text that we're looking at
12 right now, this iMessage, was the top one in the string of
13 messages that I had with Michael.
14 Q. Is the phone you're talking about the same phone that
15 you had back in 2016?
16 A. No.
17 Q. And so what is your understanding as to how that message
18 sort of was still retrievable to you, even though you were
19 retrieving it on a newer phone?
20 A. When you get a new phone with Apple, there's a process
21 for transferring data from your old phone to your new phone
22 and from your iCloud account to your new phone. And then,
23 when I got the new phone -- I think it was in November or
24 December of 2021 -- I went through that process and, you
25 know, a lot of the material was downloaded at that time.

835
1 But when I looked for this on that day, it seemed like it
2 took some time to download to my new phone.
3 Q. Understood. And then did you provide to the government
4 just that exchange we looked at yesterday, or the whole
5 chain, or something in between?
6 A. It was the whole chain.
7 Q. Understood. So let's go back to that exchange we were
8 looking at yesterday.
9 MR. DeFILIPPIS: Ms. Arsenault, if we could just
10 magnify all of the messages from September 18th.
11 I'm sorry, September -- yes, September 18th.
12 Q. So, Mr. Baker, you recall getting this first message
13 here in which Mr. Sussmann asked you for a meeting?
14 A. After I reviewed it, and after I thought about it, and
15 after I looked up -- there was something about the date that
16 reminded me that I had received this call on a Sunday, or
17 this message, I'm sorry, on a Sunday. And so, yes, then I
18 recalled actually receiving it from Michael.
19 Q. And when you responded, "Okay. I will find a time.
20 What might work for you?" what, if anything, made you
21 willing to schedule something for the next day?
22 A. Well, the message seemed very -- first of all, I knew
23 Michael and had high regard for him, and he -- from the text
24 and from the context and the text of the message, it seemed
25 urgent and important, and so I trusted that if Michael

836
1 needed to see me right away and in the way he described
2 it here as being time-sensitive and sensitive, I thought
3 it's -- I should try to meet with him as soon as possible.
4 And my schedule allowed for me to meet with him
5 the following day, so that's what I did. That's what I told
6 him, that I could do that.
7 Q. He then writes: "Any time but lunchtime - you name it."
8 And then you reply, "2:00 p.m. at my office? Do
9 you have a badge or do you need help getting into the
10 building?"
11 Now, you explained yesterday -- I think you
12 testified that Mr. Sussmann did have some kind of a badge.
13 Could you just it describe to the jury in a little bit more
14 detail. What is that? Is it like an FBI agent's badge, or
15 something else?
16 A. No, it's a different badge for -- the FBI, to make
17 things easier to get in and out of the building, because
18 it's a complicated process with security and so on, for
19 certain people who come to the FBI building, the
20 headquarters building here in Washington, on a frequent
21 basis, they'll get -- it's a plastic ID badge that enables
22 them to go through the security gates quickly. You just go
23 up, put your badge on the reader, and you get right in.
24 And there's different colors for different types
25 of folks so that people can spot that. So FBI employees

837
1 have one color badge. Contractors have a different color
2 badge. People from different parts of the intelligence
3 community might have a different color badge.
4 I don't know what color Michael's badge was.
5 But in any event, there's a series of plastic ID
6 badges with your photo and with a little chip in them that
7 enables you to get in and out of the building.
8 Q. So would that mean -- for example, would Mr. Sussmann
9 have to go through the magnetometer that we're all familiar
10 with, or would the badge allow you to just walk right in?
11 A. I believe the badge that he had would have allowed him
12 to walk right in.
13 Q. So Mr. Sussmann responds -- let me ask you this: Do you
14 know of any particular reason why Mr. Sussmann needed
15 regular access to the FBI at that time?
16 A. I think he had a -- I don't know what the word is --
17 vibrant national security practice that caused him to
18 interact with the Bureau a lot, and so I think somebody must
19 have sponsored him to have a badge of this nature.
20 And just to correct it, you don't get to walk
21 right in with the badge. You have to go to security. You
22 put the badge at the reader, and then you go through a
23 series of turnstiles and so on, so it makes a record of when
24 you're coming back and forth.
25 Q. Okay. But he was not in any sense an FBI employee,

838
1 correct?
2 A. No. No.
3 Q. So Mr. Sussmann responds to you then, "I have a badge.
4 Please remind me of your room #."
5 And then you write back a number; is that right?
6 A. Yes, sir.
7 Q. Okay. Did the meeting happen as planned on that next
8 day, which would have been the 19th of September?
9 A. Yes, it did.
10 Q. And did it happen, as far as you remember, around the
11 scheduled time?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. Let me show you what's been premarked as Government's
14 Exhibit 240.
15 A. Thank you for blowing it up.
16 Q. What are we looking at here?
17 A. To me, this looks like a document that's a record of my
18 calendar for the day that would have been retrieved from the
19 FBI computer.
20 Q. Now, did you keep an electronic calendar at the FBI?
21 A. I had an electronic calendar. I had an executive
22 assistant, and she was in charge of the calendar.
23 MR. DeFILIPPIS: Your Honor, the government offers
24 Government Exhibit 240.
25 MR. BERKOWITZ: No objection.

839
1 THE COURT: So moved.
2 Q. Now, Mr. Baker, just walk us through the subject line
3 and the other information on this calendar invite here.
4 A. It says, "Meeting w/Michael Sussmann."
5 It's got the start time on September 19, 2016, at
6 2:00 p.m. End time September 19, 2016, at 2:30 p.m. It
7 says show the time as busy on the calendar.
8 It was not a recurring meeting. I was organizing
9 it. I believe it would have been through my executive
10 assistant. And the required attendees within the FBI were
11 just me.
12 Q. Mr. Baker, what floor at the FBI headquarters was your
13 office on?
14 A. The seventh floor.
15 Q. Is the seventh floor also sort of a term of art at the
16 FBI?
17 A. Sort of. It refers to the floor where the director is
18 and other senior executives.
19 Q. So when people talk about the seventh floor, do they
20 sometimes use that to refer to FBI leadership?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. And just for record purposes, where is FBI headquarters
23 located? Is that here?
24 A. It's on Pennsylvania Avenue in Washington, D.C.,
25 Northwest.
840
1 Q. So tell us what happened, as best as you recall. Did
2 Mr. Sussmann come to the meeting I think you said around the
3 scheduled time?
4 A. That's my recollection, yes.
5 Q. And did he go directly to your office, or did you meet
6 him somewhere else?
7 A. No, I believe he came to my office.
8 Q. Who, if anybody, was with him?
9 A. No other person was with him at the time. He had
10 materials with him that he brought, but no other people were
11 with him.
12 Q. And just describe for us your office and, if you recall,
13 where this meeting happened.
14 A. The meeting happened in my personal office.
15 So I have or had a personal office with my desk
16 and a set of -- there was a sofa. There were a couple of
17 chairs. I had a Sensitive Compartmented Information
18 Facility storage area for classified information adjacent to
19 my office, and then there was an entryway or sort of an
20 entry area where my executive assistant and a special
21 assistant sat. And then across from them I had another
22 larger conference room with a big conference table.
23 Q. And so where did the meeting happen?
24 A. The meeting took place in my personal office.
25 Q. Now, when Mr. Sussmann came in, did he have anything

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1 with him?
2 A. Yes. He had some written materials and some electronic
3 media with him.
4 Q. And so how did the meeting begin? What happened?
5 A. Michael started to explain why he was there. He said
6 that he was not appearing before me on behalf of any
7 particular client, and that he had some information that was
8 of concern relating to an apparent surreptitious
9 communications channel between something called Alfa-Bank,
10 which he described as being connected to the Kremlin in
11 Russia, and some part of the Trump organization in the
12 United States. And it looked, according to some cyber
13 security researchers that he was in contact with, as if it
14 were, again, some surreptitious way for those two entities
15 to communicate with each other.
16 Q. As best as you recall, how long did the meeting last?
17 A. 30 minutes.
18 Q. Give or take?
19 A. Approximately. Approximately 30 minutes, yes.
20 Q. Mr. Baker, you mentioned a statement that Mr. Sussmann
21 said he was not doing this on behalf of a client. Did that
22 statement occur towards the beginning of the meeting? The
23 end of the meeting? Or somewhere in between?
24 A. I think it was pretty close to the beginning of the
25 meeting. It was part of his introduction to the meeting.

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1 Q. Now, Mr. Baker --
2 MR. DeFILIPPIS: Ms. Arsenault, if we could go
3 back to Government's Exhibit 1500, to the relevant page, to
4 the September 18th message.
5 Q. Mr. Baker, you'll recall that this is the message
6 Mr. Sussmann sent you the night before. Is it your
7 testimony that he repeated that statement in the meeting
8 with you?
9 A. In essence. I believe he said, "I'm" -- in the meeting
10 he said, "I'm not here on behalf of any particular client."
11 Q. And how confident, Mr. Baker, are you that he said that,
12 repeated that, in the meeting?
13 A. I'm 100 percent confident that he said that in the
14 meeting.
15 Q. And when he said that, Mr. Baker, what impression did it
16 have on you? How did you respond?
17 A. Michael's a friend of mine and a colleague, and I
18 believed it and trusted that the statement was truthful.
19 Q. And where it says in the text message the night before
20 "Want to help the Bureau," when you read that the night
21 before, what did you understand that to mean?
22 A. That he was coming to see me as a good citizen who had
23 obtained some information that he wanted to share with me.
24 Again, from the text of this, I literally had no
25 idea what he was coming to see me about, what the subject

843
1 matter was at all. But knowing Michael, I would expect
2 him -- if he had information, as a citizen, I think he would
3 want to help the government. That's the kind of person that
4 I thought him to be.
5 Q. And when he repeated that statement in the meeting, did
6 you come away with the same impression, that he was acting
7 as a good citizen?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. Now, in connection with these allegations, you said he
10 described allegations of a secret communications channel
11 between the Trump organization and a Russian bank. What, if
12 anything, did he say about where he had gotten these
13 allegations?
14 A. He said -- to the best of my recollection, he said that
15 he had been in contact with or approached by some cyber
16 security experts that he said he was not going to identify
17 but he said were people like some people that he named who
18 he thought that I either knew or knew of.
19 Q. And when you say that they were people like the people
20 he named, what do you mean there?
21 A. Well, so he said -- again, to the best of my
22 recollection, he said that these people were like -- he
23 named Susan Landau, who is a professor of cyber security and
24 I think engineering; Steve Bellovin, who is also a professor
25 and expert on cyber security; and a person named Matt Blaze,

844
1 same, an academic who are -- all three of them are, I think,
2 nationally and even internationally recognized cyber
3 security experts in their field.
4 And one of them, Susan, I knew quite well and is a
5 friend.
6 Q. And had you heard all three names? Were you familiar
7 with all of them?
8 A. I was familiar with all of them, yes. I was familiar
9 with them and knew Susan personally.
10 I can't remember if, at that time, I had met Matt
11 and Steve by that point, but I knew -- I knew who they were
12 by reputation.
13 Q. And when he said that they were like the people who had
14 gathered the information, what did you understand the
15 comparison to be? In other words, what was similar about
16 them?
17 A. Serious people who were experts in the field of cyber
18 security who were well-regarded and were trustworthy.
19 Q. Did he mention any other names of the people who had
20 actually gathered the information? Any other names?
21 A. No.
22 Q. What, if anything, did Mr. Sussmann say about whether
23 folks outside the FBI were aware of these allegations?
24 A. My recollection is that he identified -- or he said that
25 some media organizations were aware of this material or

845
1 these allegations.
2 Q. And to the best you recall, what did he say in that
3 regard?
4 A. He said they were major news outlets, and either he said
5 or I construed him to mean like the Washington Post, The New
6 York Times, The Wall Street Journal. I think that's what he
7 referenced.
8 So major, well-known news organizations had
9 received this information apparently from -- well, I didn't
10 know what source. They had the information somehow.
11 Q. Did he say one way or the other whether he had provided
12 them with the information or whether they got it from
13 someone else?
14 A. I don't think he said.
15 Q. And did you have an understanding one way or the other
16 whether --
17 A. Yes. My impression was that the cyber security experts
18 had given it to him, is what I recall today sitting here.
19 Q. And when you say --
20 A. I'm sorry. That the cyber security experts had given
21 this material to whatever reporter it was or whatever news
22 organization it was. I didn't have the impression that
23 Michael had given this information to the reporter.
24 Q. Now, you testified that there was an allegation of a
25 secret channel between the Trump organization and Alfa-Bank,

846
1 which is a Russian bank; is that right?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. Do you recall there being any other entities or
4 organizations referenced in the allegation Mr. Sussmann
5 conveyed?
6 A. Two points.
7 One, he referenced something called Spectrum
8 Health, which I understood to be some type of a hospital or
9 health system. And what I gathered from the conversation
10 was -- excuse me. What I gathered from the conversation was
11 that somehow the communications from Alfa-Bank were being
12 sent -- or at least some of them were being sent -- through
13 this Spectrum Health organization and then to the Trump
14 organization in an effort to obscure the origin and the
15 destination of the communications.
16 This is a fairly typical thing that malicious
17 cyber actors do to obscure what it is that they're up to.
18 They'll find an innocent -- maybe an innocent or not
19 innocent, but anyway, they find a third party to go through,
20 sometimes multiple third parties, in order to make it harder
21 for anybody to trace the communications back to their
22 origin.
23 He also referenced then -- he referenced a system
24 that's called TOR, T-O-R, which refers to The Onion Router,
25 which is a publicly available methodology that people can

847
1 use, anybody can use, to, again, obscure the origin and
2 destination of communications on the Internet.
3 Q. And what, if anything, did you understand the
4 relationship between TOR and these allegations was? Was it
5 being used in some way?
6 A. I think it was analogized to TOR in the sense of this
7 looked like something like TOR.
8 I don't -- I'm not -- I can't recall if he said
9 they were using TOR or this looks like TOR, but there's
10 efforts that the communicants, let's say -- so meaning the
11 Trump organization and Alfa-Bank -- were using some
12 methodology to make it hard for anybody who would see the
13 communications on the Internet to determine where they were
14 going or where they were from.
15 Q. Now, going back to the reference to news media
16 organizations, what, if anything, did he say about whether
17 those organizations planned to publish anything, do
18 anything? Did he say anything in that regard?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. And what was that?
21 A. My recollection is that he said that they were -- that
22 the information that he, Michael, had was that the news
23 organization was intent on publishing about -- publishing
24 something about this connection relatively soon.
25 Q. Now, when you heard him say that, what, if any, reaction
848
1 did you have? How did that affect your view of the
2 materials or the meeting?
3 A. Well, it affected my thinking about the urgency of this
4 matter. It affected my thinking of the urgency of the
5 matter and -- because I know, from my prior experience in
6 this field, that if a news organization were to publish
7 something about an alleged surreptitious communications
8 channel, it's likely that as soon as that article came out
9 the communications channel would disappear, and that would
10 make it much harder for the FBI to investigate the existence
11 of such a channel. The users would just do something
12 different, and then whatever work had been done and
13 presented to us would not be of any -- it's not of any use.
14 It wouldn't be of as much use to the Bureau. It would be
15 harder to find out if they had established a new
16 communications channel somehow.
17 Q. So if we go back to Mr. Sussmann's text message from the
18 night before, he did say in the beginning of the message, "I
19 have something time-sensitive (and sensitive) I need to
20 discuss."
21 Did the news -- how did the news organization
22 information affect your view of that assertion?
23 A. Time-sensitive.
24 Q. Okay.
25 A. And so accurate, in other words.

849
1 Q. All right.
2 A. So yes, if the FBI wanted to investigate this in the
3 counterintelligence world -- really, in any part of criminal
4 law but -- or criminal investigations, but especially in the
5 counterintelligence world, you don't want the bad guys to
6 know that you're looking at them. You want to be able to
7 investigate without them being aware that you're looking at
8 them. That's critically important.
9 And so if there was a news article about this that
10 was coming out in a few days or a week or whenever, then
11 that was just going to make it harder for us to figure out
12 what was going on.
13 And so, yes, based on what he was telling me, that
14 seemed 100 percent accurate. This was very time-sensitive.
15 Q. Okay. Mr. Baker, give me just one moment.
16 Now, Mr. Baker, in connection with the computer
17 scientist who Mr. Sussmann referenced to you, the
18 researchers, at any point in describing them did he refer to
19 a client or clients?
20 A. No. As I said earlier, he said the opposite, that he
21 was not there on behalf of any particular client.
22 Q. Now, during this meeting did Mr. Sussmann make any
23 particular asks of you?
24 A. No.
25 Q. And during the meeting, did you -- what, if anything,

850
1 did you tell Mr. Sussmann about what you would do? Did you
2 make any asks of him?
3 A. Not during that meeting.
4 Well, he presented to me -- let me back up. He
5 presented to me a copy, a printed-out copy, of pages. I
6 don't know how many pages, maybe a half-an-inch thick or so.
7 You know, I think they were 8 1/2 x 11 pages clipped
8 together with a binder clip. And then he also provided me
9 with I think it was two or three thumb drives that had the
10 same information on them, at least as I understood it.
11 So he presented that to me, and I took that
12 information, but he didn't ask me to do anything. He just
13 said, you know -- well, he said take whatever action you
14 think is appropriate.
15 Q. And just for everyone's benefit, what is a thumb drive?
16 A. A thumb drive is a small digital storage device, and
17 sometimes quite a bit of data can be stored on them. It's
18 about the size of a thumb.
19 Q. Got it.
20 Now, when the meeting ended, is that when he
21 handed over the thumb drives and the hard copy materials?
22 A. He may have passed them to me during the course of the
23 meeting, and I held them -- I think I flipped through the
24 pages but didn't really look at them in any close detail.
25 Q. Now, Mr. Baker, I think this was clear from your

851
1 testimony, but who, if anyone, did you bring into the
2 meeting? Was anyone from the FBI in that meeting?
3 A. No. Nobody from anywhere was in the meeting. It was
4 just Michael and me.
5 Q. Okay. And any particular reason for that?
6 A. I hadn't -- from this -- from his text, saying that it
7 was time-sensitive and sensitive, I literally had no idea
8 what he was talking about, and so I wanted to hear from
9 Michael what it was that he had to say.
10 I mean, I didn't know who else it might pertain
11 to. It might pertain to somebody else in the Bureau or
12 subject matter that was new or very sensitive. I really had
13 no idea.
14 So not knowing who else to bring in, I didn't
15 bring anybody in. I didn't know if this was
16 counterterrorism or counterintelligence or law enforcement
17 or some allegation that the FBI was doing something improper
18 or that the Justice Department was doing something improper.
19 I had no idea what this was about. So I was -- it didn't
20 take me long to figure out that I should just meet with
21 Michael by myself.
22 Q. In your role as the top lawyer at the FBI, how common or
23 uncommon was it for you to take in materials like this? Was
24 it a common occurrence?
25 A. It was uncommon.
852
1 Q. Is there any reason for that?
2 A. Well, I'm not a case agent.
3 And now having said that, the culture of the FBI
4 is to work with the public to protect the public. So the
5 FBI has 1-800 numbers. We have tip lines. We have a
6 variety of ways we can take in information from the public.
7 Furthermore, taking information from the public is
8 specifically authorized in the Attorney General's guidelines
9 that govern how the FBI can conduct its investigative
10 activities. And there's a provision in the FBI's internal
11 policies and procedures guidelines that say that any FBI
12 employee can take information from the public.
13 Again, the idea is to get the public's assistance
14 in helping prevent crime, protect national security, and so
15 on in the public interest.
16 Q. So you said the meeting lasted about 30 minutes?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. And after the meeting, what, if anything, did you do to
19 act on what you had learned and what Mr. Sussmann had given
20 you?
21 A. To the best of my recollection, immediately or within
22 minutes I placed a phone call to the person who's the head
23 of the -- one of the highest-ranking officials of the FBI,
24 but the head of the counterintelligence division, the
25 assistant director of the counterintelligence division named

853
1 Bill Priestap.
2 Q. And first, how confident are you that it was a phone
3 call, or could it have been another mode of communication?
4 A. I'm pretty sure it was a phone call. I could have gone
5 down to his office, but I want -- so it could have been -- I
6 think it was a phone call. It could have been an in-person
7 meeting, but I know that I reached out for Bill as quickly
8 as I could.
9 Q. You testified Mr. Priestap, I think, was head of the
10 counterintelligence division? Is that what you said?
11 A. He was the assistant director of the counterintelligence
12 division, the highest-ranking FBI official responsible for
13 counterterrorism -- sorry, counterintelligence information.
14 Q. And just briefly for the jury, what does the assistant
15 director for counterintelligence do, including what is
16 really counterintelligence?
17 A. Counterintelligence is the efforts of the FBI to thwart
18 the malicious activities of hostile foreign intelligence
19 services, so spy services of foreign countries who try to
20 harm the United States or our allies.
21 The FBI is responsible, on a global basis, to try
22 to thwart those efforts by conducting investigations, by
23 recruiting sources, by conducting electronic surveillance,
24 by making arrests, by recruiting spies on the other side to
25 help us. It's a whole range of activities, again, intended

854
1 to -- a whole range of investigative activities intended to
2 thwart, for example, the Russian Foreign Intelligence
3 Service from spying on us.
4 Q. And why was it that you thought these allegations were
5 appropriate to bring to Mr. Priestap's attention?
6 A. Because it involved Russia and an allegation that this
7 bank had some connection to the Kremlin, which refers to the
8 leadership of the Russian Federation, the government of the
9 Russian Federation. And so if there's some effort at that
10 point in time to communicate in some way with some part of
11 the Trump organization, that seemed to me, on its face, to
12 be a potential national security threat.
13 The FBI, at that point in time, was already
14 investigating allegations that there were connections
15 between the Trump campaign and the Russian Federation. So
16 we all -- I already knew that we had an investigation going
17 on of that nature. And then here was another set of
18 allegations relating to a different aspect of alleged
19 interactions or connections between the Russian government
20 and the Trump -- in this case some part of the Trump
21 organization.
22 Q. And with regard to that investigation of ties between
23 the Trump organization and the Russian government, as the
24 top lawyer at the FBI, was that something that at the time
25 was a priority for you or one of the matters you were

855
1 closely focused on?
2 A. Yes. That was a very high priority for me.
3 Q. And was the FBI at that time devoting considerable
4 resources to that investigation?
5 A. Yes, but -- the answer is yes.
6 It was also a very sensitive investigation so we
7 had to be very careful about how we discussed it internally
8 and who was working on the case. We wanted to make sure
9 that nothing about the investigation leaked.
10 Q. So let's get back to your call or interaction with
11 Mr. Priestap.
12 As best as you recall -- well, let me first --
13 before we do that, what did you do with the physical
14 materials?
15 A. The physical materials I held on my desk in my office at
16 the moment -- for the moment.
17 Q. Okay. So at the time you interacted with Mr. Priestap
18 they were still with you?
19 A. That's my recollection. That's why I think it was a
20 phone call, because I still had the materials with me.
21 Q. Okay. So let's talk about the phone call.
22 What, if anything -- what was the gist of what you
23 told Mr. Priestap?
24 A. So a couple of things.
25 So, first, I explained who Michael was, and I

856
1 identified him as Michael, as a partner at Perkins Coie.
2 And then I explained a little bit about Perkins
3 Coie, that they had -- it was a firm that I was familiar
4 with, and that there was at least one other partner there
5 with substantial national security -- with a substantial
6 national security background, a person named Todd Hinnen.
7 Q. I'm sorry, Mr. Baker, just for the court reporter, how
8 do you spell Todd --
9 A. H-I-N-E-N, I think. I think there's -- that's the right
10 number of Ns.
11 Q. Okay. Sorry to interrupt.
12 A. So Todd had been a Deputy Assistant Attorney General in
13 the Department of Justice's National Security Division, so a
14 pretty high-ranking national security official. And then
15 for a period of time he was the head -- the acting head of
16 the National Security Division. So a serious national
17 security lawyer who also worked for Perkins.
18 And then I explained -- yes. So I explained -- I
19 explained that, and then I was explaining more about Michael
20 and, I think, who he was and his practice.
21 Q. And what did you say in that regard?
22 A. Well, I was trying to explain that Michael was -- in
23 essence, I was vouching for Michael because I was trying to
24 explain that Michael was a serious lawyer, a smart guy with
25 DOJ experience, with national security experience. Somebody

857
1 who could under -- and with cyber experience; somebody who
2 could understand the importance and the validity of the
3 information that had been brought to him by the cyber
4 security experts.
5 So Michael was -- he wasn't a, you know, personal
6 injury lawyer. He was somebody who could understand the
7 meaning of this cyber material. And, therefore, when I
8 received it from him, him explaining to me that he took it
9 seriously made me take it seriously. And so I was trying to
10 explain that to Priestap.
11 Q. And what, if anything, did you tell Mr. Priestap about
12 other clients Mr. Sussmann might have had or anything in
13 that regard?
14 A. I repeated to Mr. Priestap that Michael had said that he
15 was not there on behalf of any particular client, that he
16 was there as a citizen, as a -- essentially as a human
17 source of information, confidential human source. That's
18 kind of how I thought about him.
19 Q. Why did you want to share that piece with Mr. Priestap?
20 A. Well, so that Bill would know -- so that Bill would know
21 who Michael was, and that Bill would be able to take
22 Michael, I think, as seriously as I took him.
23 And the other part of this was to tell Bill --
24 like I was quite concerned, after my discussion with
25 Michael, about us needing to move quickly to investigate

858
1 this material before the press published something about it,
2 and so I needed to explain to Bill, like, hey, this is
3 serious material from a serious guy, and we need to get
4 moving on it quickly if we're going to do something about
5 this.
6 So I was trying to imbue with him a sense of
7 seriousness and urgency.
8 Q. I think you testified yesterday that by this time you
9 were at least generally aware that Mr. Sussmann represented
10 the DNC in connection with hacks; is that right?
11 A. That's correct.
12 Q. And what, if anything, did you say to Mr. Priestap about
13 that?
14 A. I think I told him like, okay, this is who Michael is.
15 He's represented the Democratic party in the Russian hack
16 that we were also investigating and/or the Hillary Clinton
17 Campaign. So just, again, to orient Bill to who Michael
18 was. I mean, that's a serious credential in terms of being
19 a cyber security expert.
20 And then to explain: But in this case he said
21 he's not appearing on behalf of them. In this case he's
22 coming in as a good citizen.
23 So, you know, lawyers have clients. They have
24 different clients, lots of clients sometimes, and -- but
25 this was not that situation. Michael was doing this in a

859
1 different capacity.
2 Q. So just to be clear, based on what Mr. Sussmann said
3 during the meeting, did you think he was there seeing you on
4 behalf of the DNC?
5 A. No.
6 Q. And just to be clear, when -- based on what he said in
7 the meeting, did you think he was there to see you on behalf
8 of the Hillary Clinton Campaign?
9 A. No.
10 Q. Why?
11 A. Because he said he wasn't. He said he was there on
12 behalf of -- in the text message that we have and also in
13 his statement to me, he said he was not there on behalf of
14 any client.
15 Q. Okay. So would it be fair to say you oriented
16 Mr. Priestap as to who Mr. Sussmann was? Is that what you
17 were saying you were doing?
18 A. Who Michael was and the importance and the urgency of
19 dealing with this material.
20 Q. So after you did that, did you share with Mr. Priestap
21 more about the substance of the allegation?
22 A. I described to Bill, yes, the substance of it, that this
23 was some type of surreptitious communications channel that
24 was somehow, perhaps, using this Spectrum Health node, if
25 you will, to try to obscure the communications.

860
1 I explained to him about the TOR analogy, at
2 least. TOR was something that I was familiar with. I
3 wasn't sure if Bill was very familiar with it, so I think I
4 explained a little bit about TOR to him, yes.
5 Q. Okay.
6 A. And then I also -- like, I wanted to get rid of this
7 material as quickly as possible. I hated having it on my
8 desk because it was evidence of a crime, potentially, and
9 it's certainly foreign intelligence information. And so
10 being a lawyer and not an agent, I didn't want to have this
11 material any longer than I needed to.
12 Q. And just so everyone is clear, as the assistant director
13 of the counterintelligence division, would Mr. Priestap be
14 an agent, a Special Agent?
15 A. Yes. He was a career FBI agent with many years of
16 experience.
17 Q. Okay. So not a lawyer?
18 A. Does Bill have a -- Bill might have a law degree. I
19 can't remember.
20 Q. Okay.
21 A. Some agents have law degrees.
22 Q. Okay.
23 A. But he was not serving in the capacity as a lawyer at
24 that time.
25 Q. So he would have had a badge and a gun?

861
1 A. He had a badge and a gun.
2 Q. Okay. Mr. Baker, presumably before testifying today and
3 throughout the last months, have you had a chance to review
4 records that have refreshed your recollection to these
5 matters?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. And do you recall at some point you were shown notes
8 that were from a notebook of Mr. Priestap?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. In looking at those notes, when you did look at them,
11 did that help refresh your mind in terms of what happened on
12 that day, September 19th?
13 A. Yes. Yes.
14 Q. If I could show you what's been marked as Government
15 Exhibit 243. Do you recognize this?
16 A. Yes, I do.
17 Q. And what is it?
18 A. Well, when I -- these are notes that I've seen
19 previously that were described to me as Bill Priestap's
20 notes.
21 MR. DeFILIPPIS: Okay. Your Honor, the government
22 offers Government Exhibit 243.
23 MR. BERKOWITZ: No objection, subject to the
24 stipulation that we spoke about earlier.
25 THE COURT: Government 243 is admitted.

862
1 Q. Now, Mr. Baker, I know that -- I'm not going to ask you
2 to vouch for the fact that these are Mr. Priestap's notes,
3 but that's your understanding based on what others have told
4 you, right?
5 A. Correct.
6 Q. So why don't we just walk through these notes to see to
7 what extent they accord with your recollection of that
8 conversation with Mr. Priestap.
9 I also recognize it's not your handwriting so it
10 may not be easy for you to read.
11 A. It's better than mine.
12 Q. Would you just read to the jury the first part numbered
13 1 with the circle around it.
14 A. Yes. So it says "1," and then it says "Michael
15 Sussmann." And then it goes up, and it looks like a "plus
16 Todd Hinnen" or Hinen. And then back down to Michael's
17 line, it says, "Attorney, Perkins Coie," and then a dash,
18 "said not doing this for any client."
19 Q. And let me just stop you there. Does that accord or not
20 accord with your recollection of what you told Mr. Priestap
21 about the "not doing for any client" statement and when you
22 said it? Does that accord with --
23 A. That accords with what I told Mr. Priestap.
24 Q. And the phrase "said not doing this for any client,"
25 again, does that accord with what you saw in the text
863
1 message and what you recall him repeating in the meeting?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. Okay. Continue.
4 A. Then below that it says -- under "Michael" it says,
5 "represents DNC, Clinton Foundation, etc."
6 Q. Now, just to stop you there. Which part of your
7 testimony before does that reflect, if any? In other words,
8 what is that?
9 A. That was my recollection, that Michael had represented
10 the DNC. It says "Clinton Foundation," but my recollection
11 was -- sitting here today, my recollection was that Michael
12 represented the Hillary Clinton Campaign, not the
13 Foundation.
14 But I may have said "Clinton Foundation," or Bill
15 may have misunderstood me or -- yes, so I can't explain
16 that.
17 Q. Okay. And just to be clear, when it says "represents
18 DNC, Clinton Foundation, etc.," do you understand that to
19 mean represents them here on September 19th or --
20 A. No.
21 Q. -- in other matters?
22 A. No. In other matters.
23 Again, I was trying to orient Bill with respect to
24 who Michael was and to establish his bona fides, his
25 credibility as a source.
864
1 Q. Okay. Continue.
2 A. So below that it says, "Former DOJ officials." And
3 that's a reference both to Michael, because I think I said
4 that Michael had been an attorney at DOJ, and that Todd also
5 was an attorney at DOJ or had been an attorney at DOJ.
6 Q. And you were also a former DOJ, right?
7 A. Correct.
8 Q. Okay. And then the next line, the next bullet, which
9 says "been approached"?
10 A. "Been approached by prominent cyber people (academic or
11 Corp POCs)."
12 Q. What did you understand that "Corp POCs" to mean?
13 A. Some reference to corporation -- people who work for
14 corporations' points of contact. "POC," I think that's a
15 reference to points of contact.
16 Q. Now, Mr. Baker, in the text message that you received
17 the night before there was a portion of that message that
18 said --
19 MR. DeFILIPPIS: I'm sorry, Ms. Arsenault, can we
20 bring up 1500, the text message.
21 Q. So in the text message Mr. Sussmann said, "I'm coming on
22 my own - not on behalf of a client or company."
23 So when Mr. -- when you understood, from your
24 meeting, that Mr. Sussmann had received information or been
25 approached by academic or corporate POCs, did you understand

865
1 them to be his clients or not his clients?
2 A. No, not his clients. These were the cyber security
3 experts that he was in contact with, but not clients.
4 Q. All right. Returning back to Government Exhibit 243.
5 Now, to the right, sort of off to the side from
6 the "academic or corporate" -- I'm sorry, what is "POC"?
7 You might have said.
8 A. I think it means point of contact.
9 Q. Off to the right of that there's another little notation
10 there. Just read that for us.
11 A. It says, "People like: Matt Blaze, Steve Bellovin
12 (ph)" -- I think he means phonetic; it means Bill is just
13 estimating, he's guessing, at the spelling -- "and Susan
14 Landau (ph)," again, phonetic, guessing at the spelling of
15 Susan's last name.
16 Q. If you could just briefly remind the jury, how did they
17 come up in the conversation with Mr. Sussmann?
18 A. My recollection is that Michael said the people he was
19 working with were people like this, like of high caliber;
20 highly respected academic people that I would probably know.
21 Q. And did you understand that those were the people who
22 gathered the data, or you're just saying people like --
23 A. People like that; not these people. Specifically not
24 these people. People like that, of that quality.
25 Q. Turning to the lower section there beginning with the

866
1 "NYTs," what do we have there?
2 A. So it says, "NYTs" -- which means The New York Times --
3 "Wash Post" -- the Washington Post -- "or WSJ" -- which
4 means The Wall Street Journal -- "on Friday." So it was
5 sooner than I thought even.
6 Yes, so, to me, that means that -- I was telling
7 Bill that one of these organizations was going to publish
8 something as soon as Friday about these allegations.
9 Q. To what extent did that affect your view of the urgency
10 of this information?
11 A. Very urgent. If we're going to do something, we need to
12 get going.
13 Q. And, again, why is that?
14 A. Because if this -- if they published some article, based
15 on my experience in the national security field for a long
16 time, the communicants, the people communicating with each
17 other, were going to switch to some other channel very
18 quickly.
19 And the communication streams on the Internet are
20 very ephemeral. They disappear quickly. And sometimes the
21 records exist for a period of time, and sometimes they
22 disappear very rapidly, especially if it involves
23 communications overseas.
24 And so it was going to be much, much harder, if
25 they switched their communications -- if the people

867
1 communicating with each other switched their communications
2 mode, it would be much, much harder for the Bureau to figure
3 out what was happening if they -- if the article is
4 published and they switched.
5 Q. Mr. Baker, it sounds like -- were you operating under
6 the assumptions that this allegation could be true? Was
7 that a part of your calculus here?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. All right. So below the part about the media there,
10 what do we have?
11 A. Sort of off to the side it says, "Foreign power
12 contacting Trump org." "Foreign power" means a foreign
13 government. It could be a terrorist group also, but in this
14 context it means a foreign government or some part of a
15 foreign government.
16 So then it says -- same line basically -- "Secret
17 Trump org server that has had comms with Alfa-Bank Moscow."
18 And then below that it says, "(connected to
19 Kremlin)" and then it looks like a plus, "a hospital in U.S.
20 used as a" -- and then it just stops. But below the
21 "hospital," it says "(Spectrum Health in MI?)", which I
22 think means in Michigan.
23 And below that, just to go back on the side just
24 to finish that sort of paragraph, if you will, "comm" --
25 C-O-M-M, which means communications -- "mode (TOR)," T-O-R.

868
1 Q. The Spectrum Health piece, is that the entity you had
2 referenced early in your testimony as the organization, the
3 hospital?
4 A. The hospital, some kind of an intermediary point between
5 Alfa-Bank and the Trump organization -- excuse me, Alfa-
6 Bank, the Trump organization, somehow through Spectrum
7 Health to make it harder for people like the FBI to figure
8 out what's going on.
9 Q. And then "TOR." I think you testified before you had
10 some general familiarity with TOR; is that correct?
11 A. I was familiar with TOR from a series of other sensitive
12 investigations with the criminal division of the FBI.
13 And just while we're on the topic, if you drop
14 down to the very bottom line it says, "CID has a TOR
15 expert." I think that was me telling Bill that there was an
16 expert in the criminal investigative division, CID. This
17 guy was a genius with respect to TOR. And so I was trying
18 to tell Bill, if we needed to investigate TOR in some way,
19 we had this guy to -- that we could rely on as well.
20 Q. Okay. And then finally, the next part of the text,
21 "Another article"?
22 A. "Another article to come out later" -- I don't know what
23 that reference means, "approximately" maybe -- "(three to
24 four weeks) about Trump org contacting foreign nations."
25 So again, the same thing about the urgency of

869
1 this, that there was some other news organization that was
2 going to publish something relatively soon.
3 And, again, if I could just -- the FBI was already
4 conducting an investigation of alleged connections between
5 the Trump campaign and the Russians by this point in time,
6 and so that was a matter of great concern to all of us. And
7 so these articles coming out revealing any part of what the
8 FBI might be doing in terms of investigate -- I'm sorry, not
9 what the FBI was doing -- what might be happening between
10 the Trump organization and Russia was of concern to me in
11 terms of the impact that it would have on the investigation
12 and our ability to conduct it without the other side knowing
13 what was happening.
14 Q. Now, let's go back. You said that you think you
15 probably had the materials still in your possession when you
16 spoke to Mr. Priestap?
17 A. I think so, yes.
18 Q. Okay. And what, if anything -- so, again, best
19 estimate, recognizing it's six years ago, lengthier call
20 with Mr. Priestap?
21 A. I don't think it was a lengthy call. Maybe five, ten
22 minutes, something like that.
23 Q. And after you spoke to Mr. Priestap, what did you do
24 with the materials?
25 A. I believe that I asked Bill to send somebody to come get

870
1 this stuff because I wanted to get rid of it as quickly as
2 possible.
3 Q. And do you know who came, or did somebody come?
4 A. Somebody eventually came. I can't remember specifically
5 who it was, but somebody eventually came, and relatively
6 quickly.
7 Q. Other than Mr. Priestap on that day, did you tell anyone
8 else about the allegation?
9 A. I believe that I told my senior leadership team in the
10 office of general counsel.
11 Q. And in terms of how the office of general counsel was
12 structured, what title or position would the senior
13 leadership team have? What was the structure?
14 A. Again, it was me as the general counsel. And I also
15 should say I also had the rank of assistant director, so I
16 was the same rank as Bill.
17 Anyway, the general counsel, and then below that
18 were -- at that point in time I think there were three
19 deputy general counsels: one who was responsible for sort
20 of all of our criminal investigative matters and training;
21 another one who was responsible for all of our litigation
22 matters -- the FBI gets sued a lot, so we have a lot of
23 attorneys who deal with litigation -- and then there is a
24 third one who was responsible for national security and
25 cyber.
871
1 And then below that we had section chiefs and unit
2 chiefs and line attorneys and paralegals and a whole range
3 of other professional support staff.
4 Q. And what was the name of your deputy for, I think you
5 said, national security and cyber?
6 A. That was Trisha Anderson.
7 Q. Did you view the allegations that Mr. Sussmann gave you
8 as falling within the national security and/or cyber areas?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. Would you say it was one? Both? In other words, was --
11 A. It was both. It was both, which is why I had
12 reorganized that part of the office to encompass both of
13 those simultaneously.
14 Q. Do you think you did speak to Mr. Anderson -- I'm sorry,
15 Ms. Anderson about this matter on that day?
16 A. I believe so, yes.
17 Q. And what, if anything, did you tell her?
18 A. I believe I gave her a short summary of the matter and
19 also said that Michael had come to me not on behalf of any
20 particular client.
21 Q. And with regard -- so you had told Mr. Priestap, you
22 testified, that statement "not on behalf of a client." Why
23 is it that you also shared that with Ms. Anderson?
24 A. Well, she was the main lawyer for Bill Priestap in terms
25 of day-to-day interactions. National security and cyber

872
1 were her responsibilities. So she handled
2 counterintelligence and cyber. She also handled
3 counterterrorism and any other national security-related
4 matter.
5 But in any event, she was the main lawyer for Bill
6 on a day-to-day basis interacting with him.
7 Q. You mentioned these deputies in the general counsel's
8 office. What sort of regular meetings did you have with
9 your staff? Did you have regular meetings?
10 A. We had daily meetings. For a period of time we had
11 twice-daily meetings with the senior staff. Then we had
12 weekly meetings. We had monthly meetings. So I was meeting
13 with my team a lot.
14 But with the deputy general counsels and my chief
15 of staff and a couple of other folks, my special assistant,
16 we were meeting at least once a day and sometimes twice a
17 day.
18 Q. Okay. So that will be the deputies, your chief of
19 staff?
20 A. Correct.
21 Q. And where would those meetings occur?
22 A. Usually in my conference room right across from my
23 office.
24 Q. Did there come a time when you had the opportunity to
25 look at notes from what you understood to be Ms. Anderson's

873
1 notebook?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. And if I could put on the screen for you what's been
4 premarked as Government's Exhibit 242.
5 Now, there were some redactions in the middle of
6 the page, but do you recognize this?
7 A. I've seen these before, yes.
8 Q. And are these the notes that you understood to be from
9 Ms. Anderson's notebook?
10 A. Yes.
13 MR. BERKOWITZ: No objection, subject to the
14 stipulation, Your Honor.
16 Q. So, Mr. Baker, looking at these notes, just read for us
17 the top line.
18 A. It says, "Deputies Mtg," which I think means meeting,
19 "9/16" -- I'm sorry, "9/19/16."
20 Q. Deputies meeting. From your vantage point, any idea
21 what that refers to?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. What would that be?
24 A. That was my daily meeting with my deputies.
25 Q. The ones you referenced earlier?

874
1 A. Yes, the deputy general counsels.
2 Q. Now, let's say you had something sensitive on a national
3 security matter, a classified matter, and you needed to
4 discuss it with your deputy, Ms. Anderson. Would you
5 typically do that at the deputies meeting? Would you do it
6 after? Would it depend?
7 A. I had numerous interactions with Trisha throughout the
8 day, and so sometimes we met one on one, sometimes we met
9 with small groups, sometimes we met with the deputies.
10 I had -- as you can imagine, the FBI has a lot of
11 national security responsibilities; and so I was meeting
12 with her and talking with her on a frequent basis.
13 MR. DeFILIPPIS: Ms. Arsenault, if we could just
14 show the full document to Mr. Baker and the jury just so
15 that we have the perspective.
16 Q. So, Mr. Baker, the redactions on this document appear to
17 cover most of the page, but do you see how there's the
18 deputies meeting heading and a date, and then further down
19 on the page it looks like the writer wrote the date again?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. And what is the date that the person wrote towards the
22 bottom of the page?
23 A. Again, 9/19/16.
24 MR. DeFILIPPIS: Okay. And, Ms. Arsenault, if we
25 could just pull out the lower part.

875
1 Q. Mr. Baker, just read for the jury the notes at the
2 bottom of that page, recognizing it's not your handwriting.
3 A. Yes, "Sussmann" -- something, it looks like "meeting" --
4 "with Baker."
5 "No specific client but group of cyber academics
6 talked w/him about research.
7 "Article this Friday. NYT, Wash" -- it looks
8 like -- I'm interpreting it as Washington Post, and then
9 something, and it fades out.
10 Q. Okay. Are those notes generally consistent or
11 inconsistent with what you recall from the meeting with
12 Mr. Sussmann?
13 A. Yes. Consistent, I'm sorry, consistent.
14 Q. And how about with the text message you received the
15 night before the meeting?
16 A. Consistent.
17 Q. And then how about with what you told Mr. Priestap
18 shortly after your meeting with Mr. Sussmann?
19 A. Consistent.
20 MR. BERKOWITZ: Objection to the characterization.
21 THE COURT: Sustained.
22 Q. To what extent, Mr. Baker, do these notes reflect your
23 understanding of your meeting with Mr. Sussmann?
24 A. I'm sorry, could you repeat that?
25 Q. To what extent do these notes represent an accurate

876
1 summary of your meeting with Mr. Sussmann?
2 A. Well, they're accurate on this one particular point for
3 sure and on the article point. It doesn't go into great
4 detail about the other matters that were discussed.
5 Q. Got it.
6 A. It doesn't go into any detail about the matters that
7 were -- the other matters that were discussed.
8 Q. And when you spoke to Ms. Anderson and Mr. -- with
9 Ms. Anderson, do you have a sense of whether your recounting
10 of the "no specific client" piece of it would have happened
11 at the beginning or the end of that conversation?
12 A. I'm not sure. I don't know.
13 Q. Okay. Now, who was your supervisory chain at the FBI?
14 In other words, who were your bosses?
15 A. My boss was the deputy director, and then the director.
16 Q. At this time who was the deputy director?
17 A. Andy McCabe.
18 Q. That's McCabe?
19 A. McCabe, M-c-C-A-B-E.
20 Q. And who was the director of the FBI at this time?
21 A. At this point in time it was James Comey.
22 Q. And what was the nature of your interactions with them
23 generally? Did you speak to them often?
24 A. Spoke -- when they were in town I spoke to them every
25 day, sometimes multiple times per day.

877
1 Q. And were their offices on the same floor as yours?
2 A. Same floor, just down the hallway a bit.
3 Q. Okay. Now, Mr. Baker, are you familiar with the concept
4 of a chain of custody?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. What's a chain of custody?
7 A. Chain of custody is a legal term that is intended to
8 describe how a piece of evidence has been handled from the
9 moment it came into the possession of the government until
10 the present moment. So it's everybody who handled -- it's
11 everybody within the government who handled a piece of
12 evidence.
13 It's a list -- excuse me, it's a list of those
14 folks.
15 Q. Do you recall whether there was a chain of custody done
16 here for these materials?
17 A. Eventually, yes.
18 Q. Okay. And is it your best recollection that was like
19 the same day or a subsequent day?
20 A. Sometime later, I believe.
21 Q. Okay. Let me show you what's been premarked as
22 Government Exhibit 282. Do you recognize this?
23 A. Yes, I do.
24 Q. What is it?
25 A. This is a chain of custody document that I signed and

878
1 other people signed after me.
2 Q. Okay. And this is already in evidence so it's on the
3 screen.
4 Mr. Baker, do you remember somebody coming to ask
5 you to fill out the chain of custody?
6 A. Eventually, yes.
7 Q. And tell us what you remember about that.
8 A. Well, first, someone came and took those materials that
9 I described earlier and took them away. I believe it was
10 either Bill Priestap or it may have been Pete Strzok, so
11 another high -- Bill's deputy. One of those folks, I
12 believe, came and took the material.
13 Then later somebody came back to me with this
14 document to make sure that we had an accurate record of the
15 handling of this evidence.
16 Q. And is that your signature there?
17 A. My signature is in two places. It's at the very top --
18 it's hard to read. Thank you.
19 So "Initial Receipt, Signature of Seizing
20 Individual," meaning that I seized the material from someone
21 outside the government. And that's my signature and my name
22 and so on, and the date, and approximate time that I seized
23 the material.
24 Q. Mr. Baker, do you recall one way or the other whether
25 you told the person who came to ask you to sign this form
879
1 where you had gotten the materials?
2 A. Sorry, could you repeat that?
3 Q. Do you recall -- so someone came to ask you to sign this
4 form; is that right?
5 A. That is correct.
6 Q. Do you recall one way or the other whether you told that
7 person who had given you the materials? Mr. Sussmann.
8 A. I don't recall telling that person where the materials
9 had come from.
10 Q. And do you recall one way or the other whether they
11 asked or didn't ask?
12 A. I don't recall whether they asked or didn't ask.
13 Q. Is it possible that you did not -- that you chose not to
14 reveal to that person who had given you the materials?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. If that is what happened, why would you do that?
17 A. Because, as I said earlier, this is a very sensitive
18 investigation, and if Michael was bringing me this very
19 sensitive information as a citizen, then at that point in
20 time I would -- I believe I thought of and would have
21 thought of Michael as a source for the FBI, somebody from
22 the public coming forward to give us that information.
23 And so, because of the sensitivity of it, I would
24 have wanted to protect his identity. I wouldn't want
25 anybody to know who he was any more than absolutely had to.
880
1 Protecting the identity of confidential human
2 sources at the FBI is one of our most important priorities.
3 Folks who are willing to help the FBI are critically
4 important to our success in enforcing criminal law and
5 protecting the country, and so we want to protect those
6 folks very much.
7 And so I would not have wanted to tell anybody who
8 didn't have any need to know that information the identity
9 of a person who had given me this type of material. I had
10 already told the information to the head of the
11 counterintelligence division and, I believe, to Pete Strzok,
12 so I didn't think that I needed to expand that knowledge --
13 that circle of knowledge any more than had to be the case.
14 Q. And when you said you might have thought of Mr. Sussmann
15 as a source, do you mean you thought of him as a signed-up
16 official FBI source or just someone providing information?
17 A. No, not a signed-up source that we had a written
18 agreement with, but a person who had in their possession
19 very sensitive information that he was willing to give to
20 us. That's a pretty important person to protect.
21 Q. Now, if you had learned or known that Mr. Sussmann was a
22 lawyer coming for a client, would you have protected his
23 identity in that way?
24 A. I don't think so.
25 Q. And why is that?

881
1 A. Well, because he'd be the lawyer representing somebody
2 whose identity he may or may not have disclosed.
3 So the person that he was representing, or
4 organization, or whatever it was, that would, to me, in my
5 mind, be the sensitive human source. The lawyer wouldn't
6 be. Because lawyers, as I said earlier, have lots of
7 clients, and people know they have lots of clients, and they
8 represent different clients in different matters over
9 different times to different people.
10 Q. Mr. Baker, you testified earlier that your direct
11 reports, your bosses, were Mr. McCabe and Mr. Comey. Do you
12 think you informed either Mr. McCabe or Mr. Comey of these
13 allegations after you learned about them?
14 A. Yes. I believe that I reported it to both of them.
15 Q. And why is it that you'd report it up in that way?
16 A. Because, again, the FBI was already conducting -- excuse
17 me, the FBI was already conducting an investigation of the
18 Trump/Russia matter. Here was another piece of evidence
19 that had come to me about Trump and Russia.
20 And so it was very concerning, and it seemed very
21 time-sensitive, as Michael had described, with respect to
22 these reporters publishing something. So it seemed to me of
23 great urgency and great seriousness that I would want to
24 make my bosses aware of this information.
25 Q. Anything you recall about how -- first, do you think you

882
1 told both of them? One of them?
2 A. I think I told both of them.
3 Q. Any recollection of how they responded or the general
4 tenor of their reaction?
5 A. I think they were quite concerned about it also.
6 And just to state, for the record, Mr. Trump at
7 the time was a candidate for the office of President of the
8 United States, and so the FBI is investigating allegations
9 related to his potential interactions and those of his --
10 people on his campaign with the government of the Russian
11 Federation. So that was of high, high importance to the FBI
12 at this time.
13 Q. Let me show you what's been premarked as Government
14 Exhibit 285.
15 Is this an email sent by you to Mr. Comey and
16 others at the FBI?
17 A. Yes.
20 MR. BERKOWITZ: No objection, Your Honor.
22 A. If I could just be clear, there's two emails embedded
23 here, right? So there's an email that I sent originally --
24 Q. Yes.
25 A. -- and then an email that Bill Priestap sends to me?

883
1 Q. Yes.
2 Okay. So looking at the first of those emails,
3 could you just walk us through, Mr. Baker, the date and time
4 of it, and then the people you've put in the "To" line
5 there.
6 A. So in the original message, it's from me sent Thursday,
7 September 22, 2016, at 11:14 a.m.
8 Whoops. Thank you.
9 And I'm sending it to Director Comey, Deputy
10 Director McCabe; Bill Priestap; Mike Kortan, K-O-R-T-A-N;
11 Dave Bowdich. And that's it.
12 Q. And can you tell us what positions each -- if you
13 remember, what position each of those folks held?
14 A. Mr. Comey was the Director. Mr. McCabe was the Deputy
15 Director. Bill Priestap was the Assistant Director for
16 Counterintelligence, "CD" as that's referenced there. Mike
17 Kortan was the head of public affairs for the FBI, so the
18 person who engaged with the press. And Dave Bowdich -- I
19 believe Dave at the time was the ADD, which is, what,
20 Associate Deputy Director? I think that's right.
21 Q. Okay. So the date of this is what? September 22nd?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. So let me back up a little bit and ask you. You
24 testified that on the 19th Mr. Sussmann mentioned there were
25 some news organizations who might be publishing an article,

884
1 correct?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. What, if any, follow-up did you do on that issue?
4 A. On the press issue?
5 Q. Yes.
6 A. A number of things.
7 So I had conversations initially about it with
8 Bill and then the other leaders that we just -- that we just
9 saw on the email chain. And I don't remember who had the
10 idea, but the basic agreed-upon plan that we came up with
11 was: Hey, Jim, you should go back to Michael and see if
12 he's willing to disclose the name of the reporter or
13 reporters, because we need more time. This material is --
14 just the way it is, we're going to need more time to
15 investigate it; so we've got to see if we can go to the
16 press and ask them to hold off on publishing this article
17 for a period of time so that we can do some preliminary
18 investigation or some investigation, as I said earlier, in
19 order to figure out what was going on and before the people
20 who were communicating were aware that we might be
21 investigating it or that somebody might be investigating it.
22 And so we wanted to see -- so we needed to figure
23 out who the reporter was, and then to try to see if there
24 was a way to sort of ask them to hold off on the story.
25 Q. So is that something that you were sort of given the

885
1 task to do, which is to go back to Mr. Sussmann?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. And was that within a couple of days of the meeting with
4 Mr. Sussmann?
5 A. I think it was very soon after the meeting with
6 Mr. Sussmann, yes, because of the urgency of getting to
7 the -- figuring out who the reporter was, setting up a
8 meeting, asking them to hold it. We expected that they
9 would have to talk to their senior leadership in the news
10 organization.
11 This is something that is done from time to time.
12 In my experience, the government will ask the press to hold
13 off on publishing an article in order to give the government
14 some time to do any number of different things. So it's not
15 common, but it's -- but it does happen.
16 Q. And so did you call Mr. Sussmann?
17 A. Yes. That's my recollection.
18 Q. Now, Mr. Baker, I'm going to show you something you've
19 never seen before, but I'll show you what's been marked as
21 And looking at this, Mr. Baker, just based on your
22 life experience, what is this?
23 A. It looks like a bill from Verizon.
24 Q. Okay. And who is the listed party on the bill?
25 A. It looks like it's Michael Sussmann.

886
1 MR. DeFILIPPIS: Your Honor, subject to a
2 stipulation that will be entered between the parties, the
3 government offers Government Exhibit 1400.
6 MR. DeFILIPPIS: And if I could direct us,
7 Ms. Arsenault, to the first page of billing records, to the
8 entry at the bottom of -- second to the bottom of that first
9 page.
10 (The following is a bench conference
11 held outside the hearing of the jury)
12 MR. BERKOWITZ: Your Honor, I hadn't seen this
13 particular exhibit before. While I have no objection to the
14 phone record, it contains Mr. Sussmann's home address and
15 his current phone number, and I think that those should be
16 redacted.
17 THE COURT: Okay. Can we conceal them for now?
18 MR. DeFILIPPIS: Sure.
19 THE COURT: Before we publish to the jury?
20 MR. DeFILIPPIS: Yes, no problem.
21 MR. BERKOWITZ: Thank you.
22 (This is the end of the bench conference)
23 MR. DeFILIPPIS: Thank you, Your Honor, and just a
24 moment.
25 THE COURT: How much longer do you have?

887
1 MR. DeFILIPPIS: Your Honor, it will be quite a
2 while.
3 THE COURT: Well, whenever you get to a natural
4 stopping point --
5 MR. DeFILIPPIS: Okay.
6 THE COURT: -- why don't we take our break?
7 MR. DeFILIPPIS: Your Honor, if you'd like to do
8 it now.
9 THE COURT: Why don't we do it now.
10 MR. DeFILIPPIS: Yes.
11 THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, we're going to
12 take our morning break for about 15 minutes. I have 10:40.
13 So at about five minutes to 11:00 come back ready to go.
14 And Juror No. 5, if you could just stay back,
15 please.
16 Again, no discussions about the case, no research
17 about the case, no social media concerning the case. Okay?
18 (Jury exits courtroom)
19 THE COURT: All right, ma'am. We received your
20 note, and I've shared it with counsel. And I understand
21 that you've recently realized that your daughter and
22 Mr. Sussmann's daughter are on the same crew team; is that
23 correct?
24 JUROR NO. 5: Yes.
25 THE COURT: And you were not aware of that

888
1 information when you filled out your questionnaire?
2 JUROR NO. 5: No, certainly not. This is quite
3 surprising.
4 THE COURT: And you were not aware of it when we
5 spoke at the bench here on Monday?
6 JUROR NO. 5: No, sir.
7 THE COURT: All right. Okay. Had you known about
8 that connection either when you filled out your
9 questionnaire or when we spoke on Monday, would your answers
10 have been any different to the questionnaire; particularly
11 those questions related to your ability to be fair as well
12 as those questions about any concern about others' reaction
13 to what your verdict may be in this case?
14 JUROR NO. 5: No. Obviously I would have
15 disclosed it had I known; but no, my answers are not --
16 THE COURT: And you feel that way sitting here
17 today?
18 JUROR NO. 5: Yes, I do.
19 THE COURT: All right. And do you know
20 Mr. Sussmann's daughter?
21 JUROR NO. 5: I do not. I believe she's a year or
22 two behind my daughter. My daughter's a senior, so...
23 THE COURT: Do you know Mr. Sussmann or his wife
24 or any other members of his family?
25 JUROR NO. 5: No. Obviously, when my daughter

889
1 mentioned it, I thought -- I talked to other crew parents.
2 I don't recall certainly meeting Mr. Sussmann, and I don't
3 recall meeting anybody else by that name on the crew team.
4 THE COURT: Okay. Counsel?
5 MS. SHAW: Thank you, Your Honor. Brittain Shaw
6 on behalf of the United States.
7 I believe, Your Honor, we would request that she
8 be excused. I think this would be a very difficult
9 situation.
10 THE COURT: Why don't we do that outside the
11 presence of the juror.
12 Any voir dire questions?
13 MS. SHAW: In terms of your daughter's
14 relationship with Mr. Sussmann's daughter, do they also have
15 classes together? Is that your understanding?
16 JUROR NO. 5: I don't know. I'm afraid this is
17 the first time she's ever mentioned it, and I don't actually
18 know his daughter's name. She just mentioned, "Oh, a girl
19 on my crew team is -- her father is involved in this case,"
20 obviously not understanding the connection.
21 I believe she's a few years behind, but, you know,
22 it's a small crew team so she obviously would know her from
23 that. I would doubt they would have classes together being
24 a senior and a few years earlier.
25 MS. SHAW: And about how many girls or young women

890
1 are on the crew team?
2 JUROR NO. 5: Between 30 and 40, I think. I
3 should know that.
4 MS. SHAW: Is it the practice of these parents to
5 go to these crew events?
6 JUROR NO. 5: Yes.
7 MS. SHAW: And do they sort of organize pre and
8 post gatherings for the team?
9 JUROR NO. 5: Yes. And actually, I should mention
10 my daughter is a coxswain, and she's one of the three
11 captains, one of the three senior captains, so I've had a
12 bit of a role this year, although less than the other
13 captains, in organizing things like, you know, the food and
14 things for the regattas and crew dinners and things.
15 I've never had a crew dinner at my house. I
16 haven't met, you know, all the girls. But of course I would
17 have seen the girls at the races.
18 MS. SHAW: And just so we're clear, in addition to
19 being the captain, she's the coxswain. And that's the
20 person that's in the boat with the other seven, or is it
21 eight, rowers?
22 JUROR NO. 5: Fours and eights. And I would say I
23 don't know if she's in a boat with Mr. Sussmann's daughter.
24 She's usually in a boat with other seniors, but I think she
25 has been coxswain for some of the younger girls. But I

891
1 don't know.
2 MS. SHAW: Okay.
3 Thank you.
4 JUROR NO. 5: Thank you.
5 MR. BERKOWITZ: Hello. I just want to make sure
6 you haven't discussed the case with your daughter.
7 JUROR NO. 5: No, I have not. So I was -- when
8 she mentioned it, I was, like, oh, that's interesting.
9 Obviously I didn't say anything to her either way about
10 whether I am or am not on the jury.
11 MR. BERKOWITZ: Okay.
12 THE COURT: Have you discussed the case with
13 anybody else?
14 JUROR NO. 5: No, I have not. You know, I just
15 told my family I can't say what it's about.
16 THE COURT: Okay. So obviously our objective is
17 to have jurors who are fair and impartial. Is there
18 anything at all about the connection that would make you
19 feel uncomfortable continuing as a juror in this case or to
20 question your ability to be impartial and to follow all of
21 the Court's instructions?
22 JUROR NO. 5: No, sir. I mean, I certainly was
23 taken aback when she mentioned it, but no, I don't believe
24 that would affect my ability to be...
25 THE COURT: Okay.

892
1 (Juror exits courtroom)
2 THE COURT: All right. Let's take our break, and
3 I'll think about it.
4 (Recess taken)
5 THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: Court is back in session.
6 THE COURT: All right. Please be seated,
7 everybody.
8 MS. SHAW: Thank you, Your Honor. Brittain Shaw
9 for the United States.
10 With respect to the juror, I just wanted to make
11 our record with respect to that.
12 As Your Honor noted, that if she had known this
13 when she was filling out the questionnaire, it certainly
14 would have been something that she would have included, and
15 the government would have moved to strike her for cause; and
16 if we had not succeeded on that, we would have exercised one
17 of our peremptories.
18 And I have no reason to doubt that she's being
19 truthful and would try to be fair to the best of her
20 ability, but, you know, anyone that's been a parent knows
21 that you can't really separate, you know, what might be best
22 for your child from your -- sort of how you think through
23 things, and we believe it could weigh on her. And so our
24 position would be that she should not be -- she should not
25 stay on the jury.

893
1 THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Berkowitz?
2 MR. BERKOWITZ: A couple of things, Your Honor.
3 First of all, on repeated questioning by both you
4 and of her own volition she said she can be fair and
5 impartial. She raised the issue, which I thought was very
6 conscientious of her to do. She didn't hide it. At the
7 time she filled out her application, she noted it.
8 She has not met Mr. Sussmann. She doesn't know
9 the daughter. And, you know, there's no reason that she
10 can't sit as a fair and impartial juror.
11 Now, we obviously -- we'll leave it at that, Your
12 Honor.
13 THE COURT: Okay. The Court will deny the
14 government's motion to unseat Juror 5 for the reasons
15 Mr. Berkowitz noted. The connection is not so close that I
16 think it necessarily affects her impartiality. She
17 obviously did not know the connection, unfortunately, when
18 she filled out her questionnaire. The fact that she brought
19 the connection voluntarily to the Court's attention as soon
20 as she learned it shows that she is conscientious and takes
21 her obligations as a juror seriously. And she reiterated
22 quite confidently that she could continue to be fair and
23 that the connection would not affect or cause any concerns
24 about the reaction to any verdict that she might render.
25 And just for the record, the daughters are on the

894
1 same team, but they are not friends. They are three years
2 apart. The team is fairly large, upwards of 40 members, and
3 they are three years apart. And as a senior, she is
4 probably out of there anyway.
5 So for all those reasons, the Court will keep
6 Juror 5.
7 All right.
8 (Jury enters courtroom)
9 THE COURT: You can get Mr. Baker.
10 All right. Welcome back, sir.
11 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Judge.
13 Q. Okay. Mr. Baker, before the break I think we were
14 talking about -- first, you testified that you believe you
15 called Mr. Sussmann in connection with this decision to
16 reach out to him about the potential media article; is that
17 right?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. And we were looking at Government Exhibit 1400.
20 MR. DeFILIPPIS: And, Ms. Arsenault, if we could
21 bring up Page 93 of Government Exhibit 1400.
22 Q. Now, Mr. Baker, recognizing you've never seen these
23 records before --
24 MR. DeFILIPPIS: But, Ms. Arsenault, could we
25 highlight the second call from the bottom of that page.

895
1 Q. Now, Mr. Baker, there's a phone number on this record,
2 which is 202-324-6825. Is that number familiar to you?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. And what number do you understand that to be?
5 A. To the best of my recollection, that was the phone
6 number that was on my desk.
7 Q. At the FBI?
8 A. At the FBI.
9 Q. And is there any particular pattern, if you remember,
10 that FBI phone numbers follow at FBI headquarters?
11 A. Well, 202 is the D.C. area code, generally speaking; and
12 324 is generally the FBI headquarters prefix, I guess you
13 would say.
14 Q. Okay.
15 A. And 68 -- there were several 68 numbers that were
16 associated with the office of general counsel, to the best
17 of my recollection.
18 Q. So looking at these phone records here, the date of the
19 call is what?
20 A. The date of the call is 9/21.
21 Q. The time?
22 A. 3:34 p.m.
23 Q. And then we have the number you referenced, which is
24 your desk at the FBI?
25 A. Yes.
896
1 Q. And then, if you go further over to the right a few
2 columns, do you see where it says "Incoming Calls"?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. Okay. Now, Mr. Baker, does that accord generally with
5 around the time period when you might have spoken to
6 Mr. Sussmann about the issue we were just discussing?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. Now, what's your recollection of what it is that you
9 said to Mr. Sussmann when you called him?
10 A. The point of this phone call was to ask Michael the
11 identity of the reporter that he had referenced in the
12 meeting with me so that we could ask the reporter to slow
13 down on publishing the article.
14 Q. And do you recall what he said when you made that
15 request?
16 A. To the best of my recollection, he said he had to -- he
17 had to get back to me; that he couldn't answer that question
18 on the spot; that he would have to check with somebody
19 before he could get back to me.
20 Q. And for the jury's benefit, again, what's the point of
21 trying to find out who the reporter is, from the FBI's
22 perspective?
23 A. So that we could reach out to them directly and ask them
24 to delay publication of this article for some period of time
25 so that the FBI could do some investigation of this alleged

897
1 secret surreptitious communications channel.
2 Q. Now, let's bring us back to Government Exhibit 1500,
3 which is your text message chain with Mr. Sussmann.
5 go to the page following the one that we've been focusing
6 on.
7 Next page.
8 Sorry, go further ahead.
9 Next page.
10 Okay.
12 Q. So, Mr. Baker, if we look at the first message that
13 appears to have been sent on September 21st of 2016, again,
14 looking at the top of the page here, does this appear to be
15 a continuation of your exchanges with Mr. Sussmann?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. Michael?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. So just read for the jury the message that appears to
20 have been sent on September 21, 2016, at 10:07 p.m.
21 A. It says, "Jim, sorry I have been unable to respond
22 sooner. Travel and persons availability were not ideal this
23 afternoon and this evening. I am working on your request
24 and expect to have an answer for you by 9:00 a.m. tomorrow -
25 and I'm hoping for a positive response."

898
1 Q. Okay. Now, just to remind ourselves, the phone record
2 that we had just looked at was a call that occurred at 3:34
3 p.m. on that same date, September 21st. Do you recall that,
4 Mr. Baker?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. And then this is Mr. Sussmann texting you into that
7 night at 10:07 p.m.?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. So generally, what did you understand Mr. Sussmann to be
10 conveying to you?
11 A. That he was working hard to respond to my request about
12 the identity of the reporter, but that he hadn't been able
13 to contact the people he needed to contact yet, and he would
14 get back to me, but it seemed like everything was going in
15 the direction that we had hoped -- we at the FBI had hoped
16 for, meaning I understood this to be optimistic about the
17 possibility of us getting the identity of that reporter.
18 Q. Okay. So when he said "I have been unable to respond
19 sooner," did that refer to the call earlier in the day in
20 which you had asked him for the identity of the reporter?
21 A. That's what I think I concluded, yes.
22 Q. And when he said "travel and persons availability were
23 not ideal this afternoon and evening," what did you
24 understand him to mean?
25 A. I mean, Michael's a busy guy. He might have been

899
1 traveling. I didn't know.
2 And then he needed to talk -- my understanding was
3 from our prior conversation, he needed to talk to the cyber
4 security experts to run by them the idea of us learning the
5 identity -- "us" being the FBI -- learning the identity of
6 the reporter.
7 Q. And when he said "travel and persons," what did
8 "persons" mean in your mind?
9 A. In my mind it meant the cyber security experts that he
10 had referenced in the first conversation with me.
11 Q. In your mind, did you think that "persons" referred to a
12 client or clients?
13 A. No.
14 Q. At any time between when you met with Mr. Sussmann and
15 this text exchange, did Mr. Sussmann tell you he had a
16 client or clients?
17 A. No.
18 Q. And in the phone call you had with Mr. Sussmann before
19 this exchange, did he mention something about a client or
20 clients?
21 A. No.
22 Q. So on September -- it looks like there are no further
23 text exchanges on that day; is that right?
24 A. That looks like -- yes, that looks correct.
25 Q. Mr. Baker, you must be an early riser. There's a

900
1 message September 22nd at 4:37 a.m. Do you see that one?
2 A. Yes. I probably was asleep by the time he sent the text
3 the night before, so I saw it first thing in the morning
4 when I woke up the next day.
5 Q. Okay. Why do you get up so early?
6 A. To go running on a regular basis to deal with the stress
7 of being general counsel of the FBI.
8 Q. Okay. So September 22nd, if I could direct your
9 attention back to those Verizon records.
11 go to Page 94 of those records.
12 Q. Now, I want to direct your attention first, Mr. Baker,
13 to a call that looks like it occurred on that same date,
14 September 22nd at 10:28 a.m. Do you see that call?
15 A. Yes, I do.
16 Q. And is that -- so the number there is 202-324-6829,
17 which is one digit off from the prior number we saw, 6825.
18 Any recollection of the 6829 number?
19 A. To the best of my recollection, that was the main number
20 for the office of general counsel.
21 Q. Okay.
22 A. So it's very likely that my executive assistant would
23 have answered that call.
24 Q. And what was the time of that call?
25 A. The time of day?

901
1 Q. Yes.
2 A. Yes, 10:28 a.m.
3 Q. Okay. And what is the duration of that call?
4 A. Four minutes.
5 Q. All right. So 10:28 a.m. for four minutes. Does that
6 accord with your recollection that you spoke to Mr. Sussmann
7 the day after receiving his text the night before that he
8 had been unable to respond sooner?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. And tell us what you remember happening there.
11 A. To the best of my recollection, I believe in this phone
12 call he conveyed to me the name of the reporter.
13 Q. And is it possible that -- did he -- okay. Let's go
14 back to Government Exhibit 1500.
15 So there is a text message that occurs, it looks
16 like, at 10:34 a.m., which would be a few minutes after that
17 10:28 a.m. call.
18 A. Okay.
19 Q. Do you see that there?
20 A. Yes, I do.
21 Q. And that text message says, "Yes, I can tell you. I
22 called your office. Call me when you can."
23 A. Yes, okay.
24 Q. In looking at the text message in comparison to the toll
25 records, does that refresh your recollection as to the

902
1 sequence?
2 A. Yes. I was wrong what I said a minute ago. I think
3 it -- I think Michael called my office, probably spoke to my
4 executive assistant. She probably took a message, and then
5 I think he also texted me roughly at the same time.
6 Q. And when he said, "Yes, I can tell you," what is that
7 referring to in your mind?
8 A. That he could tell me the identity of the reporter.
9 Q. And in your recollection, did he eventually tell you the
10 identity of the reporter?
11 A. Yes, he did.
12 Q. If we can go back to the toll records, Page 94 of
14 And it looks like -- Mr. Baker, do you see where
15 there was a call at 11:05 a.m.?
16 A. Yes. Yes.
17 Q. And that's to -- are we now back to your desk number,
18 what you think might have been your desk number?
20 Q. And how long is that call?
21 A. That call was only two minutes.
22 Q. And is that an incoming call? Is that a call from you
23 to Mr. Sussmann, given that it's incoming on his billing
24 records?
25 A. That's what it looks like.

903
1 Q. So does that accord with your recollection that after
2 receiving this text message at some point you called
3 Mr. Sussmann?
4 A. Yes. Because also, when I just picked up the phone at
5 my desk and pushed the button, the 6825 number is my
6 recollection of what would be the number I would be calling
7 from.
8 Q. Okay. So are you fairly certain, then, that you spoke
9 to Mr. Sussmann on the 22nd about the issue of this media
10 report?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. And when you spoke to him, and he revealed the identity
13 of the reporter, what did he say, and who was it?
14 A. It was Eric Lichtblau from The New York Times.
15 Q. Anything else you recall him saying?
16 A. Not in that conversation. It was maybe some
17 pleasantries at the start, but that was about it.
18 It was a short conversation where he conveyed the
19 information, and I thanked him.
20 Q. So what did the FBI -- you and your colleagues -- decide
21 to do once you knew who the reporter was?
22 A. So then I think, as we saw from the email before, I
23 notified folks in the leadership of the FBI about the
24 identity of the reporter, and then, I believe, Michael
25 Kortan, being the head of public affairs, is the one who

904
1 then reached out to either Eric or others from The New York
2 Times -- I'm not sure exactly who Kortan reached out to --
3 to get in touch with Eric Lichtblau.
4 Q. Now, let me just back up and be clear. In either of
5 those phone calls, or any of the phone calls you had with
6 Mr. Sussmann on the 21st or the 22nd, did he mention to you
7 that he had a client or clients?
8 A. No.
9 Q. And when you then relayed back to the FBI who the
10 reporter was, did you have any understanding in your mind
11 that Mr. Sussmann was working with a client or clients?
12 A. No.
13 Q. How many total meetings did the FBI have -- you said --
14 did a meeting go forward with Mr. Lichtblau?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. How many total meetings were there, as best as you
17 remember?
18 A. As best as I remember, there were two separate meetings.
19 Q. So let me show you what's been marked as Government
20 Exhibit 285.
21 Is this an email from Mr. Priestap to you?
22 A. It's an email from Priestap to me with this other email
23 from earlier embedded within it.
25 offers Government Exhibit 285.

905
1 THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: It's already in.
3 THE COURT: I think it's already in, Counsel.
4 MR. DeFILIPPIS: Oh, okay. I'm sorry.
5 Q. Mr. Baker -- I'm sorry, we put this in earlier.
6 So could you remind the jury, Mr. Comey was what
7 position at the FBI?
8 A. He was the Director.
9 Q. And I think you testified earlier that Mr. Priestap was
10 the Director of Counterintelligence?
11 A. Assistant Director for Counterintelligence.
12 Q. And Mr. Kortan?
13 A. He was Assistant Director for Public Affairs.
14 Q. And then finally, Mr. McCabe you said was the Deputy
15 Director?
16 A. Correct.
17 Q. And how about Mr. Bowdich?
18 A. I think his title was Associate Deputy Director at this
19 time.
20 Q. Now, Mr. Baker, can you read for the jury the text of
21 that email which was sent on September 22nd by you?
22 A. The one by me?
23 Q. Uh-huh.
24 A. It says, "The reporter on the matter we discussed is
25 Eric Lichtblau from The New York Times. He is shooting for

906
1 Sunday, but may not have all of the details wrapped up by
2 that time.
3 "He has been informed that we might call. Perhaps
4 we can discuss for a few minutes at the prep for Andy at
5 noon.
6 "Thanks.
7 "Jim."
8 Q. Okay. So when you said "he's shooting for Sunday, but
9 may not have all the details wrapped up by that time," what
10 did you mean?
11 A. Well, that he, Eric Lichtblau, was shooting to publish
12 this article about Alfa-Bank on Sunday, but may not have had
13 all the details wrapped up by that Sunday, so it may get
14 delayed even beyond that point.
15 Q. As best as you recall, what were you basing that on?
16 Where did you learn that?
17 A. The only place I could have learned that would have been
18 from Michael.
19 Q. And do you think it was on one of those calls in which
20 he revealed -- the call in which he revealed the identity of
21 Mr. Lichtblau?
22 A. My guess is in that two-minute phone call, yes.
23 Q. You then say, "He has been informed that we might call.
24 Perhaps we can discuss for a few minutes at the prep for
25 Andy at noon."
907
1 By "he" there, he had been informed, did you mean
2 Lichtblau?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. And when you say "the prep for Andy at noon," what does
5 that mean?
6 A. We must have been -- this group of people that I was
7 sending this email to must have been meeting with Andy
8 McCabe, the Deputy Director, at noon to prepare him for some
9 other meeting, which I don't remember what it was; you know,
10 like a pre-meeting to get ready for another meeting.
11 Q. All right. And then now let's turn to the reply that
12 Mr. Priestap sends. It looks like he sends that about an
13 hour later; is that right?
15 Q. And he only copies you?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. And just read for the jury the text of that email.
18 A. "Jim. Sorry, but I just now saw this email. I will
19 call you this afternoon. Thx, Bill."
20 Q. And do you remember one way or the other whether you
21 spoke to Mr. Priestap that afternoon?
22 A. I don't remember.
23 Q. But in any event, did a meeting with Mr. Lichtblau go
24 forward?
25 A. Yes.
908
1 Q. Let me show you what's been marked Government Exhibit
2 286.
3 Is this an email chain that ends with an email
4 from Mr. Kortan to Mr. Priestap and you?
5 A. Let's see. Oh, at the top? Yes, from Kortan to
6 Priestap and me, yes.
7 MR. DeFILIPPIS: All right. The government offers
8 Exhibit 286.
11 Q. Let us start at the bottom of this email chain, which is
12 an email from Mr. Lichtblau to Mr. Kortan.
13 A. Uh-huh.
14 Q. So explain to the jury, Mr. Kortan had a public affairs
15 role; is that right?
17 Q. What does someone in his position do in their day-to-day
18 job?
19 A. His job was to act on behalf of the FBI with respect to
20 all of our public matters. This included interacting with
21 the press, responding to press inquiries, reaching out to
22 the press.
23 When there's an FBI TV show that people want to
24 interact with the FBI on, the producers or whatever, Mike
25 handles all that. And, you know, he interacts with other

909
1 public affairs officials at the Department of Justice,
2 elsewhere in the government, if there's some issue involving
3 multiple agencies.
4 So -- yes.
5 Q. Okay. And so is he the principal one who would interact
6 directly with reporters on a matter like this?
8 Q. Mr. Lichtblau writes to Mr. Kortan, and you're not
9 copied. Right?
11 Q. And he says, "you know what time we're meeting?"
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. So looking at that, does that accord with approximately
14 when you think the first meeting with Mr. Lichtblau might
15 have happened?
16 A. Approximately, yes.
17 Q. And then Mr. Kortan writes back, "Don't, but I know
18 Baker's tied up until later this afternoon. Priestap says
19 he'll know more from his people this afternoon as well."
20 So planning for the meeting?
21 A. It looks like it, yes.
22 Q. And then Mr. Lichtblau sends another email, and it looks
23 like they set up a tentative time, and then -- of 3:00 p.m.?
24 A. It looks that way, yes.
25 Q. And what does Mr. Lichtblau say below there?

910
1 A. "Also planning to bring Steve Myers, another reporter in
2 D.C. who's our Russo" -- I think meaning Russian -- "expert
3 (he just wrote a book on Putin, which he'd be happy to
4 autograph while he's there)."
5 Q. Okay. Did you get an autograph?
6 A. No.
7 Q. All right. Then finally, the email from Mr. Kortan to
8 Mr. Priestap and you, and that's at 12:09 p.m., so a little
9 after noon.
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. What does Mr. Kortan say?
12 A. "FYI....... Not sure where we are investigatively, but
13 do we want to bring him by for some kind of recap later
14 today?"
15 Q. What did you understand Mr. Kortan to be asking?
16 A. It's a little bit unclear, frankly, but I think do we
17 still want -- Mike was checking in with Bill and me to see
18 if we still wanted to have this meeting with Eric Lichtblau
19 to ask him to hold off and slow down on this article.
20 Q. Okay. So you testified earlier there were a total of
21 two meetings with Mr. Lichtblau, right?
22 A. Correct.
23 Q. And were they close in time? Days apart?
24 A. There was some gap in between them. I don't remember
25 how much.
911
1 Q. All right. So let's turn to the first meeting that you
2 recall. Where did that meeting happen?
3 A. That happened in my conference room.
4 Q. And from the FBI side, who was there?
5 A. To the best of my recollection, it was me, Bill
6 Priestap, Mike Kortan.
7 Q. And from the media side, who was that?
8 A. I think it was Eric Lichtblau, and I believe it was
9 Steve Myers.
10 Q. Before that meeting had you ever met Mr. Lichtblau or
11 Mr. Myers?
12 A. I don't think I'd ever met Mr. Myers before. I believe
13 I -- somehow I knew who Eric was. I don't remember -- I
14 think I had met him before.
15 I'm sorry, yes. I had met him before.
16 Q. Okay. And were you guys in any sense friends or...?
17 A. We had had interactions with each other, and I remember,
18 like, our kids played at the same basketball arena for like
19 one season or something like that, or he was playing
20 basketball at the same arena like in Maryland where my kid's
21 team was also playing, and I would see him occasionally
22 there.
23 Q. From the FBI's perspective going into that meeting, what
24 was the goal?
25 A. The goal was to ask them to continue to hold off on

912
1 publishing the article for some period of time so that we
2 could continue to investigate.
3 Q. So tell us what you remember about what the Bureau said
4 and what Mr. Lichtblau and Mr. Myers said?
5 A. I mean, to the best of my recollection, it was
6 straightforward in that regard. We were asking them to slow
7 down, and then we just -- so we're asking them to slow down.
8 We discussed the substance of the cyber security
9 information that both sides had. And then there was a
10 significant amount of probing from The New York Times of the
11 FBI to try to find out more about what we were investigating
12 with respect to Russia.
13 Q. Okay. And how did the discussions end? What was the
14 outcome?
15 A. I don't remember if it was in that meeting or shortly
16 thereafter, but The New York Times agreed to continue to
17 hold off on publishing an article, I think in part because
18 they also weren't just ready yet.
19 We were trying to move as quickly as we could, and
20 they weren't quite ready or as ready as I initially thought
21 with respect to publishing it, so it worked out basically
22 from both sides.
23 MR. BERKOWITZ: Objection; foundation, Judge. If
24 we could get what they said?
25 THE COURT: Why don't you take him through it a

913
1 little more slowly.
3 Q. Mr. Baker, as best as you recall, recognizing it's a
4 long time ago, what did the FBI say to Mr. Lichtblau and
5 Mr. Myers to attempt to persuade them to not run the story?
6 A. That we had this material, that we were taking it
7 seriously, that it was technical in nature, that it was
8 complicated, and that we needed more time to investigate
9 whether, in fact, there was a surreptitious communications
10 channel between Alfa-Bank and some part of the Trump
11 organization.
12 Q. And did they react in any way or give you an initial
13 view?
14 A. Their initial view was that they were open to that
15 request.
16 MR. BERKOWITZ: Objection; again, foundation. Who
17 said what?
18 THE COURT: I'll overrule it.
19 Q. Mr. Baker, let me just ask you before you answer that
20 question, who was speaking primarily for the FBI, if you
21 remember?
22 A. Primarily -- my recollection is it was primarily Bill
23 Priestap.
24 Q. Okay. And who primarily, if anyone, was speaking for
25 The New York Times?

914
1 A. Eric Lichtblau.
2 Q. And did Mr. Myers chime in, or was he more silent, if
3 you remember?
4 A. He chimed in occasionally, but Eric was the one who
5 spoke the most.
6 Q. Okay. So when you were just describing what The New
7 York Times reaction was, was that probably Mr. Lichtblau?
8 A. That was Mr. Lichtblau.
9 Q. And, I'm sorry, just continue in what you recall him
10 saying.
11 A. My recollection is that he was trying to understand how
12 serious -- how seriously we were taking this allegation, I
13 guess you would say, and the extent to which we thought
14 there was some type of nefarious activity between the Trump
15 organization and Russia.
16 So he was asking us a series of probing questions,
17 most of which we rebuffed because we didn't want to disclose
18 really what it was that we were up to. So I think he was
19 fairly -- he was frustrated, to some degree, with the
20 conversation. That's my recollection.
21 Q. And when you testified earlier that you were in some
22 sense comparing -- I forget the phrase used -- comparing
23 notes or comparing information with what you had versus what
24 they had, do you remember anything more specific about what
25 they said they'd had and what you said you had?
915
1 A. To the best of my recollection, I think that they --
2 that they weren't quite persuaded yet either about the
3 veracity -- I don't want to say "the veracity" -- about
4 whether this material actually showed that there was the
5 existence of a surreptitious communications channel. They
6 weren't yet convinced and were not yet ready to publish and
7 were doing additional resource -- research, I'm sorry, to
8 test the material, to validate the material, to make sure
9 that they understood the material.
10 Q. And what, if anything, did you and Mr. Priestap or
11 others say about the FBI's view of that matter? Did you
12 give them any specifics?
13 A. Well, the -- yes. That we were still working on it, and
14 that it was -- as I said earlier, it was complicated and
15 taking more time. And we needed more time, I'm sorry. We
16 needed more time to investigate it fully.
17 Q. Now, stepping aside for a minute, in your job as FBI
18 director -- sorry, FBI General Counsel, did you become
19 familiar with reporters and deal with reporters on occasion?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. And did you get experience with how national security
22 reporters gather information and the sort of factors that go
23 into stories they write?
24 A. To some degree, yes.
25 Q. Okay. And, again, you're not an expert on the media,

916
1 but did you sort of get a feel for those things?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. And in your experience observing reporters and their
4 interactions with the FBI, to what extent does an FBI
5 investigation sometimes affect whether a reporter publishes
6 a story or not?
7 A. Sometimes if the FBI requests -- FBI or other elements
8 of the U.S. government, if they request the reporter to hold
9 off on a report, they will do it. Sometimes you can ask for
10 them to not say certain specific things, and they will do
11 it.
12 And I was aware, from prior experience, that
13 Mr. Lichtblau had been involved in such discussions with
14 high levels of the U.S. government on another matter some
15 number of years before, so I knew that at least in that
16 instance he, I believe, is my recollection -- he or The New
17 York Times -- had agreed to not publish something.
18 Q. Are you aware of any occasions where the investigation
19 of something by the FBI has the opposite effect, where it
20 prompts a news story?
21 A. Well, if reporters learn that we are investigating
22 something and it's of interest to them, then yes, they will
23 sometimes publish things for sure.
24 Q. Okay. So at this meeting with Mr. Lichtblau and
25 Mr. Myers and you and Priestap, is there anything else you
917
1 recall specifically about what was said or any commitments
2 that were made?
3 A. I think the commitment was that we would continue to do
4 our work, and that we might meet with him again, depending
5 upon what we found.
6 Can I just back --
7 Q. Sure.
8 A. To answer your question, your prior question more fully.
9 There's also a concern at the FBI that I
10 encountered in other situations where we would be worried
11 that sometimes reporters would want to report about the fact
12 that the FBI was investigating something, even if they
13 didn't have confidence in the underlying information and
14 themselves didn't want to report it. So, in other words,
15 they might be investigating something they were unsure about
16 whether they had enough information to report about it, but
17 what they could report, if they could find it out, is that
18 the FBI was investigating a particular allegation or set of
19 allegations.
20 So they're not reporting necessarily directly
21 about the thing. They're reporting about the FBI
22 investigating about the thing. And if they had confidence
23 in that part of the story, they might publish some element
24 of that whole story.
25 Does that make sense?

918
1 Q. Yes. So are you saying, Mr. Baker, that the reporters
2 sometimes see the fact of an FBI investigation as a reason
3 to write a story on something they otherwise might not?
4 MR. BERKOWITZ: Objection, Your Honor; leading.
5 THE COURT: Rephrase.
6 Q. Mr. Baker, in your experience, to what extent do
7 reporters sometimes publish things because the FBI is
8 looking at it, even if they wouldn't otherwise do a story on
9 it?
10 A. In my experience, sometimes they do that; and also, the
11 FBI's very worried about them doing that.
12 Q. Okay. So that was the first meeting. I think you
13 testified that either at the meeting or sometime fairly
14 shortly thereafter they agreed not to go with the story at
15 that point?
16 A. Correct.
17 Q. The second meeting, what is it you remember about that
18 meeting?
19 A. It was the same people who attended. It also took place
20 in the same location, my conference room. And it was us --
21 to the best of my recollection, it was us informing them
22 that the Bureau had concluded that the materials that we had
23 obtained from Mr. Sussmann, as augmented or amplified by
24 whatever investigative activity the Bureau undertook, did
25 not substantiate that there was a surreptitious

919
1 communications channel between Alfa-Bank and some part of
2 the Trump organization.
3 Q. And just so we're clear, that was the Bureau's
4 conclusion at that time?
5 A. That's what we concluded.
6 Q. And so what happened at the meeting?
7 MR. BERKOWITZ: And, Judge, objection; foundation.
8 Date?
9 MR. DeFILIPPIS: I'll rephrase it, Your Honor.
10 THE COURT: Date of the meeting.
11 Q. Mr. Baker, do you recall on what specific date this
12 second meeting happened?
13 A. No.
14 Q. And what's your best recollection of how close in time
15 it was to the first one, recognizing this is years ago?
16 A. Relatively close, within -- it wasn't days, I don't
17 think. It was more like a week or maybe two weeks,
18 something like that.
19 Q. Okay. And by that time the FBI's view of this
20 information was what?
21 A. The FBI's view of the information at that point in
22 time -- excuse me.
23 The FBI's view of the information at that point in
24 time was that the data that we had from the cyber security
25 researchers that Mr. Sussmann had given me, plus whatever

920
1 investigative steps we were able to undertake, did not
2 reveal that there was some type of surreptitious
3 communications channel between Alfa-Bank and the Trump
4 organization. We concluded there was no substance.
5 We couldn't confirm it, I guess, is the most
6 accurate way to say it. We could not confirm that there was
7 a surreptitious communication channel.
8 Q. As the FBI General Counsel, was it your -- did it fall
9 within your responsibilities to oversee investigations day-
10 to-day?
11 A. The Office of General Counsel has an oversight
12 responsibility with respect to FBI investigations to make
13 sure that they're following the law and the Attorney General
14 guidelines and statutes and so on.
15 But day-to-day, we're not running cases. We're
16 not deciding what leads to follow and who should be
17 responsible for obtaining what evidence, that type of thing.
18 That's what the agents in the field will do or the agents at
19 headquarters.
20 But it's the FBI agents that are running the
21 investigations with legal advice and oversight from my
22 office, my former office.
23 Q. In the Alfa-Bank-related matters, did you -- were you
24 involved day-to-day in the weeds of the investigation?
25 A. No.
921
1 Q. What was the nature of any information or updates you
2 received on it? Frequency? Level of detail?
3 A. To the best of my recollection, I just got summary --
4 meaning relatively short -- updates from Bill Priestap.
5 Possibly from Pete Strzok also, but I think mainly from Bill
6 Priestap.
7 Q. I think you had mentioned Mr. Priestap before. What was
8 Mr. Strzok's position?
9 A. He was a Deputy Assistant Director, so he was one of
10 Bill Priestap's direct reports.
11 Q. Okay. And for the court reporter, is that S-T-R-Z-O-K?
12 A. I think that's right, yes.
13 Q. Okay. So after that second meeting with The New York
14 Times, did an article eventually come out? Do you know one
15 way or the other?
16 A. I think an article eventually came out.
17 Q. What, if anything, do you remember about that?
18 A. Not much. The only thing I can remember is that it -- I
19 really -- to be honest, I can't remember much about the
20 article. I think they were also not able to -- I shouldn't
21 say any more.
22 I can't exactly remember what the article
23 concluded.
24 Q. Okay. Now, we were talking about the investigation. Do
25 you know whether the FBI opened formally an investigation of

922
1 the Alfa-Bank matter?
2 A. Opened like a particular file on the Alfa-Bank matter?
3 Q. Yes.
4 A. I don't know whether we opened a particular file number
5 on the Alfa-Bank matter.
6 Q. But was it your understanding that somebody was looking
7 at it?
8 A. Absolutely.
9 Q. Okay. And moving forward in time, by the time that that
10 was all concluded, by the time all the investigative steps
11 had been taken, do you know about how long that was? Was it
12 weeks? Months?
13 A. I think it was a couple of -- I mean, several weeks.
14 Maybe a month, maybe a month and a half.
15 Q. Okay. And then are you -- at the FBI, do you have a
16 formal sort of case file system that logs evidence or
17 documents relating to cases?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. And would you know, as the FBI General Counsel, when the
20 investigation was actually formally closed in that system?
21 Would you have any idea one way or the other?
22 A. Not in this case I didn't.
23 Q. Okay. And last you heard of the investigation, at the
24 end of the steps that the FBI took, what was your
25 understanding of the final conclusion?

923
1 A. That there was nothing there.
2 Q. So let's go back to Government Exhibit 1500.
3 So, Mr. Baker, if you'll recall the meeting with
4 Mr. Lichtblau, the emails about meeting that day were
5 September 26th of 2016, right?
6 A. I have to rely on the record. I don't remember off the
7 top of my head.
8 Q. Assume, for the argument, that it's the 26th.
9 A. Okay.
10 Q. We have --
11 MR. DeFILIPPIS: If we go to the next page, and
12 then the one after that.
13 Q. Okay. So do you see a text message from Mr. Sussmann on
14 September 28, 2016?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. At 6:19 p.m.?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. And just what does that message say?
19 A. It says, "Jim - I suspect a story may go live tomorrow.
20 Since the reporter started going to experts and then the
21 subjects, looks like rumors of a big story are trickling out
22 and I think that will force the media outlet's hand. I have
23 no actual knowledge of the reporter's timetable so I'm
24 reading tea leaves but that's what it looks like to me."
25 Q. So when Mr. Sussmann said -- let me ask you: By this

924
1 point had Mr. Sussmann described to you or mentioned to you
2 any client or clients he was working with?
3 A. No.
4 Q. And so when he referred to "since the reporter started
5 going to experts and then the subjects," who did you
6 understand the subjects to be?
7 A. I understood that to mean -- going to experts and then
8 the subjects.
9 Ah, it could be -- so the experts, I think, meant
10 the cyber experts. Could be other experts, too.
11 But then the subjects, I believe that means the
12 Trump organization and Alfa-Bank. That's -- in FBI
13 parlance, we would consider them to be the subjects of the
14 investigation, and so I think Michael would have been
15 referring to them.
16 Q. And when he then says, "looks like rumors of a big story
17 are trickling out and I think that will force the media
18 outlet's hand," what did you mean -- what did you understand
19 that to mean?
20 A. The way I understood that was that other news
21 organizations, other than The New York Times, had some part
22 of the story. And news organizations, being very
23 competitive with each other, don't want to get scooped, and
24 so that puts pressure on them to put the story out quickly.
25 Q. Where Mr. Sussmann says, "I have no actual knowledge of

925
1 the reporter's timetable so I'm reading tea leaves but
2 that's what it looks like to me," what did you think he
3 meant?
4 A. I understood that to mean that he wasn't talking to Eric
5 Lichtblau directly, but he was getting this through some
6 other mechanism.
7 Q. At this time did you have a sense from Mr. Sussmann,
8 from your calls or any other communications, of whether he
9 had given these materials to Mr. Lichtblau? Did you know
10 one way or the other?
11 A. I didn't know. At the end of the day I didn't know one
12 way or the other.
13 Q. And as best as you remember, did Mr. Sussmann ever say,
14 "I gave these materials to Mr. Lichtblau"?
15 A. I don't think he ever said that.
16 Q. So you respond, it looks like on that same day, "Ok.
17 Thanks."
18 And then we have another text message two days
19 later, September 30, 2016.
20 Between those two days, do you recall anything of
21 note between you and Mr. Sussmann, or no?
22 A. Not that I can recall, no.
23 Q. And then what does the text message say on September
24 30th?
25 A. "Jim, I hear that another organization has a related

926
1 story - facts seem muddled - but sounds like it's coming out
2 tomorrow."
3 Q. What, if anything, do you recall doing upon getting that
4 text message?
5 A. I'm not sure. I'm not sure. I may have passed that
6 information on to Bill Priestap and Mike Kortan.
7 Q. Okay. Mr. Baker, when did you leave the FBI?
8 A. I left the FBI in May of 2018.
9 Q. Okay. And in connection -- before you left the FBI, in
10 connection with your role as FBI General Counsel, I think
11 you've testified you accessed a lot of classified
12 information; is that right?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. And you had security clearances and everything?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. Now, in connection with all of that, in your experience
17 does classified information sometimes make its way to news
18 organizations or those outside the FBI?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. And did you -- as being part of the FBI's leadership,
21 were there occasions when you would learn that classified
22 information had leaked?
23 A. In the sense -- leak in the sense of an unauthorized
24 disclosure?
25 Q. Yes.
927
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. And when a leak happens, what does the FBI typically do
3 to sort of get to the bottom of it, if anything?
4 A. Well, sometimes the FBI will initiate a leak
5 investigation -- I'm sorry.
6 Sometimes the FBI will initiate a leak
7 investigation on its own, and sometimes it will wait until
8 it receives what's called a referral from another part of
9 the government. So, in other words, if the information that
10 was unauthorized to be disclosed was generated by some part
11 of the government -- let's say the CIA -- the FBI might wait
12 to get a referral from the CIA saying, "Hey, this
13 information is classified, it's obviously leaked, and we
14 request that you investigate."
15 Q. So in your role as FBI General Counsel, were there
16 occasions when you were interviewed in connection with
17 suspected leaks of classified information?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. And for people who are at the top levels of the FBI with
20 access to lots of classified information, is that a fairly
21 common occurrence?
22 A. Well, I was investigated and questioned many times, yes.
23 Q. And for certain classified information, are there
24 specific rules that limit the distribution of it to an
25 actual list of people? Have you encountered that?

928
1 A. Yes. Sometimes that happens.
2 Q. And so when a leak investigation occurs of something
3 that's gone to people it shouldn't, how do investigators
4 sometimes get to the bottom of where the leak might have
5 come from?
6 A. You start with the people who had access to the
7 information. It's sort of like working out in a set of
8 concentric circles. Who had access to the information that
9 was leaked; and then, of those people, who might have spoken
10 to the press. Were there any phone records or emails or any
11 type of information that might reveal who was speaking to
12 the press.
13 And then the Bureau will go out and interview
14 people in a variety of different ways to try to figure out
15 who it was that was responsible for a particular
16 unauthorized disclosure.
17 Q. So did -- have there been occasions when you've been
18 interviewed in situations like that?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. And when you were interviewed, did you reveal what you
21 knew about -- if you knew anything about whether information
22 had been disclosed?
23 A. I answered whatever questions the agents were asking me
24 as truthfully as I possibly could.
25 Q. And was there a particular occasion or occasions where

929
1 you were a focus of the investigation in terms of where the
2 government was investigating whether you might have been the
3 one to disclose the information?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. And was there anything like that in the 2018 time period
6 when you were preparing to depart the Bureau?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. And without getting into any classified information
9 whatsoever or any particular news outlets, tell us just
10 briefly what the nature of that investigation was.
11 A. The nature of that investigation, as I understood it,
12 was that -- was an investigation into whether I had been
13 involved in an unauthorized disclosure of classified
14 information.
15 Q. And had you, in fact, spoken with a reporter in that
16 investigation?
17 A. Prior to the investigation, yes.
18 Q. Okay. And what was -- again, without getting into any
19 classified information, did there come a time when you
20 disclosed something to a reporter about internal government
21 business?
22 A. Yes. I was in a conversation with a reporter and
23 Mr. Kortan on a telephone call during which I made an
24 authorized disclosure of information that I understood at
25 the time to no longer be classified.

930
1 Q. Got it. And in your mind, who had authorized you to
2 disclose that information?
3 A. The director of the FBI, the office of the director of
4 national intelligence, including the director of national
5 intelligence.
6 Q. And, again, without getting into the information, was
7 it -- what was the estimation --
8 THE COURT: Hold on, Counsel.
9 Q. -- of those people as you understood it in terms of --
10 THE COURT: Quick conference.
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
931
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15
16
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18
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20
21
22
23
24
25
932
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
19 Q. Sorry for the pause there, Mr. Baker. And we'll come
20 back to the topic we've been discussing, but let me now
21 return you back to Government Exhibit 1500.
22 Now, Mr. Baker, when you left the FBI, did you
23 stay in contact with Mr. Sussmann?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. And so at that time would you say you were friends?

933
1 Colleagues? Something in between?
2 A. Both.
3 Q. And I want to direct your attention -- if we go a few
4 pages forward -- to September 30th.
5 MR. DeFILIPPIS: I'm sorry, next page.
6 Q. So, Mr. Baker, it looks like this is September 19th, but
7 it's two years later. That's 2018; is that right?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. And what does that message say?
10 A. You want me to read the top message?
11 Q. Yes.
12 A. It says, "Jim FYI New Yorker story pushed back one week.
13 Will go live next Sunday. Great seeing you this week.
14 We'll be back in touch soon. Michael."
15 Q. Okay. So during the 2018 time period -- now, by this
16 date do you know whether you left the Bureau or not?
17 A. I had left the Bureau. I had left the Bureau in May of
18 2018.
19 Q. And is it fair to assume, from reading this, that you
20 had interacted with Mr. Sussmann in some way?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. Do you recall what that was, or not?
23 A. To the best of my recollection, it was me talking about
24 possibly going to work at Michael's law firm.
25 Q. Okay. And what was the name of his law firm?

934
1 A. Perkins Coie.
2 Q. How did it come to be that you started to talk with
3 Mr. Sussmann about going to work there?
4 A. To the best of my recollection, I think it was Michael's
5 idea. I mean, Michael knew that I had left the Bureau, and
6 I was looking around for a job -- I had a job at the time,
7 so I was working -- I was working at the time, but I was
8 looking around at other jobs and -- including law firms.
9 And so somehow he became aware of that and inquired about
10 whether I would be interested in working at Perkins Coie.
11 That's the best of my recollection.
12 Q. So when you reply at 9:41 a.m., which looks like it's
13 the next day, you say, "Thanks. Great to see you as well.
14 Looking forward to continuing the conversation."
15 What did "continuing the conversation" refer to?
16 A. Continuing the conversation about possibly working with
17 him.
18 Q. So what happened with your effort -- now, let me ask you
19 first: Were you looking at jobs at other places, too, or
20 was it just Perkins Coie?
21 A. I was looking for jobs in numerous places, both at law
22 firms and in-house positions with companies.
23 Q. And how did it go with respect to your efforts to
24 potentially get a job at Perkins Coie?
25 A. Well, eventually Michael worked it out that I ended up

935
1 having interviews there. I went in and spent some
2 significant part of the day meeting a number of different
3 folks -- meeting with Michael and meeting with a number of
4 different folks at the law firm.
5 Q. And after you met with those folks, did they make you a
6 job offer?
7 A. They never made me a job offer.
8 Q. Did they give you a rejection letter?
9 A. There was some confusion at one point in time. I was
10 working with a headhunter to try to find a job, and she had
11 received a communication from Perkins Coie saying that they
12 had, for lack of a better word, rejected me. And then I
13 told Michael about that.
14 And he's like, whoa, whoa, that's -- that doesn't
15 make sense, based on what he knew. And so he went and got
16 it sorted out and figured out that that -- there had been a
17 miscommunication inside the firm or with the headhunter.
18 And so that was reversed, basically. And so it was still --
19 the way I understood it, it was still possible. They were
20 still considering whether they would make me a job offer.
21 But then eventually I got a different job and took
22 that.
23 Q. And where was that job?
24 A. That job was at something called the R Street -- the
25 letter R -- Street Institute. It's a think tank, a center/

936
1 right think tank here in Washington, D.C.
2 Q. And just to sort of -- you say you currently work at
3 Twitter?
5 Q. Where did you work in between the R Street Institute and
6 Twitter?
7 A. In between the R Street Institute and Twitter -- well,
8 in addition to the R Street -- I worked at the R Street
9 Institute, I eventually worked at CNN also as a legal
10 analyst, and then I went from those two positions to
11 Twitter.
12 Q. Got it.
13 So with regard to the offer at Perkins Coie, did
14 it just -- you never got an offer, but you never got a
15 rejection?
16 A. At the end of the day, yes.
17 Q. Do you know about how long the interview process and
18 formal part of the process took?
19 A. Well, I think -- looking back at Exhibit 1500 and the
20 date of September 29th, I think I was roughly having initial
21 conversations with Michael during this time period, Michael
22 and others at the firm. And then I got my job with the R
23 Street Institute in early December of 2018.
24 So it was during that time period that we were
25 having those conversations.

937
1 Q. And at the end of the day, when you didn't get the job
2 offer from Perkins Coie, did that cause you to have negative
3 feelings in any way towards Mr. Sussmann?
4 A. No.
5 Q. Why was that?
6 A. Because I thought that Michael was an ally for me inside
7 the firm. He was the person sort of leading the effort to
8 try to get me to work there and had -- what would you call
9 it? -- shepherded me around when I was doing my interviews;
10 met me when I arrived, talked to me at the end of it, as
11 best I can recall.
12 Q. And with regard to the firm more generally, did the
13 process give you any negative resentful feelings towards
14 anybody at the firm or the firm generally?
15 A. No, not at all.
16 Q. All right. Let's continue along the text chain here
17 with Mr. Sussmann.
18 It looks like on October 8th of 2018 -- so a
19 little bit after the prior message -- Mr. Sussmann sent you,
20 it looks like, a New Yorker link. Any recollection of what
21 that was?
22 A. I believe it was a reference -- I believe it was an
23 article having to do with the Alfa-Bank matter. I don't
24 specifically recall it, but it had to do with Alfa-Bank or
25 Russia or something along those lines.

938
1 Q. Okay. And then, if we go to the next page, there's the
2 text message. There's a picture that sort of carries over.
3 In this text message Mr. Sussmann appears to have
4 sent you a picture of some kind. What do you understand
5 that to be?
6 A. Well, it says "Protesters outside of our Bellevue, WA
7 office..."
8 Yes, and it's a photograph of protesters holding a
9 sign that says -- do you want me to read it?
10 Q. If you can.
11 A. Okay. "Sussmann, Baker, and Steele, Perkins Coie
12 D'Etat. End British coup on Trump."
13 And then something below I can't read.
14 Q. Okay. Did you or do you have any idea what that means?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. And what is that?
17 A. I think -- could you show me the date again, if you
18 don't mind?
19 THE COURT: Mr. DeFilippis.
20 A. October 10.
23 MR. BERKOWITZ: I feel like this is becoming
24 regular. I apologize, Your Honor. I'd just note that the
25 name Steele is on there. I don't know what he intends to

939
1 elicit, but I want to be cautious given the Court's ruling.
2 MR. DeFILIPPIS: Your Honor, I don't intend to
3 elicit anything about that. I don't know that he'll comment
4 on it, but I don't intend to elicit anything specific about
5 that.
6 THE COURT: Okay. Very well.
9 Q. Okay. Sorry, Mr. Baker. What, generally speaking, did
10 you understand this to be?
11 A. Generally speaking, I understood it to be a photograph
12 taken by someone outside of Perkins Coie's office in
13 Bellevue, Washington, protesting that Michael and I and
14 others were involved in some type of coup with respect to
15 Donald Trump.
16 Q. Were you involved in any coup against Donald Trump?
17 A. No.
18 Q. And why is it that he was sending this to you? Was it
19 just commiserating as a friend? Something else?
20 A. Partly that, I believe, yes. Partly also, at some
21 point in time in this -- I believe in October of 2018 -- I
22 testified -- well, it was an interview.
23 So I was interviewed on the record by two
24 committees of the U.S. House of Representatives regarding
25 the FBI's investigation of Russia and Mr. Trump. And during

940
1 the course of that interview, Mr. Sussmann's name came up,
2 and facts related to the matters we've been discussing
3 today, the Alfa-Bank/Trump connection, came up; and I was
4 answering a series of questions about that.
5 And I believe that someone disclosed that
6 information, that I had talked about that during the --
7 during the interview, and that that became the source of
8 press articles, and that there was a -- among other things,
9 I was being highly criticized for having had this meeting in
10 the first place with Mr. Sussmann, and that somehow that
11 made me part of a coup. It made me a traitor to the
12 country, and that people thought I should be hanged.
13 Q. Mr. Baker, just to back up a little bit, you mentioned
14 Congressional testimony, Congressional inquiries. Can you
15 explain to the jury why or in what context at that time
16 Congress was looking into something that would have involved
17 you? In other words, what was the background for that?
18 A. There were multiple committees of Congress. I think in
19 this particular instance it was the Judiciary Committee and
20 the House Government Oversight and Reform Committee. HGOR?
21 Anyway... Plus, the Senate Intelligence Committee was also
22 looking at it.
23 They were investigating the FBI's investigation of
24 Donald Trump and his connection and the campaign's
25 connection to Russia.
941
1 Q. So -- and I don't want to put words in your mouth, but
2 Congress was looking into the FBI's activities during that
3 investigation; is that --
4 A. They were investigating the investigators.
5 Q. Okay. And in that regard, if you look back at
6 Government Exhibit 1500, there's -- Mr. Sussmann sends you
7 some kind of protest literature pamphlet and said, "And
8 here's the pamphlet they're handing out"?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. Did you understand that to be more of the sort of
11 sending you things that were coming out of these public
12 issues?
13 A. Yes, that Michael was keeping an eye on these things as
14 well and sending me updates.
15 Q. Okay.
16 MR. DeFILIPPIS: If we go to the next page of the
17 text exchange.
18 Q. Mr. Sussmann appears to send you a news article of some
19 kind or an opinion article, and then another article.
20 Can you just explain to the jury what you
21 understand those to be.
22 A. So these are Wall Street Journal -- it looks like it's
23 from the Wall Street Journal "Opinion" section, and I
24 believe -- I can't read it very well on the screen here. I
25 believe the first one, "Who Is Michael Sussmann?" is highly

942
1 critical of Michael, and so he's sending that to me.
2 Q. And when you received these articles, to the best that
3 you recall, did you read them in detail? Did you read them
4 at all?
5 A. I don't -- I think I skimmed them, but I don't recall
6 reading them in any detail, no.
7 Q. And the first article, to what extent did it criticize
8 Michael for his meeting with you? Was that a subject of the
9 article?
10 A. I think that was the general tenor of these discussions,
11 that Michael was being criticized for meeting with me, that
12 he was somehow a traitor, that -- and a coup plotter, that I
13 was a coup plotter and a traitor; again, all of which is
14 false. And then we were both being attacked for sort of
15 related but different reasons with respect to the meeting
16 that we had that is the subject of the discussion we've been
17 having to today.
18 Q. All right. And let's go to the next page where one of
19 those articles, the second one, appears to be magnified to
20 some degree.
21 Can you see, Mr. Baker, that that editorial there
22 is titled "Our Michael Sussmann is an Honorable Man"?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. And then it's signed -- it's a letter of some sort
25 signed by John Devaney, managing partner of Perkins Coie,

943
1 LLP?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. What do you understand that was?
4 A. I think this was their -- I think this was the response
5 of John Devaney to the prior opinion piece that we just saw
6 a moment ago asking about who is Michael Sussmann.
7 Q. Did you read -- again, as to this article, did you, when
8 you got it, read it and -- did you read it in detail?
9 A. I don't recall reading it in detail, no.
10 Q. So there's a paragraph at the end there that's a bit
11 difficult to read, but I think it says, "In addition and as
12 Perkins Coie has previously publicly stated, Mr. Sussmann's
13 meeting with the FBI general counsel, James Baker, was on
14 behalf of a client with no connections to either the Clinton
15 campaign, the DNC or any other Political Law Group client."
16 Do you think you read or focused on that paragraph
17 when you received this?
18 A. To the best of my recollection sitting here today, I do
19 not remember reading that paragraph at the time that Michael
20 sent it to me.
21 Q. And where it says in the end of that article or, sorry,
22 that letter there, "was on behalf of a client with no
23 connections to either the Clinton campaign, the DNC or any
24 other Political Law Group client," you don't remember
25 reading that specific line?

944
1 A. Again, sitting here today, to the best of my
2 recollection, I don't remember reading that at the time.
3 Q. And between your meeting with Mr. Sussmann in 2016 and
4 his sending of this article to you in 2018, to the best of
5 your recollection did Mr. Sussmann ever change his assertion
6 to you that he was not representing a client?
7 A. No.
8 Q. Just below that screenshot there's a message from
9 Mr. Sussmann that says, "Hope your Day 2 went well. Here is
10 John Devaney's letter to the editor. Let's talk next week
11 about the future."
12 Any idea what "Day 2" meant?
13 A. So I believe this was the second interview I was having
14 with the two House committees members and staff.
15 Q. And is that the Congressional matter that you've
16 described before that was looking into the FBI's conduct on
17 the Trump-related matters?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. And so you had two total days of testimony?
20 A. It was an interview, technically; but yes, two total
21 days, lengthy days.
22 Q. So, I'm sorry, Mr. Baker, is it the case, then, that it
23 wasn't under oath, but it was just sort of an interview?
24 A. It was an interview, but I understood that I could not
25 make false statements to Congress.

945
1 Q. Okay. When you said "it sucked," what did you mean?
2 A. It sucked. It was terrible. I felt -- it sucked at
3 multiple levels.
4 It sucked because the experience itself, sitting
5 in the room being questioned the way that I was questioned,
6 was, as a citizen of the United States, upsetting and
7 appalling, to see members of Congress behaving the way that
8 they were behaving. It was very upsetting to me.
9 It sucked because I felt as though I had dragged
10 Michael into a maelstrom by discussing him in the first
11 meeting and having this whole media thing blow up.
12 It sucked because I had literally had reporters,
13 when I left, chasing me down the hallway running at full
14 speed to try to catch up to me with cameras, you know,
15 running around in front of me to get in front of me to take
16 pictures of me walking -- just walking down the hallway.
17 It sucked because the allegation was somehow that
18 the FBI had engaged in some type of improper activity with
19 respect to Mr. Trump.
20 It sucked because my friends had been pilloried in
21 public, my friends and colleagues had been pilloried in
22 public, improperly in my view; that we were accused of being
23 traitors and coup plotters. All of this was totally false
24 and wrong.
25 And so it -- as you can tell with me speaking

946
1 right now, all of this was an extremely traumatic
2 experience, having lived through that, and then having to
3 revisit it in this format in front of Congress. It was
4 terrible. And yet I thought -- and I still think -- that as
5 a person who held a position of power, that I should be held
6 accountable by any appropriate body that this country has,
7 and that any other official like me should be willing to do
8 the same.
9 Q. Mr. Baker, during that interview with Congress, did
10 it -- was it only about your meeting with Mr. Sussmann, or
11 did it cover a wide range --
12 A. A whole range of different things.
13 Q. And in your sort of perspective on your time there, did
14 that constitute a major facet of what it was you were there
15 to speak about, or was it a relatively minor component?
16 A. No, they turned it -- after the -- in the first session
17 Michael was -- my interaction with Michael was one of a
18 number of different things that they talked about. But then
19 in the second session, they drilled into it to a greater
20 degree, is my recollection.
21 Q. If I can ask you to look at what's been premarked as
22 Government Exhibit 57. Do you recognize this from its
23 header?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. What is it?
947
1 A. This looks like a transcript of the interview that I
2 had. This was probably the first one.
3 Q. Okay. And so the date of this one is October 3rd of
4 2018?
6 Q. And I think your text message to Sussmann said "Hope
7 your" -- sorry, his text message to you said "Hope your Day
8 2 went well," which he sent on October 19th.
9 Was your second one somewhere around October 19th?
10 A. I think so, yes.
11 Q. Okay. But this was the first?
12 A. Yes, sir.
13 Q. Now, if I could --
14 MR. DeFILIPPIS: Ms. Arsenault, if we could bring
15 up Page 52 of that transcript.
16 Q. Okay. And, Mr. Baker, just so the jury can absorb the
17 relevant portion here, I'll -- if I could read the
18 questions, and you just read the answer that you gave.
19 A. Sure.
20 MR. DeFILIPPIS: I'm sorry, Your Honor, the
21 government offers Government Exhibit 57.
22 MR. BERKOWITZ: Your Honor, we would object other
23 than the specific questions and answers which could be
24 impeachment, but it's not being offered for its truth.
25 THE COURT: All right. So a couple of issues.

948
1 How long is this, and --
2 MR. DeFILIPPIS: Your Honor, the full transcript
3 is --
4 THE COURT: You're not offering the full
5 transcript, but just this excerpt?
6 MR. DeFILIPPIS: Your Honor, we could do either.
7 THE COURT: There's no reason for the full
8 transcript to be admitted --
10 THE COURT: -- assuming it's admissible.
11 And you just want an instruction that's it's being
12 offered in anticipation of your -- any challenge to
13 Mr. Baker's credibility; is that fair?
14 MR. BERKOWITZ: Correct. I think it's addressing
15 impeachment, and it's all authentic, and we have no question
16 about that. It's obviously -- he's here to testify today.
17 It's not his testimony being offered today.
18 THE COURT: Okay. So, ladies and gentlemen, the
19 Court will admit this portion of this transcript not for the
20 truth of the words but for its consistency or inconsistency
21 with Mr. Baker's present testimony.
22 Is that fair, Counsel?
23 MR. DeFILIPPIS: Fine, Your Honor.
24 MR. BERKOWITZ: Yes.
25 MR. DeFILIPPIS: And just to put everybody at

949
1 ease, we're not reading the full transcript.
2 THE COURT: Yes, and we're not sending the full
3 transcript back.
5 Q. Okay. Mr. Baker, so towards the bottom of Page 52
6 there's a statement that says, "So in the last round the
7 majority discussed evidence." We'll start there, and then
8 if you could just read the answers. Is that all right?
9 A. Let me find my place here.
10 Okay. That's helpful. Thank you.
11 Q. So in the last round, the majority discussed evidence
12 that Michael Sussmann from Perkins Coie.
13 A. Sussmann.
14 Q. S-U-S-S-M-A-N. Oh, sorry. That's you.
15 A. S-U-S-S-M-A-N, yes.
16 Q. And Mr. Sussmann --
17 MR. BERKOWITZ: And, Judge, just -- I want to
18 object. I don't think that this is impeaching or that we're
19 contending this. If he wants to front impeachment, we can,
20 but we're going through what he's already covered.
21 THE COURT: Well, as I understand it, he's
22 offering it as a prior consistent statement in anticipation
23 of a challenge to credibility, which I believe he can do.
24 Are you objecting to the form?
25 MR. BERKOWITZ: Well, what I see on the screen is

950
1 something that we don't contest. They were in the criminal
2 division together and knew each other there.
3 THE COURT: All right. So just -- that frames it.
4 But why don't you get to the relevant testimony that you're
5 trying to --
8 Q. Let's go then to Page 53, Mr. Baker. And so there's the
9 question where I'll begin that says, "Okay."
10 Okay. And I believe last round it was mentioned
11 that Perkins Coie, his firm, had represented the DNC and the
12 Hillary Clinton Campaign. Is that your understanding as
13 well?"
14 A. That is what they said. I have never confirmed that. I
15 think I read that in the press.
16 THE COURT: And just so we're clear, these are
17 questions being asked by counsel for a House investigating
18 committee of Mr. Baker. And Mr. DeFilippis is playing the
19 role of the questioner, and Mr. Baker is reciting the
20 answers that he gave that day.
21 MR. DeFILIPPIS: That's right. Thank you, Your
22 Honor.
24 Q. Okay. So I believe last round it was mentioned that
25 Perkins Coie, his firm, had represented the DNC and the
951
1 Hillary Clinton campaign. Is that your understanding as
2 well?
3 Same, we're just.
4 A. I'm sorry, I lost the place on the page. Yes -- I'm
5 sorry.
6 That is what they said. I have never confirmed
7 that. I think I read that in the press.
8 Q. Okay. So when Mr. Sussmann came to you to provide some
9 evidence, you were not specifically aware that he was
10 representing the DNC or the Hillary Clinton Campaign at the
11 time?
12 A. I don't recall. I don't recall him specifically saying
13 that at that time.
14 Q. Okay. So when Mr. Sussmann did provide you this
15 evidence, did you react in any way -- in any way with
16 concern. Were you alarmed? Were you -- did you believe it
17 was inappropriate for him to come to you with this
18 information?
19 A. No, I did not believe it was inappropriate. It was a
20 citizen providing information to the FBI about a matter that
21 they thought had either to do with a crime or some national
22 security threat. And so it did not seem inappropriate to
23 me.
24 Q. Okay. So I guess it is just my interpretation, but I
25 believe last round it was somewhat implied that if he did

952
1 have an association to the Democratic National Committee and
2 the Hillary Clinton Campaign, that might lead someone to
3 believe that is something improper was done, and I wonder if
4 you could just explain to me, you know, why your view is
5 that it was not improper because just the mere notion that
6 someone who is a Democrat or Republican, you know, comes to
7 you with information, should that information somehow be
8 discounted or considered less credible because of, you know,
9 partisan affiliation?
10 A. Well, the FBI is responsible for protecting everybody in
11 this country. Period, full stop. And we do that without
12 regard to who they are or what their political background is
13 or anything else. If they believe they have evidence of a
14 crime or believe they have been a victim of a crime, we will
15 do what we can within our lawful authorities to protect
16 them.
17 Q. Okay. Go ahead.
18 A. I can't see the rest of it. I'm sorry.
19 Q. Oh, sorry.
20 A. And so when a citizen comes -- I'm sorry, let me start
21 again.
22 And so when a citizen comes with evidence, we
23 accept it. That is my just general understanding over many,
24 many years. We, the Bureau. We, the Department of Justice.
25 And so that is how I construed what Michael was doing. It

953
1 was -- he believed he had evidence, again, either of a crime
2 or of a national security threat, and he believed it was
3 appropriate -- he believed it was appropriate to provide it
4 to us.
5 When he did, I didn't think there was anything
6 improper about it whatsoever.
7 As I said, I recognized that I was obtaining
8 evidence and I wanted to get it out of my hands into the
9 hands of agents as quickly as possible. And that is what I
10 did.
11 Q. Okay.
12 So, Mr. Baker, are those -- is that still your
13 view today?
14 A. About the impropriety part?
15 Q. Yes.
16 A. Yes, I do not believe that a citizen coming forward with
17 evidence that they believe to reflect evidence of a crime or
18 a national security threat is improper. Indeed, as I said
19 earlier, it's fully authorized by the Attorney General
20 guidelines and the FBI's internal policies.
21 Q. All right. And briefly, let's return to Page 53 where
22 the questioner said: "Okay, and I believe the last round it
23 was mentioned."
24 A. Okay. Go ahead.
25 Q. Okay.
954
1 MR. DeFILIPPIS: And let's just get another Q and
2 A in there, Ms. Arsenault. Just show a little more.
3 Q. All right. So you were asked, the questioner said: I
4 believe last round it was mentioned that Perkins Coie, his
5 firm, had represented the DNC and the Hillary Clinton
6 Campaign. Is that your understanding as well?
7 You say: That is what they said. I have never
8 confirmed that. I think I read it in the press.
9 When you were asked this question, had you had a
10 chance to reconstruct the chronology of when you knew
11 Mr. Sussmann represented the DNC or the Clinton Campaign,
12 when you learned it?
13 A. When I was testifying at this -- or when I was being
14 interviewed at this point in time?
15 Q. Yes.
16 A. I'm sorry, what is the exact question? I'm sorry.
17 Q. When you were asked this question and answered that "I
18 read it in the press," had you had a chance to go back to
19 your records and figure out exactly when you learned that
20 Mr. Sussmann represented the DNC and the Clinton Campaign?
21 A. No, I had not.
22 Q. And the next question was: So when Mr. Sussmann came to
23 you to provide some evidence, you were not specifically
24 aware that he was representing the DNC or the Clinton
25 Campaign at that time. What did you understand that

955
1 question to be getting at?
2 A. That -- well, looking at it today, I think that I was
3 thinking about the reference at the time to mean in the
4 actual meeting that was taking place in my office that I
5 described earlier today.
6 Q. Okay. And you responded: I don't recall. I don't
7 recall him specifically saying that at the time.
8 When you gave that answer, had you had a chance to
9 refresh your recollection of that meeting?
10 A. No. I honestly did -- to the best of my recollection, I
11 didn't know that Michael was going to come up at all in
12 these interviews. I was going there to talk about the FBI's
13 overall investigation of Donald Trump and Russia, and so I
14 didn't think Michael was going to come up.
15 But it did. And so I just started answering these
16 questions to the best of my ability at the time, having not
17 really prepared at all for that line of inquiry.
18 Q. And when you said, "I don't recall him specifically
19 saying that at the time," did you mean Mr. Sussmann didn't
20 say that he was representing the DNC or the Clinton
21 Campaign?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. And did you, during this exchange with the members of
24 Congress or their staff, volunteer or mention to them that
25 Mr. Sussmann had said he was not there for a client?

956
1 A. I don't recall me saying that.
2 Q. And if not, why?
3 A. I think because I was not -- I just -- again, I had not
4 really prepared myself to be discussing my interaction with
5 Michael. I just didn't think it would come up in this
6 session, so I hadn't thought about it in a while. That's
7 one thing.
8 I mean, I think also that once we had -- "we" the
9 FBI -- investigated the allegations and that he had -- not
10 the allegations, the information that he had presented to me
11 in that meeting, I kind of honestly sort of dismissed it
12 from my mind as something that we had decided was a dead
13 end, and so I kind of like just forgot about it to some
14 degree.
15 And then I don't recall him -- they were honing
16 in -- they -- and my recollection is that in this set of
17 questions, and then in other questions by members, they were
18 focusing in on trying to find out whether he had said did he
19 say something about representing the DNC or Hillary Clinton
20 in that meeting. And I was like, well no, I don't think so.
21 I don't remember him saying anything about representing the
22 DNC or Hillary in that meeting.
23 Q. Got it.
24 And so you -- you testified on that day. Was it a
25 lengthy day? How long was --

957
1 A. Yes. They were like -- each session was like four, four
2 and a half hours each.
3 Q. Now, did there come a time, Mr. Baker, when you were
4 interviewed by the DOJ's Office of Inspector General?
5 A. I've been interviewed by the Office of Inspector General
6 many, many times.
7 Q. And what does the DOJ Office of the Inspector General
8 do?
9 A. The Office of the Inspector General is sort of a semi-
10 independent part of the Department of Justice that is
11 intended to conduct oversights of the functioning of the
12 Department of Justice, to do investigations of particular
13 things that the Department of Justice has done, including
14 the Bureau. And then it also performs sort of a management
15 oversight to see if the Bureau or any other part of the
16 Department of Justice is actually being efficient. Are they
17 spending money well; are they running their programs well;
18 are they wasting money.
19 So I guess at the end of the day they're looking
20 to determine whether there is any waste, fraud, or abuse by
21 any part of the Department of Justice, and also whether any
22 criminal activity might have taken place in connection with
23 any of that, any action by any department official.
24 Q. So when -- were you -- did that office, the DOJ Office
25 of Inspector General, similarly start looking at the Trump/

958
1 Russia issues that Congress looked at?
2 A. They were also investigating the investigators, yes.
3 Q. And was it in that context that you sat down with them?
4 Probably not the only context, but did you sit down with
5 them in that context?
6 A. To the best of my recollection, yes. I think -- I think
7 multiple times.
8 But I've been interviewed by them so many times I
9 don't remember exactly what -- exactly with respect to what
10 investigation.
11 Q. Let me show you what's been premarked as Government
12 Exhibit 65.
13 Looking at the header page here, the front page,
14 do you recognize this?
15 A. Well, I mean, I see what it is. I'm not sure that I
16 have seen this before.
17 Q. Okay.
18 A. Or I haven't seen the entirety of it before, let me put
19 it that way.
20 Q. Got it. But does this -- based on your experience with
21 the Inspector General's office, do they typically do
22 transcripts when they interview someone?
23 A. I don't know that they typically do transcripts. They
24 interview a lot of people, but I don't recall seeing a lot
25 of transcripts done by them of interviews.

959
1 Q. Do you recall meeting with them at some point around
2 July of 2019?
3 A. Probably.
4 Q. And do you remember whether or not they were preparing a
5 transcript?
6 A. I don't remember.
7 Q. Okay.
8 A. I've been interviewed by them when they've recorded the
9 interviews. I've been interviewed by them when they don't
10 record the interviews. So I can't remember exactly what
11 happened in this particular instance.
12 Q. Okay. But you're not doubting that you were interviewed
13 by them, July 15th?
14 A. If they have a transcript of an interview with me, I'm
15 sure that that is what happened.
17 offers Government Exhibit 65 and will focus on only a
18 limited portion of the transcript.
19 MR. BERKOWITZ: No objection to the portions that
20 are inconsistent with his testimony, Your Honor.
22 MR. DeFILIPPIS: Ms. Arsenault, if we could go to
23 Page 30 of this transcript, the very bottom line, and then
24 we're going to go quickly to the next.
25 I'm sorry, yes, Page 30, like last third.

960
1 Q. Okay. Mr. Baker, I will play the role of Ms. Terzaken,
2 if you can play yourself.
3 Okay. With Michael Sussmann, your conversations
4 with him before the election, if you could briefly describe
5 how the conversations came out, what information he provided
6 to you?
7 A. So I'll go into the Sussmann stuff, yeah, okay. So he
8 came in. He -- he -- all of this is gone over in the
9 transcript with the committee, so I won't -- I'll try to
10 just summarize briefly.
11 My basic recollection is, in some way, shape, or
12 form, Michael reached out and wanted to come in and meet
13 with me. And so we scheduled that. So Michael came in and
14 met with me. And he had some amount of information,
15 physical evidence, printed out, and also a thumb drive or
16 two, that he said related to strange interactions that were
17 some -- that some number of people that were his clients,
18 who were, he described, as I recall it, sort of cyber-
19 security experts, had found about some strange connection
20 between some part of Donald Trump's organizations and Alfa-
21 Bank, which was described as being controlled by the
22 Kremlin. And that it appeared to be the case that this was
23 a -- it was -- it was surmised that this was a back-
24 channel -- what do you call it? -- a back-channel of
25 electronic communications, that somehow the Trump

961
1 organization and Alpha-Bank were using this what looked like
2 basically a surreptitious channel to communicate with each
3 other.
4 And so he presented me with this information. I
5 listened to him. I, you know, took the information from
6 him. I think I immediately called up I believe it was
7 Priestap, and I either went down to Priestap or he sent
8 somebody to get it, but I got it out of my hands, like, you
9 know, that afternoon or that day, whatever it was.
10 Q. Okay. So, Mr. Baker, if I can direct your attention to
11 the paragraph starting "My basic recollection."
12 Towards the middle of that paragraph you say: And
13 he had some amount of information, physical evidence,
14 printed out, and also a thumb drive or two, that he said
15 related to strange interactions that some number of people
16 that were his clients, who were, he described, as I recall
17 it, some sort of cyber-security experts.
18 A. Uh-huh.
19 Q. So you used the word "clients" there. Do you see that?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. Why did you say that?
22 A. To the best of my recollection, I think I was trying
23 to -- just based on what we just read -- describe this
24 interaction at a high level using shorthand that in this
25 particular instance with using that word was obviously

962
1 inaccurate.
2 Q. Okay. At any time between your meeting with -- your
3 text message with Mr. Sussmann on September 18th of '16 and
4 then, did Mr. Sussmann tell you that he had been working for
5 a client or clients?
6 A. No.
7 Q. In between your Congressional testimony and this
8 interview, had Mr. Sussmann told you that the cyber security
9 experts were a client or clients of his?
10 A. No.
11 Q. And so when you made that statement there, was it
12 inaccurate?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. Okay. And was that something -- just a slip-up
15 essentially?
16 A. It was an inaccurate statement, yes. It was wrong. I
17 don't know how else to describe it. Yes.
18 Again, I believe I was trying to move quickly
19 through this based on what the question had been also to
20 speak -- if you could go back to the question.
21 "Briefly describe how the conversations came
22 about."
23 So I was trying to be brief, so I was using
24 shorthand and not going into deeply think about my
25 conversation with Michael, about the nature and scope of his

963
1 relationship with the people, cyber experts, that he was
2 referring to.
3 Q. When you deal with lawyers outside the FBI in your role
4 as FBI General Counsel, when you did that, how typical was
5 it that those lawyers would be communicating with you on
6 behalf of a client?
7 A. Usually the case.
8 Q. Okay. So to what extent does that affect -- did that
9 affect you when you spoke about --
10 A. Yes, it was a shorthand way of referring to the people
11 that Michael was working with. A shorthand and inaccurate
12 way to refer to them. Imprecise.
13 Q. Got it. Mr. Baker, switching topics, have you ever
14 heard of a person --
15 THE COURT: Counsel, how much longer do you have?
16 MR. DeFILIPPIS: Your Honor, this might actually
17 be a great point to --
18 THE COURT: Okay.
19 All right. Ladies and gentlemen, we're going to
20 take our lunch break.
21 As always, no discussions about the case, no
22 social media about the case or any of the related issues,
23 and no independent research about the case.
24 We'll break for about an hour and 15 minutes.
25 Okay?
964
1 (Jury exits courtroom)
2 THE COURT: All right. Sir, you can step down.
3 Be seated, everyone.
4 Okay. Do you want to take up the issue that we
5 had the sidebar about?
6 As long as it's outside of the jury, we can do it
7 in the courtroom, just avoid, obviously, any classified
8 material.
9 Sorry, I guess my question, to start, is: There
10 was classified discovery on this issue, correct?
11 MR. BERKOWITZ: Correct. There's also been
12 public --
13 THE COURT: Yes.
14 MR. BERKOWITZ: -- discussion of it, and so
15 there's a matching, if you will, Judge, or there's an
16 overlapping.
17 THE COURT: Okay. And this was a topic in your
18 CIPA 5 notice, correct?
19 MR. BERKOWITZ: Correct.
20 THE COURT: Okay. And was there an agreed-upon
21 declassification or stipulation or summary on this topic?
22 MR. BERKOWITZ: There was. It's a paragraph,
23 Judge. There were also questions of Mr. Baker that were not
24 classified that may get into the subject of this leak
25 investigation, and we do intend to ask him, you know,

965
1 essentially whether there were competing stories about
2 whether he was authorized to do this.
3 THE COURT: Okay. So as long as that's within the
4 scope of what he testified to, can you do that confined to
5 either the public record or the agreed-upon CIPA
6 substitution?
7 MR. BERKOWITZ: I believe that I can, Your Honor.
8 What concerns me is the suggestion of the outcome in the
9 findings of the investigation, which I don't know whether
10 those are outside the classified nature of the record.
11 THE COURT: Okay. Mr. DeFilippis, is that outside
12 either the CIPA stipulation or the public record?
13 MR. DeFILIPPIS: Your Honor, I'm going to defer to
14 our CIPA expert, Mr. Algor.
15 THE COURT: Okay.
16 MR. ALGOR: Your Honor, I believe the ultimate
17 finding by Special Counsel Durham, then-US Attorney Durham,
18 was part of the substitution, and those were the elements
19 that the defense was going to cross him on.
20 THE COURT: Okay. Well, go back to the
21 substitution and the public record, and so long as you're --
22 the scope of your cross is within that, I don't think we
23 have a problem. All right?
24 MR. BERKOWITZ: Very good, Your Honor. The scope
25 of my cross may be broad given the direct, but yes.

966
1 THE COURT: But that's a scope issue. We don't
2 have to deal with any CIPA concerns.
3 All right. Are we generally on schedule, Counsel?
4 I'd like to give the jury a little sense of how things are
5 going when I tell them that they're going to have to come in
6 tomorrow morning.
7 MR. DeFILIPPIS: We are generally on schedule,
8 Your Honor. I think Mr. Baker's going slightly longer than
9 we anticipated. I expect there will not be more than an
10 hour more with him.
11 THE COURT: Okay. So I can tell the jury that
12 we're basically on the schedule that I informed them of at
13 the beginning of the case?
14 MR. DeFILIPPIS: I think that's right, Your Honor.
15 THE COURT: Okay. Thanks. Have a good lunch.
16 (Lunch recess taken at 12:39 p.m.)
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967
1 CERTIFICATE OF OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
3 I, LISA A. MOREIRA, RDR, CRR, do hereby
4 certify that the above and foregoing constitutes a true and
5 accurate transcript of my stenographic notes and is a full,
6 true and complete transcript of the proceedings to the best
7 of my ability.
8 Dated this 19th day of May, 2022.
10
/s/Lisa A. Moreira, RDR, CRR
11 Official Court Reporter
United States Courthouse
12 Room 6718
333 Constitution Avenue, NW
13 Washington, DC 20001
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897:13, 897:20, 898:2 900:14, 901:2, 936:8, 943:11
/ 923:5, 923:14, 3rd [1] - 947:3 901:5, 901:16, additional [1] - 915:7
925:19, 944:3 901:17, 902:15, additionally [1] -
/s/Lisa [1] - 967:10 934:12
2018 [10] - 926:8, 4 829:11
929:5, 933:7, aback [1] - 891:23 address [1] - 886:14
1 933:15, 933:18, 40 [2] - 890:2, 894:2 ability [7] - 869:12, addressing [1] -
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1/2 [1] - 850:7 2019 [1] - 959:2 5 955:16, 967:7 admissible [1] -
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100 [2] - 842:13, 888:2, 888:6,
202-324-6825 [1] - 898:12, 920:1, admitted [2] - 861:25,
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900:16 879:25, 922:8
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825:20 academics [1] - 875:5 916:5, 963:8, 963:9
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898:3, 904:6 access [4] - 837:15, 848:4
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1271 [1] - 825:19 6 accessed [1] - 926:11
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900:1, 900:8, 6 [1] - 830:10 accord [9] - 862:7, afraid [2] - 828:6,
12:39 [1] - 966:16
900:14, 903:9, 637-2231 [1] - 825:15 862:19, 862:20, 889:16
13 [1] - 833:14
904:6, 905:21 65 [2] - 958:12, 959:17 862:22, 862:25, afternoon [7] - 897:23,
1400 [5] - 885:20,
240 [2] - 838:14, 6718 [2] - 825:22, 896:4, 901:6, 903:1, 898:23, 907:19,
886:3, 894:19,
838:24 967:12 909:13 907:21, 909:18,
894:21, 902:13
242 [2] - 873:4, 873:12 68 [2] - 895:15 according [1] - 841:12 909:19, 961:9
145 [1] - 825:14
243 [4] - 861:15, 6825 [2] - 900:17, accords [1] - 862:23 agencies [1] - 909:3
15 [2] - 887:12, 963:24
861:22, 861:25, 903:5 account [3] - 834:5, Agent [1] - 860:14
1500 [9] - 832:23,
865:4 6829 [1] - 900:18 834:7, 834:22 agent [4] - 852:2,
842:3, 864:20,
26th [2] - 923:5, 923:8 6:19 [1] - 923:16 accountable [1] - 860:10, 860:14,
897:2, 901:14,
28 [1] - 923:14 6th [1] - 830:3 946:6 860:15
923:2, 932:21,
282 [1] - 877:22 accurate [8] - 833:25, agent's [1] - 836:14
936:19, 941:6
848:25, 849:14,
15th [1] - 959:13 285 [4] - 882:14, 8 agents [6] - 860:21,
882:19, 904:20, 875:25, 876:2, 920:18, 920:20,
18th [5] - 832:20, 8 [1] - 850:7
904:25 878:14, 920:6, 967:5 928:23, 953:9
835:10, 835:11, 832 [1] - 826:4
286 [2] - 908:2, 908:8 accused [1] - 945:22 ago [6] - 833:4,
842:4, 962:3 8th [1] - 937:18
29th [1] - 936:20 act [2] - 852:19, 869:19, 902:2,
19 [3] - 825:4, 839:5,
2:00 [2] - 836:8, 839:6 908:19 913:4, 919:15, 943:6
839:6
19th [8] - 838:8, 2:30 [1] - 839:6 9 acting [2] - 843:6, agreed [7] - 830:3,
856:15 884:10, 912:16,
861:12, 863:19, 9/16 [1] - 873:19
Action [1] - 825:3
883:24, 933:6, 3 9/19/16 [2] - 873:19,
action [2] - 850:13,
916:17, 918:14,
947:8, 947:9, 967:8 874:23 964:20, 965:5
30 [7] - 841:17, 957:23 agreed-upon [3] -
1:21-cr-00582-CRC-1 9/21 [1] - 895:20
841:19, 852:16, activities [5] - 852:10, 884:10, 964:20,
[1] - 825:4 906-1200 [1] - 825:20
890:2, 925:19, 853:18, 853:25, 965:5
93 [1] - 894:21
959:23, 959:25 854:1, 941:2 agreement [2] -
2 30th [2] - 925:24,
94 [2] - 900:11, 902:12
activity [4] - 914:14,
9:00 [1] - 897:24 830:17, 880:18
2 [3] - 944:9, 944:12, 933:4 918:24, 945:18, ahead [3] - 897:8,
324 [1] - 895:12 9:09 [1] - 825:5
947:8 957:22 952:17, 953:24
333 [2] - 825:23, 9:41 [1] - 934:12
20001 [2] - 825:23, actors [1] - 846:17 alarmed [1] - 951:16
967:13 967:12 actual [4] - 923:23, Alfa [20] - 841:9,
969
845:25, 846:11, Anderson [9] - 829:12, areas [1] - 871:8 attempt [1] - 913:5 Baker [79] - 829:12,
847:11, 867:17, 830:8, 871:6, arena [2] - 911:18, attended [1] - 918:19 830:7, 831:15,
868:5, 906:12, 871:14, 871:15, 911:20 attendees [1] - 839:10 831:20, 832:6,
913:10, 919:1, 871:23, 874:4, argument [1] - 923:8 attention [6] - 854:5, 832:8, 832:16,
920:3, 920:23, 876:8, 876:9 arrests [1] - 853:24 893:19, 900:9, 832:18, 832:24,
922:1, 922:2, 922:5, Anderson's [2] - arrived [1] - 937:10 900:12, 933:3, 833:2, 835:12,
924:12, 937:23, 872:25, 873:9 Arsenault [15] - 827:9, 961:10 839:2, 839:12,
937:24, 940:3, ANDREW [1] - 825:12 832:22, 835:9, attorney [5] - 862:17, 841:20, 842:1,
960:20 Andrew [1] - 827:9 842:2, 864:19, 864:4, 864:5, 965:17 842:5, 842:11,
Alfa-Bank [16] - 841:9, Andy [5] - 876:17, 874:13, 874:24, Attorney [4] - 852:8, 842:15, 849:15,
845:25, 846:11, 906:4, 906:25, 886:7, 894:20, 856:12, 920:13, 849:16, 850:25,
847:11, 867:17, 907:4, 907:7 894:24, 897:4, 953:19 856:7, 861:2, 862:1,
868:5, 906:12, answer [9] - 827:22, 900:10, 947:14, attorneys [2] - 870:23, 864:16, 867:5,
913:10, 919:1, 828:13, 855:5, 954:2, 959:22 871:2 873:16, 874:14,
920:3, 922:1, 922:2, 896:17, 897:24, art [1] - 839:15 augmented [1] - 874:16, 875:1,
922:5, 924:12, 913:19, 917:8, article [31] - 848:8, 918:23 875:4, 875:22,
937:23, 937:24 947:18, 955:8 849:9, 866:14, authentic [1] - 948:15 877:3, 878:4,
Alfa-Bank-related [1] - answered [3] - 900:23, 867:3, 868:21, authorities [1] - 878:24, 881:10,
920:23 928:23, 954:17 868:22, 875:7, 952:15 883:3, 885:18,
Alfa-Bank/Trump [1] - answering [2] - 940:4, 876:3, 883:25, authorized [5] - 852:8, 885:21, 894:9,
940:3 955:15 884:16, 885:13, 929:24, 930:1, 894:13, 894:22,
Algor [2] - 827:8, answers [5] - 888:9, 894:16, 896:13, 953:19, 965:2 895:1, 896:4,
965:14 888:15, 947:23, 896:24, 906:12, autograph [2] - 910:4, 897:12, 898:4,
ALGOR [2] - 825:13, 949:8, 950:20 910:19, 912:1, 910:5 899:25, 900:12,
965:16 anticipated [1] - 966:9 912:17, 921:14, availability [2] - 902:14, 905:5,
allegation [10] - anticipation [2] - 921:16, 921:20, 897:22, 898:22 905:20, 913:3,
845:24, 846:4, 948:12, 949:22 921:22, 937:23, available [2] - 833:18, 913:19, 918:1,
851:17, 854:6, anyway [4] - 830:12, 941:18, 941:19, 846:25 918:6, 919:11,
859:21, 867:6, 846:19, 870:17, 942:7, 942:9, 943:7, 923:3, 926:7,
Avenue [4] - 825:19,
870:8, 914:12, 894:4 943:21, 944:4 932:19, 932:22,
825:23, 839:24,
917:18, 945:17 anyway.. [1] - 940:21 articles [4] - 869:7, 933:6, 938:11,
967:12
allegations [16] - apart [3] - 894:2, 940:8, 942:2, 942:19 939:9, 940:13,
avoid [1] - 964:7
843:9, 843:10, 894:3, 910:23 aside [1] - 915:17 942:21, 943:13,
aware [13] - 844:23,
843:13, 844:23, asleep [1] - 900:2 944:22, 946:9,
apologize [1] - 938:24 844:25, 849:7,
845:1, 847:4, 854:4, aspect [1] - 854:18 947:16, 949:5,
appalling [1] - 945:7 858:9, 881:24,
854:14, 854:18, assertion [2] - 848:22, 950:8, 950:18,
apparent [1] - 841:8 884:20, 887:25,
866:8, 871:7, 944:5 950:19, 953:12,
appear [2] - 874:16, 888:4, 916:12,
881:13, 882:8, assistance [1] - 957:3, 960:1,
897:14 916:18, 934:9,
917:19, 956:9, 852:13 961:10, 963:13,
APPEARANCES [1] - 951:9, 954:24
956:10 964:23
825:11 assistant [17] -
alleged [4] - 848:7, Baker's [5] - 829:7,
appeared [1] - 960:22 838:22, 839:10, B
854:18, 869:4, 840:20, 840:21, 909:18, 948:13,
appearing [2] - 841:6,
896:25 852:25, 853:11, back-channel [1] - 948:21, 966:8
858:21
allies [1] - 853:20 853:14, 856:12, 960:24 bank [3] - 843:11,
apple [1] - 833:14
allow [1] - 837:10 860:12, 870:15, background [3] - 846:1, 854:7
Apple [2] - 834:7,
allowed [2] - 836:4, 872:15, 883:15, 856:6, 940:17, Bank [20] - 841:9,
834:20
837:11 900:22, 902:4, 952:12 845:25, 846:11,
application [1] - 893:7
ally [1] - 937:6 905:11, 905:13, bad [1] - 849:5 847:11, 867:17,
appreciate [3] -
Alpha [1] - 961:1 921:9 badge [18] - 836:9, 868:5, 868:6,
827:20, 830:22,
Alpha-Bank [1] - associate [1] - 905:18 836:12, 836:14, 906:12, 913:10,
831:1
961:1 Associate [1] - 883:20 836:16, 836:21, 919:1, 920:3,
approached [4] -
AMERICA [1] - 825:3 836:23, 837:1, 920:23, 922:1,
843:15, 864:9, associated [1] -
America [1] - 827:4 837:2, 837:3, 837:4, 922:2, 922:5,
864:10, 864:25 895:16
Americas [1] - 825:19 837:10, 837:11, 924:12, 937:23,
appropriate [5] - association [1] - 952:1
837:19, 837:21, 937:24, 960:21,
amount [3] - 912:10, 850:14, 854:5, assume [2] - 923:8,
837:22, 838:3, 961:1
960:14, 961:13 946:6, 953:3 933:19
860:25, 861:1 Bank/Trump [1] -
amplified [1] - 918:23 approximate [1] - assuming [1] - 948:10
badges [1] - 837:6 940:3
analogized [1] - 847:6 878:22 assumptions [1] -
BAKER [2] - 826:3, bar [1] - 833:24
analogy [1] - 860:1 area [3] - 840:18, 867:6
832:13 based [11] - 828:24,
analyst [1] - 936:10 840:20, 895:11 attacked [1] - 942:14
970
849:13, 859:2, BERKOWITZ [41] - 923:21, 924:16 853:14, 865:16, 951:1

859:6, 862:3, 825:16, 827:11, Bill [36] - 853:1, 853:7, 929:10, 953:21, campaign's [1] -
866:14, 885:21, 827:15, 827:19, 857:20, 857:21, 960:4, 960:10, 940:24
935:15, 958:20, 828:2, 830:16, 857:23, 858:2, 962:21 candidate [1] - 882:7
961:23, 962:19 831:3, 831:11, 858:17, 859:22, bring [12] - 831:15, capacity [2] - 859:1,
basic [3] - 884:10, 831:14, 831:19, 860:3, 860:18, 832:23, 851:1, 860:23
960:11, 961:11 831:23, 838:25, 861:19, 863:14, 851:14, 851:15, captain [1] - 890:19
basing [1] - 906:15 861:23, 873:13, 863:23, 865:12, 854:5, 864:20, captains [3] - 890:11,
basis [5] - 836:21, 875:20, 882:20, 866:7, 868:15, 894:21, 897:2, 890:13
853:21, 872:6, 886:4, 886:12, 868:18, 869:25, 910:1, 910:13, career [1] - 860:15
874:12, 900:6 886:21, 891:5, 870:16, 871:24, 947:14 careful [1] - 855:7
basketball [2] - 891:11, 893:2, 872:5, 878:10, bringing [1] - 879:18 carries [1] - 938:2
911:18, 911:20 905:2, 908:9, 882:25, 883:10, British [1] - 938:12 case [24] - 828:12,
be.. [1] - 891:24 912:23, 913:16, 883:15, 884:8, Brittain [3] - 827:7, 852:2, 854:20,
became [2] - 934:9, 918:4, 919:7, 907:19, 910:17, 889:5, 892:8 855:8, 858:20,
940:7 938:23, 947:22, 911:5, 913:22, BRITTAIN [1] - 825:13 858:21, 880:13,
become [1] - 915:18 948:14, 948:24, 921:4, 921:5, broad [1] - 965:25 887:16, 887:17,
becoming [1] - 938:23 949:17, 949:25, 921:10, 926:6 brought [3] - 840:10, 888:13, 889:19,
BEFORE [1] - 825:10 959:19, 964:11, bill [2] - 885:23, 857:3, 893:18 891:6, 891:12,
begin [2] - 841:4, 964:14, 964:19, 885:24 building [5] - 836:10, 891:19, 922:16,
950:9 964:22, 965:7, Bill's [1] - 878:11 836:17, 836:19, 922:22, 944:22,
beginning [9] - 831:6, 965:24 billing [2] - 886:7, 836:20, 837:7 960:22, 963:7,
834:3, 834:10, best [41] - 833:6, 902:23 bullet [1] - 864:8 963:21, 963:22,
841:22, 841:24, 840:1, 841:16, binder [1] - 850:8 Bureau [17] - 837:18, 963:23, 966:13
848:18, 865:25, 843:14, 843:21, bit [11] - 836:13, 842:20, 848:14, Case [1] - 827:3
876:11, 966:13 845:2, 852:21, 850:17, 856:2, 851:11, 867:2, cases [2] - 920:15,
behalf [20] - 827:7, 855:12, 869:18, 860:4, 877:2, 912:3, 918:22, 922:17
827:13, 841:6, 877:18, 892:19, 883:23, 890:12, 918:24, 928:13, catch [1] - 945:14
841:21, 842:10, 892:21, 895:5, 910:16, 937:19, 929:6, 933:16, CATHERINE [1] -
849:21, 857:15, 895:16, 896:16, 940:13, 943:10 933:17, 934:5, 825:17
858:21, 859:4, 900:19, 901:11, Blaze [2] - 843:25, 952:24, 957:14, Catherine [1] - 827:12
859:7, 859:12, 904:16, 904:18, 865:11 957:15 caused [1] - 837:17
859:13, 864:22, 906:15, 911:5, blow [1] - 945:11 Bureau's [1] - 919:3 cautious [1] - 939:1
871:19, 871:22, 912:5, 913:3, 915:1, blowing [1] - 838:15 business [1] - 929:21 CD [1] - 883:16
889:6, 908:19, 918:21, 919:14, boat [3] - 890:20, busy [2] - 839:7, cell [1] - 833:12
943:14, 943:22, 921:3, 925:13, 890:23, 890:24 898:25 center [1] - 935:25
963:6 933:23, 934:4, body [1] - 946:6 button [1] - 903:5 certain [5] - 828:15,
behaving [2] - 945:7, 934:11, 937:11, bona [1] - 863:24 BY [8] - 832:15, 836:19, 903:8,
945:8 942:2, 943:18, book [1] - 910:3 894:12, 897:11, 916:10, 927:23
behind [2] - 888:22, 944:1, 944:4, boss [1] - 876:15 932:18, 939:8, certainly [7] - 828:11,
889:21 955:10, 955:16, bosses [3] - 876:14, 949:4, 950:7, 950:23 828:14, 860:9,
Bellevue [2] - 938:6, 958:6, 961:22, 967:6 881:11, 881:24 888:2, 889:2,
better [2] - 862:11,
939:13
935:12
BOSWORTH [1] - C 891:22, 892:13
Bellovin [2] - 843:24, 825:17 CERTIFICATE [1] -
865:11 between [29] - 835:5, calculus [1] - 867:7
Bosworth [1] - 827:12 967:1
below [11] - 863:4, 841:9, 841:23, calendar [6] - 838:18,
bottom [11] - 868:14, certify [1] - 967:4
864:2, 867:9, 843:11, 845:25, 838:20, 838:21,
874:22, 875:2, chain [15] - 833:17,
867:18, 867:20, 847:4, 854:15, 838:22, 839:3, 839:7
886:8, 894:25, 835:5, 835:6,
867:23, 870:17, 854:19, 854:22, caliber [1] - 865:19
908:11, 927:3, 876:13, 877:4,
871:1, 909:25, 868:4, 869:4, 869:9, cameras [1] - 945:14
928:4, 949:5, 959:23 877:6, 877:7,
938:13, 944:8 886:2, 890:2, Campaign [11] -
Bowdich [3] - 883:11, 877:15, 877:25,
899:14, 910:24, 858:17, 859:8,
bench [7] - 886:10, 883:18, 905:17 878:5, 884:9, 897:3,
913:10, 914:14, 863:12, 950:12,
886:22, 888:5, brand [1] - 833:13 908:3, 908:11,
919:1, 920:3, 951:10, 952:2,
930:12, 932:17, break [8] - 831:5, 937:16
925:20, 925:21, 954:6, 954:11,
938:21, 939:7 831:7, 887:6, chairs [1] - 840:17
933:1, 936:5, 936:7, 954:20, 954:25,
benefit [2] - 850:15, 887:12, 892:2, challenge [2] - 948:12,
944:3, 960:20, 955:21
896:20 894:13, 963:20, 949:23
962:2, 962:7 campaign [6] - 854:15,
Berkowitz [4] - 963:24 chance [4] - 861:3,
beyond [1] - 906:14 869:5, 882:10,
827:12, 827:17, brief [1] - 962:23 954:10, 954:18,
big [3] - 840:22, 943:15, 943:23,
893:1, 893:15 briefly [8] - 830:16, 955:8
971
change [1] - 944:5 859:2, 859:6, 949:12, 950:11, 847:13, 848:7, 881:17
channel [18] - 841:9, 860:12, 863:17, 950:25, 954:4 848:9, 848:16, conference [12] -
843:10, 845:25, 882:22, 890:18, Coie's [1] - 939:12 859:23, 859:25, 840:22, 872:22,
848:8, 848:9, 904:4, 919:3, 950:16 colleague [1] - 842:17 866:23, 866:25, 886:10, 886:22,
848:11, 848:16, clearances [1] - colleagues [3] - 867:1, 867:25, 911:3, 918:20,
859:23, 866:17, 926:14 903:20, 933:1, 897:1, 913:9, 915:5, 930:10, 930:12,
897:1, 913:10, client [31] - 841:7, 945:21 919:1, 920:3, 925:8, 932:17, 938:21,
915:5, 919:1, 920:3, 841:21, 842:10, color [4] - 837:1, 960:25 939:7
920:7, 960:24, 961:2 849:19, 849:21, 837:3, 837:4 community [1] - 837:3 confidence [2] -
characterization [1] - 857:15, 859:14, colors [1] - 836:24 companies [1] - 917:13, 917:22
875:20 862:18, 862:21, COLUMBIA [1] - 825:1 934:22 confident [3] - 842:11,
charade [1] - 830:19 862:24, 864:22, columns [1] - 896:2 company [1] - 864:22 842:13, 853:2
charge [1] - 838:22 871:20, 871:22, Comey [7] - 876:21, comparing [3] - confidential [2] -
chasing [1] - 945:13 875:5, 876:10, 881:11, 881:12, 914:22, 914:23 857:17, 880:1
check [1] - 896:18 880:22, 899:12, 882:15, 883:9, comparison [2] - confidently [1] -
checking [1] - 910:17 899:16, 899:19, 883:14, 905:6 844:15, 901:24 893:22
chief [2] - 872:14, 904:7, 904:11, coming [14] - 830:20, compartmented [1] - confined [1] - 965:4
872:18 924:2, 943:14, 837:24, 842:22, 840:17 confirm [2] - 920:5,
chiefs [2] - 871:1, 943:15, 943:22, 842:25, 849:10, competing [1] - 965:1 920:6
871:2 943:24, 944:6, 858:22, 864:21, competitive [1] - confirmed [3] -
child [1] - 892:22 955:25, 962:5, 869:7, 878:4, 924:23 950:14, 951:6, 954:8
chime [1] - 914:2 962:9, 963:6 879:22, 880:22, complete [1] - 967:6 confront [1] - 830:21
chimed [1] - 914:4 clients [23] - 849:19, 926:1, 941:11, completed [1] - confusion [1] - 935:9
chip [1] - 837:6 857:12, 858:23, 953:16 833:21 Congress [9] - 940:16,
chooses [3] - 828:1, 858:24, 865:1, comm [1] - 867:24 complicated [3] - 940:18, 941:2,
828:3, 828:25 865:2, 865:3, 881:7, COMM [1] - 867:25 836:18, 913:8, 944:25, 945:7,
chose [1] - 879:13 881:8, 899:12, comment [1] - 939:3 915:14 946:3, 946:9,
899:16, 899:20, commiserating [1] - comply [1] - 833:8 955:24, 958:1
CHRISTOPHER [1] -
904:7, 904:11, 939:19 component [1] - congressional [4] -
825:10
924:2, 960:17, commitment [1] - 946:15 940:14, 944:15,
chronology [1] -
961:16, 961:19, 917:3 computer [2] - 838:19, 962:7
954:10
962:5, 962:9 commitments [1] - 849:16 connected [2] -
CIA [2] - 927:11,
Clinton [19] - 858:16, 917:1 conceal [1] - 886:17 841:10, 867:18
927:12
859:8, 863:5, Committee [1] - 952:1 concentric [1] - 928:8 connection [23] -
CID [2] - 868:14,
863:10, 863:12, committee [5] - concept [1] - 877:3 830:7, 843:9,
868:16
863:14, 863:18, 940:19, 940:20, 847:24, 849:16,
CIPA [5] - 964:18, concern [6] - 841:8,
943:14, 943:23, 940:21, 950:18, 854:7, 858:10,
965:5, 965:12, 869:6, 869:10,
950:12, 951:1, 960:9 888:8, 889:20,
965:14, 966:2 888:12, 917:9,
951:10, 952:2, 891:18, 893:15,
circle [2] - 862:13, committees [3] - 951:16
954:5, 954:11, 893:17, 893:19,
880:13 939:24, 940:18, concerned [2] -
954:20, 954:24, 893:23, 894:15,
circles [1] - 928:8 944:14 857:24, 882:5
955:20, 956:19 926:9, 926:10,
citizen [11] - 842:22, common [4] - 851:22, concerning [3] -
clip [1] - 850:8 926:16, 927:16,
843:2, 843:7, 851:24, 885:15, 828:16, 881:20,
clipped [1] - 850:7 940:3, 940:24,
857:16, 858:22, 927:21 887:17
close [6] - 841:24, comms [1] - 867:17 940:25, 957:22,
879:19, 945:6, concerns [3] - 893:23,
850:24, 893:15, 960:19
951:20, 952:20, communicants [2] - 965:8, 966:2
910:23, 919:14, connections [5] -
952:22, 953:16 847:10, 866:16 concluded [6] -
919:16 854:14, 854:19,
classes [2] - 889:15, communicate [3] - 898:21, 918:22,
closed [1] - 922:20 869:4, 943:14,
889:23 841:15, 854:10, 919:5, 920:4,
closely [1] - 855:1 943:23
classified [17] - 961:2 921:23, 922:10
closings [1] - 828:23 communicating [4] - conclusion [2] - conscientious [2] -
840:18, 874:3,
CNN [1] - 936:9 866:16, 867:1, 919:4, 922:25 893:6, 893:20
926:11, 926:17,
code [1] - 895:11 884:20, 963:5 conditional [1] - consents [1] - 829:14
926:21, 927:13,
927:17, 927:20, Coie [17] - 856:1, communication [4] - 827:25 consider [1] - 924:13
927:23, 929:8, 856:3, 862:17, 853:3, 866:19, conduct [4] - 852:9, considerable [1] -
929:13, 929:19, 934:1, 934:10, 920:7, 935:11 869:12, 944:16, 855:3
929:25, 964:7, 934:20, 934:24, communications [23] 957:11 considered [1] - 952:8
964:10, 964:24, 935:11, 936:13, - 841:9, 843:10, conducting [5] - considering [1] -
965:10 937:2, 938:11, 846:11, 846:15, 853:22, 853:23, 935:20
942:25, 943:12, 846:21, 847:2, 869:4, 881:16, consistency [1] -
clear [10] - 850:25,
972
948:20 copied [1] - 909:9 872:3 966:15, 967:1 845:20, 846:17,

consistent [6] - copies [1] - 907:15 countries [1] - 853:19 Court [7] - 825:21, 857:1, 857:3, 857:7,
875:10, 875:13, copy [3] - 850:5, country [4] - 880:5, 825:22, 828:19, 858:19, 864:10,
875:16, 875:19, 850:21 940:12, 946:6, 893:13, 894:5, 865:2, 870:25,
949:22 Corp [2] - 864:11, 952:11 948:19, 967:11 871:5, 871:8,
constitute [1] - 946:14 864:12 coup [7] - 938:12, Court's [4] - 828:14, 871:25, 872:2,
constitutes [1] - 967:4 corporate [2] - 864:25, 939:14, 939:16, 891:21, 893:19, 875:5, 899:3, 899:9,
Constitution [2] - 865:6 940:11, 942:12, 939:1 912:8, 919:24,
825:23, 967:12 corporation [1] - 942:13, 945:23 Courthouse [2] - 924:10, 960:18,
construed [2] - 845:5, 864:13 couple [8] - 831:7, 825:22, 967:11 961:17, 962:8, 963:1
952:25 corporations' [1] - 840:16, 855:24, courtroom [6] - 832:2, cyber-security [1] -
consulted [1] - 829:13 864:14 872:15, 885:3, 887:18, 892:1, 961:17
contact [9] - 841:13, correct [27] - 829:17, 893:2, 922:13, 894:8, 964:1, 964:7
843:15, 864:14, 837:20, 838:1, 947:25 COURTROOM [3] - D
864:15, 865:3, 858:11, 862:5, course [4] - 830:5, 827:2, 892:5, 905:1
D'Etat [1] - 938:12
865:8, 898:13, 864:7, 868:10, 850:22, 890:16, cover [2] - 874:17,
D.C [4] - 839:24,
932:23 872:20, 879:5, 940:1 946:11
895:11, 910:2, 936:1
contacting [2] - 884:1, 887:23, court [4] - 827:13, covered [1] - 949:20
daily [3] - 872:10,
867:12, 868:24 899:24, 902:19, 856:7, 892:5, 921:11 coxswain [3] - 890:10,
872:11, 873:24
contains [1] - 886:14 905:16, 907:14, COURT [84] - 825:1, 890:19, 890:25
dash [1] - 862:17
contending [1] - 908:16, 909:7, 827:6, 827:10, credential [1] - 858:18
data [4] - 834:21,
949:19 909:10, 910:22, 827:14, 827:16, credibility [3] -
850:17, 865:22,
contest [1] - 950:1 918:16, 936:4, 827:23, 828:4, 863:25, 948:13,
919:24
context [7] - 833:3, 947:5, 948:14, 828:8, 828:19, 949:23
829:5, 829:16, date [18] - 835:15,
835:24, 867:14, 964:10, 964:11, credible [1] - 952:8
829:20, 830:22, 874:18, 874:19,
940:15, 958:3, 964:18, 964:19 crew [9] - 887:22,
831:4, 831:12, 874:21, 878:22,
958:4, 958:5 correctly [1] - 830:17 889:1, 889:3,
831:15, 831:22, 883:3, 883:21,
continuation [1] - counsel [21] - 827:8, 889:19, 889:22,
831:25, 832:3, 895:18, 895:20,
897:15 827:20, 828:8, 890:1, 890:5,
832:11, 839:1, 898:3, 900:13,
continue [9] - 863:3, 828:14, 870:10, 890:14, 890:15
861:25, 873:15, 919:8, 919:10,
864:1, 893:22, 870:11, 870:14, crime [7] - 852:14,
875:21, 882:21, 919:11, 933:16,
911:25, 912:2, 870:17, 887:20, 860:8, 951:21,
886:5, 886:17, 936:20, 938:17,
912:16, 914:9, 889:4, 895:16, 952:14, 953:1,
886:19, 886:25, 947:3
917:3, 937:16 900:7, 900:20, 953:17
887:3, 887:6, 887:9, Dated [1] - 967:8
Continued [1] - 832:14 920:8, 920:11, criminal [8] - 849:3,
887:11, 887:19, daughter [10] -
continuing [4] - 922:19, 926:10, 849:4, 868:12,
887:25, 888:4, 887:21, 887:22,
891:19, 934:14, 927:15, 943:13, 868:16, 870:20,
888:7, 888:16, 888:20, 888:22,
934:15, 934:16 950:17, 963:15 880:4, 950:1, 957:22
888:19, 888:23, 888:25, 889:14,
contractors [1] - 837:1 Counsel [8] - 831:9, Criminal [2] - 825:3,
889:4, 889:10, 890:10, 890:23,
controlled [1] - 960:21 905:3, 915:18, 827:3
891:12, 891:16, 891:6, 893:9
conversation [15] - 930:8, 948:22, critical [1] - 942:1
891:25, 892:2, daughter's [3] -
846:9, 846:10, 963:4, 965:17, 966:3 critically [2] - 849:8,
892:6, 893:1, 888:22, 889:13,
862:8, 865:17, COUNSEL'S [1] - 880:3
893:13, 894:9, 889:18
876:11, 899:3, 825:14 criticize [1] - 942:7
905:3, 908:10, daughters [1] - 893:25
899:10, 903:16, counsel's [2] - 829:13, criticized [2] - 940:9,
912:25, 913:18, Dave [3] - 883:11,
903:18, 914:20, 872:7 942:11
918:5, 919:10, 883:18, 883:19
929:22, 934:14, counsels [3] - 870:19, cross [3] - 965:19,
930:8, 930:10, day-to-day [5] -
934:15, 934:16, 872:14, 874:1 965:22, 965:25
938:19, 939:6, 871:25, 872:6,
962:25 counterintelligence CRR [3] - 825:21,
947:25, 948:4, 908:17, 920:15,
conversations [6] - [17] - 849:3, 849:5, 967:3, 967:10
948:7, 948:10, 920:24
884:7, 936:21, 851:16, 852:24, culture [1] - 852:3
948:18, 949:2, days [9] - 849:10,
936:25, 960:3, 852:25, 853:10, current [1] - 886:15
949:21, 950:3, 885:3, 910:23,
960:5, 962:21 853:11, 853:13, custody [6] - 877:4,
950:16, 959:21, 919:16, 925:18,
conveyed [3] - 846:5, 853:15, 853:16, 877:6, 877:7,
963:15, 963:18, 925:20, 944:19,
901:12, 903:18 853:17, 860:13, 877:15, 877:25,
964:2, 964:13, 944:21
conveying [1] - 898:10 872:2, 880:11, 878:5
883:16, 905:10, 964:17, 964:20, DC [3] - 825:15,
convinced [1] - 915:6 cyber [30] - 841:12,
905:11 965:3, 965:11, 825:23, 967:13
COOPER [1] - 825:10 843:15, 843:23,
counterterrorism [3] - 965:15, 965:20, dead [1] - 956:12
cooperation [3] - 843:25, 844:2,
851:16, 853:13, 966:1, 966:11, deal [6] - 830:25,
830:23, 831:1 844:17, 845:17,
870:23, 900:6,
973
915:19, 963:3, 966:2 942:20, 946:20, details [3] - 906:1, 926:24, 928:16, 892:18
dealing [1] - 859:19 956:14 906:9, 906:13 929:13, 929:24 doubting [1] - 959:12
December [2] - degrees [1] - 860:21 determine [2] - discounted [1] - 952:8 down [15] - 853:5,
834:24, 936:23 delay [1] - 896:24 847:13, 957:20 discovery [1] - 964:10 862:16, 868:14,
decide [1] - 903:20 delayed [1] - 906:14 Devaney [2] - 942:25, discretion [1] - 828:15 874:18, 877:2,
decided [1] - 956:12 deliberate [1] - 827:21 943:5 discuss [4] - 848:20, 896:13, 910:19,
deciding [1] - 920:16 Democrat [1] - 952:6 Devaney's [1] - 944:10 874:4, 906:4, 906:24 912:7, 945:13,
decision [3] - 827:24, Democratic [2] - device [1] - 850:16 discussed [9] - 855:7, 945:16, 958:3,
827:25, 894:15 858:15, 952:1 devoting [1] - 855:3 876:4, 876:7, 891:6, 958:4, 961:7, 964:2
declassification [1] - deny [2] - 828:19, different [23] - 836:16, 891:12, 905:24, download [2] -
964:21 893:13 836:24, 837:1, 912:8, 949:7, 949:11 834:11, 835:2
deeply [1] - 962:24 depart [1] - 929:6 837:2, 837:3, discussing [6] - 830:2, downloaded [3] -
default [1] - 828:9 Department [9] - 848:12, 854:18, 896:6, 932:20, 834:4, 834:8, 834:25
Defendant [2] - 825:7, 851:18, 856:13, 858:24, 859:1, 940:2, 945:10, 956:4 dragged [1] - 945:9
825:16 909:1, 952:24, 881:8, 881:9, discussion [3] - drilled [1] - 946:19
defense [7] - 828:13, 957:10, 957:12, 885:14, 888:10, 857:24, 942:16, drive [4] - 850:15,
828:23, 829:13, 957:13, 957:16, 928:14, 935:2, 964:14 850:16, 960:15,
830:9, 830:14, 957:21 935:4, 935:21, discussions [5] - 961:14
833:9, 965:19 department [1] - 942:15, 946:12, 887:16, 912:13, drives [2] - 850:9,
defense's [1] - 828:20 957:23 946:18 916:13, 942:10, 850:21
defer [1] - 965:13 deputies [7] - 872:7, difficult [2] - 889:8, 963:21 drop [1] - 868:13
DeFilippis [69] - 872:18, 873:20, 943:11 dismissed [1] - 956:11 duration [1] - 901:3
825:12, 827:9, 873:24, 874:5, digit [1] - 900:17 distribution [1] - Durham [4] - 827:9,
828:5, 829:23, 874:9, 874:18 digital [1] - 850:16 927:24 833:20, 965:17
830:1, 830:17, Deputies [1] - 873:18 dinner [1] - 890:15 DISTRICT [3] - 825:1, during [16] - 829:7,
831:10, 832:7, deputy [15] - 856:12, dinners [1] - 890:14 825:1, 825:10 849:22, 849:25,
832:12, 832:15, 870:19, 871:4, dire [1] - 889:12 division [9] - 852:24, 850:3, 850:22,
832:22, 835:9, 872:14, 874:1, DIRECT [1] - 832:14 852:25, 853:10, 859:3, 929:23,
838:23, 842:2, 874:4, 876:15, direct [9] - 830:20, 853:12, 860:13, 933:15, 936:21,
861:21, 864:19, 876:16, 878:11, 881:10, 886:6, 868:12, 868:16, 936:24, 939:25,
873:11, 874:13, 883:14, 883:20, 900:8, 900:12, 880:11, 950:2 940:6, 940:7, 941:2,
874:24, 882:18, 905:14, 905:18, 921:10, 933:3, Division [2] - 856:13, 946:9, 955:23
886:1, 886:6, 907:8, 921:9 961:10, 965:25 856:16
886:18, 886:20, Deputy [1] - 883:9 direction [1] - 898:15 DNC [17] - 858:10, E
886:23, 887:1, DEPUTY [3] - 827:2, directly [5] - 840:5, 859:4, 863:5,
early [4] - 868:2,
887:5, 887:7, 892:5, 905:1 896:23, 909:6, 863:10, 863:18,
899:25, 900:5,
887:10, 894:12, describe [7] - 836:13, 917:20, 925:5 943:15, 943:23,
936:23
894:20, 894:24, 840:12, 877:8, Director [2] - 883:9, 950:11, 950:25,
897:4, 897:11, 951:10, 954:5, ease [1] - 949:1
960:4, 961:23, 883:10
900:10, 904:24, 954:11, 954:20, easier [1] - 836:17
962:17, 962:21 director [26] - 839:17,
905:4, 908:7, 913:2, 954:24, 955:20, easy [1] - 862:10
described [13] - 836:1, 852:25, 853:11,
919:9, 923:11, 841:10, 843:10, 956:19, 956:22 EDGAR [1] - 825:13
853:15, 860:12,
930:11, 932:18, 859:22, 861:19, document [5] - editor [1] - 944:10
870:15, 876:15,
933:5, 938:19, 878:9, 881:21, 876:16, 876:20, 838:17, 874:14, editorial [1] - 942:21
939:2, 939:8, 924:1, 944:16, 883:14, 883:15, 874:16, 877:25, effect [1] - 916:19
941:16, 947:14, 955:5, 960:18, 883:20, 905:8, 878:14 efficiency [2] - 830:6,
947:20, 948:2, 960:21, 961:16 905:10, 905:11, documents [1] - 830:18
948:6, 948:9, describing [2] - 905:13, 905:15, 922:17 efficient [1] - 957:16
948:23, 948:25, 849:18, 914:6 905:18, 907:8, DOJ [8] - 856:25, effort [4] - 846:14,
949:4, 950:6, 950:7, desk [8] - 840:15, 915:18, 921:9, 864:2, 864:4, 864:5, 854:9, 934:18, 937:7
950:18, 950:21, 855:15, 860:8, 930:3, 930:4 864:6, 957:7, 957:24 efforts [4] - 847:10,
950:23, 954:1, 895:6, 895:24, disappear [3] - 848:9, DOJ's [1] - 957:4 853:17, 853:22,
959:16, 959:22, 902:17, 902:18, 866:20, 866:22 Donald [5] - 939:15, 934:23
963:16, 965:11, 903:5 disclose [4] - 884:12, 939:16, 940:24, eight [1] - 890:21
965:13, 966:7, destination [2] - 914:17, 929:3, 930:2 955:13, 960:20 eights [1] - 890:22
966:14 846:15, 847:2 disclosed [6] - 881:2, done [6] - 848:12, either [18] - 843:18,
DeFilippis)................. detail [9] - 836:14, 888:15, 927:10, 877:15, 885:11, 845:4, 878:10,
............. [1] - 826:4 850:24, 876:4, 928:22, 929:20, 952:3, 957:13, 881:12, 888:8,
degree [6] - 860:18, 876:6, 921:2, 942:3, 940:5 958:25 891:9, 904:1, 904:4,
914:19, 915:24, 942:6, 943:8, 943:9 disclosure [4] - doubt [2] - 889:23, 915:2, 918:13,
974
943:14, 943:23, entered [1] - 886:2 exact [1] - 954:16 946:2, 958:20 844:6, 844:8, 856:3,
948:6, 951:21, enters [2] - 832:2, exactly [7] - 833:11, expert [7] - 843:25, 860:2, 860:3,
953:1, 961:7, 965:5, 894:8 904:2, 921:22, 858:19, 868:15, 868:11, 877:3,
965:12 entirety [1] - 958:18 954:19, 958:9, 868:16, 910:2, 895:2, 915:19
election [1] - 960:4 entities [2] - 841:14, 959:10 915:25, 965:14 familiarity [1] - 868:10
electronic [5] - 846:3 EXAMINATION [1] - experts [19] - 843:16, family [2] - 888:24,
838:20, 838:21, entity [1] - 868:1 832:14 844:3, 844:17, 891:15
841:2, 853:23, entry [2] - 840:20, example [2] - 837:8, 845:17, 845:20, far [1] - 838:10
960:25 886:8 854:2 857:4, 865:3, 899:4, father [1] - 889:19
element [1] - 917:23 entryway [1] - 840:19 excerpt [1] - 948:5 899:9, 923:20, FBI [113] - 836:14,
elements [2] - 916:7, ephemeral [1] - exchange [6] - 835:4, 924:5, 924:7, 924:9, 836:16, 836:19,
965:18 866:20 835:7, 899:15, 924:10, 960:19, 836:25, 837:15,
elicit [3] - 939:1, Eric [11] - 903:14, 899:19, 941:17, 961:17, 962:9, 963:1 837:25, 838:19,
939:3, 939:4 904:1, 904:3, 955:23 explain [11] - 841:5, 838:20, 839:10,
elicited [1] - 828:13 905:25, 906:11, exchanges [2] - 856:22, 856:24, 839:12, 839:16,
elsewhere [1] - 909:2 910:18, 911:8, 897:15, 899:23 857:10, 858:2, 839:20, 839:22,
email [18] - 882:15, 911:13, 914:1, excuse [5] - 846:10, 858:20, 863:15, 844:23, 848:10,
882:23, 882:25, 914:4, 925:4 868:5, 877:13, 908:14, 940:15, 849:2, 851:2,
884:9, 903:22, especially [2] - 849:4, 881:16, 919:22 941:20, 952:4 851:17, 851:22,
904:21, 904:22, 866:22 excused [1] - 889:8 explained [8] - 836:11, 852:3, 852:5, 852:9,
905:21, 907:7, ESQ [7] - 825:12, executive [5] - 838:21, 855:25, 856:2, 852:11, 852:23,
907:17, 907:18, 825:13, 825:13, 839:9, 840:20, 856:18, 856:19, 853:12, 853:17,
908:3, 908:11, 825:16, 825:17, 900:22, 902:4 860:1, 860:4 853:21, 854:13,
908:12, 909:22, 825:17, 825:18 executives [1] - explaining [2] - 854:24, 855:3,
910:7 essence [2] - 842:9, 839:18 856:19, 857:8 860:15, 868:7,
emails [5] - 833:22, 856:23 exercised [1] - 892:16 extent [10] - 828:20, 868:12, 869:3,
882:22, 883:2, essentially [4] - 830:7, exhibit [1] - 886:13 862:7, 866:9, 869:8, 869:9,
923:4, 928:10 857:16, 962:15, Exhibit [31] - 832:23, 875:22, 875:25, 870:22, 874:10,
embedded [2] - 965:1 838:14, 838:24, 914:13, 916:4, 876:13, 876:20,
882:22, 904:23 establish [1] - 863:24 842:3, 861:15, 918:6, 942:7, 963:8 879:21, 880:2,
employee [2] - 837:25, established [1] - 861:22, 865:4, extremely [1] - 946:1 880:3, 880:16,
852:12 848:15 873:4, 873:12, eye [1] - 941:13 881:16, 881:17,
employees [1] - estimate [1] - 869:19 877:22, 882:14, 882:8, 882:11,
836:25 estimating [1] - 882:19, 885:20, F 882:16, 883:17,
enables [2] - 836:21, 865:13 886:3, 894:19, 895:7, 895:8,
face [1] - 854:11 895:10, 895:12,
837:7 estimation [2] - 834:4, 894:21, 897:2,
facet [1] - 946:14 895:24, 896:25,
encompass [1] - 930:7 901:14, 902:13,
facility [1] - 840:18 898:15, 899:5,
871:12 etc [2] - 863:5, 863:18 904:20, 904:25,
fact [6] - 862:2, 900:7, 903:20,
encountered [2] - evening [2] - 897:23, 908:1, 908:8, 923:2,
893:18, 913:9, 903:23, 904:9,
917:10, 927:25 898:23 932:21, 936:19,
917:11, 918:2, 904:13, 905:7,
End [1] - 839:6 event [4] - 828:25, 941:6, 946:22,
929:15 908:19, 908:23,
end [16] - 841:23, 837:5, 872:5, 907:23 947:21, 958:12,
factors [1] - 915:22 908:24, 911:4,
876:11, 886:22, events [1] - 890:5 959:17
facts [2] - 926:1, 940:2 912:11, 913:4,
912:13, 922:24, eventually [10] - exist [1] - 866:21
fades [1] - 875:9 913:20, 915:17,
925:11, 932:17, 870:4, 870:5, existence [2] - 848:10,
915:5 fair [10] - 859:15, 915:18, 916:4,
936:16, 937:1, 877:17, 878:6,
exits [3] - 887:18, 888:11, 891:17, 916:7, 916:19,
937:10, 938:12, 902:9, 921:14,
892:19, 893:4, 917:9, 917:12,
939:7, 943:10, 921:16, 934:25, 892:1, 964:1
893:10, 893:22, 917:18, 917:21,
943:21, 956:13, 935:21, 936:9 expand [1] - 880:12
933:19, 948:13, 918:2, 918:7, 920:8,
957:19 evidence [21] - 860:8, expect [4] - 830:10,
948:22 920:12, 920:20,
ended [2] - 850:20, 877:8, 877:12, 843:1, 897:24, 966:9
fairly [6] - 846:16, 921:25, 922:15,
934:25 878:2, 878:15, expected [1] - 885:8
894:2, 903:8, 922:19, 922:24,
ends [1] - 908:3 881:18, 920:17, experience [17] -
914:19, 918:13, 924:12, 926:7,
enforcement [1] - 922:16, 949:7, 848:5, 856:25,
927:20 926:8, 926:9,
851:16 949:11, 951:9, 857:1, 860:16,
fall [1] - 920:8 926:10, 926:18,
enforcing [1] - 880:4 951:15, 952:13, 866:15, 885:12,
falling [1] - 871:8 927:2, 927:4, 927:6,
engaged [2] - 883:18, 952:22, 953:1, 885:22, 915:21,
false [3] - 942:14, 927:11, 927:15,
945:18 953:8, 953:17, 916:3, 916:12,
944:25, 945:23 927:19, 930:3,
engineering [1] - 954:23, 960:15, 918:6, 918:10,
familiar [11] - 837:9, 932:22, 943:13,
843:24 961:13 926:16, 945:4,
975
945:18, 951:20, 878:8, 881:25, 922:20 870:14, 870:17, 927:11, 929:2,

952:10, 956:9, 883:2, 886:7, 886:8, format [1] - 946:3 870:19, 872:7, 929:20, 940:20,
963:3, 963:4 889:17, 893:3, former [3] - 864:2, 872:14, 874:1, 947:21, 959:16
FBI's [15] - 852:10, 894:14, 897:12, 864:6, 920:22 882:3, 895:16, Government [26] -
896:21, 911:23, 899:10, 900:3, forth [1] - 837:24 900:7, 900:20, 832:23, 838:24,
915:11, 918:11, 900:12, 909:14, forward [7] - 879:22, 920:8, 920:11, 861:14, 861:22,
919:19, 919:21, 911:1, 918:12, 904:14, 907:24, 922:19, 926:10, 865:4, 873:12,
919:23, 926:20, 919:15, 934:19, 922:9, 933:4, 927:15, 942:10, 877:22, 882:13,
939:25, 940:23, 940:10, 941:25, 934:14, 953:16 943:13, 952:23, 882:19, 885:20,
941:2, 944:16, 942:7, 945:10, Foundation [2] - 957:5 886:3, 894:19,
953:20, 955:12 946:16, 947:2, 863:5, 863:14 General [9] - 856:12, 894:21, 897:2,
federation [1] - 882:11 947:11 foundation [7] - 830:7, 915:18, 920:13, 901:14, 902:13,
Federation [3] - 854:8, five [2] - 869:21, 863:10, 863:13, 953:19, 957:4, 904:19, 904:25,
854:9, 854:15 887:13 863:18, 912:23, 957:7, 957:9, 908:1, 923:2,
feelings [2] - 937:3, flag [2] - 829:3, 829:14 913:16, 919:7 957:25, 963:4 932:21, 941:6,
937:13 flipped [1] - 850:23 four [5] - 868:24, General's [1] - 852:8 946:22, 947:21,
felt [2] - 945:2, 945:9 floor [8] - 832:7, 901:4, 901:5, 957:1 general's [1] - 958:21 958:11, 959:17
few [10] - 829:3, 833:4, 839:12, 839:14, fours [1] - 890:22 generally [13] - 858:9, government's [2] -
849:10, 889:21, 839:15, 839:17, frames [1] - 950:3 875:10, 876:23, 828:10, 893:14
889:24, 896:1, 839:19, 877:1, 877:2 frankly [1] - 910:16 895:11, 895:12, Government's [3] -
901:16, 906:4, fly [1] - 831:1 fraud [1] - 957:20 896:4, 898:9, 838:13, 842:3, 873:4
906:24, 933:3 focus [2] - 929:1, frequency [1] - 921:2 937:12, 937:14, great [8] - 830:22,
fides [1] - 863:24 959:17 frequent [2] - 836:20, 939:9, 939:11, 869:6, 876:3,
field [5] - 844:3, focused [2] - 855:1, 874:12 966:3, 966:7 881:23, 933:13,
844:17, 848:6, 943:16 Friday [3] - 866:4, generated [1] - 927:10 934:13, 963:17
866:15, 920:18 focusing [2] - 897:5, 866:8, 875:7 genius [1] - 868:17 greater [1] - 946:19
figure [8] - 849:11, 956:18 friend [3] - 842:17, gentlemen [3] - Group [2] - 943:15,
851:20, 867:2, folks [12] - 836:25, 844:5, 939:19 887:11, 948:18, 943:24
868:7, 884:19, 844:23, 872:15, friends [5] - 894:1, 963:19 group [3] - 867:13,
884:22, 928:14, 877:14, 878:11, 911:16, 932:25, girl [1] - 889:18 875:5, 907:6
954:19 880:3, 880:6, 945:20, 945:21 girls [4] - 889:25, groups [1] - 874:9
figured [1] - 935:16 883:13, 903:23, front [5] - 945:15, 890:16, 890:17, guess [8] - 828:9,
figuring [1] - 885:7 935:3, 935:4, 935:5 946:3, 949:19, 890:25 895:12, 906:22,
file [3] - 922:2, 922:4, follow [4] - 884:3, 958:13 gist [1] - 855:22 914:13, 920:5,
922:16 891:20, 895:10, frustrated [1] - 914:19 given [13] - 845:18, 951:24, 957:19,
fill [1] - 878:5 920:16 full [9] - 874:14, 845:20, 845:23, 964:9
filled [4] - 888:1, follow-up [1] - 884:3 945:13, 948:2, 852:19, 879:7, guessing [2] - 865:13,
888:8, 893:7, 893:18 following [6] - 836:5, 948:4, 948:7, 949:1, 879:14, 880:9, 865:14
filling [1] - 892:13 886:10, 897:5, 949:2, 952:11, 967:5 884:25, 902:23, guidelines [4] - 852:8,
final [1] - 922:25 920:13, 930:12, fully [3] - 915:16, 919:25, 925:9, 852:11, 920:14,
finally [3] - 868:20, 938:21 917:8, 953:19 939:1, 965:25 953:20
905:14, 910:7 food [1] - 890:13 functioning [1] - global [1] - 853:21 gun [2] - 860:25, 861:1
findings [1] - 965:9 FOR [1] - 825:1 957:11 goal [2] - 911:24, guy [5] - 856:24,
fine [1] - 948:23 force [2] - 923:22, furthermore [1] - 911:25 858:3, 868:17,
finish [1] - 867:24 924:17 852:7 govern [1] - 852:9 868:19, 898:25
firm [13] - 856:3, foregoing [1] - 967:4 future [1] - 944:11 government [35] - guys [2] - 849:5,
933:24, 933:25, foreign [8] - 853:18, FYI [1] - 933:12 833:8, 833:15, 911:16
935:4, 935:17, 853:19, 860:9, FYI...... [1] - 910:12 835:3, 838:23,
936:22, 937:7, 867:12, 867:14, 843:3, 854:8, H
937:12, 937:14, 867:15, 868:24 854:19, 854:23,
G 861:21, 861:25, hack [1] - 858:15
950:11, 950:25, Foreign [2] - 854:2,
gap [1] - 910:24 867:13, 867:14, hacks [1] - 858:10
954:5 867:11
gates [1] - 836:22 867:15, 873:11, half [3] - 850:6,
firms [2] - 934:8, forget [1] - 914:22
gather [1] - 915:22 877:9, 877:11, 922:14, 957:2
934:22 forgot [1] - 956:13
gathered [5] - 844:14, 878:21, 882:10, half-an-inch [1] -
first [36] - 829:7, form [4] - 878:25,
844:20, 846:9, 882:18, 885:12, 850:6
829:8, 831:6, 833:2, 879:4, 949:24,
846:10, 865:22 885:13, 886:3, hallway [3] - 877:2,
833:12, 834:1, 960:12
gatherings [1] - 890:8 892:15, 904:24, 945:13, 945:16
835:12, 835:22, formal [2] - 922:16,
general [22] - 868:10, 908:7, 909:2, 916:8, hand [2] - 923:22,
853:2, 855:12, 936:18
870:10, 870:11, 916:14, 927:9, 924:18
855:25, 862:12, formally [2] - 921:25,
976
handed [1] - 850:21 helpful [1] - 949:10 893:12, 904:24, imessages [1] - information [74] -
handing [1] - 941:8 helping [1] - 852:14 918:4, 919:9, 833:25 839:3, 840:17,
handled [6] - 830:25, hereby [1] - 967:3 938:24, 939:2, immediately [2] - 840:18, 841:7,
872:1, 872:2, 877:8, HGOR [1] - 940:20 947:20, 947:22, 852:21, 961:6 842:23, 843:2,
877:10, 877:11 hide [1] - 893:6 948:2, 948:6, impact [1] - 869:11 844:14, 844:20,
handles [1] - 908:25 high [9] - 835:23, 948:23, 950:22, impartial [4] - 891:17, 845:9, 845:10,
handling [1] - 878:15 855:2, 856:14, 959:16, 959:20, 891:20, 893:5, 845:12, 845:23,
hands [3] - 953:8, 865:19, 878:11, 963:16, 965:7, 893:10 847:22, 848:22,
953:9, 961:8 882:11, 916:14, 965:13, 965:16, impartiality [1] - 850:10, 850:12,
handwriting [2] - 961:24 965:24, 966:8, 893:16 852:6, 852:7,
862:9, 875:2 high-ranking [1] - 966:14 impeaching [2] - 852:12, 853:13,
hanged [1] - 940:12 856:14 HONORABLE [1] - 830:19, 949:18 857:3, 857:17,
happy [3] - 830:14, highest [2] - 852:23, 825:10 impeachment [3] - 860:9, 864:24,
831:21, 910:3 853:12 honorable [1] - 942:22 947:24, 948:15, 866:10, 879:19,
hard [4] - 847:12, highest-ranking [2] - Hope [3] - 944:9, 949:19 879:22, 880:8,
850:21, 878:18, 852:23, 853:12 947:6, 947:7 implicated [1] - 830:24 880:10, 880:16,
898:11 highlight [2] - 828:22, hoped [2] - 898:15 implied [1] - 951:25 880:19, 881:24,
harder [7] - 846:20, 894:25 hoping [1] - 897:25 importance [3] - 888:1, 903:19,
848:10, 848:15, highly [3] - 865:20, hospital [5] - 846:8, 857:2, 859:18, 912:9, 914:23,
849:11, 866:24, 940:9, 941:25 867:19, 867:21, 882:11 915:22, 917:13,
867:2, 868:7 Hillary [10] - 858:16, 868:3, 868:4 important [5] - 835:25, 917:16, 919:20,
HARDWICK [1] - 859:8, 863:12, hostile [1] - 853:18 849:8, 880:2, 880:4, 919:21, 919:23,
825:18 950:12, 951:1, hour [3] - 907:13, 880:20 921:1, 926:6,
harm [1] - 853:20 951:10, 952:2, 963:24, 966:10 imprecise [1] - 963:12 926:12, 926:17,
hated [1] - 860:7 954:5, 956:19, hours [1] - 957:2 impression [4] - 926:22, 927:9,
956:22 House [1] - 939:24 842:15, 843:6, 927:13, 927:17,
head [9] - 852:22,
Hinen [1] - 862:16 house [5] - 890:15, 845:17, 845:22 927:20, 927:23,
852:24, 853:9,
HINEN [1] - 856:9 934:22, 940:20, improper [7] - 851:17, 928:7, 928:8,
856:15, 880:10,
944:14, 950:17 851:18, 945:18, 928:11, 928:21,
883:17, 903:25, Hinnen [2] - 856:6,
human [4] - 857:16, 952:3, 952:5, 953:6, 929:3, 929:8,
923:7 862:16
857:17, 880:1, 881:5 953:18 929:14, 929:19,
header [2] - 946:23, hold [10] - 831:5,
929:24, 930:2,
958:13 884:16, 884:24, improperly [1] -
930:6, 940:6,
headhunter [2] - 885:8, 885:12, I 945:22
951:18, 951:20,
935:10, 935:17 910:19, 911:25, impropriety [1] -
iCloud [4] - 834:4, 952:7, 956:10,
heading [1] - 874:18 912:17, 916:8, 930:8 953:14
834:6, 834:7, 834:22 960:5, 960:14,
headquarters [6] - holding [1] - 938:8 IN [1] - 825:1
ID [2] - 836:21, 837:5 961:4, 961:5, 961:13
836:20, 839:12, home [1] - 886:14 in-house [1] - 934:22
idea [13] - 830:11, informed [5] - 881:12,
839:22, 895:10, honest [1] - 921:19 in-person [1] - 853:6
842:25, 851:7, 906:3, 906:23,
895:12, 920:19 honestly [2] - 955:10, inaccurate [4] - 962:1,
851:13, 851:19, 907:1, 966:12
Health [6] - 846:8, 956:11 962:12, 962:16,
852:13, 873:20, informing [1] - 918:21
846:13, 859:24, honing [1] - 956:15 963:11
884:10, 899:4, initial [3] - 913:12,
867:21, 868:1, 868:7 Honor [59] - 827:2, inappropriate [3] -
922:21, 934:5, 913:14, 936:20
health [1] - 846:9 827:5, 827:11, 951:17, 951:19,
938:14, 944:12 Initial [1] - 878:19
hear [2] - 851:8, 827:19, 828:3, 951:22
ideal [2] - 897:22, initiate [2] - 927:4,
925:25 828:7, 828:10, inch [1] - 850:6
898:23 927:6
heard [5] - 827:18, 828:12, 828:18, included [2] - 892:14,
identified [2] - 844:24, injury [1] - 857:6
844:6, 847:25, 829:2, 829:4, 908:20
856:1 innocent [3] - 846:18,
922:23, 963:14 829:15, 829:25, including [4] - 853:15,
identify [1] - 843:16 846:19
hearing [3] - 886:11, 830:1, 830:5, 930:4, 934:8, 957:13
identity [16] - 879:24, inquired [1] - 934:9
930:13, 938:22 830:16, 831:3, incoming [2] - 902:22,
880:1, 880:8, inquiries [2] - 908:21,
held [8] - 850:23, 831:10, 831:14, 902:23
880:23, 881:2, 940:14
855:15, 883:13, 831:19, 831:24, Incoming [1] - 896:2
896:11, 898:12, inquiry [1] - 955:17
886:11, 930:13, 832:12, 838:23, inconsistency [1] -
898:17, 898:20, inside [2] - 935:17,
938:22, 946:5 861:21, 873:11, 948:20
899:5, 902:8, 937:6
HELD [1] - 825:10 873:14, 882:18, inconsistent [2] -
902:10, 903:12, Inspector [4] - 957:4,
hello [1] - 891:5 882:20, 886:1, 875:11, 959:20
903:24, 906:20 957:7, 957:9, 957:25
help [7] - 833:8, 836:9, 886:12, 886:23, indeed [1] - 953:18
imagine [1] - 874:10 inspector [2] - 957:5,
842:20, 843:3, 887:1, 887:7, 889:5, independent [2] -
imbue [1] - 858:6 958:21
853:25, 861:11, 889:7, 892:8, 957:10, 963:23
892:12, 893:2, iMessage [1] - 834:12 instance [4] - 916:16,
880:3 Individual [1] - 878:20
977
940:19, 959:11, 944:24, 946:9, 922:10 964:15, 964:23 868:4, 910:13,

961:25 947:1, 958:22, investigatively [1] - JUDGE [1] - 825:10 938:4, 941:7,
institute [1] - 935:25 958:24, 959:14, 910:12 judge [2] - 831:11, 941:19, 956:11,
Institute [4] - 936:5, 962:8 investigators [3] - 949:17 956:13
936:7, 936:9, 936:23 interviewed [11] - 928:3, 941:4, 958:2 judiciary [1] - 940:19 knowing [3] - 843:1,
instruction [3] - 927:16, 928:18, invite [1] - 839:3 July [2] - 959:2, 851:14, 869:12
828:16, 829:9, 928:20, 939:23, involved [8] - 854:6, 959:13 knowledge [4] -
948:11 954:14, 957:4, 889:19, 916:13, Juror [3] - 887:14, 880:12, 880:13,
instructions [1] - 957:5, 958:8, 959:8, 920:24, 929:13, 893:14, 894:6 923:23, 924:25
891:21 959:9, 959:12 939:14, 939:16, juror [6] - 889:11, known [5] - 845:8,
intelligence [6] - interviews [6] - 935:1, 940:16 891:19, 892:1, 880:21, 888:7,
837:2, 853:18, 937:9, 955:12, involves [1] - 866:22 892:10, 893:10, 888:15, 892:12
860:9, 930:4, 930:5, 958:25, 959:9, involving [1] - 909:2 893:21 knows [1] - 892:20
940:21 959:10 iPhone [1] - 833:14 JUROR [16] - 887:24, Kori [1] - 827:9
Intelligence [1] - 854:2 introduction [1] - issue [11] - 830:23, 888:2, 888:6, Kortan [17] - 883:10,
intend [3] - 939:2, 841:25 831:7, 884:3, 884:4, 888:14, 888:18, 883:17, 903:25,
939:4, 964:25 investigate [11] - 893:5, 896:6, 903:9, 888:21, 888:25, 904:2, 905:12,
intended [4] - 853:25, 848:10, 849:2, 909:2, 964:4, 889:16, 890:2, 908:4, 908:5,
854:1, 877:7, 957:11 849:7, 857:25, 964:10, 966:1 890:6, 890:9, 908:12, 908:14,
intends [1] - 938:25 868:18, 869:8, issues [6] - 830:24, 890:22, 891:4, 909:8, 909:17,
intent [1] - 847:23 884:15, 912:2, 831:2, 941:12, 891:7, 891:14, 910:7, 910:11,
interact [3] - 837:18, 913:8, 915:16, 947:25, 958:1, 891:22 910:15, 911:6,
908:24, 909:5 927:14 963:22 jurors [1] - 891:17 926:6, 929:23
interacted [2] - investigated [2] - itself [2] - 827:21, JURY [1] - 825:9 KORTAN [1] - 883:10
855:17, 933:20 927:22, 956:9 945:4 jury [34] - 829:8, Kremlin [4] - 841:10,
interacting [2] - 872:6, investigating [16] - IV [1] - 825:13 830:5, 830:13, 854:7, 867:19,
908:20 854:14, 858:16, 831:4, 831:18, 960:22
interaction [4] - 882:8, 884:21, J 832:2, 832:25,
855:10, 946:17, 912:11, 916:21, 833:11, 836:13, L
917:12, 917:15, JAMES [2] - 826:3, 853:14, 862:12,
956:4, 961:24
917:18, 917:22, 832:13 lack [1] - 935:12
interactions [9] - 865:16, 874:14,
929:2, 940:23, James [2] - 876:21, 875:1, 886:11, ladies [3] - 887:11,
854:19, 871:25,
941:4, 950:17, 958:2 943:13 886:19, 887:18, 948:18, 963:19
874:7, 876:22,
investigation [37] - Jenkins [1] - 831:24 891:10, 892:25, Landau [2] - 843:23,
882:9, 911:17,
854:16, 854:22, Jim [7] - 884:11, 894:8, 897:19, 865:14
916:4, 960:16,
855:4, 855:6, 855:9, 897:21, 906:7, 905:6, 905:20, large [1] - 894:2
961:15
869:4, 869:11, 907:18, 923:19, 907:17, 908:14, larger [1] - 840:22
interacts [1] - 908:25
879:18, 881:17, 925:25, 933:12 930:13, 938:22, last [13] - 827:17,
interest [2] - 852:15,
884:18, 896:25, job [15] - 908:18, 940:15, 941:20, 841:16, 861:3,
916:22
916:5, 916:18, 908:19, 915:17, 947:16, 964:1, 865:15, 922:23,
interested [1] - 934:10
918:2, 920:24, 934:6, 934:24, 964:6, 966:4, 966:11 949:6, 949:11,
interesting [1] - 891:8
921:24, 921:25, 935:6, 935:7, jury's [1] - 896:20 950:10, 950:24,
intermediary [1] -
922:20, 922:23, 935:10, 935:20, Justice [8] - 851:18, 951:25, 953:22,
868:4
924:14, 927:5, 935:21, 935:23, 909:1, 952:24, 954:4, 959:25
internal [3] - 852:10,
927:7, 928:2, 929:1, 935:24, 936:22, 957:10, 957:12, lasted [1] - 852:16
929:20, 953:20
929:10, 929:11, 937:1 957:13, 957:16, LATHAM [1] - 825:18
internally [1] - 855:7
929:12, 929:16, jobs [3] - 934:8, 957:21 Law [2] - 943:15,
internationally [1] -
929:17, 939:25, 934:19, 934:21 Justice's [1] - 856:13 943:24
844:2
940:23, 941:3, John [4] - 827:9, law [11] - 849:4,
Internet [3] - 847:2,
955:13, 958:10, 942:25, 943:5, 851:16, 860:18,
847:13, 866:19 K
964:25, 965:9 944:10 860:21, 880:4,
interpretation [1] - keep [2] - 838:20,
investigations [7] - joined [1] - 827:8 920:13, 933:24,
951:24 894:5
849:4, 853:22, JONATHAN [1] - 933:25, 934:8,
interpreting [1] - keeping [1] - 941:13
868:12, 920:9, 825:13 934:21, 935:4
875:8 kept [1] - 834:9
920:12, 920:21, Jonathan [1] - 827:8 lawful [1] - 952:15
interrupt [1] - 856:11 kid's [1] - 911:20
957:12 journal [1] - 941:23 lawyer [13] - 851:22,
interview [15] - kids [1] - 911:18
investigative [7] - Journal [3] - 845:6, 854:24, 856:17,
928:13, 936:17,
852:9, 854:1, 866:4, 941:22 kind [12] - 833:12, 856:24, 857:6,
939:22, 940:1,
868:16, 870:20, Judge [5] - 894:11, 833:19, 836:12, 860:10, 860:17,
940:7, 944:13,
918:24, 920:1, 912:23, 919:7, 843:3, 857:18, 860:23, 871:24,
944:20, 944:23,
978
872:5, 880:22, 908:12, 909:8, 934:14, 934:19, material [23] - 831:20, 956:8, 958:15
881:1, 881:5 909:14, 909:22, 934:21, 936:19, 833:21, 834:8, meaning [6] - 847:10,
lawyers [4] - 858:23, 909:25, 910:18, 940:16, 940:22, 834:25, 844:25, 857:7, 878:20,
881:6, 963:3, 963:5 910:21, 911:8, 941:2, 944:16, 845:21, 857:7, 898:16, 910:2, 921:4
lead [1] - 952:2 911:10, 912:4, 955:2, 957:19, 858:1, 858:3, means [14] - 865:8,
leaders [1] - 884:8 913:4, 914:1, 914:7, 957:25, 958:13 859:19, 860:7, 865:12, 866:2,
leadership [7] - 914:8, 916:13, looks [31] - 838:17, 860:11, 878:12, 866:4, 866:6,
839:20, 854:8, 916:24, 923:4, 847:9, 862:15, 878:20, 878:23, 867:12, 867:14,
870:9, 870:13, 925:5, 925:9, 925:14 867:19, 874:19, 880:9, 884:13, 867:22, 867:25,
885:9, 903:23, life [1] - 885:22 875:3, 875:7, 913:6, 915:4, 915:8, 868:23, 873:18,
926:20 likely [2] - 848:8, 885:23, 885:25, 915:9, 964:8 924:11, 938:14
leading [2] - 918:4, 900:22 899:22, 899:24, materials [19] - meant [4] - 899:9,
937:7 limit [1] - 927:24 900:13, 901:15, 840:10, 841:2, 924:9, 925:3, 944:12
leads [1] - 920:16 limited [1] - 959:18 902:14, 902:25, 848:2, 850:21, mechanism [1] - 925:6
leak [7] - 926:23, line [11] - 839:2, 907:12, 909:21, 851:23, 855:14, media [13] - 841:3,
927:2, 927:4, 927:6, 862:17, 864:8, 909:22, 909:24, 855:15, 855:20, 844:25, 847:15,
928:2, 928:4, 964:24 867:16, 868:14, 923:21, 923:24, 869:15, 869:24, 867:9, 887:17,
leaked [4] - 855:9, 871:2, 873:17, 924:16, 925:2, 877:16, 878:8, 894:16, 903:9,
926:22, 927:13, 883:4, 943:25, 925:16, 933:6, 879:1, 879:7, 879:8, 911:7, 915:25,
928:9 955:17, 959:23 934:12, 937:18, 879:14, 918:22, 923:22, 924:17,
leaks [1] - 927:17 lines [2] - 852:5, 937:20, 941:22, 925:9, 925:14 945:11, 963:22
learn [3] - 906:16, 937:25 947:1 Matt [3] - 843:25, meet [6] - 836:3,
916:21, 926:21 link [1] - 937:20 lost [1] - 951:4 844:10, 865:11 836:4, 840:5,
learned [7] - 852:19, LISA [1] - 967:3 lower [2] - 865:25, matter [23] - 829:14, 851:20, 917:4,
880:21, 881:13, Lisa [1] - 825:21 874:25 833:3, 843:1, 848:4, 960:12
893:20, 906:17, list [3] - 877:13, lunch [3] - 963:20, 848:5, 851:12, meeting [100] - 830:3,
954:12, 954:19 927:25 966:15, 966:16 869:6, 871:15, 835:13, 838:7,
learning [2] - 899:4, listed [1] - 885:24 lunchtime [1] - 836:7 871:18, 872:4, 839:8, 840:2,
899:5 listened [1] - 961:5 874:3, 881:18, 840:13, 840:14,
least [7] - 846:12, literally [3] - 842:24, M 905:24, 909:6, 840:23, 840:24,
850:10, 856:4, 851:7, 945:12 915:11, 916:14, 841:4, 841:16,
M-c-C-A-B-E [1] - 922:1, 922:2, 922:5,
858:9, 860:2, literature [1] - 941:7 841:22, 841:23,
876:19 937:23, 944:15,
872:16, 916:15 litigation [2] - 870:21, 841:25, 842:7,
ma'am [1] - 887:19 951:20 842:9, 842:12,
leave [2] - 893:11, 870:23
maelstrom [1] - matters [14] - 854:25, 842:14, 843:5,
926:7 live [2] - 923:19,
945:10 861:5, 863:21, 848:2, 849:22,
leaves [2] - 923:24, 933:13
magnetometer [1] - 863:22, 870:20, 849:25, 850:3,
925:1 lived [1] - 946:2
837:9 870:22, 876:4, 850:20, 850:23,
left [9] - 832:18, 926:8, LLP [2] - 825:18, 943:1
magnified [1] - 942:19 876:6, 876:7, 881:8, 851:2, 851:3,
926:9, 932:22, located [1] - 839:23
magnify [1] - 835:10 908:20, 920:23, 852:16, 852:18,
933:16, 933:17, location [1] - 918:20
main [3] - 871:24, 940:2, 944:17 853:7, 859:3, 859:7,
934:5, 945:13 logs [1] - 922:16
872:5, 900:19 max [1] - 833:14 863:1, 864:24,
legal [3] - 877:7, look [8] - 833:16,
major [3] - 845:4, McCabe [9] - 876:17, 872:12, 872:16,
920:21, 936:9 833:20, 850:24,
845:8, 946:14 876:18, 876:19, 873:18, 873:20,
lengthier [1] - 869:19 861:10, 872:25,
majority [2] - 949:7, 881:11, 881:12, 873:24, 874:5,
lengthy [3] - 869:21, 897:12, 941:5,
949:11 883:10, 883:14, 874:11, 874:18,
944:21, 956:25 946:21
malicious [2] - 846:16, 905:14, 907:8 875:3, 875:11,
less [2] - 890:12, looked [10] - 833:22,
853:18 mean [28] - 837:8, 875:15, 875:18,
952:8 833:23, 835:1,
man [1] - 942:22 842:21, 843:20, 875:23, 876:1,
letter [5] - 935:8, 835:4, 835:15,
management [1] - 845:5, 851:10, 885:3, 885:5, 885:8,
935:25, 942:24, 841:12, 847:7,
957:14 858:18, 863:19, 889:2, 889:3,
943:22, 944:10 898:2, 958:1, 961:1
managing [1] - 942:25 864:12, 880:15, 896:12, 904:14,
level [3] - 828:17, looking [30] - 834:11,
March [3] - 830:3, 891:22, 898:24, 907:7, 907:9,
921:2, 961:24 835:8, 838:16,
830:10, 833:5 898:25, 899:8, 907:10, 907:23,
levels [3] - 916:14, 849:6, 849:7,
marked [4] - 861:14, 906:10, 907:1, 909:11, 909:14,
927:19, 945:3 861:10, 873:16,
885:19, 904:19, 907:5, 912:5, 909:20, 910:18,
Lichtblau [28] - 883:2, 885:21,
908:1 922:13, 924:7, 911:1, 911:2,
903:14, 904:3, 894:19, 895:18,
Maryland [1] - 911:20 924:18, 924:19, 911:10, 911:23,
904:14, 905:25, 897:14, 901:24,
mask [1] - 832:11 925:4, 934:5, 945:1, 912:15, 916:24,
906:11, 906:21, 909:13, 918:8,
matching [1] - 964:15 955:3, 955:19, 918:12, 918:13,
907:2, 907:23, 922:6, 934:6, 934:8,
979
918:17, 918:18, met [14] - 844:10, 837:3, 851:10, 967:10 947:22, 948:2,
919:6, 919:10, 874:8, 874:9, 851:11, 857:12, MORNING [1] - 825:6 948:6, 948:9,
919:12, 921:13, 890:16, 893:8, 860:18, 865:7, morning [12] - 827:5, 948:14, 948:23,
923:3, 923:4, 935:2, 899:14, 911:10, 869:8, 869:9, 827:6, 827:10, 948:24, 948:25,
935:3, 940:9, 942:8, 911:12, 911:14, 880:14, 883:25, 827:11, 827:14, 949:4, 949:17,
942:11, 942:15, 911:15, 935:5, 884:20, 884:21, 827:15, 829:6, 949:25, 950:6,
943:13, 944:3, 937:10, 960:14 892:21, 893:24, 832:16, 832:17, 950:7, 950:21,
945:11, 946:10, methodology [2] - 896:5, 898:25, 887:12, 900:3, 966:6 950:23, 954:1,
955:4, 955:9, 846:25, 847:12 902:18, 906:3, Moscow [1] - 867:17 959:16, 959:19,
956:11, 956:20, MI [1] - 867:21 906:23, 909:14, most [6] - 834:1, 959:22, 963:16,
956:22, 959:1, 962:2 Michael [78] - 827:4, 917:4, 917:15, 874:17, 880:2, 964:11, 964:14,
Meeting [1] - 839:4 827:12, 834:13, 917:23, 918:3, 914:5, 914:17, 920:5 964:19, 964:22,
meetings [11] - 872:8, 835:18, 835:23, 927:11, 928:4, motion [7] - 827:17, 965:7, 965:13,
872:9, 872:10, 835:25, 841:5, 928:9, 928:11, 827:18, 827:21, 965:16, 965:24,
872:11, 872:12, 843:1, 845:23, 929:2, 952:2, 827:24, 828:11, 966:7, 966:14
872:21, 904:13, 847:22, 851:4, 957:22, 963:16 828:20, 893:14 MS [16] - 827:5, 827:7,
904:16, 904:18, 851:9, 851:21, Mike [6] - 883:10, mouth [1] - 941:1 828:6, 828:9, 829:2,
910:21 855:25, 856:1, 883:16, 908:24, move [3] - 857:25, 829:6, 829:18,
members [6] - 888:24, 856:19, 856:22, 910:17, 911:6, 926:6 912:19, 962:18 829:23, 889:5,
894:2, 944:14, 856:23, 856:24, mind [10] - 861:11, moved [7] - 839:1, 889:13, 889:25,
945:7, 955:23, 857:5, 857:14, 881:5, 899:8, 899:9, 873:15, 882:21, 890:4, 890:7,
956:17 857:21, 857:22, 899:11, 902:7, 886:5, 892:15, 890:18, 891:2, 892:8
mention [5] - 844:19, 857:25, 858:14, 904:10, 930:1, 908:10, 959:21 Mtg [1] - 873:18
890:9, 899:19, 858:17, 858:25, 938:18, 956:12 moving [2] - 858:4, muddled [1] - 926:1
904:6, 955:24 859:18, 862:14, mine [2] - 842:17, 922:9 multiple [6] - 846:20,
mentioned [15] - 863:4, 863:9, 862:11 MR [101] - 827:11, 876:25, 909:3,
841:20, 872:7, 863:11, 863:24, minor [1] - 946:15 827:15, 827:19, 940:18, 945:3, 958:7
883:24, 889:1, 864:3, 864:4, minute [4] - 831:11, 828:2, 830:1, must [4] - 837:18,
889:17, 889:18, 865:18, 871:19, 902:2, 906:22, 830:16, 831:3, 899:25, 907:6, 907:7
891:8, 891:23, 879:18, 879:21, 915:17 831:10, 831:11, Myers [4] - 910:1,
921:7, 924:1, 881:21, 884:11, minutes [14] - 841:17, 831:14, 831:19, 911:9, 912:4, 913:5
940:13, 950:10, 885:25, 896:10, 841:19, 852:16, 831:23, 832:12, myers [4] - 911:11,
950:24, 953:23, 897:17, 902:3, 852:22, 869:22, 832:15, 832:22, 911:12, 914:2,
954:4 903:24, 906:18, 887:12, 887:13, 835:9, 838:23, 916:25
mere [1] - 952:5 924:14, 933:14, 901:4, 901:5, 838:25, 842:2,
message [44] - 832:24, 934:5, 934:25, 901:16, 902:21, 861:21, 861:23, N
833:3, 833:16, 935:3, 935:13, 906:4, 906:24, 864:19, 873:11,
834:17, 835:12, 936:21, 937:6, 963:24 name [12] - 833:24,
873:13, 874:13,
835:17, 835:22, 939:13, 941:13, miscommunication 836:7, 865:15,
874:24, 875:20,
835:24, 842:4, 941:25, 942:1, [1] - 935:17
871:4, 878:21,
882:18, 882:20,
842:5, 842:19, 942:8, 942:11, mistrial [3] - 828:11, 884:12, 889:3,
886:1, 886:4, 886:6,
848:17, 848:18, 942:22, 943:6, 828:18, 828:20 889:18, 901:12,
886:12, 886:18,
859:12, 863:1, 943:19, 945:10, 933:25, 938:25,
misunderstood [1] - 886:20, 886:21,
864:16, 864:17, 946:17, 949:12, 940:1
863:15 886:23, 887:1,
864:20, 864:21, 952:25, 955:11, named [6] - 843:17,
mode [3] - 853:3, 887:5, 887:7,
875:14, 883:6, 955:14, 956:5, 843:20, 843:23,
867:2, 867:25 887:10, 891:5,
897:3, 897:12, 960:3, 960:12, 843:25, 852:25,
moment [7] - 849:15, 891:11, 893:2,
897:19, 900:1, 960:13, 962:25, 856:6
855:16, 877:9, 894:12, 894:20,
901:15, 901:21, 963:11 894:24, 897:4, names [3] - 844:6,
877:10, 886:24,
901:24, 902:4, MICHAEL [2] - 825:6, 897:11, 900:10, 844:19, 844:20
943:6
903:2, 923:13, 825:17 904:24, 905:2, Natalie [1] - 827:12
Monday [2] - 888:5,
923:18, 925:18, Michael's [6] - 837:4, 888:9 905:4, 908:7, 908:9, NATALIE [1] - 825:18
925:23, 926:4, 842:17, 862:16, money [2] - 957:17, 912:23, 913:2, national [22] - 837:17,
933:9, 933:10, 898:25, 933:24, 957:18 913:16, 918:4, 852:14, 854:12,
937:19, 938:2, 934:4 919:7, 919:9, 856:5, 856:6,
month [2] - 922:14
938:3, 944:8, 947:6, Michigan [1] - 867:22 923:11, 930:11, 856:14, 856:16,
monthly [1] - 872:12
947:7, 962:3 middle [2] - 873:5, 932:18, 933:5, 856:25, 866:15,
months [3] - 833:4,
messages [4] - 961:12 938:23, 939:2, 870:24, 871:5,
861:3, 922:12
833:12, 833:16, might [35] - 830:13, 939:8, 941:16, 871:8, 871:25,
MOREIRA [1] - 967:3
834:13, 835:10 833:16, 835:20, 947:14, 947:20, 872:3, 874:2,
Moreira [2] - 825:21,
874:11, 915:21,
980
930:4, 951:21, 868:20, 897:7, notion [1] - 952:5 927:13, 948:16, OFFICIAL [1] - 967:1
953:2, 953:18 897:9, 900:4, November [1] - 834:23 961:25, 964:7 Official [1] - 825:22
National [3] - 856:13, 923:11, 933:5, Ns [1] - 856:10 occasion [2] - 915:19, officials [3] - 852:23,
856:16, 952:1 933:13, 934:13, number [25] - 838:5, 928:25 864:2, 909:1
nationally [1] - 844:2 938:1, 941:16, 856:10, 884:6, occasionally [2] - often [1] - 876:23
nations [1] - 868:24 942:18, 944:10, 885:14, 886:15, 911:21, 914:4 old [1] - 834:21
natural [1] - 887:3 954:22, 959:24 895:1, 895:2, 895:4, occasions [5] - once [3] - 872:16,
nature [9] - 837:19, nice [1] - 832:4 895:6, 895:23, 916:18, 926:21, 903:21, 956:8
854:17, 876:22, night [11] - 827:17, 900:16, 900:17, 927:16, 928:17, one [57] - 828:21,
913:7, 921:1, 832:4, 842:6, 900:18, 900:19, 928:25 831:11, 834:12,
929:10, 929:11, 842:19, 842:20, 902:17, 902:18, occur [2] - 841:22, 837:1, 844:4,
962:25, 965:10 848:18, 864:17, 903:5, 903:6, 872:21 845:11, 845:15,
necessarily [2] - 875:15, 898:7, 916:15, 922:4, occurred [2] - 898:2, 846:7, 849:15,
893:16, 917:20 900:3, 901:7 935:2, 935:3, 900:13 852:23, 854:25,
necessary [1] - 828:16 NO [16] - 887:24, 946:18, 960:17, occurrence [2] - 856:4, 866:7,
need [10] - 827:25, 888:2, 888:6, 961:15 851:24, 927:21 870:19, 870:21,
828:2, 829:9, 836:9, 888:14, 888:18, numbered [1] - 862:12 occurs [2] - 901:15, 870:24, 871:10,
848:19, 858:3, 888:21, 888:25, numbers [3] - 852:5, 928:2 874:8, 876:2,
866:11, 880:8, 889:16, 890:2, 895:10, 895:15 October [6] - 937:18, 878:11, 878:24,
884:13, 884:14 890:6, 890:9, numerous [2] - 874:7, 938:20, 939:21, 879:6, 879:10,
needed [15] - 828:11, 890:22, 891:4, 934:21 947:3, 947:8, 947:9 880:2, 882:1,
836:1, 837:14, 891:7, 891:14, NW [2] - 825:23, OF [4] - 825:1, 825:3, 890:10, 890:11,
858:2, 860:11, 891:22 967:12 825:9, 967:1 892:16, 897:5,
868:18, 874:3, nobody [1] - 851:3 NY [1] - 825:19 offer [7] - 829:8, 900:1, 900:17,
880:12, 884:22, node [1] - 859:24 NYT [1] - 875:7 935:6, 935:7, 903:25, 905:22,
898:13, 899:2, nonresponsive [2] - NYTs [2] - 866:1, 935:20, 936:13, 906:19, 907:20,
899:3, 913:8, 828:13, 828:21 866:2 936:14, 937:2 909:5, 911:19,
915:15, 915:16 nonresponsiveness offered [3] - 947:24, 914:4, 919:15,
[1] - 828:16 921:9, 921:14,
needing [1] - 857:25 O 948:12, 948:17
nefarious [1] - 914:14 noon [5] - 906:5, offering [3] - 829:11, 922:21, 923:12,
negative [2] - 937:2, 906:25, 907:4, oath [2] - 832:9, 948:4, 949:22 925:10, 925:11,
937:13 907:8, 910:9 944:23 929:3, 933:12,
offers [9] - 838:23,
never [9] - 885:19, Northeast [1] - 825:14 object [2] - 947:22, 861:22, 873:11, 935:9, 941:25,
890:15, 894:22, northwest [1] - 839:25 949:18 882:18, 886:3, 942:18, 942:19,
935:7, 936:14, notation [1] - 865:9 objecting [1] - 949:24 904:25, 908:7, 946:17, 947:2,
950:14, 951:6, 954:7 note [4] - 831:4, objection [15] - 830:9, 947:21, 959:17 947:3, 947:9, 956:7
new [7] - 834:20, 887:20, 925:21, 838:25, 861:23, OFFICE [1] - 825:14 ones [1] - 873:25
834:21, 834:22, 938:24 873:13, 875:20, office [30] - 836:8, onion [1] - 846:24
834:23, 835:2, notebook [3] - 861:8, 882:20, 886:4, 839:13, 840:5, open [1] - 913:14
848:15, 851:12 873:1, 873:9 886:13, 905:2, 840:7, 840:12, opened [3] - 921:25,
New [15] - 825:19, noted [4] - 828:12, 908:9, 912:23, 840:14, 840:15, 922:2, 922:4
845:5, 866:2, 892:12, 893:7, 913:16, 918:4, 840:19, 840:24, operating [1] - 867:5
903:14, 904:1, 893:15 919:7, 959:19 853:5, 855:15, opinion [2] - 941:19,
905:25, 912:10, notes [27] - 829:12, objections [1] - 831:1 870:10, 870:11, 943:5
912:16, 913:25, 829:17, 829:18, objective [1] - 891:16 871:12, 872:8, Opinion [1] - 941:23
914:6, 916:16, 829:19, 829:21, obligations [2] - 872:23, 882:7, opportunity [1] -
921:13, 924:21, 830:2, 830:4, 833:9, 893:21 895:16, 900:20, 872:24
933:12, 937:20 830:10, 830:12, obscure [4] - 846:14, 901:22, 902:3, opposite [2] - 849:20,
newer [1] - 834:19 830:18, 861:7, 846:17, 847:1, 920:11, 920:22, 916:19
news [18] - 845:4, 861:10, 861:18, 859:25 930:3, 939:12, optimistic [1] - 898:16
845:8, 845:21, 861:20, 862:2, observing [1] - 916:3 955:4, 957:5, or.. [1] - 911:16
847:15, 847:22, 862:6, 872:25, obtained [2] - 842:23, 957:24, 958:21 order [3] - 846:20,
848:6, 848:21, 873:8, 873:16, 918:23 Office [4] - 957:4, 884:19, 885:13
849:9, 869:1, 875:1, 875:10, obtaining [2] - 920:17, 957:7, 957:9, 957:24 org [3] - 867:12,
883:25, 885:9, 875:22, 875:25, 953:7 office.. [1] - 938:7 867:17, 868:24
916:20, 924:20, 914:23, 967:5 obviously [12] - offices [1] - 877:1 organization [27] -
924:22, 926:17, nothing [2] - 855:9, 888:14, 888:25, official [6] - 853:12, 841:11, 843:11,
929:9, 941:18 923:1 889:20, 889:22, 856:14, 880:16, 845:22, 845:25,
next [18] - 835:21, notice [1] - 964:18 891:9, 891:16, 946:7, 957:23, 846:13, 846:14,
838:7, 864:8, notified [1] - 903:23 893:11, 893:17, 967:11 847:11, 847:23,
981
848:6, 848:21, 857:15, 871:20, 892:17 896:10, 898:1,

P
854:11, 854:21, 876:2, 886:13, performs [1] - 957:14 899:18, 901:11,
854:23, 868:2, p.m [11] - 836:8, 895:9, 917:18, perhaps [5] - 828:15, 903:4, 904:5,
868:5, 868:6, 869:1, 839:6, 895:22, 922:2, 922:4, 829:23, 859:24, 906:22, 928:10
869:10, 881:4, 897:20, 898:3, 928:15, 928:25, 906:3, 906:24 phonetic [2] - 865:12,
885:10, 913:11, 898:7, 909:23, 929:9, 940:19, period [12] - 856:15, 865:14
914:15, 919:2, 910:8, 923:16, 957:12, 959:11, 866:21, 872:10, photo [1] - 837:6
920:4, 924:12, 966:16 961:25 884:17, 896:5, photograph [2] -
925:25, 961:1 PAGE [1] - 826:2 particularly [1] - 896:24, 912:1, 938:8, 939:11
organizations [11] - Page [9] - 894:21, 888:10 929:5, 933:15, phrase [2] - 862:24,
844:25, 845:8, 900:11, 902:12, parties [5] - 828:22, 936:21, 936:24, 914:22
846:4, 847:16, 947:15, 949:5, 830:1, 830:3, 952:11 physical [4] - 855:13,
847:17, 866:7, 950:8, 953:21, 846:20, 886:2 Perkins [19] - 856:1, 855:15, 960:15,
883:25, 924:21, 959:23, 959:25 parties' [1] - 830:17 856:2, 856:17, 961:13
924:22, 926:18, page [22] - 832:23, partisan [1] - 952:9 862:17, 934:1, picked [1] - 903:4
960:20 842:3, 873:6, partly [2] - 939:20 934:10, 934:20, picture [2] - 938:2,
organize [1] - 890:7 874:17, 874:19, partner [3] - 856:1, 934:24, 935:11, 938:4
organizing [2] - 839:8, 874:22, 875:2, 856:4, 942:25 936:13, 937:2, pictures [1] - 945:16
890:13 886:7, 886:9, parts [1] - 837:2 938:11, 939:12, piece [7] - 857:19,
orient [2] - 858:17, 894:25, 897:5, party [3] - 846:19, 942:25, 943:12, 868:1, 876:10,
863:23 897:7, 897:9, 858:15, 885:24 949:12, 950:11, 877:8, 877:11,
oriented [1] - 859:15 897:14, 923:11, passed [2] - 850:22, 950:25, 954:4 881:18, 943:5
origin [3] - 846:14, 933:5, 938:1, 926:5 person [20] - 840:9, pilloried [2] - 945:20,
846:22, 847:1 941:16, 942:18, pattern [1] - 895:9 843:3, 843:25, 945:21
original [1] - 883:6 951:4, 958:13 pause [1] - 932:19 852:22, 853:6, place [8] - 840:24,
originally [1] - 882:23 pages [5] - 850:5, 856:6, 874:21, 906:17, 918:19,
Pause [2] - 831:13,
others' [1] - 888:12 850:6, 850:7, 878:25, 879:7, 940:10, 949:9,
832:1
otherwise [2] - 918:3, 850:24, 933:4 879:8, 879:14, 951:4, 955:4, 957:22
pauses [2] - 834:3,
918:8 pamphlet [2] - 941:7, 880:9, 880:18, placed [1] - 852:22
834:9
ourselves [1] - 898:1 941:8 880:20, 881:3,
Pennsylvania [1] - places [3] - 878:17,
outcome [2] - 912:14, paragraph [7] - 883:18, 890:20, 934:19, 934:21
839:24
965:8 867:24, 943:10, 937:7, 946:5, 963:14
people [52] - 836:19, Plaintiff [1] - 825:4
outlet's [2] - 923:22, 943:16, 943:19, personal [4] - 840:14,
836:25, 837:2, plan [3] - 829:7,
924:18 961:11, 961:12, 840:15, 840:24,
839:19, 840:10, 829:11, 884:10
outlets [2] - 845:4, 964:22 857:5
843:17, 843:19, planned [2] - 838:7,
929:9 paralegals [1] - 871:2 personally [1] - 844:9
843:22, 844:13, 847:17
outline [1] - 829:23 parent [1] - 892:20 844:17, 844:19, persons [5] - 897:22, planning [2] - 909:20,
outreach [1] - 832:19 parents [2] - 889:1, 846:25, 864:10, 898:22, 899:7, 910:1
outside [13] - 844:23, 890:4 864:13, 865:18, 899:8, 899:11 plastic [2] - 836:21,
878:21, 886:11, parlance [1] - 924:13 865:19, 865:20, perspective [4] - 837:5
889:10, 926:18, part [32] - 841:11, 865:21, 865:22, 874:15, 896:22, play [2] - 960:1, 960:2
930:13, 938:6, 841:25, 849:3, 865:23, 865:24, 911:23, 946:13 played [1] - 911:18
938:22, 939:12, 854:10, 854:20, 866:16, 866:25, persuade [1] - 913:5 playing [3] - 911:19,
963:3, 964:6, 857:23, 862:12, 868:7, 878:1, 881:7, persuaded [1] - 915:2 911:21, 950:18
965:10, 965:11 863:6, 867:7, 867:9, 881:9, 882:10, pertain [2] - 851:10, pleasantries [1] -
overall [1] - 955:13 867:14, 868:20, 883:4, 884:19, 851:11 903:17
overlapping [1] - 869:7, 871:12, 898:13, 907:6, Pete [3] - 878:10, plotter [2] - 942:12,
874:25, 912:17, 908:23, 909:19, 880:11, 921:5
964:16 942:13
913:10, 917:23, 918:19, 927:19, ph [2] - 865:12, 865:14
overrule [1] - 913:18 plotters [1] - 945:23
919:1, 924:21, 927:25, 928:3, phone [32] - 833:13,
overseas [1] - 866:23 Plus [1] - 940:21
926:20, 927:8, 928:6, 928:9, 833:22, 834:14,
oversee [1] - 920:9 plus [3] - 862:15,
927:10, 935:2, 928:14, 930:9, 834:19, 834:20,
oversight [4] - 920:11, 867:19, 919:25
936:18, 940:11, 940:12, 958:24, 834:21, 834:22,
920:21, 940:20, POC [2] - 864:14,
953:14, 957:10, 960:17, 961:15, 834:23, 835:2,
957:15 865:6
957:15, 957:21, 963:1, 963:10 852:22, 853:2,
oversights [1] - POCs [2] - 864:12,
960:20, 965:18 People [1] - 865:11 853:4, 853:6,
957:11 864:25
particular [21] - per [1] - 876:25 855:20, 855:21,
own [3] - 864:22, POCs) [1] - 864:11
837:14, 841:7, percent [2] - 842:13, 886:14, 886:15,
893:4, 927:7 point [30] - 828:17,
842:10, 849:21, 849:14 895:1, 895:5,
849:23, 851:5, 834:10, 844:11,
peremptories [1] - 895:10, 895:18,
849:18, 854:10,
982
854:13, 861:7, premarked [6] - Priestap's [4] - 854:5, 909:1, 941:11, quickly [14] - 836:22,
865:8, 868:4, 869:5, 838:13, 873:4, 861:19, 862:2, 945:21, 945:22, 853:7, 857:25,
870:18, 873:20, 877:21, 882:13, 921:10 964:12, 965:5, 858:4, 860:7,
876:2, 876:3, 946:21, 958:11 primarily [4] - 913:20, 965:12, 965:21 866:18, 866:20,
876:21, 879:19, prep [3] - 906:4, 913:22, 913:24 public's [1] - 852:13 870:1, 870:6,
887:4, 896:10, 906:24, 907:4 principal [1] - 909:5 publication [1] - 912:19, 924:24,
896:20, 903:2, prepare [1] - 907:8 printed [3] - 850:5, 896:24 953:9, 959:24,
906:14, 918:15, prepared [3] - 828:21, 960:15, 961:14 publicly [2] - 846:25, 962:18
919:21, 919:23, 955:17, 956:4 printed-out [1] - 850:5 943:12 quite [9] - 844:4,
924:1, 935:9, preparing [2] - 929:6, priorities [1] - 880:2 publish [11] - 847:17, 850:17, 857:24,
939:21, 954:14, 959:4 priority [2] - 854:25, 848:6, 866:7, 869:2, 882:5, 887:1, 888:2,
959:1, 963:17 presence [1] - 889:11 855:2 886:19, 906:11, 893:22, 912:20,
points [3] - 846:6, present [3] - 827:13, privilege [1] - 830:24 915:6, 916:17, 915:2
864:14, 864:15 877:10, 948:21 pro [1] - 833:14 916:23, 917:23,
policies [2] - 852:11, presented [6] - probing [2] - 912:10, 918:7 R
953:20 848:13, 850:4, 914:16 published [3] - 858:1,
Political [2] - 943:15, races [1] - 890:17
850:5, 850:11, problem [2] - 886:20, 866:14, 867:4
943:24 raised [1] - 893:5
956:10, 961:4 965:23 publishes [1] - 916:5
political [1] - 952:12 range [5] - 853:25,
president [1] - 882:7 procedures [1] - publishing [10] -
portion [4] - 864:17, 854:1, 871:2,
press [15] - 858:1, 852:11 847:23, 881:22,
947:17, 948:19, 946:11, 946:12
883:18, 884:4, proceedings [1] - 883:25, 884:16,
959:18 rank [2] - 870:15,
884:16, 885:12, 967:6 885:13, 896:13,
portions [4] - 828:15, 870:16
908:21, 908:22, process [6] - 834:20, 912:1, 912:17,
828:21, 828:23, 912:21 ranking [3] - 852:23,
928:10, 928:12, 834:24, 836:18,
959:19 pull [1] - 874:25 853:12, 856:14
940:8, 950:15, 936:17, 936:18,
position [8] - 828:10, RAO [1] - 825:18
951:7, 954:8, 954:18 937:13 purposes [3] - 830:6,
870:12, 883:13, 830:18, 839:22 Rao [1] - 827:12
pressure [1] - 924:24 producers [1] - 908:24
892:24, 905:7, pushed [2] - 903:5, rapidly [1] - 866:22
presumably [1] - professional [1] -
908:17, 921:8, 946:5 933:12 rather [1] - 830:19
861:2 871:3
positions [3] - 883:12, put [10] - 830:6, RDR [3] - 825:21,
presume [1] - 830:11 professor [2] - 843:23,
934:22, 936:10 836:23, 837:22, 967:3, 967:10
pretty [4] - 841:24, 843:24
positive [1] - 897:25 873:3, 883:4, 905:5, reach [2] - 894:16,
853:4, 856:14, programs [1] - 957:17
possession [3] - 924:24, 941:1, 896:23
880:20 prominent [1] - 864:10
869:15, 877:9, 948:25, 958:18 reached [4] - 853:7,
prevent [1] - 852:14 prompts [1] - 916:20
880:18 Putin [1] - 910:3 904:1, 904:2, 960:12
previously [2] - protect [6] - 852:4,
possibility [1] - 898:17 puts [1] - 924:24 reaching [1] - 908:21
861:19, 943:12 852:14, 879:24,
possible [7] - 836:3, react [2] - 913:12,
Priestap [49] - 829:12, 880:5, 880:20,
951:15
860:7, 870:2, 830:8, 853:1, 853:9, 952:15 Q reaction [5] - 847:25,
879:13, 901:13, 855:11, 855:17, protected [1] - 880:22
935:19, 953:9 quality [1] - 865:24 882:4, 888:12,
855:23, 857:10, protecting [3] - 880:1,
possibly [4] - 921:5, questioned [3] - 893:24, 914:7
857:11, 857:14, 880:5, 952:10
928:24, 933:24, 927:22, 945:5 read [29] - 842:20,
857:19, 858:12, protest [1] - 941:7
934:16 questioner [3] - 862:10, 862:12,
859:16, 859:20, Protesters [1] - 938:6
post [2] - 866:3, 890:8 950:19, 953:22, 865:10, 873:16,
860:13, 861:8, protesters [1] - 938:8
Post [3] - 845:5, 866:3, 954:3 875:1, 878:18,
862:8, 862:20, protesting [1] - 939:13
875:8 862:23, 869:16, questioning [1] - 897:19, 905:20,
provide [6] - 831:21, 893:3 907:17, 933:10,
potential [3] - 854:12, 869:20, 869:23, 835:3, 951:8,
882:9, 894:16 870:7, 871:21, questionnaire [5] - 938:9, 938:13,
951:14, 953:3, 888:1, 888:9, 941:24, 942:3,
potentially [2] - 860:8, 871:24, 875:17, 954:23
934:24 878:10, 882:25, 888:10, 892:13, 943:7, 943:8,
provided [3] - 845:11, 893:18 943:11, 943:16,
power [3] - 867:11, 883:10, 883:15, 850:8, 960:5
867:12, 946:5 904:21, 904:22, questions [15] - 947:17, 947:18,
providing [2] - 880:16, 827:22, 831:8, 949:8, 950:15,
practice [3] - 837:17, 905:9, 907:12, 951:20
907:21, 908:4, 888:11, 888:12, 951:7, 954:8,
856:20, 890:4 provision [1] - 852:10
908:6, 909:18, 889:12, 914:16, 954:18, 961:23
pre [2] - 890:7, 907:10 public [20] - 852:4,
910:8, 911:6, 928:23, 940:4, reader [2] - 836:23,
pre-meeting [1] - 852:6, 852:7,
913:23, 915:10, 947:18, 947:23, 837:22
907:10 852:12, 852:15,
916:25, 921:4, 950:17, 955:16, readily [1] - 833:18
prefix [1] - 895:12 879:22, 883:17,
921:6, 921:7, 926:6, 956:17, 964:23 reading [10] - 832:24,
preliminary [1] - 903:25, 905:13,
961:7 quick [1] - 930:10 923:24, 925:1,
884:17 908:14, 908:20,
983
933:19, 942:6, 896:16, 900:18, referring [4] - 902:7, 914:24, 918:17, 921:10
943:9, 943:19, 900:19, 901:6, 924:15, 963:2, 921:17, 921:18, represent [2] - 875:25,
943:25, 944:2, 949:1 901:11, 901:25, 963:10 921:19, 921:22, 881:8
ready [7] - 832:6, 902:9, 903:1, 903:6, refers [4] - 839:17, 923:6, 925:13, Representatives [1] -
887:13, 907:10, 911:5, 912:5, 846:24, 854:7, 943:19, 943:24, 939:24
912:18, 912:20, 913:22, 914:11, 873:21 944:2, 956:21, represented [9] -
915:6 914:20, 915:1, reflect [3] - 863:7, 958:9, 959:4, 959:6, 858:9, 858:15,
realized [1] - 887:21 916:16, 918:21, 875:22, 953:17 959:10 863:9, 863:12,
really [9] - 849:3, 919:14, 921:3, reform [1] - 940:20 remind [5] - 832:8, 950:11, 950:25,
850:24, 851:12, 933:23, 934:4, refresh [3] - 861:11, 838:4, 865:16, 954:5, 954:11,
853:16, 892:21, 934:11, 937:20, 901:25, 955:9 898:1, 905:6 954:20
914:18, 921:19, 943:18, 944:2, refreshed [1] - 861:4 reminded [1] - 835:16 representing [8] -
955:17, 956:4 944:5, 946:20, refreshing [1] - 829:20 render [1] - 893:24 881:1, 881:3, 944:6,
reason [7] - 837:14, 955:9, 955:10, regard [12] - 835:23, reorganized [1] - 951:10, 954:24,
851:5, 852:1, 956:16, 958:6, 845:3, 847:18, 871:12 955:20, 956:19,
892:18, 893:9, 960:11, 961:11, 854:22, 856:21, repeat [2] - 875:24, 956:21
918:2, 948:7 961:22 857:13, 871:21, 879:2 represents [3] - 863:5,
reasons [3] - 893:14, reconstruct [1] - 912:6, 936:13, repeated [5] - 842:7, 863:17, 863:19
894:5, 942:15 954:10 937:12, 941:5, 842:12, 843:5, Republican [1] - 952:6
rebuffed [1] - 914:17 record [18] - 827:3, 952:12 857:14, 893:3 reputation [1] - 844:12
recalled [1] - 835:18 837:23, 838:17, regarded [1] - 844:18 repeating [1] - 863:1 request [8] - 833:8,
recap [1] - 910:13 839:22, 878:14, regarding [1] - 939:24 rephrase [2] - 918:5, 889:7, 896:15,
Receipt [1] - 878:19 882:6, 886:14, regattas [1] - 890:14 919:9 897:23, 898:11,
received [12] - 827:17, 892:11, 893:25, regular [5] - 837:15, reply [3] - 836:8, 913:15, 916:8,
835:16, 845:9, 895:1, 898:1, 923:6, 872:8, 872:9, 900:6, 907:11, 934:12 927:14
857:8, 864:16, 939:23, 959:10, 938:24 report [7] - 881:15, requests [1] - 916:7
864:24, 875:14, 965:5, 965:10, reiterated [1] - 893:21 903:10, 916:9, required [1] - 839:10
887:19, 921:2, 965:12, 965:21 rejected [1] - 935:12 917:11, 917:14, research [4] - 875:6,
935:11, 942:2, recorded [1] - 959:8 rejection [2] - 935:8, 917:16, 917:17 887:16, 915:7,
943:17 records [12] - 861:4, 936:15 reported [1] - 881:14 963:23
receives [1] - 927:8 866:21, 886:7, related [11] - 872:3, REPORTER [1] - researchers [3] -
receiving [3] - 835:18, 894:23, 895:18, 882:9, 888:11, 967:1 841:13, 849:18,
901:7, 903:2 900:9, 900:11, 920:23, 925:25, Reporter [3] - 825:21, 919:25
recent [1] - 834:1 901:25, 902:12, 940:2, 942:15, 825:22, 967:11 resentful [1] - 937:13
recently [1] - 887:21 902:24, 928:10, 944:17, 960:16, reporter [30] - 845:21, resource [1] - 915:7
recess [1] - 966:16 954:19 961:15, 963:22 845:23, 856:7, resources [1] - 855:4
Recess [1] - 892:4 recounting [1] - 876:9 relating [3] - 841:8, 884:12, 884:23, respect [14] - 863:23,
reciting [1] - 950:19 recruiting [2] - 853:23, 854:18, 922:17 885:7, 896:11, 868:17, 881:21,
recognize [6] - 861:15, 853:24 relationship [3] - 896:12, 896:21, 892:10, 892:11,
862:9, 873:6, recurring [1] - 839:8 847:4, 889:14, 963:1 898:12, 898:17, 908:19, 912:12,
877:22, 946:22, redacted [1] - 886:16 relatively [6] - 847:24, 898:20, 899:6, 912:21, 920:12,
958:14 redactions [2] - 873:5, 869:2, 870:5, 901:12, 902:8, 934:23, 939:14,
recognized [2] - 874:16 919:16, 921:4, 902:10, 903:13, 942:15, 945:19,
844:2, 953:7 refer [5] - 839:20, 946:15 903:21, 903:24, 958:9
recognizing [5] - 849:18, 898:19, relayed [1] - 904:9 904:10, 905:24, respected [1] - 865:20
869:19, 875:2, 934:15, 963:12 relevant [4] - 832:23, 910:1, 916:5, 916:8, respond [6] - 842:16,
894:22, 913:3, reference [7] - 847:15, 842:3, 947:17, 950:4 921:11, 923:20, 897:21, 898:11,
919:15 864:3, 864:13, rely [2] - 868:19, 923:6 924:4, 929:15, 898:18, 901:8,
recollection [56] - 864:15, 868:23, remember [38] - 929:20, 929:22 925:16
829:20, 833:6, 937:22, 955:3 838:10, 844:10, reporter's [2] - 923:23, responded [3] -
840:4, 843:14, referenced [12] - 860:19, 870:4, 925:1 835:19, 882:3, 955:6
843:22, 844:24, 845:7, 846:4, 846:7, 878:4, 878:7, reporters [12] - responding [1] -
847:21, 852:21, 846:23, 849:17, 883:13, 884:9, 881:22, 884:13, 908:21
855:19, 861:4, 868:2, 873:25, 895:9, 901:10, 909:6, 915:19, responds [2] - 837:13,
862:7, 862:20, 883:16, 895:23, 904:17, 904:18, 915:22, 916:3, 838:3
863:9, 863:10, 896:11, 899:10 907:9, 907:20, 916:21, 917:11, response [3] - 833:7,
863:11, 865:18, referral [2] - 927:8, 907:22, 910:24, 918:1, 918:7, 945:12 897:25, 943:4
877:18, 882:3, 927:12 911:13, 911:17, reporting [2] - 917:20, responsibilities [3] -
885:17, 895:5, referred [2] - 899:11, 912:3, 912:15, 917:21 872:1, 874:11, 920:9
895:17, 896:8, 924:4 913:21, 914:3, reports [2] - 881:11, responsibility [1] -
984
920:12 881:19, 912:12, security [42] - 836:18, 872:11, 885:9, session [5] - 892:5,
responsible [8] - 914:15, 937:25, 836:22, 837:17, 888:22, 889:24, 946:16, 946:19,
853:12, 853:21, 939:25, 940:25, 837:21, 841:13, 890:11, 894:3 956:6, 957:1
870:19, 870:21, 955:13, 958:1 843:16, 843:23, seniors [1] - 890:24 set [6] - 840:16,
870:24, 920:17, Russian [11] - 843:11, 843:25, 844:3, sense [12] - 837:25, 854:17, 909:23,
928:15, 952:10 846:1, 854:2, 854:8, 844:18, 845:17, 847:6, 858:6, 876:9, 917:18, 928:7,
rest [1] - 952:18 854:9, 854:15, 845:20, 852:14, 911:16, 914:22, 956:16
Resumed [1] - 832:13 854:19, 854:23, 854:12, 856:5, 917:25, 925:7, sets [1] - 830:4
retrievable [1] - 858:15, 882:10, 856:6, 856:14, 926:23, 935:15, setting [1] - 885:7
834:18 910:2 856:17, 856:25, 966:4 seven [1] - 890:20
retrieve [1] - 833:12 Russians [1] - 869:5 857:4, 858:19, sensitive [18] - 836:2, seventh [3] - 839:14,
retrieved [2] - 833:3, Russo [1] - 910:2 865:2, 866:15, 840:17, 848:19, 839:15, 839:19
838:18 870:24, 871:5, 848:23, 849:14, several [2] - 895:15,
retrieving [1] - 834:19 S 871:8, 871:25, 851:7, 851:12, 922:13
return [2] - 932:21, 872:3, 874:3, 855:6, 868:11, shape [1] - 960:11
S-U-S-S-M-A-N [1] - 874:11, 899:4, 874:2, 879:17,
953:21 share [3] - 842:23,
949:14 899:9, 912:8, 879:19, 880:19,
returning [1] - 865:4 857:19, 859:20
sat [2] - 840:21, 958:3 915:21, 919:24, 881:5, 881:21
reveal [4] - 879:14, shared [2] - 871:23,
saw [7] - 862:25, 926:14, 951:22, sensitivity [1] - 879:23
920:2, 928:11, 887:20
884:9, 900:3, 953:2, 953:18, sent [15] - 842:6,
928:20 Shaw [4] - 827:7,
900:17, 903:22, 960:19, 961:17, 846:12, 882:15,
revealed [3] - 903:12, 828:5, 889:5, 892:8
907:18, 943:5 962:8 882:23, 883:6,
906:20 SHAW [17] - 825:13,
schedule [5] - 835:21, security-related [1] - 897:13, 897:20,
revealing [1] - 869:7 827:5, 827:7, 828:6,
836:4, 966:3, 966:7, 872:3 900:2, 905:21,
reversed [1] - 935:18 828:9, 829:2, 829:6,
966:12 see [31] - 830:13, 937:19, 938:4,
review [1] - 861:3 829:18, 829:23,
scheduled [3] - 831:7, 836:1, 943:20, 947:8, 961:7
reviewed [1] - 835:14 889:5, 889:13,
838:11, 840:3, 842:22, 842:25, separate [2] - 892:21,
revised [1] - 828:24 889:25, 890:4,
960:13 847:12, 859:7, 904:18
revisit [1] - 946:3 890:7, 890:18,
scientist [1] - 849:17 862:6, 874:17, September [28] -
rid [2] - 860:6, 870:1 891:2, 892:8
scooped [1] - 924:23 884:11, 884:15, 832:19, 835:10,
riser [1] - 899:25 shepherded [1] -
scope [5] - 962:25, 884:22, 884:23, 835:11, 838:8,
rises [1] - 828:17 937:9
965:4, 965:22, 896:2, 900:1, 839:5, 839:6, 842:4,
role [8] - 851:22, shooting [3] - 905:25,
965:24, 966:1 900:14, 901:19, 861:12, 863:19,
890:12, 908:15, 906:8, 906:11
screen [5] - 833:17, 902:14, 908:5, 883:7, 883:21,
926:10, 927:15, short [3] - 871:18,
873:3, 878:3, 910:17, 911:21, 897:13, 897:20,
950:19, 960:1, 963:3 903:18, 921:4
941:24, 949:25 918:2, 923:13, 898:3, 899:22,
room [6] - 838:4, shorthand [4] -
screenshot [1] - 944:8 934:13, 942:21, 900:1, 900:8,
840:22, 872:22, 961:24, 962:24,
scroll [1] - 834:2 945:7, 949:25, 900:14, 905:21,
911:3, 918:20, 945:5 963:10, 963:11
scrolled [1] - 834:3 952:18, 957:15, 923:5, 923:14,
Room [2] - 825:22, shortly [3] - 875:18,
SEAN [1] - 825:16 958:15, 961:19 925:19, 925:23,
967:12 912:15, 918:14
Sean [1] - 827:11 seeing [3] - 859:3, 933:4, 933:6,
roughly [2] - 902:5, show [15] - 830:10,
search [2] - 833:23, 933:13, 958:24 936:20, 962:3
936:20 838:13, 839:7,
833:24 seem [2] - 926:1, sequence [1] - 902:1 861:14, 874:14,
round [7] - 949:6,
season [1] - 911:19 951:22 series [5] - 837:5, 877:21, 882:13,
949:11, 950:10,
seat [2] - 831:17, seized [2] - 878:20, 837:23, 868:11, 885:18, 885:19,
950:24, 951:25,
831:18 878:22 914:16, 940:4 904:19, 908:1,
953:22, 954:4
seated [2] - 892:6, Seizing [1] - 878:19 serious [7] - 844:17, 908:23, 938:17,
router [1] - 846:24
964:3 semi [1] - 957:9 856:16, 856:24, 954:2, 958:11
routine [1] - 828:22
second [9] - 886:8, Senate [1] - 940:21 858:3, 858:18, showed [1] - 915:4
rowers [1] - 890:21
894:25, 918:17, send [2] - 869:25, 914:12 shown [3] - 830:4,
rules [1] - 927:24
919:12, 921:13, 941:18 seriously [6] - 857:9, 831:2, 861:7
ruling [1] - 939:1
942:19, 944:13, sending [8] - 883:9, 857:22, 893:21, shows [1] - 893:20
rumors [2] - 923:21,
946:19, 947:9 907:7, 939:18, 913:7, 914:12 side [7] - 853:24,
924:16
Secret [1] - 867:16 941:11, 941:14, seriousness [2] - 865:5, 867:11,
run [2] - 899:4, 913:5
secret [3] - 843:10, 942:1, 944:4, 949:2 858:7, 881:23 867:23, 869:12,
running [6] - 900:6,
845:25, 897:1 sends [5] - 882:25, server [1] - 867:17 911:4, 911:7
920:15, 920:20,
section [3] - 865:25, 907:12, 909:22, Service [1] - 854:3 sidebar [1] - 964:5
945:13, 945:15,
871:1, 941:23 941:6 services [2] - 853:19 sides [5] - 828:24,
957:17
Security [2] - 856:13, senior [9] - 839:18, serving [1] - 860:23 831:2, 831:5, 912:9,
Russia [11] - 841:11,
856:16 870:9, 870:12, SESSION [1] - 825:6 912:22
854:6, 869:10,
985
sign [3] - 878:25, 918:2, 918:7, 880:2 862:21, 871:22, street [4] - 935:24,
879:3, 938:9 918:10, 926:17, speaking [7] - 895:11, 949:6, 949:22, 935:25, 936:8,
signature [3] - 878:16, 927:4, 927:6, 927:7, 913:20, 913:24, 962:11, 962:16 941:23
878:17, 878:21 928:1, 928:4 928:11, 939:9, statements [2] - Street [8] - 825:14,
Signature [1] - 878:19 somewhat [1] - 951:25 939:11, 945:25 833:9, 944:25 845:6, 866:4, 936:5,
signed [6] - 877:25, somewhere [3] - speaks [1] - 827:21 STATES [3] - 825:1, 936:7, 936:8,
878:1, 880:15, 840:6, 841:23, 947:9 Special [2] - 860:14, 825:3, 825:10 936:23, 941:22
880:17, 942:24, soon [8] - 836:3, 965:17 States [10] - 825:12, stress [1] - 900:6
942:25 847:24, 848:8, special [2] - 840:20, 827:3, 827:8, strike [4] - 827:18,
signed-up [2] - 866:8, 869:2, 885:5, 872:15 841:12, 853:20, 828:15, 828:21,
880:15, 880:17 893:19, 933:14 SPECIAL [1] - 825:14 882:8, 889:6, 892:9, 892:15
significant [2] - sooner [4] - 866:5, specific [9] - 875:5, 945:6, 967:11 string [2] - 833:25,
912:10, 935:2 897:22, 898:19, 876:10, 914:24, statutes [1] - 920:14 834:12
silent [1] - 914:2 901:8 916:10, 919:11, stay [3] - 887:14, structure [1] - 870:13
similar [1] - 844:15 sorry [42] - 835:11, 927:24, 939:4, 892:25, 932:23 structured [1] - 870:12
similarly [1] - 957:25 835:17, 845:20, 943:25, 947:23 Steele [2] - 938:11, STRZOK [1] - 921:11
simultaneously [1] - 853:13, 856:7, specifically [10] - 938:25 Strzok [3] - 878:10,
871:13 856:11, 864:19, 852:8, 865:23, stenographic [1] - 880:11, 921:5
sit [2] - 893:10, 958:4 865:6, 869:8, 870:4, 917:1, 967:5 Strzok's [1] - 921:8
sitting [6] - 845:18, 871:14, 873:19, 937:24, 951:9, step [1] - 964:2 stuff [2] - 870:1, 960:7
863:11, 888:16, 875:13, 875:24, 951:12, 954:23, stepping [1] - 915:17 subject [11] - 830:5,
943:18, 944:1, 945:4 879:2, 897:8, 955:7, 955:18 steps [3] - 920:1, 830:7, 839:2,
situation [2] - 858:25, 897:21, 905:4, specifics [1] - 915:12 922:10, 922:24 842:25, 851:12,
889:9 905:5, 907:18, Spectrum [6] - 846:7, Steve [5] - 843:24, 861:23, 873:13,
situations [2] - 911:15, 914:9, 846:13, 859:24, 844:11, 865:11, 886:1, 942:8,
917:10, 928:18 915:7, 915:15, 867:21, 868:1, 868:6 910:1, 911:9 942:16, 964:24
six [1] - 869:19 915:18, 927:5, speed [1] - 945:14 still [13] - 832:8, subjects [6] - 923:21,
size [1] - 850:18 932:19, 933:5, spell [1] - 856:8 834:18, 855:18, 924:5, 924:6, 924:8,
skimmed [1] - 942:5 939:9, 943:21, spelling [2] - 865:13, 855:20, 869:15, 924:11, 924:13
slightly [1] - 966:8 944:22, 947:7, 865:14 910:17, 910:18, subsequent [1] -
947:20, 949:14, spending [1] - 957:17 915:13, 935:18, 877:19
slip [2] - 832:11,
951:4, 951:5, spent [1] - 935:1 935:19, 935:20, substance [4] -
962:14
952:18, 952:19, spies [1] - 853:24 946:4, 953:12 859:21, 859:22,
slip-up [1] - 962:14
952:20, 954:16, spoken [3] - 896:5, stipulation [7] - 829:8, 912:8, 920:4
slow [4] - 896:12,
959:25, 964:9 928:9, 929:15 829:10, 861:24, substantial [2] - 856:5
910:19, 912:6, 912:7
sort [31] - 834:18, sponsored [1] - 873:14, 886:2, substantiate [1] -
slowly [1] - 913:1
839:15, 839:17, 837:19 964:21, 965:12 918:25
small [3] - 850:16,
840:19, 865:5, spot [2] - 836:25, stop [3] - 862:19, substitution [3] -
874:9, 889:22
867:11, 867:24, 896:18 863:6, 952:11 965:6, 965:18,
smart [1] - 856:24
870:19, 872:8, spy [1] - 853:19 stopping [1] - 887:4 965:21
smoothly [1] - 830:25
884:24, 884:25, stops [1] - 867:20 succeeded [1] -
so.. [1] - 888:22 spying [1] - 854:3
890:7, 892:22, storage [2] - 840:18, 892:16
social [2] - 887:17, staff [7] - 871:3, 872:9,
915:22, 916:1, 850:16
963:22 872:11, 872:15, success [1] - 880:4
922:16, 927:3, stored [1] - 850:17
sofa [1] - 840:16 872:19, 944:14, sucked [8] - 945:1,
928:7, 936:2, 937:7, stories [2] - 915:23,
someone [11] - 955:24 945:2, 945:4, 945:9,
938:2, 941:10, 965:1
845:13, 878:8, start [8] - 839:5, 945:12, 945:17,
942:14, 942:24,
878:20, 879:3, 903:17, 908:11, story [16] - 884:24, 945:20
944:23, 946:13,
880:16, 908:17, 928:6, 949:7, 913:5, 916:6, sued [1] - 870:22
956:11, 957:9,
939:12, 940:5, 952:20, 957:25, 916:20, 917:23, suggestion [1] - 965:8
957:14, 960:18,
952:2, 952:6, 958:22 964:9 917:24, 918:3, summarize [1] -
961:17
sometime [2] - 877:20, started [9] - 829:6, 918:8, 918:14, 960:10
sorted [1] - 935:16
918:13 832:6, 834:1, 834:2, 923:19, 923:21, summary [4] - 871:18,
sounds [3] - 830:22, 924:16, 924:22,
sometimes [25] - 841:5, 923:20, 876:1, 921:3, 964:21
867:5, 926:1 924:24, 926:1,
839:20, 846:20, 924:4, 934:2, 955:15 Sunday [7] - 835:16,
source [10] - 845:10, 933:12
850:17, 858:24, starting [1] - 961:11 835:17, 906:1,
857:17, 863:25, straightforward [1] -
866:20, 866:21, state [1] - 882:6 906:8, 906:12,
879:21, 880:15, 912:6
872:16, 874:8, statement [12] - 906:13, 933:13
880:16, 880:17, strange [3] - 960:16,
874:9, 876:25, 841:20, 841:22, supervisory [1] -
881:5, 940:7 960:19, 961:15
916:5, 916:7, 916:9, 842:7, 842:18, 876:13
sources [2] - 853:23, streams [1] - 866:19
916:23, 917:11, 843:5, 859:13, support [1] - 871:3
986
surmised [1] - 960:23 941:18, 941:25, test [1] - 915:8 861:25, 873:15, 850:15, 850:16,
surprising [1] - 888:3 942:22, 943:6, testified [18] - 833:2, 875:21, 882:21, 850:18, 850:21,
surreptitious [11] - 944:3, 944:5, 944:9, 836:12, 845:24, 886:5, 886:17, 960:15, 961:14
841:8, 841:14, 946:10, 947:6, 853:9, 858:8, 868:9, 886:19, 886:25, Thursday [2] - 825:4,
848:7, 859:23, 949:12, 949:13, 871:22, 881:10, 887:3, 887:6, 887:9, 883:6
897:1, 913:9, 915:5, 949:16, 951:8, 883:24, 894:14, 887:11, 887:19, thwart [3] - 853:17,
918:25, 920:2, 951:14, 954:11, 905:9, 910:20, 887:25, 888:4, 853:22, 854:2
920:7, 961:2 954:20, 954:22, 914:21, 918:13, 888:7, 888:16, Thx [1] - 907:19
surveillance [1] - 955:19, 955:25, 926:11, 939:22, 888:19, 888:23, tied [1] - 909:18
853:23 960:3, 960:7, 962:3, 956:24, 965:4 889:4, 889:10, ties [1] - 854:22
Susan [4] - 843:23, 962:4, 962:8 testify [6] - 827:24, 891:12, 891:16, time-sensitive [6] -
844:4, 844:9, 865:13 Sussmann's [9] - 828:1, 828:3, 891:25, 892:2, 836:2, 848:19,
Susan's [1] - 865:15 833:24, 848:17, 828:25, 830:8, 892:5, 892:6, 893:1, 848:23, 849:14,
suspect [1] - 923:19 886:14, 887:22, 948:16 893:13, 894:9, 851:7, 881:21
suspected [1] - 927:17 888:20, 889:14, testifying [2] - 861:2, 894:11, 905:1, timetable [2] - 923:23,
SUSSMAN [1] - 949:15 890:23, 940:1, 954:13 905:3, 908:10, 925:1
SUSSMANN [1] - 943:12 testimony [13] - 829:7, 912:25, 913:18, tip [1] - 852:5
825:6 sustained [1] - 875:21 833:7, 842:7, 851:1, 918:5, 919:10, title [2] - 870:12,
Sussmann [108] - switch [1] - 866:17 863:7, 868:2, 930:8, 930:10, 905:18
827:4, 827:13, switched [3] - 866:25, 940:14, 944:19, 938:19, 939:6, titled [1] - 942:22
827:23, 828:25, 867:1, 867:4 948:17, 948:21, 947:25, 948:4, to-day [1] - 920:10
832:19, 833:17, switching [1] - 963:13 950:4, 959:20, 962:7 948:7, 948:10, today [14] - 845:18,
835:13, 836:12, system [4] - 846:9, text [41] - 832:24, 948:18, 949:2, 861:2, 863:11,
837:8, 837:13, 846:23, 922:16, 833:3, 833:16, 949:21, 950:3, 888:17, 910:14,
837:14, 838:3, 922:20 833:23, 833:25, 950:16, 959:21, 940:3, 942:17,
839:4, 840:2, 834:11, 835:23, 963:15, 963:18, 943:18, 944:1,
964:2, 964:13,
840:25, 841:20, T 835:24, 842:19, 948:16, 948:17,
842:6, 844:22, 842:24, 848:17, 964:17, 964:20, 953:13, 955:2, 955:5
T-O-R [1] - 867:25 851:6, 859:12, 965:3, 965:11,
846:4, 849:17, Todd [5] - 856:6,
table [2] - 827:8, 862:25, 864:16, 965:15, 965:20,
849:22, 850:1, 856:8, 856:12,
840:22 864:20, 864:21, 966:1, 966:11,
852:19, 857:12, 862:16, 864:4
tank [2] - 935:25, 868:20, 875:14, 966:15
858:9, 859:2, together [4] - 850:8,
936:1 897:3, 899:15, themselves [1] -
859:16, 862:15, 889:15, 889:23,
task [1] - 885:1 899:23, 900:2, 917:14
864:21, 864:24, 950:2
865:17, 871:7, tea [2] - 923:24, 925:1 901:7, 901:15, then-US [1] - 965:17 toll [2] - 901:24,
875:3, 875:12, team [12] - 870:9, 901:21, 901:24, there) [1] - 910:4 902:12
875:18, 875:23, 870:13, 872:13, 903:2, 905:20, thereafter [2] - 912:16, tomorrow [4] - 897:24,
876:1, 879:7, 887:22, 889:3, 907:17, 923:13, 918:14 923:19, 926:2, 966:6
880:14, 880:21, 889:19, 889:22, 925:18, 925:23, therefore [1] - 857:7 took [14] - 835:2,
883:24, 885:1, 890:1, 890:8, 894:1, 926:4, 937:16, they've [1] - 959:8 840:24, 850:11,
885:4, 885:6, 894:2, 911:21 938:2, 938:3, thick [1] - 850:6 857:8, 857:22,
885:16, 885:25, technical [1] - 913:7 941:17, 947:6, thinking [3] - 848:3, 878:8, 878:9,
888:23, 889:2, technically [1] - 947:7, 962:3 848:4, 955:3 878:12, 902:4,
893:8, 894:15, 944:20 texted [1] - 902:5 third [4] - 846:19, 918:19, 922:24,
896:6, 896:9, 897:3, telephone [1] - 929:23 texting [1] - 898:6 846:20, 870:24, 935:21, 936:18,
897:15, 898:6, ten [1] - 869:21 texts [1] - 833:23 959:25 961:5
898:9, 899:14, tenor [2] - 882:4, thanked [1] - 903:19 thoughtfully [1] - top [10] - 834:12,
899:15, 899:18, 942:10 THE [90] - 825:1, 827:20 851:22, 854:24,
901:6, 902:23, tentative [1] - 909:23 825:1, 825:10, thoughts [1] - 830:14 873:17, 878:17,
903:3, 903:9, 904:6, term [2] - 839:15, 827:2, 827:6, threat [4] - 854:12, 897:14, 908:5,
904:11, 918:23, 877:7 827:10, 827:14, 951:22, 953:2, 923:7, 927:19,
919:25, 923:13, terms [9] - 858:18, 827:16, 827:23, 953:18 933:10
923:25, 924:1, 861:11, 869:8, 828:4, 828:8, three [9] - 844:1, topic [4] - 868:13,
924:25, 925:7, 869:11, 870:11, 828:19, 829:5, 844:6, 850:9, 932:20, 964:17,
925:13, 925:21, 871:24, 889:13, 829:16, 829:20, 868:23, 870:18, 964:21
932:23, 933:20, 929:1, 930:9 830:22, 831:4, 890:10, 890:11, topics [1] - 963:13
934:3, 937:3, terrible [2] - 945:2, 831:12, 831:15, 894:1, 894:3 TOR [17] - 846:24,
937:17, 937:19, 946:4 831:22, 831:25, throughout [2] - 847:4, 847:6, 847:7,
938:3, 938:11, terrorist [1] - 867:13 832:3, 832:10, 861:3, 874:7 847:9, 860:1, 860:2,
940:10, 941:6, Terzaken [1] - 960:1 832:11, 839:1, thumb [7] - 850:9, 860:4, 867:25,
987
868:9, 868:10, 939:16, 939:25, 920:17, 928:11, 864:20, 865:17, vs [2] - 825:5, 827:4
868:11, 868:14, 940:24, 944:17, 939:14, 945:18 880:15, 880:17,
868:17, 868:18 945:19, 955:13, typed [1] - 833:24 881:15, 883:23, W
total [5] - 904:13, 957:25, 960:25 types [1] - 836:24 884:3, 884:10,
904:16, 910:20, Trump's [1] - 960:20 885:7, 894:21, w/him [1] - 875:6
typical [2] - 846:16,
944:19, 944:20 Trump-related [1] - 963:4 900:4, 900:5, 903:4, w/Michael [1] - 839:4
totally [1] - 945:23 944:17 typically [4] - 874:5, 904:4, 906:1, 906:9, WA [1] - 938:6
touch [2] - 904:3, Trump/Russia [1] - 927:2, 958:21, 906:13, 909:18, wait [2] - 927:7,
933:14 881:18 958:23 909:23, 914:18, 927:11
towards [6] - 841:22, trusted [2] - 835:25, 934:25, 940:1, walk [6] - 837:10,
940:3, 940:13, 837:12, 837:20,
874:21, 937:3, 842:18 U 839:2, 862:6, 883:3
937:13, 949:5, trustworthy [1] - 945:11, 945:14,
961:12 844:18 U.S [5] - 825:22, 947:15, 955:11, walking [2] - 945:16
town [1] - 876:24 867:19, 916:8, 955:14, 956:5, Wall [4] - 845:6, 866:4,
truth [2] - 947:24,
916:14, 939:24 961:6, 962:14, 964:4 941:22, 941:23
trace [1] - 846:21 948:20
ultimate [1] - 965:16 updates [3] - 921:1, wants [1] - 949:19
training [1] - 870:20 truthful [2] - 842:18,
892:19 unable [3] - 897:21, 921:4, 941:14 warrants [1] - 828:18
traitor [3] - 940:11,
898:18, 901:8 upsetting [2] - 945:6, wash [2] - 866:3,
942:12, 942:13 truthfully [1] - 928:24
unauthorized [4] - 945:8 875:7
traitors [1] - 945:23 try [12] - 836:3,
926:23, 927:10, upwards [1] - 894:2 Washington [10] -
TRANSCRIPT [1] - 853:19, 853:21,
928:16, 929:13 urgency [8] - 848:3, 825:15, 825:23,
825:9 859:25, 884:23,
892:19, 912:11, unclear [1] - 910:16 848:4, 858:7, 836:20, 839:24,
transcript [18] -
928:14, 935:10, uncomfortable [1] - 859:18, 866:9, 845:5, 866:3, 875:8,
828:22, 828:23,
937:8, 945:14, 960:9 891:19 868:25, 881:23, 936:1, 939:13,
828:25, 947:1,
947:15, 948:2, trying [14] - 856:22, uncommon [2] - 885:6 967:13
948:5, 948:8, 856:23, 857:9, 851:23, 851:25 urgent [2] - 835:25, waste [1] - 957:20
948:19, 949:1, 858:6, 863:23, under [5] - 832:9, 866:11 wasting [1] - 957:18
949:3, 959:5, 868:17, 896:21, 857:1, 863:4, 867:5, US [1] - 965:17 WATKINS [1] - 825:18
959:14, 959:18, 912:19, 914:11, 944:23 users [1] - 848:11 ways [2] - 852:6,
959:23, 960:9, 950:5, 956:18, underlying [1] - 928:14
917:13 weeds [1] - 920:24
967:5, 967:6 961:22, 962:18, V
transcripts [3] - 962:23 understood [18] - week [5] - 849:10,
835:3, 835:7, 846:8, validate [1] - 915:8 919:17, 933:12,
958:22, 958:23, turn [3] - 833:9,
850:10, 864:23, validity [1] - 857:2 933:13, 944:10
958:25 907:11, 911:1
872:25, 873:8, vantage [1] - 873:20 weekly [1] - 872:12
transferring [1] - turned [1] - 946:16
898:16, 915:9, variety [2] - 852:6, weeks [4] - 868:24,
834:21 turning [1] - 865:25
924:7, 924:20, 928:14 919:17, 922:12,
traumatic [1] - 946:1 turnstiles [1] - 837:23
925:4, 929:11, various [1] - 834:3 922:13
travel [3] - 897:22, TV [1] - 908:23
929:24, 930:9, veracity [2] - 915:3 weigh [1] - 892:23
898:22, 899:7 twice [2] - 872:11,
935:19, 939:11, verdict [2] - 888:13, welcome [3] - 831:17,
traveling [1] - 899:1 872:16
944:24 893:24 832:3, 894:10
TRIAL [1] - 825:9 twice-daily [1] -
undertake [1] - 920:1 Verizon [2] - 885:23, well-known [1] - 845:8
trickling [2] - 923:21, 872:11
undertook [1] - 918:24 900:9 well-regarded [1] -
924:17 Twitter [4] - 936:3,
unfortunately [1] - versus [1] - 914:23 844:18
Trisha [2] - 871:6, 936:6, 936:7, 936:11
893:17 vibrant [1] - 837:17 whatsoever [2] -
874:7 two [21] - 841:14,
unit [1] - 871:1 victim [1] - 952:14 929:9, 953:6
true [3] - 867:6, 967:4, 846:6, 850:9,
878:17, 882:22, UNITED [3] - 825:1, view [13] - 848:1, whoa [2] - 935:14
967:6
888:22, 902:21, 825:3, 825:10 848:22, 866:9, whole [8] - 835:4,
Trump [34] - 841:11,
904:18, 906:22, United [10] - 825:12, 871:7, 913:13, 835:6, 853:25,
843:11, 845:25,
910:21, 919:17, 827:3, 827:7, 913:14, 915:11, 854:1, 871:2,
846:13, 847:11,
925:18, 925:20, 841:12, 853:20, 919:19, 919:21, 917:24, 945:11,
854:11, 854:15,
933:7, 936:10, 882:8, 889:6, 892:9, 919:23, 945:22, 946:12
854:20, 854:23,
939:23, 944:14, 945:6, 967:11 952:4, 953:13 Whoops [1] - 883:8
867:12, 867:17,
944:19, 944:20, unseat [1] - 893:14 voir [1] - 889:12 wide [1] - 946:11
868:5, 868:6,
868:24, 869:5, 960:16, 961:14 unsure [1] - 917:15 volition [1] - 893:4 wife [1] - 888:23
869:10, 881:19, two-minute [1] - up [42] - 831:21, voluntarily [1] - willing [5] - 835:21,
882:6, 913:10, 906:22 832:23, 833:25, 893:19 880:3, 880:19,
914:14, 919:2, type [9] - 846:8, 835:15, 836:23, volunteer [1] - 955:24 884:12, 946:7
920:3, 924:12, 859:23, 880:9, 838:15, 846:17, vouch [1] - 862:2 WITNESS [3] - 826:2,
938:12, 939:15, 914:14, 920:2, 850:4, 862:15, vouching [1] - 856:23 832:10, 894:11
988
woke [1] - 900:4

women [1] - 889:25
wonder [1] - 952:3
word [4] - 837:16,
935:12, 961:19,
961:25
words [11] - 833:18,
844:15, 848:25,
863:7, 871:10,
876:14, 917:14,
927:9, 940:17,
941:1, 948:20
world [2] - 849:3,
849:5
worried [2] - 917:10,
918:11
wrapped [3] - 906:1,
906:9, 906:13
write [3] - 838:5,
915:23, 918:3
writer [1] - 874:19
writes [3] - 836:7,
909:8, 909:17
written [2] - 841:2,
880:17
wrote [3] - 874:19,
874:21, 910:3
WSJ [1] - 866:3
Y
YAO [1] - 825:17
Yao [1] - 827:12
year [2] - 888:21,
890:12
years [10] - 860:15,
869:19, 889:21,
889:24, 894:1,
894:3, 916:15,
919:15, 933:7,
952:24
yesterday [8] - 828:12,
830:24, 832:18,
832:25, 835:4,
835:8, 836:11, 858:8
York [13] - 825:19,
845:6, 866:2,
903:14, 904:1,
905:25, 912:10,
912:16, 913:25,
914:7, 916:17,
921:13, 924:21
Yorker [2] - 933:12,
937:20
young [1] - 889:25
younger [1] - 890:25
yourself [1] - 960:2

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825

1 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

6 MICHAEL A. SUSSMANN, *MORNING SESSION*

2 THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: Your Honor, we're back on

3 the record for Criminal Case 21-582, United States of

4 America vs. Michael Sussmann.

5 MS. SHAW: Good morning, Your Honor.

6 THE COURT: Good morning.

7 MS. SHAW: Brittain Shaw on behalf of the United

8 States. I'm joined at counsel table by Jonathan Algor,

9 Andrew DeFilippis, Kori Arsenault, and John Durham.

10 THE COURT: Good morning.

11 MR. BERKOWITZ: Good morning, Your Honor; Sean

12 Berkowitz, Michael Bosworth, Natalie Rao, Catherine Yao on

13 behalf of Mr. Sussmann, who is present in court.

14 THE COURT: Good morning, everybody.

15 MR. BERKOWITZ: Good morning.

16 THE COURT: All right.

17 Mr. Berkowitz, I received your motion last night

18 on the motion to strike. Do you want to be heard further?

19 MR. BERKOWITZ: Your Honor, we very much

20 appreciate your counsel. We had time to thoughtfully

21 deliberate, and I think that our motion speaks for itself.

22 If you have questions, we're here to answer them.

23 THE COURT: Okay. You say that Mr. Sussmann

24 hasn't made a decision to testify yet. Is the motion

25 conditional on that decision? Do we need to do anything if

2 MR. BERKOWITZ: I don't think we need to do

3 anything if he chooses to testify, Your Honor.

4 THE COURT: Okay.

5 Mr. DeFilippis? Ms. Shaw.

6 MS. SHAW: Me again, I'm afraid. Thank you, Your

8 THE COURT: You're his counsel.

9 MS. SHAW: I guess so by default.

10 Your Honor, it would be the government's position

11 that certainly the motion for a mistrial is not needed in

12 this case. As Your Honor noted yesterday, this was a

13 nonresponsive answer to a question elicited by defense

14 counsel, and it would certainly be within the Court's

15 discretion to strike certain portions of that and perhaps

16 make necessary instruction concerning the nonresponsiveness

17 at some point, but we don't believe it rises to the level of

18 anything that warrants a mistrial, Your Honor.

19 THE COURT: Okay. The Court will deny the

20 defense's motion for a mistrial, to the extent it has made

21 one, but is prepared to strike the nonresponsive portions of

22 the transcript. And it is routine for parties to highlight

23 portions of the transcript in closings, and the defense --

24 and both sides would be able to do that based on the revised

25 transcript in the event Mr. Sussmann chooses not to testify,

2 MS. SHAW: Thank you, Your Honor.

3 I just wanted to flag a few things for Your

5 THE COURT: Sure.

6 MS. SHAW: -- before we started this morning.

7 First, during Mr. Baker's testimony we plan to

9 not -- you know, may need an instruction on what a

10 stipulation would be.

11 And then additionally, we plan to be offering the

12 notes of Mr. Priestap and Ms. Anderson through Mr. Baker,

13 and I understand that defense counsel's been consulted on

14 this matter and consents to this. So I just wanted to flag

15 that for Your Honor.

16 THE COURT: So how is it going to come in? He has

6 MICHAEL A. SUSSMANN, MORNING SESSION