Professional Documents
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Gibbs Etc
Gibbs Etc
First to be determined is whether it is the Bahrain law Section 48 has not been repealed or amended by the
on prescription of action based on the Amiri Decree Civil Code of the Philippines. Article 2270 of said
No. 23 of 1976 or a Philippine law on prescription that Code repealed only those provisions of the Code of
shall be the governing law. Civil Procedures as to which were inconsistent with it.
There is no provision in the Civil Code of the
Article 156 of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 Philippines, which is inconsistent with or contradictory
provides: to Section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Paras,
Philippine Conflict of Laws 104 [7th ed.]).
In the light of the 1987 Constitution, however, Section Code shall be filed within three (3)
48 cannot be enforced ex proprio vigore insofar as it years from the time the cause of
ordains the application in this jurisdiction of Section action accrued, otherwise they shall
156 of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976. be forever barred.
The courts of the forum will not enforce any foreign xxx xxx xxx
claim obnoxious to the forum's public policy
(Canadian Northern Railway Co. v. Eggen, 252 U.S. The case of Philippine Air Lines Employees
553, 40 S. Ct. 402, 64 L. ed. 713 [1920]). To enforce Association v. Philippine Air Lines, Inc., 70 SCRA 244
the one-year prescriptive period of the Amiri Decree (1976) invoked by the claimants in G.R. Nos. 104911-
No. 23 of 1976 as regards the claims in question 14 is inapplicable to the cases at bench (Rollo, p. 21).
would contravene the public policy on the protection The said case involved the correct computation of
to labor. overtime pay as provided in the collective bargaining
agreements and not the Eight-Hour Labor Law.
In the Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the
1987 Constitution emphasized that: As noted by the Court: "That is precisely why
petitioners did not make any reference as to the
The state shall promote social justice in all phases of computation for overtime work under the Eight-Hour
national development. (Sec. 10). Labor Law (Secs. 3 and 4, CA No. 494) and instead
insisted that work computation provided in the
The state affirms labor as a primary social economic collective bargaining agreements between the parties
force. It shall protect the rights of workers and be observed. Since the claim for pay differentials is
promote their welfare (Sec. 18). primarily anchored on the written contracts between
the litigants, the ten-year prescriptive period provided
In article XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights, the by Art. 1144(1) of the New Civil Code should govern."
1987 Constitution provides:
Section 7-a of the Eight-Hour Labor Law (CA No. 444
Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, as amended by R.A. No. 19933) provides:
local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and
promote full employment and equality of employment Any action to enforce any cause of action under this
opportunities for all. Act shall be commenced within three years after the
cause of action accrued otherwise such action shall
Having determined that the applicable law on be forever barred, . . . .
prescription is the Philippine law, the next question is
whether the prescriptive period governing the filing of The court further explained:
the claims is three years, as provided by the Labor
Code or ten years, as provided by the Civil Code of The three-year prescriptive period fixed in the Eight-
the Philippines. Hour Labor Law (CA No. 444 as amended) will apply,
if the claim for differentials for overtime work is solely
The claimants are of the view that the applicable based on said law, and not on a collective bargaining
provision is Article 1144 of the Civil Code of the agreement or any other contract. In the instant case,
Philippines, which provides: the claim for overtime compensation is not so much
because of Commonwealth Act No. 444, as amended
The following actions must be brought within ten but because the claim is demandable right of the
years from the time the right of action accrues: employees, by reason of the above-mentioned
collective bargaining agreement.
(1) Upon a written contract;
Section 7-a of the Eight-Hour Labor Law provides the
(2) Upon an obligation created by law; prescriptive period for filing "actions to enforce any
cause of action under said law." On the other hand,
(3) Upon a judgment. Article 291 of the Labor Code of the Philippines
provides the prescriptive period for filing "money
NLRC, on the other hand, believes that the applicable claims arising from employer-employee relations."
provision is Article 291 of the Labor Code of the The claims in the cases at bench all arose from the
Philippines, which in pertinent part provides: employer-employee relations, which is broader in
scope than claims arising from a specific law or from
Money claims-all money claims arising the collective bargaining agreement.
from employer-employee relations
accruing during the effectivity of this
The contention of the POEA Administrator, that the where they had their domicile. Jacquelyn was
three-year prescriptive period under Article 291 of the injured while riding a motor truck driven by
Labor Code of the Philippines applies only to money
claims specifically recoverable under said Code, does Gleason in California. Jaccquelyn filed an
not find support in the plain language of the provision. action against Gleason and Continental Casualty
Neither is the contention of the claimants in G.R. Nos. Company to recover damages. Defendants
104911-14 that said Article refers only to claims Gleason and Continental moved for dismissal
"arising from the employer's violation of the
employee's right," as provided by the Labor Code on the grounds of spousal immunity under
supported by the facial reading of the provision. California law. [State of the wrong: California;
State of domicile: Wisconsin]
HAUMSCHILD VS. CONTINENTAL
CASUALTY Issue:
(1959)
Where the place of the wrong prohibits
husbands and wives from suing each other for
Brief Fact Summary negligence, may the court of the spouses’
domicile apply its own law which would allow
Mrs. Haumschild (Plaintiff) was injured as a
such suits?
result of her husband’s negligence while they
were traveling in California. She brought suit
in Wisconsin where they lived.
Held
Yes. Where the place of the wrong prohibits
Synopsis of Rule of Law husbands and wives from suing each other for
negligence, the court of the spouses’ domicile
Interspousal immunity for tort actions is a rule
may apply its own law that would allow such
of family law and not tort law and the law of the
suits. This case presents the issue of capacity to
spouses’ domicile governs, not the law of the
sue due to marital status. This relates to
place where the wrong occurred.
substantive family law and not to substantive
tort law. While the majority of the states
recognize the place of the wrong as governing
Quick Facts: Jacquelyn Haumschild and LeRoy capacity, we feel that the state of the domicile
Gleason were married in Lincoln, Wisconsin, has a greater interest in such cases than the state
where they had their domicile. Jacquelyn was where the wrong took place. While California’s
injured while riding a motor truck driven by conflict of laws rule would refer to our law to
Gleason in California. Jacquelyn filed an action determine the wife’s capacity, we do not feel it
against Gleason and Continental Casualty proper to resort to the awkward principles of
Company to recover damages. Defendants renvoi to accomplish what we feel to be the
Gleason and Continental moved for dismissal desired result. The law of the place of the
on the ground of spousal immunity under wrong will govern as to substantive tort law, but
California law. The court held that capacity to the law of the domicile will govern as to
sue is governed by law of the domicile while capacity to sue. Mrs. Haumschild (Plaintiff)
tort issue is governed by law where tort took should be allowed to recover.
place.
Facts: Jacquelyn Haumschild and LeRoy
Gleason were married in Lincoln, Wisconsin,
Interspousal Liability for Automobile Accidents destroyed the "one person" concept thereby
in the Conflict of Laws: Law and Reason versus leaving as the other remaining reason for the
the Restatement," by Alan W. Ford: The lex fori immunity the objective of preventing family
and the lex loci delicti rules have already been discord, same reason for denying an
criticized as inadequate. Between them, these unemancipated child the capacity to sue a
two rules encompass all of the American cases. parent, brother, or sister. Clearly this policy
To find a more-desirable alternative we must, reason for denying the capacity to sue more
therefore, go beyond those cases. The foreign properly lies within the sphere of family law,
experience, briefly discussed above, is a useful where domicile usually controls the law to be
starting point. As that experience suggests, there applied, than it does tort law, where the place of
is some logic in separating questions of status injury generally determines the substantive law
and tort, in determining the incidents of the which will govern.
marital relationship by the family law, and the
problems of tort by the law of torts. If a
conflicts problem is involved, there is no reason
why both questions should be determined by the From both the standpoint of public policy and
law of torts. Instead, the two questions should logic, the proper solution of the conflict-of-laws
remain separate, and problems of status or problem, in cases similar to the instant action, is
capacity could be referred, by an appropriate to hold that the law of the domicile is the one
conflicts rule, to the law of the place of the that ought to be applied in determining any
domicile." issue of incapacity to sue based upon family
relationship.
Emery v. Emery : “… We think that disabilities
to sue and immunities from suit because of a The reason why the authorities on conflict of
family relationship are more properly laws almost universally reject the renvoi
determined by reference to the law of the state doctrine (permitting a court of the forum state to
of the family domicile. That state has the apply the conflict-of-laws principle of a foreign
primary responsibility for establishing and state) is that it is likely to result in the court
regulating the incidents of the family pursuing a course equivalent to a never-ending
relationship and it is the only state in which the circle. For example, in this case, the Wisconsin
parties can, by participation in the legislative court would first look to the law of California to
processes, effect a change in those incidents. see whether a wife can sue her husband in tort.
Moreover, it is undesirable that the rights, California substantive law holds that she cannot.
duties, disabilities, and immunities conferred or However, California has adopted a conflict-of-
imposed by the family relationship should laws principle that holds that the law of the
constantly change as members of the family domicile determines such question. Applying
cross state boundaries during temporary such principle, the court is referred back to
absences from their home." Wisconsin law because Wisconsin is the state of
domicile…
The two reasons most often advanced for the
common-law rule, that one spouse may not sue
the other, are the ancient concept that husband The Court overruled Court’s six previous
and wife constitute in law but one person, and decisions and partially overruled two others.
that to permit such suits will be to foment However, the decision should not be interpreted
family discord and strife. The Married Women's as a rejection by this court of the general rule
Acts of the various states have effectively that ordinarily the substantive rights of parties
to an action in tort are to be determined in the 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which is
light of the law of the place of wrong. This as follows:
decision merely holds that incapacity to sue ART. 16. Real property as well as personal
because of marital status presents a question of property is subject to the law of the country
family law rather than tort law. where it is situated.
As to his citizenship, we find that the The decision of CFI Davao, sustains the
citizenship that he acquired in California when contention of the executor-appellee that under
he resided in Sacramento from 1904 to 1913, the California Probate Code, a testator may
was never lost by his stay in the Philippines, dispose of his property by will in the form and
and the deceased appears to have considered manner he desires. But HELEN invokes the
himself as a citizen of California by the fact that provisions of Article 946 of the Civil Code of
when he executed his will he declared that he California, which is as follows:
was a citizen of that State; so that he appears
never to have intended to abandon his If there is no law to the contrary, in the place
California citizenship by acquiring another. But where personal property is situated, it is
at the time of his death, he was domiciled in deemed to follow the person of its owner, and
the Philippines. is governed by the law of his domicile.
What law will govern, as to the After careful consideration of the
determination of the testatrix’ domicile which evidences, it was ruled that according to
will affect the dispositions of the will: French or French law, in administering the movable
English law? property of the deceased foreigner who,
according to the law of his country, is domiciled
RULING: in France, and whose property must, according
to that law, be applied in accordance with the
Domicile flows from the combination of law of the country in which she was domiciled,
fact and intention, the fact of residence and the will apply French municipal law, even though
intention of remaining for an unlimited time.
The intention required is not an intention
the deceased had not complied with Art. 13 of trial court rendered judgment in favor of
the French Civil Code. Clara. The university appealed.
FACTS:
Then it was found that there were some
George Dater (defendant) and John objections to certain delinquent taxes of
Price (defendant), both from Michigan, 1927. Further negotiations followed,
owned real property in Chicago, Illinois. and finally on January 3, 1929, and after
Dater and Price entered into the tax objections were cleared in the
negotiations with the University of tile, the loan was actually made and the
Chicago (university) (plaintiff) to borrow money paid over by check made
$75,000. Dater and Price offered the payable to Mr. and Mrs. Dater and Mr.
Chicago property as collateral for the and Mrs. Price and cashed in Chicago,
loan. The university agreed to lend Ill. January 29, 1929, John R. Price
Dater and Price the money so long as died, and it is conceded that Mrs. Price
title to the property was good. Dater and became the actual and record owner of
his wife, Nellie, along with Price and his at least one-half of the property after the
wife, Clara, (defendants) executed death of her husband. Subsequent to
promissory notes and a trust deed at a December 1, 1933, foreclosure
bank in Michigan. The documents were proceedings were commenced on the
mailed from Michigan to the university’s property and the property purchased at
agent in Chicago, where the trust deed chancery sale. Suit was filed in Michigan
was subsequently recorded. After John before the foreclosure suit was
Price died, Clara became the owner of completed in Chicago. Judgment was
at least one-half of the Chicago rendered in favor of plaintiff against
property. Four years later, the property George R. Dater in the amount of SI
went into foreclosure because Clara 5,536.32 and from which no appeal has
could not make payments on the loan. been taken. Judgment was also entered
The university filed suit in Michigan state in favor of Clara Price from which she
court to collect on the promissory note. appeals It is conceded that under the
The trial court rendered a $15,536 law of Illinois a married woman is as free
judgment in favor of the university to contract as a man, while in Michigan
against George Dater. Additionally, the a married woman has not the legal
capacity to bind herself or her separate
estate by signing these notes. University Assuming, however, that by the Michigan law
of Chicago: contends that the contract of the forum the case is governed by the law of
was an Illinois contract; The signing of Illinois, it presents the unique situation in the
the notes in Michigan was not the final realm of conflict of laws that by the law of
act in the making of the contract, but Illinois the case is governed by law of Michigan
rather a preliminary step. The delivery based on the case of Burr v. Beckler. In that
of the note being conditional upon the case the court held held that delivery of the
defendant's producing a satisfactory note and trust deed by the wife was complete
title, the approval of the title in Illinois in Florida, the law of that state governed her
was the last act necessary to make a capacity to contract, and, because she was not
legal delivery. competent to enter into a contract under the
law of Florida, her note and trust deed were
void.
Issue:
whether the Connectcut choice of rule be
applied
Held:
No, the court held that there is no reason for
applying Connecticuts choice of rule as it would
PFAU VS. TRENT ALUMINIUM CO. frustrate the very goal of governmental interest
(1970) analysis. Connectcuts choice of law rule doe
not identify the states interest in the matter. the
lex loci rule was born in an effort to achieve
simplicity and uniformity and does not relate to
states interest in having its law applied to given
issues in a tort case. ISSUE: Whether or not the petition of the
oppositor-appeallants is valid.
We conclude that since Iowa has no interest in
this litigation, and since the substantive laws of HELD: No, the Court ruled that their petition is
Connecticut and New Jersey are the same, this invalid, that the illegitimate children are not
case presents a false conflict and the entitled to the legitimes under the Texas law
Connecticut plaintiff should have the right to because the deceased’s citizenship is from the
maintain an action for ordinary negligence in State of Texas and therefore the National rule
our courts. for the deceased is applied.
In the present case, the decedent was BOTH a
national and a domiciliary of Texas at the time
of his death. So that even assuming that Texas
has a conflicts of law rule providing that the law
of the domicile should govern, the same
would not result in a reference back
(renvoi) to Philippine law, but would still refer
to Texas Law.
BELLIS VS. BELLIS
Likewise, Assuming that the decedent’s
G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967 intention in executing a separate Philippine will
that decedent intended Philippine law to govern
(1968)
his Phillipine state, it will NOT ALTER the law,
If a Texan (US) provides in his will that his
for as this Court ruled in Miciano v. Brimo, 60
properties in the Philippines should be
Phil. 867, 870, a provision in a foreigner’s will
distributed in accordance with the Philippine
to the effect that his properties shall be
law on succession, the provision is to be
distributed in accordance with Philippine law
regarded as VOID because it contravenes Art.
and not with his national law, is illegal and void
16 (par. 2) which ordains the application of his
for his national law, in this regard, cannot be
own national law. Thus, if the Texan, under
ignored.
Texan law, has no compulsory heirs, the
Philippine law on the legitimes of compulsory
(1) Said children are NOT entitled to their
heirs cannot be applied.
legitimes for under Texas law which we must
apply (because it is the national law of the
FACTS:
deceased), there are no legitimes. (See Art. 16,
par. 2, Civil Code).
Amos G. Bellis was a citizen and resident of
(2) The renvoi doctrine, applied in Testate
Texas at the time of his death. Before he died,
Estate of Edward Christensen, Aznar v.
he had made two wills, one disposing of his
Christensen Garcia, L6759, Jan. 31, 1963,
Texas properties, the other, disposing of his
cannot be applied. Said doctrine is usually
Philippine properties. When Bellis died his will
pertinent where the decedent is a national of
was admitted to probate in the CFI of manila
one country, and a domiciliary of another.
nad project partition of was made according to
the stipulations in the will. The illegitimate
Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts rule
children opposed the wills on the ground
adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling
that they have been deprived of the legitimes.
for the application of the law of the place where
(to which they would be entitled, if Philippine
the properties are situated, renvoi would arise,
law were to apply). Furthermore, under Texas
since the properties here involved are found in
Law, there are no compulsory heirs and
the Philippines.
therefore, no legitimes.
another. It does not apply to a case where the
In the absence however of proof as to the decedent was a citizen of Texas and was
conflicts of law rule in Texas, it should not be domiciled therein at the time of his death. So
presumed different from ours. (Lim v. that, even assuming that Texas has a conflicts
Collector, 36 Phil. 427; In re Testate Estate rule providing that the domiciliary law should
of Suntay, 95 Phil. 500). govern successional rights, the same would not
result in a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine
(3) The contention that the national law of the law, but it would still refer to Texas law.
deceased (Art. 16, par. 2; Art. 1039) should be Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts rule,
disregarded because of Art. 17, par. 3 which in adopting the rule of lex rei sitae, which calls for
effect provides that our prohibitive laws should the application of the law of the place where
not be rendered nugatory by foreign laws, is the properties are situated, renvoi would arise,
WRONG, firstly, because Art. 16, par. 2 and where the properties involved are found in the
Art. 1039 are special provisions while Art. 17, Philippines.
par. 3 is merely a general provision; and
secondly, because Congress deleted the
Same; Foreign laws.—In the absence of proof
phrase “notwithstanding the provisions of this
as to the conflicts rule of Texas, it would be
and the next preceding article” when it
presumed to be the same as our local conflicts
incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil Code as
rule.
Art. 17 of the new Civil Code, while
reproducing without substantial change, the
second paragraph of Art. 10 of the old Civil Same; Applicability of national law to
Code as Art. 16 in the new. It must have succession; Capacity to succeed—The
been its purpose to make the second decedent's national law governs the order of
paragraph of Art. 16 a specific provision in succession, the amount of successional rights,
itself, which must be applied in testate and the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will
intestate successions. As further indication of and capacity to succeed.
this legislative intent, Congress added a new
provision, under Art. 1039, which decrees that Same; Testamentary provision that
capacity to succeed is to be governed by the successional right to decedent's estate
national law of the decedent. It is, therefore, would be governed by law other than his
evident that whatever public policy or good national law is void.—A provision in a
customs may be involved in our system of foreigner's will that his properties should be
legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend distributed in accordance with Philippine law
the same to the succession of foreign and not in accordance with his national law is
nationals.(4) It has been pointed out by the void, being contrary to article 16 of the New
oppositor that the decedent executed two wills Civil Code.
—one to govern his Texas estate and the
other his Philippine estate —arguing from
this that he intended Philippine law to Same; System of legitimes does not apply
govern his Philippine estate. to estate of a citizen of Texas.—Where the
decedent was a citizen of Texas and under
Texas laws there are no forced heirs, the
system of legitimes in Philippine law cannot be
applied to the succession to the decedent's
testate because the intrinsic validity of the
NOTES: provisions of the decedent's will and the
amount of successional rights are to be
DOCTRINES: Wills; Succession; Conflict of determined under Texas law.
laws; Renvoi doctrine.—The doctrine of
renvoi is usually pertinent where the decedent
is a national of one country and is domiciled in
laws between Philippines and Texas law), and
the proper distribution of Linnie’s, Charles’, and
their conjugal estates.
Facts:
PCIB MAGNO
Issue: WON the Texas Law should apply
Article 16 of the Civil On the other hand, Ruling:
Code provides that respondent Magno
"the denies It cannot be determined what law of Texas
applies, since neither parties presented
national law of the that Mrs. Hodges evidence to prove the law of Texas. As stated
person whose died a resident of in the decision:
succession is under the Philippines,
consideration, since allegedly she “The Court regrets, however, that it cannot do
whatever may be the never changed nor so, for the simple reason that neither the
nature of the property intended to change evidence submitted by the parties in the court
and regardless of the her original below nor their discussion, in their respective
country wherein said residence of birth in briefs and memoranda before Us, of their
property may be Texas, United respective contentions on the pertinent legal
found", shall prevail. States of America, issues, of grave importance as they are,
and contends that, appear to Us to be adequate enough to enable
However, the Conflict anyway, regardless Us to render an intelligent comprehensive and
of Law of Texas, of the question of just resolution. For one thing, there is no clear
which is the "national her residence, she and reliable proof of what in fact the possibly
law" of the testatrix, being indisputably a applicable laws of Texas are.”
Linnie Jane Hodges, citizen of Texas,
provide that the under said Article 16 It should be borne in mind that as above-
domiciliary law of the Civil Code, indicated, the question of what are the laws of
the distribution of Texas governing the matters herein issue is, in
(Philippine law — see her estate is subject the first instance, one of fact, not of law.
paragraph 2, supra) to the laws of said Elementary is the rule that foreign laws may
not be taken judicial notice of and have to be
proven like any other fact in dispute between inapplicable to his father’s will as the the deceased
the parties in any proceeding, with the rare testator was not resident of State of illinois
exception in instances when the said laws are
already within the actual knowledge of the Issue: Whether or not there was deprivation of due
court, such as when they are well and process on the part of the petition.
generally known or they have been actually
Held: No.
ruled upon in other cases before it and none of
the parties concerned do not claim otherwise. Due publication was made pursuant to this order of
the court through the three-week publication of the
notice in Manila Daily Bulletin. The Supreme Court
also asserted that in view of the statute concerned
which reads as “A will made within the Philippine
Islands by a citizen or subject of another state or
country, which is executed in accordance with the law
of the state or country of which he is a citizen or
subject, and which might be proved and allowed by
the law of his own state or country, may be proved,
allowed, and recorded in the Philippine Islands, and
shall have the same effect as if executed according to
the laws of these Islands” the “state”, being not
capitalized, does not mean that United States is
excluded from the phrase (because during this time,
IN RE: ESTATE OF JOHNSON Philippines was still a territory of the US).
(1918)
WALTON VS. ARABIAN AMERICAN OIL CO.
(1956)
Facts:
DOCTRINE:
On February 4, 1916, Emil H. Johnson, a
native of Sweden and a naturalized citizen of the
United States, died in the city of Manila. He left a will Where comprehension of foreign law is not
disposing an estate with an estimated amount of easy, then, a court abuses its discretion under
P231,800. The will was written in the testator’s own that statute perhaps if it takes judicial notice of
handwriting, and is signed by himself and two foreign law when it is not pleaded, and surely
witnesses only, instead of three witnesses required by does so unless the party, who would otherwise
section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This will, have had the burden of proving that law, has in
therefore, was not executed in conformity with the some way adequately assisted the court in
provisions of law generally applicable to wills judicially learning it.
executed by inhabitants of these Islands, and hence
could not have been proved under section 618. FACTS:
A probate proceeding was filed on the ground that 1) Leo Walton is a citizen and resident of
Johnson was, at the time of his death, a citizen of the Arkansas, who, while temporarily in Saudi
State of Illinois, United States of America; 2) that the Arabia, was seriously injured when an
will was duly executed in accordance with the laws of automobile he was driving collided with a truck
that State; and hence could properly be probated here owned by Arabian American Oil Company,
pursuant to section 636 of the Code of Civil driven by one of its employees. Arabian
Procedure. American Oil Company is a corporation
incorporated in Delaware, licensed to do
However, Ebba Ingelborg, the alleged daughter of
Johmson files for the annulment of the decree of business in New York, and engaged in
probate and commencement of intestate extensive business activities in Saudi Arabia.
administration of state alleging that Illionoise law is Walton’s complaint did not allege pertinent
Saudi Arabian 'law,' nor at the trial did he prove
or offer to prove it. Arabian American Oil
Company did not, in its answer, allege such
'law,' and Arabian American Oil Company did
not prove or offer to prove it. There was
evidence from which it might have been
inferred, reasonably, that, under well-
established New York decisions, Arabian
American Oil Company was negligent and
therefore liable to Walton. The trial judge,
saying he would not take judicial notice of
Saudi-Arabian 'law,' directed a verdict in favor
of Arabian American Oil Company and gave
judgment against Walton.
ISSUE:
RULING:
FACTS:
RULING: No, the trial court is correct in dismissing Hence, Supreme Court held that evidence
the motion for involuntary dismissal of complaint. sustained finding that money paid by plaintiff to
defendant was a loan which plaintiff was entitled to
In this case, the court decided based upon the recover.
presumption that the law of France in common with
that of other civilized countries recognizes a liability
to make repayment under the facts present in the case.