GIBBS vs. GOVT. OF THE PHILIPPINE Philippine Islands.

This Government, therefore, may

ISLANDS apply the principles and rules of private international
G.R. No. L-35694, December 23, 1933 law (conflict of laws) on the same footing as an
ALLISON D. GIBBS organized territory or state of the United States.
vs. THE GOVER Under the provisions of the Civil Code and the
NMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, jurisprudence prevailing here, the wife, upon the
THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF THE CITY acquisition of any conjugal property, becomes
OF MANILA immediately vested with an interest and title therein
No. 35694. December 23, 1933 equal to that of her husband, subject to the power of
Facts management and disposition which the law vests
 in the husband. Immediately upon her death, if there
This involves three parcels of lands; belonged to the c are no obligations of the decedent, as is true in
onjugal partnership of Allison and Eva Gibbs; latter the present case, her share in the conjugal property is
died intestate in California; both were citizens transmitted to her heirs by succession.
and domiciled in the US. The wife of the appellee was, by the law of the
 Philippine Islands, vested of a descendible interest,
Allison was declared as the sole owner (Sec. 1401 of equal to that of her husband, in the Philippine lands
the Civil Code of California) in a California court covered by certificates of title Nos. 20880, 28336
and is now enforcing the foreign judgment by and 28331, from the date of their acquisition to the
seeking the transfer certificates of the lands to his date of her death.
name. The descendible interest here in question in the
 Register of Deeds:declined because not paid the lands aforesaid was transmitted to her heirs by
inheritance tax imposed. virtue of inheritance and this transmission plainly falls
 CFI :affirmed the foreign judgment; within the language of section 1536 of Article
upon the death of the wife, the entire community XI of Chapter 40 of the Administrative Code which
property without administration be longs to the levies a tax on inheritances.
surviving husband; because she never had more than
an inchoate interest or expectancy which is
extinguished upon her death.
SC: remanded the case to the court of origin for new GRANT VS. MCAULIFFE
trial upon additional evidence in regard to the 41 CAL. 2d 859 (1953)
pertinent law of California in force at the
time of the death of Mrs. Gibbs and the acquisition of FACTS:
the land. Pullen was a resident of California and the driver of
The appellee contends that the law of California an automobile who died as result of an auto accident
should determine the nature and extent of the title, in which he was allegedly the negligent party. 
that vested in Eva Gibbs under the three TCTs
The accident took place in Arizona. Grant, also a
citing article 9 of the Civil Code. But that, even if the
nature and extent of her title under said certificates be
resident of California, was injured in the accident and
governed by the law of the Philippine Islands, sought damages from McAuliffe (Defendant),
the laws of California govern the succession to such Pullen’s administrator.
title, citing the second paragraph of article 10 of Under California law, tort actions survive the
the Civil Code. tortfeasor’s death, however, under Arizona law they
Issue: Whether do not.
Eva Gibbs at the time of her death the owner of a The California trial court found that Arizona law
descendible interesting the Philippine lands above applied since it was a substantive rather than
-mentioned procedural nature and, therefore, granted McAuliffe’s
Held: YES (Defendant) motion to abate Plaintiff’s suit.
Ratio:
Plaintiff Grant appealed, arguing that the law was in
The attention of the court has not been called to any
law of California that incapacitates a married
fact procedural and therefore the law of the forum,
woman from acquiring or holding land in a foreign California, should apply.
jurisdiction in accordance with the lex rei sitæ. ISSUE: Is a survival statute as to tort actions
The Organic Act of the Philippine Islands (Act of substantive law that would govern litigation over
Congress, August 29, 1916, known as the "Jones injuries sustained wherever the case is tried?
Law") as regards the determination of private rights, HELD: No.  A survival statute as to tort actions is not
grants practical autonomy to the Government of the substantive law that would govern litigation over
injuries sustained wherever the case is tried. This
court recognizes the doctrine that the substantive law IICompromise Agreements
of the place of the wrong must govern litigation the parties had arrived at a compromise agreement
wherever it is tried.  However, the forum state may and the corresponding motions for the approval of the
always follow its own procedural rules of law.  agreements were filed by the parties and approved by
the Court:
Since the authorities are split on whether a survival
statute is procedural or substantive, this court will IIIThe facts as found by the NLRC are as follows:
determine which argument has the most merit. 
Because a survival statute does not create a new cause it appears that the complainants-
of action but simply allows the continuation of an appellants allege that they were
existing action, it is procedural.  All the relevant recruited by respondent-appellant
contacts are with California and the survival statute AIBC for its accredited foreign
does not relate to liability but is a procedural rule to principal, Brown & Root, on various
enforce claims for damages.  Since a court may dates from 1975 to 1983. They were
always follow its own procedural rules, this case may all deployed at various projects
properly be tried under California law. Reversed and undertaken by Brown & Root in
several countries in the Middle East,
remanded.
such as Saudi Arabia, Libya, United
Arab Emirates and Bahrain, as well as
in Southeast Asia, in Indonesia and
CADALIN VS. POEA ADMIN Malaysia.
238 SCRA 721 (1994)
Having been officially processed as
FACTS overseas contract workers by the
In 1984, Bienvenido M.. Cadalin, et.al. instituted a Philippine Government, all the
class suit with the Philippine Overseas Employment individual complainants signed
Administration (POEA) for money claims arising from standard overseas employment
their recruitment by AIBC and employment by BRII. contracts
BRII is a foreign corporation with headquarters in
Houston, Texas, and is engaged in construction; while ISSUES:The issues raised before and resolved by the
AIBC is a domestic corporation licensed as a service NLRC were:
contractor to recruit, mobilize and deploy Filipino
workers for overseas employment on behalf of its First: — Whether or not complainants are entitled to
foreign principals. the benefits provided by Amiri Decree No. 23 of
The complaint sought the payment of the unexpired Bahrain;
portion of the employment contracts, which was
terminated prematurely, and secondarily, the payment (a) Whether or not the complainants who have worked
of the interest of the earnings of the Travel and in Bahrain are entitled to the above-mentioned
Reserved Fund, interest on all the unpaid benefits; benefits.
area wage and salary differential pay; fringe benefits;
refund of SSS and premium not remitted to the SSS; (b) Whether or not Art. 44 of the same Decree
refund of withholding tax not remitted to the BIR; (allegedly prescribing a more favorable treatment of
penalties for committing prohibited practices; as well alien employees) bars complainants from enjoying its
as the suspension of the license of AIBC and the benefits.
accreditation of BRII.
In 1989, the POEA Administrator rendered his Second: — Assuming that Amiri Decree No. 23 of
decision which awarded the amount of $824,652.44 in Bahrain is applicable in these cases, whether or not
favor of only 324 complainants. complainants' claim for the benefits provided therein
In 1991, NLRC promulgated its Resolution, disposing have prescribed.
as follows:
Anent the first issue, NLRC set aside Section 1, Rule
1. The claims of the 94 complainants identified and 129 of the 1989 Revised Rules on Evidence
listed in Annex "A" hereof are dismissed for having governing the pleading and proof of a foreign law and
prescribed; admitted in evidence a simple copy of the Bahrain's
xxx Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 (Labour Law for the
3. The awards given by the POEA to the 19 Private Sector). NLRC invoked Article 221 of the
complainants classified and listed in Annex "C" Labor Code of the Philippines, vesting on the
hereof, who appear to have worked elsewhere than in Commission ample discretion to use every and all
Bahrain are hereby set aside. reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case
without regard to the technicalities of law or A claim arising out of a contract of employment shall
procedure. NLRC agreed with the POEA not be actionable after the lapse of one year from the
Administrator that the Amiri Decree No. 23, being date of the expiry of the contract. (G.R. Nos. 105029-
more favorable and beneficial to the workers, should 31, Rollo, p. 226).
form part of the overseas employment contract of the
complainants. As a general rule, a foreign procedural law will not be
applied in the forum. Procedural matters, such as
NLRC, however, held that the Amiri Decree No. 23 service of process, joinder of actions, period and
applied only to the claimants, who worked in Bahrain, requisites for appeal, and so forth, are governed by
and set aside awards of the POEA Administrator in the laws of the forum. This is true even if the action is
favor of the claimants, who worked elsewhere. based upon a foreign substantive law (Restatement of
the Conflict of Laws, Sec. 685; Salonga, Private
On the second issue, NLRC ruled that the prescriptive International Law, 131 [1979]).
period for the filing of the claims of the complainants
was three years, as provided in Article 291 of the A law on prescription of actions is sui generis in
Labor Code of the Philippines, and not ten years as Conflict of Laws in the sense that it may be viewed
provided in Article 1144 of the Civil Code of the either as procedural or substantive, depending on the
Philippines nor one year as provided in the Amiri characterization given such a law.
Decree No. 23 of 1976.
Thus in Bournias v. Atlantic Maritime Company,
supra, the American court applied the statute of
limitations of New York, instead of the Panamanian
VIG.R. No. 104776; G.R. Nos. 104911-14; G.R. Nos. law, after finding that there was no showing that the
105029-32 Panamanian law on prescription was intended to be
substantive. Being considered merely a procedural
All the petitions raise the common issue of law even in Panama, it has to give way to the law of
prescription although they disagreed as to the time the forum on prescription of actions.
that should be embraced within the prescriptive
period. However, the characterization of a statute into a
procedural or substantive law becomes irrelevant
To the POEA Administrator, the prescriptive period when the country of the forum has a "borrowing
was ten years, applying Article 1144 of the Civil Code statute." Said statute has the practical effect of
of the Philippines. NLRC believed otherwise, fixing the treating the foreign statute of limitation as one of
prescriptive period at three years as provided in substance (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws 152-153
Article 291 of the Labor Code of the Philippines. [1938]). A "borrowing statute" directs the state of the
forum to apply the foreign statute of limitations to the
The claimants in G.R. No. 104776 and G.R. Nos. pending claims based on a foreign law (Siegel,
104911-14, invoking different grounds, insisted that Conflicts, 183 [1975]). While there are several kinds of
NLRC erred in ruling that the prescriptive period "borrowing statutes," one form provides that an action
applicable to the claims was three years, instead of barred by the laws of the place where it accrued, will
ten years, as found by the POEA Administrator. not be enforced in the forum even though the local
statute has not run against it (Goodrich and Scoles,
The Solicitor General expressed his personal view Conflict of Laws, 152-153 [1938]). Section 48 of our
that the prescriptive period was one year as Code of Civil Procedure is of this kind. Said Section
prescribed by the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 but he provides:
deferred to the ruling of NLRC that Article 291 of the
Labor Code of the Philippines was the operative law. If by the laws of the state or country where the cause
of action arose, the action is barred, it is also barred in
RULING: the Philippines Islands.

First to be determined is whether it is the Bahrain law Section 48 has not been repealed or amended by the
on prescription of action based on the Amiri Decree Civil Code of the Philippines. Article 2270 of said
No. 23 of 1976 or a Philippine law on prescription that Code repealed only those provisions of the Code of
shall be the governing law. Civil Procedures as to which were inconsistent with it.
There is no provision in the Civil Code of the
Article 156 of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 Philippines, which is inconsistent with or contradictory
provides: to Section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Paras,
Philippine Conflict of Laws 104 [7th ed.]).
In the light of the 1987 Constitution, however, Section Code shall be filed within three (3)
48 cannot be enforced ex proprio vigore insofar as it years from the time the cause of
ordains the application in this jurisdiction of Section action accrued, otherwise they shall
156 of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976. be forever barred.

The courts of the forum will not enforce any foreign xxx xxx xxx
claim obnoxious to the forum's public policy
(Canadian Northern Railway Co. v. Eggen, 252 U.S. The case of Philippine Air Lines Employees
553, 40 S. Ct. 402, 64 L. ed. 713 [1920]). To enforce Association v. Philippine Air Lines, Inc., 70 SCRA 244
the one-year prescriptive period of the Amiri Decree (1976) invoked by the claimants in G.R. Nos. 104911-
No. 23 of 1976 as regards the claims in question 14 is inapplicable to the cases at bench (Rollo, p. 21).
would contravene the public policy on the protection The said case involved the correct computation of
to labor. overtime pay as provided in the collective bargaining
agreements and not the Eight-Hour Labor Law.
In the Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the
1987 Constitution emphasized that: As noted by the Court: "That is precisely why
petitioners did not make any reference as to the
The state shall promote social justice in all phases of computation for overtime work under the Eight-Hour
national development. (Sec. 10). Labor Law (Secs. 3 and 4, CA No. 494) and instead
insisted that work computation provided in the
The state affirms labor as a primary social economic collective bargaining agreements between the parties
force. It shall protect the rights of workers and be observed. Since the claim for pay differentials is
promote their welfare (Sec. 18). primarily anchored on the written contracts between
the litigants, the ten-year prescriptive period provided
In article XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights, the by Art. 1144(1) of the New Civil Code should govern."
1987 Constitution provides:
Section 7-a of the Eight-Hour Labor Law (CA No. 444
Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, as amended by R.A. No. 19933) provides:
local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and
promote full employment and equality of employment Any action to enforce any cause of action under this
opportunities for all. Act shall be commenced within three years after the
cause of action accrued otherwise such action shall
Having determined that the applicable law on be forever barred, . . . .
prescription is the Philippine law, the next question is
whether the prescriptive period governing the filing of The court further explained:
the claims is three years, as provided by the Labor
Code or ten years, as provided by the Civil Code of The three-year prescriptive period fixed in the Eight-
the Philippines. Hour Labor Law (CA No. 444 as amended) will apply,
if the claim for differentials for overtime work is solely
The claimants are of the view that the applicable based on said law, and not on a collective bargaining
provision is Article 1144 of the Civil Code of the agreement or any other contract. In the instant case,
Philippines, which provides: the claim for overtime compensation is not so much
because of Commonwealth Act No. 444, as amended
The following actions must be brought within ten but because the claim is demandable right of the
years from the time the right of action accrues: employees, by reason of the above-mentioned
collective bargaining agreement.
(1) Upon a written contract;
Section 7-a of the Eight-Hour Labor Law provides the
(2) Upon an obligation created by law; prescriptive period for filing "actions to enforce any
cause of action under said law." On the other hand,
(3) Upon a judgment. Article 291 of the Labor Code of the Philippines
provides the prescriptive period for filing "money
NLRC, on the other hand, believes that the applicable claims arising from employer-employee relations."
provision is Article 291 of the Labor Code of the The claims in the cases at bench all arose from the
Philippines, which in pertinent part provides: employer-employee relations, which is broader in
scope than claims arising from a specific law or from
Money claims-all money claims arising the collective bargaining agreement.
from employer-employee relations
accruing during the effectivity of this
The contention of the POEA Administrator, that the where they had their domicile. Jacquelyn was
three-year prescriptive period under Article 291 of the injured while riding a motor truck driven by
Labor Code of the Philippines applies only to money
claims specifically recoverable under said Code, does Gleason in California. Jaccquelyn filed an
not find support in the plain language of the provision. action against Gleason and Continental Casualty
Neither is the contention of the claimants in G.R. Nos. Company to recover damages. Defendants
104911-14 that said Article refers only to claims Gleason and Continental moved for dismissal
"arising from the employer's violation of the
employee's right," as provided by the Labor Code on the grounds of spousal immunity under
supported by the facial reading of the provision. California law. [State of the wrong: California;
State of domicile: Wisconsin]
 
 
HAUMSCHILD VS. CONTINENTAL
CASUALTY Issue:
(1959)
Where the place of the wrong prohibits
husbands and wives from suing each other for
Brief Fact Summary negligence, may the court of the spouses’
domicile apply its own law which would allow
Mrs. Haumschild (Plaintiff) was injured as a
such suits?
result of her husband’s negligence while they
were traveling in California.  She brought suit  
in Wisconsin where they lived.
Held
 
Yes. Where the place of the wrong prohibits
Synopsis of Rule of Law husbands and wives from suing each other for
negligence, the court of the spouses’ domicile
Interspousal immunity for tort actions is a rule
may apply its own law that would allow such
of family law and not tort law and the law of the
suits.  This case presents the issue of capacity to
spouses’ domicile governs, not the law of the
sue due to marital status.  This relates to
place where the wrong occurred.
substantive family law and not to substantive
  tort law.  While the majority of the states
recognize the place of the wrong as governing
Quick Facts: Jacquelyn Haumschild and LeRoy capacity, we feel that the state of the domicile
Gleason were married in Lincoln, Wisconsin, has a greater interest in such cases than the state
where they had their domicile. Jacquelyn was where the wrong took place.  While California’s
injured while riding a motor truck driven by conflict of laws rule would refer to our law to
Gleason in California. Jacquelyn filed an action determine the wife’s capacity, we do not feel it
against Gleason and Continental Casualty proper to resort to the awkward principles of
Company to recover damages. Defendants renvoi to accomplish what we feel to be the
Gleason and Continental moved for dismissal desired result.  The law of the place of the
on the ground of spousal immunity under wrong will govern as to substantive tort law, but
California law. The court held that capacity to the law of the domicile will govern as to
sue is governed by law of the domicile while capacity to sue.  Mrs. Haumschild (Plaintiff)
tort issue is governed by law where tort took should be allowed to recover. 
place.
 
Facts: Jacquelyn Haumschild and LeRoy
Gleason were married in Lincoln, Wisconsin,
Interspousal Liability for Automobile Accidents destroyed the "one person" concept thereby
in the Conflict of Laws: Law and Reason versus leaving as the other remaining reason for the
the Restatement," by Alan W. Ford: The lex fori immunity the objective of preventing family
and the lex loci delicti rules have already been discord, same reason for denying an
criticized as inadequate. Between them, these unemancipated child the capacity to sue a
two rules encompass all of the American cases. parent, brother, or sister. Clearly this policy
To find a more-desirable alternative we must, reason for denying the capacity to sue more
therefore, go beyond those cases. The foreign properly lies within the sphere of family law,
experience, briefly discussed above, is a useful where domicile usually controls the law to be
starting point. As that experience suggests, there applied, than it does tort law, where the place of
is some logic in separating questions of status injury generally determines the substantive law
and tort, in determining the incidents of the which will govern.
marital relationship by the family law, and the
problems of tort by the law of torts. If a  
conflicts problem is involved, there is no reason
why both questions should be determined by the From both the standpoint of public policy and
law of torts. Instead, the two questions should logic, the proper solution of the conflict-of-laws
remain separate, and problems of status or problem, in cases similar to the instant action, is
capacity could be referred, by an appropriate to hold that the law of the domicile is the one
conflicts rule, to the law of the place of the that ought to be applied in determining any
domicile." issue of incapacity to sue based upon family
relationship.
 
 
Emery v. Emery : “… We think that disabilities
to sue and immunities from suit because of a The reason why the authorities on conflict of
family relationship are more properly laws almost universally reject the renvoi
determined by reference to the law of the state doctrine (permitting a court of the forum state to
of the family domicile. That state has the apply the conflict-of-laws principle of a foreign
primary responsibility for establishing and state) is that it is likely to result in the court
regulating the incidents of the family pursuing a course equivalent to a never-ending
relationship and it is the only state in which the circle. For example, in this case, the Wisconsin
parties can, by participation in the legislative court would first look to the law of California to
processes, effect a change in those incidents. see whether a wife can sue her husband in tort.
Moreover, it is undesirable that the rights, California substantive law holds that she cannot.
duties, disabilities, and immunities conferred or However, California has adopted a conflict-of-
imposed by the family relationship should laws principle that holds that the law of the
constantly change as members of the family domicile determines such question. Applying
cross state boundaries during temporary such principle, the court is referred back to
absences from their home." Wisconsin law because Wisconsin is the state of
domicile…
 The two reasons most often advanced for the
common-law rule, that one spouse may not sue  
the other, are the ancient concept that husband The Court overruled Court’s six previous
and wife constitute in law but one person, and decisions and partially overruled two others.
that to permit such suits will be to foment However, the decision should not be interpreted
family discord and strife. The Married Women's as a rejection by this court of the general rule
Acts of the various states have effectively that ordinarily the substantive rights of parties
to an action in tort are to be determined in the 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which is
light of the law of the place of wrong. This as follows:
decision merely holds that incapacity to sue ART. 16. Real property as well as personal
because of marital status presents a question of property is subject to the law of the country
family law rather than tort law.  where it is situated.

However, intestate and testamentary

AZNAR VS. GARCIA successions, both with respect to the order of
117 PHIL. 106 (1963) succession and to the amount of successional
FACTS: rights and to the intrinsic validity of
EDWARD Christensen died testate. The estate testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by
was distributed by Executioner Aznar the national law of the person whose
according to the will, which provides that: Php succession is under consideration, whatever
3,600 be given to HELEN Christensen as her may be the nature of the property and
legacy, and the rest of his estate to his regardless of the country where said property
daughter LUCY Christensen, as pronounced by may be found.
CFI Davao.
The application of this article in the case at bar
Opposition to the approval of the project of requires the determination of the meaning of
partition was filed by Helen, insofar as it the term “national law” is used therein.
deprives her of her legitime as an
acknowledged natural child, she having been The next question is: What is the law in
declared by Us an acknowledged natural child California governing the disposition of personal
of the deceased Edward in an earlier case. property?

As to his citizenship, we find that the The decision of CFI Davao, sustains the
citizenship that he acquired in California when contention of the executor-appellee that under
he resided in Sacramento from 1904 to 1913, the California Probate Code, a testator may
was never lost by his stay in the Philippines, dispose of his property by will in the form and
and the deceased appears to have considered manner he desires. But HELEN invokes the
himself as a citizen of California by the fact that provisions of Article 946 of the Civil Code of
when he executed his will he declared that he California, which is as follows:
was a citizen of that State; so that he appears
never to have intended to abandon his If there is no law to the contrary, in the place
California citizenship by acquiring another. But where personal property is situated, it is
at the time of his death, he was domiciled in deemed to follow the person of its owner, and
the Philippines. is governed by the law of his domicile.

It is argued on executor’s behalf that as the

ISSUE: What law on succession should apply, deceased Christensen was a citizen of the
the Philippine law or the California law? State of California, the internal law thereof,
which is that given in the Kaufman case,
HELD: should govern the determination of the validity
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is of the testamentary provisions of Christensen’s
hereby reversed and the case returned to the will, such law being in force in the State of
lower court with instructions that the partition California of which Christensen was a citizen.
be made as the Philippine law on succession Appellant, on the other hand, insists that Article
provides. 946 should be applicable, and in accordance
therewith and following the doctrine of the
The law that governs the validity of his renvoi, the question of the validity of the
testamentary dispositions is defined in Article testamentary provision in question should be
referred back to the law of the decedent’s will then be like a football, tossed back and
domicile, which is the Philippines. forth between the two states, between the
country of which the decedent was a citizen
We note that Article 946 of the California Civil and the country of his domicile. The Philippine
Code is its conflict of laws rule, while the rule court must apply its own law as directed in the
applied in In re Kaufman, its internal law. If the conflict of laws rule of the state of the
law on succession and the conflict of laws rules decedent, if the question has to be decided,
of California are to be enforced jointly, each in especially as the application of the internal law
its own intended and appropriate sphere, the of California provides no legitime for children
principle cited In re Kaufman should apply to while the Philippine law, Arts. 887(4) and 894,
citizens living in the State, but Article 946 Civil Code of the Philippines, makes natural
should apply to such of its citizens as are not children legally acknowledged as forced heirs
domiciled in California but in other jurisdictions. of the parent recognizing them.
The rule laid down of resorting to the law of the
domicile in the determination of matters with We therefore find that as the domicile of the
foreign element involved is in accord with the deceased Edward, a citizen of California, is the
general principle of American law that the Philippines, the validity of the provisions of his
domiciliary law should govern in most matters will depriving his acknowledged natural child,
or rights which follow the person of the owner. the appellant HELEN, should be governed by
the Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to
Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Art. 946 of the Civil Code of California, not by
Code of the Philippines pointed out as the the internal law of California. 
national law is the internal law of California. But
as explained above, the laws of California have NOTES: There is no single American law
prescribed two sets of laws for its citizens, one governing the validity of testamentary
for residents therein and another for those provisions in the United States, each state of
domiciled in other jurisdictions. the Union having its own private law applicable
  to its citizens only and in force only within the
It is argued on appellees’ (Aznar and LUCY) state. The “national law” indicated in Article 16
behalf that the clause “if there is no law to the of the Civil Code above quoted cannot,
contrary in the place where the property is therefore, possibly mean or apply to any
situated” in Sec. 946 of the California Civil general American law. So it can refer to no
Code refers to Article 16 of the Civil Code of other than the private law of the State of
the Philippines and that the law to the contrary California.
in the Philippines is the provision in said Article
16 that the national law of the deceased should ANNESLY, DAVIDSON VS. ANNESLY
govern. This contention can not be sustained. 1926
 
As explained in the various authorities cited FACTS:
above, the national law mentioned in Article 16
of our Civil Code is the law on conflict of laws          Sybil Annesley, a British woman,
in the California Civil Code, i.e., Article 946, married James O’Donel Annesley whose
which authorizes the reference or return of the domicile was English and lived in France. After
question to the law of the testator’s domicile. her husband’s death, she resided continuously
The conflict of laws rule in California, Article there until her death in 1924. She never took
946, Civil Code, precisely refers back the case, steps prescribed by Art. 13 of the French Civil
when a decedent is not domiciled in California, Code to obtain a formal French domicile.
to the law of his domicile, the Philippines in the
case at bar. The court of the domicile can not          At the time of her death, she owned an
and should not refer the case back to immovable property in France (Chateau de
California; such action would leave the issue Quillebaudy), and movable property (trust
incapable of determination because the case money) both in France and in England.
         On November 1919, she executed a specifically directed to a change of domicile,
holograph will in French language, stating that but an intention of residing in a country for an
her two daughters had their share of her unlimited time. The Court here conceded that
property. domicile cannot depend upon mere
declaration, though the fact of the declaration
         On December 1919, she likewise having been made must be one of the
executed in France a will in English form, elements to be weighed in arriving at a
revoking all former testamentary dispositions. conclusion on the question of domicile.
The will also provide that after all dispositions
of her real and personal estate, the ultimate          The question whether Sybil Annesley
residue is given to her daughter, Miss Annesly, died domiciled in France must be answered by
absolutely. In addition, the will also contained ascertaining whether she had abandoned her
provisions wherein Sybil stated that she has no English domicile and had acquired a French
intention of abandoning her England domicile, domicile of choice in accordance with the
and that she intend to remain a British subject. requirements of the English law – namely, by
On July 1921, she executed also in France a the
codicil in English form, confirming her
dispositions in the will. 1.       Factum of residence coupled with
animus manendi, and

2.       That regardless of the question

BASED ON: BASED ON: FRENCH
whether she had not complied with
BRITISH LAW LAW (FRANCE)
the formalities required by French
(ENGLAND)
law to be carried out by her before
she could rank as a domiciled
Testatrix is Testatrix should comply French woman.
domiciled in with Art. 13 to acquire
France French domicile.               Testatrix’ domicile at the time of
(England is still her her death was French.
domicile)
         French Law accordingly applies, but the
question remains: what French law? According
No law on how to Testatrix could only to French municipal law, the law applicable in
dispose estate. dispose of 1/3 of her the case of a foreigner not legally domiciled in
personal property. France is the law of that person’s nationality, in
this case is British. But the law of that
nationality refers the question back to French
         Probate proceedings on the will were law, the law of the domicile; and the question
made before the English Courts. arises, will the French law accept this reference
back, or renvoi, and apply French municipal
ISSUE: law?

         What law will govern, as to the          After careful consideration of the
determination of the testatrix’ domicile which evidences, it was ruled that according to
will affect the dispositions of the will: French or French law, in administering the movable
English law?   property of the deceased foreigner who,
according to the law of his country, is domiciled
RULING:   in France, and whose property must, according
to that law, be applied in accordance with the
         Domicile flows from the combination of law of the country in which she was domiciled,
fact and intention, the fact of residence and the will apply French municipal law, even though
intention of remaining for an unlimited time.
The intention required is not an intention
the deceased had not complied with Art. 13 of trial court rendered judgment in favor of
the French Civil Code. Clara. The university appealed.

         Regards her English personal estate

and her French movable property the testatrix
in this case had power only to dispose of 1/3 by
her will. 

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO VS. DATER

(1936)

FACTS:
 Then it was found that there were some
 George Dater (defendant) and John objections to certain delinquent taxes of
Price (defendant), both from Michigan, 1927.  Further negotiations followed,
owned real property in Chicago, Illinois. and finally on January 3, 1929, and after
Dater and Price entered into the tax objections were cleared in the
negotiations with the University of tile, the loan was actually made and the
Chicago (university) (plaintiff) to borrow money paid over by check made
$75,000. Dater and Price offered the payable to Mr. and Mrs. Dater and Mr.
Chicago property as collateral for the and Mrs. Price and cashed in Chicago,
loan. The university agreed to lend Ill.  January 29, 1929, John R. Price
Dater and Price the money so long as died, and it is conceded that Mrs. Price
title to the property was good. Dater and became the actual and record owner of
his wife, Nellie, along with Price and his at least one-half of the property after the
wife, Clara, (defendants) executed death of her husband.  Subsequent to
promissory notes and a trust deed at a December 1, 1933, foreclosure
bank in Michigan. The documents were proceedings were commenced on the
mailed from Michigan to the university’s property and the property purchased at
agent in Chicago, where the trust deed chancery sale. Suit was filed in Michigan
was subsequently recorded. After John before the foreclosure suit was
Price died, Clara became the owner of completed in Chicago.  Judgment was
at least one-half of the Chicago rendered in favor of plaintiff against
property. Four years later, the property George R. Dater in the amount of SI
went into foreclosure because Clara 5,536.32 and from which no appeal has
could not make payments on the loan. been taken. Judgment was also entered
The university filed suit in Michigan state in favor of Clara Price from which she
court to collect on the promissory note. appeals  It is conceded that under the
The trial court rendered a $15,536 law of Illinois a married woman is as free
judgment in favor of the university to contract as a man, while in Michigan
against George Dater. Additionally, the a married woman has not the legal
capacity to bind herself or her separate
 estate by signing these notes. University Assuming, however, that by the Michigan law
of Chicago: contends that the contract of the forum the case is governed by the law of
was an Illinois contract;  The signing of Illinois, it presents the unique situation in the
the notes in Michigan was not the final realm of conflict of laws that by the law of
act in the making of the contract, but Illinois the case is governed by law of Michigan
rather a preliminary step.  The delivery based on the case of Burr v. Beckler. In that
of the note being conditional upon the case the court held held that delivery of the
defendant's producing a satisfactory note and trust deed by the wife was complete
title, the approval of the title in Illinois in Florida, the law of that state governed her
was the last act necessary to make a capacity to contract, and, because she was not
legal delivery. competent to enter into a contract under the
law of Florida, her note and trust deed were
  void. 

The Burr Case is directly applicable, and,

consequently, under the law of Illinois, it must
be held that the capacity of defendant Clara A.
Price is governed by the law of Michigan.
Under the law of Michigan, a married woman
cannot bind her separate estate through
ISSUE:
personal engagement for the benefit of others.
1. Whether or not Michigan law or Illinois Defendant Price is not liable.
law governs this case? - MICHIGAN

2. Whether or not Clara Price is not liable?-

But, it is claimed, that the obligation was
NOT LIABLE
accepted in the state of Illinois, and was there
payable and, by the law of that state, Mrs.
Price is not saved from liability by reason of
RULING: want of capacity under the Michigan law of
coverture.  The personal liability of Mrs. Price
This case does not involve conflict of laws could not be enforced in Illinois under the
relative to the construction, force, and effect of theory of an Illinois contract.  In this case, the
the instruments, signed or executed in one negotiations for the loan, to be secured by a
state to be performed in another- but that of mortgage, had reached the stage where the
the capacity of Mrs. Price to enter into such an lender prepared the note and mortgage in
obligation in Michigan.  Illinois and sent the same to an agent in
Michigan, with direction as to execution by
A settled rule where the contract is either defendants in the latter state-when executed, it
expressly or tacitly to be performed in some was then to be returned by such agent to the
place other than where it is made in conformity mortgagee in Illinois.  Mrs. Price, at the request
to the presumed intention of the parties, the of the agent, executed the instruments and the
contract (as to its validity, nature, obligation, agent mailed the same to the mortgagee, It
and interpretation) is to be governed by the law must be agreed that this case is governed by
of the place of performance, but such rule the law of Michigan or of Illinois.  (Because
cannot be applied to the question of the married women cannot contract). 
capacity of married woman to contract.

If by the law of Michigan, it is clear, and is not

disputed, that defendant has no personal Burr v. Beckler.  In Burr v. Beckler, the wife, a
liability on the note, recoverable from her resident of Illinois, was sojourning temporarily
separate estate. in Florida. Her husband owed a concern (a
business, I think) in Illinois, of which he was Facts:
treasurer, on an overdraft.  He informed his
wife that he could borrow the necessary money
to pay the overdraft from an estate of which he Steven Pfau (plaintiff) and Bruce Trent
was trustee.  The wife executed a note and (defendant) attended the same college in
trust deed in Florida and mailed them to her Iowa. Pfau was a domiciliary of
husband, as trustee, at Chicago, Ill., as he had Connecticut, Trent of New Jersey. While on
directed her to do.  The husband also signed campus, Trent operated a vehicle owned by
the trust deed. In this case, the court held that his father’s company, Trent Aluminum Co.
delivery of the note and trust deed by the wife
(defendant), a New Jersey corporation.
was complete in Florida, the law of that state
governed her capacity to contract, and,
Pfau was a passenger in Trent’s vehicle
because she was not competent to enter into a when Trent got into an accident in Iowa.
contract under the law of Florida, her note and Pfau was injured. He sued Trent and Trent
trust deed were void.  In neither case had there Aluminum in a New Jersey court for
been a binding engagement by the mortgagee negligence. Defendants asserted, as a
to make the loan prior to the delivery.  In defense, application of Iowa’s guest statute,
neither case had the money been paid in which precluded a guest-passenger from
advance of the delivery or contemporaneously suing the host-driver for ordinary
therewith.  There is nothing in the Burr Case to negligence. Defendants further argued that
indicate that the mortgagee could not have if Connecticut law rather than Iowa law
refused to make the loan or that the should apply, the court should then also
mortgagors could not have refused to take the
apply Connecticut’s conflict-of-law rules,
money or could not have abandoned the matter
after the wife deposited the papers in the mail. which designated the lex loci delicti—Iowa
The Burr opinion indicates no circumstance in this case—as the governing law for torts.
fixing the effect of the manual delivery which is
not present here.  The sole question presented by this appeal is
whether the Iowa guest statute is applicable to
this action. In Mellk v. Sarahson, 49 N.J. 226
(1967) this Court abandoned the old lex loci
The Burr Case is directly applicable, and, delicti rule for determining choice of law in tort
consequently, under the law of Illinois, it must cases, and adopted the governmental interest
be held that the capacity of defendant Clara A. analysis approach. We did so because we
Price is governed by the law of Michigan. believed that the lex loci delicti doctrine worked
Under the law of Michigan, a married woman unjust results in many cases and ignored the
cannot bind her separate estate through interests which jurisdictions other than that
personal engagement for the benefit of others. where the tort occurred may have in the
Defendant Price is not liable. resolution of the particular issues involved.

Issue:
whether the Connectcut choice of rule be
applied

Held:
No, the court held that there is no reason for
applying Connecticuts choice of rule as it would
PFAU VS. TRENT ALUMINIUM CO. frustrate the very goal of governmental interest
(1970) analysis. Connectcuts choice of law rule doe
not identify the states interest in the matter. the
lex loci rule was born in an effort to achieve
simplicity and uniformity and does not relate to
states interest in having its law applied to given
issues in a tort case. ISSUE: Whether or not the petition of the
oppositor-appeallants is valid. 
We conclude that since Iowa has no interest in
this litigation, and since the substantive laws of HELD: No, the Court ruled that their petition is
Connecticut and New Jersey are the same, this invalid, that the illegitimate children are not
case presents a false conflict and the entitled to the legitimes under the Texas law
Connecticut plaintiff should have the right to because the deceased’s citizenship is from the
maintain an action for ordinary negligence in State of Texas and therefore the National rule
our courts. for the deceased is applied. 
 
In the present case, the decedent was BOTH a
national and a domiciliary of Texas at the time
of his death. So that even assuming that Texas
has a conflicts of law rule providing that the law
of the domicile should govern, the same
would not result in a reference back
(renvoi) to Philippine law, but would still refer
to Texas Law.
BELLIS VS. BELLIS
Likewise, Assuming that the decedent’s
G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967 intention in executing a separate Philippine will
that decedent intended Philippine law to govern
(1968)
his Phillipine state, it will NOT ALTER the law,
If a Texan (US) provides in his will that his
for as this Court ruled in Miciano v. Brimo, 60
properties in the Philippines should be
Phil. 867, 870, a provision in a foreigner’s will
distributed in accordance with the Philippine
to the effect that his properties shall be
law on succession, the provision is to be
distributed in accordance with Philippine law
regarded as VOID because it contravenes Art.
and not with his national law, is illegal and void
16 (par. 2) which ordains the application of his
for his national law, in this regard, cannot be
own national law. Thus, if the Texan, under
ignored.
Texan law, has no compulsory heirs, the
Philippine law on the legitimes of compulsory
(1) Said children are NOT entitled to their
heirs cannot be applied.
legitimes for under Texas law which we must
apply (because it is the national law of the
FACTS:
deceased), there are no legitimes. (See Art. 16,
par. 2, Civil Code).
Amos G. Bellis was a citizen and resident of
(2) The renvoi doctrine, applied in Testate
Texas at the time of his death. Before he died,
Estate of Edward Christensen, Aznar v.
he had made two wills, one disposing of his
Christensen Garcia, L6759, Jan. 31, 1963,
Texas properties, the other, disposing of his
cannot be applied. Said doctrine is usually
Philippine properties. When Bellis died his will
pertinent where the decedent is a national of
was admitted to probate in the CFI of manila
one country, and a domiciliary of another.
nad project partition of was made according to
the stipulations in the will. The illegitimate
Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts rule
children opposed the wills on the ground
adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling
that they have been deprived of the legitimes.
for the application of the law of the place where
(to which they would be entitled, if Philippine
the properties are situated, renvoi would arise,
law were to apply). Furthermore, under Texas
since the properties here involved are found in
Law, there are no compulsory heirs and
the Philippines.
therefore, no legitimes.
 another. It does not apply to a case where the
In the absence however of proof as to the decedent was a citizen of Texas and was
conflicts of law rule in Texas, it should not be domiciled therein at the time of his death. So
presumed different from ours. (Lim v. that, even assuming that Texas has a conflicts
Collector, 36 Phil. 427; In re Testate Estate rule providing that the domiciliary law should
of Suntay, 95 Phil. 500). govern successional rights, the same would not
result in a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine
(3) The contention that the national law of the law, but it would still refer to Texas law.
deceased (Art. 16, par. 2; Art. 1039) should be Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts rule,
disregarded because of Art. 17, par. 3 which in adopting the rule of lex rei sitae, which calls for
effect provides that our prohibitive laws should the application of the law of the place where
not be rendered nugatory by foreign laws, is the properties are situated, renvoi would arise,
WRONG, firstly, because Art. 16, par. 2 and where the properties involved are found in the
Art. 1039 are special provisions while Art. 17, Philippines.
par. 3 is merely a general provision; and
secondly, because Congress deleted the
Same; Foreign laws.—In the absence of proof
phrase “notwithstanding the provisions of this
as to the conflicts rule of Texas, it would be
and the next preceding article” when it
presumed to be the same as our local conflicts
incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil Code as
rule.
Art. 17 of the new Civil Code, while
reproducing without substantial change, the
second paragraph of Art. 10 of the old Civil Same; Applicability of national law to
Code as Art. 16 in the new. It must have succession; Capacity to succeed—The
been its purpose to make the second decedent's national law governs the order of
paragraph of Art. 16 a specific provision in succession, the amount of successional rights,
itself, which must be applied in testate and the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will
intestate successions. As further indication of and capacity to succeed. 
this legislative intent, Congress added a new
provision, under Art. 1039, which decrees that Same; Testamentary provision that
capacity to succeed is to be governed by the successional right to decedent's estate
national law of the decedent. It is, therefore, would be governed by law other than his
evident that whatever public policy or good national law is void.—A provision in a
customs may be involved in our system of foreigner's will that his properties should be
legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend distributed in accordance with Philippine law
the same to the succession of foreign and not in accordance with his national law is
nationals.(4) It has been pointed out by the void, being contrary to article 16 of the New
oppositor that the decedent executed two wills Civil Code.
—one to govern his Texas estate and the
other his Philippine estate —arguing from
this that he intended Philippine law to Same; System of legitimes does not apply
govern his Philippine estate. to estate of a citizen of Texas.—Where the
decedent was a citizen of Texas and under
Texas laws there are no forced heirs, the
system of legitimes in Philippine law cannot be
applied to the succession to the decedent's
testate because the intrinsic validity of the
NOTES: provisions of the decedent's will and the
amount of successional rights are to be
DOCTRINES: Wills; Succession; Conflict of determined under Texas law. 
laws; Renvoi doctrine.—The doctrine of
renvoi is usually pertinent where the decedent
is a national of one country and is domiciled in
 laws between Philippines and Texas law), and
the proper distribution of Linnie’s, Charles’, and
their conjugal estates.

Facts: 

Linnie Jane Hodges and Christian Hodges

were both Americans, originally residing in
Texas.

In her will Linnie said that she would bequeath

all her property to her husband Charles, and
give him the authority to manage it and dispose
of the estate, except the property in Lubbock,
Texas. The will also had a provision that in
case of death of Charles, the estate should be
distributed among her siblings.

So, during the rest of his life Charles was able

to sell and dispose some of the properties in
PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND his capacity as administrator of the estate. At
INDUSTRIAL BANK VS. ESCOLIN some point Charles was stricken ill and
(1974) subsequently dies. His lawyer then filed a
motion for the determination, liquidation, and
DOCTRINE: Elementary is the rule that foreign distribution of the estate to the heirs of both
laws may not be taken judicial notice of and spouses. The lawyer advised that a reference
have to be proven like any other fact in dispute to the will of Charles be made, which was kept
between the parties in any proceeding, with the in an iron vault, and that the employee Avelina
rare exception in instances when the said laws Magno be appointed as administratix of the
are already within the actual knowledge of the estate, because she was the trusted employee
court, such as when they are well and of the spouse.
generally known or they have been actually
ruled upon in other cases before it and none of Thereafter the brother of Charles Hodges, Joe
the parties concerned do not claim otherwise. Hodges appeared and asked that a liquidation
of the assets of Charles be made.
Summary: The Hodges lived in the Philippines
for almost half a century and died leaving Since during the life of Charles he was unable
substantial properties in Iloilo and in the US. to liquidate the estate of his wife, there was a
The missus died 5 years before the husband, question on whether the distribution to the
providing in her will that while her estate would siblings should follow the Texas Law or the
go to him, upon his death, the remainder Philippine Law.
should pass to her siblings. (They were
childless.) The court held that this testamentary
provision, while probably ineffectual as a
substitution under the Civil Code, is not actually
a substitution, but is a valid and simultaneous
institution of heirs, though the passing of title to
the inheritance to the others (the siblings) was
made to depend on a resolutory condition (the
husband’s death). Case was remanded to the
trial court for the determination of the proper
application of the renvoi principle (conflict of
 should govern the State which,
testamentary according to her, do
dispositions and not provide for any
successional rights legitime, hence, the
over movables brothers and sisters
(personal properties), of Mrs. Hodges are
and the law of the entitled to the
situs of the property remainder of the
(also Philippine law as whole of her share
to properties located of the conjugal
in the Philippines) with partnership
regards immovable properties consisting
(real properties). of onehalf thereof.
Thus, applying the
"Renvoi Doctrine", as
approved and applied
by our Supreme Court
in the case of "In The
Matter Of The Testate
Estate of Eduard E.
CONTENTION OF PARTIES Christensen",

PCIB MAGNO
Issue: WON the Texas Law should apply
Article 16 of the Civil On the other hand, Ruling:
Code provides that respondent Magno
"the denies It cannot be determined what law of Texas
applies, since neither parties presented
national law of the that Mrs. Hodges evidence to prove the law of Texas. As stated
person whose died a resident of in the decision:
succession is under the Philippines,
consideration, since allegedly she “The Court regrets, however, that it cannot do
whatever may be the never changed nor so, for the simple reason that neither the
nature of the property intended to change evidence submitted by the parties in the court
and regardless of the her original below nor their discussion, in their respective
country wherein said residence of birth in briefs and memoranda before Us, of their
property may be Texas, United respective contentions on the pertinent legal
found", shall prevail. States of America, issues, of grave importance as they are,
and contends that, appear to Us to be adequate enough to enable
However, the Conflict anyway, regardless Us to render an intelligent comprehensive and
of Law of Texas, of the question of just resolution. For one thing, there is no clear
which is the "national her residence, she and reliable proof of what in fact the possibly
law" of the testatrix, being indisputably a applicable laws of Texas are.”
Linnie Jane Hodges, citizen of Texas,
provide that the under said Article 16 It should be borne in mind that as above-
domiciliary law of the Civil Code, indicated, the question of what are the laws of
the distribution of Texas governing the matters herein issue is, in
(Philippine law — see her estate is subject the first instance, one of fact, not of law.
paragraph 2, supra) to the laws of said Elementary is the rule that foreign laws may
not be taken judicial notice of and have to be
proven like any other fact in dispute between inapplicable to his father’s will as the the deceased
the parties in any proceeding, with the rare testator was not resident of State of illinois
exception in instances when the said laws are
already within the actual knowledge of the Issue:  Whether or not there was deprivation of due
court, such as when they are well and process on the part of the petition.
generally known or they have been actually
Held: No.
ruled upon in other cases before it and none of
the parties concerned do not claim otherwise. Due publication was made pursuant to this order of
the court through the three-week publication of the
notice in Manila Daily Bulletin. The Supreme Court
also asserted that in view of the statute concerned
which reads as “A will made within the Philippine
Islands by a citizen or subject of another state or
country, which is executed in accordance with the law
of the state or country of which he is a citizen or
subject, and which might be proved and allowed by
the law of his own state or country, may be proved,
allowed, and recorded in the Philippine Islands, and
shall have the same effect as if executed according to
the laws of these Islands” the “state”, being not
capitalized, does not mean that United States is
excluded from the phrase (because during this time,
IN RE: ESTATE OF JOHNSON  Philippines was still a territory of the US).
(1918)
WALTON VS. ARABIAN AMERICAN OIL CO. 
(1956)
Facts:
DOCTRINE:
             On February 4, 1916, Emil H. Johnson, a
native of Sweden and a naturalized citizen of the
United States, died in the city of Manila. He left a will Where comprehension of foreign law is not
disposing an estate with an estimated amount of easy, then, a court abuses its discretion under
P231,800. The will was written in the testator’s own that statute perhaps if it takes judicial notice of
handwriting, and is signed by himself and two foreign law when it is not pleaded, and surely
witnesses only, instead of three witnesses required by does so unless the party, who would otherwise
section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This will, have had the burden of proving that law, has in
therefore, was not executed in conformity with the some way adequately assisted the court in
provisions of law generally applicable to wills judicially learning it.
executed by inhabitants of these Islands, and hence
could not have been proved under section 618. FACTS:

A probate proceeding was filed on the ground that 1) Leo Walton is a citizen and resident of
Johnson was, at the time of his death, a citizen of the Arkansas, who, while temporarily in Saudi
State of Illinois, United States of America; 2) that the Arabia, was seriously injured when an
will was duly executed in accordance with the laws of automobile he was driving collided with a truck
that State; and hence could properly be probated here owned by Arabian American Oil Company,
pursuant to section 636 of the Code of Civil driven by one of its employees. Arabian
Procedure. American Oil Company is a corporation
incorporated in Delaware, licensed to do
However, Ebba Ingelborg, the alleged daughter of
Johmson files for the annulment of the decree of business in New York, and engaged in
probate and commencement of intestate extensive business activities in Saudi Arabia.
administration of state alleging that Illionoise law is Walton’s complaint did not allege pertinent
Saudi Arabian 'law,' nor at the trial did he prove
or offer to prove it. Arabian American Oil
Company did not, in its answer, allege such
'law,' and Arabian American Oil Company did
not prove or offer to prove it. There was
evidence from which it might have been
inferred, reasonably, that, under well-
established New York decisions, Arabian
American Oil Company was negligent and
therefore liable to Walton. The trial judge,
saying he would not take judicial notice of
Saudi-Arabian 'law,' directed a verdict in favor
of Arabian American Oil Company and gave
judgment against Walton.

ISSUE:

May the trial court take judicial notice of a

foreign law when it was not pleaded?

RULING:

No. The court found that Walton had the

burden of showing, to the trial court's
satisfaction, Saudi Arabian law, but failed to so LEARY VS. GLEDHILL
prove that law. The court found that, because (1951)
jurisdiction rested on diversity of citizenship,
New York rules of the conflict of laws applied, THOMAS A. LEARY, PLAINTIFF-
which was that the substantive law applicable RESPONDENT, v. WILLIAM L. GLEDHILL,
to an alleged tort was the law of the place DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
where the alleged tort occurred. The court
found that it would have been an abuse of Doctrine: It is presumed that in the absence of proof
discretion had the trial court to take judicial of foreign law, the parties acquiesced in the
notice of the foreign law when it was not application of the law of the forum, either common
pleaded. law or statutory.

FACTS:

Thomas A. Leary brought action against William L.

Gledhill to recover an alleged loan made by plaintiff
to defendant in France. When Leary visited Gedhill in
Paris, the latter asked help from Leary as he is in need
of money but did not mention anything about selling
the plaintiff any shares of stock. Thereafter when
Leary is backed in Germany, he mailed Gedhill a
check payable to the defendant's order for $1,500
without indicating on the check or in the
accompanying letter what the money was for.

Gedhill endorsed the check and converted it into

traveller's checks. The parties did not see each other
again until the day of the trial. The plaintiff failed to
reach the defendant after many attempts to see him at
his home and calling him on the telephone at various  that the parties by failing to prove the law of
times. France have acquiesced in having their dispute
determined by the law of the forum.
Gedhill claimed that money paid to him by the
plaintiff was an investment and moved for an By the application of these various
involuntary dismissal on the ground that the plaintiff's presumptions the courts have in effect treated the
proofs were insufficient, there being no promise to common law rule that foreign law could not be
repay, no demand for repayment, and no pleading or noticed but must be pleaded and proved as if it were a
proof of the law of France where the transaction matter of fact merely as a permissive rule whereby
occurred. either party could, if it were to his advantage, plead
and prove the foreign law. Thus, the failure to plead
When the case was submitted to the jury, Gedhill and prove the foreign law has not generally been
further objected to the charge on the ground that it did considered as fatal.
not instruct the jury to find as a fact what the law of
France was. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the In New Jersey, in the absence of proof as to
plaintiff in the sum of $1,500. the applicable foreign law, the courts have frequently
applied the presumption that the common law exists in
ISSUE: Did the trial court erred in dismissing the the foreign jurisdiction. Here, the defendant is in no
motion for involuntary dismissal of complaint on the way prejudiced by the application of the law of New
ground that the plaintiff's proofs were insufficient Jersey State. If he had desired to raise an issue as to
after it failed to prove a demand for repayment of the the foreign law, he might have done so in his answer
money and no pleading or proof of the law of France or at the pretrial conference or, with permission of the
where the transaction occurred to recover against a court, at the trial itself, and himself have introduced
defendant? proof as to the law of France.

RULING: No, the trial court is correct in dismissing Hence, Supreme Court held that evidence
the motion for involuntary dismissal of complaint. sustained finding that money paid by plaintiff to
defendant was a loan which plaintiff was entitled to
In this case, the court decided based upon the recover.
presumption that the law of France in common with
that of other civilized countries recognizes a liability
to make repayment under the facts present in the case.

Indeed, the transaction occurred in France.

Likewise, the court may properly take judicial
knowledge that France is not a common law, but
rather a civil jurisdiction. It would, therefore, be
inappropriate and indeed contrary to elementary
knowledge to presume that the principles of the
common law prevail there. This does not mean,
however, that the plaintiff must fail in his cause of
action because of the absence of any proof at the trial
as to the applicable law of France. In these
circumstances any one of the other three presumptions
may be indulged in such as:

 that the law of France is the same as the law of

the forum;
 that the law of France, like all civilized
countries, recognizes certain fundamental
principles, as, that the taking of a loan creates
an obligation upon the borrower to make
repayment; and