STATE OF RHODE ISLAND

PROVIDENCE Sc. SUPERIOR COURT

JOHN DOE, Hearing Date to be set by Court

Plaintiff,

v. C.A. No. PC 2022-00466

STATE OF RHODE ISLAND,

DIVISION OF THE STATE POLICE,
JAMES MANNI, COLONEL OF THE
STATE POLICE,
Defendants.

MOTION OF TO INTERVENE FOR THE LIMITED PURPOSE

OF CHALLENGING PLAINTIFF’S USE OF A PSEUDONYM

Black Lives Matter RI PAC (“BLM RI PAC”), Direct Action for Rights and Equality

(“DARE”), and the American Civil Liberties Union of Rhode Island (“ACLU RI”) respectfully

move under Rule 24(b) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure to intervene in this action

for the limited purpose of challenging plaintiff’s attempt to proceed in this case under a

pseudonym.

In support of the Motion, movants state as follows:

1. Movant and proposed intervenor BLM RI PAC was formed in 2020 in support of Black

lives, following the murder of George Floyd and the national summer of unrest to challenge

white supremacy. BLM RI PAC is a political action committee created by young people of

color in Rhode Island with the belief that representation is the best way for the government

to serve the interests of its people. BLM RI PAC is dedicated to challenging systematic

racism in all of its forms. A central focus of its efforts is to work toward the public
 accountability of Rhode Island police departments. BLM RI PAC has fought to make

police departments more transparent and has sought the release of body cam recordings

held by the Providence Police Department. BLM RI PAC believes that police

accountability will only exist when communities of color can trust that dangerous officers

will be removed from their positions.

2. Movant and proposed intervenor DARE was founded in 1986 and its mission is “to

organize low-income families living in communities of color for social, economic, and

political justice.” DARE Mission Statement, http://daretowin.org/about/mission.html.

DARE has long been involved in the campaign for open access and disclosure of

Providence Police Department records regarding civilian complaints of police misconduct.

See, e.g., Direct Action for Rights and Equality v. Gannon, 713 A.2d 218 (R.I. 1998) and

819 A.2d 651 (R.I. 2003).

3. Movant and proposed intervenor ACLU RI, with over 5,000 members, is the Rhode Island

affiliate of the American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”), a nationwide, non-profit,

nonpartisan organization. ACLU RI, like the national organization with which it is

affiliated, is dedicated to vindicating the principles of liberty embodied in the Bill of Rights

to the U.S. Constitution and related statutes. ACLU RI, directly or through its volunteer

attorneys, has appeared in numerous cases in state and federal court on issues promoting

government transparency under the First Amendment and the Access to Public Records

Act, including access to both police and judicial records. See, e.g., The Rake v. Gorodetsky,

452 A.2d 1144, 1146 (R.I.1982) (ordering release of certain internal records of police

misconduct) (“The United States Supreme Court has recognized that the public’s right to

know and have access to information is an essential part of the First Amendment.”); Rhode

2
 
 Island Affiliate, American Civil Liberties Union, Inc. v. Moran (R.I. Superior Court, C.A.

No. 07-2286) (ordering release of the name of a police officer involved in the fatal shooting

of a civilian); In re Providence Journal, Inc., 293 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2002) (overturning

district court practice of refusing to place parties’ legal memoranda in the public case file).

4. The motion to intervene is timely. As set forth in the accompanying memorandum, this

motion is filed very shortly after the public, including movants, first became aware of the

pendency of this action brough by pseudonym through reporting by the Boston Globe on

May 19, 2022 and no party will be prejudiced by intervention for the limited purpose

sought.

5. None of the existing parties adequately represents the movants’ interests in transparency,

public accountability of police departments, and the public’s right of access to judicial

proceedings. A review of the court records of this proceeding discloses that Plaintiff has

proceeded by pseudonym in the absence of Court order or any showing on the record that

he has met the heavy burden to proceed by pseudonym and that Defendants, although

questioning the propriety in a footnote to the Answer, have taken no affirmative steps on

the record to bring the issue before the Court for determination.

6. As set forth in the accompanying memorandum, intervention for this limited purpose is

warranted because movants have an interest in public access to judicial proceedings and

the public accountability of Rhode Island police departments, both of which would be

undermined by allowing plaintiff to proceed under a pseudonym. Because movants are

seeking intervention for a limited purpose, they request that the Court waive the

requirement that they file a “pleading.”

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 7. Alternatively, if the Court believes that a pleading is necessary, movants will submit an

Answer that takes no position on any of the facts or law at issue in this case except the

plaintiff’s use of a pseudonym.

8. Movants are filing, at the same time as the within motion to intervene, as an Exhibit hereto,

the [Proposed] Motion to Require Plaintiff to Proceed in His Own Name, which Movants

will file if permitted to intervene. The memorandum of law accompanying the within

Motion to Intervene is also filed in support of the [Proposed] Motion to Require Plaintiff

to Proceed in His Own Name.

By their attorneys,

/s/_Jared A. Goldstein_
Jared A. Goldstein (pro hac vice pending)
Roger Williams University School of Law
10 Metacom Ave.
Bristol, RI 02809
(401) 254-4594
[email protected]

/s/ Lynette Labinger__

Lynette Labinger (#1645)
128 Dorrance Street, Box 710
Providence, RI 02903
(401) 465-9565
[email protected]

Cooperating Attorneys,
American Civil Liberties Union Foundation
of Rhode Island

NOTICE OF HEARING

The within Motion shall be called for hearing at a time directed by the Court.

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 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on June 1, 2022:
I electronically filed and served this document through the electronic filing system.

The document electronically served is available for viewing and/or downloading from the
Rhode Island Judiciary’s Electronic Filing System.

I served a copy of the document by email upon all counsel of record:

Carly Iafrate ([email protected])
Adam J. Sholes ([email protected])
Vincent F. Ragosta, Jr. ([email protected])
D. Peter DeSimone ([email protected])
/s/ Lynette Labinger ____________
 STATE OF RHODE ISLAND

PROVIDENCE Sc. SUPERIOR COURT

JOHN DOE, C.A. No. PC 2022-00466

Plaintiff,

v.

STATE OF RHODE ISLAND,

DIVISION OF THE STATE POLICE,
JAMES MANNI, COLONEL OF THE
STATE POLICE,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OF BLM RI PAC, DARE, AND ACLU RI

IN SUPPORT OF
(1) THEIR MOTION TO INTERVENE AND
(2) THEIR MOTION TO REQUIRE THE PLAINTIFF
TO LITIGATE IN HIS OWN NAME

Black Lives Matter RI PAC (“BLM RI PAC”), Direct Action for Rights and Equality

(“DARE”), and American Civil Liberties Union of Rhode Island (“ACLU RI”) have moved to

intervene in this matter for a single limited purpose: to oppose plaintiff’s attempt to litigate under

a pseudonym. As organizations dedicated to public accountability, especially the accountability of

Rhode Island police departments, BLM RI PAC, DARE, and ACLU RI have strong interests in

asserting the public’s constitutionally protected right of access to judicial proceedings, which

includes a right to know the names of litigants bringing suit in Rhode Island courts. The

fundamental principle that the public has a right of access to judicial proceedings applies with

special force in cases like this one, which focuses on public officials and the operations of

government. As Rhode Island courts have uniformly held, a litigant can proceed under a

pseudonym only under exceptional circumstances, but the docket in this case shows that plaintiff
has made no submission to justify shielding his identity from the public. This Court should require

that the case may proceed only if the plaintiff litigates in his own name.

I. THIS COURT SHOULD ALLOW BLM RI PAC, DARE, AND ACLU RI TO

INTERVENE FOR THE LIMITED PURPOSE OF CHALLENGING THE
PLAINTIFF’S ATTEMPT TO PROCEED USING A PSEUDONYM

A motion to intervene is governed by Rule 24 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil

Procedure. Under that rule and its counterparts in other jurisdictions, courts have routinely granted

motions to intervene for the limited purpose of challenging efforts to restrict access to judicial

proceedings, including attempts to proceed pseudonymously, when intervention is sought by

members of the press or by groups like BLM RI PAC, DARE, and ACLU RI that are dedicated to

public accountability. As the First Circuit has explained, intervention “is an effective mechanism

for third-party claims of access to information generated through judicial proceedings.” Pub.

Citizen v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 858 F.2d 775, 783 (1st Cir. 1988); see also Flynt v. Lombardi, 782

F.3d 963, 966 (8th Cir. 2015) (“Rule 24(b) intervention [is] an appropriate procedural vehicle for

parties seeking to intervene for the purpose of obtaining judicial records.”); Pansy v. Borough of

Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 778 (3d Cir. 1994) (collecting cases); Does 1-6 v. Mills, No. 1:21-CV-

00242-JDL, 2021 WL 6197377 (D. Me. Dec. 30, 2021) (granting motion by media companies to

intervene to challenge the plaintiffs’ use of pseudonyms); Doe v. Tenenbaum, No. 8:11-CV-02958-

AW, 2012 WL 12519833 (D. Md. Oct. 9, 2012) (granting motion by consumer group to intervene

to challenge plaintiff’s use of a pseudonym).

The motion to intervene by BLM RI PAC, DARE, and ACLU RI satisfies the requirements

for intervention under Rule 24(b). That Rule provides:

Upon timely application anyone may be permitted to intervene in an action ... (2)
when an applicant’s claim or defense and the main action have a question of law or
fact in common.... In exercising its discretion the court shall consider whether the

2
 
 intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the
original parties.

As elaborated in Rhode Island decisions, a court should consider several factors in assessing a

motion to intervene under Rule 24(b), including the intervenor’s interest in the issue, whether the

intervenors’ interests are adequately represented by other parties, and whether granting

intervention will cause delay or prejudice to the rights of the original parties. Verizon New England

Inc. v. Savage, 267 A.3d 647, 653 (R.I. 2022).

As discussed more fully below, the motion to intervene satisfies the requirements of Rule

24(b). First, movants have a strong interest in the issue on which they seek to intervene, in that

they are dedicated to government transparency, access to judicial proceedings, and the public

accountability of Rhode Island police departments, which would be undermined by allowing this

case to proceed with a pseudonymous plaintiff. No other party in this case represents the interest

of the public in the openness of judicial proceedings. Second, the motion is timely, in that the

movants have brought this motion as soon as they learned of the case proceeding pseudonymously.

Moreover, the harm to the movants and to the public from shielding the plaintiff’s name is ongoing.

It bears emphasis that courts addressing similar motions have ruled that the “usual

requirements to establish Rule 24(b) permissive intervention . . . are more relaxed when

intervention is for the limited purpose of accessing records.” CRST Expedited, Inc. v. TransAm

Trucking Inc., No. 16-CV-0052-LTS, 2018 WL 9880439, at *3 (N.D. Iowa Oct. 9, 2018). Thus,

“where a party is seeking to intervene in a case for the limited purpose of unsealing judicial records,

most circuits have found that ‘there is no reason to require such a strong nexus of fact or law.’ . . .

Instead, in such cases, it is the public's interest in the confidentially of the judicial records that—

in the language of Rule 24(b)(2)—[is] ‘a question of law ... in common between the Parties [to the

original suit] and the [would-be intervenor].’” Flynt v. Lombardi, 782 F.3d at 967; see also Pansy,

3
 
23 F.3d at 778. That principle applies here, where the movants seek to challenge the plaintiff’s

attempt to litigate this action without giving the public access to his identity.

A. BLM RI PAC, DARE, and ACLU RI Have an Interest in the Public

Accountability of Rhode Island Police Departments, and that Interest Is Not
Adequately Represented by Other Parties

BLM RI PAC, DARE, and ACLU RI have a strong and cognizable interest in the discrete

issue on which they seek to intervene:

 BLM RI PAC was formed in 2020 in support of Black lives, following the murder of

George Floyd and the national summer of unrest to challenge white supremacy. BLM RI

PAC is a political action committee created by young people of color in Rhode Island with

the belief that representation is the best way for the government to serve the interests of its

people. BLM RI PAC is dedicated to challenging systematic racism in all of its forms. A

central focus of its efforts is to work toward the public accountability of Rhode Island

police departments. BLM RI PAC has fought to make police departments more transparent

and has sought the release of body cam recordings held by the Providence Police

Department. BLM RI PAC believes that police accountability will only exist when

communities of color can trust that dangerous officers will be removed from their positions.

 DARE was founded in 1986 and its mission is “to organize low-income families living in

communities of color for social, economic, and political justice.” DARE Mission

Statement, http://daretowin.org/about/mission.html. DARE has long been involved in the

campaign for open access and disclosure of Providence Police Department records

regarding civilian complaints of police misconduct. See, e.g., Direct Action for Rights and

Equality v. Gannon, 713 A.2d 218 (R.I. 1998) and 819 A.2d 651 (R.I. 2003).

4
 
  ACLU RI, with over 5,000 members, is the Rhode Island affiliate of the American Civil

Liberties Union (“ACLU”), a nationwide, non-profit, nonpartisan organization. ACLU RI,

like the national organization with which it is affiliated, is dedicated to vindicating the

principles of liberty embodied in the Bill of Rights to the U.S. Constitution and related

statutes. ACLU RI, directly or through its volunteer attorneys, has appeared in numerous

cases in state and federal court on issues promoting government transparency under the

First Amendment and the Access to Public Records Act, including access to both police

and judicial records. See, e.g., The Rake v. Gorodetsky, 452 A.2d 1144, 1146 (R.I.1982)

(ordering release of certain internal records of police misconduct) (“The United States

Supreme Court has recognized that the public’s right to know and have access to

information is an essential part of the First Amendment.”); Rhode Island Affiliate,

American Civil Liberties Union, Inc. v. Moran (R.I. Superior Court, C.A. No. 07-2286)

(ordering release of the name of a police officer involved in the fatal shooting of a civilian);

In re Providence Journal, Inc., 293 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2002) (overturning district court

practice of refusing to place parties’ legal memoranda in the public case file).

The attempt by a police officer to shield his identity in a lawsuit challenging allegations of

official misconduct raises issues that are central to movants’ mission—access to the courts,

government transparency, and public accountability of Rhode Island police departments. As is

well established, “lawsuits are public events and the public has a legitimate interest in knowing

the facts involved in them. Among the facts is the identity of the parties.” Doe v. U.S. Dept. of

Justice, 93 F.R.D. 483, 484 (D. Colo. 1982).

Courts have uniformly found that public interest organizations focused on transparency

and public accountability, like BLM RI PAC, DARE, and ACLU RI, as well as news media and

5
 
consumer groups, may intervene to challenge orders restricting the public’s right of access to

information in judicial proceedings, including the identity of litigants. As the Third Circuit has

declared, “third parties have standing to challenge protective orders and confidentiality orders in

an effort to obtain access to information or judicial proceedings.” Pansy, 23 F.3d at 777; see also

Doe v. Pub. Citizen, 749 F.3d 246, 261 (4th Cir. 2014) (“[T]he presumptive right of access to

judicial documents and materials under the First Amendment and common law gives [a third party

consumer advocacy group] an interest in the underlying litigation” such that it had standing to

appeal the district court’s order denying its post-judgment motion to intervene for the limited

purpose of unsealing records). Indeed, even members of the public have a right to intervene to

vindicate their right of access to judicial materials. See, e.g., Bond v. Uteras, 585 F.3d 1061, 1072,

1074 (7th Cir. 2009) (“[T]he general right of public access to judicial records is enough to give

members of the public standing to attack a protective order that seals this information from public

inspection.”). In re Franklin Nat. Bank Sec. Litig., 92 F.R.D. 468, 471 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), aff’d sub

nom. F.D.I.C. v. Ernst & Ernst, 677 F.2d 230 (2d Cir. 1982).

None of the parties adequately represents the movants’ interests in transparency, public

accountability of police departments, and the public’s right of access to judicial proceedings. See,

e.g., Schiller v. City of New York, No. 04 CIV. 7921, 2006 WL 2788256, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27,

2006) (granting the New York Times’ motion to intervene to challenge protective order and ruling

that “there is no reason to believe that the Times’ concerns are coextensive” with the parties); Does

1-6 v. Mills, supra, 2021 WL 6197377, at *2 (“Because the Media Intervenors seek to vindicate

their and the public’s common law and First Amendment rights of access to judicial proceedings,

and that interest is not currently represented by any of the parties, this consideration weighs in

favor of granting, not denying, intervention.”).

6
 
 B. The Motion to Intervene Is Timely

As the Rhode Island Supreme Court has ruled, the timeliness of a motion for intervention

is judged by two criteria: “(1) the length of time during which the proposed intervenor has known

about his interest in the suit without acting and (2) the harm or prejudice that results to the rights

of other parties by delay.” Marteg Corp. v. Zoning Bd. of Rev. of City of Warwick, 425 A.2d 1240,

1243 (R.I. 1981). Movants first learned of this lawsuit on May 19, 2022, when the Boston Globe

first reported on it. See Brian Amaral, ‘John Doe’ R.I. trooper who missed work because he was

drunk goes to court to get job back, Boston Globe, https://www.bostonglobe.com/2022/05/9/metro/john-doe-ri-

trooper-who-missed-work-because-he-was-drunk-goes-court-get-job-back/ (May 19, 2022); see also Katie

Mulvaney, Trooper sues Rhode Island State Police over firing due to Christmas Day

‘incapacitation’, Providence Journal, https://www.providencejournal.com/story/news/courts/2022/05/21/rhode-

island-state-police-fired-trooper-files-lawsuit/9857953002/ (May 21, 2022). Movants filed this motion to

intervene as swiftly as possible after first learning that a police officer was seeking to publicly

challenge his dismissal for misconduct while simultaneously seeking to shield his identity from

the public he has pledged to serve.

Because the harm is ongoing whenever the public is prevented from getting access to

information in judicial proceedings, courts have allowed motions to intervene at much later stages

in litigation than here. For instance, the Third Circuit has held that “a district court may properly

consider a motion to intervene permissively for the limited purpose of modifying a protective order

even after the underlying dispute between the parties has long been settled.” Pansy, 23 F.3d at 779.

Similarly, the Eighth Circuit held that a publisher’s motion to intervene for the limited purpose of

seeking to unseal court records was timely, even though the underlying case had been dismissed a

year before the motion to intervene was filed. Flynt v. Lombardi, 782 F.3d at 966 n.2; see Bond v.

7
 
Utreras, 585 F.3d at 1072 (holding that a third party who has standing can intervene under Rule

24(b) for the purpose of challenging a protective order “in a case or controversy that is no longer

live—as when the case has been dismissed and none of the original parties has sought this relief

postjudgment”).

Accordingly, movants should be allowed to intervene in this matter for the limited purpose

of challenging plaintiff’s use of a pseudonym. They have an interest in this issue that is not

adequately represented by other parties. The motion is timely. No prejudice or harm will result to

the parties from granting this motion.

C. The Court Should Exercise its Discretion to Waive the Requirement of a

Separate “Pleading”

Because of the limited purpose for which movants seek intervention, this Court has

discretion to waive the requirement that an intervenor submit a “pleading,” as would ordinarily be

required by Rule 24(c). See Hughes v. Abell, No. CV 09-220 (JDB), 2014 WL 12787807, at *7

(D.D.C. Feb. 10, 2014) (“Courts have excused [the pleading] requirement when intervention is

sought for a limited purpose, such as to obtain confidential records.”); Sch. Bd. of City of Newport

News v. T.R. Driscoll, Inc., No. 4:11CV79, 2011 WL 3809216, at *3 (E.D. Va. July 29, 2011)

(“Since General Casualty is moving to intervene for a limited purpose, which is clearly set forth

in its motion and memoranda, the Court does not find it necessary to demand strict compliance

with the Rule 24(c) provision requiring that the motion to intervene be accompanied by a

pleading.”); Yaffa v. Sunsouth Bank, No. 3:12CV00288/MCR/CJK, 2014 WL 11512204, at *2

(N.D. Fla. Feb. 19, 2014) (holding that the requirement of a pleading can be waived because the

“ordinary principles applicable to intervention do not necessarily apply to intervention for the

limited purpose of modifying a protective order to gain access to documents”); Park v. McCabe

Trotter & Beverly, P.C., No. 2:17-CV-657-RMG, 2018 WL 3543526, at *2 (D.S.C. July 23, 2018);

8
 
Diagnostic Devices, Inc. v. Taidoc Technology Corp., 257 F.R.D. 96, 101 (W.D.N.C. 2009). If,

however, the Court concludes that a pleading is required for intervention, movants would submit

an answer that takes no position on any of the facts or law at issue in this case, except to dispute

the plaintiff’s use of a pseudonym.

II. THIS COURT SHOULD REQUIRE PLAINTIFF TO BRING SUIT IN HIS OWN
NAME

The public has a right to know the identity of litigants in this Court. Rule 10(a) of the

Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure carries out that principle and provides that “[i]n the

complaint the title of the action shall include the names of all the parties.” Rule 10(a) helps

effectuate the fundamental principle that judicial proceedings are open to the public and protects

the public’s constitutional right of access to the courts. While there are rare occasions when the

use of pseudonyms is justified, the Rhode Island Supreme Court has established a strong

presumption against allowing a party to bring suit under a pseudonym. Doe v. Burkland, 808 A.2d

1090, 1096 (R.I. 2002); Pelland v. State, 919 A.2d 373, 376 (R.I. 2007). A party seeking to use a

fictitious name can overcome that presumption only if they demonstrate that their privacy interests

outweigh the public’s interests in disclosure.

In this case, the plaintiff has submitted no filing that even attempts to demonstrate that he

could meet the standard for using a pseudonym. That failure alone warrants an order from this

court to require that the plaintiff either withdraw his complaint or amend it to litigate in his own

name.

In addition, it is highly unlikely that the plaintiff could establish a right to shield his identity

from the public. This case challenges the actions by a government agency responding to allegations

of official misconduct by a public official acting in his official capacity. As is well-established,

the public has a profound interest in monitoring the workings of its government. Although the

9
 
plaintiff may have been able to keep personnel decisions about him private, he chose instead to

publicly challenge the basis for his dismissal in open court. He cannot simultaneously attempt to

clear his name while also hiding his name from the public. To be sure, the case involves potentially

embarrassing allegations that the plaintiff committed official misconduct, but the possibility of

embarrassment does not justify shielding the identity of a public official from the public that he is

sworn to serve.

A. The Public Has a Right to Know the Identity of Litigants in This Court

As the Rhode Island Supreme Court has declared, the constitutionally-protected principle

of judicial openness requires that litigants ordinarily must proceed in their own names: “[T]he

customary and constitutionally-embedded presumption of openness in judicial proceedings

requires that litigants proceed under their own names unless an exceptional circumstance requiring

anonymity exists.” Doe v. Burkland, 808 A.2d at 1096 (internal quotations, citations omitted). This

Court has specifically held that the presumption against allowing litigants to file under

pseudonyms applies in cases brought by police officers under the Law Enforcement Officers’ Bill

of Rights (“LEOBOR”). Doe v. Cranston Police Dept., No. PM-14-3369, 2015 WL 631638, at *7

(R.I.Super. Feb. 10, 2015) (Gibney, P.J.). In so holding, this Court explained that the principle that

litigants must bring suit in their own name “instantiates the principle that judicial proceedings,

civil as well as criminal, are to be conducted in public. As such, anonymous pleading is the

exception to this rule.” Id. (internal quotations, citations omitted).

The rule that a lawsuit must be brought in the litigant’s own name reflects core values of

the American legal tradition. As one court put it, “lawsuits are public events and the public has a

legitimate interest in knowing the facts involved in them. Among the facts is the identity of the

parties.” Doe v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 93 F.R.D. at 484. The principles of government transparency

10
 
and judicial openness have constitutional dimensions. See, e.g., The Rake v. Gorodetsky, 452 A.2d

at 1146 (“The United States Supreme Court has recognized that the public’s right to know and

have access to information is an essential part of the First Amendment.”). The Supreme Court has

repeatedly held that the public’s right to attend criminal trials derives from the First Amendment.

Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court for Norfolk County, 457 U.S. 596, 598, 602 (1982);

Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980). The Court emphasized that the

public has historically enjoyed a right of access to judicial proceedings and that public scrutiny is

essential to “the functioning of the judicial process and the government as a whole.” Globe

Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 605-06. Although the public’s right of access to criminal cases is not

absolute, the Court held that it can be denied only if “the denial is necessitated by a compelling

governmental interest, and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.” Id. at 606–07. The public’s

right of access to judicial proceedings extends to civil cases as well. See, e.g., In re Providence J.

Co., Inc., 293 F.3d at 13; Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 805 F.2d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1986).

As the Rhode Island Supreme Court explained in Burkland, the public’s right of access to

judicial proceedings includes the right to know the identities of the litigants:

Access to the identity of the litigants is an ingredient of public scrutiny [of the
judiciary]. Though not as critical as access to the proceedings, knowing the
litigants’ identities nevertheless tends to sharpen public scrutiny of the judicial
process, to increase confidence in the administration of the law, to enhance the
therapeutic value of judicial proceedings, and to serve the structural function of the
first amendment by enabling informed discussion of judicial operations.

Burkland, 808 A.2d at 1097 (quoting Joan Steinman, Public Trial, Pseudonymous Parties: When

Should Litigants Be Permitted to Keep Their Identities Confidential?, 37 Hastings L.J. 1, 36 (1985)

(“Public Trial”).

Given the public’s right of access to judicial proceedings, including the names of litigants,

the Rhode Island Supreme Court has established a strong presumption against allowing a party to

11
 
proceed using a pseudonym. Burkland, 808 A.2d at 1096. As this Court has declared, “the use of

fictitious names is disfavored.” Doe v. Cranston Police Dept., supra at *8. Allowing a party to

proceed under a pseudonym is a “rare dispensation,” Doe v. Pub. Citizen, 749 F.3d at 273, which

can only be granted under “exceptional circumstances.”

A party seeking to proceed under a pseudonym bears the burden of overcoming the

presumption that the public has a right to know their identity. See Qualls v. Rumsfeld, 228 F.R.D.

8, 13 (D.D.C. 2005) (“[I]t is the litigant seeking to proceed under pseudonym that bears the burden

to demonstrate a legitimate basis for proceeding in that manner.”). In Burkland, the Rhode Island

Supreme Court explained what a party would have to demonstrate to justify shielding their

identity: “For parties to litigate a case under a pseudonym, they must show that they possess a

substantial privacy interest that outweighs the public’s interest in disclosure. . . . In addition, there

must be a strong social interest in concealing the identity of the plaintiff.” 808 A.2d at 1096

(internal quotations, citations omitted). The Court has further identified a set of factors, both

favoring and opposing allowing the use of a pseudonym, that courts may consider. On the one

hand, courts may consider the following factors that may favor granting a request to proceed under

a pseudonym:

(1) the extent to which the identity has been kept confidential; (2) the reasons the
litigant fears public disclosure; (3) the public interest in concealing the litigant’s
identity; (4) circumstances that create an atypically weak interest in public
disclosure; and (5) the legitimacy of the motives both of the litigant seeking
pseudonymity and the party seeking to force disclosure.

Pelland v. State, 919 A.2d at 377. On the other hand, courts may consider the following factors

that may conflict with a request to use a pseudonym:

On the other side of the equation, the court should evaluate the interest of the public
in knowing the litigants' identities by considering: (A) “the universal level of public
interest in access to the identities of litigants”; (B) “whether, because of the subject
matter of the litigation, the status of the litigant as a public figure, or otherwise,

12
 
 there is a particularly strong public interest in knowing the litigants’ identities,
beyond the public interest that normally obtains”; and (C) “whether the opposition
to pseudonymity by [the other parties], the public, or the press is illegitimately
motivated.”

Burkland, 808 A.2d at 1096 n.6 (quoting Joan Steinman, Public Trial) (internal citations omitted).

In this case, the plaintiff has made no submission at all (at least none that appears on the

docket sheet for this case) that even attempts to justify proceeding pseudonymously. Instead, he

filed his complaint under the name “John Doe” without any explanation why his identity should

be shielded from the public. The situation in this case is strikingly similar to an earlier LEOBOR

case, in which this Court admonished the plaintiff-police officer for filing suit under a pseudonym

without first providing any justification. Doe v. Cranston Police Dept., supra 2015 WL 631638,

at *7. As this Court said: “Petitioner may only proceed pseudonymously if he first presents some

reasons convincing the Court that the Pelland factors weigh in favor of allowing him to do so.” Id.

(emphasis added). As with the plaintiff in that case, the plaintiff here filed his complaint under a

pseudonym without first presenting any justification. As far as the docket in this case discloses,

the plaintiff has made no submission to justify proceeding pseudonymously.1

By submitting nothing to justify shielding his identity, the plaintiff plainly has not met his

burden to proceed under a pseudonym. As discussed below, it is highly unlikely that the plaintiff

could meet that burden even if he did attempt to do so.

 
1
A footnote in Plaintiff’s memorandum in support of summary judgment obliquely asserts that the
Court “has permitted the Plaintiff to proceed using a pseudonym on a preliminary basis,” p.1 n.1,
but nothing in any publicly available filing explains that assertion.  
13
 
 B. The Presumption Against Allowing a Plaintiff to Use a Pseudonym Applies
Most Strongly in Cases Involving Allegations of Official Misconduct by Public
Officials

This case addresses a quintessential matter of public interest: a state police officer is alleged

to have committed misconduct while acting in his official capacity and that officer challenges the

response to that alleged misconduct by the Rhode Island Division of the State Police. The public’s

right of access to judicial proceedings applies most forcefully in cases like this, which address the

operations of government. Although Rhode Island law affords some protection to police personnel

records, see Gen. Laws 1956, § 38-2-2(4)(A)(1)(b), and LEOBOR internal administrative

proceedings, Gen. Laws 1956, § 42-28.6-2(12),2 that protection does not apply when a police

officer chooses to publicly challenge allegations of misconduct by filing a lawsuit in open court.

Instead, the presumption against allowing a litigant to proceed under a pseudonym applies

especially strongly against a public official when he chooses to file suit in court over a matter

involving official misconduct and government operations.

The Rhode Island Supreme Court has made clear that the public interest in understanding

the operation of government weighs strongly against allowing a case brought by a public official

to proceed under a pseudonym. The Court thus said, that in deciding whether to allow a litigant to

proceed under a pseudonym, a court should evaluate “whether, because of the subject matter of

the litigation, the status of the litigant as a public figure, or otherwise, there is a particularly strong

public interest in knowing the litigants’ identities, beyond the public interest that normally

obtains.” Burkland, 808 A.2d at 1096 n.6.

 
2
Even in the LEOBOR context, a restriction on public statements by police officials about alleged
officer misconduct is waived “if the officer makes a public statement.” Gen. Laws 1956, § 42-
28.6-2(12). The plaintiff’s filing of a complaint undoubtedly constitutes such a public statement.
14
 
 Other courts have agreed that the use of pseudonyms is inappropriate when public officials

bring suit over the operations of government. For instance, in Doe v. United States Department of

Justice, supra, , the plaintiff, a state court judge, filed a Freedom of Information Act case without

disclosing his name and sought to discover documents about him held in the possession of the

Drug Enforcement Administration. The plaintiff argued that the use of a pseudonym was

appropriate because the public revelation of his efforts to discover this information would

embarrass him, prejudicially affect his privacy rights, and interfere with his ability to perform his

judicial duties. The court emphatically rejected this argument, declaring that the public interest in

government operations weighed strongly against allowing the plaintiff to proceed under a

pseudonym: “No prolix recitation of authority should be required to establish that the public

interest in the conduct of its business by public officials is of paramount importance.” Id. at 484.

Many courts have likewise held that police officers are “public figures” and “public

officers” under the principles of New York Times Co. v Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See Henry

v. Media General Operations, Inc., 254 A.3d 822 (R.I. 2021); see generally Who is “public figure”

for purposes of defamation action?, 19 A.L.R.5th § 60[a] (compiling cases). Due to their positions

of prominence and power, police officers must expect to be subjected to public scrutiny. That is

especially true here, when a police officer seeks to challenge allegations of official misconduct. In

this circumstance, the Court should not protect the plaintiff from the public scrutiny that goes with

his job by allowing him to litigate his claims anonymously. See Steinman, Public Trial, 37

Hastings L.J. at 19 (“When a litigant is a public figure, the public and press may be particularly

inclined to scrutinize the participants’ conduct, with a salutary effect upon their performances.

That extra measure of community scrutiny will be absent so long as the identity and notoriety of

the litigant are shielded by a pseudonym.”).

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 C. Concerns that the Plaintiff May Have About Exposing His Identity to the
Public Cannot Justify the Use of a Pseudonym

In this case, plaintiff has no reason to hide his name from the defendants, who undoubtedly

know his identity and have access to his personnel files. Instead, plaintiff’s only possible basis to

seek anonymity is to shield his identity from the public. To justify filing under a pseudonym,

however, the plaintiff must demonstrate that he “possess[es] a substantial privacy interest that

outweighs the public’s interest in disclosure.”Burkland, 808 A.2d at 1096. The plaintiff has made

no attempt to make that showing, and it is unlikely that he could do so.

To be sure, this case involves allegations that the plaintiff had a romantic relationship with

a subordinate officer and that he got drunk and didn’t show up for work, and these allegations

might well be embarrassing to the plaintiff. As the Rhode Island Supreme Court has made clear,

however, a “risk of embarrassment . . . [is] insufficient” to justify the use of a pseudonym.

Burkland, 808 A.2d at 1096. As one court has explained, employment disputes frequently involve

allegations of misconduct that are embarrassing to litigants but fear of embarrassment does not

present a basis for shielding a plaintiff’s identity:

No doubt lots of parties would prefer to keep their disputes private. For example, a
plaintiff alleging he was discriminated against by his employer when his
employment was terminated typically will have to disclose the employer’s reason
for terminating the plaintiff’s employment—a reason that the plaintiff disputes is
the real reason and which is often embarrassing or even damaging to his or her
reputation. But there is no suggestion that such a plaintiff may proceed under a
pseudonym to protect his or her reputation.

Doe v. Milwaukee County, No. 18-cv-503, 2018 WL 3458985, at *1 (E.D. Wis. July 18, 2018).

It may also be that the plaintiff fears that disclosure of his identity may hurt his future

career prospects, but that too presents no basis for proceeding under a pseudonym. See Qualls v.

Rumsfeld, 228 F.R.D. at 12 (“[A] threat of economic harm alone does not generally permit a court

to let litigants proceed[] under pseudonym.”) (citation omitted); In re Boeing 737 MAX Pilots

16
 
Litig., 2020 WL 247404, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 16, 2020) (“The worst-case scenario for the Plaintiffs

is losing their jobs. That is no small thing, but transparency is no small thing either. At most,

Plaintiffs allege a potential for economic harm,” which would not justify the use of a pseudonym);

Roe v. Doe, 319 F. Supp. 3d 422, 428 (D.D.C. 2018) (“Defendant argues that a pseudonym would

protect his reputation with ‘employers and admissions officers as [he] applies to jobs and graduate

schools after graduation.’ . . . If an economic harm is to justify a pseudonym, the movant must

allege more than the ‘typical methods by which employers retaliate against employees who assert

their legal rights,’ such as ‘threats of termination and blacklisting,’ and must instead encompass a

risk of ‘extraordinary retaliation, such as deportation, arrest, and imprisonment.’”) (citations

omitted).

The central fact in this case is that the plaintiff himself has chosen to file this lawsuit in

order to publicly dispute the allegations of official misconduct that led to his dismissal. He cannot

simultaneously seek to clear his name while shielding his name from the public. As courts have

noted, filing a lawsuit necessarily means that the subject of dispute will become a public matter.

As one court has put it: “[B]ringing litigation can subject a plaintiff to scrutiny and criticism and

can affect the way [the] plaintiff is viewed by coworkers and friends, but fears of embarrassment

. . . do not permit a plaintiff to proceed under a pseudonym.” Qualls, 228 F.R.D. at 12. As a result,

courts have routinely held that employment disputes brought by public officials cannot proceed

under a pseudonym: “Absent extremely unusual circumstances not present here, employment

lawsuits like the one at bar, which involves serious claims of retaliation and discrimination against

a public university employer, should be public. And that includes the names of the parties to the

case.” Doe v. Regents of Univ. of Colorado, No. 22-CV-00423-RM-NRN, 2022 WL 1468071, at

*6 (D. Colo. May 9, 2022).

17
 In contrast, courts have allowed parties to proceed under a pseudonym only upon a showing

that they would face consequences from public disclosure that are far more consequential than

mere public embarrassment, harm to reputations, and economic costs. For instance, in Roe v.

Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), the Court allowed the plaintiff to proceed under a pseudonym when

she sought to obtain an abortion that was prohibited by state criminal law. Similarly, courts allowed

plaintiffs to use pseudonyms when they sought to challenge the validity of state sodomy laws, Doe

v. Commonwealth’s Attorney for City of Richmond, 403 F.Supp. 1199 (E.D.Va. 1975), and when

they challenged the Department of Defense’s “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell” policy against LGBTQ

service members, see, e.g., Log Cabin Republicans v. United States, 716 F. Supp. 2d 884, 928

(C.D. Cal. 2010), vacated as moot, 658 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2011). Reviewing such cases, one court

explained: “the cases affording plaintiffs anonymity all share several characteristics . . . . The

plaintiffs in those actions, at the least, divulged personal information of the utmost intimacy; many

also had to admit that they either had violated state laws or government regulations or wished to

engage in prohibited conduct.” Coe v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for Dist. of Colorado, 676 F.2d 411, 416 (10th

Cir. 1982).

The plaintiff in this case has made no showing that he faces any harm from disclosing his

identity, let alone the kinds of extraordinary harms that would make this the exceptional case that

would justify shielding his name from the public. If the plaintiff is going to publicly challenge the

allegations by the State Division of Police that he engaged in official misconduct in the course of

18
 
his official duties, he must do so in his own name.3

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, this Court should (1) grant the motion by BLM RI PAC,

DARE, and ACLU RI to intervene for the limited purpose of challenging the plaintiff’s use of a

pseudonym, and (2) require the plaintiff to withdraw his complaint or amend it to use his own

name.

By their attorneys,

/s/_Jared A. Goldstein
Jared A. Goldstein (pro hac vice pending)
Roger Williams University School of Law
10 Metacom Ave.
Bristol, RI 02809
(401) 254-4594
[email protected]

/s/ Lynette Labinger

Lynette Labinger (#1645)
128 Dorrance Street, Box 710
Providence, RI 02903
(401) 465-9565
[email protected]

Cooperating Attorneys,
American Civil Liberties Union Foundation
of Rhode Island

3
 Plaintiff’s submissions to date suggest that he may have some concerns about divulging private
medical matters, but, if valid, those concerns would be best addressed through protective orders
regarding specific documents, rather than by shielding the plaintiff’s identity. See Doe v. Trustees
of Indiana Univ., No. 121CV02903JRSMJD, 2022 WL 36485, at *5 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 3, 2022)
(rejecting request to proceed under a pseudonym but stating that “should a need for confidentiality
arise in this case, there are alternative methods to protect the confidentiality of the plaintiff’s
information”). 
19