3/2/22, 1:21 PM [ G.R. No.

124442, July 20, 2001 ]

414 Phil. 68

FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 124442, July 20, 2001 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS.
ARMANDO COMPACION Y SURPOSA, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

DECISION

KAPUNAN,
J.:

Armando S. Compacion was charged with violating Section 9 of R.A. No. 6425 (known as
the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972), as amended by R.A. No. 7659, in an information which
reads as follows:

The undersigned accuses ARMANDO COMPACION y Surposa, Barangay

Captain of Barangay Bagonbon, San Carlos City, Negros Occidental, of the crime
of "VIOLATION OF SECTION 9, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6425, OTHERWISE
KNOWN AS THE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 1972 AS AMENDED BY
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7659" committed as follows:

"That on or about 1:30 o'clock A.M., July 13, 1995, at Barangay

Bagonbon, San Carlos City, Negros Occidental, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, without any authority of law, did, then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and criminally plant, cultivate or culture two (2) full
grown Indian Hemp Plants, otherwise known as "Marijuana plants",
more or less eleven (11) feet tall, in gross violation of Section 9,
Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act
of 1972 as amended by Republic Act No. 7659."

CONTRARY TO LAW.[1]

Upon arraignment on August 16, 1995, the accused pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.

Thereafter, trial ensued.

On January 2, 1996, the trial court convicted the accused of the crime charged. The decretal
portion of the decision reads as follows:

WHEREAS, the Court finds the accused ARMANDO COMPACION Y

SURPOSA GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime of
"Violation of Section 9, R.A. No. 6425, otherwise known as The Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by R.A. No. 7659" whereof he is charged in the
information in the instant case and sentences him to reclusion perpetua and to pay
a fine of half a million (P500,000.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency. The portion of
the backyard of his residence in the poblacion proper of Brgy. Bagonbon this City
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and Province, in which the two (2) marijuana plants, Exh. "F", subject-matter of
this case, were planted, cultivated and cultured, is hereby ordered confiscated and
escheated in favor of the State, pursuant to the aforequoted Sec. 13 R.A. 7659.

It would seem that the penalty imposed upon the accused in the instant case for
having planted, cultivated and cultured just two (2) marijuana plants is extremely
harsh. But there is nothing in the law which allows the Court to impose a lesser
penalty in view of the peculiar facts and circumstances in this particular case.
Hence, dura lex, sed lex. The law is, indeed, harsh but it is the law.

The obvious message of the law is that people should not have a nonchalant or
cavalier attitude towards dangerous prohibited drugs. They should not dabble in it
as if they were a flippant thing. These dangerous and prohibited drugs are a
terrible menace to the minds and morality of our people for their distortive and
pervertive effects on them resulting in rampant criminality. That is why the
government wants this evil exterminated from our country. It is too bad that the
accused instead of helping the government in this drive, in his capacity as
barangay captain of his barangay, made a mockery of it by planting, cultivating
and culturing said two (2) marijuana plants himself.

A word of counsel and hope for the accused. This is a time of reflection forced
upon him by the result of his own act in violating the law. It is time for him to
humbly submit to the compassion of God and of his only begotten Son, whose
birth on earth to become the Saviour of all sinners, we have just celebrated, to
change and transform his own life by his coming to Him for the purpose, so that
with a changed life, God might be gracious enough to move the heart of His
Excellency, the President, of this Country, to pardon and let him walk out of
prison a freeman. It would be good for him to read God's Word daily while in
prison for his guidance, comfort and hope.

Accused convicted of the crime whereof he is charged in the information in the

instant case.

SO ORDERED.[2]

The accused now appeals from the above judgment of conviction and asks the Court to
reverse the same on the following grounds, viz:

The lower court erred:

1. In holding that Exhibit "F" of the prosecution, consisting of two marijuana

plants wrapped in plastic, is admissible in evidence against the accused as
the corpus delicti in the instant case, inspite of the fact that the prosecution
failed to prove that the specimens of marijuana (Exhibit "F") examined by
the forensic chemist were the ones purportedly planted and cultivated by
the accused, and of the fact that the prosecution failed to establish the
evidence's chain of custody; and

2. In holding that the warrantless search of the residence of the accused at

1:30 o'clock in the morning of July 13, 1995 at Barangay Bagonbon, San
Carlos City, Negros Occidental, and seizure of two eleven feet tall, more or
less, full grown suspected Indian Hemp, otherwise known as Marijuana
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plants, leading to the subsequent arrest of the accused, were valid on the
ground that the accused has committed the crime of cultivating the said
marijuana plants in violation of Sec. 9, RA 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972), as amended by RA 7659 in open view, inspite of the fact that they
had to enter the dwelling of the accused to get to the place where the
suspected marijuana plants were planted, and in admitting in evidence the
said plants, later marked as Exhibit "F", against the accused, inspite of the
fact that the said plants were the fruits of the poisonous tree.[3]

The relevant facts are as follows:

Acting on a confidential tip supplied by a police informant that accused-appellant was

growing and cultivating marijuana plants, SPO1 Gilbert L. Linda and SPO2 Basilio Sarong
of the 6th Narcotic Regional Field Unit of the Narcotics Command (NARCOM) of the
Bacolod City Detachment conducted a surveillance of the residence of accused-appellant
who was then the barangay captain of barangay Bagonbon, San Carlos City, Negros
Occidental on July 9, 1995. During the said surveillance, they saw two (2) tall plants in the
backyard of the accused-appellant which they suspected to be marijuana plants.[4]

SPO1 Linda and SPO2 Sarong reported the result of their surveillance to SPO4 Ranulfo T.
Villamor, Jr., Chief of NARCOM, Bacolod City, who immediately formed a team composed
of the members of the Intelligence Division Provincial Command, the Criminal Investigation
Command and the Special Action Force. Two members of the media, one from DYWF
Radio and another from DYRL Radio, were also included in the composite team.

On July 12, 1995, the team applied for a search warrant with the office of Executive Judge
Bernardo Ponferrada in Bacolod City. However, Judge Ponferrada informed them that he did
not have territorial jurisdiction over the matter.[5] The team then left Bacolod City for San
Carlos City. They arrived there around six-thirty in the evening, then went to the house of
Executive Judge Roberto S. Javellana to secure a search warrant. They were not able to do so
because it was nighttime and office hours were obviously over. They were told by the judge
to go back in the morning.[6]

Nonetheless, the team proceeded to barangay Bagonbon and arrived at the residence of
accused-appellant in the early morning of July 13, 1995. SPO4 Villamor knocked at the gate
and called out for the accused-appellant. What happened thereafter is subject to conflicting
accounts. The prosecution contends that the accused-appellant opened the gate and permitted
them to come in. He was immediately asked by SPO4 Villamor about the suspected
marijuana plants and he admitted that he planted and cultivated the same for the use of his
wife who was suffering from migraine. SPO4 Villamor then told him that he would be
charged for violation of Section 9 of R.A. No. 6425 and informed him of his constitutional
rights. The operatives then uprooted the suspected marijuana plants. SPO1 Linda conducted
an initial field test of the plants by using the Narcotics Drug Identification Kit. The test
yielded a positive result.[7]

On July 15, 1995, the plants were turned over to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime
Laboratory, Bacolod City Police Command, particularly to Senior Inspector Reah Abastillas
Villavicencio. Senior Inspector Villavicencio weighed and measured the plants, one was 125
inches and weighed 700 grams while the other was 130 inches and weighed 900 grams.
Three (3) qualitative examinations were conducted, namely: the microscopic test, the

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chemical test, and the thin layer chromatographic test. All yielded positive results.[8]

On his part, accused-appellant maintains that around one-thirty in the early morning of July
13, 1995 while he and his family were sleeping, he heard somebody knocking outside his
house. He went down bringing with him a flashlight. After he opened the gate, four (4)
persons who he thought were members of the military, entered the premises then went inside
the house. It was dark so he could not count the others who entered the house as the same
was lit only by a kerosene lamp. One of the four men told him to sit in the living room. Some
of the men went upstairs while the others went around the house. None of them asked for his
permission to search his house and the premises.[9]

After about twenty (20) minutes of searching, the men called him outside and brought him to
the backyard. One of the military men said: "Captain, you have a (sic) marijuana here at your
backyard" to which accused-appellant replied: "I do not know that they were (sic) marijuana
plants but what I know is that they are medicinal plants for my wife" who was suffering from
migraine.[10]

After he was informed that the plants in his backyard were marijuana, the men took pictures
of him and themselves. Thereafter, he was brought inside the house where he and the
military men spent the night.[11]

At around ten o'clock that same morning, they brought him with them to the city hall.
Accused-appellant saw that one of the two (2) service vehicles they brought was fully loaded
with plants. He was later told by the military men that said plants were marijuana.[12] Upon
arrival at the city hall, the men met with the mayor and then unloaded the alleged marijuana
plants. A picture of him together with the arresting team was taken with the alleged
marijuana as back drop. Soon thereafter, he was taken to Hda. Socorro at the SAF
Headquarters.[13]

A criminal complaint for violation of Section 9 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended by R.A. No.
7659 was filed against accused-appellant.

Turning to the legal defenses of accused-appellant, we now consider his allegation that his
constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures had been violated by the
police authorities.

The relevant constitutional provisions are found in Sections 2 and 3 [2], Article III of the
1987 Constitution which read as follows:

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons
or things to be seized.

Sec. 3. xxx

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(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

Said constitutional provisions are safeguards against reckless, malicious and unreasonable
invasion of privacy and liberty. The Court, in Villanueva v. Querubin,[14] underscored their
importance:

It is deference to one's personality that lies at the core of this right, but it could be
also looked upon as a recognition of a constitutionally protected area, primarily
one's home, but not necessarily thereto confined. What is sought to be guarded is
a man's prerogative to choose who is allowed entry to his residence. In that haven
of refuge, his individuality can assert itself not only in the choice of who shall be
welcome but likewise in the kind of objects he wants around him. There the state,
however powerful, does not as such have access except under the circumstances
above noted, for in the traditional formulation, his house, however humble, is his
castle. Thus is outlawed any unwarranted intrusion by government, which is
called upon to refrain from any invasion of his dwelling and to respect the
privacies of his life. In the same vein, Landynski in his authoritative work could
fitly characterize this constitutional right as the embodiment of "a spiritual
concept: the belief that to value the privacy of home and person and to afford its
constitutional protection against the long reach of government is no less than to
value human dignity, and that his privacy must not be disturbed except in case of
overriding social need, and then only under stringent procedural safeguards."[15]

A search and seizure, therefore, must be carried out through or with a judicial warrant;
otherwise, such search and seizure becomes "unreasonable" within the meaning of the
constitutional provision.[16] Evidence secured thereby, i.e., the "fruits" of the search and
seizure, will be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding."[17]

The requirement that a warrant must be obtained from the proper judicial authority prior to
the conduct of a search and seizure is, however, not absolute. There are several instances
when the law recognizes exceptions, such as when the owner of the premises consents or
voluntarily submits to a search;[18] when the owner of the premises waives his right against
such incursion;[19] when the search is incidental to a lawful arrest;[20] when it is made on
vessels and aircraft for violation of customs laws;[21] when it is made on automobiles for the
purpose of preventing violations of smuggling or immigration laws;[22] when it involves
prohibited articles in plain view;[23] when it involves a "stop and frisk" situation;[24] when
the search is under exigent and emergency circumstances;[25] or in cases of inspection of
buildings and other premises for the enforcement of fire, sanitary and building regulations.
[26] In these instances, a search may be validly made even without a warrant.

In the instant case, the search and seizure conducted by the composite team in the house of
accused-appellant was not authorized by a search warrant. It does not appear either that the
situation falls under any of the above mentioned cases. Consequently, accused-appellant's
right against unreasonable search and seizure was clearly violated.

It is extant from the records that accused-appellant did not consent to the warrantless search
and seizure conducted. While the right to be secure from unreasonable search and seizure
may, like every right, be waived either expressly or impliedly,[27] such waiver must
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constitute a valid waiver made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. The act of the
accused-appellant in allowing the members of the military to enter his premises and his
consequent silence during the unreasonable search and seizure could not be construed as
voluntary submission or an implied acquiescence to warrantless search and seizure
especially so when members of the raiding team were intimidatingly numerous and heavily
armed. His implied acquiescence, if any, could not have been more than mere passive
conformity given under coercive or intimidating circumstances and is, thus, considered no
consent at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee. Consequently, herein
accused-appellant's lack of objection to the search and seizure is not tantamount to a waiver
of his constitutional right or a voluntary submission to the warrantless search and seizure.[28]
The case of People v. Burgos,[29] is instructive. In Burgos, the Court ruled that the accused is
not to be presumed to have waived the unlawful search "simply because he failed to object."
There, we held:

xxx To constitute a waiver, it must appear first that the right exists; secondly, that
the person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of
such a right; and lastly, that said person had an actual intention to relinquish the
right (Pasion Vda. De Garcia v. Locsin, 65 Phil. 689). The fact that the accused
failed to object to the entry into his house does not amount to a permission to
make a search therein (Magoncia v. Palacio, 80 Phil. 770).  As pointed out by
Justice Laurel in the case of Pasion Vda. De Garcia v. Locsin (supra);

xxx     xxx      xxx

x x x As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of

the citizen, the courts do not place the citizen in the position of either contesting
an officer's authority by force, or waiving his constitutional rights; but instead
they hold that a peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a consent or an
invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of
the law.

We apply the rule that: "courts indulge every reasonable presumption against
waiver of fundamental constitutional rights and that we do not presume
acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights."[30]

Neither could the members of the composite team have justified their search of accused-
appellant's premises by invoking the necessity and urgency of the situation. It was admitted
by the members of the arresting team that the residence of accused-appellant had already
been put under surveillance following a tip from a confidential informant. The surveillance
was conducted on July 9, 1995 while the alleged marijuana plants were seized four (4) days
later or on July 13, 1995. Surely, the raiding team had all the opportunity to have first
secured a search warrant before forcing their way into accused-appellant's premises. In fact,
they earlier had approached then Executive Judge Ponferrada of Bacolod City who declined
to issue one on the ground that the matter was outside his territorial jurisdiction. Then, they
went to Executive Judge Javellana of San Carlos City in the evening of July 12, 1995 who
asked them to come back in the morning as it was already nighttime and outside of office
hours. However, in their haste to apprehend the accused-appellant on the pretext that
information of his impending arrest may be leaked to him, the team proceeded to go to his
residence to arrest him and seize the alleged marijuana plants. The team's apprehension of a
tip-off was unfounded. It is far-fetched that one could have gone to accused-appellant's place
before the following morning to warn him of his impending arrest as barangay Bagonbon is
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an isolated and difficult to reach mountain barangay. The road leading to it was rough, hilly
and eroded by rain and flood.[31] A few hours delay to await the issuance of a warrant in the
morning would not have compromised the team's operation.

In justifying the validity of the warrantless arrest, search and seizure on July 13, 1995, the
trial court ruled that the accused-appellant was caught "in flagrante delicto of having
planted, grown and cultivated the marijuana plants" which was "easily visible from outside
of the residence of the accused."[32] Thus, the trial court concluded that:

xxx (T)he said two (2) marijuana plants, Exh. "F", were the very corpus delicti of
the crime the accused has been committing since the time he planted them in the
backyard of his residence for whatever reason - a corpus delicti which the
NARCOM agents saw with their very own eyes as the same were in plain view
when they made a surveillance in the accused's place on July 9, 1995. Said corpus
delicti has remained on the spots in accused's backyard where they had been
growing since the time they were planted there and, therefore, any peace officer
or even private citizen, for that matter, who has seen said plants and recognized
them as marijuana, was by law empowered and authorized to arrest the accused
even without any warrant of arrest.

The accused was caught in flagrante delicto for he was carrying

marijuana, hence, committing a crime, at the time of his arrest. The
warrantless search which was conducted following a lawful arrest,
was valid.

- People vs. Bandin (Dec. 10, 1993)

226 SCRA 299, at p. 300

The accused was caught in flagrante delicto growing, cultivating and culturing
said two (2) marijuana plants, Exh. "F", in the backyard of his residence, which
the NARCOM agents uprooted from there at the time they arrested and
apprehended him. Under said circumstances, a search warrant and/or warrant of
arrest were not legally needed before the NARCOM agents could effect the arrest
of the accused.[33]

As a general rule, objects in the "plain view" of an officer who has the right to be in the
position to have that view are subject to seizure without a warrant.[34] It is usually applied
where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless
inadvertently comes across an incriminating object.[35] Thus, the following elements must be
present before the doctrine may be applied: (a) a prior valid intention based on the valid
warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties;
(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be where
they are; (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and (d) "plain view" justified were
seizure of evidence without further search.[36]

Here, there was no valid warrantless arrest. They forced their way into accused-appellant's
premises without the latter's consent. It is undisputed that the NARCOM agents conducted a
surveillance of the residence of accused-appellant on July 9, 1995 on the suspicion that he
was growing and cultivating marijuana when they allegedly came in "plain view" of the
marijuana plants. When the agents entered his premises on July 13, 1995, their intention was

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to seize the evidence against him. In fact, they initially wanted to secure a search warrant but
could not simply wait for one to be issued. The NARCOM agents, therefore, did not come
across the marijuana plants inadvertently when they conducted a surveillance and barged
into accused-appellant's residence.

In People v. Musa,[37] the Court held:

The "plain view" doctrine may not, however, be used to launch unbridled
searches and indiscriminate seizures nor to extend a general exploratory search
made solely to find evidence of defendant's guilt. The "plain view" doctrine is
usually applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the
accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object.
[Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 29 L.Ed. 2d 564 (1971)]
Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court stated the following limitations on the
application of the doctrine:

What the "plain view" cases have in common is that the police officer
in each of them had a prior justification for an intrusion in the course
of which he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence
incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to supplement the prior
justification - whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit,
search incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason for
being present unconnected with a search directed against the accused -
and permits the warrantless seizure. Of course, the extension of the
original justification is legitimate only where it is immediately
apparent to the police that they have evidence before them; the "plain
view" doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory search
from one object to another until something incriminating at last
emerges. [Id., 29 L.Ed. 2d 583. See also Texas v. Brown, 460 U.G.
730, 75 L. Ed. 2d 502 (1983)]

It was not even apparent to the members of the composite team whether the plants involved
herein were indeed marijuana plants. After said plants were uprooted, SPO1 Linda had to
conduct a field test on said plants by using a Narcotics Drug Identification Kit to determine
if the same were indeed marijuana plants.[38] Later, Senior Inspector Villavicencio, a
forensic chemist, had to conduct three (3) qualitative examinations to determine if the plants
were indeed marijuana.[39]

Since the evidence was secured on the occasion of an unreasonable search and seizure, the
same is tainted and illegal and should therefore be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of
a poisonous tree.[40] In People v. Aruta,[41] we held that:

The exclusion of such evidence is the only practical means of enforcing the
constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizure. The non-
exclusionary rule is contrary to the letter and spirit of the prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures.

While conceding that the officer making the unlawful search and seizure may be
held criminally and civilly liable, the Stonehill case observed that most
jurisdictions have realized that the exclusionary rule is "he only practical means
of enforcing the constitutional injunction" against abuse. This approach is based
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on the justification made by Judge Learned Hand that "only in case the
prosecution which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit
by their wrong, will the wrong be repressed."

Unreasonable searches and seizures are the menace against which the
constitutional guarantees afford full protection. While the power to search and
seize may at times be necessary to the public welfare, still it may be exercised
and the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights of the
citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify
indifference to the basic principles of government.

Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the
rights of the individual in the name of order. Order is too high a price to pay for
the loss of liberty. As Justice Holmes declared: "I think it is less evil that some
criminals escape than that the government should play an ignoble part." It is
simply not allowed in free society to violate a law to enforce another, especially
if the law violated is the Constitution itself.[42]

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Carlos City, Branch 58 is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Armando S. Compacion is hereby
ACQUITTED of the crime charged on ground of reasonable doubt. He is ordered released
from confinement unless he is being held for some other legal grounds. The subject
marijuana is ordered disposed of in accordance with law.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

[1] Records, p. 1.

[2] Id., at 147-148.

[3] Rollo, pp. 117-118.

[4] TSN, September 7, 1995, pp. 4-5.

[5] Id., at 5-9.

[6] Id., at 9.

[7] Id., at 11-19.

[8] Id., at 18; TSN, September 14, 1995, pp. 6-13.

[9] TSN, October 25, 1995, pp. 8-10.

[10] Id., at 11-12.

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[11] Id., at 14.

[12] Id., at 15.

[13] Id., at 16.

[14] 48 SCRA 345 (1972).

[15] Id., at 350.

[16] People v. Rodrigueza, 205 SCRA 791, 798 (1992).

[17] People v. Aminnudin, 163 SCRA 402 (1988).

[18] People v. Malasugui, 63 Phil 221 (1936).

[19] Bagcal v. Villaraza, 120 SCRA 525 (1983).

[20] Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972).

[21] Roldan v. Arca, 65 SCRA 336 (1975).

[22] Caroll v. U.S., 267 U.S. 132 (1925).

[23] Harris v. U.S., 390 U.S. 234 (1968)

[24] People v. Salayao, 262 SCRA 255 (1996).

[25] People v. De Gracia, 233 SCRA 716 (1994).

[26] Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).

[27]People v. Malasugui, supra; People v. Donato, 198 SCRA 130 (1991); People v.
Rodrigueza, supra; People v. Aruta, 288 SCRA 626 (1998).

[28] People v. Aruta, supra; Aniag v. Commission on Elections, 237 SCRA 424 (1994).

[29] 144 SCRA 1 (1986).

[30]Id., at 16; Also cited in People v. Aruta, supra and People v. Barros, 231 SCRA 557
(1994).

[31] TSN, November 9, 1995, p. 22.

[32] Decision, p. 26, Rollo, p. 76.

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[33] Rollo, pp. 80-81.

[34] Harris v. U.S., supra.

[35] Collidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564 (1971).

[36]People v. Bolasa, 321 SCRA 459 (1999); People v. Doria, 301 SCRA 668 (1999);
Padilla v. Court of Appeals, 269 SCRA 402 (1997).

[37] 217 SCRA 597, 611 (1993).

[38] See Note 7.

[39] TSN, September 14, 1995, pp. 6-13, 22.

[40] People v. Montilla, 285 SCRA 703 (1998).

[41] Supra.

[42] Id., at 652-653.

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