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Complainant Respondent: Special First Division
Complainant Respondent: Special First Division
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J : p
Factual Antecedents
Issue
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Is respondent administratively liable for engaging in the practice of law
during the period of her suspension and prior to an order of the Court lifting
such suspension?
Our Ruling
Time and again, the Court reminds the bench and bar "that the
practice of law is not a right but a mere privilege [subject] to the inherent
regulatory power of the [Court]." 34 It is a "privilege burdened with
conditions." 35 As such, lawyers must comply with its rigid standards, which
include mental fitness, maintenance of highest level of morality, and full
compliance with the rules of the legal profession. 36
With regard to suspension to practice law, in Maniago v. Atty. De Dios ,
37 the Court laid down the guidelines for the lifting of an order of suspension,
to wit:
1) After a finding that respondent lawyer must be suspended from
the practice of law, the Court shall render a decision imposing the
penalty;
2) Unless the Court explicitly states that the decision is
immediately executory upon receipt thereof, respondent has 15
days within which to file a motion for reconsideration thereof.
The denial of said motion shall render the decision final and
executory;
3) Upon the expiration of the period of suspension, respondent shall
file a Sworn Statement with the Court, through the Office of the
Bar Confidant, stating therein that he or she has desisted from
the practice of law and has not appeared in any court during the
period of his or her suspension;
4) Copies of the Sworn Statement shall be furnished to the Local
Chapter of the IBP and to the Executive Judge of the courts where
respondent has pending cases handled by him or her, and/or
where he or she has appeared as counsel;
5) The Sworn Statement shall be considered as proof of
respondent's compliance with the order of suspension;
6) Any finding or report contrary to the statements made by the
lawyer under oath shall be a ground for the imposition of a more
severe punishment, or disbarment, as may be warranted. 38
Pursuant to these guidelines, in this case, the Court issued a Resolution
dated October 5, 2011 suspending respondent from the practice of law for
six months effective immediately. Respondent filed her motion for
reconsideration. And, on November 12, 2012, she received the notice of the
denial of such motion per Registry Return Receipt No. 53365.
While, indeed, service of a judgment or resolution must be done only
personally or by registered mail, 39 and that mere showing of a downloaded
copy of the October 5, 2011 Resolution to respondent is not a valid service,
the fact, however, that respondent was duly informed of her suspension
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remains unrebutted. Again, as stated above, she filed a motion for
reconsideration on the October 5, 2011 Resolution, and the Court duly
notified her of the denial of said motion. It thus follows that respondent's six
months suspension commenced from the notice of the denial of her motion
for reconsideration on November 12, 2012 until May 12, 2013.
I n Ibana-Andrade v. Atty. Paita-Moya , 40 despite having received the
Resolution anent her suspension, Atty. Paita-Moya continued to practice law.
She filed pleadings and she appeared as counsel in courts. For which reason,
the Court suspended her from the practice of law for six month in addition to
her initial one month suspension, or a total of seven months.
Too, in Feliciano v. Atty. Bautista-Lozada , 41 respondent therein, Atty.
Lozada, appeared and signed as counsel, for and in behalf of her husband,
during the period of her suspension from the practice of law. For having
done so, the Court ruled that she engaged in unauthorized practice of law.
The Court did not give weight to Atty. Lozada's defense of good faith as she
was very well aware that when she represented her husband, she was still
serving her suspension order. The Court also noted that Atty. Lozada did not
seek any clearance or clarification from the Court if she can represent her
husband in court. In this regard, the Court suspended Atty. Lozada for six
months for her willful disobedience to a lawful order of the Court.
Similarly, in this case, the Court notified respondent of her suspension.
However, she continued to engage in the practice law by filing pleadings and
appearing as counsel in courts during the period of her suspension.
It is common sense that when the Court orders the suspension of a
lawyer from the practice of law, the lawyer must desist from performing all
functions which require the application of legal knowledge within the period
of his or her suspension. 42 To stress, by practice of law, we refer to "any
activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training, and experience. It includes performing acts
which are characteristic of the legal profession, or rendering any kind of
service which requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill." 43
In fine, it will amount to unauthorized practice, and a violation of a lawful
order of the Court if a suspended lawyer engages in the practice of law
during the pendency of his or her suspension. 44
As also stressed by the OBC in its March 24, 2015 Report, during and
even after the period of her suspension and without filing a sworn statement
for the lifting of her suspension, respondent signed pleadings and appeared
in courts as counsel. Clearly, such acts of respondent are in violation of the
order of her suspension to practice law.
Moreover, the lifting of a suspension order is not automatic. It is
necessary that there is an order from the Court lifting the suspension of a
lawyer to practice law. To note, in Maniago, the Court explicitly stated that a
suspended lawyer shall, upon the expiration of one's suspension, file a sworn
statement with the Court, and that such statement shall be considered proof
of the lawyer's compliance with the order of suspension.
In this case, on February 19, 2014, the Court directed respondent to
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comply with the guidelines for the lifting of the suspension order against her
by filing a sworn statement on the matter. However, respondent did not
comply. Instead, she filed a complaint (Civil Case No. 2015-0007) against the
OCA, the OBC and a certain Atty. Paraiso with the RTC. For having done so,
respondent violated a lawful order of the Court, that is, to comply with the
guidelines for the lifting of the order of suspension against her.
To recapitulate, respondent's violation of the lawful order of the Court
is two-fold: 1) she filed pleadings and appeared in court as counsel during
the period of her suspension, and prior to the lifting of such order of her
suspension; and 2) she did not comply with the Court's directive for her to
file a sworn statement in compliance with the guidelines for the lifting of the
suspension order.
Under Section 27, 45 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a member of the
bar may be disbarred or suspended from practice of law for willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, among other grounds.
Here, respondent willfully disobeyed the Court's lawful orders by failing to
comply with the order of her suspension, and to the Court's directive to
observe the guidelines for the lifting thereof. Pursuant to prevailing
jurisprudence, the suspension for six (6) months from the practice of law
against respondent is in order. 46
WHEREFORE, Atty. Haide V. Gumba is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for an additional period of six (6) months (from her original
six (6) months suspension) and WARNED that a repetition of the same or
similar offense will be dealt with more severely.
Atty. Haide V. Gumba is DIRECTED to inform the Court of the date of
her receipt of this Decision, to determine the reckoning point when her
suspension shall take effect.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts, the Office of the Bar
Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for their information and
guidance. The Office of the Bar Confidant is DIRECTED to append a copy of
this Decision to the record of respondent as member of the Bar.
SO ORDERED.
Leonardo-de Castro, Bersamin, Leonen and Martires, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
6. Id. at 17.
9. CANON 1 — A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for law and for legal processes.
10. Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.
11. Canon 7 — A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the
legal profession, and support the activities of the integrated bar.
12. Rollo , p. 71.
13. Id. at 82-87; penned by Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr. and concurred
in by then Chief Justice Renato C. Corona and Associate Justices Teresita J.
Leonardo-de Castro, Lucas P. Bersamin and Mariano C. del Castillo.
14. Id. at 96.
15. Id. at 98.
20. The Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan, Court of Tax Appeals, Regional Trial
Courts, Shari'a District Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts, Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, Shari'a Circuit Courts.
21. Id. at 187.
22. Id. at 188-192.
43. Eustaquio v. Navales , A.C. No. 10465, June 8, 2016, 792 SCRA 377, 384.
44. Feliciano v. Atty. Bautista-Lozada , supra note 41 at 354-355.
45. Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds
therefor. — A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his
office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other
gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the
oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or
wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to
do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
46. Paras v. Paras, A.C. No. 5333, March 13, 2017.