SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION

[A.C. No. 9000. January 10, 2018.]

TOMAS P. TAN, JR. , complainant , vs. ATTY. HAIDE V. GUMBA ,

respondent.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J : p

This case is an offshoot of the administrative Complaint 1 filed by

Tomas P. Tan, Jr. (complainant) against Atty. Haide V. Gumba (respondent),
and for which respondent was suspended from the practice of law for six
months. The issues now ripe for resolution are: a) whether respondent
disobeyed a lawful order of the Court by not abiding by the order of her
suspension; and b) whether respondent deserves a stiffer penalty for such
violation.

Factual Antecedents

According to complainant, in August 1999, respondent obtained from

him a P350,000.00 loan with 12% interest per annum. Incidental thereto,
respondent executed in favor of complainant an undated Deed of Absolute
Sale 2 over a 105-square meter lot located in Naga City, and covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 2055 3 under the name of respondent's
father, Nicasio Vista. Attached to said Deed was a Special Power of Attorney
4 (SPA) executed by respondent's parents authorizing her to apply for a loan
with a bank to be secured by the subject property. Complainant and
respondent purportedly agreed that if the latter failed to pay the loan in or
before August 2000, complainant may register the Deed of Absolute Sale
with the Register of Deeds (RD). 5
Respondent failed to pay her loan when it fell due. And despite
repeated demands, she failed to settle her obligation. Complainant
attempted to register the Deed of Absolute Sale with the RD of Naga City but
to no avail because the aforesaid SPA only covered the authority of
respondent to mortgage the property to a bank, and not to sell it. 6
Complainant argued that if not for respondent's misrepresentation, be
would not have approved her loan. He added that respondent committed
dishonesty, and used her skill as a lawyer and her moral ascendancy over
him in securing the loan. Thus, he prayed that respondent be sanctioned for
her infraction. 7
In his Commissioner's Report 8 dated February 9, 2009, Commissioner
Jose I. de la Rama, Jr. (Commissioner de la Rama) faulted respondent for
failing to file an answer, and participate in the mandatory conference. He
further declared that the SPA specifically authorized respondent to mortgage
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 to property with a bank. He stressed that for selling the property, and not
just mortgaging it to complainant, who was not even a bank, respondent
acted beyond her authority. Having done so, she committed gross violation
of the Lawyer's Oath as well as Canon 1, 9 Rule 1.01, 10 and Canon 7 11 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. As such, he recommended that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one year.
In the Resolution No. XIX-2010-446 12 dated August 8, 2010, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Board of Governors (IBP-BOG) resolved to
adopt and approve the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner de la
Rama.
Action of the Supreme Court

Thereafter, the Court issued a Resolution 13 dated October 5, 2011,

which sustained the findings and conclusion of the IBP. The Court
nonetheless found the reduction of the penalty proper, pursuant to its sound
judicial discretion and on the facts of the case. Accordingly, it suspended
respondent from the practice of law for six months, effective immediately,
with a warning that a repetition of same or similar act will be dealt with more
severely.
On March 14, 2012, the Court resolved to serve anew the October 5,
2011 Resolution upon respondent because its previous copy sent to her was
returned unserved. 14 In its August 13, 2012 Resolution, 15 the Court
considered the October 5, 2011 Resolution to have been served upon
respondent after the March 14, 2012 Resolution was also returned unserved.
In the same resolution, the Court also denied with finality respondent's
motion for reconsideration on the October 5, 2011 Resolution.
Subsequently, Judge Margaret N. Armea (Judge Armea) of the Municipal
Trial Court in Cities of Naga City, Branch 2 wrote a letter 16 inquiring from
the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) whether respondent could
continue representing her clients and appear in courts. She also asked the
OCA if the decision relating to respondent's suspension, which was
downloaded from the internet, constitutes sufficient notice to disqualify her
to appear in courts for the period of her suspension.
According to Judge Armea, her inquiry arose because respondent
represented a party in a case pending in her court; and, the counsel of the
opposing party called Judge Armea's attention regarding the legal standing
of respondent to appear as counsel. Judge Armea added that respondent
denied that she was suspended to practice law since she (respondent) had
not yet received a copy of the Court's resolution on the matter.
In her Answer/Comment 17 to the query of Judge Armea, respondent
countered that by reason of such downloaded decision, Judge Armea and
Executive Judge Pablo Cabillan Formaran III (Judge Formaran III) of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Naga City disallowed her appearance in their
courts. She insisted that service of any pleading or judgment cannot be
made through the internet. She further claimed that she had not received an
authentic copy of the Court's October 5, 2011 Resolution.
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 On January 22, 2013, the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) referred the
October 5, 2011 Resolution to the OCA for circulation to all courts. 18 In
response, on January 30, 2013, the OCA issued OCA Circular No. 14-2013 19
addressed to the courts, 20 the Office of the Chief State Prosecutor (CSP),
Public Attorney's Office (PAO), and the IBP informing them of the October 5,
2011 and August 13, 2012 Resolutions of the Court.
IBP's Report and Recommendation

Meanwhile, in its Notice of Resolution No. XX-2013-359 21 dated March

21, 2013, the IBP-BOG resolved to adopt and approve the Report and
Recommendation 22 of Commissioner Oliver A. Cachapero (Commissioner
Cachapero) to dismiss the complaint against respondent. According to
Commissioner Cachapero, there is no rule allowing the service of judgments
through the internet; and, Judge Armea and Judge Formaran III acted ahead
of time when they implemented the suspension of respondent even before
the actual service upon her of the resolution concerning her suspension.
Statement and Report of the OBC

In its November 22, 2013 Statement, 23 the OBC stressed that

respondent received the August 13, 2012 Resolution (denying her motion for
reconsideration on the October 5, 2011 Resolution) on November 12, 2012
per Registry Return Receipt No. 53365. Thus, the effectivity of respondent's
suspension was from November 12, 2012 until May 12, 2013. The OBC also
pointed out that suspension is not automatically lifted by mere lapse of the
period of suspension. It is necessary that an order be issued by the Court
lifting the suspension to enable the concerned lawyer to resume practice of
law.
The OBC further maintained in its November 27, 2013 Report 24 that
respondent has no authority to practice law and appear in court as counsel
during her suspension, and until such time that the Court has lifted the order
of her suspension. Thus, the OBC made these recommendations:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing premises, it is
respectfully recommended that:
1. Respondent be REQUIRED to file a sworn statement with
motion to lift order of her suspension, attaching therewith
certifications from the Office of the Executive Judge of the court
where she practices [h]er profession and IBP Local Chapter of which
she is affiliated, that she has ceased and desisted from the practice of
law from 12 November 2012 to 12 May 2013, immediately; and
2. The IBP be REQUIRED to EXPLAIN within 72 hours why
they should not be sanctioned for disciplinary action for issuing said
Notice of Resolution No. XX-2013-353, dated 21 March 2013,
purportedly dismissing this case for lack of merit. 25
On February 19, 2014, the Court noted 26 the OBC Report, and directed
respondent to comply with the guidelines relating to the lifting of the order of
her suspension as enunciated in Maniago v. Atty. De Dios. 27

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com

 Upon the request of respondent, on December 2, 2014, the OBC issued
a Certification, 28 which stated that respondent had been ordered suspended
from the practice of law for six months, and as of the issuance of said
certification, the order of her suspension had not yet been lifted.
Complaint against the OCA, the OBC and Atty. Paraiso

On February 6, 2015, respondent filed with the RTC a verified

Complaint 29 for nullity of clearance, damages, and preliminary injunction
with urgent prayer for a temporary restraining order against the OCA, the
OBC, and Atty. Nelson P. Paraiso (Atty. Paraiso). The case was docketed as
Civil Case No. 2015-0007.
Essentially, respondent accused the OCA and the OBC of suspending
her from the practice of law even if the administrative case against her was
still pending with the IBP. She likewise faulted the OBC for requiring her to
submit a clearance from its office before she resumes her practice of law
after the suspension. In turn, she argued that Atty. Paraiso benefited from
this supposed "bogus suspension" by publicly announcing the disqualification
of respondent to practice law.
In its Answer, 30 the OCA argued that the RTC had no jurisdiction over
the action, which seeks reversal, modification or enjoinment of a directive of
the Court. The OCA also stressed that respondent should raise such matter
by filing a motion for reconsideration in the administrative case, instead of
filing a complaint with the RTC. It also stated that the issuance of OCA
Circular No. 14-2013 was in compliance with the Court's directive to inform
all courts, the CSP, the PAO, and the IBP of the suspension of respondent.
For its part, the OBC declared in a Report 31 dated March 24, 2015 that
during and after the period of her suspension, without the same having been
lifted, respondent filed pleadings and appeared in courts in the following
cases:
x x x (1) Civil Case No. 2013-0106 (Romy Fay Gumba v. The City
Assessor of Naga City, et al.), (2) Civil Case No. RTC 2006-0063 (Sps.
Jaime M. Kalaw, et al. v. Fausto David, et al.) , (3) Other Spec. Proc.
No. RTC 2012-0019 (Petition for Reconstitution of Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 21128 of the Registry of Deeds of Naga City v. Danilo O.
Laborado). 32
The OBC likewise confirmed that as of the time it issued the March 24,
2015 Report, the Court had not yet lifted the order of suspension against
respondent. The OBC opined that for failing to comply with the order of her
suspension, respondent deliberately refused to obey a lawful order of the
Court. Thus, it recommended that a stiffer penalty be imposed against
respondent.
On June 4, 2015, the OBC reported that the RTC dismissed Civil Case
No. 2015-0007 for lack of jurisdiction, and pending resolution was
respondent's motion for reconsideration. 33

Issue
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 Is respondent administratively liable for engaging in the practice of law
during the period of her suspension and prior to an order of the Court lifting
such suspension?

Our Ruling

Time and again, the Court reminds the bench and bar "that the
practice of law is not a right but a mere privilege [subject] to the inherent
regulatory power of the [Court]." 34 It is a "privilege burdened with
conditions." 35 As such, lawyers must comply with its rigid standards, which
include mental fitness, maintenance of highest level of morality, and full
compliance with the rules of the legal profession. 36
With regard to suspension to practice law, in Maniago v. Atty. De Dios ,
37 the Court laid down the guidelines for the lifting of an order of suspension,

to wit:
1) After a finding that respondent lawyer must be suspended from
the practice of law, the Court shall render a decision imposing the
penalty;
2) Unless the Court explicitly states that the decision is
immediately executory upon receipt thereof, respondent has 15
days within which to file a motion for reconsideration thereof.
The denial of said motion shall render the decision final and
executory;
3) Upon the expiration of the period of suspension, respondent shall
file a Sworn Statement with the Court, through the Office of the
Bar Confidant, stating therein that he or she has desisted from
the practice of law and has not appeared in any court during the
period of his or her suspension;
4) Copies of the Sworn Statement shall be furnished to the Local
Chapter of the IBP and to the Executive Judge of the courts where
respondent has pending cases handled by him or her, and/or
where he or she has appeared as counsel;
5) The Sworn Statement shall be considered as proof of
respondent's compliance with the order of suspension;
6) Any finding or report contrary to the statements made by the
lawyer under oath shall be a ground for the imposition of a more
severe punishment, or disbarment, as may be warranted. 38
Pursuant to these guidelines, in this case, the Court issued a Resolution
dated October 5, 2011 suspending respondent from the practice of law for
six months effective immediately. Respondent filed her motion for
reconsideration. And, on November 12, 2012, she received the notice of the
denial of such motion per Registry Return Receipt No. 53365.
While, indeed, service of a judgment or resolution must be done only
personally or by registered mail, 39 and that mere showing of a downloaded
copy of the October 5, 2011 Resolution to respondent is not a valid service,
the fact, however, that respondent was duly informed of her suspension
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 remains unrebutted. Again, as stated above, she filed a motion for
reconsideration on the October 5, 2011 Resolution, and the Court duly
notified her of the denial of said motion. It thus follows that respondent's six
months suspension commenced from the notice of the denial of her motion
for reconsideration on November 12, 2012 until May 12, 2013.
I n Ibana-Andrade v. Atty. Paita-Moya , 40 despite having received the
Resolution anent her suspension, Atty. Paita-Moya continued to practice law.
She filed pleadings and she appeared as counsel in courts. For which reason,
the Court suspended her from the practice of law for six month in addition to
her initial one month suspension, or a total of seven months.
Too, in Feliciano v. Atty. Bautista-Lozada , 41 respondent therein, Atty.
Lozada, appeared and signed as counsel, for and in behalf of her husband,
during the period of her suspension from the practice of law. For having
done so, the Court ruled that she engaged in unauthorized practice of law.
The Court did not give weight to Atty. Lozada's defense of good faith as she
was very well aware that when she represented her husband, she was still
serving her suspension order. The Court also noted that Atty. Lozada did not
seek any clearance or clarification from the Court if she can represent her
husband in court. In this regard, the Court suspended Atty. Lozada for six
months for her willful disobedience to a lawful order of the Court.
Similarly, in this case, the Court notified respondent of her suspension.
However, she continued to engage in the practice law by filing pleadings and
appearing as counsel in courts during the period of her suspension.
It is common sense that when the Court orders the suspension of a
lawyer from the practice of law, the lawyer must desist from performing all
functions which require the application of legal knowledge within the period
of his or her suspension. 42 To stress, by practice of law, we refer to "any
activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training, and experience. It includes performing acts
which are characteristic of the legal profession, or rendering any kind of
service which requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill." 43
In fine, it will amount to unauthorized practice, and a violation of a lawful
order of the Court if a suspended lawyer engages in the practice of law
during the pendency of his or her suspension. 44
As also stressed by the OBC in its March 24, 2015 Report, during and
even after the period of her suspension and without filing a sworn statement
for the lifting of her suspension, respondent signed pleadings and appeared
in courts as counsel. Clearly, such acts of respondent are in violation of the
order of her suspension to practice law.
Moreover, the lifting of a suspension order is not automatic. It is
necessary that there is an order from the Court lifting the suspension of a
lawyer to practice law. To note, in Maniago, the Court explicitly stated that a
suspended lawyer shall, upon the expiration of one's suspension, file a sworn
statement with the Court, and that such statement shall be considered proof
of the lawyer's compliance with the order of suspension.
In this case, on February 19, 2014, the Court directed respondent to
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 comply with the guidelines for the lifting of the suspension order against her
by filing a sworn statement on the matter. However, respondent did not
comply. Instead, she filed a complaint (Civil Case No. 2015-0007) against the
OCA, the OBC and a certain Atty. Paraiso with the RTC. For having done so,
respondent violated a lawful order of the Court, that is, to comply with the
guidelines for the lifting of the order of suspension against her.
To recapitulate, respondent's violation of the lawful order of the Court
is two-fold: 1) she filed pleadings and appeared in court as counsel during
the period of her suspension, and prior to the lifting of such order of her
suspension; and 2) she did not comply with the Court's directive for her to
file a sworn statement in compliance with the guidelines for the lifting of the
suspension order.
Under Section 27, 45 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a member of the
bar may be disbarred or suspended from practice of law for willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, among other grounds.
Here, respondent willfully disobeyed the Court's lawful orders by failing to
comply with the order of her suspension, and to the Court's directive to
observe the guidelines for the lifting thereof. Pursuant to prevailing
jurisprudence, the suspension for six (6) months from the practice of law
against respondent is in order. 46
WHEREFORE, Atty. Haide V. Gumba is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for an additional period of six (6) months (from her original
six (6) months suspension) and WARNED that a repetition of the same or
similar offense will be dealt with more severely.
Atty. Haide V. Gumba is DIRECTED to inform the Court of the date of
her receipt of this Decision, to determine the reckoning point when her
suspension shall take effect.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts, the Office of the Bar
Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for their information and
guidance. The Office of the Bar Confidant is DIRECTED to append a copy of
this Decision to the record of respondent as member of the Bar.
SO ORDERED.
Leonardo-de Castro, Bersamin, Leonen and Martires, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1. Rollo , pp. 16-19.

2. Id. at 23-24.
3. Id. at 20-22.
4. Id. at 25.
5. Id. at 16.

6. Id. at 17.

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com

 7. Id. at 17-18.
8. Id. at 72-77.

9. CANON 1 — A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for law and for legal processes.

10. Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.
11. Canon 7 — A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the
legal profession, and support the activities of the integrated bar.
12. Rollo , p. 71.

13. Id. at 82-87; penned by Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr. and concurred
in by then Chief Justice Renato C. Corona and Associate Justices Teresita J.
Leonardo-de Castro, Lucas P. Bersamin and Mariano C. del Castillo.
14. Id. at 96.
15. Id. at 98.

16. Id. at 103.

17. Id. at 119-125.
18. Id. at 99.
19. Id. at 176.

20. The Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan, Court of Tax Appeals, Regional Trial
Courts, Shari'a District Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts, Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, Shari'a Circuit Courts.
21. Id. at 187.
22. Id. at 188-192.

23. Id. at 179-180.

24. Id. at 200-201.
25. Id. at 201.
26. Id. at 203.

27. 631 Phil. 139 (2010).

28. Rollo , p. 264.
29. Id. at 231-239.
30. Id. at 266-271.
31. Id. at 272-273.

32. Id. at 272.

33. Id. at 274.
34. Maniago v. Atty. De Dios, supra note 27 at 145.
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 35. Lingan v. Atty. Calubaquib, 737 Phil. 191, 209 (2014).
36. Id.
37. Supra note 27.

38. Id. at 145-146.

39. RULES OF COURT, Rule 13, Section 9.
40. 763 Phil. 687 (2015).
41. 755 Phil. 349 (2015).
42. Feliciano v. Atty. Bautista-Lozada , id . at 354.

43. Eustaquio v. Navales , A.C. No. 10465, June 8, 2016, 792 SCRA 377, 384.
44. Feliciano v. Atty. Bautista-Lozada , supra note 41 at 354-355.
45. Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds
therefor. — A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his
office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other
gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the
oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or
wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to
do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
46. Paras v. Paras, A.C. No. 5333, March 13, 2017.

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com