G.R. No.

104600 July 2, 1999

RILLORAZA, AFRICA, DE OCAMPO and AFRICA, petitioner,

vs.
EASTERN TELECOMMUNICATIONS PHILS., INC. and PHILIPPINE LONG
DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY, respondents.

PARDO, J.:

The basic issue submitted for consideration of the Court is whether or not petitioner is
entitled to recover attorney's fees amounting to Twenty Six Million Three Hundred Fifty
Thousand Seven Hundred Seventy Nine Pesos and Ninety One Centavos
(P26,350,779.91) for handling the case for its client Eastern Telecommunications
Philippines, Inc. filed with the Regional Trial Court, Makati, though its services were
terminated in midstream and the client directly compromised the case with the adverse
party.

The Facts

In giving due course to the petition, we carefully considered the facts attendant to the
case. On August 28, 1987, Eastern Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. (ETPI)
represented by the law firm San Juan, Africa, Gonzales and San Agustin (SAGA), filed
with the Regional Trial Court, Makati, a complaint for recovery of revenue shares
against Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT). Atty. Francisco D.
Rilloraza, a partner of the firm appeared for ETPI.

After ETPI rested its case, it paid SAGA the billed amount of One Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P10 0,000.00). On September 18, 1987, the trial court issued a resolution
granting ETPI's application for preliminary restrictive and mandatory injunctions. During
this period, SAGA was dissolved and four of the junior partners formed the law firm
Rilloraza, Africa, De Ocampo & Africa (RADA), which took over as counsel in the case
for ETPI. The latter signed a retainer agreement with counsel dated October 1, 1987. 1

Petitioners presented the three aspects of the main case in the trial court. First, the
traffic revenue shares which ETPI sought to recover from PLDT in accordance with the
contract between them. Second, ETPI sought preventive injunctive relief against the
PLDT's threats to deny ETPI access to the Philippines international gateway switch.
Third, ETPI called this the "foreign correspondentships aspect" where ETPI sought
preventive injunctive relief against PLDT's incursions and inducements directed at
ETPI's foreign correspondents in Hongkong, Taiwan and Singapore, to break their
correspondentship contracts with PLDT, using the threat of denying them access to the
international gateway as leverage.

In this connection, ETPI filed with the trial court two urgent motions for restraining
order, one on October 30, 1987 and another on November 4, 1987. As the applications
were not acted upon, ETPI brought the case up to the Court of Appeals by petition
for certiorari.

On June 28, 1988, petitioner received a letter from ETPI signed by E. M. Villanueva,
President and Chief Executive Officer. In substance, the letter stated that ETPI was
terminating the retainer contract dated October 1, 1987, effective June 30, 1988.

On June 29, 1988, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court a notice of attorney's
lien, furnishing copies to the plaintiff ETPI, to the signatory of the termination letter and
PLDT. On the same date, petitioner additionally sent a letter to ETPI attaching its partial
billing statement. In its notice, RADA informed the court that there were negotiations
towards a compromise between ETPI and PLDT.
In April 1990, petitioner confirmed that indeed the parties arrived at an amicable
settlement and that the same was entered as a judgment. On April 26, 1990, petitioner
filed a motion for the enforcement of attorney's lien with the Regional Trial Court of
Makati and then appraised the Supreme Court thereof by manifestation. 2 We noted the
manifestation in a resolution dated July 23, 1990.

On May 24, 1990, PLDT filed with the trial court a manifestation that it is not a party to
nor in any manner involved in the attorney's lien being asserted by Atty. Rilloraza for
and in behalf of the law firm, 3 while ETPI filed its opposition thereto on June 11, 1990.

The Lower Court's Ruling

The trial court in its resolution dated September 14, 1990 denied the motion for
enforcement of attorney's lien. Thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court finds that the Notice of

Attorney's Lien filed by the law firm of Rilloraza, Africa, De Ocampo and
Africa has no basis in fact and in law, and therefore denies the Motion for
Enforcement of Attorney's Lien.

SO ORDERED.

On October 10, 1990, petitioner filed with the trial court a notice of appeal from the
above-mentioned order to the Supreme Court. On November 6, 1990, ETPI filed a
Motion to Dismiss Appeal contending that the case could be brought to the Supreme
Court only via a petition for review on certiorari, not by a mere notice of appeal. In an
order dated January 16, 1991, the trial court dismissed RADA's appeal.

The trial court said:

There is no more regular appeal from the Regional Trial Court to the
Supreme Court. Under the amendment of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act
by R.A. 5440, orders and judgments of the Regional Trial Court may be
elevated to the Supreme Court only by petition for review on certiorari.

xxx xxx xxx

Wherefore, premises considered, the order dated September 14, 1990 is

hereby reconsidered and set aside. The Notice of Appeal filed by movant
RADA is dismissed.

SO ORDERED.

Given this 16th day of January, 1991, at Makati, Metro Manila.

Hence, on February 9, 1991, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme

Court, which we remanded to the Court of Appeals. The latter dismissed the petition in
a decision promulgated on November 14, 1991, 6 ruling that the judge committed no
abuse of discretion in denying petitioner's motion for enforcement of attorney's lien.
Thus:

We therefore rule that respondent judge committed no abuse of

discretion, much less a grave one, in denying petitioner's motion for
enforcement of attorney's lien.

Assuming that respondent judge committed an error in denying

petitioner's motion for enforcement of attorney's lien, it cannot be
corrected by certiorari.
 WHEREFORE, the writs prayed for are DENIED, and the petition is hereby
DISMISSED, with cost against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

There is nothing sacrosanct about procedural rules, which are liberally construed in
order to promote their objectives and assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy and
inexpensive determination of every action or proceeding. 8 In analogous case, 9 we
ruled that where the rigid application of the rules would frustrate substantial justice 10,
or bar the vindication of a legitimate grievance, the courts are justified in exempting a
particular case from the operation of the rules.

In A-One Feeds, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, we said —

Litigations should, as much as possible, be decided on the merits and not

on technicality. Dismissal of appeals purely on technical grounds is
frowned upon, and the rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a
very rigid, technical sense, for they are adopted to help secure, not
override, substantial justice and thereby defeat their very claims. As has
been the constant ruling of this Court, every party litigant should be
afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of
his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities. 11

A basic legal principle is that no one shall be unjustly enriched at the expense of
another. 12 This principle is one of the mainstays of every legal system for centuries and
which the Civil Code echoes:

Art. 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or

any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the
expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to
him. 

The Code Commission, its report, emphasized that:

It is most needful that this ancient principle be clearly and specifically

consecrated in the proposed Civil Code to the end that in cases not
foreseen by the lawmaker, no one may unjustly benefit himself to the
prejudice of another. The German Civil Code has a similar provision (Art.
812). 14

With this in mind, one could easily understand why, despite technical deficiencies, we
resolved to give due course to this petition. More importantly, the case on its face
appears to be impressed with merit.

B. The Attorney's Fees

We understand that Atty. Francisco Rilloraza handled the case from its inception until
ETPI terminated the law firm's services in 1988. Petitioner's claim for attorney's fees
hinges on two grounds: first, the fact that Atty. Rilloraza personally handled the case
when he was working for SAGA; and second, the retainer agreement dated October 1,
1987.

We agree that petitioners are entitled to attorneys' fees. We, however, are not
convinced with the petitioner's arguments that the services RADA rendered merit the
amount they are claiming.

First, petitioner contends that Atty. Rilloraza initiated the filing of the complaint. When a
client employs the services of a law firm, he does not employ the services of the lawyer
who is assigned to personally handle the case. Rather, he employs the entire law firm.
In the event that the counsel appearing for the client resigns, the firm is bound to
provide a replacement. Thus, RADA could not claim to have initiated the filing of the
complaint considering that ETPI hired SAGA. What is more, on September 17, 1987,
ETPI paid SAGA the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P100,00.00) 15 representing services performed prior to September 17, 1987. SAGA
assigned one of its associates, Atty. Francisco Rilloraza, to handle the case for the firm.
Although Atty. Rilloraza handled the case personally, he did so for and in behalf of
SAGA.

Second, petitioner claims that under the retainer agreement, which provides:

6.2 B.Court Cases:

Should recourse to judicial action be necessary to effect collection or

judicial action be taken by adverse party, our attorney's fees shall be
fifteen percent (15%) of the amounts collected or the value of the
property acquired or liability saved. 16

the firm is entitled to the fees agreed upon.

However, the retainer agreement has been terminated. True, Attorney Rilloraza played
a vital role during the inception of the case and in the course of the trial. We cannot
also ignore the fact that an attorney-client relationship between petitioner and
respondent no longer existed during its culmination by amicable agreement. To award
the attorneys' fees amounting to 15% of the sum of One Hundred Twenty Five Million
Six Hundred Seventy One Thousand Eight Hundred Eighty Six Pesos and Four Centavos
(P125,671,886.04) plus Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00) paid by PLDT to ETPI
would be too unconscionable.

"In any case, whether there is an agreement or not, the courts shall fix a reasonable
compensation which lawyers may receive for their professional services. " 17 "A lawyer
has the right to be paid for the legal services he has extended to his client, which
compensation must be reasonable." 18 A lawyer would be entitled to receive what he
merits for his services. Otherwise stated, the amount must be determined on
a quantum meruit basis.

"Quantum meruit, meaning 'as much as he deserved' is used as a basis for determining
the lawyer's professional fees in the absence of a contract but recoverable by him from
his client. 19 Recovery of attorney's fees on the basis of quantum meruit is authorized
when (1) there is no express contract for payment of attorney's fees agreed upon
between the lawyer and the client; (2) when although there is a formal contract for
attorney's fees, the fees stipulated are found unconscionable or unreasonable by the
court; and (3) when the contract for attorney's fee's is void due to purely formal defects
of execution; (4) when the counsel, for justifiable cause, was not able to finish the case
to its conclusion; (5) when lawyer and client disregard the contract for attorney's
fees, 20

In fixing a reasonable compensation for the services rendered by a lawyer on the basis
of quantum meruit, the elements to be considered are generally (1) the importance of
the subject matter in controversy, (2) the extent of services rendered, and (3) the
professional standing of the lawyer. A determination of these factors would
indispensably require nothing less than a full-blown trial where private respondents can
adduce evidence to establish the right to lawful attorney's fees and for petitioner to
oppose or refute the same. 21 The trial court has the principal task of fixing the amount
of attorney's fees. 22 Hence, the necessity of a hearing is beyond cavil.

C. Charging Lien

Petitioner contends that pursuant to Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, it is
entitled to a charging lien. The rule provides:
 Sec. 37. Attorney's liens. — An attorney shall have a lien upon the funds,
documents and papers of his client, which have lawfully come into his
possession and may retain the same until his lawful fees and
disbursements have been paid, and may apply such funds to the
satisfaction thereof. He shall also have a lien to the same extent upon all
judgments for the payment of money, and executions issued in pursuance
of such judgments, which he has secured in a litigation of his client, from
and after the time when he shall have caused a statement of his claim of
such lien to be entered upon the records of the court rendering such
judgment, or issuing such execution, and shall have caused written notice
thereof to be delivered to his client and to the adverse party; and he shall
have the same right and power over such judgments and executions as
his client would have to enforce his lien and secure the payment of his
just fees and disbursements." (Emphasis supplied).

We do not agree. A charging lien to be enforceable as security for the payment of

attorney's fees requires as a condition sine qua non a judgment for money and
execution in pursuance of such judgment secured in the main action by the attorney in
favor of his client 23. A charging lien presupposes that the attorney has secured a
favorable money judgment for his client. 24 From the facts of the case it would seem
that petitioner had no hand in the settlement that occurred, nor did it ever obtain a
favorable judgment for ETPI.

ETPI entered into a compromise agreement when it ended the services of petitioner
and through the effort of ETPI's new lawyers, the law firm Romulo, Mabanta,
Buenaventura, Sayoc and De los Angeles. Whether there was bad faith in the
substitution of the lawyers to avoid compliance with the retainer agreement could only
be determined after a trial of the case on the merits.

This decision, however, should not be interpreted as to impose upon petitioner any
additional burden in collecting its attorney's fees. The petitioner must avail itself of the
proper remedy in order to forestall the possibility of any injustice on or unjust
enrichment of any of the parties.

The Judgment (Fallo)

ACCORDINGLY, the Court GRANTS the petition, REVERSES the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 24463 and REMANDS the case to the court of origin for the
determination of the amount of attorney's fees to which petitioner is entitled.

G.R. No. 159691               June 13, 2013

HEIRS OF MARCELO SOTTO, REPRESENTED BY: LOLIBETH SOTTO NOBLE,

DANILO C. SOTTO, CRISTINA C. SOTTO, EMMANUEL C. SOTTO, and FILEMON
C. SOTTO; and SALVACION BARCELONA, AS HEIR OF DECEASED MIGUEL
BARCELONA, Petitioners,
vs.
MATILDE S. PALICTE, Respondent.

We start this decision by expressing our alarm that this case is the fifth suit to reach the
Court dividing the several heirs of the late Don Filemon Y. Sotto (Filemon) respecting
four real properties that had belonged to Filemon' s estate (Estate of Sotto ).

The first case (Matilde S. Palicte v. Hon. Jose O. Ramolete, et al., No. L-55076,
September 21, 1987, 154 SCRA 132) held that herein respondent Matilde S. Palicte
(Matilde), one of four declared heirs of Filemon, had validly redeemed the four
properties pursuant to the assailed deed of redemption, and was entitled to have the
title over the four properties transferred to her name, subject to the right of the three
other declared heirs to join her in the redemption of the four properties within a period
of six months.

The second was the civil case filed by Pascuala against Matilde (Civil Case No. CEB-
19338) to annul the former’s waiver of rights, and to restore her as a co-redemptioner
of Matilde with respect to the four properties (G.R. No. 131722, February 4, 1998).

The third was an incident in Civil Case No. R-10027 (that is, the suit brought by the
heirs of Carmen Rallos against the Estate of Sotto) wherein the heirs of Miguel belatedly
filed in November 1998 a motion for reconsideration praying that the order issued on
October 5, 1989 be set aside, and that they be still included as Matilde’s co-
redemptioners. After the trial court denied their motion for reconsideration for its lack of
merit, the heirs of Miguel elevated the denial to the CA on certiorari and prohibition, but
the CA dismissed their petition and upheld the order issued on October 5, 1989.
Thence, the heirs of Miguel came to the Court on certiorari (G.R. No. 154585), but the
Court dismissed their petition for being filed out of time and for lack of merit on
September 23, 2002.

The fourth was The Estate of Don Filemon Y. Sotto, represented by its duly designated
Administrator, Sixto Sotto Pahang, Jr. v. Matilde S. Palicte, et al. (G.R. No. 158642,
September 22, 2008, 566 SCRA 142), whereby the Court expressly affirmed the ruling
rendered by the probate court in Cebu City in Special Proceedings No. 2706-R entitled
Intestate Estate of the Deceased Don Filemon Sotto denying the administrator’s motion
to require Matilde to turn over the four real properties to the Estate of Sotto.

The fifth is this case. It seems that the disposition by the Court of the previous cases
did not yet satisfy herein petitioners despite their being the successors-in-interest of
two of the declared heirs of Filemon who had been parties in the previous cases either
directly or in privity. They now pray that the Court undo the decision promulgated on
November 29, 2002, whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) declared their action for the
partition of the four properties as already barred by the judgments previously rendered,
and the resolution promulgated on August 5, 2003 denying their motion for
reconsideration.

The principal concern here is whether this action for partition should still prosper
notwithstanding the earlier rulings favoring Matilde’s exclusive right over the four
properties.

Antecedents

Filemon had four children, namely: Marcelo Sotto (Marcelo), Pascuala Sotto-Pahang
(Pascuala), Miguel Barcelona (Miguel), and Matilde. Marcelo was the administrator of
the Estate of Sotto. Marcelo and Miguel were the predecessors-in-interest of petitioners.

In June 1967, Pilar Teves (Pilar) and other heirs of Carmen Rallos (Carmen), the
deceased wife of Filemon, filed in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Cebu City a
complaint against the Estate of Sotto (Civil Case No. R-10027) seeking to recover
certain properties that Filemon had inherited from Carmen, and damages. The CFI
rendered judgment awarding to Pilar and other heirs of Carmen damages of
₱233,963.65, among other reliefs. To satisfy the monetary part of the judgment, levy
on execution was effected against six parcels of land and two residential houses
belonging to the Estate of Sotto. The levied assets were sold at a public auction. Later
on, Matilde redeemed four of the parcels of land in her own name (i.e., Lots No. 1049,
No. 1051, No. 1052 and No. 2179-C), while her sister Pascuala redeemed one of the
two houses because her family was residing there. On July 9, 1980, the Deputy
Provincial Sheriff of Cebu executed a deed of redemption in favor of Matilde, which the
Clerk of Court approved.
On July 24, 1980, Matilde filed in Civil Case No. R-10027 a motion to transfer to her
name the title to the four properties. However, the CFI denied her motion, and instead
declared the deed of redemption issued in her favor null and void, holding that Matilde,
although declared in Special Proceedings No. 2706-R as one of the heirs of Filemon, did
not qualify as a successor-in-interest with the right to redeem the four properties.
Matilde directly appealed the adverse ruling to the Court via petition for review, and on
September 21, 1987, the Court, reversing the CFI’s ruling, granted Matilde’s petition for
review but allowed her co-heirs the opportunity to join Matilde as co-redemptioners for
a period of six months before the probate court (i.e., RTC of Cebu City, Branch 16)
would grant her motion to transfer the title to her name.1

The other heirs of Filemon failed to exercise their option granted in the decision of
September 21, 1987 to join Matilde as co-redemptioners within the six-month period.
Accordingly, on October 5, 1989, the trial court issued an order in Civil Case No. R-
10027 approving Matilde’s motion to transfer the title of the four lots to her name, and
directing the Register of Deeds of Cebu to register the deed of redemption and issue
new certificates of title covering the four properties in Matilde’s name.

It appears that Pascuala, who executed a document on November 25, 1992 expressly
waiving her rights in the four properties covered by the deed of redemption, changed
her mind and decided to file on September 23, 1996 in the RTC in Cebu City a
complaint to seek the nullification of her waiver of rights, and to have herself be
declared as a co-redemptioner of the four properties (Civil Case No. CEB-19338).
However, the RTC dismissed Civil Case No. CEB-19338 on the ground of its being
barred by laches. Pascuala then assailed the dismissal of Civil Case No. CEB-19338 in
the CA through a petition for certiorari (C.A.-G.R. SP No. 44660), which the CA
dismissed on November 21, 1997. Undeterred, Pascuala appealed the dismissal of her
petition for certiorari (G.R. No. 131722), but the Court denied due course to her petition
on February 4, 1998 because of her failure to pay the docket fees and because of her
certification against forum shopping having been signed only by her counsel.

In November 1998, the heirs of Miguel filed a motion for reconsideration in Civil Case
No. R-10027 of the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 16, praying that the order issued on
October 5, 1989 be set aside, and that they be included as Matilde’s co-redemptioners.
After the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration for its lack of merit on April 25,
2000, they assailed the denial by petition for certiorari and prohibition (C.A.-G.R. SP No.
60225). The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari and prohibition on January 10,
2002. Thereafter, they elevated the matter to the Court via petition for certiorari (G.R.
No. 154585), which the Court dismissed on September 23, 2002 for being filed out of
time and for lack of merit.

On September 10, 1999, the heirs of Marcelo, specifically: Lolibeth Sotto Noble, Danilo
C. Sotto, Cristina C. Sotto, Emmanuel C. Sotto, Filemon C. Sotto, and Marcela C. Sotto;
and the heirs of Miguel, namely: Alberto, Arturo and Salvacion, all surnamed Barcelona
(herein petitioners), instituted the present action for partition against Matilde in the RTC
of Cebu City, Branch 20 (Civil Case No. CEB-24293). 2 Alleging in their complaint that
despite the redemption of the four properties having been made in the sole name of
Matilde, the four properties still rightfully belonged to the Estate of Sotto for having
furnished the funds used to redeem the properties, they prayed that the RTC declare
the four properties as the assets of the Estate of Sotto, and that the RTC direct their
partition among the heirs of Filemon.

It is notable at this juncture that the heirs of Pascuala did not join the action for
partition whether as plaintiffs or defendants.3

Instead of filing her answer, Matilde moved to dismiss the complaint, 4 stating that: (a)
petitioners had no cause of action for partition because they held no interest in the four
properties; (b) the claim was already barred by prior judgment, estoppel and laches; (c)
the court had no jurisdiction over the action; and (d) a similar case entitled Pahang v.
Palicte (Civil Case No. 19338) had been dismissed with finality by Branch 8 of the RTC
in Cebu City.

On November 15, 1999, the RTC granted Matilde’s motion to dismiss and dismissed the
complaint,5 holding that Civil Case No. CEB-24293 was already barred by prior judgment
considering that the decision in G.R. No. 55076, the order dated October 5, 1989 of the
RTC in Civil Case No. R-10027, and the decision in G.R. No. 131722 had all become
final, and that the cases had involved the same parties, the same subject matter, the
same causes of action, and the same factual and legal issues. The RTC observed that it
was bereft of jurisdiction to annul the rulings of co-equal courts that had recognized
Matilde’s exclusive ownership of the four properties.

Following the denial by the RTC of their motion for reconsideration, 6 petitioners
appealed the dismissal of Civil Case No. CEB-24293 to the CA, which promulgated its
judgment on November 29, 2002 affirming the dismissal. 7 After the CA denied
petitioners’ motion for reconsideration,8 they brought this present appeal to the Court.

In the meantime, the Estate of Sotto, through the administrator, moved in the probate
court (Special Proceedings No. 2706-R) to require Matilde to account for and turn over
the four properties that allegedly belonged to the estate, presenting documentary
evidence showing that Matilde had effected the redemption of the four properties with
the funds of the estate in accordance with the express authorization of Marcelo. 9 The
probate court granted the motion, but subsequently reversed itself upon Matilde’s
motion for reconsideration. Hence, the Estate of Sotto appealed (G.R. No. 158642), but
the Court promulgated its decision on September 22, 2008 adversely against the Estate
of Sotto.10

Issue

Petitioners insist that this action for partition was not barred by the prior judgment
promulgated on September 21, 1987 in No. L-55076, because they were not hereby
questioning Matilde’s right to redeem the four properties but were instead raising issues
that had not been passed upon in No. L-55076, or in any of the other cases mentioned
by the CA; that the issues being raised here were, namely: (a) whether or not the
redemption of the four properties by Matilde was in accordance with the agreement
between her and Marcelo; and (b) whether or not the funds used to redeem the four
properties belonged to the Estate of Sotto; 11 that there could be no bar by res judicata
because there was no identity of parties and causes of action between this action and
the previous cases; that the captions of the decided cases referred to by the CA showed
that the parties there were different from the parties here; and that it had not been
shown that this action and the other cases were based on the same causes of action. 12

The sole decisive question is whether or not the present action for partition was already
barred by prior judgment.

Ruling

The appeal lacks merit.

Petitioners argue here that the four properties be declared as part of the Estate of Sotto
to be partitioned among the heirs of Filemon because the funds expended by Matilde
for the redemption of the properties came from the Estate of Sotto.

Their argument was similar to that made in The Estate of Don Filemon Y. Sotto v.
Palicte,13 the fourth case to reach the Court, where the Court explicitly ruled as follows:

All these judgments and order upholding Matilde’s exclusive ownership of the subject
properties became final and executory except the action for partition which is still
pending in this Court. The judgments were on the merits and rendered by courts having
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties.

There is substantial identity of parties considering that the present case and the
previous cases involve the heirs of Filemon. There is identity of parties not only when
the parties in the case are the same, but also between those in privity with them, such
as between their successors-in-interest. Absolute identity of parties is not required, and
where a shared identity of interest is shown by the identity of relief sought by one
person in a prior case and the second person in a subsequent case, such was deemed
sufficient.

There is identity of causes of action since the issues raised in all the cases essentially
involve the claim of ownership over the subject properties. Even if the forms or natures
of the actions are different, there is still identity of causes of action when the same
facts or evidence support and establish the causes of action in the case at bar and in
the previous cases.

Hence, the probate court was correct in setting aside the motion to require Matilde to
turn over the subject properties to the estate considering that Matilde’s title and
ownership over the subject properties have already been upheld in previous final
decisions and order. This Court will not countenance the estate’s ploy to countermand
the previous decisions sustaining Matilde’s right over the subject properties. A party
cannot evade the application of the principle of res judicata by the mere expediency of
varying the form of action or the relief sought, or adopting a different method of
presenting the issue, or by pleading justifiable circumstances.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Orders dated 20 December 2002
and 2 June 2003 issued by the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 16, in SP.
PROC. No. 2706-R. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

For this the fifth case to reach us, we still rule that res judicata was applicable to bar
petitioners’ action for partition of the four properties.

Res judicata exists when as between the action sought to be dismissed and the other
action these elements are present, namely; (1) the former judgment must be final; (2)
the former judgment must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the
subject matter and the parties; (3) the former judgment must be a judgment on the
merits; and (4) there must be between the first and subsequent actions (i) identity of
parties or at least such as representing the same interest in both actions; (ii) identity of
subject matter, or of the rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded
on the same facts; and, (iii) identity of causes of action in both actions such that any
judgment that may be rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is
successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration. 14

The first three elements were present. The decision of the Court in G.R. No. 55076 (the
first case), the decision of the Court in G.R. No. 131722 (the second case), the order
dated October 5, 1989 of the RTC in Civil Case No. R-10027 as upheld by the Court in
G.R. No. 154585 (the third case), and the decision in G.R. No. 158642 (the fourth case)
– all of which dealt with Matilde’s right to the four properties – had upheld Matilde’s
right to the four properties and had all become final. Such rulings were rendered in the
exercise of the respective courts’ jurisdiction over the subject matter, and were
adjudications on the merits of the cases.

What remains to be determined is whether Civil Case No. CEB-24293 and the previous
cases involved the same parties, the same subject matter, the same causes of action,
and the same factual and legal issues.
We find that, indeed, Civil Case No. CEB-24293 was no different from the previous
cases as far as parties, subject matter, causes of action and issues were concerned. In
other words, Civil Case No. CEB-24293 was an undisguised relitigation of the same
settled matter concerning Matilde’s ownership of the four properties.

First of all, petitioners, as plaintiffs in Civil Case No. CEB-24293, were suing in their
capacities as the successors-in-interest of Marcelo and Miguel. Even in such capacities,
petitioners’ identity with the parties in the previous cases firmly remained. In G.R. No.
L-55076 (the first case), in which Matilde was the petitioner while her brother Marcelo,
the administrator of the Estate of Sotto, was one of the respondents, the Court affirmed
Matilde’s redemption of the four properties notwithstanding that it gave the other heirs
of Filemon the opportunity to join as co-redemptioners within a period of six months.
When the other heirs did not ultimately join as Matilde’s co-redemptioners within the
period allowed by the Court, the trial court in Civil Case No. R-10027 rightly directed the
Register of Deeds to issue new certificates of title covering the properties in Matilde’s
name. In Civil Case No. CEB-19338 (the second case), the action Pascuala brought
against Matilde for the nullification of Pascuala’s waiver of rights involving the four
properties, the trial court dismissed the complaint upon finding Pascuala barred by
laches from asserting her right as Matilde’s coredemptioner. The CA and, later on, the
Court itself (G.R. No. 131722) affirmed the dismissal by the trial court. In Civil Case No.
R-10027, the trial court denied the motion of the heirs of Miguel (who are petitioners
herein) to include them as co-redemptioners of the properties on the ground of laches
and res judicata. Again, the CA and, later on, the Court itself (G.R. No. 154585)
affirmed the denial. In G.R. No. 158642 (the fourth case), the Court upheld the ruling of
the probate court in Special Proceedings No. 2706-R denying the administrator’s motion
to require Matilde to turn over the four real properties to the Estate of Sotto.

In all the five cases (Civil Case No. CEB-24293 included), an identity of parties existed
because the parties were the same, or there was privity among them, or some of the
parties were successors-in-interest litigating for the same thing and under the same title
and in the same capacity.15 An absolute identity of the parties was not necessary,
because a shared identity of interest sufficed for res judicata to apply. 16 Moreover, mere
substantial identity of parties, or even community of interests between parties in the
prior and subsequent cases, even if the latter were not impleaded in the first case,
would be sufficient.17 As such, the fact that a previous case was filed in the name of the
Estate of Sotto only was of no consequence.

Secondly, the subject matter of all the actions (Civil Case No. CEB-24293 included), was
the same, that is, Matilde’s right to the four properties. On the one hand, Matilde
insisted that she had the exclusive right to them, while, on the other hand, the other
declared heirs of Filemon, like petitioners’ predecessors-in-interest, maintained that the
properties belonged to the Estate of Sotto.

And, lastly, a judgment rendered in the other cases, regardless of which party was
successful, would amount to res judicata in relation to Civil Case No. CEB-24293.

Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment or decree on the merits rendered by
a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive about the rights of the parties or their
privies in all later suits and on all points and matters determined in the previous suit.
The foundation principle upon which the doctrine rests is that the parties ought not to
be permitted to litigate the same issue more than once; that when a right or fact has
been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, so long as it
remains unreversed, it should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with
them in law or estate.18

Section 47 (b) Rule 39 of the Rules of Court institutionalizes the doctrine of res judicata
in the concept of bar by prior judgment, viz:
Section 47. Effect of judgments and final orders.—The effect of a judgment or final
order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the
judgment or final order, may be as follows:

xxxx

(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly
adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto,
conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to
the commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing
and under the same title and in the same capacity; and

xxxx

The doctrine of res judicata is an old axiom of law, dictated by wisdom and sanctified
by age, and founded on the broad principle that it is to the interest of the public that
there should be an end to litigation by the same parties over a subject once fully and
fairly adjudicated. It has been appropriately said that the doctrine is a rule pervading
every well-regulated system of jurisprudence, and is put upon two grounds embodied in
various maxims of the common law: one, public policy and necessity, which makes it to
the interest of the State that there should be an end to litigation –interest reipublicae ut
sit finis litium; the other, the hardship on the individual that he should be vexed twice
for one and the same cause – nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadem causa. A
contrary doctrine would subject the public peace and quiet to the will and neglect of
individuals and prefer the gratification of the litigious disposition on the part of suitors
to the preservation of the public tranquillity and happiness. 19 The doctrine is to be
applied with rigidity because:

x x x the maintenance of public order, the repose of society, and the quiet of families
require that what has been definitely determined by competent tribunals shall be
accepted as irrefragable legal truth. So deeply is this principle implanted in xxx
jurisprudence that commentators upon it have said, the res judicata renders white that
which is black and straight that which is crooked. Facit excurvo rectum, ex albo nigrum.
No other evidence can afford strength to the presumption of truth it creates, and no
argument can detract from its legal efficacy. 20

What we have seen here is a clear demonstration of unmitigated forum shopping on the
part of petitioners and their counsel. It should not be enough for us to just express our
alarm at petitioners’ disregard of the doctrine of res judicata. We do not justly conclude
this decision unless we perform one last unpleasant task, which is to demand from
petitioners’ counsel, Atty. Makilito B. Mahinay, an explanation of his role in this
pernicious attempt to relitigate the already settled issue regarding Matilde’s exclusive
right in the four properties. He was not unaware of the other cases in which the issue
had been definitely settled considering that his clients were the heirs themselves of
Marcelo and Miguel.1âwphi1 Moreover, he had represented the Estate of Sotto in G.R.
No. 158642 (The Estate of Don Filemon Y. Sotto v. Palicte).

Under the circumstances, Atty. Mahinay appears to have engaged in the prejudicial
practice of forum shopping as much as any of his clients had been. If he was guilty, the
Court would not tolerate it, and would sanction him. In this regard, forum shopping,
according to Ao-as v. Court of Appeals,21 may be committed as follows:

As the present jurisprudence now stands, forum shopping can he committed in three
ways: (1) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and with the same
prayer, the previous case not having been resolved yet (litis pendentia); (2) filing
multiple cases based on the same cause of action and the same prayer, the previous
case having been finally resolved (res judicata); and (3) filing multiple cases based on
the same cause of action but with different prayers (splitting of causes of action, where
the ground for dismissal is also either litis pendentia or res judicata). If the forum
shopping is not considered willful and deliberate, the subsequent cases shall he
dismissed without prejudice on one of the two grounds mentioned above. However, if
the forum shopping is willful and deliberate, both (or all, if there are more than two)
actions shall be dismissed with prejudice.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review; AFFIRMS the decision
promulgated on November 29, 2002; and ORDERS petitioners to pay the costs of suit.

The Court DIRECTS Atty. Makilito B. Mahinay to show cause in writing within ten days
from notice why he should not be sanctioned as a member of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for committing a clear violation of the rule prohibiting forum-shopping by
aiding his clients in asserting the same claims at least twice.

SO ORDERED

A.C. No. 10576               January 14, 2015

ARCATOMY S. GUARIN, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. CHRISTINE A.C. LIMPIN, Respondent.

Before us is a complaint 1 for disbarment filed by Arcatomy S. Guarin against Atty.

Christine Antenor-Cruz Limpin for allegedly filing a false General Information Sheet
(GIS) with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) thus violating Canon 1 2 and
Rule 1.013 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).

The facts are culled from the pleadings.

In 2004, Guarin was hired by Mr. Celso G. de los Angeles as Chief Operating Officer and
thereafter as President of OneCard Company, Inc., a member of the Legacy Group of
Companies. He resigned from his post effective August 11, 2008 and transferred to St.
Luke's Medical Center as the Vice President for Finance.

On November 27, 2008, Atty. Limpin, the Corporate Secretary of Legacy Card, Inc.
(LCI), another corporation under the Legacy Group, filed with the SEC a GIS for LCI for
"updating purposes". The GIS4 identified Guarin as Chairman of the Board of Directors
(BOD) and President.

Mired with allegations of anomalous business transactions and practices, on December

18, 2008, LCI applied for voluntary dissolution with the SEC.

On July 22, 2009, Guarin filed this complaint with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP CBD) claiming that Atty. Limpin violated Canon 1 and
Rule 1.01 of the CPR by knowingly listing him as a stockholder, Chairman of the Board
and President of LCI when she knew that he had already resigned and had never held
any share nor was he elected as chairperson of the BOD or been President of LCI. He
also never received any notice of meeting or agenda where his appointment as
Chairman would be taken up. He has never accepted any appointment as Chairman and
President of LCI.

Atty. Limpin admits that she filed the GIS with the SEC listing Guarin as a stockholder,
the Chairman of the BOD and President of LCI. She argued that the GIS was provisional
to comply with SEC requirements. It would have been corrected in the future but
unfortunately LCI filed for voluntary dissolution shortly thereafter. She averred that the
GIS was made and submitted in good faith and that her certification served to attest to
the information from the last BOD meeting held on March 3, 2008.5
She asserted that Guarin knew that he was a stockholder. Atty. Limpin said that on
October 13, 2008, she sent Guarin a text message and asked him to meet with her so
hemay sign a Deed of Assignment concerning shareholdings. Guarin responded in the
affirmative and said that he would meet with her on Friday, October 17, 2008. Guarin,
however, neglected to show up at the arranged time and place for reasons unknown to
Atty. Limpin. On the strength of Guarin’s positive reply, Atty. Limpin filed the GIS on
November 27, 2008.

To belie the claim that LCI never held any board meeting, Atty. Limpin presented
Secretary’s Certificates dated May 16, 2006 6 , May 22, 20067 , and June 13,
20078 bearing Guarin’s signature.

Moreover, Atty. Limpin stated that there were pending criminal complaints against the
directors and officers of LCI, where she and Guarin are co-respondents: Senator Roxas,
et al. v. Celso de los Angeles, et al. 9 and SEC v. Legacy Card, Inc.10 In those
proceedings, Guarin raised as a defense that the November 27, 2008 GIS was spurious
and/or perjured. She averred that this Court held that "when the criminal prosecution
based on the same act charged is still pending in court, any administrative disciplinary
proceedings for the same act must await the outcome of the criminal case to avoid
contradictory findings."11 During the mandatory preliminary conference, however, both
parties stipulated that the complaint filed by Senator Roxas was dismissed as to
Guarin.12

Lastly, Atty. Limpin contends that Guarin failed to present sufficient evidence to warrant
disbarment.1âwphi1 She stated that merely presenting the GIS does not constitute as
proof of any unethical conduct, harassment and malpractice.

In its Report,13 the IBP CBD found that Atty. Limpin violated Canon 1, Rules 1.01 and
1.0214 of the CPR and thus recommended that she be suspended from the practice of
law for three months. It noted that based on the submissions of the parties, Guarin was
never a stockholder of LCI consequently making him ineligible tobe a member of the
BOD. Neither was there proof that Guarin acted as the President of LCI but was a mere
signatory of LCI’s bank accounts. This made the verified statement of Atty. Limpin
untrue.15

Moreover, it was noted that only Mr. Celso de los Angeles had the authority to appoint
or designate directors or officers of Legacy. Atty. Limpin was aware that this procedure
was not legally permissible. Despite knowing this to be irregular, she allowed herself to
be dictated upon and falsely certified that Guarin was a stockholder, chairman and
president of the company. The Secretary’s Certificates with Guarin’s signature Atty.
Limpin presented were of no moment since inthese Guarin merely acceded to become a
signatory of bank accounts and these do not show that Guarin was a stockholder.

The IBP Board of Governors in its April 15, 2013 Resolution 16 adopted in totothe CBD
Report. Atty. Limpin moved for reconsideration 17 but was denied in the March 21, 2014
Resolution18 of the IBP Board of Governors.

We adopt the report and recommendation of the IBP. Atty. Limpin has violated Canon
1, Rule 1.01and Rule 1.02 of the CPR.

Members of the bar are reminded that their first duty is to comply with the rules of
procedure, ratherthan seek exceptions as loopholes. 19 A lawyer who assists a client in a
dishonest scheme or who connives in violating the law commits an act which justifies
disciplinary action against the lawyer.20

Disbarment proceedings are sui generisand can proceed independently of civil and
criminal cases.1âwphi1 As Justice Malcolm stated "[t]he serious consequences of
disbarment or suspension should follow only where there is a clear preponderance of
evidence against the respondent. The presumption is that the attorney is innocent of
the charges pr[o]ferred and has performed his duty as an officer of the court in
accordance with his oath."21

Grounds for such administrative action against a lawyer may be found in Section
27,22 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. Among these are (1) the use of any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office and (2) any violation of the oath
which he is required to take before the admission to practice.

After going through the submissions and stipulations of the parties, we agree with the
IBP that there is no indication that Guarin held any share to the corporation and that he
is therefore ineligible to hold a seat in the BOD and be the president of the
company.23 It is undisputed that Atty. Limpin filed and certified that Guarin was a
stockholder of LCI in the GIS. While she posits that she had made the same in good
faith, her certification also contained a stipulation that she made a due verification of
the statements contained therein. That Atty. Limpin believed that Guarin would sign a
Deed of Assignment is inconsequential: he never signed the instrument. We also note
that there was no submission which would support the allegation that Guarin was in
fact a stockholder. We thus find that in filing a GIS that contained false information,
Atty. Limpin committed an infraction which did not conform to her oath as a lawyer in
accord with Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the CPR.1âwphi1

We also agree with the IBP that in allowing herself to be swayed by the business
practice of having Mr. de los Angeles appoint the members of the BOD and officers of
the corporation despite the rules enunciated in the Corporation Code with respect to the
election of such officers, Atty. Limpin has transgressed Rule 1.02 of the CPR.

However, considering the seriousness of Atty. Limpin's action m submitting a false

document we see it fit to increase the recommended penalty to six months suspension
from the practice of law.

WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Christine A.C. Limpin GUILTY of violation of

Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Rule 1.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Accordingly, we SUSPEND respondent Atty. Christine A.C. Limpin from the practice of
law for SIX (6) MONTHS effective upon finality of this Decision, with a warning that a
repetition of the same or similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended
to respondent's personal record as an attorney, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
the Department of Justice, and all courts in the country for their information and
guidance.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 10675

DATU ISMAEL MALANGAS, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. PAUL C. ZAIDE, Respondent.

Before the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP), complainant Datu Ismael Malangas (complainant) instituted this verified
complaint1 for disbarment against Atty. Paul C. Zaide (respondent lawyer).

Factual Antecedents

Complainant accused respondent lawyer of committing acts of dishonesty, breach of

trust, and violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics 2 in relation to the complaint for
damages (Civil Case No. 6380 of the Regional Trial Court [RTC] of Lanao del Norte at
Iligan City) that he filed against Paul Alfeche (Alfeche) and the NEMA Electrical and
Industrial Sales, Inc./Melanio Siao (NEMA). Complainant averred that on March 6, 2003,
he figw·ed in an accident while crossing Quezon Avenue, Iligan City, when two vehicles
hit and pinned him in· between them, causing him to lose consciousness; that he was
then brought to a hospital where he was confined for four months; that he was later
transferred to other hospitals where he underwent different major operations for which
he spent more than Pl.5 million; and that despite the operations, he remained crippled
and bed ridden.

Because of these, he engaged respondent lawyer's professional services to prosecute

his complaint for damages against therein defendants Alfeche and NEMA; that he gave
respondent lawyer P20,000.00 as acceptance fee and P50,000.00 as filing fees; that
respondent lawyer made him believe that the amount of P50,000.00 was needed as
filing fees in order to commence a P5 million-damage suit covering the accrued and
anticipated damages caused by the accident; that subsequently, respondent lawyer filed
on his behalf a complaint for damages before the RTC of Iligan City, thereat docketed
as Civil Case No. 6380; that respondent lawyer then furnished him (complainant) with a
copy of said Complaint seeking to recover damages in the amount of P5 million; and
that to assure him that the complaint had indeed been filed, this complaint was
stamped "received" by the RTC.

According to complainant, he later discovered, however, that his Complaint had been
dismissed by the RTC because of "failure to prosecute," for the reason that respondent
lawyer did not attend two hearings in the case, and also because respondent lawyer did
not submit an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss filed therein by NEMA; that on
account of this, he asked respondent lawyer to file a Motion for Reconsideration, only to
find out later that respondent lawyer not only did not file a motion for reconsideration
from the Order of dismissal issued by the RTC, but worse, respondent lawyer instead
filed a Withdrawal of Appearance as counsel effectively leaving him without counsel to
prosecute his case; and that after this, he sent a relative to the RTC, where he further
discovered through this relative that the amount of damages sought in the Complaint
filed by respondent lawyer was only P250,000.00, and not PS million, as stated in the
copy of the Complaint given to him by respondent lawyer.

Challenging complainant's allegations, respondent lawyer claimed that complainant was

in fact a client of the Zaragoza-Macabangkit Law Offices, a law firm that he joined way
back in 2002, right after he passed the Bar Examinations; and that as a junior associate
in that law fim1, he only received appearance fees in attending to complainant's civil
case. Respondent lawyer specifically denied that he received an acceptance fee of
P20,000.00, and explained that complainant was already an established client of the
law office he was working for.

As regards the amount of damages, respondent lawyer claimed that in the Complaint he
filed before the RTC, he was even reluctant to ask for P250,000.00 in dan1ages, as
complainant's hospital bills did not reach this amount; but that he nevertheless prayed
for this amount because he was anticipating that complainant would incur additional
expenses as a result of the accident. According to respondent lawyer, the complaint
which embodied a prayer for PS million in damages "was clearly maneuvered to create
an impression that (he, respondent lawyer) defrauded the complainant." 3

Lastly, respondent lawyer contended that although he deliberately skipped attending

the hearings set by the RTC in said Civil Case No. 6380, and that although he also
intentionally filed no opposition to NEMA's Motion to Dismiss, these matters were
initially agreed upon between him and complainant after he (respondent lawyer)
discovered that NEMA' s car did not in fact hit complainant, because NEMA's car was
not illegally parked where it was at the time of the accident; that although complainant
was aware of these facts, complainant suddenly changed his mind~ and insisted on
continuing with the case against NEMA, and pressing for the claim of P5 million in
damages, because complainant believed that NEMA had more leviable properties than
the other defendant Alfeche. According to respondent lawyer, he also found out that
despite the fact that Alf eche had already settled with complainant, the latter still
persisted in pursuing the civil case against Alfeche; 4 that at this point, he realized that
complainant was acting under the compulsion of greed in pressing for the continuation
of the case against his adversaries; and that because of these reasons, he decided to
withdraw from the case as complainant's counsel.

Proceedings before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines

Following the investigation, Commissioner Oliver A. Cachapero oft11e IBP Commission

on Bar Discipline submitted his Report and Recommendation 5 dated January 29, 2013
finding respondent lawyer guilty of dishonesty and breach of trust, for which he
recommended a penalty of two years suspension against respondent lawyer.
Commissioner Cachapero found complainant's allegations more credible than
respondent lawyer's explanations, thus –

Respondent further mentioned that he has been handling cases for or against
Complainant since he embarked on law practice and has never received acceptance fee
from Complainant. He pictured himself as giving out pro bona services to Complainant
for two (2) years. However, he may have contradicted his declaration in this regard
when in his Answer he mentioned that he received P7,000.00 for docket fee and the
rest was paid as advance fees for his services and the usual visitation done by him at
the hospital.6

As regards the true amom1t of damages sought in said Civil Case No. 6380,
Commissioner Cachapero had this to say:

The undersigned deems the complainant's tale plausible enough. The aforesaid page
containing a statement of claim amounting to P5,000,000.00 shows impeccably that it
was typed simultaneously with the rest of the pages of the complaint. There is no
showing that it was merely inserted as a supplement or addition after taking out a
genuine page of the same. It is a constituent part of the complaint which could only
have been printed and/or typed by the respondent or his agent.

Respondent claimed that the insertion of the page (page 8) was 'maneuvered' by
Complainant. If tliese were true, what would have motivated Complainant to do such a
'switching' act? None. In fact, following his discovery of the same, he conducted himself
out like a man wronged. He wrote respondent twice in September 2004 (September 1
and 9, 2004) and castigated respondent for his switching act. Surprisingly, respondent
did not care to take the matter up with complainant through letter or personal
confrontation. To the undersigned, respondent's act of paying no heed to such claim
from Complainant reveals a subtle affumation of his fault in this regard. 7

Ultimately, Commissioner Cachapero found respondent lawyer negligent in the handling

of complainant's case, citing the RTC's Order of July 1, 2004, to wit-

In this regard the record will show that as early as May 18, 2004, plaintiffs counsel was
furriished a copy of said motion, but for reasons only known to him no comment or
opposition was registered by plaintiff In fact, if only to afford plaintiff [a chance] to
countervail movant's motion, last May 24, 2004, as prayed for, plaintiffs counsel was
given ten (10) days to file an Opposition, but sad to say, until now, not\vithstanding the
lapse of practically 37 days no opposition, neither a comment was filed by plaintiff. With
this development the Court will have to confine its scrutiny solely on the motion to
dismiss of movant.8

Action of the IBP Board of Governors

Via Resolution No. XX:-2013-91,9 the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved
the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner Cachapero, viz.:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and

APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the
above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex 'A', and finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and
rules and considering that Respondent committed Dishonesty, Breach of Trust and
Negligence to Complainant, Atty. Paul C. Zaide is hereby SUSPENDED from practice of
law for two (2) years.,

On January 11, 201410 respondent lawyer moved for reconsideration of the foregoing

Resolution. But in its Resolution 11 of May 4, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors denied
respondent lawyer's Motion for Reconsideration.

Our Ruling

After a careful review of the records, we find respondent lawyer guilty of professional
misconduct and of violating Canons 1, 12 16, 13 and 1814 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR). Not only do we find complainant's version more credible but we
also note the glaring inconsistencies in respondent lawyer's allegations.

Respondent lawyer claims that as a mere associate in the Zaragoza Macabangkit Law
offices, "he has NO participation whatsoever regarding the fees the complainant is
giving to the office."15 But, as pointed out by Commissioner Cachapero, respondent
lawyer himself admitted that he received "P7,000.00 for the docket fees and the rest
[was paid] as advance fees for his services and the usual visitation done [by] him at the
hospital."16 Because of this admission, it can be concluded that respondent lawyer
received fees "for his services" from the complainant himself Further bolstering the fact
that respondent lawyer did in fact receive fees for his professional services are
complainant's demand letters 17 - one received on September 1, 2004 and another
delivered by registered mail on September 9, 2004 -asking respondent lawyer to return
the amount of P20,000.00 acceptance fee and to account for the docket fees paid to
the RTC of Iligan City. To these, respondent lawyer merely replied that he "was made
to understand that the 'docket fee' in Alfeche case is part of [respondent's]
claims"18 without denying that he had received such an1ount. The complainant was
thus constrained to conduct his own investigation against his own lawyer, in the course
of which he discovered that of the P50,000.00 alleged filing fees that he gave
respondent lawyer, only P2,623.60 was paid by respondent lawyer to the RTC. As
Commissioner Cachapero aptly stated in his Report and
19
Recommendation,  "[r]espondent's act of paying no heed to such claim from
[c]omplainant reveals a subtle affirmation" that he, indeed, received the acceptance
fee.

Finally, respondent lawyer's former law partners belied his clain1 that he did not
receive, as in fact it was the law firm which received, the an1ounts paid by the
complainant. In their Joint Affidavit, 20 lawyers Leo M. Zaragoza and Alex E. Macabangkit
averred that "the payment made by complainant to Atty. Zaide belongs to him
exclusively and we do not interfere in the arrangement x x x and we do not [have] any
share thereof. "21

Respondent lawyer's refusal to account for the funds given to him, especially his refusal
to return the amount paid in excess of what was required as docket fees, clearly
violated Rules 16.01and16.03 of the CPR, to wit:

Rule 16.01 - A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for
or from the client.
Rule 16.03 - A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or
upon demand. However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much
thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice
promptly thereafter to his client. He shall also have a lien to the same extent on all
judgments and executions he has secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of
Court.

"The Code of Professional Responsibility demands the utmost degree of fidelity and
good fai1h in dealing wit the moneys entrusted to lawyers because of their fiduciary
relationship."22 Any lawyer who does not live up to this duty must be prepared to take
the consequences of his waywardness.

As regards the alleged switching of page 8 of the complaint, respondent lawyer claimed
that it was complainant who switched the pages "to create an impression that
respondent lawyer defrauded the complainant." He asserted in his Motion for
Reconsideration that he came to learn of the PS million claim only during the
disbarment proceedings and that he ''thought it was a joke as respondent lawyer was
NOT able to attend the preliminary conference at the IBP Cagayan de Oro City, where
he could have seen the document. " That respondent lawyer seems to find it hard to
get together with himself is shown by the fact that on the very same page of his Motion
for Reconsideration, he himself admitted that "when respondent lawyer was told of the
amount, he asked the clerk of the office to change it to a more reasonable and realistic
relief, which was eventually heeded, which respondent lawyer was NOT aware that
herein complainant was able to get a draft copy prepared by the office." 25 To borrow
Commissioner Cachapero' s apt observation, this obvious contradiction renders his
defense doubtful, to say the least. Notably, respondent lawyer's former law partners
also belied his claim that Loma B. Martinez, the person who supposedly typed the
Complaint, was a personnel of their law firm. In their Joint Affidavit, they contended
that "Loma B. Martinez was never our Office Staff. She never prepared any pleading in
the office for any of us including that of Atty. Zaide." 26

Respondent lawyer's transgressions did not end there. By his deliberate failure to file a
Comment on or Opposition to NEMA's Motion to Dismiss in said Civil Case No. 6380, and
by his failure to appear at the hearings in connection therewith, respondent lawyer
unduly delayed the case as the trial court had to postpone the hearings thereon, and
this, in turn, naturally arrested the progress of the case insofar as NEMA was
concerned. As previously mentioned, the RTC had to put off for 37 days its ruling on
NEMA.'s Motion to Dismiss because respondent lawyer moved for time to oppose the
same. Yet, despite the 10-day extension given to him, respondent lawyer still failed to
appear at the hearings or file the appropriate pleading. These failings are clearly
offensive to Rules 18.0327 and 18.0428 of the CPR. If respondent lawyer's claim that he
and complainant had indeed agreed to drop the case against NEMA were true, then he
as an officer of the court should have saved the Court's precious time by at least
promptly manifesting his lack of objection to NEMA's Motion to Dismiss. This he did not
do.

Given the gravity of the offenses imputed against him, and considering that this is his
second administrative case,29 respondent lawyer's defense that he was a young lawyer
when he went astray, hardly merits sympathy from this Court. 1âwphi1 Surely
respondent lawyer could not have been unaware that when he took the solemn oath to
become a member of the bar, he did so not only to enjoy the rewards and privileges of
an attorney and counsellor at law, but he also took upon his shoulders the heavy
burden of responsibility and duty that a full-fledged membership in the Philippine Bar
necessarily entailed. Respondent lawyer could not have been oblivious of the fact that
the exercise of a right or privilege is always encumbered with the burden of
responsibility and duty.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Paul C. Zaide is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two
(2) years effective immediately. Atty. Paul C. Zaide is also ORDERED to promptly return
to complainant the sums given to him as acceptance fee and docket fees in the amount
of P70,000.00, from which should be deducted the amount of P2,623.60 paid as
docketing fees.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 11754

JOAQUIN G. BONIFACIO, Complainant
vs.
ATTY. EDGARDO O. ERA and ATTY. DIANE KAREN B. BRAGAS, Respondents

This administrative case arose from a verified Affidavit-Complaint 1 filed before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) by complainant Joaquin G. Bonifacio (Bonifacio)
against respondents Atty. Edgardo O. Era (Atty. Era) and Atty. Diane Karen B. Bragas
(Atty. Bragas) for violating the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).

The Facts

Sometime in 2003, an illegal dismissal case was lodged against Bonifacio and his
company, Solid Engine Rebuilders Corporation entitled Gil Abucejo, Edgar Besmano,
Efren Sager, Darlito Sosa, Gerardo G. Talosa, and Salvador Villanueva v. Solid Engine
Rebuilders Corporation and/or Joaquin  G. Bonifacio, docketed as NLRC NCR Case No.
00-05- 05953-03. Complainants therein (Abucejon Group) were represented by Era and
Associates Law Office through Atty. Era.

On June 15, 2004, the Labor Arbiter found Bonifacio and the corporation liable for
illegal dismissal and, consequently, ordered them to pay Abucejo Group their separation
pay, full backwages and pro-rated 13th month pay. More specifically, Bonifacio and his
corporation were ordered to pay a partially computed amount of ₱674,128 for the
separation pay and full backwages, and ₱16,050.65 for the 13th month pay. Bonifacio
and the corporation brought their case up to the Supreme Court but they suffered the
same fate as their appeals and motions were decided against them.

Thus, on January 26, 2006, a Writ of Execution 5 was issued to implement the June 15,
2004 Decision. A Notice of Garnishment dated February 6, 2006 was likewise
issued.6 Two alias writs dated May 8, 2008 7 and April 16, 20138 were later on issued,
directing the sheriff to collect the sum of ₱4,012,166.43, representing the judgment
award plus interest and attorney's fees.

Meanwhile, an administrative complaint was filed against Atty. Era for representing
conflicting interests entitled Ferdinand A. Samson v. Atty. Edgardo  0. Era, docketed as
A.C. No. 6664.9 In a July 16, 2013 Decision, this Court found Atty. Era guilty of the
charge and imposed the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for two years,
the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS and PRONOUNCES Atty. EDGARDO O. ERA guilty of
violating Rule 15.03 of Canon 15, and Canon 17 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility; and SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for two years effective upon
his receipt of this decision, with a warning that his commission of a similar offense will
be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this decision be included in the personal record of Atty. EDGARDO O. ERA
and entered m [sic] his file in the Office of the Bar Confidant.

Let copies of this decision be disseminated to all lower courts by the Office of the Court
Administrator, as well as to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for its guidance.

SO ORDERED.
On November 28, 2013, the scheduled public auction over Bonifacio's and/or the
corporation's properties in the business establishment was conducted to implement the
alias writ. Atty. Era actively participated therein. He attended the public auction and
tendered a bid for his clients who were declared the highest bidders. On the same day,
a certificate of sale was issued, which Atty. Era presented to the corporation's officers
and employees who were there at that time. Armed with such documents, Atty. Era led
the pulling out of the subject properties but eventually stopped to negotiate with
Bonifacio's children for the payment of the judgment award instead of pulling out the
auctioned properties. Atty. Era summoned Bonifacio's children to continue with the
negotiation in his law office. On behalf of his clients, their counter-offer for the
satisfaction of the judgment award went from ₱6 Million to ₱9 Million. 11

As the parties were not able to settle, on December 3, 2013, Attys. Era and Bragas
went back to Bonifacio's business establishment together with their clients and several
men, and forced open the establishment to pull out the auctioned properties. This was
evidenced by the videos presented by Bonifacio in the instant administrative
complaint.12

This prompted Bonifacio to file a criminal complaint for malicious mischief, robbery, and
trespassing with the Office of the City Prosecutor, Pasay City. In its Resolution 13 dated
March 31, 2014, the Office of the City Prosecutor found probable cause to indict Attys.
Era and Bragas for grave coercion.

Meanwhile, Atty. Era's name remains to appear in pleadings filed before the NLRC and
this Court sometime in February and April, 2014 with regard to the subject labor case.

On August 8, 2014, Bonifacio filed the instant administrative complaint.

In their Answer, Attys. Era and Bragas alleged that Bonifacio has no personal
knowledge as to what transpired on November 28, 2013 and December 3, 2013 as the
latter was not present therein at that time. Hence, his allegations of force, threat, and
intimidation in the execution of the judgment is without basis. In his defense, Atty. Era
further argued that he did not violate the Court's order of suspension from the practice
of law as he merely acted as his clients' attorney-in-fact pursuant to a Special Power of
Attomey (SPA) dated May 3, 2006. It is Atty. Era's theory that with such SP A, he was
not engaged in the practice of law in representing his clients in the implementation of
the alias writ. He added that he never signed any document or pleading on behalf of his
clients during his suspension. For Atty. Bragas, being an associate of Era and Associates
Law Firm, she was merely representing the Abucejo Group as said law firm's clients.
Anent the Php 6 Million to 9 Million counter-offer that they made, Attys. Era and Bragas
explained that the parties were still on negotiation, hence, both parties are free to have
their own computations, which they could respectively accept or otherwise. 21

In his Report and Recommendation22 dated March 17, 2015, Investigating

Commissioner Jose Villanueva Cabrera recommended the dismissal of the instant
administrative complaint for insufficiency of evidence.

The Investigating Commissioner found nothing wrong with the indication of a

suspended lawyer's name in a pleading considering that the same was not signed by
the latter. There was also no proof that a pleading was prepared by Atty. Era. On the
other hand, there was no impediment against Atty. Bragas to sign the pleadings. There
was also no proof that in doing so, Atty. Bragas was assisting suspended Atty. Era in
filing a pleading. Neither the presence of Atty. Era during the public auction and the
negotiations was an implication or proof that Atty. Era was engaging in the practice of
law during his suspension. According to the Investigating Commissioner, anybody, not
exclusively lawyers, can be present at an auction sale or negotiation.

As to whether Attys. Era and Bragas violated any rules/laws in the implementation of
the judgment by using force, threat, and intimidation, the Investigating Commissioner
noted that complainant contradicted such imputations by filing the following pleadings,
to wit: (1) a Motion to Close and Terminate Case 23 dated December 18, 2013,
acknowledging the full satisfaction of the judgment award and even prayed for Attys.
Era and Bragas' clients to take possession of the remaining machines in his business
establishment; (2) a Manifestation 24 dated March 12, 2014, wherein complainant stated
that he has surrendered the vehicles listed in the certificate of sale; (3) an Omnibus
Motion with Entry of Appearance (Motion to Withdraw and Motion to Reiterate Motion
to Close and Terminate Case and release of TRO Bond25 dated February 4, 2014; (4) A
Motion for Consignation with Motion to Lift Levy26 dated October 29, 2014; and (5) a
Motion to Withdraw Complaint27 dated December 10, 2013 on the criminal case for
Malicious Mischief, Robbery, and Trespassing against Attys. Era and Bragas. In fine, the
Investigating Commissioner ratiocinated that in acknowledging the satisfaction of the
judgment in the labor case and withdrawing the criminal case that he filed against
Attys. Era and Bragas with regard to the implementation of the said judgment,
complainant contradicted and demolished his own allegation that the satisfaction of the
judgment was improperly and unlawfully implemented. 28

Thus, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that the administrative charges

against Attys. Era and Bragas be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. 29

The IBP Board of Governors (Board), in its Resolution No. XXI- 2015-270 30 dated April
18, 2015 reversed and set aside the Investigating Commissioner's findings and
conclusions:

RESOLUTION No. XXI-2015-270 CBD Case No. 14-4300 Joaquin G. Bonifacio vs. Atty.
Edgardo O. Era and Atty. Diane Karen B. Bragas

RESOLVED to REVERSE as it is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein
made part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and considering Atty. Era's continued
engagement in the practice of law during the period of his suspension by admittedly
participating in the negotiation for the payment of money judgment including pegging
of interest he acted as his clients advocate instead as an agent in view of the presence
also of his client in the negotiation, for holding office and admittedly summoned the
complainant's children to determine the money judgment. Hence, Atty. Edgardo O. Era
is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) years.

RESOLVED FURTHER, for her assistance in the unauthorized practice of law of Atty.
Edgardo O. Era, Atty. Diane Karen B. Bragas is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for one (1) month.

In its Extended Resolution dated October 17, 2016, the IBP Board of Governors found
Atty. Era's argument that he merely acted pursuant to an SP A given to him untenable.
The Board explained that the invoked SP A gave Atty. Era the authority to appear and
represent the Abucejo Group only on the May 4, 2006 auction and did not include the
November 28, 2013 auction. Also, while he was authorized to receive payment on
behalf of his clients, the SP A specifically stated that said payments should be made in
the form of checks and not machinery or property. Thus, Atty. Era had no authority
under the SP A to represent his clients during the November 28, 2013 auction and to
pull out and receive the corporation's machines as payment of the judgment award. At
any rate, according to the Board, Atty. Era's clients relied on his legal knowledge in
having the judgment award satisfied. Clearly, Atty. Era violated Section 28, 32 Rule 138
of the Rules of Court.

Corollary to this, the Board also found Atty. Bragas liable for allowing and assisting Atty.
Era to engage in an unauthorized practice of law. The Board concluded that Atty.
Bragas ought to know that Atty. Era's acts during the satisfaction of the alias writ could
be performed only by a member of the bar in good standing.34
Pursuant to Section 12(b),35 Rule 139-B of the Rules, the records of the instant case
were transmitted to this Court.

No motion for reconsideration or petition for review was filed by either party as of June
29, 2017.

Necessarily, the Court will now proceed to give its final action on the instant
administrative case, the issues being: (1) Did Atty. Era engage in the practice of law
during his suspension therefrom that would warrant another disciplinary action against
him?; and (2) In the affirmative, is Atty. Bragas guilty of directly or indirectly assisting
Atty. Era in his illegal practice of law that would likewise warrant this Court's exercise of
its disciplining authority against her?

We sustain the findings and recommendations of the Board of Governors.

Atty. Era's acts constituted ''practice of law".

On this matter, Our pronouncement in the landmark case of Renato L. Cayetano v.

Christian Monsod, et. al. 36 is on point. Thus, We quote herein the relevant portions of
the said Decision, viz.:

Black defines "practice of law" as:

"The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles
and technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to
appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces
the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special
proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the
giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken
for them in matters connected with the law. An attorney engages in the practice of law
by maintaining an office where he is held out to be an attorney, using a letterhead
describing himself as an attorney, counseling clients in legal matters, negotiating with
opposing counsel about pending litigation, and fixing and collecting fees for services
rendered by his associate." (Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.)

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title Abstract
and Trust Co. v. Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N .E. 650) A person is also considered
to be in the practice of law when he:

"xxx for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms,
associations or corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears in a
representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending or prospective, before
any court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission constituted
by law or authorized to settle controversies and there, in such representative capacity
performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their
clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity,
engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights under the law, or
while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court
for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law." (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v.
CS. Dudley and Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852).

This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava,  (105 Phil. 173, 176-
177) stated:

"The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it
embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special
proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients
before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to
clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation
services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a
judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in
bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute
law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work
done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect
of facts and conditions." (5 Am. Jur. pp. 262, 263).

xxxx

The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing for new
lawyers (1974-1975) listed the dimensions of the practice of law in even broader terms
as advocacy, counselling and public service.

"One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in the

profession. If what he does exacts knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual for
attorneys engaging in the active practice of their profession, and he follows some one
or more lines of employment such as this he is a practicing attorney at law within the
meaning of the statute." (Barr v. Cardell, 155 NW 312)

Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of
law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. 1âwphi1 "To engage in the
practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession.
Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or
service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill." (111 ALR
23)37 (Emphasis supplied)

In Atty. Edita Noe-Lacsamana v. Atty. Yolando F. Bustamante, 38We succinctly ruled that
the term practice of law implies customarily or habitually holding oneself out to the
public as a lawyer for compensation as a source of livelihood or in consideration of
services. Holding one's self out as a lawyer may be shown by acts indicative of that
purpose, such as identifying oneself as an attorney, appearing in court in representation
of a client, or associating oneself as a partner of a law office for the general practice of
law.39

In this case, it is undisputed that Atty. Era committed the following acts: (1) appeared
on behalf of his winning clients in the public auction of the condemned properties; (2)
tendered bid in the auction for his clients; (3) secured the certificate of sale and
presented the said document to the corporation's officers and employees present in the
premises at that time; (4) insisted that his clients are now the new owners of the
subject properties, hence, should be allowed entry in the premises; (5) initiated the pull
out of the properties; and (6) negotiated with Bonifacio's children in his law office as
regards the payment of the judgment award with interest instead of pulling out the
properties.40

It is true that being present in an auction sale and negotiating matters relating to the
same may not be exclusively for lawyers, as opined by the Investigating Commissioner.
However, in this case, as aptly put by the Board in its Resolution, Atty. Era's acts clearly
involved the determination by a trained legal mind of the legal effects and
consequences of each course of action in the satisfaction of the judgment
award.41 Precisely, this is why his clients chose Atty. Era to represent them in the public
auction and in any negotiation/settlement with the corporation arising from the labor
case as stated in the SPA being invoked by Atty. Era. 42 Such trained legal mind is what
his clients were relying upon in seeking redress for their claims. This is evident from the
fact that they agreed not to enter into any amicable settlement without the prior written
consent of Atty. Era, the latter being their lawyer. 43 It could readily be seen that the
said SPA was executed by reason of Atty. Era being their legal counsel. Thus, We are
one with the Board's submission that the said SPA cannot be invoked to support Atty.
Era's claim that he was not engaged in the practice of law in performing the acts above-
cited as such SP A cunningly undermines the suspension ordered by this Court against
Atty. Era, which We cannot countenance.

Atty. Era was engaged in an unauthorized practice of law during his suspension

As mentioned, Atty. Era was suspended from the practice of law for a period of two
years in this Court's Decision dated July 16, 2013. He performed the above-cited acts
on the same year, specifically November to December 2013. Indubitably, Atty. Era was
engaged in an unauthorized law practice.

Atty. Era's acts constitute willful disobedience of the lawful order of this Court, which
under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is a sufficient cause for suspension or
disbarment. Further, Atty. Era's intentional maneuver to circumvent the suspension
order not only reflects his insubordination to authority but also his disrespect to this
Court's lawful order which warrants reproach. Members of the bar, above anyone else,
are called upon to obey court orders and processes. Graver responsibility is imposed
upon a lawyer than any other to uphold the integrity of the courts and to show respect
to their processes.

This case is not novel. We had previously disciplined erring lawyers who continue in
their practice despite being suspended by the Court. In Rodrigo A. Molina v. Atty.
Ceferino R. Magat,47this Court suspended Atty. Magat from the practice of law for
practicing his profession despite this Court's previous order of suspension. Likewise in
another case, We suspended a lawyer for continuing in her practice despite the clear
language of this Court's suspension order. 48

In view of the foregoing, We agree with the Board of Governors' Resolution, finding
Atty. Era guilty of willfully disobeying the lawful order of this Court warranting the
exercise of Our disciplining authority. We also adopt the Board's recommendation as to
the penalty to be imposed upon Atty. Era, i.e., three years suspension from the practice
of law, taking into account that this is his second infraction.

Atty. Bragas is guilty of assisting Atty. Era in his unauthorized practice of law and, thus,
must likewise be reproved.

There is no question that Atty. Bragas has knowledge of Atty. Era's suspension from the
practice of law and yet, she allowed herself to participate in Atty. Era's unauthorized
practice. Clearly, Atty. Bragas violated the CPR, specifically:

CANON 9 - A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice
of law.

Indeed, it is a lawyer's duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the
unauthorized practice of law. Such duty is founded upon public interest and policy,
which requires that law practice be limited only to individuals found duly qualified in
education and character.49

As correctly observed by the Board, Atty. Bragas ought to know that Atty. Era's acts
constitutive of law practice could be performed only by a member of the Bar in good
standing, which Atty. Era was not at that time. Hence, she should have not participated
to such transgression.

Being an associate in Atty. Era's law firm cannot be used to circumvent the suspension
order. The factual circumstances of the case clearly shows that Atty. Bragas did not act
to replace Atty. Era as counsel for his and/or the law firm's clients during the latter's
suspension. Atty. Bragas merely assisted Atty. Era, who admittedly was the one actively
performing all acts pertaining to the labor case he was handling.

Considering the foregoing, We also adopt the Board's recommendation as regards Atty.
Bragas' guilt in the violation of the CPR.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Atty. Edgardo O. Era is found GUILTY of willfully
disobeying this Court's lawful order and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for a period of three (3) years, while Atty. Diane Karen B. Bragas is likewise
found GUILTY of violating CANON 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) month, effective immediately
from receipt of this Decision. Also, both Attys. Era and Bragas are WARNED that a
repetition of the same or similar offense, or a commission of another offense will
warrant a more severe penalty.

Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the personal records of respondents as

members of the Bar, and copies furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for
circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 12289

ATTY. ANASTACIO T. MUNTUERTO, JR.; ATTY. RAMON JOSE G. DUYONGCO;

ATTY. MARIO Y. CA VADA; and ATTY. CHAD RODOLFO M. MIEL, Complainants
vs.
ATTY. GERARDO WILFREDO L. ALBERTO, Respondent

A lawyer who notarizes documents without a notarial commission, and assists and abets
the unauthorized practice of law by a non-lawyer, deliberately violates the Lawyer's
Oath and transgresses the canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility . He
thereby manifests a lack of respect for the law and dishonesty, and deserves to be
severely punished.

Antecedents

We hereby consider and resolve the disbarment complaint filed by the complainants
charging the respondent with falsification of public documents, and wilful and deliberate
violations of his oath as a lawyer, and of the mandatory rules of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.1

The complainants aver that the respondent was the counsel of record of Cristeto E.
Dinopol, Jr., who had instituted an action for reconveyance and recovery of possession
and damages against Singfil Hydro Builders in the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
47, in Masbate City docketed as Civil Case No. 6835; that the respondent had attached
to the complaint a supplemental agreement and an amended joint venture agreement
separately acknowledged before him as a notary public for and in Cavite City; that he
had antedated his notarizations; that, however, the Notarial Division of the RTC in
Cavite City certified that it had "no record of any Commission/Order appointing a
certain Atty. Gerardo Wilfredo L. Alberto as Notary Public for the City of Cavite nor of
any documents notarized by him, more specifically a document denominated as
Supplemental & Amended Joint Venture Agreement ;'''2 that he had not indicated his
MCLE3 certificate of compliance number and the date of issue of such certificate; 4 that
realizing that the complaint he had filed was fatally defective, he had his client sign and
file the so-called Motion for Prior Leave of Court to Admit the Herein Attached Amended
Complaint, with the amended complaint attached; and that the respondent had further
falsified the supposed secretary's certificate to make it appear that he had been duly
appointed as the acting corporate secretary of Singtrader JV Corporation, and that a
resolution had been adopted by said corporation authorizing Cristeto E. Dinopol, Jr. as
its representative relative to the filing of the necessary and proper actions. 5

Upon receipt of the administrative complaint against the respondent, the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) directed him to file his answer. However, he did not comply,
and for that reason he was declared in default. 6
The IBP then conducted a mandatory conference on June 18, 2016, but the respondent
did not attend the same despite notice. Furthermore, he did not file his position paper. 7

Findings and Recommendation of the IBP

In her Report and Recommendation dated January 31, 2017, IBP Investigating
Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala found the charges against the respondent
established, and recommended his suspension from the practice of law for five years, to
wit:

PREMISES CONSIDERED, we respectfully recommend that respondent, ATTY.

GERARDO WILFREDO L. ALBERTO, be SUSPENDED for a period of FIVE (5)
YEARS from receipt hereof as a lawyer and as a member of the Bar.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.8

On November 27, 2017, the IBP Board of Governors adopted the findings and
recommendation of IBP Investigation Commissioner Villanueva-Maala, viz.:

RESOLVED  to  ADOPT the findings of fact and recommendation of the Investigating

Commissioner, but modifying the recommended penalty to SUSPENSION FROM THE
PRACTICE OF LAW for five (5) years.

RESOLVED FURTHER to recommend the imposition upon respondent of a FINE  of

Five Thousand Pesos (₱5,000.00) for disregarding the Orders of the Commission .9

The respondent did not appeal or move for reconsideration.

Issue

Did the respondent violate the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility: (a) by notarizing documents without having been issued a notarial
commission; (b) by allowing a non-lawyer to sign a motion filed in court; and (c) by
failing to indicate his MCLE compliance number in the complaint filed in connection with
a pending case?

Ruling of the Court

We ADOPT with MODIFICATION the findings and recommendation of the IBP Board

of Governors.

The respondent notarized the supplemental agreement and the amended joint venture
agreement attached to the complaint he filed in Civil Case No. 6835. 10 According to the
findings by IBP Investigating Commissioner Villanueva-Maala, he held no notarial
commission when he notarized the documents. Such lack of the notarial commission
was confirmed by the certification issued by the Office of the Clerk of Court of the RTC
in Cavite City to the effect that said office had no record of any commission appointing
the respondent a notary public for and in the City of Cavite. 11

The respondent should be subjected to strong disciplinary action for notarizing the
documents without authorization or commission to do so.

To start with, the act of the respondent constituted a blatant violation of the injunction
of the Lawyer's Oath to obey the laws. The law thereby violated is the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice, which expressly defines a notary public as "any person commissioned
to perform official acts under the [2004 Rules on Notarial Practice]."12 The commission,
which is the grant of authority to perform notarial acts, 13 is issued upon due application
by the Executive Judge of the province or city where the applicant is to have a regular
place of work or business after a summary hearing conducted by the Executive Judge
following the publication of the notice of summary hearing in a newspaper of general
circulation in said province or city, and after posting of the notice of summary hearing
in a conspicuous place in the offices of the Executive Judge and of the Clerk of
Court.14 Clearly, the exercise of the authority to notarize cannot simply be done by
anyone.

The significance of the office of the notary public cannot be taken for granted. The
notarial act is invested with public interest, such that only those who are qualified or
authorized may act and serve as notaries public. 15 The Court has expounded on the
character of the office of the notary public in Bernardo Vda. de Rosales v.
Ramos,16 stating thusly:

The principal function of a notary public is to authenticate documents. When a notary

public certifies to the due execution and delivery of the document under his hand and
seal he gives the document the force of evidence. Indeed, one of the purposes of
requiring documents to be acknowledged before a notary public, in addition to the
solemnity which should surround the execution and delivery of documents, is to
authorize such documents to be given without further proof of their execution and
delivery. Where the notary public is a lawyer, a graver responsibility is placed upon him
by reason of his solemn oath to obey the laws and to do no falsehood or consent to the
doing of any. Failing in this, he must accept the consequences of his unwarranted
actions.

And, secondly, the respondent, by making it appear that he had been duly
commissioned to act as notary public, thereby vested the documents with evidentiary
value. Yet, because of the absence of a notarial commission in his favor, he foisted a
deliberate falsehood on the trial court. He became guilty of dishonesty. He also
trivialized the solemnity of notarizing the documents. Such effrontery transgressed the
prohibition against unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct on his part as an
attorney made explicit in Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, to wit: "A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct."17

II

The resolution issued in Bar Matter No. 1922,18 as amended, required the respondent to
disclose in all the pleadings, motions and other papers he filed in court of information
on his compliance with the MCLE program of the Supreme Court. The resolution reads
as follows:

In the Resolution of the Court En Banc dated January 14, 2014 in the above-cited
administrative matter, the Court RESOLVED, upon the recommendation of the MCLE
Governing Board, to:

(a) AMEND the June 3, 2008 resolution by repealing the phrase "Failure to disclose the
required information would cause the dismissal of the case and the expunction of the
pleadings from the records" and replacing it with "Failure to disclose the required
information would subject the counsel to appropriate penalty and disciplinary action ";
and

(b) PRESCRIBE the following rules for non-disclosure of current MCLE

compliance/exemption number in the pleadings:

(i) The lawyer shall be imposed a fine of ₱2,000.00 for the first offense, ₱3,000.00 for
the second offense and ₱4,000.00 for the third offense;
(ii) In addition to the fine, counsel may be listed as a delinquent member of the Bar
pursuant to Section 2, Rule 13 of Bar Matter No. 850 and its implementing rules and
regulations; and

(iii) The non-compliant lawyer shall be discharged from the case and the client/s shall
be allowed to secure the services of a new counsel with the concomitant right to
demand the return of fees already paid to the non-compliant lawyer.

However, the respondent did not disclose his MCLE certificate of compliance number
and the date of issue of the certificate in the complaint he filed in Civil Case No. 6835 of
the RTC in Masbate City. Such non-disclosure was a flagrant disobedience to the
aforequoted terms of the resolution issued in Bar Matter No. 1922.

It is good to mention that the respondent seemed to be a repeat violator of the

requirement for disclosure under the resolution issued in Bar Matter No. 1922. He had
been observed to have been guilty of the same omission in A.C. No. 12131, 19 where the
Court noted his having defied the order for him to submit his MCLE compliance, to wit:

With regard to the case docketed as SEC-MC13-138 pending before RTC Mandaluyong
City, Branch 211, complainant also appeared as counsel for and signed the pleadings
without a certificate of compliance for MCLE IV. Also, in its order dated August 19,
2014, the RTC directed complainant to show cause for his failure to comply with the
directives of the court for him to submit his MCLE compliance. Up to the present,
complainant has yet to comply with the order of the court.

III

The respondent was also liable for the charge of assisting and abetting the
unauthorized practice of law by a non-lawyer because he had a non-lawyer sign and file
the so-called Motion for Prior Leave of Court to Admit the Herein Attached Amended
Complaint despite him being the counsel of record of the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 6835.
He thereby patently breached both the letter and spirit of Rule 9.01, Canon 9 of
the Code, which states:

Rule 9.01 — A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of
any task which by law may only be performed by a member of the Bar in good
standing.

The preparation and signing of any pleading, motion or other paper to be submitted in
court in connection with any pending matter constitute legal work within the context of
the practice of law. Verily, pursuant to Section 3, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, the
signature on the pleading, motion or other paper serves as a certification that the
signing attorney "has read the pleading; that to the best of his knowledge, information,
and belief there is good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay."
Such formal assurance cannot be undertaken and given except by a regular member of
the Philippine Bar in good standing. It is also necessary to stress that the high
responsibility for conducting the litigation pertains only to the enrolled attorney of the
party in whose behalf the pleading, motion or other paper is submitted in court. He may
delegate the signing of the pleading, motion or other paper to another lawyer, but not
to a non-lawyer.20

In Cambaliza v. Cristal-Tenorio,21 the Court, holding that the lawyer's duty to prevent,

or, at the very least, not to assist in the unauthorized practice of law is founded on
public interest and policy, pointed out that:

x x x Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found
duly qualified in education and character. The permissive right conferred on the lawyer
is an individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper
standards of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the
court, the client, and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed
to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary control of the Court. It devolves upon
a lawyer to see that this purpose is attained. Thus, the canons and ethics of the
profession enjoin him not to permit the professional services or his name to be used in
aid of, or to make possible the unauthorized practice of law by, any agency, personal or
corporate. And, the law makes it a misbehavior on his part, subject to disciplinary
action, to aid a layman in the unauthorized practice of law. 22

In fine, the responsibility of signing the so-called Motion for Prior Leave of Court to
Admit the Herein Attached Amended Complaint  was personal to the respondent as the
attorney of record. That he delegated it to a non-lawyer was an abdication of the
responsibility that subjected him to sanction.

IV

We next consider the penalty with which to sanction the respondent.

The Court has held lawyers administratively liable for notarizing documents without
having been issued their notarial commissions. In Nunga v. Viray,23 the Court
suspended a lawyer for three years for notarizing an instrument without a commission.
In Zoreta v. Simpliciano,24 the lawyer was suspended from the practice of law for two
years, and permanently barred from being commissioned as a notary public for
notarizing several documents after the expiration of his commission. In Mariano v.
Echanez,25 the Court suspended the erring lawyer from the practice of law for two years
and permanently barred him from being commissioned as a notary public for
performing notarial acts without a valid notarial commission.

The respondent's act of having the representative of his corporate client sign the so-
called Motion for Prior Leave of Court to Admit the Herein Attached Amended
Complaint submitted to the RTC could be equated to the censurable act in Tapay v.
Bancolo,26 where the lawyer had allowed a non-lawyer to sign a pleading filed in court.
The offending lawyer was suspended from the practice of law for one year.

In addition, the respondent's failure to comply with the directives of the IBP to do
certain acts in relation to the investigation of the administrative charge brought against
him - specifically, that he did not file his answer, and his verified position paper despite
being required to do so - exhibited defiance towards the IBP's directives. Such defiance
should not be overlooked, but ought to be treated as an aggravating circumstance of
his liability in this case. This treatment would constantly remind him that the IBP, as the
investigator designated by the Court itself to investigate the charge brought against
him, was discharging a public duty in the Court's name and stead, and should be
respected in its discharge of the duty.

In view of all the foregoing, the Court deems it to be just and proper to adopt the IBP
Board of Governors' recommendation to suspend the respondent from the practice of
law for a period of five years effective upon receipt of this decision, and to bar him
permanently from being commissioned as notary public in the Philippines.

WHEREFORE, the Court SUSPENDS respondent ATTY. GERARDO WILFREDO L.

ALBERTO from the practice of law for five (5) years effective upon receipt of this
decision; PERMANENTLY BARS him from being commissioned as Notary Public in the
Philippines effective upon his receipt of this decision; and STERNLY WARNS him that
a stiffer penalty will be imposed should he commit a similar offense hereafter.

Let this decision be attached to the records of ATTY. GERARDO WILFREDO L.

ALBERTO in the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines;
and be furnished to the Office of the Court Administrator for proper dissemination to all
courts throughout the country.
SO ORDERED.