New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen Decision
New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen Decision
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can, and must, apply to circumstances beyond those the Founders spe-
cifically anticipated, even though its meaning is fixed according to the
understandings of those who ratified it. See, e.g., United States v.
Jones, 565 U. S. 400, 404–405. Indeed, the Court recognized in Heller
at least one way in which the Second Amendment’s historically fixed
meaning applies to new circumstances: Its reference to “arms” does not
apply “only [to] those arms in existence in the 18th century.” 554 U. S.,
at 582.
To determine whether a firearm regulation is consistent with the
Second Amendment, Heller and McDonald point toward at least two
relevant metrics: first, whether modern and historical regulations im-
pose a comparable burden on the right of armed self-defense, and sec-
ond, whether that regulatory burden is comparably justified. Because
“individual self-defense is ‘the central component’ of the Second
Amendment right,” these two metrics are “ ‘central’ ” considerations
when engaging in an analogical inquiry. McDonald, 561 U. S., at 767
(quoting Heller, 554 U. S., at 599).
To be clear, even if a modern-day regulation is not a dead ringer for
historical precursors, it still may be analogous enough to pass consti-
tutional muster. For example, courts can use analogies to “longstand-
ing” “laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such
as schools and government buildings” to determine whether modern
regulations are constitutionally permissible. Id., at 626. That said,
respondents’ attempt to characterize New York’s proper-cause require-
ment as a “sensitive-place” law lacks merit because there is no histor-
ical basis for New York to effectively declare the island of Manhattan
a “sensitive place” simply because it is crowded and protected gener-
ally by the New York City Police Department. Pp. 17–22.
(b) Having made the constitutional standard endorsed in Heller
more explicit, the Court applies that standard to New York’s proper-
cause requirement. Pp. 23–62.
(1) It is undisputed that petitioners Koch and Nash—two ordi-
nary, law-abiding, adult citizens—are part of “the people” whom the
Second Amendment protects. See Heller, 554 U. S., at 580. And no
party disputes that handguns are weapons “in common use” today for
self-defense. See id., at 627. The Court has little difficulty concluding
also that the plain text of the Second Amendment protects Koch’s and
Nash’s proposed course of conduct—carrying handguns publicly for
self-defense. Nothing in the Second Amendment’s text draws a
home/public distinction with respect to the right to keep and bear
arms, and the definition of “bear” naturally encompasses public carry.
Moreover, the Second Amendment guarantees an “individual right to
possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation,” id., at 592, and
confrontation can surely take place outside the home. Pp. 23–24.
4 NEW YORK STATE RIFLE & PISTOL ASSN., INC. v. BRUEN
Syllabus
(2) The burden then falls on respondents to show that New York’s
proper-cause requirement is consistent with this Nation’s historical
tradition of firearm regulation. To do so, respondents appeal to a va-
riety of historical sources from the late 1200s to the early 1900s. But
when it comes to interpreting the Constitution, not all history is cre-
ated equal. “Constitutional rights are enshrined with the scope they
were understood to have when the people adopted them.” Heller, 554
U. S., at 634–635. The Second Amendment was adopted in 1791; the
Fourteenth in 1868. Historical evidence that long predates or post-
dates either time may not illuminate the scope of the right. With these
principles in mind, the Court concludes that respondents have failed
to meet their burden to identify an American tradition justifying New
York’s proper-cause requirement. Pp. 24–62.
(i) Respondents’ substantial reliance on English history and
custom before the founding makes some sense given Heller’s statement
that the Second Amendment “codified a right ‘inherited from our Eng-
lish ancestors.’ ” 554 U. S., at 599. But the Court finds that history
ambiguous at best and sees little reason to think that the Framers
would have thought it applicable in the New World. The Court cannot
conclude from this historical record that, by the time of the founding,
English law would have justified restricting the right to publicly bear
arms suited for self-defense only to those who demonstrate some spe-
cial need for self-protection. Pp. 30–37.
(ii) Respondents next direct the Court to the history of the Col-
onies and early Republic, but they identify only three restrictions on
public carry from that time. While the Court doubts that just three
colonial regulations could suffice to show a tradition of public-carry
regulation, even looking at these laws on their own terms, the Court is
not convinced that they regulated public carry akin to the New York
law at issue. The statutes essentially prohibited bearing arms in a
way that spread “fear” or “terror” among the people, including by car-
rying of “dangerous and unusual weapons.” See 554 U. S., at 627.
Whatever the likelihood that handguns were considered “dangerous
and unusual” during the colonial period, they are today “the quintes-
sential self-defense weapon.” Id., at 629. Thus, these colonial laws
provide no justification for laws restricting the public carry of weapons
that are unquestionably in common use today. Pp. 37–42.
(iii) Only after the ratification of the Second Amendment in
1791 did public-carry restrictions proliferate. Respondents rely heav-
ily on these restrictions, which generally fell into three categories:
common-law offenses, statutory prohibitions, and “surety” statutes.
None of these restrictions imposed a substantial burden on public
carry analogous to that imposed by New York’s restrictive licensing
regime.
Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 5
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(v) Finally, respondents point to the slight uptick in gun regu-
lation during the late-19th century. As the Court suggested in Heller,
however, late-19th-century evidence cannot provide much insight into
the meaning of the Second Amendment when it contradicts earlier ev-
idence. In addition, the vast majority of the statutes that respondents
invoke come from the Western Territories. The bare existence of these
localized restrictions cannot overcome the overwhelming evidence of
an otherwise enduring American tradition permitting public carry.
See Heller, 554 U. S., at 614. Moreover, these territorial laws were
rarely subject to judicial scrutiny, and absent any evidence explaining
why these unprecedented prohibitions on all public carry were under-
stood to comport with the Second Amendment, they do little to inform
“the origins and continuing significance of the Amendment.” Ibid.; see
also The Federalist No. 37, p. 229. Finally, these territorial re-
strictions deserve little weight because they were, consistent with the
transitory nature of territorial government, short lived. Some were
held unconstitutional shortly after passage, and others did not survive
a Territory’s admission to the Union as a State. Pp. 58–62.
(vi) After reviewing the Anglo-American history of public carry,
the Court concludes that respondents have not met their burden to
identify an American tradition justifying New York’s proper-cause re-
quirement. Apart from a few late-19th-century outlier jurisdictions,
American governments simply have not broadly prohibited the public
carry of commonly used firearms for personal defense. Nor have they
generally required law-abiding, responsible citizens to “demonstrate a
special need for self-protection distinguishable from that of the general
community” to carry arms in public. Klenosky, 75 App. Div. 2d, at 793,
428 N. Y. S. 2d, at 257. P. 62.
(c) The constitutional right to bear arms in public for self-defense is
not “a second-class right, subject to an entirely different body of rules
than the other Bill of Rights guarantees.” McDonald, 561 U. S., at 780
(plurality opinion). The exercise of other constitutional rights does not
require individuals to demonstrate to government officers some special
need. The Second Amendment right to carry arms in public for self-
defense is no different. New York’s proper-cause requirement violates
the Fourteenth Amendment by preventing law-abiding citizens with
ordinary self-defense needs from exercising their right to keep and
bear arms in public. Pp. 62–63.
818 Fed. Appx. 99, reversed and remanded.
THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J.,
and ALITO, GORSUCH, KAVANAUGH, and BARRETT, JJ., joined. ALITO, J.,
filed a concurring opinion. KAVANAUGH, J., filed a concurring opinion, in
which ROBERTS, C. J., joined. BARRETT, J., filed a concurring opinion.
BREYER, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which SOTOMAYOR and KAGAN,
JJ., joined.
Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 1
No. 20–843
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§18.65.700 (2020); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §13–3112 (Cum. Supp. 2021);
Ark. Code Ann. §5–73–309 (Supp. 2021); Colo. Rev. Stat. §18–12–206
(2021); Fla. Stat. §790.06 (2021); Ga. Code Ann. §16–11–129 (Supp.
2021); Idaho Code Ann. §18–3302K (Cum. Supp. 2021); Ill. Comp. Stat.,
ch. 430, §66/10 (West Cum. Supp. 2021); Ind. Code §35–47–2–3 (2021);
Iowa Code §724.7 (2022); Kan. Stat. Ann. §75–7c03 (2021); Ky. Rev. Stat.
Ann. §237.110 (Lexis Cum. Supp. 2021); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §40:1379.3
(West Cum. Supp. 2022); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 25, §2003 (Cum. Supp.
2022); Mich. Comp. Laws §28.425b (2020); Minn. Stat. §624.714 (2020);
Miss. Code Ann. §45–9–101 (2022); Mo. Rev. Stat. §571.101 (2016); Mont.
Code Ann. §45–8–321 (2021); Neb. Rev. Stat. §69–2430 (2019); Nev. Rev.
Stat. §202.3657 (2021); N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §159:6 (Cum. Supp. 2021);
N. M. Stat. Ann. §29–19–4 (2018); N. C. Gen. Stat. Ann. §14–415.11
(2021); N. D. Cent. Code Ann. §62.1–04–03 (Supp. 2021); Ohio Rev. Code
Ann. §2923.125 (2020); Okla. Stat., Tit. 21, §1290.12 (2021); Ore. Rev.
Stat. §166.291 (2021); 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. §6109 (Cum. Supp. 2016); S. C.
Code Ann. §23–31–215(A) (Cum. Supp. 2021); S. D. Codified Laws §23–
7–7 (Cum. Supp. 2021); Tenn. Code Ann. §39–17–1366 (Supp. 2021); Tex.
Govt. Code Ann. §411.177 (West Cum. Supp. 2021); Utah Code §53–5–
Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 5
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3 Rather than begin with its view of the governing legal framework, the
A
Since Heller and McDonald, the two-step test that Courts
of Appeals have developed to assess Second Amendment
claims proceeds as follows. At the first step, the govern-
ment may justify its regulation by “establish[ing] that the
challenged law regulates activity falling outside the scope
of the right as originally understood.” E.g., Kanter v. Barr,
919 F. 3d 437, 441 (CA7 2019) (internal quotation marks
omitted). But see United States v. Boyd, 999 F. 3d 171, 185
(CA3 2021) (requiring claimant to show “ ‘a burden on con-
duct falling within the scope of the Second Amendment’s
guarantee’ ”). The Courts of Appeals then ascertain the
original scope of the right based on its historical meaning.
E.g., United States v. Focia, 869 F. 3d 1269, 1285 (CA11
2017). If the government can prove that the regulated con-
duct falls beyond the Amendment’s original scope, “then the
analysis can stop there; the regulated activity is categori-
cally unprotected.” United States v. Greeno, 679 F. 3d 510,
518 (CA6 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). But if
the historical evidence at this step is “inconclusive or sug-
gests that the regulated activity is not categorically unpro-
tected,” the courts generally proceed to step two. Kanter,
919 F. 3d, at 441 (internal quotation marks omitted).
At the second step, courts often analyze “how close the
law comes to the core of the Second Amendment right and
the severity of the law’s burden on that right.” Ibid. (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted). The Courts of Appeals gen-
erally maintain “that the core Second Amendment right is
limited to self-defense in the home.” Gould, 907 F. 3d, at
671 (emphasis added). But see Wrenn, 864 F. 3d, at 659
(“[T]he Amendment’s core generally covers carrying in pub-
lic for self defense”). If a “core” Second Amendment right is
burdened, courts apply “strict scrutiny” and ask whether
the Government can prove that the law is “narrowly tai-
lored to achieve a compelling governmental interest.” Kolbe
v. Hogan, 849 F. 3d 114, 133 (CA4 2017) (internal quotation
10 NEW YORK STATE RIFLE & PISTOL ASSN., INC. v. BRUEN
N. J., 910 F. 3d 106, 117 (CA3 2018); accord, Worman v. Healey, 922 F. 3d
26, 33, 36–39 (CA1 2019); Libertarian Party of Erie Cty. v. Cuomo, 970
F. 3d 106, 127–128 (CA2 2020); Harley v. Wilkinson, 988 F. 3d 766, 769
(CA4 2021); National Rifle Assn. of Am., Inc. v. Bureau of Alcohol, To-
bacco, Firearms, and Explosives, 700 F. 3d 185, 194–195 (CA5 2012);
United States v. Greeno, 679 F. 3d 510, 518 (CA6 2012); Kanter v. Barr,
919 F. 3d 437, 442 (CA7 2019); Young v. Hawaii, 992 F. 3d 765, 783 (CA9
2021) (en banc); United States v. Reese, 627 F. 3d 792, 800–801 (CA10
2010); GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. Georgia, 687 F. 3d 1244, 1260, n. 34
(CA11 2012); United States v. Class, 930 F. 3d 460, 463 (CADC 2019).
Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 11
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heightened “standar[d] of scrutiny” did not supplant Heller’s focus on
constitutional text and history. Rather, Heller’s comment “was more of
a gilding-the-lily observation about the extreme nature of D.C.’s law,”
Heller v. District of Columbia, 670 F. 3d 1244, 1277 (CADC 2011) (Ka-
vanaugh, J., dissenting), than a reflection of Heller’s methodology or
holding.
16 NEW YORK STATE RIFLE & PISTOL ASSN., INC. v. BRUEN
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6 The dissent claims that Heller’s text-and-history test will prove un-
end scrutiny under the guise of an analogical inquiry. Again, the Second
Amendment is the “product of an interest balancing by the people,” not
the evolving product of federal judges. Heller, 554 U. S., at 635 (empha-
sis altered). Analogical reasoning requires judges to apply faithfully the
balance struck by the founding generation to modern circumstances, and
Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 21
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contrary to the dissent’s assertion, there is nothing “[i]roni[c]” about that
undertaking. Post, at 30. It is not an invitation to revise that balance
through means-end scrutiny.
22 NEW YORK STATE RIFLE & PISTOL ASSN., INC. v. BRUEN
III
Having made the constitutional standard endorsed in
Heller more explicit, we now apply that standard to New
York’s proper-cause requirement.
A
It is undisputed that petitioners Koch and Nash—two or-
dinary, law-abiding, adult citizens—are part of “the people”
whom the Second Amendment protects. See Heller, 554
U. S., at 580. Nor does any party dispute that handguns
are weapons “in common use” today for self-defense. See
id., at 627; see also Caetano, 577 U. S., at 411–412. We
therefore turn to whether the plain text of the Second
Amendment protects Koch’s and Nash’s proposed course of
conduct—carrying handguns publicly for self-defense.
We have little difficulty concluding that it does. Respond-
ents do not dispute this. See Brief for Respondents 19. Nor
could they. Nothing in the Second Amendment’s text draws
a home/public distinction with respect to the right to keep
and bear arms. As we explained in Heller, the “textual ele-
ments” of the Second Amendment’s operative clause— “the
right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be in-
fringed”—“guarantee the individual right to possess and
carry weapons in case of confrontation.” 554 U. S., at 592.
Heller further confirmed that the right to “bear arms” refers
to the right to “wear, bear, or carry . . . upon the person or
in the clothing or in a pocket, for the purpose . . . of being
armed and ready for offensive or defensive action in a case
of conflict with another person.” Id., at 584 (quoting Mus-
carello v. United States, 524 U. S. 125, 143 (1998) (Gins-
burg, J., dissenting); internal quotation marks omitted).
This definition of “bear” naturally encompasses public
carry. Most gun owners do not wear a holstered pistol at
their hip in their bedroom or while sitting at the dinner ta-
ble. Although individuals often “keep” firearms in their
home, at the ready for self-defense, most do not “bear” (i.e.,
24 NEW YORK STATE RIFLE & PISTOL ASSN., INC. v. BRUEN
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much discretion licensing officers in New York possess, or whether the
proper cause standard differs across counties.” Post, at 20. We disagree.
The dissent does not dispute that any applicant for an unrestricted con-
cealed-carry license in New York can satisfy the proper-cause standard
only if he has “ ‘ “a special need for self-protection distinguishable from
that of the general community.” ’ ” Post, at 13 (quoting Kachalsky v.
County of Westchester, 701 F. 3d 81, 86 (CA2 2012)). And in light of the
text of the Second Amendment, along with the Nation’s history of firearm
regulation, we conclude below that a State may not prevent law-abiding
citizens from publicly carrying handguns because they have not demon-
strated a special need for self-defense. See infra, at 62. That conclusion
does not depend upon any of the factual questions raised by the dissent.
Nash and Koch allege that they were denied unrestricted licenses be-
cause they had not “demonstrate[d] a special need for self-defense that
distinguished [them] from the general public.” App. 123, 125. If those
allegations are proven true, then it simply does not matter whether li-
censing officers have applied the proper-cause standard differently to
other concealed-carry license applicants; Nash’s and Koch’s constitu-
tional rights to bear arms in public for self-defense were still violated.
26 NEW YORK STATE RIFLE & PISTOL ASSN., INC. v. BRUEN
(1888). But this Court has long cautioned that the English
common law “is not to be taken in all respects to be that of
America.” Van Ness v. Pacard, 2 Pet. 137, 144 (1829)
(Story, J., for the Court); see also Wheaton v. Peters, 8 Pet.
591, 659 (1834); Funk, 290 U. S., at 384. Thus, “[t]he lan-
guage of the Constitution cannot be interpreted safely ex-
cept by reference to the common law and to British institu-
tions as they were when the instrument was framed and
adopted,” not as they existed in the Middle Ages. Ex parte
Grossman, 267 U. S. 87, 108–109 (1925) (emphasis added);
see also United States v. Reid, 12 How. 361, 363 (1852).
We interpret the English history that respondents and
the United States muster in light of these interpretive prin-
ciples. We find that history ambiguous at best and see little
reason to think that the Framers would have thought it ap-
plicable in the New World. It is not sufficiently probative
to defend New York’s proper-cause requirement.
To begin, respondents and their amici point to several
medieval English regulations from as early as 1285 that
they say indicate a longstanding tradition of restricting the
public carry of firearms. See 13 Edw. 1, 102. The most
prominent is the 1328 Statute of Northampton (or Statute),
passed shortly after Edward II was deposed by force of arms
and his son, Edward III, took the throne of a kingdom where
“tendency to turmoil and rebellion was everywhere appar-
ent throughout the realm.” N. Trenholme, The Risings in
the English Monastic Towns in 1327, 6 Am. Hist. Rev. 650,
651 (1901). At the time, “[b]ands of malefactors, knights as
well as those of lesser degree, harried the country, commit-
ting assaults and murders,” prompted by a more general
“spirit of insubordination” that led to a “decay in English
national life.” K. Vickers, England in the Later Middle
Ages 107 (1926).
The Statute of Northampton was, in part, “a product of
. . . the acute disorder that still plagued England.” A. Ver-
duyn, The Politics of Law and Order During the Early
32 NEW YORK STATE RIFLE & PISTOL ASSN., INC. v. BRUEN
Years of Edward III, 108 Eng. Hist. Rev. 842, 850 (1993). It
provided that, with some exceptions, Englishmen could not
“come before the King’s Justices, or other of the King’s Min-
isters doing their office, with force and arms, nor bring no
force in affray of the peace, nor to go nor ride armed by night
nor by day, in Fairs, Markets, nor in the presence of the
Justices or other Ministers, nor in no part elsewhere, upon
pain to forfeit their Armour to the King, and their Bodies to
Prison at the King’s pleasure.” 2 Edw. 3 c. 3 (1328).
Respondents argue that the prohibition on “rid[ing]” or
“go[ing] . . . armed” was a sweeping restriction on public
carry of self-defense weapons that would ultimately be
adopted in Colonial America and justify onerous public-
carry regulations. Notwithstanding the ink the parties spill
over this provision, the Statute of Northampton—at least
as it was understood during the Middle Ages—has little
bearing on the Second Amendment adopted in 1791. The
Statute of Northampton was enacted nearly 20 years before
the Black Death, more than 200 years before the birth of
Shakespeare, more than 350 years before the Salem Witch
Trials, more than 450 years before the ratification of the
Constitution, and nearly 550 years before the adoption of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Statute’s prohibition on going or riding “armed” ob-
viously did not contemplate handguns, given they did not
appear in Europe until about the mid-1500s. See K. Chase,
Firearms: A Global History to 1700, p. 61 (2003). Rather, it
appears to have been centrally concerned with the wearing
of armor. See, e.g., Calendar of the Close Rolls, Edward III,
1330–1333, p. 131 (Apr. 3, 1330) (H. Maxwell-Lyte ed.
1898); id., at 243 (May 28, 1331); id., Edward III, 1327–
1330, at 314 (Aug. 29, 1328) (1896). If it did apply beyond
armor, it applied to such weapons as the “launcegay,” a 10-
to 12-foot-long lightweight lance. See 7 Rich. 2 c. 13 (1383);
20 Rich. 2 c. 1 (1396).
The Statute’s apparent focus on armor and, perhaps,
Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 33
Henry VIII that limited the ownership and use of handguns (which could
not be shorter than a yard) to those subjects with annual property values
of at least £100, see 33 Hen. 8 c. 6, §§1–2—fell into a similar obsolescence.
As far as we can discern, the last recorded prosecutions under the 1541
statute occurred in 1693, neither of which appears to have been success-
ful. See King and Queen v. Bullock, 4 Mod. 147, 87 Eng. Rep. 315 (K. B.
1693); King v. Litten, 1 Shower, K. B. 367, 89 Eng. Rep. 644 (K. B. 1693).
It seems that other prosecutions under the 1541 statute during the late
1600s were similarly unsuccessful. See King v. Silcot, 3 Mod. 280, 280–
Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 35
Rep. 75, because it only “arguably” supports the view that an evil-intent
requirement attached to the Statute of Northampton by the late 1600s
and early 1700s. See post, at 37. But again, because the Second Amend-
ment’s bare text covers petitioners’ public carry, the respondents here
shoulder the burden of demonstrating that New York’s proper-cause re-
quirement is consistent with the Second Amendment’s text and histori-
cal scope. See supra, at 15. To the extent there are multiple plausible
36 NEW YORK STATE RIFLE & PISTOL ASSN., INC. v. BRUEN
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interpretations of Sir John Knight’s Case, we will favor the one that is
more consistent with the Second Amendment’s command.
12 Even Catholics, who fell beyond the protection of the right to have
arms, and who were stripped of all “Arms, Weapons, Gunpowder, [and]
Ammunition,” were at least allowed to keep “such necessary Weapons as
shall be allowed . . . by Order of the Justices of the Peace . . . for the De-
fence of his House or Person.” 1 Wm. & Mary c. 15, §4, in 3 Eng. Stat. at
Large 399 (1688).
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15 The dissent concedes that Huntly, 25 N. C. 418, recognized that citi-
zens were “ ‘at perfect liberty’ to carry for ‘lawful purpose[s].’ ” Post, at
42 (quoting Huntly, 25 N. C., at 423). But the dissent disputes that such
“lawful purpose[s]” included self-defense, because Huntly goes on to
speak more specifically of carrying arms for “business or amusement.”
Id., at 422–423. This is an unduly stingy interpretation of Huntly. In
particular, Huntly stated that “the citizen is at perfect liberty to carry
his gun” “[f]or any lawful purpose,” of which “business” and “amusement”
were then mentioned. Ibid. (emphasis added). Huntly then contrasted
these “lawful purpose[s]” with the “wicked purpose . . . to terrify and
alarm.” Ibid. Because there is no evidence that Huntly considered self-
defense a “wicked purpose,” we think the best reading of Huntly would
sanction public carry for self-defense, so long as it was not “in such [a]
manner as naturally will terrify and alarm.” Id., at 423.
44 NEW YORK STATE RIFLE & PISTOL ASSN., INC. v. BRUEN
deadly weapons per se, but only the carrying of such weap-
ons “for the purpose of an affray, and in such manner as to
strike terror to the people.” O’Neil v. State, 16 Ala. 65, 67
(1849). Therefore, those who sought to carry firearms pub-
licly and peaceably in antebellum America were generally
free to do so.
Statutory Prohibitions. In the early to mid-19th century,
some States began enacting laws that proscribed the con-
cealed carry of pistols and other small weapons. As we rec-
ognized in Heller, “the majority of the 19th-century courts
to consider the question held that [these] prohibitions on
carrying concealed weapons were lawful under the Second
Amendment or state analogues.” 554 U. S., at 626. Re-
spondents unsurprisingly cite these statutes16—and deci-
sions upholding them17—as evidence that States were his-
torically free to ban public carry.
In fact, however, the history reveals a consensus that
States could not ban public carry altogether. Respondents’
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16 Beginning in 1813 with Kentucky, six States (five of which were in
612, 616 (1840); State v. Buzzard, 4 Ark. 18 (1842); Nunn v. State, 1 Ga.
243 (1846); State v. Chandler, 5 La. 489 (1850); State v. Smith, 11 La.
633 (1856); State v. Jumel, 13 La. 399 (1858). But see Bliss v. Common-
wealth, 12 Ky. 90 (1822). See generally 2 J. Kent, Commentaries on
American Law *340, n. b.
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18 See Reid, 1 Ala., at 619 (holding that “the Legislature cannot inhibit
the citizen from bearing arms openly”); id., at 621 (noting that there was
no evidence “tending to show that the defendant could not have defended
himself as successfully, by carrying the pistol openly, as by secreting it
about his person”).
19 See, e.g., Chandler, 5 La., at 490 (Louisiana concealed-carry prohibi-
tion “interfered with no man’s right to carry arms (to use its words) ‘in
full open view,’ which places men upon an equality”); Smith, 11 La., at
633 (The “arms” described in the Second Amendment “are such as are
borne by a people in war, or at least carried openly”); Jumel, 13 La., at
399–400 (“The statute in question does not infringe the right of the peo-
ple to keep or bear arms. It is a measure of police, prohibiting only a
particular mode of bearing arms which is found dangerous to the peace
of society”).
20 With respect to Indiana’s concealed-carry prohibition, the Indiana
Supreme Court’s reasons for upholding it are unknown because the court
issued a one-sentence per curiam order holding the law “not unconstitu-
tional.” Mitchell, 3 Blackf., at 229. Similarly, the Arkansas Supreme
Court upheld Arkansas’ prohibition, but without reaching a majority ra-
tionale. See Buzzard, 4 Ark. 18. The Arkansas Supreme Court would
later adopt Tennessee’s approach, which tolerated the prohibition of all
public carry of handguns except for military-style revolvers. See, e.g.,
Fife v. State, 31 Ark. 455 (1876).
46 NEW YORK STATE RIFLE & PISTOL ASSN., INC. v. BRUEN
Ga., at 251. But to the extent the Act also prohibited “bear-
ing arms openly,” the court went on, it was “in conflict with
the Constitutio[n] and void.” Ibid.; see also Heller, 554
U. S., at 612. The Georgia Supreme Court’s treatment of
the State’s general prohibition on the public carriage of
handguns indicates that it was considered beyond the con-
stitutional pale in antebellum America to altogether pro-
hibit public carry.
Finally, we agree that Tennessee’s prohibition on carry-
ing “publicly or privately” any “belt or pocket pisto[l],” 1821
Tenn. Acts ch. 13, p. 15, was, on its face, uniquely severe,
see Heller, 554 U. S., at 629. That said, when the Tennessee
Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of a sub-
stantively identical successor provision, see 1870 Tenn.
Acts ch. 13, §1, p. 28, the court read this language to permit
the public carry of larger, military-style pistols because any
categorical prohibition on their carry would “violat[e] the
constitutional right to keep arms.” Andrews v. State, 50
Tenn. 165, 187 (1871); see also Heller, 554 U. S., at 629 (dis-
cussing Andrews).21
All told, these antebellum state-court decisions evince a
consensus view that States could not altogether prohibit the
public carry of “arms” protected by the Second Amendment
or state analogues.22
——————
21 Shortly after Andrews, 50 Tenn. 165, Tennessee codified an excep-
tion to the State’s handgun ban for “an[y] army pistol, or such as are
commonly carried and used in the United States Army” so long as they
were carried “openly in [one’s] hands.” 1871 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 90, §1;
see also State v. Wilburn, 66 Tenn. 57, 61–63 (1872); Porter v. State, 66
Tenn. 106, 107–108 (1874).
22 The Territory of New Mexico made it a crime in 1860 to carry “any
——————
that were localized in the Western Territories, New Mexico’s prohibition
ended when the Territory entered the Union as a State in 1911 and guar-
anteed in its State Constitution that “[t]he people have the right to bear
arms for their security and defense, but nothing herein shall be held to
permit the carrying of concealed weapons.” N. M. Const., Art. II, §6
(1911); see infra, at 61.
48 NEW YORK STATE RIFLE & PISTOL ASSN., INC. v. BRUEN
(1840); Mich. Rev. Stat., ch. 162, §16 (1846); 1847 Va. Acts ch. 14, §16;
Terr. of Minn. Rev. Stat., ch. 112, §18 (1851); 1854 Ore. Stat. ch. 16, §17,
p. 220; D. C. Rev. Code ch. 141, §16 (1857); 1860 Pa. Laws p. 432, §6;
W. Va. Code, ch. 153, §8 (1868).
24 It is true that two of the antebellum surety laws were unusually
broad in that they did not expressly require a citizen complaint to trigger
the posting of a surety. See 1847 Va. Acts ch. 14, §16; W. Va. Code, ch.
153, §8 (1868).
Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 49
——————
25 The dissent speculates that the absence of recorded cases involving
surety laws may simply “show that these laws were normally followed.”
Post, at 45. Perhaps. But again, the burden rests with the government
to establish the relevant tradition of regulation, see supra, at 15, and,
given all of the other features of surety laws that make them poor ana-
logues to New York’s proper-cause standard, we consider the barren rec-
ord of enforcement to be simply one additional reason to discount their
relevance.
Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 51
4
Evidence from around the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment also fails to support respondents’ position. For
the most part, respondents and the United States ignore
the “outpouring of discussion of the [right to keep and bear
arms] in Congress and in public discourse, as people de-
bated whether and how to secure constitutional rights for
newly free slaves” after the Civil War. Heller, 554 U. S., at
614. Of course, we are not obliged to sift the historical ma-
terials for evidence to sustain New York’s statute. That is
respondents’ burden. Nevertheless, we think a short review
of the public discourse surrounding Reconstruction is useful
in demonstrating how public carry for self-defense re-
mained a central component of the protection that the Four-
teenth Amendment secured for all citizens.
A short prologue is in order. Even before the Civil War
commenced in 1861, this Court indirectly affirmed the im-
portance of the right to keep and bear arms in public. Writ-
ing for the Court in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393
(1857), Chief Justice Taney offered what he thought was a
parade of horribles that would result from recognizing that
free blacks were citizens of the United States. If blacks
were citizens, Taney fretted, they would be entitled to the
privileges and immunities of citizens, including the right
“to keep and carry arms wherever they went.” Id., at 417
(emphasis added). Thus, even Chief Justice Taney recog-
nized (albeit unenthusiastically in the case of blacks) that
public carry was a component of the right to keep and bear
arms—a right free blacks were often denied in antebellum
America.
After the Civil War, of course, the exercise of this funda-
mental right by freed slaves was systematically thwarted.
This Court has already recounted some of the Southern
abuses violating blacks’ right to keep and bear arms. See
McDonald, 561 U. S., at 771 (noting the “systematic efforts”
Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 53
ond Military District (North and South Carolina), and provided that
“[t]he practice of carrying deadly weapons, except by officers and soldiers
in the military service of the United States, is prohibited.” Headquarters
Second Military Dist., Gen. Orders No. 10 (Charleston, S. C., Apr. 11,
1867), in S. Exec. Doc. No. 14, 40th Cong., 1st Sess., 64 (1867). We put
little weight on this categorical restriction given that the order also spec-
ified that a violation of this prohibition would “render the offender ame-
nable to trial and punishment by military commission,” ibid., rather than
a jury otherwise guaranteed by the Constitution. There is thus little in-
dication that these military dictates were designed to align with the Con-
stitution’s usual application during times of peace.
27 That said, Southern prohibitions on concealed carry were not always
rying for “the lawful defence of themselves, their families or their prop-
erty, and the same being then and there threatened with danger.” 1869
Terr. of N. M. Laws ch. 32, §1, p. 72. The Arizona law similarly exempted
those who have “reasonable ground for fearing an unlawful attack upon
his person.” 1889 Ariz. Terr. Sess. Laws no. 13, §2, p. 17.
Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 59
——————
30 Many other state courts during this period continued the antebellum
Ark. Acts p. 156, §1. But this categorical prohibition was also short lived.
About six years later, Arkansas exempted “pistols as are used in the
army or navy of the United States,” so long as they were carried “uncov-
ered, and in [the] hand.” 1881 Ark. Acts p. 191, no. 96, §§1, 2.
32 In 1879, Salina, Kansas, prohibited the carry of pistols but broadly
——————
for the defense of his person, property or family.” Salina, Kan., Rev. Or-
dinance No. 268, §2.
Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 63
ers some special need. That is not how the First Amend-
ment works when it comes to unpopular speech or the free
exercise of religion. It is not how the Sixth Amendment
works when it comes to a defendant’s right to confront the
witnesses against him. And it is not how the Second
Amendment works when it comes to public carry for self-
defense.
New York’s proper-cause requirement violates the Four-
teenth Amendment in that it prevents law-abiding citizens
with ordinary self-defense needs from exercising their right
to keep and bear arms. We therefore reverse the judgment
of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for further pro-
ceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 1
No. 20–843
_________________
this case. How many of the cases involving the use of a gun
in a domestic dispute occur outside the home, and how
many are prevented by laws like New York’s?
The dissent cites statistics on children and adolescents
killed by guns, see post, at 1, 4, but what does this have to
do with the question whether an adult who is licensed to
possess a handgun may be prohibited from carrying it out-
side the home? Our decision, as noted, does not expand the
categories of people who may lawfully possess a gun, and
federal law generally forbids the possession of a handgun
by a person who is under the age of 18, 18 U. S. C.
§§922(x)(2)–(5), and bars the sale of a handgun to anyone
under the age of 21, §§922(b)(1), (c)(1).1
The dissent cites the large number of guns in private
hands—nearly 400 million—but it does not explain what
this statistic has to do with the question whether a person
who already has the right to keep a gun in the home for self-
——————
1 The dissent makes no effort to explain the relevance of most of the
https://www.wate.com/news/local-news/jefferson-city-police-
legally-armed-good-samaritan-stops-assault/).
In other incidents, a law-abiding person was driven to vi-
olate the Sullivan Law because of fear of victimization and
as a result was arrested, prosecuted, and incarcerated. See
Brief for Black Attorneys of Legal Aid et al. as Amici Curiae
22–25.
Some briefs were filed by members of groups whose mem-
bers feel that they have special reasons to fear attacks. See
Brief for Asian Pacific American Gun Owners Association
as Amicus Curiae; Brief for DC Project Foundation et al. as
Amici Curiae; Brief for Black Guns Matter et al. as Amici
Curiae; Brief for Independent Women’s Law Center as Ami-
cus Curiae; Brief for National African American Gun Asso-
ciation, Inc., as Amicus Curiae.
I reiterate: All that we decide in this case is that the Sec-
ond Amendment protects the right of law-abiding people to
carry a gun outside the home for self-defense and that the
Sullivan Law, which makes that virtually impossible for
most New Yorkers, is unconstitutional.
II
This brings me to Part II–B of the dissent, post, at 11–21,
which chastises the Court for deciding this case without a
trial and factual findings about just how hard it is for a law-
abiding New Yorker to get a carry permit. The record be-
fore us, however, tells us everything we need on this score.
At argument, New York’s solicitor general was asked about
an ordinary person who works at night and must walk
through dark and crime-infested streets to get home. Tr. of
Oral Arg. 66–67. The solicitor general was asked whether
such a person would be issued a carry permit if she pleaded:
“[T]here have been a lot of muggings in this area, and I am
scared to death.” Id., at 67. The solicitor general’s candid
answer was “in general,” no. Ibid. To get a permit, the ap-
plicant would have to show more—for example, that she
Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 7
had been singled out for attack. Id., at 65; see also id., at
58. A law that dictates that answer violates the Second
Amendment.
III
My final point concerns the dissent’s complaint that the
Court relies too heavily on history and should instead ap-
prove the sort of “means-end” analysis employed in this
case by the Second Circuit. Under that approach, a court,
in most cases, assesses a law’s burden on the Second
Amendment right and the strength of the State’s interest
in imposing the challenged restriction. See post, at 20. This
mode of analysis places no firm limits on the ability of
judges to sustain any law restricting the possession or use
of a gun. Two examples illustrate the point.
The first is the Second Circuit’s decision in a case the
Court decided two Terms ago, New York State Rifle & Pistol
Assn., Inc. v. City of New York, 590 U. S. ___ (2020). The
law in that case affected New York City residents who had
been issued permits to keep a gun in the home for self-
defense. The city recommended that these permit holders
practice at a range to ensure that they are able to handle
their guns safely, but the law prohibited them from taking
their guns to any range other than the seven that were
spread around the city’s five boroughs. Even if such a per-
son unloaded the gun, locked it in the trunk of a car, and
drove to the nearest range, that person would violate the
law if the nearest range happened to be outside city limits.
The Second Circuit held that the law was constitutional,
concluding, among other things, that the restriction was
substantially related to the city’s interests in public safety
and crime prevention. See New York State Rifle & Pistol
Assn., Inc. v. New York, 883 F. 3d 45, 62–64 (2018). But
after we agreed to review that decision, the city repealed
the law and admitted that it did not actually have any ben-
eficial effect on public safety. See N. Y. Penal Law Ann.
8 NEW YORK STATE RIFLE & PISTOL ASSN., INC. v. BRUEN
——————
3 If we put together the dissent in this case and JUSTICE BREYER’s Hel-
ler dissent, States and local governments would essentially be free to ban
the possession of all handguns, and it is unclear whether its approach
would impose any significant restrictions on laws regulating long guns.
The dissent would extend a very large measure of deference to legislation
implicating Second Amendment rights, but it does not claim that such
deference is appropriate when any other constitutional right is at issue.
Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 9
No. 20–843
_________________
No. 20–843
_________________
No. 20–843
_________________
II
A
New York State requires individuals to obtain a license
in order to carry a concealed handgun in public. N. Y. Penal
Law Ann. §400.00(2) (West Cum. Supp. 2022). I address
the specifics of that licensing regime in greater detail in
Part II–B below. Because, at this stage in the proceedings,
the parties have not had an opportunity to develop the evi-
dentiary record, I refer to facts and representations made
in petitioners’ complaint and in amicus briefs filed before
us.
Under New York’s regime, petitioners Brandon Koch and
Robert Nash have obtained restricted licenses that permit
them to carry a concealed handgun for certain purposes and
at certain times and places. They wish to expand the scope
of their licenses so that they can carry a concealed handgun
without restriction.
Koch and Nash are residents of Rensselaer County, New
York. Koch lives in Troy, a town of about 50,000, located
eight miles from New York’s capital city of Albany, which
has a population of about 98,000. See App. 100; U. S. Cen-
sus Bureau, Quick Facts: Troy City, New York (last up-
dated July 1, 2021), https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/
troycitynewyork; id., Albany City, New York, https://www.
census.gov/quickfacts/albanycitynewyork. Nash lives in
Averill Park, a small town 12.5 miles from Albany. App.
100.
Koch and Nash each applied for a license to carry a con-
cealed handgun. Both were issued restricted licenses that
allowed them to carry handguns only for purposes of hunt-
ing and target shooting. Id., at 104, 106. But they wanted
“unrestricted” licenses that would allow them to carry con-
cealed handguns “for personal protection and all lawful pur-
poses.” Id., at 112; see also id., at 40. They wrote to the
licensing officer in Rensselaer County—Justice Richard
Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 11
Two years later in 1913, New York amended the law to es-
tablish substantive standards for the issuance of a license.
See 1913 N. Y. Laws ch. 608, §1, pp. 1627–1629. Those
standards have remained the foundation of New York’s li-
censing regime ever since—a regime that the Court now,
more than a century later, strikes down as unconstitu-
tional.
As it did over 100 years ago, New York’s law today con-
tinues to require individuals to obtain a license before car-
rying a concealed handgun in public. N. Y. Penal Law Ann.
§400.00(2); Kachalsky, 701 F. 3d, at 85–86. Because the
State does not allow the open carriage of handguns at all, a
concealed-carry license is the only way to legally carry a
handgun in public. Id., at 86. This licensing requirement
applies only to handguns (i.e., “pistols and revolvers”) and
short-barreled rifles and shotguns, not to all types of fire-
arms. Id., at 85. For instance, the State does not require a
license to carry a long gun (i.e., a rifle or a shotgun over a
certain length) in public. Ibid.; §265.00(3) (West 2022).
To obtain a concealed-carry license for a handgun, an ap-
plicant must satisfy certain eligibility criteria. Among
other things, he must generally be at least 21 years old and
of “good moral character.” §400.00(1). And he cannot have
been convicted of a felony, dishonorably discharged from
the military, or involuntarily committed to a mental hy-
giene facility. Ibid. If these and other eligibility criteria
are satisfied, New York law provides that a concealed-carry
license “shall be issued” to individuals working in certain
professions, such as judges, corrections officers, or messen-
gers of a “banking institution or express company.”
§400.00(2). Individuals who satisfy the eligibility criteria
but do not work in one of these professions may still obtain
a concealed-carry license, but they must additionally show
that “proper cause exists for the issuance thereof.”
§400.00(2)(f ).
The words “proper cause” may appear on their face to be
Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 13
the 25-year period from 1991 to 2015 and found that “shall
issue” laws were associated with 6.5% higher total homicide
rates, 8.6% higher firearm homicide rates, and 10.6%
higher handgun homicide rates. Siegel, 107 Am. J. Pub.
Health, at 1924–1925, 1927. Another study longitudinally
followed 33 States that had adopted “shall-issue” laws be-
tween 1981 and 2007 and found that the adoption of those
laws was associated with a 13%–15% increase in rates of
violent crime after 10 years. Donohue, 16 J. Empirical Le-
gal Studies, at 200, 240. Numerous other studies show sim-
ilar results. See, e.g., Siegel, 36 J. Rural Health, at 261
(finding that “may issue” laws are associated with 17%
lower firearm homicide rates in large cities); C. Crifasi et
al., Association Between Firearm Laws and Homicide in
Urban Counties, 95 J. Urb. Health 383, 387 (2018) (finding
that “shall issue” laws are associated with a 4% increase in
firearm homicide rates in urban counties); M. Doucette, C.
Crifasi, & S. Frattaroli, Right-to-Carry Laws and Firearm
Workplace Homicides: A Longitudinal Analysis (1992–
2017), 109 Am. J. Pub. Health 1747, 1751 (Dec. 2019) (find-
ing that States with “shall issue” laws between 1992 and
2017 experienced 29% higher rates of firearm-related work-
place homicides); Brief for Social Scientists et al. as Amici
Curiae 15–16, and nn. 17–20 (citing “thirteen . . . empirical
papers from just the last few years linking [“shall issue”]
laws to higher violent crime”).
JUSTICE ALITO points to competing empirical evidence
that arrives at a different conclusion. Ante, at 3, n. 1 (con-
curring opinion). But these types of disagreements are ex-
actly the sort that are better addressed by legislatures than
courts. The Court today restricts the ability of legislatures
to fulfill that role. It does so without knowing how New
York’s law is administered in practice, how much discretion
licensing officers in New York possess, or whether the
proper cause standard differs across counties. And it does
so without giving the State an opportunity to develop the
Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 21
that preventing public terror was one reason that the Stat-
ute of Northampton prohibited public carriage, but not an
element of the crime. See supra, at 37–39. And, consistent
with that understanding, American regulations modeled on
the Statute of Northampton appear to have been under-
stood to set forth a broad prohibition on public carriage of
firearms without any intent-to-terrify requirement. See
Charles, 60 Clev. St. L. Rev., at 35, 37–41; J. Haywood, A
Manual of the Laws of North-Carolina, pt. 2, p. 40 (3d
ed.1814); J. Ewing, The Office and Duty of a Justice of the
Peace 546 (1805).
The Court cites three cases considering common-law of-
fenses, ante, at 42–44, but those cases do not support the
view that only public carriage in a manner likely to terrify
violated American successors to the Statute of Northamp-
ton. If anything, they suggest that public carriage of fire-
arms was not common practice. At least one of the cases
the Court cites, State v. Huntly, wrote that the Statute of
Northampton codified a pre-existing common-law offense,
which provided that “riding or going armed with dangerous
or unusual weapons, is a crime against the public peace, by
terrifying the good people of the land.” 25 N. C., at 420–421
(quoting 4 Blackstone, Commentaries, at 149; emphasis
added). Huntly added that “[a] gun is an ‘unusual weapon’ ”
and that “[n]o man amongst us carries it about with him, as
one of his every-day accoutrements—as a part of his dress—
and never, we trust, will the day come when any deadly
weapon will be worn or wielded in our peace-loving and law-
abiding State, as an appendage of manly equipment.” 25
N. C., at 422. True, Huntly recognized that citizens were
nonetheless “at perfect liberty” to carry for “lawful pur-
pose[s]”—but it specified that those purposes were “busi-
ness or amusement.” Id., at 422–423. New York’s law sim-
ilarly recognizes that hunting, target shooting, and certain
professional activities are proper causes justifying lawful
carriage of a firearm. See supra, at 12–13. The other two
Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 43
cases the Court cites for this point similarly offer it only
limited support—either because the atextual intent ele-
ment the Court advocates was irrelevant to the decision’s
result, see O’Neill v. State, 16 Ala. 65 (1849), or because the
decision adopted an outlier position not reflected in the
other cases cited by the Court, see Simpson v. State, 13
Tenn. 356, 360 (1833); see also ante, at 42–43, 57 (majority
opinion) (refusing to give “a pair of state-court decisions”
“disproportionate weight”). The founding-era regulations—
like the colonial and English laws on which they were mod-
eled—thus demonstrate a longstanding tradition of broad
restrictions on public carriage of firearms.
D. The 19th Century.
Beginning in the 19th century, States began to innovate
on the Statute of Northampton in at least two ways. First,
many States and Territories passed bans on concealed car-
riage or on any carriage, concealed or otherwise, of certain
concealable weapons. For example, Georgia made it unlaw-
ful to carry, “unless in an open manner and fully exposed to
view, any pistol, (except horseman’s pistols,) dirk, sword in
a cane, spear, bowie-knife, or any other kind of knives, man-
ufactured and sold for the purpose of offence and defence.”
Ga. Code §4413 (1861). Other States and Territories en-
acted similar prohibitions. See, e.g., Ala. Code §3274 (1852)
(banning, with limited exceptions, concealed carriage of “a
pistol, or any other description of fire arms”); see also ante,
at 44, n. 16 (majority opinion) (collecting sources). And the
Territory of New Mexico appears to have banned all car-
riage whatsoever of “any class of pistols whatever,” as well
as “bowie kni[ves,] . . . Arkansas toothpick[s], Spanish dag-
ger[s], slung-shot[s], or any other deadly weapon.” 1860
Terr. of N. M. Laws §§1–2, p. 94. These 19th-century bans
on concealed carriage were stricter than New York’s law,
for they prohibited concealed carriage with at most limited
exceptions, while New York permits concealed carriage
44 NEW YORK STATE RIFLE & PISTOL ASSN., INC. v. BRUEN
open carriage, so it is far from clear that the cases the Court
cites represent a consensus view. See State v. Mitchell, 3
Blackf. 229 (Ind. 1833); State v. Buzzard, 4 Ark. 18 (1842).
And, of course, the Court does not say whether the result in
this case would be different if New York allowed open car-
riage by law-abiding citizens as a matter of course.
The second 19th-century innovation, adopted in a num-
ber of States, was surety laws. Massachusetts’ surety law,
which served as a model for laws adopted by many other
States, provided that any person who went “armed with a
dirk, dagger, sword, pistol, or other offensive and dangerous
weapon,” and who lacked “reasonable cause to fear an as-
sualt [sic],” could be made to pay a surety upon the “com-
plaint of any person having reasonable cause to fear an in-
jury, or breach of the peace.” Mass. Rev. Stat., ch. 134, §16
(1836). Other States and Territories enacted identical or
substantially similar laws. See, e.g., Me. Rev. Stat., ch. 169,
§16 (1840); Mich. Rev. Stat., ch. 162, §16 (1846); Terr. of
Minn. Rev. Stat., ch. 112, §18 (1851); 1854 Ore. Stat., ch.
16, §17; W. Va. Code, ch. 153, §8 (1868); 1862 Pa. Laws p.
250, §6. These laws resemble New York’s licensing regime
in many, though admittedly not all, relevant respects. Most
notably, like New York’s proper cause requirement, the
surety laws conditioned public carriage in at least some cir-
cumstances on a special showing of need. Compare supra,
at 13, with Mass. Rev. Stat., ch. 134, §16.
The Court believes that the absence of recorded cases in-
volving surety laws means that they were rarely enforced.
Ante, at 49–50. Of course, this may just as well show that
these laws were normally followed. In any case, scholars
cited by the Court tell us that “traditional case law research
is not especially probative of the application of these re-
strictions” because “in many cases those records did not sur-
vive the passage of time” or “are not well indexed or digi-
tally searchable.” E. Ruben & S. Cornell, Firearms
46 NEW YORK STATE RIFLE & PISTOL ASSN., INC. v. BRUEN
did not strip felons of the right to bear arms simply because
of their status as felons”). Like JUSTICE KAVANAUGH, I un-
derstand the Court’s opinion today to cast no doubt on that
aspect of Heller’s holding. Ante, at 3 (concurring opinion).
But unlike JUSTICE KAVANAUGH, I find the disconnect be-
tween Heller’s treatment of laws prohibiting, for example,
firearms possession by felons or the mentally ill, and the
Court’s treatment of New York’s licensing regime, hard to
square. The inconsistency suggests that the Court today
takes either an unnecessarily cramped view of the relevant
historical record or a needlessly rigid approach to analogi-
cal reasoning.
* * *
The historical examples of regulations similar to New
York’s licensing regime are legion. Closely analogous Eng-
lish laws were enacted beginning in the 13th century, and
similar American regulations were passed during the colo-
nial period, the founding era, the 19th century, and the 20th
century. Not all of these laws were identical to New York’s,
but that is inevitable in an analysis that demands exami-
nation of seven centuries of history. At a minimum, the
laws I have recounted resembled New York’s law, similarly
restricting the right to publicly carry weapons and serving
roughly similar purposes. That is all that the Court’s test,
which allows and even encourages “analogical reasoning,”
purports to require. See ante, at 21 (disclaiming the neces-
sity of a “historical twin”).
In each instance, the Court finds a reason to discount the
historical evidence’s persuasive force. Some of the laws
New York has identified are too old. But others are too re-
cent. Still others did not last long enough. Some applied to
too few people. Some were enacted for the wrong reasons.
Some may have been based on a constitutional rationale
that is now impossible to identify. Some arose in histori-
cally unique circumstances. And some are not sufficiently
50 NEW YORK STATE RIFLE & PISTOL ASSN., INC. v. BRUEN