yokAcikBilim 10149057

GRADUATE SCHOOL OF NATURAL AND APPLIED SCIENCES
Ph.D. THESIS
MAY, 2017
REPUBLIC OF TURKEY
YILDIZ TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY
A NEW PROTECTION PHILOSOPHY IN SMART DISTRIBUTION

NETWORKS
ABDULFETAH ABDELA SHOBOLE
Ph.D. THESIS
DEPARTMENT OF ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING
PROGRAM OF ELECTRICAL POWER PLANTS
ADVISER
ASSIST. PROF. DR. MUSTAFA BAYSAL
ISTANBUL, 2017
REPUBLIC OF TURKEY

NETWORKS
A thesis submitted by Abdulfetah Abdela SHOBOLE in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY is approved by the
committee on ______________ in Department of Electrical Engineering, Electrical
Power Plants Program.
Thesis Adviser
Assist. Prof. Dr. Mustafa BAYSAL
Yıldız Technical University
Approved By the Examining Committee

Assist. Prof. Mustafa BAYSAL
Yıldız Technical University _____________________
Prof. Dr. İlhami ÇOLAK, Member

Nişantaşı University _____________________
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Uğur S. SELAMOĞULLARI, Member

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Aslan İNAN, Member

Assist. Prof. Dr. Alper ŞIŞMAN, Member

Marmara University _____________________
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
In the name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful.
Read in the name of your Lord Who created. He created man from a clot. Who taught (to
write) with the pen, Taught man what he knew not.
(The Clot – 96th Surah – Verses 1 to 5)
They said: Glory be to Thee! We have no knowledge but that which Thou hast taught
us; surely Thou art the Knowing, the Wise.
(The Cow – 2nd Surah – 32nd Verse)
…and say: O my Lord! Increase me in knowledge.

(Ta Ha – 20th Surah – 114th Verse)
I would like to express my gratitude to my supervisor, Assist. Professor Mustafa Baysal
for his dedication and support though out my thesis works. I would also like to thank
TÜBİTAK for granting me the scholarship to study in Turkey.
Finally, for their encouragement and support I would like to thank my family especially
my beloved wife URJI FAKI USMAN. She gave me so much comfort and care during
my study.
May, 2017
Abdulfetah Abdela SHOBOLE

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
LIST OF SYMBOLS ..................................................................................................... viii
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ........................................................................................... x
LIST OF FIGURES ........................................................................................................ xii
LIST OF TABLES ......................................................................................................... xiv
ABSTRACT.................................................................................................................... xv
ÖZET ............................................................................................................................ xvii
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 19
1.1 Literature Review ................................................................................................... 19

1.1.1 Distribution Network ...................................................................................... 20
1.1.2 Micro Grids ..................................................................................................... 22
1.2 Objective of the Thesis ........................................................................................... 23
1.2.1 The Specific Objectives of the Research ........................................................ 24
1.3 Hypothesis .............................................................................................................. 25
1.3.1 DIgSILENT Powerfactory Simulation Tool ................................................... 25
1.3.2 Originality of the Thesis ................................................................................. 25
1.3.3 Thesis Outline ................................................................................................. 26
CHAPTER 2
POWER SYSTEM PROTECTION ................................................................................ 27
2.1 Development of Protection Relays ......................................................................... 27

2.2 Overcurrent Protection ............................................................................................ 28
2.2.1 Characteristics of Overcurrent Protection Relay ............................................ 28
2.3 Case Study for the Protection Coordination of Radial Network ............................ 31
2.3.1 Components of the SKS .................................................................................. 34
1.3.4 Protection Arrangements of the SKS .............................................................. 34
2.3.2 Fault Current ................................................................................................... 35
2.3.3 Load Current ................................................................................................... 38
2.3.4 Instrument Transformers................................................................................. 39
v
2.4 Earth Fault Protection ............................................................................................. 46
2.4.1 Sensitive Earth Fault ....................................................................................... 47
2.4.2 Directional Earth Fault Protection .................................................................. 47
2.4.3 Influence of Earthing Nature on the Earth Fault Protection ........................... 47
2.4.4 Earth Fault Protection on Insulated Networks ................................................ 48
2.5 Differential Protection ............................................................................................ 56
2.5.1 Restraining Current ......................................................................................... 57
2.5.2 The Slope of the Percentage Differential Curve ............................................. 57
2.5.3 Case Study SKS Power Transformer Feeder Protection by RED 615 ........... 59
2.6 Distance Protection ................................................................................................. 61
2.6.1 Distance Relay Protection Configurations ...................................................... 62
2.6.2 Infeed and Outfeed.......................................................................................... 64
2.6.3 Arc Resistance Effect...................................................................................... 66
2.6.4 Load Encroachment ........................................................................................ 67
2.6.5 Power Swing Detection, Blocking and Out-of-Step Relays ........................... 68
2.6.6 Zones of Protection in Distance Relaying ...................................................... 69
2.6.7 Distance Protection Schemes .......................................................................... 70
2.6.8 Minimum Length of Line ............................................................................... 73
2.6.9 Setting Calculation for the SKS ...................................................................... 73
2.7 Overvoltage and Undervoltage Protection .............................................................. 79
CHAPTER 3
PROTECTION OF THE RING DISTRIBUTION NETWORK .................................... 82
3.1 System Modeling and Short Circuit Analysis ......................................................... 84

3.2 Customer Feeder Protection.................................................................................... 87
3.2.1 Inverse Time Overcurrent (51) ....................................................................... 87
3.2.2 Definite Time Overcurrent (50) ...................................................................... 88
3.2.3 Definite Time Ground Fault Protection (50N) ............................................... 88
3.2.4 Inrush Detection .............................................................................................. 89
3.3 Ring Input and Out Feeders Protection................................................................... 89
3.3.1 Differential Protection .................................................................................... 89
3.3.2 Auxiliary Protection ........................................................................................ 90
3.3.3 Directional Definite Time Overcurrent Protection ......................................... 95
3.3.4 Directional Earth Fault Protection (67N)........................................................ 98
3.4 Bus bar Protection by using GOOSE communication .......................................... 101
CHAPTER 4
IEC-61850 PROTOCOL APPLICATIONS FOR PROTECTION AND AUTOMATION

OF INDUSTRIAL DISTRIBUTION NETWORK ...................................................... 106
4.1 Scope and Contents of IEC 61850 ........................................................................ 106

4.2 Data and Service Modeling in IEC 61850 ............................................................ 108
4.2.1 Information Model in IEC 61850 ................................................................. 108
4.2.2 Information Exchange Model ....................................................................... 113
4.3 Abstract Communication Service Interface (ACSI) ............................................. 114
4.3.1 Communication ............................................................................................. 114
4.4 Substation Configuration Description Language (SCL) ....................................... 118
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4.5 GOOSE Communication ...................................................................................... 120
4.5.1 Bus-bar Protection by Using GOOSE Communication ................................ 121
4.5.2 Coupling Cubicle Automation by using GOOSE ......................................... 121
4.6 Process Bus Communication (Sample Measured Value) ..................................... 123
CHAPTER 5
INTEGRATION EFFECTS OF DISTRIBUTED GENERATIONS TO THE

DISTRIBUTION NETWORK ..................................................................................... 125
5.1 The Challenges of PV Based DGs on the Distribution Networks ........................ 126
5.1.1 Description of the Solar Power Plant Site ..................................................... 128
5.1.2 The Effect of Total Short Circuit Current ...................................................... 131
5.1.3 Effects of the Fault Current From one Side .................................................. 135
5.2 The Effect of Non-Inverter Based DGs ................................................................ 136
CHAPTER 6
A NEW PROTECTION PHILOSOPHY FOR SMART DISTRIBUTION NETWORK

...................................................................................................................................... 140
6.1 Protection Coordination Problems Due to DGs .................................................... 141

6.2 The Suggested Protection Philosophy .................................................................. 145
6.3 Suggestions for the Implementation ..................................................................... 148
6.4 Simulation and Analysis ....................................................................................... 150
CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ....................................................... 160
7.1 Conclusions ........................................................................................................... 160

7.2 Recommendations for Further Works................................................................... 163
7.3 Limitations of the Thesis ...................................................................................... 163
REFERENCES ............................................................................................................. 164
APPENDIX-A
Cable and Transformer Data Used for Short Circuit Analysis of SKS ........................ 171
APPENDIX-B
Cable and Transformer Data Used for Short Circuit Analysis of Gebze Industrial Zone
...................................................................................................................................... 173
CURRICULUM VITAE ............................................................................................... 175
vii
LIST OF SYMBOLS
C Neutral line capacitance

C1 Coupling capacitor
C2 Coupling capacitor
ER Relay timing error
ECT Allowance for CT ratio error
F Signal frequency
I Arc current
Ibias Bias current
Idiff Differential current
IL Per phases maximum load current
In Nominal Current
Is Relay setting current
Ir The ratio of measured current to the relay setting current
IR Mean current
Ires Residual current
I1 Positive sequence current
I2 Negative sequence current
IO Zero sequence current
IscMax The maximum fault current
L Compensating reactor
RB Burden resistance
RsCT Current Transformer secondary resistance
Rwr The connection wire resistance
Rrb Relays burden resistance
S The apparent power
T Operating time of relay
tCB CB interrupting time
tO Relay overshoot time
tS safety margin (sec)
V Per phase voltage
VO Zero sequence voltage
Vres Residual Voltage
VT Voltage transformer
ULL Line-Line Voltage
øc Relay characteristic angle setting
KZ0(mag) L1 default residual compensation factor(magnitude)
KZ0(ang) L1 default residual compensation factor (phase angle)
KZ0(mag) L1 default residual compensation factor(magnitude)
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R Resistance
Ra Arc resistance
RB Burden resistance
RsCT Current Transformer secondary resistance
Rwr The connection wire resistance
Rrb Relays burden resistance
R1ph Phase fault resistive reach value - Zone 1
R1G Ground fault resistive reach value - Zone 1
S The apparent power
TZ1 Time delay - Zone 1
X Inductance
ZO Zero sequence impedance
Z1 Positive sequence impedance
Z2 Negative sequence impedance
Zs Source impedance
Zm Coupling impedance
Zf Fault impedance
Zapp Impedance seen by the relay
Z1(mag) Impedance reach setting of zone 1 (magnitude)
Z1(ang) Impedance reach setting of zone 1 (phase angle)
Z2(mag) Impedance reach setting of zone 2 (magnitude)
Z3(mag) impedance reach setting of zone 3 (magnitude)
Z4(mag) Zone 4 reach impedance setting (magnitude)
ix
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
ANM Active Network Management

ANSI American National Standards Institute
ACSI Abstract Communication Service Interface
CBs Circuit Breakers
CBCT Core balance current transformer
CT Current Transformer
CDC Common Data Classes
cid Configured IED Description
DGs Distributed Generations
DNs Distributed Generations
DPL DigSILENT Programming Language
DUTT Direct Under-Reaching Transfer Trip
HYBRID POTT Hybrid Permissive Over-Reaching Transfer Trip
EI Extremely Inverse
FC Functional constraint
IDTs Intelligent Distributed Terminals
IEC International Electrotechnical Commission
IED Intelligent End Devices
IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
ICD IED Capability Description
GOOSE Generic Object Oriented Substation Event
GPS Global Positioning System
GSE Control blocks for generic substation events
LN Logical Node
LV Low Voltage
MCAA MultiCast-Application-Association
MGs Micro Grids
MMS Manufacturing Messaging Specification
MV Medium Voltage
PUTT Permissive Under-Reaching Transfer Trip
PCC Point of Common Coupling
PT Potential Transformer
PV Photo Voltaic
RCA Relay Characteristic Angle
RMS Root Mean Square
SSD System Specification Description
SCL Substation Configuration Language
SCD Substation Configuration Description
x
SPS Single Point Status
SKS Siddik Kardesler Substation
SCSM Specific Communication Service Mappings
SI Standard Inverse
TPAA Two-Party-Application Association
TEİAŞ Network owner and operator of Turkey
TMS Time Multiplier Setting
UCA Utility Communication Architecture
VI Very Inverse
XML eXtensible Markup Language
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LIST OF FIGURES
Page
Figure 1.1 Structure of Smart Distribution Grid. ....................................................................................... 21
Figure 1.2 PV Micro grid and distribution network ................................................................................... 23
Figure 2.1 Development of protection relays [28] ..................................................................................... 27
Figure 2.2 Vector diagram for the 90o-30o connection (Phase-A element) .............................................. 31
Figure 2.3 Vector diagram for the 90o-45o connection (Phase-A element) .............................................. 32
Figure 2.4 Siddik Kardeşler substation single line diagram ....................................................................... 37
Figure 2.5 Excitation curve, CTs secondary voltage vs. secondary current............................................... 41
Figure 2.6 Capacitive voltage transformers ............................................................................................... 41
Figure 2.7 SKS relays coordination curve ................................................................................................. 46
Figure 2.8 Phasor diagram for insulated system with C phase-earth fault [42] ......................................... 48
Figure 2.9 Current distribution in an insulated system with a C phase–earth fault [42] ............................ 49
Figure 2.10 Earth fault in petersen coil earthed system [42] ..................................................................... 50
Figure 2.11 Distribution of currents during a C-phase-earth fault on radial distribution system [42] ....... 51
Figure 2.12 C phase-earth fault in Petersen coil earthed network: practical case with resistance present . 52
Figure 2.13 Resistive components of spill current [42] ............................................................................. 53
Figure 2.14 Ground fault protection coordination curve............................................................................ 55
Figure 2.15 Dual slope bias technique ....................................................................................................... 56
Figure 2.16 Operating characteristics of the differential protection [43] ................................................... 60
Figure 2.17 A balanced transmission system [55] ..................................................................................... 62
Figure 2.18 Three phase to the ground bolted fault ................................................................................... 63
Figure 2.19 (a) Infeed (b) Outfeed Effect .................................................................................................. 65
Figure 2.20 Increased arc resistance coverage [53] ................................................................................... 67
Figure 2.21 Relay characteristic modification for the load encroachment. ................................................ 68
Figure 2.22 Zones of protection in distance relaying ................................................................................ 69
Figure 2.23 Zone-1 extension schemes ...................................................................................................... 72
Figure 2.24 Pilot aided protection schemes ............................................................................................... 72
Figure 2.25 (a) Protection coordination Kroman Çelik (b) Protection coordination the Diliskelesi. ........ 73
Figure 2.26 (a) Characteristics of overvoltage protection (b) Characteristics of undervoltage protection 80
Figure 3.1 Ring Distribution Network of the TEMBELOVA GEBZE OSB ............................................. 86
Figure 3.2 Operating characteristics of the differential protection [35]. .................................................... 89
Figure 3.3 Vector Diagram for the 90o-45o Connection (Phase-A element)............................................. 91
Figure 3.4 (a) The ring network opened from the right (b) The ring network opened from the left. ......... 92
Figure 3.5 The inverse time coordination characteristic curve when DM1-H01 side is open. .................. 96
Figure 3.6 The inverse time coordination characteristic curve when DM3-H14 side is open. .................. 97
Figure 3.7 The definite time coordination characteristic curve when DM1-H01 side is open. .................. 99
Figure 3.8 The definite time coordination characteristic curve when DM3-H14 side is open. ................ 100
Figure 3.9 Zero sequence overcurrent for ground fault detection. ........................................................... 101
Figure 3.10 The definite time coordination characteristic curve when DM1-H01 side is open. .............. 103
Figure 3.11 The definite time coordination characteristic curve when DM3-H14 side is open. .............. 104
Figure 3.12 GOOSE application for the bus bar protection. .................................................................... 105
Figure 4.1 The 10 major sections of IEC 61850. ..................................................................................... 107
Figure 4.2 IEC 61850 Information Model ............................................................................................... 108
Figure 4.3 Data Model in IEC 61850 Protocol ........................................................................................ 109
Figure 4.4 Example of logical node, data, data attributes and constraints ............................................... 110
Figure 4.5 Single Point Status (SPS) Common Data Class...................................................................... 112
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Figure 4.6 LD/LN, Functional Constraint, Data and Data Attribute ........................................................ 112
Figure 4.7 Information Exchange Model ................................................................................................. 113
Figure 4.8 The SCSMs of IEC61850 placed according to the OSI layers ............................................... 115
Figure 4.9 Two-Party-Application Association ....................................................................................... 118
Figure 4.10 MultiCast-Application-Association (MCAA) ...................................................................... 118
Figure 4.11 GOOSE application for blocking the bus bar protection relay. ............................................ 122
Figure 4.12 The coupler automation with ring input and output relays ................................................... 122
Figure 4.13 The basic concept of the sample value ................................................................................. 123
Figure 5.1 The negative effect of PV based DG integration on the conventional protection................... 127
Figure 5.2 The site of solar plants in Antalya .......................................................................................... 128
Figure 5.3 Single line diagram of the solar plants in Antalya .................................................................. 129
Figure 5.4 The main components of solar plants ..................................................................................... 129
Figure 5.5 The effect of PV based DG integration on weak distribution network and the fault current .. 132
Figure 5.6 The effect of PV based integration on strong network and the fault current variation ........... 133
Figure 5.7 (a) When fault is applied on the GES TM11 (b) When fault is applied on FINIKE TM bus . 134
Figure 5.8 The variation fault current for the fault at GES TM11 ........................................................... 135
Figure 5.9 The variation of fault current for the upstream and downstream faults .................................. 137
Figure 5.10 (a) Fault variation at the R1B position (b) Fault variation at the R3B and R4B positions ... 138
Figure 5.11 Comparison of inverter and non-inverter based DGs integration effect for weak system .... 139
Figure 6.1 Part of Antalya solar power plant project ............................................................................... 142
Figure 6.2 Antalya CLK Solar Power Plant Project ................................................................................ 143
Figure 6.3 The fault current variation for the CLK SPP .......................................................................... 144
Figure 6.4 An adaptive protection philosophy for DNs with DGs. .......................................................... 146
Figure 6.5. Speeding up the relay operation ............................................................................................ 148
Figure 6.6 The logic to be implemented in the relay for speed-up operation. ......................................... 149
Figure 6.7 Signal Paths for the proposed communication method........................................................... 151
Figure 6.8 The Protection Coordination Paths for simulation analysis ................................................... 153
Figure 6.9 TMS and operating time at the maximum fault currents for Path-1 ....................................... 154
Figure 6.10. Time inverse characteristics for relays RA601, RA602 and RAD01 .................................. 154
Figure 6.11 TMS and operating time at the maximum fault currents for Path-2 ..................................... 155
Figure 6.12 Time inverse characteristics for relays RBD00, RBD01, RBD02 and RB503. .................... 155
xiii
LIST OF TABLES
Page
Table 2.1 IEC 60255 standard characteristics [42]. ................................................................................... 29
Table 2.2 154 kV components of substation. ............................................................................................. 33
Table 2.3 34 kV components of substation. ............................................................................................... 33
Table 2.4 Symmetrical components and fault types .................................................................................. 36
Table 2.5 Minimum and maximum short circuits currents of the source network. .................................... 38
Table 2.6 Minimum and maximum short circuits currents of the SKS. ..................................................... 38
Table 2.7 Maximum load current. .............................................................................................................. 39
Table 2.8 Typical voltage transformer accuracy class and burden ratings................................................. 42
Table 2.9 Typical relay timing errors – Standard IDMT Relay. ................................................................ 44
Table 2.10 Setting results for MV protection relays. ................................................................................. 45
Table 2.11 Earth fault protection setting for the SKS. ............................................................................... 54
Table 2.12 The Parameters for RED 615 ................................................................................................... 61
Table 2.13 Zero and positive sequence impedance of the lines ................................................................. 74
Table 2.14 For SKS distance relay looking towards Kroman Çelik substation ......................................... 77
Table 2.15 For SKS distance relay looking towards Kroman Çelik substation ......................................... 78
Table 3.1 The Source Network Maximum and Minimum Short Circuit Currents ..................................... 84
Table 3.2 The Source Network Transformer Data ..................................................................................... 84
Table 3.3 The Maximum short circuit current when the ring is opened from the right and left. ............... 86
Table 3.4 The summary of the minimum short circuit current. ................................................................. 87
Table 3.5 IEC 60255 Standard Characteristics. ......................................................................................... 88
Table 3.6 The Parameters for RED 615 ..................................................................................................... 89
Table 3.7 The pickup current and time multiplier setting of the time inverse overcurrent relays .............. 94
Table 3.8 The pickup current and operating time of definite time directional overcurrent. ....................... 98
Table 3.9 The pickup current and operating time of directional earth fault protection. ........................... 102
Table 3.10 Directional Definite Time for Bus Bar protection. ................................................................ 102
Table 4.1 IEC 61850 to MMS object mapping ........................................................................................ 116
Table 4.2 IEC 61850 services mapping (partial) ..................................................................................... 116
Table 4.3 Types of SCL file ..................................................................................................................... 119
Table 5.1 Types of overhead lines and cables used in solar plants .......................................................... 130
Table 5.2 Total strings current calculation ............................................................................................... 130
Table 6.1 The status of CBs to detect network configuration .................................................................. 149
Table 6.2 Relay RAD01 operating time at the downstream locations and its own location .................. 156
Table 6.3 Relay RAD01 operating time at the downstream relay locations and its own location ........... 156
Table 6.4 The wrong operations resulted and adaptive setting’s advantage at relay RAD01 ................. 158
Table 6.5 The wrong operations resulted and adaptive setting’s advantage at relay RAD201 ................ 158
xiv
ABSTRACT

NETWORKS
Department of Electrical Engineering

Ph.D. Thesis
Adviser: Assist. Prof. Dr. Mustafa BAYSAL
Power systems must be protected against faults to ensure quality and reliable operation
in generation, transmission and distribution systems. For reliable operation of the power
systems, an electrical fault must be cleared within minimum possible time. To achieve
this goal, different types of protection relays have been used in classical power systems.
On the other hand, the Distributed Generations' (DGs) integration to power system has
increased in the recent years due to economic, environmental and technical advantages.
This imposes technical challenge like wrong operation of protection relays. Thus, the
possible challenges that may arise due to the integration of DGs on the existing
distribution networks have been investigated in this thesis. Short circuit current level with
respect to variation in MW integration of DGs are studied considering the cases when the
utility networks are weak and strong. For this study, the solar power project in the Antalya
region is used as a case study. The strength and weakness of the utility network will
depend on the short circuit power of the system. When the utility network is strong (have
high short circuit power), the integration effect of inverter based DGs like solar power
plants were observed insignificant. However, for the weak utility networks (with low
short circuit power), the integration of inverter based DGs has been observed to have
considerable influence. The future Distribution Networks (DNs), commonly referred to
as smart grids, are expected to be reliable, efficient and accommodate renewable energy
resources. The smart distribution network has to withstand the technical challenges
related to the integration of Distributed Generations. Among this technical challenges,
the protection malfunctioning with increased integration of DGs is an issue which
requires a great concern. Thus, a protection philosophy which can suit the future smart
grid requirements with respect to increased integration of DGs has to be devised. In this
thesis, a new adaptive protection technique which is based on the characteristics of fault
current and load current is proposed. The circuit breakers or switches connecting DGs to
xv
the network can be in either on or off state. In the proposed method, the state of circuit
breakers (CBs) and DGs are monitored by Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs). If any
status change occurs (from on to off or vice versa), the Calculation and Relay agents are
triggered to update the directional IEDs. The Calculation agent is concerned with short
circuit and load flow calculations at the relaying points while the Relay agent is concerned
with setting calculations inside the relay. The propose method is not based on the group
setting and the settings are calculated inside the relay. The dependency on the
communication is less in the proposed method. It also operates faster compared to the
normally used settings. The relay agent also transfers the data between the relays. Another
advantage of this method is that it can be implemented by using directional IEDs.
DigSILENT Power Factory, which is simulation tool, is used to verify the suggested
philosophy. Especially DigSILENT Programming Language (DPL) is used to model the
adaptive protection. The results of the simulation study show the correct operation of the
proposed method.
Keywords: Circuit breakers, etap, digSILENT programming language, distributed

generations, , distribution network, intelligent electronic devices, power system
protection, relays, smart grids, solar power plants

xvi
ÖZET
AKKILLI DAĞITIM ŞEBEKESİNİN YENİ BİR KORUMA

FELSEFESİ
Elektrik Mühendisliği Anabilim Dalı

Doktora Tezi
Tez Danışmanı: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Mustafa BAYSAL
Üretim, iletim ve dağıtım sistemlerinde kaliteli ve güvenilir bir işletme sağlanabilmesi

için elektrik güç sistemleri arızalara karşı korunmalıdır. Sistemin güvenilirliğini arttırmak
için söz konusu arızalar mümkün olan en kısa sürede giderilmelidir. Bu gereksinim
doğrultusunda geleneksel güç sistemlerde farklı koruma röleleri kullanılmıştır. Öte
yandan, sağladıkları ekonomik, çevresel ve teknik avantajlardan dolayı son zamanlarda
Dağıtık Üretim (DÜ) birimlerinin şebekeye entegrasyonu hızla artmıştır. Bu durum
koruma rölelerinin yanlış çalışması gibi teknik problemleri de beraberinde getirmektedir.
Bu nedenle, bu tez çalışmasında dağıtık üretimin mevcut dağıtım şebekesine
entegrasyonu ile ortaya çıkacak olan olası problemler incelenmiştir. Şebekenin güçlü ve
zayıf olması durumları dikkate alınarak entegre edilen DÜ birimlerinin güç değişimlerine
bağlı olarak kısa devre akım seviyeleri incelenmiştir. Bu incelemede Antalya
bölgesindeki bir güneş santrali örnek çalışma olarak ele alınmıştır. Şebekenin zayıf ve
güçlü olması elektrik güç sisteminin kısa devre gücüne bağlı olacaktır. Şebeke güçlü
(yüksek kısa devre gücü) olduğu zaman güneş santralleri gibi evirici vasıtasıyla şebekeye
entegre edilen DÜ’lerin şebeke üzerinde meydana getirdikleri etkinin az olduğu
görülmüştür. Ancak şebeke zayıf (düşük kısa devre gücü) olduğu zaman şebeke üzerinde
DÜ nedeniyle ortaya çıkan etkinin ciddi boyutta olduğu ortaya görülmüştür. Akıllı şebeke
olarak adlandırılan geleceğin dağıtım şebekelerinin, güvenilir, verimli ve yenilebilir
enerji kaynakları ile uyumlu olması bekleniyor. Akıllı dağıtım şebekesi DÜ entegrasyonu
ile ortaya çıkan teknik zorluklara karşı dirençli olmak zorundadır. Bu zorluklar içerisinde
en önemlisi, artan DÜ entegrasyonu ile koruma sistemlerinin doğru bir şekilde
çalışmamasıdır. Bu nedenle, akıllı şebekede artan DÜ entegrasyonuna bağlı olarak ortaya
çıkan gereksinimlere uygun yeni bir koruma yaklaşımı geliştirilmesi gerekmektedir. Bu
tez çalışması kapsamında kısa devre ve yük akımının değişimleri kullanılarak yeni bir
xvii
adaptif koruma tekniği geliştirilmiştir. DÜ birimlerini şebekeye bağlayan kesiciler veya
bağlantı ekipmanlarının konumu kapalı veya açık olabilirler. Önerilen yöntemde, akıllı
elektronik cihazlar (AEC) kullanılarak kesicilerin ve DÜ’lerin durum bilgisinin izlenmesi
sağlanmaktadır. Herhangi bir durum değişikliği (açık iken kapalı veya tersi) ortağa
çıkarsa, yönlü AEC ayarlarını güncellemek üzere hesaplama ve koruma ajanları
tetiklenmektedir. Hesaplama ajanı röle noktalarındaki kısa devre ve yük akışı
hesaplamaları ile ilgilenirken, röle ajanı ise röle içerisindeki ayar hesaplamaları ile
ilgilenmektedir. Önerilen metot grup ayarları biçiminde olmayıp ayarlar röle içerisinde
gerçekleştirilmektedir. Önerilen yöntemin haberleşmeye bağlılığı çok fazla değildir.
Üstelik mevcut kullanılan ayarlar göre daha hızlı cevap vermektedir. Röle ajanı ayrıca
röleler arasındaki veri akışını da gerçekleştirmektedir. Bir başka üstünlüğü de yönlü
AEC’ler kullanılarak uygulanabilmesidir. Önerilen koruma yaklaşımını test etmek için
DigSILENT Power Factory simülasyon programı kullanılmıştır. Özellikle adaptif
korumayı modellemek için DigSILENT Programlama dili olan, DPL kullanılmıştır.
Simülasyon sonuçları, geliştirilen yöntemin doğru çalıştığını göstermektedir.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Akıllı elektronik cihazlar, akıllı şebeke, dağıtık üretim, dağıtım
şebekesi, digSILENT programlam dili, etap, güç sistem koruması, güneş santralleri,
kesici, röle.
YILDIZ TEKNİK ÜNİVERSİTESİ FEN BİLİMLERİ ENSTİTÜSÜ
xviii
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
In the 21st century, owing to the environmental concern, the trend towards integrating renewable
energy resources to the network is highly increased. Renewable energy resources such as wind
and solar are intermittent and mostly connected to the distribution level of the power system.
Additionally, the currently available power systems are constructed many years ago and are
unable to meet the current power requirements in terms of reliability and power quality. The
energy flow is from central fossil based power systems that are several kilometers away from
load centers. Besides, the network is purely monitored and susceptible to physical damages and
faults. These resulted in power losses, system faults, inefficient operation and sometimes
blackouts of the power systems. Moreover overcurrent, overvoltage, earth fault, distance and
frequency protection relays are used to clear the when fault occurs on the system. These
protections are mostly suitable when the system is radial.
To handle the above mentioned defects of the power system, the radial old power system has
to be replaced by the smart bidirectional power system.
With the introduction of the concept of the smart grid, the distribution network structure will
be greatly changed compared to generation and transmission networks of the power system.
The future distribution networks are proposed to be networked and looped [1], [2]. The looped
structures are intended to improve reliability and efficiency in DNs. This distribution network
is featured with more flexible and managed-integration of renewable energy resources. They
are also characterized by auto-reconfiguration, management of reactive power, implementation
of reliability management, improved customer average service reliability and accommodation
of electric vehicle loads.
19
Visions and roadmaps of future smart grid are defined by both governmental and private
institutions [3], [4], [5], [6], [7]. The aims of the proposed road maps are to effectively guide
the planning, design, construction, operation and other related works of the smart grid. The road
maps are also expected to make cooperation of stakeholder demands, to accelerate and promote
the development of the smart grid [8]. Additionally, focus is also made on interoperability
standards, smart meters, electric vehicles, demand response, phasor measurement units and
other automation technologies. In [9] the key characteristics of smart grid visions for
monitoring, analysis and control of smart grid as well as the technological road maps to achieve
the visions are stated.
Power system reliability and smart grid issues are top priority areas for most utility companies
in the world [10]. Thus, a lot of studies have been conducted concerning the energy management
of the smart grid. Some of these studies focus on home energy management, building energy
management and interconnect grid energy management to support grid’s reliability and security
issues [11], [12]. Demand-side management (DSM) commonly refers to programs implemented
by utility companies to control the energy consumption at the customer side of the meter [13].
It includes conservation and energy efficiency programs, fuel substitution programs, demand
response programs, and residential or commercial load management programs [14], [15], [16].
According to literatures [17], [18], smart grid researches mainly focus on four parts, which are
advanced distribution operation, advanced measurement system, advanced transmission
operation and advanced asset management. In [8] smart transmission grid is considered to
consist of three interactive, smart components, i.e., smart control centers, smart transmission
networks and smart substations. This thesis work is planned to deal with protection of the smart
distribution grid.
Distribution network includes all components of the power system from the transmission or sub
transmission step down substations to the customer’s service entrance. The power coming to
the distribution network can be from the centralized power plant through the transmission
systems or from the local generations. The distribution network can be either in the form of
overhead line or underground cable depending on their geographical locations. The overhead
distribution networks are used in the rural areas while the underground cable distribution
networks are mostly used in the urban areas.
20
The configuration of the distribution networks can be radial, ring or networked. Radial
distribution networks are the simplest and least expensive to build and operate. However, the
reliability of the radial distribution network is not good enough. This due to the fact that an
outage at a given point due to a fault or maintenance will result in an outage on all loads served
by the feeder.
The ring distribution network is formed by connecting or encircling an area serving one or more
distribution transformers or load centers. Since it's expensive to build, it is mostly used where
the continuity of service is more important, like for example organized industrial loads and
medical centers. Meshed distribution networks are most reliable. It is also most expensive to
implement.
The future distribution networks commonly referred to as smart grids, are expected to be loop
structured with increased reliability, efficiency and integration of renewable energy resources
[19], [20]. Smart grid is intelligent power network incorporated with high speed bidirectional
communication networks [21], [22]. Smart grid is intended to realize the safety, reliability,
efficiency, economy, friendly environment and safely use of power grid through advanced
sensing and measuring technologies, advanced equipment technologies, advanced control
method and advanced decision support system technologies. It is characterized by self-healing
capability, incentives to promote users participation, resistive to attacks, high power quality,
incorporating various power forms, and development of electricity market and optimized
operation of electric assets [21], [22].
Figure 1.1 Structure of Smart Distribution Grid [22]
As shown in Figure 1.1 Smart Distribution Network is expected to contain substations,

switching stations, ring main units, pole-mounted switches, micro-grids (MGs), distributed
21
generations, feeders, intelligent distributed terminals (IDTs), global positioning systems (GPS)
and the communication networks [22].
As discussed in [20], [23], [24], [25], [26], [27], the protection of smart distribution network
has to take the following points into account:
1. The looped or meshed structure of smart DNs will affect the traditional overcurrent
protection philosophy which was based on the unidirectional power flow.
2. The generator impedance changes caused by local DGs which are mostly based on power
electronic devices.
3. Adaptive protection system is required due to dynamic electrical behavior of power
electronic devices as well as change of the network structure.
4. Fast fault interruption as the fragile power electronic devices based DGs has low short
circuit withstand capacity compared to the traditional equipment.
5. The fault current waveforms are highly distorted, thus either fault limiters or power
electronic converters has to be considered.
Even though environmental and economic issues stimulated large-scale integration of the DGs
into the grid, the adverse impact on the overall stability and reliability of the existing grid
infrastructure must not be under estimated and requires solution [28], [29]. Micro grids are
expected to combat these effects and make conventional grids more suitable for widespread
deployment of DGs. Micro grids are the likely components of the future smart distribution
network that have components such as DGs, loads, storage devices that can be constantly
connected and disconnected (Figure 1.2). Moreover, for coordinating and managing DGs in a
more decentralized way than old networks, they are highly recommended in order to fully
benefit from deployment of DGs in DNs. A microgrid can be an industrial or commercial
facility, a university campus, a residential neighborhood, a hospital, an off-grid remote
community, etc [30]. Microgrids are dynamic in behavior and at any time DG or load
connection and disconnection might take place. Microgrid parameters should be dynamically
updated with the changing conditions of the network. This helps power generation, load
management, and control and protection strategies to be more efficient and optimal.
Medium voltage MGs consist of DGs and low voltage MGs that are connected to the MV
distribution system. The large load pockets of a Medium voltage MGs can be divided into
smaller load units served by individual MGs [31].
22
Figure 1.2 PV Micro grid and distribution network [31]
Micro grids have two modes of operation which are islanded and grid connected mode, thus an
effective protection scheme is required in each mode of operation. Despite the economic and
environmental benefits of micro grids, they introduce technical challenges which motivated
many researchers to solve them [32].
The traditional distribution network is radial and passive with unidirectional flow of energy. In
addition, the protection design in MV and LV networks is based on the passive paradigm with
no energy flow in the reverse direction [33]. The reduced cost of renewable energy systems,
both national and international incentives, the smart grid concept, increased cost of fuels and
environmental issues have paved the way for the increased DGs integration to the DNs.
However, when DGs are integrated, the distribution network becomes active network. The
energy starts to flow in the reverse direction due the integration of DGs, however this condition
do not suit the conventional protection system. Due to this fact, as far as the physical integration
of DGs to the distribution network is concerned, protection is one of the major issues.
Consequently, the technical challenges with respect to protection coordination has to be paid
sufficient attention. The size of DGs, the location and the interconnection interface may
determine the level of impact of the DGs on the network. The penetration level of the DGs will
determine the degree of adjustment required for today’s protection philosophy. If the integration
ratio of DGs to the network exceeds 20-30 percentage of total power system capacity, it causes
the mal-operation of the existing overcurrent protection coordination [18].
The current distribution power systems uses time or current graded protection philosophy. Even
though this protection philosophy has been used for many decades, it has to be reconsidered
with respect to the integration of DGs and of network structure change. False tripping of feeders
23
and generation units, increasing of short circuit current, unwanted islanding, and prevention of
automatic reclosing and synchronized reclosing are some of the effects of integration of DGs
to DNs [20]. According to current standard application, DGs are obliged to immediately
disconnect from the grid in case of network disturbances or faults. But such type of operation
affects the stability of the system especially when the ratio of DGs integration to the network
increased significantly.
Another challenge to the current protection philosophy comes from the requirement of the smart
grid itself. For example, Active Network Management (ANM) approaches like demand
response and network reconfiguration can threat existing protection practices [22]. Thus, it is
crucial to integrate ANM and protection approaches which are not applicable in the currently
used protection philosophy.
The above mentioned problems justify the need for the migration towards new protection
strategies [34], [35]. In this thesis, investigation of future smart DNs with respect to the
protection challenges when DGs are integrated will be made. Finally as a main goal of this
work, a new protection philosophy which can handle the problems arising from integration of
DGs and changing network structure will be proposed. The proposed protection scheme has to
adapt to the dynamic situation of the DNs.
 To study the protection systems and philosophies currently used in the power system.
The overcurrent, directional overcurrent, differential and distance protection system will
be studied. This will be based on practical substation, organized industrial zones and
solar power plants.
 The protection coordination for the radial and ring distribution networks will be
investigated.
 IEC 61850 protocol and its advantage in the bus bar protection will be studied.
 The effect of DGs penetration to the distribution network will be investigated and
solutions will be suggested.
 Based on the results of the analysis, A New Protection Philosophy for the protection of
DNs with DGs integrated will be proposed.
 The Proposed protections philosophy will tested by using DigSILENT simulation tool.
DigSILENT Programming Language (DPL) is used to model the proposed protection
philosophy.
24
In order to achieve the above mentioned goals, studies of the currently used protection
approaches will be conducted. The currently used approaches are mainly based on the
overcurrent protection, differential and distance protection. The important engineering
procedures for this methods will be studied in this research for each of these methods. This
helps to understand the currently used IEDs and power system protection state of art which is
basic for the suggested protection approach. Furthermore, the effect of DGs on the commonly
used protection approach will be investigated and the potential challenges will be identified.
DigSILENT Power Factory will be used for modeling and investigation of the network and the
DGs. Based on the identified challenges, a new protection philosophy will proposed. The
proposed method will account for the change in the short circuit current arising from DGs
switching. In addition, it will consider the structural change in the network. DPL will be used
to model the algorithm to be implemented for the protection relay.
The calculation program DIgSILENT PowerFactory is a computer aided engineering tool for
the analysis of industrial, utility and commercial electrical power systems. It has been designed
as an advanced integrated and interactive software package dedicated to electrical power system
and control analysis in order to achieve the main objectives of the planning and operation
optimization [36]. The name DIgSILENT stands for ‘Digital Simulation and Electrical Network
calculation program’ [36].
DIgSILENT has the ability to simulate load flow, RMS (Root Mean Square) fluctuations and
transient events in the same software environment. It provides models on a different levels of
detailing. It combines models for electromagnetic transient simulations of instantaneous values
with models for electromechanical simulations of RMS values. This makes the models useful
for studies of both (transient) grid fault and (longer term) power quality and control issues.
DIgSILENT provides a comprehensive library of models of electrical components in power
systems. The library includes models of e.g. generators, motors, controllers, dynamic loads and
various passive network elements (e.g. lines, transformers, static loads and shunt capacitors).
The protection approach which is proposed in this work is based on the detailed analysis of
effects of DGs on the practical distribution network. The proposed method in the current study
25
is adaptable to any DG type and the penetration level. The settings are not based on pre-
calculated setting groups. Moreover, it is not depending fully on a communication between the
central controller and the relays. The settings values are exchanged between the relays. This is
very important from the reliability perspective as it reduces the criticality of central controller.
Additionally it reduces communication costs as the central controller communicates only with
peripheral relays and CBs.
According to the proposed method, the central controller is only used for detecting change in
the network configuration and inform end relays to start the adaptive protection. In addition,
the method followed for the proposed protection technique is intended to be applicable to the
currently used IEDs. In the proposed method, the state of CBs and DGs are monitored by
Intelligent End Devices (IEDs). If any status change occurs (from on to off or vice versa), the
Calculation and Relay agents are triggered to update the directional IEDs.
DigSILENT Power Factory simulation tool used to verify the suggested philosophy. Especially
DPL is used to model the adaptive protection. The results of the simulation study show the
correct operation of the proposed method. Based on the above discussions, the approaches
followed and the proposed protection philosophy are unprecedented.
In chapter 1 brief introduction about the distribution grids, smart grids and micro grids is made.
In addition, the statement of the problem, objectives of the research and methodologies are
discussed in this chapter. Moreover, the originality of thesis is emphasized. In chapter 2, the
protection of power system is discussed in detail by using practical case studies. In this part the
engineering aspects of overcurrent protection, earth fault protection, distance protection,
differential protection and overvoltage protection are discussed for radial power system. In
Chapter 3, the discussion on the protection of ring distribution network is made with practical
example. In Chapter 4, the IEC 61850 and its application for distribution system protection is
discussed. In Chapter 5, the analysis and discussion of the effect of DGs on the distribution
network is made by using practical case study. In Chapter 6, a discussion on the new protection
philosophy is made. Furthermore, the simulation and analysis of the proposed protection
philosophy is made in this chapter. In Chapter 7, conclusion and recommendations for the
further works is made.
26
CHAPTER 2
POWER SYSTEM PROTECTION
Power system is complex infrastructure which consists of many expensive equipment. This
represents huge capital investment which has to be operated securely and reliably to minimize
the payback period. In addition, power systems are required to operate safely all through their
life time. No matter how the system is perfectly designed, power system faults are unescapable
causing risk to life and property. To insure a quality and reliable operation of the power systems,
an electrical fault must be cleared with in minimum possible time. This is important to limit the
propagation of the fault to the healthy part of the power systems. Furthermore, the faulted part
of the network has to be isolated selectively without disturbing the functionality of the rest of
the power systems. This can be achieved by proper coordination between the protection relays.
Consequently, the protection coordination is the heart of all power systems.
As shown in Figure 2.1 , the revolution of the protection relays started at the beginning of the
20th century. The first relay type was induction disk type inverse time current relays [37].
Figure 2.1 Development of protection relays [28]
27
After the invention of overcurrent relays, distance and differential relays appeared. Until 1940s
[37] all of the developed relays where electromechanical types.
Then static relays developed after 1940s. The static relays were faster than electromechanical
relays and have no moving parts. The first microprocessor based relays appeared as commercial
devices in 1979 [37]. The currently used digital numerical relays are very fast and can integrate
many functions.
The arc current generated during fault can burn copper conductors or weld together
transformer’s and machine’s core laminations in a very short time [38]. If the fault continue
for more few seconds, the heavy current can cause damage to the plant. Consequently, adequate
protection system to detect and disconnect elements of the power system under fault is an
integral part of power system design.
Protection system is an arrangement of protection equipment (like relays, fuses, etc.) and other
devices (like instrument transformers, circuit breakers, batteries, etc.) required to achieve a
specified function based on a protection principle implemented. Overcurrent and earth fault
protection are the earliest protection techniques to be used for the protection of power system.
Selectivity
The protection relays has to operate selectively by opening the circuit breakers whose operation
is required to isolate the fault. This requires the protection functions coordination among the
protective relays. Time grading, current grading or unit protection methods are commonly used
to provide the required coordination among the relays.
In the time grading method, the protection relays which are in successive zones are arranged in
time so that only the relay near to the fault operate first. For this purpose, definite time relays
are used and it is independent of the level of the fault current. But, as a disadvantage, the relay
near to the source (with highest fault current) clears the fault with longest time delay.
Current based grading takes the advantage of variation of fault current at varies parts of the
network. The variation of impedance with location between the source and the fault point is the
28
main cause of the fault current variation. For this technique to be used there must be an
appreciable impedance between the two relaying points.
To overcome the limitations of current based and time based grading, inverse time overcurrent
relay characteristic has evolved. The inverse time characteristics are defined by standards
curves. For example, IEC 60255 defines a number of standard characteristics as shown in Table
2.1. In addition, in the modern protection relays, there is also an option for the user to define
their own time-current characteristics [39], [40], [41].
Table 2.1 IEC 60255 standard characteristics [42]

Relay Characteristics Equations(IEC 60255)
Standard Inverse(SI) 0.14
t = TMS ∗
(Ir )0.02 − 1
Very Inverse(VI) 13.5
t = TMS ∗
Ir − 1
Extremely Inverse(EI) 80
t = TMS ∗
Ir 2 − 1
Long Time Standby Earth 120
t = TMS ∗
Fault Ir − 1
Where: Ir = I/Is, I= Measured current, Is=Relay setting current, TMS=Time Multiplier Setting.
Sometimes high-set instantaneous element can be used when source impedance is small in
comparison with the protected circuit impedance. This reduces tripping time at high fault levels
and improves the overall system grading by allowing the 'discriminating curves' behind the high
set instantaneous elements to be lowered.
Speed
Relays are expected to operate as fast as possible to safeguard continuity of supply by removing
each disturbance before it leads to widespread loss of synchronism and consequent collapse of
the power system [43]. Speed is the characteristics of the relay which is related with how fast
the relay has to operate to clear the fault.
Sensitivity
Protection relays must be sensitive enough to identify minimum operating fault level (current,
voltage, power etc.).
29
Reliability
The protection relays are required to be highly reliable by reducing the risk of failure to trip
(dependability) and risk of over tripping (security).
Directionality
For the parallel feeders, line with two end feeds and ring networks, the overcurrent protection
cannot provide selectivity. Therefore, directional control facility can be included to the
protection relays to provide better selectivity [44]. To determine the direction of the fault
current, voltage information is required. The connection of the voltage and current information
to the relays depends on the phase angle, at unity system power factor, by which the current
and voltage applied to the relays are displaced. In digital or numerical relays, phase
displacements can be obtained by software in contrast to electromechanical and static relays in
which the phase displacements are obtained while connecting the input quantities to the relay
[45], [46].
The commonly used standard connection for static, digital or numerical relays is 90° Quadrature
Connection. In this type, two forms of connections are available based on the angle by which
the applied voltage is shifted to produce maximum relay sensitivity which is known as the Relay
Characteristic Angle (RCA). These connections are:
90°-30° Characteristic (30° RCA)
This is obtained by connecting the phase-A relay element with Ia current and by displacing the
Vbc voltage by 30o in an anti-clockwise direction. When the current lags the system phase to
neutral voltage by 60o, the maximum sensitivity is produced. As shown in Figure 2.2, the correct
directional tripping can be obtained for current angle 30o leading to 150o lagging. These
characteristics produce good directional sensitivity for plain feeders with the zero sequence
sources behind it.
90°-45° characteristic (45° RCA)
In this case, the phase-A relay element is supplied with current Ia however the voltage Vbc
displaced by 45o in an anti-clockwise direction. In the Siddik Kardesler Substation (SKS)
directional overcurrent and earth fault protection (67/67N) are used as the backup protection
for the distance relay (21/21N).
30
The maximum sensitivity is produced for the 45o current lagging from system phase to neutral
voltage. The correct directional tripping zone is from 45o leading to 135o lagging as shown in
Figure 2.3. This connection can be used especially for the protection of transformer feeders or
feeders that have a zero sequence source in front of the relay.
Ia
MTA
Va
V’bc
g
30 de
eg
0d
15
g
Zero torque line 30 de
Vbc
Vc
Vb
Figure 2.2 Vector diagram for the 90o-30o connection (Phase-A element)
The electrical power system is expensive investments which has to be designed, implemented
and operated with great care so that it provides valuable results. Electrical substations are
among the components of this investment which requires detailed engineering work from its
design phase to implementation phase.
31
TA
M
Ia
bc
V’
Va
eg
d
45
deg
45
eg
Vbc
5d
13
Zero torque line
Vb
Vc
Figure 2.3 Vector diagram for the 90o-45o connection (Phase-A element)
If proper protection design is not followed, the fault currents that may result from abnormal
conditions can damage the components of this expensive investment within fraction of times.
The engineering of power system protection is among the challenging and important topics for
proper working of the system especially substations. Thus, during substation design stage,
detailed analysis of the system, like short circuit and load analysis has to be made. Based on the
analysis results, proper protection systems, equipment and techniques have to be selected before
the implementation stage. This involves the selection of appropriate circuit breakers, fuses,
isolators, instrument transformers, protection relays, etc. Moreover proper coordination among
these equipment is crucial task which has to be handled by protection engineer. In the following
sections, the proper steps for designing protection system is discussed with for the SKS project
32
Table 2.2 154 kV components of substation
Code Name Description
Used to convert voltage from HV to the level

1/1A Voltage Transformer
that can be used by protection, control,
automation devices and etc.
Used for Power Line Carrier (PLC)
2 Line Traps
Communication.
3/3A Current Transformer Used to convert from very high current to the
level that can be used by protection, control,
automation devices and etc.
4T Isolator with Grounding For no load opening and closing, and isolate the
blade downstream device to be worked on. The
grounding blade is used to ground the isolated
part for more safety.
5 Circuit breaker Make and break all currents within the scope of
their rating.
5T Circuit Breaker with Circuit breaker with auto-reclosing capability

Auto-reclosing
4 Isolator For no load opening and closing, and isolate the

downstream device to be worked on.
6 Surge Arrester To discharge high voltages caused by lightning

strikes or switching operations and earth faults.
7 Power Transformer To transform the voltage level from 154 kV to

34.5 kV.
The engineering steps starts from load analysis and short circuit study which is discussed in this
study. The selection of appropriate instrument transformers is also among the fundamental steps
for proper operation of the protection system. In the following sections, the detailed discussion
of the substation as well as its protection techniques will be made.
33
Table 2.3 34 kV components of substation
Code Name Description
8c/8b/8c Cable Medium Voltage (MV) XLPE underground

cable for transporting electrical energy
6a Surge Arrestor MV surge arrestor
5a/5b/5c Circuit Breaker MV circuit breaker
3a/3b/3c Current Transformers MV current transformer
14 Voltage Indicator Indicates the availability of voltage on each

phase
4t Grounding Switch Used to ground the isolated part for more

safety
10 Voltage Transformer MV voltage transformer
The SKS consists of 154 kV and 34.5 kV components that serve numerous purposes. These
elements (current transformers (CTs), meters, control and relay equipment, etc.) are shown
symbolically upon the substation’s single line diagram shown on Figure 2.4. In Table 2.2 and
Table 2.3 brief descriptions of these components are provided. The engineering steps starts
from load analysis and short circuit study which is discussed in this study. The selection of
appropriate instrument transformers is also among the fundamental steps for proper operation
of the protection system. In the following sections, the detailed discussion of the substation as
well as its protection techniques will be made.
On Figure 2.4, the protection functions used in SKS are indicated with the American National
Standards Institute (ANSI) codes. Based on single line diagram shown on Figure 2.4, the
protection arrangements for the SKS are as follow:
34
 For the 154 kV incoming transmission lines, distance protection (21/21N), directional
overcurrent protection (67/67N) and frequency protection (25) are implemented.
 For the power transformer, differential protection (87T), over current and earth fault
protections (50/51/50N/51N) are implemented.
 For the MV outgoing feeders, overcurrent and earth fault protections (50/51/50N/51N) are
implemented.
 Auxiliary Transformer is protected by fuse.
The coordination study between overcurrent relay requires the following data [44], [47], [48]:
 The Single line diagram of the system with type and rating of protection system specified
on it.
 The impedance of power system components like cables, transmission lines, transformers,
rotating machines and etc.
 The maximum and minimum short circuit currents expected to flow through each of the
protection relay.
 The maximum load current through each of the protection device.
 Starting currents of different types of motors.
 The transformer inrush, thermal withstand and damage characteristic curves.
 Decrement curves showing the rate of decay of the fault current supplied by the generators.
 The performance curves of the current transformers.
For the protection relay coordination, the distribution of the fault current throughout the
network has to be known. Especially the minimum and the maximum short circuit currents have
to be calculated at the relaying points.
Short circuit fault study for the coordination of protection relays in practical application
involves the following steps [42]:
 Identifying the possible operating conditions and stability limits by using network diagram
and available data.
 Calculating the minimum and maximum fault currents at each relaying points for each
type of fault.
 Calculating the Fault current distribution in the network especially at each relaying point.
35
Based on the above steps, the protection system to be used has to be defined. Voltage variation
at the relaying point, or the stability limit of the system when fault happens has to be calculated
and the classes of protection, such as high or low have to be determined. When fault occurs in
power system, the three phase current and voltage are no more balanced except in three phase
short circuit faults. Therefore, the protection engineer is concerned with symmetrical faults and
asymmetrical faults involving phase-to-phase and one or two phase to earth faults [44], [47].
For the analysis of unbalanced fault conditions, balanced symmetrical components are used.
Symmetrical components can also be used to detect different type of faults and identify between
the faults. For example, zero sequence and negative sequence voltages and currents are used
mostly in non-directional or directional earth fault overcurrent protection settings.
In this study, the analysis of symmetrical components will not be discussed. However the
symmetrical components (voltage and current) which are available in different type of faults
are summarized in Table 2.4. For this case, the short circuit analysis is done by using ETAP
power system analysis software. The software can calculate the maximum and minimum fault
current at each relaying points based on the IEC 60909 method or other standards. For this case,
IEC 60909 method is used.
Table 2.4 Symmetrical components and fault types
Sequence Single Phase- Phase Phase-Phase to Three Three

Currents Phase to Fault Earth Fault Phase Fault Phase to
Earth Fault Earth Fault
I1 X X X X X
I2 X X X
I0 X X
The Network owner and operator of Turkey (TEİAŞ) publishes the maximum and minimum
short circuit currents and power each year. In Table 2.5, the short currents taken from the
published data [49] for ‘GEBZE Industrialized Zone’ as well as ‘Çolakoğlu Substations’ are
summarized in Table 2.5. The impedance data of the lines, cables and the transformer used in
this study can be referred from the Appendix-A. Based on these data, in Table 2.6, the short
circuit analysis is conducted and the results are summarized.
36
ÇOLAKOĞLU SUBSTATION GEBZE OSB SUBSTATION
1272MCM 1272MCM
1 1
3 3
2 CONTROL PANEL 2 CONTROL PANEL
A W VAr A W VAr
3 2 1 3 2 1
mA mA mA mA mA mA
A W VAr A W VAr
3 3
3 2 1 3 2 1
Vk V Vk V
1 1
1 1
SYNC. SYNC.
RELAY PANEL RELAY PANEL
21 21N 25 21 21N 25
M M
4T 4T
(Phase A) 67/67N
67/67N
M M
5T 5T
1
1
M M M M
MAIN BUSBAR 4 4 4 4 154kV
M 4 M M 4 M
TRANSFER BUSBAR 4 4
5 M 5 M
TRANSFER FEEDER
M
4
METERING PANEL CONTROL PANEL
Main Energy Meter
A W VAr
3 1 1
3A Wh Varh mA mA mA
A W VAr
3 1 1
Spare Energy Meter
Power Quality
Wh Varh Meas. System Vk
1
V
1
SYNC.
RELAY PANEL
3
6
1A
50 51 50N 51N Diff. Protection
TRANSFORMER 7
51N
154/34.5kV
125(150) MVA
8C 87T
6a
34.5kV
GROUNDING TRANSFORMER 10kA
34.5 kV, 50 Hz, 25 kA, 2500 A METAL CLAD

H01 H02 H03 H04 H05 H06 H07
4t
14
11 5c 5b 5a 5a 5a
10
3a 3b 3c 3c 3c
14 14 14 14 14
TCR. & 2. HARMONIC FILTER
AUX. TRANS.
3.&4. HARMONIC FILTER
8a
POTA FURNANCE
4t 4t 4t 4t
ARC FURNANCE
12 8c
8b 8c 8c 8c
INPUT
Figure 2.4 Siddik Kardeşler substation single line diagram
37
Table 2.5 Minimum and maximum short circuits currents of the source network
Substations Maximum (kA) Minimum (kA)
Fault Types Single Phase Three Single Three

Phase Phase Phase
Gebze OSB 26,5 30 16,2 18,4
Çolakoğlu 21,1 23,2 16,9 18,8
Table 2.6 Minimum and maximum short circuits currents of the SKS
Busbar Maximum (kA) Minimum (kA)
Single Phase Three Phase Single Phase Three Phase
154 kV busbar 30.5 33 25.2 23.6
33 kV busbar 12.9 14.9 12.5 14.4
Arc-Furnace 12.5 14.5 12.2 14
Pota-Furnace 12.5 14.4 12.1 14
TCR and 2nd 12.7 14.7 12.4 14.3

Harmonic Filter
3rd and 4th Harmonic 12.7 14.7 12.1 13.9

Filter
Auxiliary Transformer 12.8 14.7 12.4 14.3
The protection relay must be set above the maximum load currents for stable operation.
Consequently the maximum load currents for the system has to be determined before
determining the relay setting. The maximum load current through each feeders is calculated by
the well-known power formula as follow:
S
IL = (2.1)
V ∗ √3
38
Where: IL is per phases maximum load current; S is the apparent power; V is per phase voltage.
The maximum load currents at each relaying points are summarized in Table 2.7.
Table 2.7 Maximum load current.
Feeders Pota Furnace Transformer Arc Furnace TCR and 3rd

Feeder 2nd HF and
4th HF
Power (MVA) 12 150 72 100 60
Current (A) 200.82 2510.29 1204.9 1673.53 1004.12
Proper protection design starts with selection of appropriate instrument (voltage and current)
transformers. Instrument transformers supply the relays with current and voltage for
measurement and protection purposes by converting the high magnitude current and voltages
to the suitable quantities to be injected to the relays.
Current Transformer
Current Transformers (CTs) are classified into metering and protection type. The metering CTs
are used for the application which requires very high accuracy over the normal range of the load
current. Protection CTs are required to operate at many times the full load current (with error
between 5%-10%) [44].
Current Transformer Ratio
The CTs has to be selected based on the maximum load current on the primary side and the
maximum secondary current under fault condition (generally rated to 100 times rated secondary
current). Additionally, the thermal withstand current during fault must be considered. Based on
IEC 60255 standard, the thermal withstand current of the current input has to be 100 time
nominal current (100xIn). For example, for the system with fault current of 25 kA, the lowest
possible CT rated current must not fall below 25 kA / 100 = 250 A. Consequently, the selection
of the primary rated current of 300 A is correct.
39
Current Transformer Saturation
The accuracy of CT depends on the fault current through the primary of the CT. For very high
currents, the saturation occurs and the relation between the primary and secondary currents will
be no more linear. The point where the linearity is lost is known as knee/excitation point (Figure
2.5). For correct operation, all the measured values read from the relay must be read when the
CTs are operating in their linear mode (unsaturated CTs). Thus, appropriate selection of CTs
has to be made in order for the relays not to saturate under the applied current.
Procedures for the Selection of CTs
The following steps has to be followed for the selection of the CTs.
1. It has to be ensured that the primary rating of the CT is greater than or equal to the expected
full load current.
2. It has to be ensured that the CT can derive the attached burden (total load resistance of
secondary circuit) during maximum fault current without saturating. The burden is
calculated as follow:
R B = R sCT + R wr + R rb (2.2)
Where: RB is the burden resistance, RsCT is the CT secondary resistance, Rwr is the connection
wire resistance, Rrb is Relays burden resistance.
In order to check whether CT will saturate under the maximum fault current or not, the CT
secondary voltage under fault condition has to be determined as follow:
R B ∗ IscMax
CTsv = (2.3)
CT Conversion Ratio
Where: CTsv is the CT secondary voltage and, IscMax is the maximum fault current.
The resulting value from equation (2.3) is plotted on the CT excitation curve and if it is below
the knee point of the CT there is no saturation and if it is above the knee point there is saturation.
Based on the above procedures, all the CTs in the SKS are determined.
Voltage Transformer
There are two types of voltage transformers (VTs) which are used in power industry, namely
electromagnetic and capacitive voltage transformers.
40
Secondary Voltage(Vs)
1.1 Vs
Vs
Knee Point
Is 1.5 Is Secondary Current (Is)
Figure 2.5 Excitation curve, CTs secondary voltage vs. secondary current
Electromagnetic voltage transformers are used for accurate metering and used for lower level
voltage applications. Capacitive voltage transformers are used for high-voltage transmission
line applications, with voltage greater than 66 kV. It consists of coupling capacitors,
compensating reactor, step-down transformer and ferro-resonance suppression circuit as shown
in Figure 2.6.
In voltage transformers accuracy class and the burden rating are very important. The common
accuracy class and the burden ratings are given in the Table 2.8. The voltage transformers used
in the SKS for both medium voltage and high voltage are as per the standard fulfilling the
accuracy limits.
C1 Ferro Resonance
L
Suppression Circuit
Compensating
Reactor
C2 Relay Voltage
Coupling Capacitors
Step Down Transformer

Figure 2.6 Capacitive voltage transformers
41
Table 2.8 Typical voltage transformer accuracy class and burden ratings
PT Accuracy Class
Common Classes(IEEE) Accuracy
1.2 98.8-101.2%
0.6 99.4-100.6%
0.3 99.7-100.3%
Burden Rating
Designations(IEEE) Accuracy maintained below
W 12.5 VA
X 25 VA
Y 75 VA
Z 200 VA
ZZ 400 VA
Coordination Procedure
The protection relays have to be set not to operate for the maximum load current, but must
operate for the minimum expected fault current. Furthermore, the overload protection can also
be provided by the inverse time relays.
The relays are required to reset when the fault current drop off. Thus, the setting must be
sufficiently high enough to allow the relay to reset when the rated current of the circuit is being
carried. This is denoted by pick-up/drop-off ratio of a relay – the value for a modern relay is
typically 0.95.
It is recommended to use relays with the same operating characteristics in series. In addition,
the relay which is furthest from source must have current setting equal to or less than the
42
primary current required to operate the relay behind it. Discrimination (selectivity) is provided
by using either time or current, or a combination of both.
For the relays to operate correctly, sufficient time has to be left which is referred to us grading
margin. The grading margin depends on a number of factors [47], [50]:
 the fault current interrupting time of the circuit breaker

 relay timing errors(variation from the characteristic time delay curve)
 the overshoot time of the relay
 CT errors
 final margin on the completion of the operation
Grading is initially carried out for the maximum fault level at the relaying point under
consideration, but a check is also made that the required grading margin exists for all current
levels between relay pick-up current and maximum fault level.
Fixed grading margin is popular, but for low fault current levels it is better to calculate at each
relaying points. A suitable minimum grading time interval, CTI, may be calculated as follows
[42]:
2ER + ECT
CTI = [ ] t + t CB + t 0 + t S (2.4)
100
Where: ER = relay timing error (as defined in IEC60255-4), ECT = allowance for CT ratio error
(%), t = nominal operating time of relay nearer to fault (sec), tCB = CB interrupting time (sec),
tO = relay overshoot time (sec), tS = safety margin (sec).
SKS Overcurrent Coordination
For the overcurrent protection coordination of the SKS, the protection arrangement as shown
in Figure 2.4 has to be referenced. The IEC normal inverse characteristic curve is selected for
the inverse time protection relay. Firstly, the operating time and time multiplier setting (TMS)
for the furthest relay from the source have to be determined. The smallest available TMS in
the relay has to be selected if there are many relays in series to be coordinated (for example for
REF 615 ABB relay, TMS=0.05 can be used). Then, if the tn , TMSn , In , Ipn are the downstream
relay’s operating time, time multiplier setting, maximum fault current and peak up current
respectively, the operating time of the of this relay can be calculated by modifying the equations
in Table 2.1 as follow:
43
0.14
t n = TMSn ∗ (2.5)
I 0.02
(I n ) −1
pn
If fixed grading margin is selected for the coordination, which is about 200 ms for the modern
IEDs, the time multiplier setting of the immediate upstream relay can be calculated as in
equation (2.6).
t n + 0.2
TMSn+1 = (2.6)
0.14
0.02
I
(I n ) −1
p_n+1
0.14
t n+1 = TMSn+1 ∗ (2.7)
In+1 0.02
(I ) −1
pn +1
Where: In is the fault current for the downstream relay; In+1 is the fault current for the upstream
relay. Ip_n+1 the pickup current for the upstream relay; TMSn+1 is the time multiplier setting for
the upstream relay. In similar way, the operating time for the upstream relay is calculated as
shown in equation (2.7).
Table 2.9 Typical relay timing errors – Standard IDMT Relay
Relay Technology
Times
Electro-Mechanical Static Digital Numerical
Typical basic timing error (%) 7.5 5 5 5
Overshoot time(s) 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.02
Safety margin(s) 0.10 0.05 0.03 0.03
Typical overall grading 0.40 0.35 0.30 0.30

margin-relay to relay(s)
In the SKS when the maximum fault current occurs at the load terminal, the MV feeders’ relays
which are nearer to the source than the load feeders’ relays have to let 0.5 seconds gap for the
load feeders’ relay to operate. By following the above procedures (equations 2.5-2.7), this
corresponds to TMS of 0.3. The pickup currents are selected as 1.1 times the maximum load
44
currents. By using equations (2.5) to (2.7) the time multiplier setting for the all the relays are
determined and summarized in Table 2.10.
Table 2.10 Setting results for MV protection relays
Feeders Function Pickup TMS Curve Time In

Current
(IEC) (s)
H03/ Pota Furnace, 51 0.6 x In 0.3 normal 400/1

33 kV
50 4.9 x In definite Time 0.05 400/1
50N 0.1 x In definite Time 0.5 400/1
H04/ Transformer, 51 0.9 x In 0.36 normal 3000/1

33 kV
50 4 x In definite time 0.05 3000/1
50N 0.05 x In definite time 1 3000/1
H05/ ARC Furnace, 51 0.46 x In 0.3 normal 3000/1
33 kV
50 2 x In definite time 0.05 3000/1
50N 0.03 x In definite time 0.5 3000/1
H06/ TCR AND 2nd 51 0.6 x In 0.3 normal 3000/1

HF, 33 kV
50 2.5 x In definite Time 0.05 3000/1
H07/ 3rd and 4th 51 0.77 x In 0.3 normal 3000/1

HF, 33 kV
50 3.4 x In definite time 0.05 3000/1
Transformer 154 kV 51 0.77 x In 0.45 normal 800/1
50 3.5 - definite time 0.05 800/1
45
In Table 2.10, the pickup settings are normalized with ratio of current transformer primary
currents. The coordination curve is shown in Figure 2.7. The curves show proper coordination
between the relays, for example the upstream relays (154 kV transformer feeder protection)
operates only after the MV feeder protection fails to operate for the fault happening on MV
side.
In addition to the time inverse, short circuit protection is done by definite time function (50).
The current setting is selected so that it is below the minimum short circuit current and above
the load current.
Figure 2.7 SKS relays coordination curve
Earth fault is the most frequent of all faults. Its protection is provided by the relay which
responds to residual current. The earth fault relay measure the residual current by using current
transformer. In addition, the residual currents can be calculated by using phase currents
measured by the relay. In normal condition for the balanced network, the vector sum of phase
46
currents or voltage is equal to zero. When earth fault happens, the vector sum of this voltage
and current is no ore zero. The load current must not affect the relay that is used for the earth
fault protection. The earth fault current can be limited in magnitude by the neutral earthing
impedance, or by earth contact resistance. To account this low level current, earth fault relay is
set to 20%-40% of full-load current or minimum earth fault current on the part of the system
being protected [51].
To prevent the over voltage due to high fault current, the LV voltage system earthing is not
done through impedance [42], [45], [46]. In contrast the HV systems can be earthed through
impedance to limit the fault current. The impedance grounding or the ground itself may cause
the current insufficient to operate the normal protection system. Core balance current
transformer (CBCT) was used, in electromechanical relays to detect such small current.
However, the currently used numerical relays can detect this fault currents.
Directional earth fault overcurrent may need to be applied in the following situations [51], [52]:
 for earth fault protection where the overcurrent protection is done by directional relays
 in insulated-earth networks
 in Petersen coil earthed networks
 where the sensitivity of sensitive earth fault protection is insufficient
 use of a directional earth fault relay may provide greater sensitivity
The nature of zero sequence currents which are produced during earth fault are influenced by
the Method of earthing [42], [54]. Thus, zero sequence currents and voltages which are utilized
for the earth fault detection depend the following points:
 a system connection to earth at two or more points

 a potential difference between the earth points resulting in a current flow in the earth paths
In the following sections the effect of the type of earthing on the earth fault protection and the
techniques to be used for detecting earth fault will be discussed.
47
In the insulated network there is no earth fault current pass, so the whole system may remain
operational under earth fault condition[42], [54]. The system must be designed to withstand the
high transient and steady-state overvoltage. The disadvantage of such network is the difficulty
of detecting earth fault current. In modern relays the following methods are available.
Residual Voltage Method
The healthy phase voltages magnitude increases by a factor of √3 and their sum is no longer
zero during occurrence of single phase-earth fault [42]. Consequently, the earth fault can be
detected by the residual voltage element. The advantage of this method is that no CTs are
required and only the voltage is being measured. But, if the unbalanced voltage occurs on the
whole affected system, it is difficult to provide any discrimination.
Sensitive Earth Fault Method
This method is based on the detection of imbalance in the per-phase charging currents [42]. It
is mostly used in MV networks.
Vaf
Restrain
Vapf
IR1
Ib1
Operate
Ia1
Vbf
Vcp f
Vbpf
Vres=-3Vo
An RCA setting of +90 degree shifts the

IR3= -(IH1+IH2)
center of the characteristic to here
Figure 2.8 Phasor diagram for insulated system with C phase-earth fault [42]
48
According to this fault detection mechanism, the relays on the healthy feeders see the unbalance
in charging currents for their own feeders (for example, IH1 for feeder-1 of Figure 2.9 or IH2 for
feeder-2 for of Figure 2.9). In contrast, the relay in the faulted feeder sees the charging currents
in the rest of the system, with the current of its’ own feeders cancelled out (IH1+IH2 for feeder-
3 of Figure 2.9).
Ia1
Ib1
-jXc1
IR1
IH1
Ia2
Ib2
-jXc2
IR2
IH2
Ia3
Ib 3
IH1+IH2+IH3
-jXc3
IR3
IR3=IH1+IH2+IH3-IH3
= IH1+IH2 IH3
IH1+IH2
Figure 2.9 Current distribution in an insulated system with a C phase–earth fault [42]
In the insulated network due to the capacitive effect, the unbalance current on the healthy
feeders lags the residual voltage by 90º as shown in Figure 2.9.
 Due to the fault, the phase-earth voltage and consequently the charging current rises by
√3 .The resulting residual current will be three times the steady-state charging current per
phase. Thus, the relay setting has to lie between one and three times the per-phase charging
current.
 Using the advantage of opposite current flow direction between the residual currents on
the healthy and faulted feeders directional earth fault relay can provide the discrimination
required.
49
 To make the residual current seen by the relay lie within the operate zone, the residual
voltage which is used as the polarizing quantity is shifted by 90o (RCA required is 90o) as
shown on Figure 2.8. This insures the residual currents on the healthy feeders lie within
the ‘restrain’ region.
Earth Fault Protection on Petersen Coil Earthed Networks
In the Petersen coil earthed systems, reactance which is nominally equal to the system
capacitance to earth, is used to earth the system [42], [54]. In this case, similar to insulated
system, no earth fault current is resulted when a single phase earth fault occurs under steady
state conditions [42].
Source
-IB
-IC
-Vab/jXC -Vac/jXC
=-IB =-IC
IL=Van/jXL
If
Peterson Coil -jXc -jXc -jXc
If=-IB-IC+Van/jXL=0
jXL If Van/jXL=IB+IC
-IB IL
A
-IC
Vac Vab
N
B
Current Vector for A Phase Fault
Figure 2.10 Earth fault in petersen coil earthed system [42]
50
Van
If = −IB − IC + (2.8)
jXL
Van
0 = −IB − IC + (2.9)
jXL
Van
= IB + IC (2.10)
jXL
IL = IH1 + IH2 + IH3 + IF (2.11)
IR3 = IH3 + IF
By using equation (2.11), (2.12) and Figure 2.10.
IR3 = IL − IH1 − IH2 (2.12)
Where: Van, Vab and Vac are the voltages between phase-A to ground, phase-A to phase-B and
phase-A to phase-C respectively; If is fault current; IB and IC are phase B and phase C currents.
Ia1
Ib1
-jXc1
IR1
IH1
Ia2
IL
Ib2
jXL
-jXc2
IR2
IH2
Ia 3
Ib3
IC3=IF
-jXc3
IR3
IF
IL=IF+IH1+IH2-IH3
IH3
IL IH1+IH2
Figure 2.11 Distribution of currents during a C-phase-earth fault on radial distribution system
[42]
CBCT is used to measure, the unbalance currents seen on the healthy feeders. Considering
Figure 2.11, the magnitude of the residual current IR1 is equal to three times the steady-state
51
charging current per phase. In contrast the residual current on the faulted feeder is equal to IL -
IH1 - IH2. For the residual voltage (Vres) polarization, the residual current is phase shifted by an
angle less than 90o on the faulted feeder and greater than 90o on the healthy feeders due to
presence of resistance effect.
If directional relay with RCA of 0o is used, the healthy feeder residual current will fall in the
‘restrain’ area of the relay characteristic while the faulted feeder residual current falls in the
‘operate’ area as shown in Figure 2.12. To ensure a measurable earth fault current and increase
the angular difference between the residual signals, a resistance can be inserted in parallel with
the Petersen Coil. This aids relay application. Sensitive earth fault and zero sequence wattmetric
[42] are the two commonly used protection elements that can be applied.
(IH1+IH2+IH3)’
A Vo
IL’
N
C B
a) Capacitive and Inductive currents
with resistive components
IL Zero torque line for 0o RCA
Restrain
Operate
-IH1-IH2
IR1=IH1
IR3
IR3=IF+IH3
=IL-IH1-IH2
Vres=-3Vo Vres=-3Vo
Restrain
Zero torque line for 0o RCA Operate
b) Unfaulted line c) Faulted line
Figure 2.12 C phase-earth fault in Petersen coil earthed network: practical case with resistance
present in XL [42]
Sensitive Earth Fault Protection
In sensitive earth fault protection, the current measurement settings are set to very low values
(0.5% of rated current) and a RCA of 0o are used [42]. The setting value is the per-phase
52
charging current of the circuit being protected. But, low levels of steady-state earth fault current
will flow and increase the residual current seen by the relay due to imperfection of the
compensation by the Petersen Coil. Thus fine tuning of the RCA is also required about the 0 o
setting, to compensate for the coil resistances, feeder resistances and the performance of the CT
used.
Sensitive Wattmetric Protection
Figure 2.13 shows a small angular difference between the spill current on the healthy and
faulted feeders. This angular difference gives rise to active components of current which are in
antiphase to each other.
Vres=-3Vo
Active Component of residual

current faulted feeder IR3 -IH1-IH2 Operate
IL
IR1
Active Component of residual
current healthy feeder Zero torque line for 0o RCA Restrain
Figure 2.13 Resistive components of spill current [42]
The detection of Wattmetric power in the forward direction indicates a fault on that feeder,
while a power in the reverse direction indicates a fault elsewhere on the system. Wattmetric
power is calculated in practice using residual quantities instead of zero sequence ones. The
resulting values are therefore nine times the zero sequence quantities as the residual values of
current and voltage are each three times the corresponding zero sequence values. The equation
used is [42]:
Vres ∗ Ires ∗ cos(∅ − ∅c ) = 9 ∗ Vo ∗ Io ∗ cos(∅ − ∅c ) (2.13)
53
Where: Vres = residual voltage, Ires = residual current,VO = zero sequence voltage, IO = zero
sequence current, ø= angle between Vres and Ires, øc=relay characteristic angle setting, the
current and RCA settings are as for a sensitive earth fault relay.
It was already mentioned that the method of system earthing also affects the Relay
Characteristic Angle (RCA). In the practical applications, there are varieties of grounding
systems. The corresponding the RCA values to be used for such systems are listed as follow:
 Resistance-earthed system: 0o RCA

 Distribution system, solidly-earthed: -45o RCA
 Transmission system, solidly-earthed: -60o RCA
In the SKS the ground fault protection is provided by instantaneous earth fault protection
function (50N). The relay used is REF 615 overcurrent protection. The setting is selected by
considering the maximum unbalance current which is about 20% of the load current. Based on
single line diagram of Figure 2.4 the earth fault protection current and time settings are given
in Table 2.11 and the corresponding characteristic curves are shown on Figure 2.14.
Table 2.11 Earth fault protection setting for the SKS.
H03/ POTA FURNACE 33 kV
Function Pickup Current TMS Curve Time Delay(Second) In
50N 0.1 x In Definite Time 0.5 400/1
H04/ TRANSFORMER FEEDER 33 kV
50N 0.05 x In Definite Time 1 3000/1
H05/ ARC FURNACE 33 kV
H06/ TCR AND 2nd HF 33 kV
54
Table 2.11 cont’d
H07/ 3rd and 4th HF 33 kV
TRANSFORMER FEEDER 154 kV
50N - - - - -
Figure 2.14 Ground fault protection coordination curve
55
Differential protection is based on the difference of the current entering and leaving the region
to be protected [54]. It depends on well-known Kirchhoff Current Law which states that the
sum of the current at a node equals to zero. In principle the differential relay must not trip under
normal operating conditions and for the fault outside its zone of protection. However, due to
current transformer accuracy error, the relay may trip for the through-fault conditions. Through-
fault conditions are the faults which are outside the region to be protected. So there must be
method to make the relay more sensitive for current differences at low current levels and secure
at high current levels. The most common solution is to use the percentage differential
characteristics. The absolute differential current is plotted on the y-axis and the restraining
current will be plotted on the x-axis as shown on Figure 2.15. The percentage differential curve
can be with single or dual slope. The curve shown in Figure 2.15 is dual slope curve.
Figure 2.15 Dual slope bias technique
For the bias technique shown in the Figure 2.15 the trip criterion can be defined as [42]:
56
|Idiff | > k1 |Ibias | + Is1 (2.14)
for |Ibias | < Is2
|Idiff | > k 2 |Ibias | − (k 2 − k1 )Is2 + Is1 (2.15)
for |Ibias | > Is2
Where: Idiff is the differential current; Ibias is the bias current; k1 is the percentage bias curve for
slope-1 and k2 is the percentage bias for slope-2.
Thus, the setting of differential relay involves determining the low operate condition (Is1), the
percentage bias curve slopes (k1 and k2), the restraining methods and the high operate
conditions.
The common restraining current calculation methods are sum of, scaled sum of and geometric
average which are given as follow [42], [55]:
Sum of: IR = |I1 | + |I2 | + ⋯ + |In | (2.15)
1
Scaled Sum of: IR = n (|I1 | + |I2 | + ⋯ + |In |) (2.16)
n
Geometric Average: IR = √|I1 | ∗ |I2 | ∗ … ∗ |In | (2.17)
The maximu of ∶ IR = max(|I1 | + |I2 | + ⋯ + |In |) (2.18)
Where: I1, I2... In are input currents to the relay. These methods are used by different relay
vendors and there is no any significant advantage of one of these methods over the other.
Percentage bias k1
To determine the slope of the percentage differential curve, the CT error has to be drawn on the
curve [42]. For example, if each CT has an error of +/-10%, by considering +10% error for the
CT on one side of the unit to be protected and -10% error for the CT on the other side of unit
to be protected, the slope of 20 % percent has to be drawn on the curve as shown in Figure 2.16
57
(percentage bias k1). As shown on the Figure 2.16, any region above the slope is an operate
region.
Percentage bias k2
When CT saturation occurs there is the possibility of false tripping as the current may fall into
operate region for through-faults [42]. To overcome this problem, steeper slope (k2) is used
after preprogramed breakpoint (maximum overload operating current, Is2). The resulting shape
is known as dual slope percent differential characteristics as shown on Figure 2.16. Slope-2 is
determined by determining the CT saturation from maximum fault current. The slope-2 is set
in such away the relay will not operate under CT saturation conditions.
Low Operate Conditions
Finally system errors are used to set the low operate condition not to operate under extreme
light load conditions. The system error includes cumulative error of CTs and the analog to
digital converters. This can be determined from the difference of actual current and the current
read by the relay. In addition, for the underground cable protection, the capacitive charging
current has to be considered for determining the low operate condition.
To make the relay not operate from the effects of line charging current, the setting of low
operate condition must be at least 2.5 times the steady-state charging current [53]. On a real and
healthy line, the differential current is equal to the capacitive load current of the line (IC).
ULL
Idiff = Ic = 2 ∗ π ∗ f ∗ C ∗ (2.19)
√3
Where: C is neutral line capacitance per [μF/km]; l = line length [km]; f = signal frequency
[Hz]; ULL = Line-Line voltage [V]
If the capacitive charging current is very large and hence the low operate condition needs to be
set to a very high value. To avoid this, facility of deducing the charging current from the
measured value is provided in some relays.
Phase –segregated current differential is used in digital or numerical relays where the currents
are compared on per phase base at each relay. Fiber optic communication is used to exchange
the pilot currents between the relays.
58
When the differential protection is used for the protection of the power transformer, the
transformation ratio, transformer vector grouping, transformer tap changer and magnetizing
inrush currents have to be considered [53].
The magnitudes of the currents on the primary and secondary sides of transformer are inversely
proportional to its turn ratio. In addition, the vector group creates phase difference between the
primary and secondary currents which has to be handled by phase correction. Depending on the
position of the tap changer, the magnitude of the primary and secondary currents will vary. Due
to this fact, the mean tap position should be taken for the calculations.
The ABB RED 615 differential relay is used for the protection of the power transformer in the
SKS. The single line of the SKS is shown in Figure 2.4 for the reference purpose. As shown in
Figure 2.4, the transformer is connected to the transformer protection cubicle by 34.5 kV XLPE
underground cable. Since the length of the cable is 50 m, the effect of charging current can be
neglected for this feeder. By considering the maximum unbalanced load current, the low operate
setting of 20% can be used.
CT Ratio Correction
Furthermore, the current transformer ratios at the two ends of the transformer are not the same.
Thus, for RED 615 relay, CTs ratio correction has to be applied as follow [54]:
1. The current on the 154 kV side of the transformer can be calculated as:
150 MVA
I154 kV = = 562.35 A (2.20)
154 kV ∗ √3
The 154 kV side current transformer ratio is 800/1. Thus, the correction ratio for 154 kV side
CT can be calculated as:
800
= 1.4226 (2.21)
562.35
2. Similarly on the 34.5 kV , the load current is given by:

150 MVA
I34 kV = = 2510.29 A (2.22)
34.5 kV ∗ √3
The MV side current transformer ratio is 3000/1. The correction factor is given by:
59
3000
= 1.195 (2.23)
2510.29
Inrush Detector
During initialization of the transformer, the inrush current flows and this current may reach
more than 10 times of the full load current. This current occurs on the source or primary side
of the transformer causing unbalance to the differential relay. Second harmonic detection
method is used to block the mal-operation of the differential relay due to inrush current. In
modern transformer differential relays or blocking for other harmonics like for example the 5th
are also provided.
Zero Sequence Current Filtering
Differential protection will see zero sequence current for an external fault, if earthing
transformer or earthed transformer winding is available within the zone of protection. This may
result in incorrect operation of the differential relay [54]. Due to this fact, zero sequence current
filtering is necessary.
I_diff
High operate stage
High Operate
Value
Slope
Section-3
Low op erate
stage
Slope
Section-2
Low Op erate Non-operate

Value stage
End End I_bias

Section-1 Section-2
Figure 2.16 Operating characteristics of the differential protection [43]
60
Generally, selectable software for zero sequence filter is typically employed in a digital or
numerical relay
The relay percentage differential curve is also shown in the Figure 2.16. Based on the above
discussions and engineering practices the values of the setting are determined and summarized
for the RED 615 as shown in Table 2.12.
Table 2.12 The Parameters for RED 615
Parameter Value
High Operate Value (%Ir) 600
Low Operate Value (%Ir) 20
Slope Section-1 (%) 30
End of Section-1 (%) 150
Slope of Section-3 (%) 60
Start Value 2.H 15
Start Value 5.H 35
The impedance of the line is proportional to length of the line. Consequently, by measuring the
impedance till the reach point (predetermined point), fault protection can be provided. This is
achieved by dividing the voltage at the relay point with the fault current and comparing it with
apparent impedance of the reach point. The advantage of distance protection is its independence
from the variation of source impedance.
The performance of distance protection is based on the accuracy of reach and the operating
time. The reach accuracy is factor of the level of the voltage presented to the relay and the
method used to measure the impedance. In addition, the impedances actually measured by a
distance relay depend on the type of the fault, the fault impedance of the loop being measured,
the fault resistance, the symmetry of line impedance and the circuit configuration (single,
double or multi-terminal circuit). Furthermore, the angle is also important in order to
61
incorporate directional selectivity in distance protection. For the lines with 150 kV and above
typical positive sequence, Z1 angle varies from 75o to 80o.
Phase relay and ground relay are the two major categories of distance relay. There are 10 types
of shunt faults against which a system has to be protected. These are [55]:
1. 3-phase fault -1
2. L-L faults -3
3. S-L-G faults- 3
4. L-L-G faults -3
Consider three phase balanced transmission line as shown on Figure 2.17.
Ia
Va Zs V’a
Zm
Ib
Vb Zs V’b
Zm
Ic
Vc Zs V’c
Figure 2.17 A balanced transmission system [55]
The sequence current, impedance and the voltage of this transmission line can be expressed as
follow [55].
I0 1 1 1 1 Ia
[I1 ] = [1 a a2 ] [Ib ] (2.24)
3
I2 1 a2 a Ic
Z0 1 2
[Z1 ] = [Zs Z m ] [1 −1] (2.25)
Z2 1 −1
62
∆V0 I0
[∆V1 ] = [Z0 Z1 Z2 ] [I1 ] (2.26)
∆V2 I2
A fundamental requirement of distance relaying is that the relay input voltages and currents
have to be configured in such a way that for any type of bolted fault (Zf = 0), the apparent
impedance seen by relay is given by xZ1.
Phase Relay Configuration
x 1-x
Ia
Vn Z1 V’a
Ib
Z1 V’b
Ic
Z1 V’c
R F R
Figure 2.18 Three phase to the ground bolted fault
By using equations (2.24)-(2.26) and Figure 2.18, it can be proved that [55].
Va Vb Vc V1
= = = = xZ1 (2.27)
Ia Ib Ic I1
Thus, a relay monitoring line current and phase voltages can locate fault by using equation
(2.27). From equation (2.27), it can be observed that when fault occurs the current magnitude
increases and the voltage decreases, this reduces the impedance. But under normal condition
the impedance is high. This is used to locate the fault easily. Alternatively, for a relay
monitoring phase-to-phase voltage and the difference of phase currents, equation (2.27) can be
extended as [55]:
63
Va − Vb Vb − Vc Vc − Va V1
= = = = xZ1 (2.28)
Ia − Ib Ib − Ic Ic − Ia I1
Traditionally the relay configured as in equation (2.28) can also locate phase to phase faults. In
addition, the distance to the fault is given by:
Zapp
x= ∗l (2.29)
Z1
Where, l is length of line and Zapp is the impedance seen by the relay.
Ground Relay Configuration
Different input configuration from phase fault relays (3-phase and L-L) is required for the
traditional ground fault relays [53]. The configurations are given in equation (18).
Va Vb Vb
xZ1 = , xZ1 = , xZ1 = (2.30)
Ia + mI0 Ib + mI0 Ib + mI0
Z0 −Z1 Ia
Where,m = , I0 =
Z1 3
Thus, the relays configured for equations (2.28) and (2.30) can detect all the 10 faults (3-phase
fault, L-L faults, S-L-G faults, L-L-G faults).
Equations (2.27)-(2.30) are based on the assumption of balanced bolted fault condition.
Furthermore, the effects of infeed and outfeed are not considered. In the practical situation this
assumptions are not valid. If we take Figure 2.19 as an example, the impedance of the relay R1
for the fault at F is not equal to Z1+xZ2 due to the remote infeed. If remote infeed is considered,
the impedance seen by relay R1 can be derived as follow [53], [55].
IBC = IED + IAB (2.31)
VR1 = IAB ∗ Z1 + (IED + IAB ) ∗ xZ2 (2.32)
VR1 IED
ZR1 = = Z1 + xZ2 + ∗ xZ2 (2.33)
IAB IAB
64
xZ2 (1-x)Z2
B C
Z1
IBC F
A IAB
R1
Z1
D IED E
(a)
xZ2 (1-x)Z2
B C
F Z1
IBC
A IAB
R1
Z1
D IED E
(b)
Figure 2.19 (a) Infeed (b) Outfeed Effect
Infeed effect is shown in Figure 2.19(a) and the relay R1 sees an equivalent increase in apparent
impedance as proved by equations (2.31-2.33). The relay observes fault the shifted from its
actual location. For example the fault which happened in zone-2 may be shifted to zone-3. This
compromises the selectivity of zone-2. However, due to the infeed effect the fault location as
observed to the relay will not be shifted to zon-1 and does not compromise selectivity of zone-
1. Consider Figure 2.19(b) where the generator G2 is replaced by the load, then:
IBC = IAB − IED (2.34)
65
VR1 IED
ZR1 = = Z1 + xZ2 − ∗ xZ2 (2.35)
IAB IAB
Equation (2.35) shows the impedance decrease due to outfeed. In other words, the fault
perceived by relay R1 is closer than its actual location. This may cause the instantaneous
operation of the relay R1 for the fault occurring on the backup line, thereby compromising
selectivity of zone-1. Due to this fact, zone (Z1) of distance relay is always set below 100% line
impedance.
The fault angle affects the impedance reach of the relay. At the system operating frequency, the
relative values of transmission line’s resistance (R) and inductance (X) will determine the fault
angle. The transmission line fault may involve arc or an earth fault involving additional
resistance due to the fault through vegetation or tower footing resistance. Due to this condition
of the fault, the value of the resistive component of the fault impedance may increase changing
the impedance angle. Thus, if the characteristic angle of the relay is set to the line angle, the
relay will under-reach under resistive fault conditions. In order to avoid the under-reach and
accept a small amount of fault resistance, in some cases the relay characteristic angle (RCA) is
set less than the line angle. However, while setting the relay, the difference between the relay
characteristic angle Ø and the line angle θ must be known. This is used to calculate the new
reach as follow [42]:
AB
AQ = (2.36)
Cos(∅ − θ)
Where: AQ is the relay impedance setting; AB is the impedance of protected line; PQ is arc
resistance as shown on Figure 2.20.
In addition, the arc resistance can be calculated by the following empirical formula [42].
28.710
Ra = L (2.37)
I1.4
Ra = arc resistance (ohms), L = length of arc (meters), I = arc-current (A)
66
X
B
Q
A R
Figure 2.20 Increased arc resistance coverage [53]
The impedance seen by the relay can be expressed in terms of the apparent power and the
voltage as follow [55]:
V2
ZR = (2.38)
S
The impedance seen by the relay is directly proportional to the square of the voltage and
inversely proportional to the apparent power. During peak load conditions the voltage will drop
and the apparent power increases as well. This results in the decrease of the impedance seen by
the relay. If the impedance seen by relay within the zones of protection due to large loads
decreases, then the relay will trip the circuit breaker. Under such circumstances, the relay is
said to trip on load encroachment. Tripping on load encroachment can even initiate cascaded
tripping and compromises security. This may even lead to blackouts.
67
It is necessary to prevent the wrong operation of relay for load encroachment. Most of the time,
loads have large power factor and this leads to large R/X ratio while faults are more or less
reactive in nature and the ratio X/R is quite high. This feature can be used to identify the load
encroachment condition. During relay setting, its characteristic can be modified by excluding
the area in R–X plane, which corresponds to high power factor.
It is not desired for distance relay to operate under power swing conditions whether the swing
is stable or not [55]. The distance relays mostly equipped with swing detection and blocking
mechanisms.
Z3
Z2
Modified part for load

Z1 B enchroachment
A R
«
Figure 2.21 Relay characteristic modification for the load encroachment.
The idea behind detecting a power swing is that the change in apparent impedance seen by relay
due to fault occurrence is faster than the change in impedance due to power swing.
68
The change in impedance during swing is a slow process due to inertia of the generators. Thus,
this time discrimination can be used to distinguish swings from faults. The detailed discussion
on the topic is available in [55].
For the selective clearing of faults on the transmission lines, zones are defined in the distance
relaying [42], [55]. The zones of protection in distance relaying can be impedance, admittance
(mho), reactance or resistive as shown on Figure 2.22.
The zones of protection can be programmed to operate in the forward (looking into the line) or
reverse direction (looking out of the line).
Impedance zone (blue circle on Figure 2.22) of protection is the circle with center at the origin.
The radius is the reach of the distance relay. It is non-directional and mostly used for the
generator backup protection.
X
Reactance
Admittance
Impedance Resistance
Tripzodal R
Figure 2.22 Zones of protection in distance relaying
69
Reactance zone (pink horizontal line on Figure 2.22) is used when the impedance of the fault
has very high resistive component which indicates that there is a load on the transmission line
and the fault is most likely not on the transmission line but on the load.
Resistance zone (green vertical line on Figure 2.22) is used when the fault impedance contains
very high reactance component which indicates the availability of little load on the transmission
line.
The admittance zone (read circle on Figure 2.22) is commonly used in the protection relays and
it is inherently directional.
Most modern numerical relays allows the user to modify the shape to suit their application.
These zones serve different functions like for example to exclude the fault on the load lenticular
shape is used; to selectively isolate the fault occurring near to the location of measurement and
not to operate for the fault behind the location of measurement expansion element is used, etc.
[53].
All the schemes used in distance protection falls either in pilot aided schemes or non-pilot aided
schemes [55], [56]. The distance relays which are used in pilot aided schemes communicate
with each other to determine the fault. The relays in non-pilot schemes do not communicate
with each other rather they use time delay and other forms of coordination to operate selectively.
Non-Pilot Aided Schemes
There are two types of non-pilot aided schemes. These are stepped protection schemes and
zone-1 extension protection schemes.
Stepped Distance Schemes
This scheme is considered as the fundamental for other protection schemes. It consists of four
zones of protection [56].
The first zone of protection (zone-1) is under reaching which protects 80-90% of the first
transmission line. This zone is also set without time delay. Therefore, if the fault occurs on the
first line the distance relay must be sure that the fault is on the transmission line and operate
without time delay. Due to CTs/ PTs accuracy limit, inaccurate line impedance data and
70
assumptions while deriving equations for the relay, zone-1 do not protect the last 10-20% of
the line which is known as end zone [56].
Sufficient margin to account for non-zero fault impedance and other errors in relaying is
provided by zon-2 and zone-3. The zone-2 is also known as overreaching. For the primary
positive sequence (ZP) and the shortest back up impedance (ZB) of the line, zone-2 is set to reach
ZP + 0.5 ZB. For the too short back up line, then it is likely that ZP + 0.5ZB will be less than 1.2ZP.
In such a case, zone-2 is set to 1.2ZP. But, it must not overlap with zone-2 of backup line if the
zone-2 of first line is extended above the 50% of the shortest backup line. If the overlapping is
unavoidable, other schemes like pilots schemes are used. The time delay for zone-2 is from 0.25
– 0.4 second. Zone-1 and zone-2 has the capability of protecting the entire length of the
transmission line. Zone-3 is set to about 220% of the protected line if line-1 and line-2 have the
same impedance or it can be set to the longest of the lines connected to the first line. The time
delay of 1 second can be used for zone-3. Zone-4 is used as the back protection of adjacent
transmission lines in the reverse direction and it must allow zon-1 and zone-2 of the first line
to operate first. Thus, it is usually set 20%-40 % of the impedance with time delay ranging from
0.75-1 second.
Zone-1 Extension
This protection scheme is the enhancement of the stepped distance schemes for transient nature
of the faults. For example, during the lighting strike of the transmission line, due to ionization
of the air, the resistance between different phases of the line reduces causing fault current to
flow. If the circuit breaker opens the line, the fault will be cleared, the ionized air will be
removed creating no more pass for the current to flow. When the circuit breaker is closed the
transmission line will resume its normal operation. The difference of the stepped scheme and
the zone-1 extension scheme is that, in the zone-1 extension scheme as shown in Figure 2.23,
the zone- 1 setting will be increased to over reach about 120% of the protected line.
During first occurrence of the fault according to zone-1 extension scheme, the relay will trip
and clear the fault even if it is in the adjacent line. If the fault was transient, this will remove
the fault and the transmission line will resume its normal operation. The relay will then
immediately adjusts itself to the stepped scheme. If the fault is permanent, the relay will clear
the fault by using its zon-1 and zone-2 of its stepped schemes based on the location of the fault
on the transmission.
71
Z2=120%
Z1=80-90% Setting re-adjusted after Z1 X operated
A Line-1 B Line-2 C
F
Z1 X=120% Z1 X operate first to clear the fault
Figure 2.23 Zone-1 extension schemes
When the auto-reclosing duration is expired the distance relay will switch again to the zone-1
extension scheme.
Pilot Aided Schemes
Z2=120%
Z1=80-90%
Communication pass
A B
R1 R2
F
Z1=80-90%
Figure 2.24 Pilot aided protection schemes
When the fault happens at the middle of the transmission line, the relays at the two end of the
line will automatically clear the fault with their zone-1 protection. But if the fault happens at
one end of the line, the relay near to the fault trips with zone-1(R2 on Figure 2.24) while the
relay on the other side trips with zone-2 (R1 on Figure 2.24). The fault current from the non-
tripping side of the transmission line will continue (from R1 side till zone-2 operates).
The pilot schemes are devised to improve the performance of stepped schemes especially for
the faults occurring at the terminals of the transmission lines. So there must be a communication
pass as shown on Figure 2.24 between the relays at the two ends of the line in order to exchange
information about the occurrence of the fault. Direct Under-Reaching Transfer Trip (DUTT),
Permissive Under-Reaching Transfer Trip (PUTT), Direct Over-Reaching Transfer Trip
(POTT) and Hybrid Permissive Over-Reaching Transfer Trip (HYBRID POTT) are the most
common types of pilot schemes. The discussion on these pilot schemes are available in [42].
72
In order to determine the minimum line length to be used in distance protection the following
checking has to be done [42]:
1. the voltage sensitivity of the relay for fault in the zone-1 for the minimum length of the
line must be sufficient enough,
2. the zone-1 ohmic resistance of the fault referred to the secondary side quantities of the
CTs and VTs has to fall in the impedance range of the relay and
3. the appropriate earth fault loop impedance has to be used for the earth faults.
The SKS is connected by two transmission lines to the rest of TEİAŞ network. One transmission
line is going towards the GEBZE organized industrial zone substation and the other is going
towards ÇOLAKOĞLU substations as shown in Figure 2.25. MiCOMho P443 distance
protection relay is used in this project.
Z4
Z3
Z2
Z1
Diliskelesi GEBZE OSB Çolakoğlu Dilovası

L4 L0 L1 L2
Kroman Çelik
Sıddık Kardeşler
L3
(a)
Z4
Z3
Z2
Z1
Diliskelesi GEBZE OSB Çolakoğlu Dilovası
L4 L0 L1 L2
Kroman Çelik
Sıddık Kardeşler
L3
(b)
Figure 2.25 (a) Protection coordination towards Kroman Çelik (b) Protection coordination
towards the diliskelesi
73
Figure 2.25 (a) shows the protection for L1 is provided by zone-1. In addition zone-2 and zone-
3 gives additional protection to other regions besides their backup protection to L1. Zon-4 gives
backup protection to L0 in the reverse direction.
Table 2.13 Zero and positive sequence impedance of the lines
Line Length(km) Z0 Z1
L0 13,094 1,092+j5,035 3,822+j17.23
L1 3,7330 1,090+j4,912 0,311+j1,436
L2 2,0100 0,500+j2,600 0,100+j0,800
L3 21,584 6,300+j28.400 1,800+j8,300
L4 11,000 3,200+j14.500 0,900+j4,200
Similarly for Figure 2.25 (b), L0 is primarily protected by zone-1. Additionally zone-2 and zone-
3 provides backup protection to other transmission line.
In the following section the settings are calculated as follow for the arrangement of Figure 2.25
and MiCOMho P443 distance protection relay.
Protection Coordination towards Kroman Çelik
Line Impedance
The positive and zero sequence impedances for lines shown on Figure 2.25 are given in Table
2.13:
Residual Compensation
Based on the discussion in section 2.4.1.2, the zero sequence and positive sequence impedances
seen by the relay are different when the earth fault occurs. Hence, the earth fault reach of the
relay requires zero sequence compensation as follow:
1 Z0 1 5.031 < 77.50

k = ( − 1) = ( − 1)
3 Z1 3 1.469 < 77.80
k = 0.808 < −0.40
74
Zone-1 Phase Reach
The required Zone-1 reach is 85% of the line impedance:
Z1 = 0.85 ∗ 1.469 < 77.80
Z1 = 1.249 < 77.80
Zone-2 Phase Reach
The required reach for zone-2 is the protected line plus 50% of the next line.
Z2 = 1.469 < 77.80 + 0.5 ∗ 0.806 < 82.90
= 1.871 < 78.90
Zone-3 Phase Reach
The required reach for zone-3 is the protected line plus 100% of the next longest line.
Z3 = 1.469 < 77.80 + 8.493 < 77.80
= 9.962 < 77.80
Zone-4 Phase Reach
The required reach is 20 % of the next transmission line which is found in the reverse direction.
Z4 = 1.03 < 77.80
Zone Time Delay Settings
The time delay for each zone can be assigned as follow:
TZ1 = 0 ms, TZ2 = 400 ms,
TZ3 = 800 ms, TZ4 = 2000 ms
Phase Fault Resistive Reach Settings
The resistive reach settings for each zone can be set independently of the impedance reach
settings while using the quadrilateral characteristic. The maximum amount of additional fault
resistance for which a zone will trip regardless of the fault within the zone is represented by
75
resistive reach setting. The following constraints have to be imposed upon resistive reach
settings:
 It must be greater than the maximum expected phase-phase fault resistance (principally that
of the fault arc). The length of the arc can be assumed as 1.5 times the conductor spacing
and the minimum arc current is 1 kA [42]. The arc impedance (Ra), can be calculated by
empirical formula in equation (25) as follow.
28707
Ra = ∗ 7 = 13 Ω
10001.4
 If load encroachment is not applied, it must be less than the apparent resistance measured
due to the heaviest load on the line [42]. For the maximum load current of 800 A, the
resistance due to maximum load (RHL) can be calculated as:
154 kV
R HL = = 111 Ω
√3 ∗ 800
Consequently, the fault resistive reach setting can be selected as:
60% R HL = 67Ω
Earth Fault Resistive Reach Settings
The total resistance that must be covered during earth faults is the sum of arc resistance (Ra)
and the total loop resistance to the fault (RTF).
A safety factor of 20% and division factor (1 + R E/RL) are included as Ra and RTF appear in the
loop measurement as in equation 2.27.
R arc + R TF
R EZ1 = 1.2 ∗ Ω (2.39)
R
1 + RE
L
This can be approximated as:
80% R HL = 89 Ω
After all the above steps are followed, the setting values are summarized in the Table 2.14 for
the relay looking towards Kroman Çelik Substation (Figure 2.25 (a)).
76
Table 2.14 For SKS distance relay looking towards Kroman Çelik substation
Relay Description Value Units

Parameter
ZL1(mag) L1 positive sequence impedance (magnitude) 1.469 Ω
ZL1(ang) L1 positive sequence impedance (phase angle) 77.8 Deg
ZL0(mag) L1 zero sequence impedance (magnitude) 5.031 Ω
ZL0(ang) L1 zero sequence impedance (phase angle) 77.5 deg
KZ0(mag) L1 default residual compensation factor(magnitude) 0.808 Ω
KZ0(ang) L1 default residual compensation factor (phase angle) -0.4 deg
Z1(mag) Impedance reach setting of zone 1 (magnitude) 1.249 Ω
Z1(ang) Impedance reach setting of zone 1 (phase angle) 77.8 deg
Z3(mag) impedance reach setting of zone 3 (magnitude) 9.962 Ω
Z4(mag) Zone 4 reach impedance setting (magnitude) 1.03 Ω
R1ph Phase fault resistive reach value - Zone 1 67 Ω
TZ1 Time delay - Zone 1 0 sec
TZ2 Time delay - Zone 2 0.4 sec
77
Table 2.14 (cont’d)
TZ3 Time delay - Zone 3 0.8 sec
TZ4 Time delay - Zone 4 2 sec
R1G Ground fault resistive reach value - Zone 1 89 Ω
Protection Coordination towards Dil Iskelesi
By repeating similar steps followed in section 3.9.1, the setting of the distance relay of SKS
looking towards Diliskelesi Substation is calculated and given in Table 2.15.
Table 2.15 For SKS distance relay looking towards Kroman Çelik substation
Relay Description Value Units
Parameter
ZL1(mag) L0 positive sequence impedance (magnitude) 5.152 Ω
ZL1(ang) L0 positive sequence impedance (phase angle) 77.8 deg
ZL0(mag) L0 zero sequence impedance (magnitude) 17.649 Ω
ZL0(ang) L0 zero sequence impedance (phase angle) 77.5 deg
KZ0(mag) L0 default residual compensation factor (magnitude) 0.809 Ω
KZ0(ang) L0 default residual compensation factor (phase angle) -0.4 deg
78
Z3(mag) impedance reach setting of zone 3 (magnitude) 9.447 Ω
Z4(mag) Zone 4 reach impedance setting (magnitude) 1.469 Ω
TZ1 Time delay - Zone 1 0 Sec
TZ2 Time delay - Zone 2 0.4 Sec
TZ3 Time delay - Zone 3 0.8 Sec
TZ4 Time delay - Zone 4 2 Sec
The overvoltage and undervoltage relays serve primarily the same purpose as an overcurrent
relay except that it is connected in the line by a potential transformer which measures the
voltage across the line. When an overvoltage or undervoltage exists the relay operates and opens
the circuit breaker. Based on IEC 60255-127, the overvoltage protection element can be defined
by using IDMT characteristic as in equation 2.40 [57].
𝑘
(𝐺) = 𝑇𝑀𝑆 ∗ {[ ] + 𝑐} (2.40)
𝑉 𝑎
(𝑉 ) − 1
𝑠
79
(a)
(b)
Figure 2.26 (a) Characteristics of overvoltage protection (b) Characteristics of undervoltage

protection
Similarly, the undervoltage protection characteristic curves can be provided by equation

2.41[57].
𝑘
𝑡(𝐺) = 𝑇𝑀𝑆 ∗ {[ ] + 𝑐} (2.41)
𝑉 𝑎
1 − (𝑉 )
𝑠
Where: t is the operating time for the constant voltage V (seconds); V is the energizing voltage
(V); Vs is overvoltage setting (V); TMS is the time multiplier setting; a, k and c are constantans
defining curves.
80
The overvoltage and under voltage relays are mostly used in the load and generation feeders.
In the thesis due to limitation of scope the overvoltage and undervoltage protection are
supported by the case studies.
81
CHAPTER 3
PROTECTION OF THE RING DISTRIBUTION NETWORK
The proper selection of protection relays and their coordination plays an important role in order
to clear the faults that occur during abnormal system conditions. When a fault occurs, only the
faulty section has to be disconnected from the rest of the system in the shortest possible time.
If the fault current cannot be cleared, the prolonged short circuit current will damage the power
system equipment. Therefore, in order to reduce the damage on the equipment, at least there
must be a method to limit fault current if clearing of the fault is impossible. In addition, the
protection system has to be designed in such a way that it cannot result in unnecessary
disconnection of the healthy systems. Furthermore, alternative operation scenarios have to be
considered for the continuity of the supply during a fault.
In the electrical power system, the protection coordination is a very crucial for quality,
reliability and security of power supply, as well as for the safety of life and property. In order
to achieve good coordination between relays, short circuit fault analysis has to be conducted
and based on the results of the analysis, the protection relay setting values have to be
determined. The assessment includes determination of the maximum and minimum three phase
and phase to ground fault currents. Additionally, the relay has to be sensitive enough to detect
the minimum fault current and immune to the load currents.
For the protection relay that is to be coordinated in series, the pickup (operating) current and
the operating time has to be determined in such a way that it provides maximum protection with
minimum possible energy interruption. In the event of fault, the relay near to the fault has to
operate first. If the relay near to the fault is not working, for example, cannot send the trip signal
to the circuit breaker, the next relay should send the trip signal to its own circuit breaker in
order to localize the fault. This is known as backup protection. Protection coordination is about
82
organizing (coordinating) of the protection relays during overcurrent, short circuit and other
fault condition intended to isolate only the faulty sections of the power system.
The most selective and fast power system protection method is the unit protection. In unit
protections, the protection zones are established for each component of power system like,
generator, cable, motor, transformer, and bus bar. In such arrangements, when a fault occurs on
a component, for example on a motor, the motor protection relays sends the opening command
to related circuit breaker to isolate only the faulty component (in this case the motor).
Distribution network includes all components power system from the transmission or sub
transmission step down substations to the customer’s service entrance. The power coming to
the distribution network can be from the centralized power plant through the transmission
systems or from the local generations. The distribution network can be either in the form of
overhead line or underground cable depending on their geographical locations. The overhead
distribution networks are used in the rural areas while underground cable distribution networks
are mostly used in the urban areas. Based on the connection schemes electrical distribution
systems can be classified as:
 Radial Systems,
 Ring Systems and
 Network Systems.
In radial distribution systems, separate feeders radiate from a single substation and feed the
loads at one end only. Radial distribution system is the cheapest to build, and is widely used in
sparsely populated areas. A radial system has only one power source for a group of customers.
A power failure, short-circuit, or a downed power line would interrupt power in the entire line
which must be fixed before power can be restored. In ring distribution systems, the network
loops through the service area and returns to the original point. The loop is usually tied into an
alternate power source. If one source of power fails, switches are thrown (automatically or
manually), and power can be fed to customers from the other source. It provides better
continuity of service than the radial system. The ring system is more expensive than the radial
because more switches and conductors are required, but the resultant improved system
reliability is often worth the price. In network systems, the connections is the most complicated
and are interlocking loop systems. A given customer can be supplied from two, three, four, or
more different power supplies. For this reason it is usually used only in congested, high load
density municipal or downtown areas
83
However providing protection coordination in the ring network is not an easy task as the energy
flows in two or more direction. In addition, the short circuit current of the system increases
compared with radial system. Moreover, the challenging issue in the protection coordination is
the time restriction from the network operator to clear the fault. Due the time restrictions, the
numbers of relays that are to be coordinated in the ring will be limited. This makes the
coordination of protection relays to become more difficult for the ring networks. In this chapter,
the state of art for the protection of industrial ring distribution network will discussed. The study
will be supported with practical work for the protection coordination of GEBZE organized
industrial zone distribution network.
According to this project (GEBZE organized industrial zone), the protection of cables is
provided by differential and directional overcurrent relays. The customer feeders are protected
by non-directional overcurrent relay. The protection of bus bar and the automation of coupling
cubicle is provided by the IEC-61850 GOOSE supported overcurrent protection system. ETAP
is used for modeling and analysis of the ring network.
GEBZE organized industrial zone is supplied from 100 MV, 154/34.5 kV GEBZE substation.
This industrialized zone contains distribution substation (designated as DM) that provide
energy to the customers.
Table 3.1 The source network maximum and minimum short circuit currents
3-Phase (kA) 1-Phase to Ground (kA)
Maximum 23.2 < −90.7O 21.1 < −92O
Minimum 18.4 < −82.0O 16.2 < −82.4O
R/X 0.1
These DMs are connected with each other in the ring as shown in Figure 3.1. For the site under
study, there are seven DMs connected in a closed ring and the connections among the DMs is
shown in Figure 3.1.
For the analysis of fault current the maximum and minimum short circuit current at the source
substation is required. In addition, the transformer and the cable data are also necessary. The
short circuit current from the source network and the transformer data are summarized in the
84
Table 3.1 and Table 3.2. The data of underground cable which is interconnecting the DMs are
given in the Appendix-B.
Table 3.2 The source network transformer data
Parameters Values
Un Prim. (kV) 154
Un Sec. (kV) 33.6
Sn (MVA) 100
Uk (%) 12.51
Vector group Y-Y
By using these data, short circuit analysis is conducted by using ETAP-software. For the
protection coordination, the maximum and minimum short circuit analysis is conducted for
three conditions of the network. These are when the network is working as a closed ring, opened
from left-side (radial), opened from the right side (radial).
This helps to identify the exact maximum and minimum short circuit currents for different
operating conditions. For each DMs in the ring, the analysis results are summarized in the Table
3.3. Since the current transformers of relays are placed at the incoming and outgoing feeder of
the ring network, the maximum short circuit flowing through the relay point occurs when the
ring is faulted while it is operating in radial (opened from one of the two sides). In the Table
3.3, the short circuit current when the ring is opened from the right and from the left is given.
The results show that, the short circuit currents are increasing towards the source from both
sides.
From the analysis it is observed that the minimum short circuit current flowing in the branch
containing relays occurs when the ring network is faulted during closed ring operation. This is
due to the fact that the fault current is divided through two branches of the ring network towards
the fault point (left and right). Besides, the minimum short circuit current flowing towards the
bus and the cable are also different.
85
EXTERNAL GRID
154 KV TEIAS
154/33 kV
33 kV TEIAS
RF7 RF8
RADMAH01
RADMBH13
ADM_B DM3_A DM3_B DM6_A DM6_B DM5_A DM5_B

ADM_A
RADMBH12
RDM3BH14
RADMAH02
RDM5BH13
RDM6AH01
RDM6BH12
RDM5AH01
RDM3BH12
DM1_A DM1_B DM2_A DM2_B DM4_A RDM4BH14

DM4_B
RDM4AH01
RDM2BH11
RDM2AH01
RDM1BH09
RDM1AHO1
Figure 3.1 Ring distribution network of the TEMBELOVA GEBZE OSB
Table 3.3 The Maximum short circuit current when the ring is opened from the right and left
DM1-A01 SIDE OPEN (Right) DM3-A14 SIDE OPEN (Left)
Group- 1 DMs Iscmax (A) Group-2 DMs Iscmax (A)
DM1-A A01 7900 DM3-B A14 8220
DM2-A A01 8136 DM6-A A01 8707
DM4-A A01 8999 DM5-A A01 9324
DM5-B A13 9236 DM4-B A14 9577
DM6-B A12 9927 DM2-B A11 10764
DM3-B A14 10639 DM1-B A09 11188
DM-B A12 11479 ADM-A A02 11479
86
The above analysis results are used for setting overcurrent protection for the cable and bus bar
protections separately. The minimum short circuit values for the discussed conditions are
summarized in the Table 3.4.
Table 3.4 The summary of the minimum short circuit current
Group-1 Iscmin (A) Group-2 Iscmin (A)
DMs DMs
To the Bus To the Cable To the Bus To the Cable
DM1-A A01 594 9442 DM3 -B A14 1786 8712
DM2-A A01 1489 9101 DM6- A A01 3353 6794
DM4-A A01 4210 5844 DM5- A A01 5122 4877
DM5-B A13 4877 5150 DM4 -B A14 5815 4237
DM6-B A12 6763 3380 DM2 -B A11 9064 1517
DM3-B A12 8712 1786 DM1 -B A09 9431 624
ADM-B A12 9669 15 ADM-A A02 9669 15
In each of the DMs customers are available. The customer feeders are protected by overcurrent
relays with inrush blocking capability. The relays that are used are ABB REF 615 relays.
This protection is used to protect the customer feeder from overcurrent situation. In the inverse
time protection, the operating time is inversely proportional to the magnitude of the current.
There are many standard curves defining the time-current characteristics. For example Table
3.5 shows IEC 60255 Standard Characteristics Curves. In this project the standard inverse is
used.
87
Table 3.5 IEC 60255 standard characteristics [42]
Relay Characteristics Equations(IEC 60255)
Standard Inverse(SI) 0.14

t = TMS ∗
(Ir )0.02 − 1
Very Inverse(VI) 13.5

t = TMS ∗
Ir − 1
Extremely Inverse(EI) 80
t = TMS ∗ 2
Ir − 1
Long time standby earth fault 120

t = TMS ∗
Ir − 1
Where: Ir = I/Is, I= Measured current, Is=Relay setting current, TMS=Time Multiplier Setting.
The pickup current of the inverse time overcurrent relay is selected to start at 1.1 times primary
currents of the current transformer. The primary currents of the current transformers are selected
by considering the maximum load currents. The time multiplier setting of 0.2 is selected for the
IEC normal inverse characteristic curve. The inrush multiplier is set to 10. This means that if
the inrush current is detected especially during transformer starting, the pickup setting will
change from 1.1 to 11.
The short circuit fault protection is provided by definite time overcurrent function. The pickup
current of the instantaneous element is set to 5 times the primary current of the current
transformer. But, when inrush is detected it is multiplied by 3 and the pickup is raised to 15
times the primary current. The operating delay setting for the instantaneous element is 50 ms.
The ground fault protection is provided by definite time overcurrent. The ground fault pickup
current have to be set above the maximum unbalance current on the feeder. For this project %
20 of primary current value of the current transformer is selected.
88
The inrush current setting is used to coordinate transformer inrush situations in distribution
networks. The inrush detector element, evaluates the ratio of second harmonic current to the
fundamental frequency current [54]. If the ratio exceeds the setting value, it will block the
operation of other protection functions like time overcurrent or instantaneous element. In this
project, the setting value of 15% is selected for the inrush detector.
I_diff
High operate stage
High Operate
Value
Slope
Section-3
Low op erate
stage
Slope
Section-2
Low Op erate Non-operate

Value stage
End End I_bias

Section-1 Section-2
Figure 3.2 Operating characteristics of the differential protection [35]
The fault in the cable is cleared instantaneously by the differential protection. Additionally,
auxiliary inverse time overcurrent protection is provided to protect the cables from the
overcurrent and short circuit faults. Thus, the auxiliary protection acts as a backup protection
for the differential protection.
Differential protection is used as the main protection to protect the cable in the ring network.
The detailed discussion on the principle of differential relay is available in [42]. The percentage
differential curve used by RED 615 relay is also shown in the Figure 3.2. The slope section-2
89
Table 3.6 The Parameters for RED 615
Parameter Value
High Operate Value (%Ir) 1000
Low Operate Value (%Ir) 20
Slope Section-2 (%) 30
End of Section-2 (%) 150
Slope of Section-3 (%) 60
Start Value 2.H 15
Start Value 5.H 35
Based on engineering practices the values of the setting are determined and summarized for the
RED 615 as shown in Table 3.6.
The auxiliary protection used for this case is directional overcurrent relay and discussed in the
following subsections.
Directional Overcurrent Protection (67)
The time current characteristic of the overcurrent protection used in the directional overcurrent
relay is IEC normal inverse. Additionally, directionality is included to selectively coordinate
the operation of the relay. The directionality of the relay is achieved by using voltage
transformer in addition to the current transformer. There are many polarizing methods in
modern IEDs like cross polarization, positive sequence polarization, negative sequence
polarization and self-polarization [42]. In this study cross polarization is used. In cross
polarization, the voltage of healthy phases are used as a reference to determine the direction of
the fault current. In Figure 3.3, the vector diagram of commonly used 90o-45o connection cross-
polarizing technique - is shown (fault occurred on phase-A). The maximum torque angle (MTA)
is rotated by 45o to provide maximum sensitivity as shown in Figure 3.3. The zero torque angle
is the boundary, separating the operate region from the restrain region.
90
In the MV feeder of the network operator’s substation (TEİAŞ’s substation), the operating time
for the inverse time overcurrent (at maximum short circuit current) and the instantaneous
ground fault protection is set to 1 second.
Consequently, the protection coordination has to be done by considering this constraint. In the
modern IEDs the grading margin between relays is about 200 ms. Thus, we can only coordinate,
for example, for an earth fault instantaneous overcurrent relay from the customer feeder to the
operator’s feeder only five relays in series. Thus, grouping some of the DMs by compromising
reliability is unescapable to provide coordination if the ring network under study contains more
than five DMs in series.
The distribution network of the GEBZE industrialized network is shown in Figure 3.4. The
coordination in the ring network using overcurrent relay is done by opening the ring on one end
first (for example right end as shown in the Figure 3.4 (a)) and coordinating it as if it is radial
network. Similarly, the coordination is done by opening the ring on the other end (the left end
as shown in Figure 3.4(b)) and coordinating as if it is radial network.
TA
M
Ia
bc
V’
Va
g
de
45
g
de
45
eg
Vbc
5d
13
Zero torque line
Vb
Vc
Figure 3.3 Vector Diagram for the 90o-45o Connection (Phase-A element)
91
EXTERNAL GRID
154 KV TEIAS
154/33 kV
33 kV TEIAS
RF7 RF8
RADMAH01 RADMBH13
ADM_A ADM_B DM3_A DM3_B DM6_A DM6_B DM5_A DM5_B
RADMBH12 RDM3BH12 RDM6BH12 RDM5BH13
DM1_A DM1_B DM2_A DM2_B DM4_A DM4_B
RDM1AHO1 RDM2AH01 RDM4AH01
(a)
EXTERNAL GRID
154 KV TEIAS
154/33 kV
33 kV TEIAS
RF7 RF8
RADMAH01 RADMBH13
DM3_A DM3_B DM6_A DM6_B DM5_A DM5_B
ADM_A ADM_B
RADMAH02 RDM3BH14 RDM6AH01 RDM5AH01
DM1_A DM1_B DM2_A DM2_B DM4_A RDM4BH14

DM4_B
RDM1BH09 RDM2BH11
(b)
Figure 3.4 (a) The ring network opened from the right (b) The ring network opened from the
left
92
Thus, the relays on the right side of each branch will be coordinated in series for the Figure
3.4(a). In similar manner the relays on the left side of each branch will be coordinated together
in similar manner. This means protection relay will be coordinated in counter clockwise
direction when the ring is open on the side of DM1-H01 (Figure 3.4(a)). This group includes
RDM1H01, RDM2H01, RDM4H01, RDM5H13, RDM6H12, RDM3H12 and RADMH12. The
designations for example RDM3H14 means the relay that is available at 14 th cubicle of DM3
(distribution substation-3).
If the tn and TMSn are downstream relay’s operating time and time multiplier settings
respectively, by using IEC normal inverse curve, the operating time (tn) can be designated as:
0.14
t n = TMSn ∗ (3.1)
I 0.02
(I n ) −1
pn
If fixed grading margin which is about 200 ms for the modern IEDs is selected for the
coordination among the protection relays that are in series, the time multiplier setting of
upstream relay can be calculated as follow:
t n + 0.2
TMSn+1 = (3.2)
0.14
In 0.02
(I ) −1
p_n+1
Where: In is the fault current for the downstream relay; In+1 is the fault current for the upstream
relay.Ip_n+1 the pickup current for the upstream relay; TMSn+1 is the time multiplier setting for
the upstream relay.
The operating time for the upstream relay is calculated as follow:
0.14
t n+1 = TMSn+1 ∗ 0.02 (3.3)
I
(I n+1 ) −1
pn +1
The time coordination must take in account that the relay near to the source must not exceed
the time limit set by the network operator. By using equations (3.1) to (3.3) the time multiplier
setting for each relay that are going to be coordinated has to be determined.
Based on the above discussion the time inverse overcurrent setting values for the GEBZE
organized industrial zone protection are calculated and summarized in Table 3.7. In this case,
the network operator’s time multiplier setting restriction is 0.3. In order for the relay to be
93
coordinated under this level, a grading margin which is less than 200 ms has to be used.
However, this may compromise the supply reliability by causing some distribution substations
to operate together for the fault at one substation.
The coordination is done at the maximum short circuit current so that it may not result problem
for the fault below the maximum short circuit current. But, for the occurrence of maximum
short circuit, the probability of tripping of two successive DMs together exist. Additionally, in
the Table 3.7 the values for the ring opened from the left and right are identical, however this
results follow from the rounding errors of the actual calculated values. Since there is a variation
of the short circuit currents from the left and right side, the actual settings are slightly different.
Rounding is required, to adjust the values to the setting range of the REF 615 relay. The
coordination curve showing the coordination characteristics is shown on Figure 3.5 and
Figure 3.6 for the case when the ring is opened from the side of DM1-H01 and DM3-
H14 respectively.
Table 3.7 The pickup current and time multiplier setting of the time inverse overcurrent relays
DM1-H01 side-open (Counter Clockwise) DM3-H14 side-open RIGHT(Clockwise)
1 DM1-H01 1 DM3-H14
Ip(xIn) 0.8 Ip(xIn) 0.8
TMS 0.05 TMS 0.05
2 DM2-H01 2 DM6-H01
TMS 0.1 TMS 0.1
3 DM4-H01 3 DM5-H01
TMS 0.15 TMS 0.15
4 DM5-H13 4 DM4-H14
94
TMS 0.2 TMS 0.2
5 DM6-H12 5 DM2-H11
Ip(xIn) 1 Ip(xIn) 1
TMS 0.25 TMS 0.25
6 DM3-H12 6 DM1-H09
Ip(xIn) 1.05 Ip(xIn) 1,05
TMS 0.3 TMS 0.3
7 ADM-H12 7 ADM-H02
TMS 0.3 TMS 0.3
This protection provides short circuit fault protection in the ring distribution network (for the
cable and the bus bars protection). The pickup currents are determined based on the minimum
fault currents. The protection for the cable protection is coordinated in similar fashion as for
the time inverse protection discussed previously. The discussion for the bus bar protection
involves the coordination with customer feeder relays. This was handled by using direct wiring
before the development of IEC 61850 Generic Object Oriented Substation Event (GOOSE)
protocol. The directional characteristics is defined in similar way to the time inverse
characteristics discussed in section 4.1.1. The discussion on the protection of busbar by using
GOOSE communication will be given in section 4.3.
95
Figure 3.5 The inverse time coordination characteristic curve when DM1-H01 side is open
The grading for the short circuit protection is provided by using different pickup setting as
shown in Table 3.8. The operation delay time of 100 ms second is selected in order to allow for
the customer feeder short circuit protection relay to operate in case the fault happens on the
customer feeder (the customer feeder protection operation delay time is 50 ms). The
coordination curve displaying the characteristic curve is shown in Figure 3.7.
96
Figure 3.6 The inverse time coordination characteristic curve when DM3-H14 side is open
97
Table 3.8 The pickup current and operating time of definite time directional overcurrent.
Time
DM3-A14 Ip Time DM1-A01 Ip
ms
side open xIn ms side open xIn
Clockwise (Counter
Clockwise)
1 DM3-14 2 100 1 DM1-A01 1 100
2 DM6-01 3 100 2 DM2-A01 2.5 100
3 DM5-01 4 100 3 DM4-A01 4 100
4 DM4-12 4.5 100 4 DM5-A13 4.5 100
5 DM2-11 5.5 100 5 DM6-A12 5 100
6 DM1-09 6 100 6 DM3-A12 6 100
7 ADM-02 6.5 100 7 ADM-A12 6.5 100
Directional earth-fault protection is used for selective operation during occurrence of earth fault
in the ring network. The directionality is achieved by using residual voltage (it can be measured
or calculated) or the negative sequence component as the polarizing quantity [42], [54]. In this
project residual voltage is used as polarizing quantity as shown in Figure 3.9. The torque angle
used in this project for the REF 615 relay is 45o (Figure 3.9).
The grading is provided by using different time settings at each relay points (the current setting
is the same, but the time setting differs). But in this case, since there are more than five DMs in
the ring network, some of the DMs are grouped together. The pickup values and operating times
are shown in Table 3.9.The coordination curves when the ring is open from DM1-H01 and
DM3-H14 side are shown on Figure 3.8 and Figure 3.9 respectively.
98
Figure 3.7 The definite time coordination characteristic curve when DM1-H01 side is open
99
100
-Uo (polarizing quantity )
Maximum torque line
Characteristic angle (+45 deg)
Io (operating quantity )
Backward operating zone
Forward operating zone
Minimum torque line
Figure 3.9 Zero sequence overcurrent for ground fault detection
The short circuit fault protection of bus bar can be provided by using directional overcurrent
relay. The directional characteristic of this relay is similar to one discussed in the previous
sections. But, in this case the relay have to protect bus bar in the reverse direction. It is not
possible to use the same function for both reverse and forward at the same time in the ABB
REF 615 relay. Consequently, different stages of definite time overcurrent that are available in
the REF 615 are used.
The used stage will trip if the fault happens in the bus bar direction. However, the relay may
trip for the fault that happened on the customer feeder which has to be cleared by the customer
feeder protection relay. To avoid this, the customer feeder protection relay should inform the
bus bar protection relay that it has detected the fault. This was done previously by tedious wiring
of signal cables.
101
Table 3.9 The pickup current and operating time of directional earth fault protection
DM3-A14 side- Ip Time DM1-A01 side-open Ip Time

open(Clockwise) (xIn) ( ms) (Counter Clockwise) (xIn) ( ms)
1 DM3-A14 0.25 0.25 1 DM1-A01 0.25 0.25
2 DM6-A01 0.25 0.45 2 DM2-A01 0.25 0.45
3 DM5-A01 0.25 0.45 3 DM4-A01 0.25 0.45
4 DM4-A12 0.25 0.65 4 DM5-A13 0.25 0.65
5 DM2-A11 0.25 0.65 5 DM6-A12 0.25 0.65
6 DM1-A09 0.25 0.85 6 DM3-A12 0.25 0.85
7 ADM-A02 0.25 0.85 7 ADM- A12 0.25 0.85
Table 3.10 Directional definite time for bus bar protection
DM3-A14 SIDE Ip Time DM1-A01 SIDE Ip Time

OPEN (Clockwise) OPEN
(xIn) ( ms) (xIn) ( ms)
(Counter Clockwise)
1 DM3-A14 5 150 1 DM-A01 5 150
2 DM6-A01 4.5 150 2 DM2-A01 4.5 150
3 DM5-A01 4 150 3 DM4-A01 4 150
4 DM4-A12 3.5 150 4 DM5-A13 3.5 150
5 DM2-A11 3 150 5 DM6-A12 3 150
6 DM1-A09 2 150 6 DM3-A12 2 150
7 ADM-A02 1 150 7 ADM- A12 1 150
102
IEC-61850 GOOSE communication can handle this in the modern IEDs. When the fault
happens on the customer feeder both bus bar protection and customer feeder protection relay
picks up (Figure 3.12 (a)). As soon as the customer feeder detects the fault it sends blocking
signal through GOOSE messages to the bus bar protection relay.
103
The bus bar protection relay resets immediately when it receives the GOOSE message from the
customer feeder relay. When the fault happens on the bus bar (Figure 3.12 (b)) since the
customer feeder protection do not detect this fault, no GOOSE blocking message is sent to the
bus bar protection relay. Thus, the bus bar protection relay will trip after the specified time
delay.
104
33 kV busbar
RA
GOOSE RF GOOSE RB
Incoming Ring Outgoing Ring

Fault on Customer
Feeder
Customer Feeder
RF will operate
1. RF, RA and RB will see the fault
2. RF will operate and sends blocking GOOSE messages to RA and RB
3. RA and RB will reset as soon as they receive the GOOSE
(a)
Fault on busbar
33 kV busbar
RA
RF RB
Incoming Ring Outgoing Ring
1. RA and RB will operate

2. RF do not see the fault
Customer Feeder
(b)
Figure 3.12 GOOSE application for the bus bar protection
The current pickup values are set based on the minimum short circuit that happens in each
relaying point. The tripping time is set to 150 ms to allow sufficient time for the customer
protection relay to detect the fault and send blocking signal. The operating time and pickup
values are given in the Table 3.10.
105
CHAPTER 4
IEC-61850 PROTOCOL APPLICATIONS FOR PROTECTION AND

AUTOMATION OF INDUSTRIAL DISTRIBUTION NETWORK
The IEC 61850-based environment has improved the operating efficiency of the existing
electrical substations [58]. The ability to describe themselves from both a data and services
points of view are the key component of a substation communication system [59]. Moreover,
the substation communications are required to meet the following requirements:
o High-speed IED to IED communication

o Networkable throughout the utility enterprise
o High-availability
o Guaranteed delivery times
o Standards based
o Multi-vendor interoperability
o Support for Voltage and Current samples data
o Support for File Transfer
o Auto-configurable / configuration support
o Support for security
In 1988 Utility Communication Architecture (UCA) started work in order to develop the
communication architecture which meets the above requirements. IEC 61850 is founded on the
concepts and fundamental work done in UCA. Substation automation efficiency and
interoperability are the main concerns of the standard. The standard represents basically two
concepts.
106
o How the information is represented, where the source is and whether it is trustable or not
o The method of sharing this information through Publish/Subscribe and MMS
The IEC 61850 is consisted of 10 parts as shown in Figure 4.1. The requirements of
communication in substation are defined in part 3.4 and 5 of the standard. This requirements
are used to describe services and data models needed, application protocol required, and the
underlying transport, network, data link, and physical layers that will meet the overall
requirements [58].
Figure 4.1 The 10 major sections of IEC 61850 [58]
The parts 3.4 and 5 of the standard defines the requirements of communication in substation.
This requirements are used to define services and data models needed, application protocols
required, and the underlying transport, network, data link, and physical layers that will meet the
overall requirements [58]. IEC 61850 is based on creating data items and services that are
independent of any underlying protocols which is referred as abstracting. The abstract
definitions are then mapped to the data objects and services of any other protocol that can meet
the data and service requirements. The definition of the abstract services are available in part
7.2 of the standard. The abstraction of data objects (referred as to logical nodes) are found in
part 7.4 of the standard. The concept of “Common Data Classes” or “CDC” which is used for
creating the larger data objects is defined in part 7.3 of the standard.
The mapping of data and services abstract definitions to the Manufacturing Messaging
Specification (MMS) is defined in Part 8.1 of the standard. Parts 9.1 and 9.2 define the mapping
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of the Sample Measured Values (unidirectional point-to-point and bi-directional multipoint
accordingly) on an Ethernet data frame.
An XML based Substation Configuration Language (SCL) was defined in Part 6 of the standard.
It is used for the formal description of the relations between the substation (switchyard) and the
substation automation system.
In Part 10 of the standard, the testing methodology in order to determine “conformance” with
the numerous protocol definitions and constraints are defined.
In the Legacy protocols how bytes are transmitted is defined, but the way of organizing data in
substations are not defined [60]. In IEC 61850 protocol, in addition to the specification of the
protocol elements (how bytes are transmitted on the wire), a comprehensive model for how
power system devices should organize data in a manner that is consistent across all types and
brands of devices are provided. This saves much cost and effort of configuring the devices.
Figure 4.2 IEC 61850 Information Model
The abstract data and object models of IEC 61850 define a standardized method of describing
power system devices (Figure 4.2) that enables all IEDs to present data using identical
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structures that are directly related to their power system function. The hierarchical information
model of IEC 61850 is described in the following sections.
Physical Device- in the IEC 61850, device model begins with a physical device which is
connected to the rest of the network as shown in Figure 4.3.The physical device is typically
defined by its network address.
Server – a physical device has one or more servers. The server is the topmost object in the
hierarchical data model. It represents the external visible behavior of a device. It communicates
with client and other peer devices. It is a communication entity within an IED and provides an
access point for the data of the logical devices and logical nodes contained in it.
Application Association - allows a client to be associated (connected) with a server.
Logical Device- Each physical device, may contain one or more logical devices. A logical
device is a more fine-grained grouping of functionality related to a particular physical device.
Logical devices contain the information produced and consumed by a group of domain-specific
application functions (Logical Nodes). The IEC 61850 logical device model allows a single
physical device to act as a proxy or gateway for multiple devices, thus providing a standard
representation of a data concentrator.
Figure 4.3 Data Model in IEC 61850 Protocol
Logical Nodes- Each logical device contains one or more logical nodes (Figure 4.3) which is a
grouping of data and associated services that is logically related to some power system function
[58]. The data model used by IEC 61850 have logical nodes containing a set of data objects.
It is also the smallest part of a function in the device that can exchange data. The first letter of
the logical nodes represents the class the logical node belongs to. The group of the logical
nodes are L: system Logical node, M: Metering and measurement, P: Protection, S: Sensor and
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monitoring, R: Protection related, X: Switchgear, C: Control, T: Instrument transformers, G:
Generic, Y: Power transformers, I: Interfacing and archiving, Z: Further power system
equipment, and A: Automatic control. Some examples of logical nodes are:
(a)
(b)
Figure 4.4 Example of logical node, data, data attributes and constraints
o The measurement logical node which is called MMXU. The first letter indicates that it
belongs to the group M (Metering and Measurement). MMXU is used for calculation of
currents, voltages, powers and impedances in a three-phase system.
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o The circuit breaker logical node, XCBR, in group X (Switchgear). It is used for modelling
switches with short circuit breaking capability.
o The alarm handling logical node, CALH, in group C (Control). It allows the creation of
group warnings and alarms.
Since the standard cannot cover all the logical nodes, it is possible to adapt the logical node,
which is defined in the standard, as a logical node class.
 Data Objects- Each logical node contains one or more elements of Data. Data objects
provide means to specify typed information, for example, position of a switch with quality
information and timestamp, contained in LNs. Values of DATA instances represent
meaningful information about substation devices, such as currents, voltages, power, phases,
temperatures, status, and timestamps and so on. Each elements of data has a unique name.
These Data names are determined by the standard and are functionally related to the power
system purpose. For instance, a circuit breaker is modeled as an XCBR logical node Figure
4.4. It contains a variety of Data including Loc for determining if operation is remote or
local, OpCnt for an operations count, Pos for the position, BlkOpn block breaker open
commands, BlkCls block breaker close commands, and CBOpCap for the circuit breaker
operating capability. The data objects consists of a number of data attributes.
 Logical Nodes Information Categories (Figure 4.4 (b))
 Common logical node information: Information independent from the dedicated function
represented by the LN, e.g., mode, health, name plate, etc.
 Status information: Information representing either the status of the process or of the
function allocated to the LN, e.g., switch type, switch operating capability.
 Settings: Information needed for the function of a logical node, e.g., first, second, and
third reclose time.
 Measured values: Analogue data measured from the process or calculated in the
functions like currents, voltages, power, etc., e.g., total active power, total reactive power
and frequency.
 Controls: Data, which are changed by commands like switchgear state (ON/OFF),
resettable counters, e.g., position, block opening.
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Figure 4.5 Single Point Status (SPS) Common Data Class
Figure 4.6 LD/LN, Functional Constraint, Data and Data Attribute
 Common Data Class (CDC)-Each element of data within the logical node conforms to the
specification of a common data class (CDC) per IEC 61850-7-3. Each CDC describes the
type and structure of the data within the logical node. For instance, there are CDCs for status
information, measured information, controllable status information, controllable analog set
point information, status settings, and analog settings. Each CDC has a defined name and a
set of CDC attributes each with a defined name, defined type, and specific purpose. Each
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individual attribute of a CDC belongs to a set of functional constraints (FC) that groups the
attributes into categories. For instance, in the Single Point Status (SPS) CDC described in
Figure 4.5, there are functional constraints for status (ST) attributes, substituted value (SV)
attributes, description (DC) attributes, and extended definition (EX) attributes. In this
example the status attributes of the SPS class consists of a status value (stVal), a quality
flag (q), and a time stamp (t).
 Functional Constraints- Functional Constraints (FC) is a property of a data attribute that
characterizes the specific use of the attribute. Useful to functionally organize data attributes
to provide structure and context.
 Object References-The standard defines an object reference to differentiate between a
reference to an object and the object name. For instance, suppose that there is a logical
device named “Relay1” consisting of a single circuit breaker logical node XCBR1. If it is
required to determine whether the breaker is in the remote or local mode of operation, it has
to be referenced as shown in Figure 4.6.
In the previous section a detailed discussion have been made on the data model of IEC 61850
protocol. In the following section a discussion will be made on the information exchange model.
Figure 4.7 Information Exchange Model
o Data-set - permits the grouping of data and data attributes.

o Substitution - supports replacement of a process value by another value
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o Setting-group-control-block - defines how to switch from one set of setting values to
another one and how to edit setting groups. It allows for a DATA instance to have several
values, which are used one at a time
o Report-control-block and log-control-block - describe the conditions for generating
reports and logs based on parameters set by the client
o Control blocks for generic substation events (GSE) - supports a fast and reliable
system-wide distribution of input and output data values
o Control blocks for transmission of sampled values - fast and cyclic transfer of samples,
for example, of instrument transformers control - describes the services to control, for
example, devices
o Time and time synchronization - provides the time base for the device and system
o File transfer - defines the exchange of large data blocks such as programs
The Abstract Communication Service Interface (ACSI) models of IEC 61850 define a set of
services and the responses to those services that enables all IEDs to behave in an identical
manner from the network behavior perspective. The ACSI provides a number of abstract
interfaces and it can be said that the ACSI represents the full capability of an IEC 61850 server
as seen from a client. Some of the interfaces describe communications between a client and a
remote server while other interfaces are provided for communication between an application in
one device and remote applications in other devices. This could be system-wide event
distribution or transmission of sampled measured values. The communications between a client
and a remote server could be device control, reporting of events, logging of events,
publisher/subscriber and others.
In the context of communications in power systems automation, the conveyance of data from
one computing device (such as an IED or a RTU) to another and during this process problems
with language, synchronization and the protocol itself can cause communications failure. To
address these problems the Open System Interconnection (OSI) Model was introduced in
1984.Open standards for communications enables seamless interoperability between devices,
this brings many advantages in terms of design, engineering and operation. Most Open standard
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communication protocols use the OSI Reference model to transmit and receive data. Following
protocols are commonly used for power systems automation applications:
• IEC-60870-104
• IEC-61850-GOOSE
• DNP3
While the abstract model discussed in the previous sections are critical in achieving level of
interoperability, these models need to be operated over a real set of protocols that are practical
to implement and that can operate within the computing environments commonly found in the
power industry. The communication protocol could be invented as part of the IEC 61850
standard, however, to achieve interoperability and make it easier to employ the new standard,
it would be favorable to choose an existing and widespread communication structure and
provide a mapping to one or more of these protocols. This is probably the reason why the IEC
61850 have chosen to provide mappings to an already standardized protocols such as MMS and
Ethernet. Such mappings are called Specific Communication Service Mappings and are
abbreviated SCSM.
The IEC 61850 model of a device is a virtualized model that begins with an abstract view of
the device and its objects and is defined in IEC 61850 part 7.
Figure 4.8 The SCSMs of IEC61850 placed according to the OSI layers
The SCSM of IEC 61850-8-1 maps most ACSI services to the Manufacturing Message
Standard which is an international networking standard (ISO 9506), usually abbreviated MMS.
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In the process of mapping the IEC 61850 objects to MMS, IEC 61850-8-1 specifies a method
of transforming the model information into a named MMS variable object that results in a
unique and unambiguous reference for each element of data in the model. In addition, the
mapping of IEC 61850 object and service models to MMS is based on a service mapping where
a specific MMS service/services are chosen as the means to implement the various services of
ACSI. For instance, the control model of ACSI is mapped to MMS read and write services.
Then the various object models of IEC 61850 are mapped to specific MMS objects. For
instance, the IEC 61850 logical device object is mapped to an MMS domain. Table 4.1
summarizes the mapping of IEC 61850 objects and Table 4.2 the ACSI mapping to MMS.
In addition, Part 8.1 of IEC 61850 provides mappings for Sampled Values, GOOSE, Time
Synchronization and GSSE to Ethernet. All but GOOSE messages and transmission of sampled
values are mapped to MMS protocol stack.
Table 4.1 IEC 61850 to MMS object mapping
In addition, there are two types of association between devices while communicating with each
other.
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Table 4.2 IEC 61850 services mapping (partial)
Two-Party-Application Association (TPAA)
 A bi-directional connection-oriented information exchange

 Reliable and end-to-end flow control
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Figure 4.9 Two-Party-Application Association
MultiCast-Application-Association (MCAA)
 A unidirectional information exchange

 Between one source (publisher) and one or many destinations (subscriber)
 The subscriber shall be able to detect loss and duplication of information received
 The receiver shall notify the loss of information to its user and shall discard duplicated
information
Figure 4.10 MultiCast-Application-Association (MCAA)
SCL is short for Substation automation system Configuration description Language. SCL is the
formal description of relations between substation automation system and the switchyard. The
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SCL language allows for configuration of a substation both before employment but also as
further equipment is added to the substation.
Table 4.3 Types of SCL file

Extension Name Description
.icd IED Capability Defines complete capability of an IED.

Contains single IED description, optional
Description
communication system description and
optional substation description. Used for
data exchange from the IED configuration
tool to the system configuration tool.
Items supported by an IED.
.ssd System Specification Complete specification of SAS excluding

IED descriptions. Describes the single
Description
line diagram of the substation and the
required logical nodes. Used for data
exchange from a system specification tool
to the system configuration tool. Entire
system.
.scd Substation Complete specification of SAS including

IED descriptions. Used for data exchange
Configuration
from the system configuration tool to IED
Description configuration tools. Single substation.
.cid Configured IED Makes communication possible between

Description an IED and an IED configuration tool.
Used for data exchange from the IED
configuration tool to the IED. Specific
IED.
The SCL file format is used for describing communication related IED configurations, IED
parameters, communication system configurations, function structures, and the relations
between them. The purpose is to exchange IED capability description, and substation
automation system descriptions between IED engineering tools and different system
engineering tools.
IEC 61850-6-1 specifies a Substation Configuration Language that is based on the eXtensible
Markup Language (XML) to describe the configuration of IEC 61850 based systems. SCL
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specifies a hierarchy of configuration files that enable multiple levels of the system to be
described in unambiguous and standardized XML files. The various SCL files include system
specification description (SSD), IED capability description (ICD), substation configuration
description (SCD), and configured IED description (CID) files. All these files are constructed
in the same methods and format but have different scopes depending on the need.
Any SCL file is structured with XML format and is made up of some of the following five parts,
depending upon its purpose.
 Header which identify an SCL configuration file and its version

 Substation description which describes the functional structure of a substation;
identifies the primary devices and their electrical connections
 IED description which describes the pre-configuration of an IED: access points, the
logical devices, and logical nodes.
 Communication system description
 Data type templates
In order to be fully compliant with the IEC 61850 standard, an IED shall have an ICD file
containing basic information about the IED such as which logical nodes and services it supports,
the IP address and so on. A configuration tool can then read such files and generate or modify
the SCD file which describes the full substation configuration. This file should be based not
only on the ICD files, but also on information entered by a system integrator about the
substation prior to adding the IEDs, or alternatively an SSD file describing the SAS itself.
Generic Object Oriented Substation Event (GOOSE) class model is used to distribute input and
output data values between IEDs on bay level (in horizontal direction) by using multicast
services. GOOSE messages are unidirectional and re-transmitted repetitively to achieve
reliability. While re-transmitting, the SqNum and retransmission time are increased gradually.
Each message in the retransmission sequence carries a timeAllowedToLive parameter that
informs the receiver, the maximum time to wait for the next re-transmission. If a new message
is not received within that time interval, the receiver assumes that the association is lost.
To send GOOSE messages a GoCB must be defined and a data set is needed that contains the
data objects of single data attributes to be sent. GoCB has to be defined per GOOSE-DataSet.
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A GOOSE message is forced to be transmitted when a trigger change is detected for a data
attribute. All members of the data set are copied in the send buffer with their actual value and
the message is sent. The subscribers, who knows the address of this GOOSE message, receives
the telegram. The GOOSE message includes for example sequence number to verify that all
messages are received.
The short circuit fault protection of bus bar protection can be provided directional overcurrent
relay. However, the relay may trip for the fault that happened on the customer feeder which
has to be cleared by the customer feeder protection relay. To avoid this, the customer feeder
protection relay should inform the bus bar protection relay, it has detected the fault. This was
done previously by tedious wiring of signal cables.
IEC-61850 GOOSE communication can handle this in the modern IEDs. When the fault
happens on the customer feeder both bus bar protection and customer feeder protection relay
picks up. As soon as the customer feeder detects the fault it sends blocking signal through
GOOSE messages to the bus bar protection relay. The bus bar protection relay resets
immediately when it receives the GOOSE message from the customer feeder relay. When the
fault happens on the bus bar since the customer feeder protection do not detect this fault, no
GOOSE blocking message is sent to the bus bar protection relay. Thus, the bus bar protection
relay will trip after the specified time delay.
In each some Distribution Substations there are two bus bars connected through bus coupler.
The bus coupler cubicle with circuit breaker is used to isolate or connect the two bus bars during
fault or when need arise for example during maintenance. The bus coupler is required to isolate
the healthy bus bar when the fault occurs on one of the two bus bars. The bus bar coupler is
provided with non-directional overcurrent relay. This helps to provide the customers on the
healthy feeder from the non-faulty part of the ring feeder. To achieve this, the bus bar coupler
protection relay has to be coordinated with bus bar protection relays. When the bus bar
protection relay detects the fault, it will send the trip command to the bus bar coupler protection
relay. The bus coupler protection relay also picks up due to the fault on the bus bar. But to
operate, it has to receive the trip command from the bus bar protection relays as shown in Figure
4.12.
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Figure 4.11 GOOSE application for blocking the bus bar protection relay
DM1, Bus-1 DM1, Bus-2
A01 A05 A09

A06
GOOSE
Ring input-output feeder Bus Coupler

Ring input-output feeder
A05-50
Trip-A05
A01-50
A09-50
Figure 4.12 The coupler automation with ring input and output relays
As shown in Figure 4.12 if the fault on the bus DM1, bus-1 is considered the operation will be
as follow:
1. First the fault is detected in the bus bar direction (reverse direction) by relays A01 and
A09. In addition, relay A05 which is non-directional will detect the fault current.
2. Then, the relays A01 will send GOOSE signal to relay A05
3. Based on the logic shown in Figure 4.12, the relay will receive trip signal either from
A01 or A09 and also detect fault.
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4. If condition 3 is fulfilled, the relay will trip its own circuit breaker and isolate the faulty
bus bar.
As technology migrates to “next generation” low-energy voltage and current sensors, the ability
to digitize the base quantities at the source and transmit the resulting sample values back to the
substation becomes a need. In addition to Sampled Values, the ability to remotely acquire status
information as well as set output controls is very desirable. IEC 61850 addresses this need
through the definition of Sampled Measured Values services and the implementation of a
Process Bus. The Process layer of the substation is related to gathering information, such as
voltage, current, and status information, from the transformers and transducers connected to the
primary power system process – the transmission of electricity. IEC 61850 defines the
collection of this data via two different protocol definitions, namely, Part 9.1 which defines a
Unidirectional Multidrop Point-to-Point fixed link carrying a fixed dataset and Part 9.2 which
defines a “configurable” dataset that can be transmitted on a multi-cast basis from one publisher
to multiple subscribers.
Figure 4.13 The basic concept of the sample value
The Merging Units in a station sample the signals at an agreed, synchronized rate. In this
manner, any IED can input data from multiple MUs and automatically align and process the
data. At this time, there is an implementation agreement that defines a base sample rate of 80
samples per power system cycle for basic protection and monitoring and a “high” rate of 256
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samples per power system cycle for high-frequency applications such as power quality and
high-resolution oscillography.
IEC 61850-9-2LE supports analog phase and neutral voltage and current transmission in real
time. The inter-panel wiring is replaced by Ethernet based communication to exchange the
current and voltage values in real-time between IEDs and automation devices. To insure highest
availability redundant Ethernet topologies have to be used. The most commonly used topologies
for sampled values application are High-availability seamless redundancy (HSR) and Parallel
redundancy protocol (PRP). These topologies are described in [58]. Optimization of the
network can be made to avoid the high traffic caused in the network due to sample value
messages.
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CHAPTER 5
INTEGRATION EFFECTS OF DISTRIBUTED GENERATIONS TO

THE DISTRIBUTION NETWORK
Even though the intermittency of resource has negative impact on power system reserve, there
is increased integration of renewable sources based DGs to the electricity network [61].
Deregulation of electric utilities, environmental concerns, limitations of fossil fuels and
decrease in the cost of modules (for the PV based DGs) are some of the reasons for the
increment in the integration of DGs like solar power plants to the distribution networks [62],
[63].
As per the report of Turkey’s Headquarter of Renewable Energy, Turkey has good solar energy
potential with average solar radiation of 1311 W/m2 . year [64]. Especially the southern part of
Turkey has a very valuable potential. In recent years, the project development and
implementation of solar power plants has boomed in Turkey. The government is also providing
supports to the sector by providing incentives, for example, below the capacity of 1 MW, the
customers can produce their own energy and sell the surplus energy to the grid without
requirement of any license. The government provides also purchasing guarantee for the
producers of electricity from solar energy with charming price compared to other resources
[65].
Most of the solar power plants are planned to be connected to the distribution networks. In the
usual practice, the distribution network operators announce the available capacity of their
transformer. Based on the available capacity, the solar power plant owners apply for the
connection permission. After the technical requirements are fulfilled, the power plant owners
are allowed to be connected their power plant to the nearby distribution network.
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Despite the incentives discussed above, the integration of DGs [66], [67], [68] and specifically
the solar power plants has dramatic effect on the conventional distribution network [69]. In
[70]the method of determining the maximum and minimum capacity of DGs at any point on
the radial network is determined. Although the trend and challenges of grid connected PV based
DGs with respect to demand and supply balancing is discussed in [71], the challenges with
respect to short circuit current and protection are not mentioned. The technical and potential
problems in regard to the grid connected DGs are discussed in [72].
The traditional distribution network is radial and passive in structure with unidirectional power
flow. In addition, the currently used protection design in MV and LV networks is based on the
passive paradigm with no energy flow in the reverse direction [73]. The energy flows in the
reverse direction due the integration of DGs, do not suit the conventional protection system.
Due to this fact, as far as the physical integration of DGs to the distribution network is
concerned, protection is one of the major issues. This study is thus, concerned with investigating
the possible challenges that may arise due to integration of PV based DGs to the protection
schemes of the existing distribution networks by considering the case study of an ongoing solar
energy projects in Antalya, Turkey.
The selection of equipment and the coordination of protection relays are based on short circuit
study. Therefore, short circuit study will be conducted at each relaying point in the network.
The problems that result with integration of PV DGs will be investigated. In addition, the fault
current effects of non-inverter based DGs will be analyzed and compared with inverter based
DGs.
This study is based on simulation of interaction of DGs to the DNs by using DIgSILENT Power
Factory which is a computer aided engineering tool for the analysis of industrial, utility, and
commercial electrical power systems. To achieve the main objectives of planning and operation
optimization in power system, it has been used as an advanced integrated and interactive
software platform dedicated to electrical power system and control analysis [74].
In distribution networks the fault current may rise to 10-15 time the nominal current depending
on the type of source. This high fault current can trigger protection relay easily. However, if
distribution network with large PV installations experiences a fault, the fault current may not
rise sufficiently due to interfaced inverter which limits the fault current. Due to this fact, there
are several shortcomings on the conventional protection schemes when PV based DGs are
126
involved in distribution networks. For instance, false tripping might occur due to the integration
of DGs into the distribution network on the same substation with a load. If we consider Figure
5.1, the current supplied from DG may exceed the pickup settings of relay R2, leading to
tripping due to occurrence of fault at F. The influence is more for the long feeders protected by
the instantaneous overcurrent and supplied from the weak grids [75].
If we consider again the fault at F in Figure 5.1, the relay R1 may not be able to trip due to fault
current contribution from PV based DG. This event, which is known as protection blinding,
occurs when the feeders are long or the concentration of DGs is high. Protection blinding may
result in the rise of dangerous touch voltage and spread of the fault current to more equipment.
Its severity depends on the local short-circuit current level, location of fault, DG’s capacity and
the grid impedance.
B R4 C
F
Grid
A R1 IAB
IED + IAB
PV based DG
R2 R3
D IED E
Figure 5.1 The negative effect of PV based DG integration on the conventional protection
Additionally, parallel operation may result in reduced fault impedance which may cause
unexpected high fault current which is above the fault currents for which the equipment is
designed. The fault current that flows on line BC of Figure 5.1. will be the sum of the fault
current from lines AB and ED which designated as IAB and IED on Figure 5.1 respectively
(PV DG), increasing the fault current on the equipment on the line BC. Furthermore, the fault
impedance seen by the relay R1 increases since the in feed is available from the PV DG.
In the overhead networks, transient faults are cleared by opening circuit CBs temporarily and
reclosing it again. If the fault is transient it will be cleared, but if it is permanent CB will keep
opening and closing continually till the number of reclosing operation is reached. On the other
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hand, when DGs are available, they will continue to supply the fault and the recloser activity
will not be successful [75], [76], [77]. This situation damages the equipment and affects the
reliability of supply.
The site of solar power plant project in Antalya with total 12 MW capacity is located at 36.25o
latitude and 29.92o longitude. It is one of the preeminent land for solar energy generation in
Turkey. Figure 5.2 shows the overview of the site.
Figure 5.2 The site of solar plants in Antalya
Figure 5.3 shows the single line diagram of the solar power plants in Antalya with the data of
overhead power plant, lines and cables are given in Table 5.1 and Table 5.2. Figure 5.4
illustrates the main components of solar plants. The 120 Wp PV panels are used for converting
solar energy to electricity.
The panels are grouped to make strings and the strings are grouped to form arrays. The DC
combiner boxes are used to combine arrays. Central inverter is used to convert the DC power
to AC. Unit transformers are used to step-up the output voltage of the inverter which is 0.4 kV
to 33 kV.
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Utility Grid
FINIKE TM
154 kV
FINIKE 154/31.5 kV
TM Uk=12%
FINIKE TM
33 kV
OHL Line #1
C
Cable #1
D
Cable #2
E
Cable #3
GES DM 3.1
Cable #4
GES DM2
Cable #5
Cable #6
PV DG1
PV DG13
Figure 5.3 Single line diagram of the solar plants in Antalya

Array-1
Central Inverter
DCB1
DC Combiner
Array-24 Box
DC
Array-1
AC
DCB24
DC Combiner
Array-24 Box
Figure 5.4 The main components of solar plants
In this study, the analysis is mainly conducted by calculating fault currents that occurs at
different location and direction. During occurrence of the fault, the inverter, which is used in
this project, limits the fault current to 150% of the rated current. The unit transformer further
limits the fault current which is supplied from the PV based DGs.
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Table 5.1 Types of overhead lines and cables used in solar plants
Pos. No. Type Length (m)
OHL Line #1 2 × 3 × 477 MCM 30080
Cable #1 (3 × 1 × 400⁄25)mm2 YAXC7V − R 75
Cable #2 (3 × 1 × 150⁄25)mm2 YAXC7V − R 440
Cable #3 (3 × 1 × 95⁄16)mm2 YAXC7V − R 515
Cable #4 (3 × 1 × 95⁄16)mm2 YAXC7V − R 760
Cable #6 4 × (3 × 1 × 240)mm2 N2XH 15
Table 5.2 Total strings current calculation
Power Plant 6×5 6×10 ISC NO of PDC NO. of Total
Names Array Array (STC) Panels (kWp) Strings String

(No.) (No.) (A) Current
at 70
°C
ABS_GÜRSES 102/37- 10 151 1.84 9360 1123.2 936 1753

40
SALT_1 GÜRSES 2 154 1.84 9300 1116 930 1742

102/39-40
SALT_GURSES_2 6 155 1.84 9480 1137.6 948 1776

102/37-38
AKSOLAR_GURSES_2 0 82 1.84 4920 590.4 492 922

102/37-38
BUSOLAR_GÜRSES 6 163 1.84 9960 1195.2 996 1866

102/25
130
AKSOLAR 101/36 0 166 1.84 9960 1195.2 996 1866
ANSOLAR 101/36 0 166 1.84 9960 1195.2 996 1866
SİMETRİ_1_GÜRSES 0 166 1.84 9960 1195.2 996 1866

101/37-38
AKGÜNEŞ_GÜRSES 0 166 1.84 9960 1195.2 996 1866

101/36-37
SALT1_GÜRSES_3 0 166 1.84 9960 1195.2 996 1866

101/36-37
SATÜRN 101/42 6 135 1.84 8280 993.6 828 1551
SATÜRN_GÜRSES 0 166 1.84 9960 1195.2 996 1866

102/25
BERRAK_1_GÜRSES 0 83 1.84 4980 597.6 498 933

102/25
The total short circuit is to mean that the fault current is flowing from the two directions towards
the bus. In order to demonstrate the integration effects of PV based DGs to the distribution
network with respect to the fault currents, the following scenarios are considered.
The electrical power system based on the short-circuit current can be considered as strong and
weak network. Weak grids are characterized by lower short circuit ratio and higher grid
impedance leading to higher risk of instability [78], [79]. The system strength could be
characterized by the Short Circuit Ratio (SCR) defined as the short circuit power (Ssc )available
divided by equipment size or load connected (Pload) to the AC system.
𝑆𝑠𝑐
𝑆𝐶𝑅 = (5.1)
𝑃𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑
For a system considered weak, the index is SCR<2.
131
Firstly, a relatively weak source network with short circuit power of 27 MVA is considered. In
this case the power transformer rating is 100 MVA. By using the equation 5.1, the SCR is 0.27,
manifesting the considered network is weak. Each PV based DG is connected step by step
Figure 5.5 (a) shows an increasing penetration of PV based DGs and its effect on the three-
phase steady state fault current on each bus. For example, on FINIKE TM bus, the short circuit
current increases from 444 A (with no DG connected) to 645A (with 12 MW DG connected).
Consequently, the total increase in the fault current is 201 A. On the other hand, by considering
the situation when the network is strong (with short circuit power of 1040 MWA, SCR is equal
to 10.40), the fault current variation is shown in Figure 5.5 (a), the increase in the fault current
is 110 A for the same bus and same condition of DGs increase.
0,7
0,65
0,6
0,55
Isc(kA)
0,5
0,45
FINIKE TM 33 GES DM 3.1

GES DM2 GES DM1
0,4
GES TM1 GES TM2
GES TM3 GES TM4
GES TM5 GES TM6
0,35
GES TM7 GES TM8
GES TM9 GES TM 10
GES TM 11 GES TM 12
0,3
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
Penetration of PV Power Plant (MW)
(a)
0,6
0,55
0,5
Isc(kA)
0,45
0,4 GES DM 3.1 GES DM2

GES DM1 GES TM1
GES TM2 GES TM3
GES TM4 GES TM5
0,35 GES TM6 GES TM7
GES TM8 GES TM9
GES TM 10 GES TM 11
GES TM 12
0,3
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
Penetration of PV Power Plant (MW)
(b)
Figure 5.5 The effect of PV based DG integration on weak distribution network and the fault
current variation
132
The trend observed above is the same for the other buses also. By excluding the FINIKE TM
bus, the variation of the fault current for the rest of the buses can be observed as shown in Figure
5.5 (b) and Figure 5.6 (b).
For the weak system, the short circuit current at the FINIKE TM is 1.2 times the fault current
at the furthest bus from it, while it is 4 times for the strong network. The latter case is better
with regard to the protection relays grading. In this case, even though the fault current
difference between each bus for both weak and strong network is small, the difference is more
visible for strong network (Figure 5.6 (b)).
7
FINIKE TM 33 GES DM 3.1

GES DM2 GES DM1
Isc(kA)
4 GES TM1 GES TM2

GES TM3 GES TM4
GES TM5 GES TM6
GES TM7 GES TM8
3 GES TM10 GES TM9
GES TM11 GES TM12
1
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
PV Penetration(MW)
(a)
1,65
1,6
1,55
Isc(kA)
1,5
GES DM 3.1 GES DM2

1,45 GES DM1 GES TM1
GES TM2 GES TM3
GES TM4 GES TM5
GES TM6 GES TM7
1,4
GES TM8 GES TM10
GES TM9 GES TM11
GES TM12
1,35
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14
PV Penetration(MW)
(b)
Figure 5.6 The effect of PV based integration on strong network and the fault current
variation
133
For instance, when the network is strong the difference in fault current is more than 10 A
between GES DM 3.1 and DM2 buses. When the network is weak the difference in the fault
current for the same buses is less than 1 A. Availability of significant difference for the fault
current between buses is important with regard to the protection coordination of relays.
(a)
(b)
Figure 5.7 (a) When fault is applied on the GES TM11 (b) When fault is applied on FINIKE
TM bus
134
In this case study one DG terminal is selected as reference (PV DG11) and three phase fault is
applied on this terminal as shown in Figure 5.7 (a).
The selection is arbitrary and makes no significant difference even if other DG terminals are
selected. For this case, the strong network condition is considered. Then, the short circuit
current is measured at the FINIKE TM bus with respect to the increase in the penetration of the
PV DGs. FINIKE TM bus is the nearest bus to the utility network (Electricity Transmission
Corporation of Turkey).
1,408
FINIKE TM 33 kV
1,407
1,406
1,405
1,404
Isc(kA)
1,403
1,402
1,401
1,4
1,399
1,398
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
PV DGs(MW)
(a)
1,6
1,55
1,5
GES TM11
Isc(kA)
1,45
1,4
1,35
1,3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
PV DGs(MW)
(b)
Figure 5.8 The variation fault current for the fault at GES TM11
135
The results in boxes in the Figure 5.7 indicates the steady state short circuit power, steady state
short circuit current and peak short circuit current respectively, based on the IEC 60909 short
circuit calculation method.
When the fault current from the PV DG increases, the short circuit current coming from the
source network is decreasing as shown on Figure 5.8 (a). For increase of 12 MW with step of
1 MW, the decrease in the short circuit current is 6 A. This shows that the fault contribution
from PV based DG do not have much influence on reducing the short circuit current of the
strong network. But if the penetration is very large and the network is weak, the increased in
penetration level has significant influence and can result protection blinding.
For the same fault location (on the bus of PV DG11), the trend in the short circuit is observed
on the PV DG11 terminal bus and shown on the Figure 5.8 (b). On the PV based DG terminal,
with increase of the penetration, the short circuit fault current increases. Thus, if overcurrent
based protections are used, it is necessary to adapt the setting values for each increase or
decrease of the DGs penetration.
Furthermore, by applying fault on the FINIKE TM as shown in Figure 5.7 (b), the variation of
fault current from PV DG11 to the FINIKE TM substation is observed. When all the DGs are
offline (not connected to the grid), the fault current is zero along all of the buses, but when DGs
are integrated, the fault current is increasing from the PV DG11 to the FINIKE TM, Figure 5.9
(a). The increment occurs on GES DM1, GES DM2 and GES DM 3.1 as the power from DGs
are collected on these buses. After GES DM 3.1, we do not observe any increase in the fault
since there are no DGs connected. In similar way, for the case when the fault is applied on PV
DG 11 terminal, the fault current varies as shown on Figure 5.9 (b). In this case fault current
increase is observed on GES DM2 and GES DM1 buses. This is due to the collection of the
fault current from PV DGs of neighboring feeders.
The non-inverter based DGs like directly interfaced wind turbines, are connected to the DNs
without the interface of inverter. Consequently, the DGs can inject significant amount of current
during fault. It is assumed that the non-inverter based DGs are connected to same network as
in Figure 5.7 in the place of previously simulated PV based DGs. Thus, the short circuit current,
which is injected to the network from each DG, is 1.539 kA.
136
0,4
0,35
0,3 12 MW DG-A 11 MW DG-A

10 MW DG-A 9 MW DG-A
8 MW DG-A 7 MW DG-A
0,25 6 MW DG-A 5 MW DG-A
4 MW DG-A 3 MW DG-A
2 MW DG-A 1 MW DG-A
Isc(kA)
O MW DG
0,2
0,15
0,1
0,05
0
B_FINIKE TM C_GES DEM 3.1 D_GES DM 2 E_GES DM1
Buses
(a)
1,6
1,55
1,5
Isc(kA)
1,45
1,4
12 MW DG-B 11 MW DG -B
10 MW DG-B 9 MW DG-B
8 MW DG-B 7 MW DG-B
1,35 6 MW DG-B 5 MW DG-B
4 MW DG-B 3 MW DG-B
2 MW DG-B 1 MW DG-B
0 MW DG-B
1,3
B_FINIKE TM C_GES DEM 3.1 Buses D_GES DM 2 E_GES DM1
(b)
Figure 5.9 The variation of fault current for the upstream and downstream faults
This may result in protection blinding at R1B. Consequently, the short circuit variation due to
the injection of DGs has significant effect significant on the network. The worst effect due to
DGs variation can be observed from Figure 5.10 (b). The fault current at the R3B and R4B
position varies from 1.407 kA to the 15.87 kA (the total variation is 14.463 kA).
To observe the fault current pattern, three-phase fault current is applied first as in Figure 5.7 (a)
in the direction of the red arrow on all buses. As shown in Figure 5.10 (a) at FINIKE TM the
137
fault current injected from the grid decreases from 1.407 kA to 1.115 kA (a total decrease of
292 A) for the integration of 12 MW.
1,45
1,4
1,35
FINIKE TM 33 kV
1,3
Isc(kA)
1,25
1,2
1,15
1,1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Non-inverter based DGs(MW)
(a)
17,1
15,1
13,1
11,1
Isc(kA)
9,1 E_GES DM2
F_GES DM1
7,1
5,1
3,1
1,1
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14
Non-inverter based DGs(MW)
(b)
Figure 5.10 (a) Fault variation at the R1B position (b) Fault variation at the R3B and R4B
positions
In such situations, the protection relay setting is depends highly on the DG penetration level.
For example, the relay setting, which is set by considering when the all the DGs are connected
to the DNs, will definitely result in protection blinding when only few DGs are on.
On the other hand the settings, which are used when only few DGs are online, may not able to
detect the fault current when more DGs are integrated. Moreover, enormous change in fault
current level should be considered when the switchgears are selected.
138
Figure 5.11 Comparison of inverter and non-inverter based DGs integration effect for weak
system
Finally, the effect of integration of inverter based and non-inverter based DGs on weak system
is shown on Figure 5.11. When non-inverter based DGs integration is increased (0-12 MW) on
weak system, the fault current at the FINIKE TM bus is observed to decrease by 77 A.
Additionally, for the weak system with inverter based DGs for the 0-12 MW integration
increase, the decrease in current of FINIKE TM bus is insignificant as shown in Figure 5.11.
139
CHAPTER 6
A NEW PROTECTION PHILOSOPHY FOR SMART DISTRIBUTION

NETWORK
DGs Integration to Distribution networks and bidirectional current flow creates similarity
between transmission networks and distribution lines. Due to the integration of DGs, the DNs
are changed from the radial to the multi-source system. The magnitude, duration, and direction
of the fault currents are also changed [80], [81], [82], [83]. A protection system which responds
to faults currents from both utility and DGs sides has to be devised [83]. Thus, directional relays,
differential relays, distance relays and voltage based relays can be used as an alternative to the
inefficient non-directional overcurrent protection [84]. For the distance relays, the shortness of
the distance and the status of the DGs can influence the correct operation of the relay. The
voltage based protection is independent of the direction and the magnitude of the fault current.
However, the voltage can be affected by load switching and other transient conditions. In
addition, achieving selective operation by using this method can be difficult. This limitations
can be resolved by the differential protection schemes as it is independent of DG type, location
and size. The differential scheme may not be economical solution due to the cost of the relay
and the requirement of communication infrastructure. Moreover, differential relay cannot
provide backup-protection and requires additional backup-protection.
In [85] a communication-assisted overcurrent radial distribution network radial distribution

network with DGs is discussed. It uses a directional overcurrent relay with reverse blocking
and inter-tripping functions.
An adaptive protection scheme which can adjust the settings to the actual state of the active
distribution network can handle the protection problems with regard to DGs integration. This
protection methods are proposed in literatures [86], [87], [88], [89], [90]. The proposed
140
methods are based on using lookup tables and memory. The general procedures followed in the
adaptive protection are [84]:
 Operational parameters of protected systems are continuously monitored by a central

unit.
 By analyzing the status of CBs and/or DGs, the structure of the networks are recognized
by the algorithms in the central unit.
 New protection settings are calculated (online or offline), based on the system operating
conditions and the structure.
 An efficient communication is used to exchange data and settings between central
control units and the protection relays.
In [91], [92] an adaptive protection method which considers the change in size and number of
DGs is proposed. However, the proposed methods are based on the pre-calculated setting
groups.
The proposed method in the current study is adaptable to any DG type and the penetration level.
The settings are not based on pre-calculated setting groups. Moreover, it is not depending fully
on a communication between the central controller and the relays. The settings values are
exchanged between the relays. This is very important from the reliability perspective as it
reduces the criticality of central controller. Additionally it reduces communication costs as the
central controller communicates only with peripheral relays and CBs. According to the
proposed method, the central controller is only used for detecting change in the network
configuration and inform end relays to start the adaptive protection. In this study the
communication technical details will not be approached.
Figure 6.1, shows part DigSILENT model of the Antalya Solar Power Plant projects with others
power plants not shown for simplicity. Considering the currently used practice on the site,
Relays R1 to R5 are non-directional overcurrent relays while the relay R6 which is contained
in the auto-producer cubicle has directional capability. Short circuit fault is applied at the bus
E_GES TM5/B9 as shown on Figure 6.1.
The fault current comes from the utility network direction and the DGs in the vicinity. The fault
current from utility network is 1.436 kA. In this case relay R4 sees a fault current of 1.449 kA
and clears the fault. In addition relay R2 which is non-directional senses a fault current of 31
141
A. The inverse time overcurrent setting is mostly 1.2 times the nominal current value which
equals to 20.04 A (for the nominal current of 17 A). Since the short-circuit current in the system
is limited, Overcurrent protective devices within photovoltaic systems need to operate on low
current levels. Consequently, the fault current which is flowing towards the nearby feeder is 31
A and is greater than the pickup setting of the R2 feeder.
Figure 6.1 Part of Antalya solar power plant project
Consequently, this may cause false tripping on R2 feeder, disconnecting the DG from the
network.
On the other hand, the fault current from the network is large enough compared to the fault
current generated by all DGs (even if we consider all DGs the total current is 372 A < 1436 A).
Thus, the reduction of fault current from the grid due to integration of DGs is not significant.
Consequently, the protection blinding will not happen on this network due to the integration of
PV based DGs unless the integration ratio is too much.
To overcome the problem of false tripping, directional overcurrent relay can be used. If for
example in Figure 6.1, R2 relay is directional relay and its forward direction is towards the
PVDG6, the occurrence of the fault on the nearby feeder will not cause false tripping as this
current will be detected in the reverse direction.
142
Figure 6.2 Antalya CLK Solar Power Plant Project
In Figure 6.2 the fault current is applied at the relaying points R1A to R4A in the direction of
red arrow. The fault current initially increases from 0.342 kA (for R1A) to 0.378 kA (for R2A)
then it decreases to 0.095 kA (for R3A) and then to 0.032 kA (for R4A) as shown on Figure
6.3(a).Similarly, if we observe for the relaying points R1B to R4B in the direction of green
arrow, the fault current initially decreases from 1.454 kA (R1B) to 1.442 kA (R2B), then it
increases to 1.563 kA (R3B) and 1.564 kA (R4B) as shown on Figure 6.3 (b). This shows that
the fault current trend is not the same to the traditional distribution system. In case of DNs with
DGs integrated, the fault current may vary towards the grid or the DGs. Thus, it is clear that a
new protection philosophy should be devised to handle the protection challenges arising from
integrating DGs to the distribution network.
In the following section a new protection philosophy based on the adaptive method is proposed.
The proposed protection philosophy can be used on the currently used IEDs.
143
0,4 0,378
0,342
0,35
0,3
SHORT CİRCUİT(KA)
0,25
0,2 RA
0,15
0,095
0,1
0,032
0,05
0
B_FINIKE TM C_GES DEM 3.1 D_GES DM 2 F_GES TM1
BUS BAR
(a)
1,58
1,563 1,564
1,56
1,54
SHORT CİRCUİT(KA)
1,52
1,5
1,48
RB
1,454 1,442
1,46
1,44
1,42
1,4
1,38
BUS BAR
(b)
Figure 6.3 The fault current variation for the CLK SPP
144
The proposed protection philosophy is shown on the flow chart of Figure 6.4. Directional
overcurrent relay has to be used on both side of each branch. In the DNs, there is a difficulty
with respect to overcurrent protection due to limitation of time from the transmission line
operators. Thus, the time assignment, in some cases the time multiplier setting (TMS) have to
be used economically.
In the proposed method, the network is initially considered as a radial from the connection point
to the end feeders (each DGs and Loads at the end of the network). The minimum possible time
and time multiplier setting are assigned to the initial relays (for example relay R1A and R1B of
Figure 6.2). Then, the time and time multiplier setting of the next backup relay (for example
R2A) will be determined based on the short circuit ratio between its relaying points and the
other relaying points on the path.
In similar way, the DGs terminal is used as the initial point for assigning the minimum time and
TMS values. If we take Figure 6.2 as an example, R1B will be assigned the initial time and
TMS values. The next backup relay R2B will be assigned the time and the TMS with respect
to short circuit ratios between itself and the other relaying points in the same direction. This
process continues for all relay on the same path of protection. According to this method, during
the coordination process, at the node combining many feeders (from many feeders to one
feeder), the incoming relays may have different time and TMS setting. In this case, the
maximum of these setting values has to be selected and sent to the upstream relay. In the reverse
direction (from one feeder to many feeders), the downstream relay can send its settings to the
upward relays and each of the upstream relay can assign different time and TMS values as each
of the setting follows different path.
The advantage of this algorithm is its simplicity and can be implemented in the currently used
IEDs. It is also adaptive and the coordination can change with respect to any change in the DGs
or the network configuration. In this method, the first relays will be initialized for each path
when each change in the network (to trigger them). In this case, each relay can process the
simple mathematical operations and adjust their setting and send their setting to the upstream
relays. Once the coordination is completed, the relays can work in coordinated manner without
any need for the communication.
145
Figure 6.4 An adaptive protection philosophy for DNs with DGs
In addition, the following steps can explain the working procedure of the chart in Figure 6.4:
1. The monitoring agent continuously monitors the status of CBs.
146
2. If any change occurs, like for example, opening or closing of CBs, the monitoring agent
triggers the calculation agents which calculates the short circuit and load currents at each
relaying points.
3. Then the peripheral relays at each branch are triggered to calculate their own setting
locally by using the currently generated load and short circuit current.
4. The pickup current, time, time multiplier and etc. settings of each relays whose settings
are calculated in step-3 will be sent to the next upstream relay on the pass.
5. If the short circuit is decreasing on the pass, the time and TMS can increase based on the
short circuit ratio between the relaying points and other points in order to provide
sufficient time. If the short circuit current is increasing the on the pass, the time and TMS
settings will decrease, to provide fast operation. This step can be selected as an optional.
6. If so many relays are meeting at the bus bar during data setting transfer, the maximum
setting values can be selected in order to avoid the overlapping.
7. The steps from 4 to 6 will be repeated till all the relays on the pass are set.
In addition, for the faults occurring on the cable or the transmission line interconnecting the
substations, the fault clearance can be speeded. This is due to the fact that the coordination is
done from two sides.
Since the time setting is increasing from two sides by default in opposite direction, time settings
of one of the two relays will be smaller. For the fault on a branch, the two relays will see the
fault in their forward direction. The relay with smaller time and TMS setting will pick up first
and send follow me signal to the corresponding relay on the opposite side. Consequently, the
corresponding relay will operate in the shorter time than its time and TMS setting. This is
demonstrated in
Figure 6.5 and Figure 6.6. The blue and dark blue lines indicate the time setting in the opposite
directions. While the red line indicates the smaller fault clearing time when the communication
is available. The advantage of this method is that it can be implemented with currently used
IEDs.
147
0,90
0,85
0,80 RB RA
0,70 0,71
MIN
0,70
0,60
0,50
Time(seconds)
0,50
0,45
0,40
0,28
0,30
0,20
0,20 0,17
0,10
0,00
Bus bars
Figure 6.5. Speeding up the relay operation
To implement the proposed method, an adaptable the directional IEDs can be used. The signals
route are shown on Figure 6.7 for a particular example of DN with DGs integration. Reliable
and fast communication infrastructure is one of the characteristics of smart distribution
network. The IEDs can communicate with each other and the controller by using standard
communication protocols like IEC 61850.
The Controller can be an independent IED. It contains monitoring and calculation agents. It can
be central (single IED) or distributed (more than one IEDs with one master) depending on the
requirement for the reliability. The monitoring agent detects the configuration change in the
network by monitoring the status of the CBs in real time. For example, if we consider Table
6.1, there is no any change in the status of CBs between (t-2)th and (t-1)th times and the monitoring
agent will not trigger the calculation agent. But at tth time CB2 is changed from open position
to closed position.
148
RiA
RiB
Follow me
signal from
RiA/RiB
RiA/RiB Trip
detects fault Time CiA/CiB
in its forward delay
direction OR
Follow me
signal to
RiA/RiB
Figure 6.6 The logic to be implemented in the relay for speed-up operation
Table 6.1 The status of CBs to detect network configuration
Designation Time CB1 CB2 CB3 CB4
A (t-2)th 1 0 1 0
B (t-1)th 1 0 1 0
C tth 1 1 1 0
A xor B (t-1)th 0 0 0 0
B xor C tth 0 1 0 0
The calculation agent contains program for load flow and short circuit calculation. The network
structure in the program will be updated in parallel with CB’s status update. Thus, the results
of load flow and short circuit calculations are updated for every change in the network.
The relay agent is assumed to contain extra capabilities like calculating the pickup time and
current at each relaying points by using the fault current and loading currents. For example, for
149
an inverse time overcurrent coordination, the relay at upstream or (n+1)th position on the
coordination series, can determine its time multiplier setting (TMSn+1) as in equation (1).
𝑡𝑛 + 𝐶𝑇𝐼
𝑇𝑀𝑆𝑛+1 = (6.1)
0.14
0.02
𝐼
(𝐼 𝑛 ) −1
𝑝_𝑛+1
Where: In is the fault current for the downstream relay (nth position); In+1 is the fault current for
the upstream relay.Ip_n+1 the pickup current for the upstream relay.
The loading currents and fault current at each relay points can be received from the controller
IEDs’ calculation agent. In addition, due to current advancement in IEDs technology, the short
circuit and load flow can be calculated within the relay itself.
As discussed previously, the algorithm automatically detects any change in the network and
initiates the adaptive protection. The adaptive protection uses load flow and short calculation
to determine the new setting as shown in the flow chart shown on Figure 6.4.
To verify the protection philosophy, part of solar power plant project in the vicinity of Antalya
which is shown on Figure 6.8 is considered. For simulation purpose the following four paths
are defined from Figure 6.8.
 Path-1: in the direction of red arrow which includes relays, RA501, RA502, RAD02 and
RAD03.
 Path-2: in the direction of blue arrow which includes relays, RBD00, RBD01, RBD02
and RB503.
 Path-3: in the direction of green arrow which includes relays RBD00, RBD01, RBD02
and RB603.
 Path-4: in the direction of red arrow which includes relays RA601, RA602, RAD01,
RAD02 and RAD03.
The monitoring agent triggers the calculation agent when it recognize any change in the
network. It also triggers the peripheral relays (RA501 and RA601) and the source relay
(RBD00). By using the short circuit and load flow data these relays calculate a new setting
value. Then, RA501 and RA601 update their setting with new values and trigger the next
150
upward relays RA502 and RA602 respectively. They also send their settings to be used by
RA502 and RA602 when they calculates their setting.
Utility
Follow me signals grid
between R02A
and R01B
Circuit
Breaker(CB)
CBs status signals
R0nB
Signals triggering
Peripheral relays R0nA
Triggering and data

exchange signals
from R0nB to R01B R02B
Triggering and data R02A Rn1A

exchange signals from
R01A, Rm1A and Rn1A
towards to R0nA direction
Controller IED
Monitoring
Agen t G
DGn
Calcu lation
Agent
R01B
R01A Rm1A
G G
DG1 DGm
Figure 6.7 Signal Paths for the proposed communication method
This process continues for all relays on the path. At the point of common coupling with many
collector feeders (in this case, D_GES DM2 bus on Figure 6.8 ), setting values that will be sent
from RA502 and RA602 to the upstream relay (RAD01) can be different. In such case, RAD01
relay will select the maximum of the values from the two relays. In similar way, other relays
trigger the next upstream relays in their path.
151
DPL is used to model the adaptive protection philosophy. As discussed in the previous section,
the monitoring agent program checks for the status of the CBs in real time and if any change
happened, it triggers the calculation agents. After that, it initializes the peripheral relay agents
(branch and source relays).
Initially all the circuit breakers connecting the DGs to the DN were open, and then closed by
one by one automatically by using test code. For each change of the CB’s status, the adaptive
protection philosophy starts to adjust the settings of all the relays. As discussed in the previous
section, in this method the protection functions which are already available in the currently
IEDs can be used. For simulation purpose, directional overcurrent relay is used with forward
direction set towards the cable (transmission line). The characteristic curve which is used for
each relay is IEC 255-3 normal inverse (equation 2).
0.14
T = TMS ∗ (6.2)
I 0.02
(Ip) −1
Where ,T ,I, Ip and TMS are pickup time, fault current, pickup current and time dial setting of the relay,
respectively.
However the method is valid also for other protection functions like short circuit and earth fault
protections.
For this simulation study, the case where the DGs integration varied from 3 MW to 14 MW is
considered. The relays at the periphery are assigned with TMS of 0.1 (suitable value can be
selected based on the number of relays to be coordinated in series), but the TMS for other relays
are determined based on the network condition.
As shown on Figure 6.9 and Figure 6.11, the TMS and the time are changing with each change
of the MW integration. These results shows how the setting of the relays are changing with
DGs status change. Had the adaptive coordination philosophy not be used the coordination
could have been lost for each path. The case for the other paths is also similar to the discussions
for the above two paths.
If Figure 6.9 (a) is considered, the TMS is increasing from relay RA601 to RA602, but it is
decreasing from relay RA602 to RAD01. From the structure network used for simulation
(Figure 6.8), there is only one DG on the path of protection of relays RA601 and RA602. The
load flow current for this path is not changing since it depends only on this DG even if the DG
s integration is increased (from DG1 to DGm as shown on Figure 6.8 and).
152
Figure 6.8 The Protection Coordination Paths for simulation analysis
(a)
153
(b)
Figure 6.9 (a) TMS and (b) operating time at the maximum fault currents for Path-1
Figure 6.10 Time inverse characteristics for relays RA601, RA602 and RAD01
(a)
154
(b)
Figure 6.11 (a) TMS and (b) operating time at the maximum fault currents for Path-2
In addition, the fault current is increasing since it comes from the nearby feeders. In contrast,
for the relay RAD01, the pickup current increases with increasing of integration. But, there is
no much change in the fault current since it only comes from the grid side (when fault is applied
for example at F3). Consequently, the decrease in TMS from RA602 to RAD01 created no
problem on the coordination as shown on Figure 6.10. Additionally, the TMS is increasing
from RAD01 to RAD02 as shown on Figure 6.9 (a).
Figure 6.12 Time inverse characteristics for relays RBD00, RBD01, RBD02 and RB503
155
Table 6.2 Relay RAD01 operating time for fault happening at the downstream relay locations
and its own location (the fault is applied when 4 MW is integrated)
DG in Adaptive Setting RAD01 relay operating time in second (4 MW DGs

MW integrated when fault is applied)
Ip(A) TMS For a fault at F1 For a fault at F2 For a fault at F3

(Isc=419 A) (Isc=431 A) (Isc=438 A)
4 62.60 0.25 0.90 0.89 0.88
5 83.50 0.26 1.10 1.08 1.07
6 104.37 0.26 1.29 1.26 1.25
7 125.21 0.26 1.48 1.45 1.43
8 146.03 0.26 1.69 1.65 1.62
9 166.81 0.26 1.93 1.87 1.84
10 187.57 0.25 2.19 2.12 2.08
11 208.30 0.25 2.50 2.40 2.35
12 229.00 0.25 2.87 2.74 2.67
13 249.67 0.25 3.32 3.15 3.06
14 270.32 0.24 3.89 3.66 3.53
15 290.95 0.24 4.64 4.30 4.13
Furthermore Figure 6.9(b) shows the operating time for a fault near to the relays. The pattern
shows, relays RA601 and RA602 operates very fast as the fault current coming from the nearby
is high. But relays RAD01 and RAD02 are operating slowly relatively as the fault in the relays
direction is not as high as fault current of relays RA601 and RA602. After the settings are
156
automatically calculated faults are applied at F1, F2 and F3 which are the midpoints of L6, L4
and L3 respectively as shown on Figure 6.8.
When the MW integration is increased from 4 MW to 14 MW, the pickup current and TMS are
automatically adjusted as shown on Table 6.2 . Two cases are considered, in the first case, faults
are applied at F1, F2 and F3 when the integration is 4 MW and the operating times of the relay
are tabulated in Table 6.2. For the same fault current, the operating times are calculated for
other settings also (TMS and Ip). Similarly the setting is calculated for the case the integration
is 15 MW as shown in Table 6.3. From these results, the difference in the operating time is
clearly observable.
Table 6.3 Relay RAD01 operating time for fault happening at the downstream relay locations
and its own location (the fault is applied when 15 MW is integrated)
DG in Adaptive Setting Operating time of RAD01 (14 MW DGs integrated

MW when fault is applied)
Ip(A) TMS For a fault at For a fault at For a fault at

F1(Isc=319 A) F2(Isc=390 A) F3(Isc=438 A)
4 62.60 0.25 1.05 0.93 0.88
5 83.50 0.26 1.33 1.15 1.07
6 104.37 0.26 1.61 1.36 1.25
7 125.21 0.26 1.92 1.58 1.43
8 146.03 0.26 2.29 1.82 1.62
9 166.81 0.26 2.74 2.09 1.84
10 187.57 0.25 3.33 2.41 2.08
157
Table 6.3(cont’d)
11 208.30 0.25 4.11 2.79 2.35
12 229.00 0.25 5.25 3.26 2.67
13 249.67 0.25 7.04 3.86 3.06
14 270.32 0.24 10.33 4.66 3.53
15 290.95 0.24 18.43 5.78 4.13
Table 6.4 The wrong operations resulted from DGs integration and adaptive setting’s
advantage at relay RAD01
Settings Operating time of RAD01 for loading variations from 3MW (IL3) to 14 MW(IL14)
IL3* IL4 IL5 IL6 IL7 IL8 IL9 IL10 IL11 IL12 IL13 IL14
= = = = = = = = = = = =
No. Ip(A) TMS 52.17 69.58 86.98 104.34 121.69 139.01 156.31 173.58 190.83 208.06 225.27 242.46
1 62.60 0.25 NO+ 16.45 5.28 3.39 2.60 2.17 1.89 1.69 1.54 1.43 1.34 1.27
2 83.50 0.26 NO NO 44.25 8.08 4.77 3.52 2.86 2.45 2.17 1.96 1.80 1.68
3 104.37 0.26 NO NO NO NO 11.82 6.33 4.48 3.56 2.99 2.62 2.34 2.14
4 125.21 0.26 NO NO NO NO NO 17.34 8.16 5.54 4.29 3.56 3.07 2.73
5 146.03 0.26 NO NO NO NO NO NO 26.51 10.42 6.73 5.08 4.14 3.54
6 166.81 0.26 NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 45.01 13.30 8.09 5.94 4.77
7 187.57 0.25 NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 102.94 17.11 9.68 6.90
8 208.30 0.25 NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 22.46 11.58
9 229.00 0.25 NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 30.54
10 249.67 0.25 NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
In Table 6.2 and Table 6.3, the advantage of the proposed adaptive protection is clearly visible.
When setting no.-1 (Ip=62.6 A and TMS=0.25) is used for all conditions of DGs variation, the
relay RAD01 operates wrongly when the integrated DGs are 4 MW and above. In similar way,
if setting no.-5 is used (Ip=146.03 A and TMS=0.26), the relay RAD01 operates wrongly under
normal condition for integration of 9 MW and above. In Table 6.4 and Table 6.5, the shaded
region with designation ‘NO’ is indicates the region where relays are not operating wrongly.
Settings 10, 11 and 12, seems working for all conditions, but if these settings are used, the relay
may not detect low current fault conditions. In addition, they are not working for higher
integration of DGs in similar way to the other settings. In the proposed method for example if
6 MW DG is integrated the setting will be automatically adjusted to setting no. 6(Ip=187.53 A
and TMS=0.42) for relay RAD02 as shown in Table 6.5. Thus, using the proposed adaptive
method avoids wrong operation. It is not also depending on the limited setting groups.
158
Table 6.5 The wrong operations resulted from DGs integration and adaptive setting’s
advantage at relay RAD02
Settings Operating time of RAD02 for loading variations from 4 MW (I L3) to 15 MW(IL14)
IL4 IL5 IL6 IL7 IL8 IL9 IL10 IL11 IL12 IL13 IL14 IL15
= = = = = = = = = = = =
No. Ip(A) TMS 69.51 86.91 104.28 121.64 138.97 156.27 173.56 190.82 208.06 225.28 242.48 259.65
1 83.41 0.45 NO 77.20 14.16 8.37 6.18 5.02 4.29 3.80 3.44 3.16 2.94 2.76
2 104.29 0.44 NO NO NO 20.13 10.77 7.64 6.06 5.10 4.46 4.00 3.65 3.37
3 125.14 0.44 NO NO NO NO 29.12 13.72 9.31 7.21 5.98 5.17 4.59 4.16
4 145.96 0.43 NO NO NO NO NO 44.14 17.38 11.22 8.48 6.92 5.91 5.20
5 166.76 0.43 NO NO NO NO NO NO 74.47 22.06 13.42 9.87 7.92 6.69
6 187.53 0.42 NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 168.96 28.27 16.00 11.41 9.01
7 208.27 0.42 NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 36.99 19.08 13.15
8 228.98 0.41 NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 50.14 22.82
9 249.67 0.41 NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 72.41
* It means the loading current in A when 3 MW DG is integrated
+ It means the relay will not pickup and there is no wrong operation
159
CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The electrical power system is expensive investments which have to be designed, implemented
and operated with great care so that it provides valuable results. If proper protection system
design procedure is not followed, the fault currents that may result from abnormal conditions
can damage the components of this expensive investment within a fraction of minutes. Thus,
during power system design stage, detailed analysis of the system, like a short circuit and load
analysis has to be made. Based on the analysis results, proper protection systems, equipment
and techniques have to be selected before the implementation stage. This involves the selection
of appropriate circuit breakers, fuses, Isolators, instrument transformers, protection relays, etc.
Moreover, proper coordination among these equipment is crucial task which has to be handled
by protection engineer. In this thesis, the proper steps for designing protection system is
discussed with practical case study of SKS project. The engineering steps start from load
analysis and short circuit study, which is discussed in this study. The selection of appropriate
instrument transformers is also among the fundamental steps for proper operation of the
protection system. Based on the requirement of the system to be protected, overcurrent,
differential and distance protection schemes are implemented in the project. Overcurrent and
earth fault protection are the earliest protection to be used for the protection of power systems.
The engineering issues related to overcurrent and earth fault protection are discussed in detail.
In addition, this protection system is designed and implemented for the SKS by providing the
necessary coordination among the protection relays. The necessary engineering steps to be
followed for the currently used protection schemes for the modern IEDs are discussed. The
results from the coordination study are implemented to the substation protection relays.
160
Power transformers which are used in substation to change between the voltage levels are
protected mainly by differential relay. The differential protection is the fastest unit protection
scheme which must not operate for the fault outside its protection zone (through fault
conditions). False tripping of differential relay due to through fault is avoided by using
percentage differential curve. Consequently, the differential relay settings involve
determination of the pickup currents and the slopes of the percentage differential curves. In
addition, CT ratio correction, inrush setting and phase angle corrections are included in the
setting parameters. ABB relay RED 615 is used for this case and the setting parameters for this
relay are determined. Furthermore, transmissions line which transfer energy from one place to
another are protected by distance relay which are placed in the electrical substation. As the
length of transmission line is proportional to its impedance, distance protection relays are
commonly employed to protect both phase and ground faults (phase and ground relay
configurations). The ground relay configuration involves residual compensation factor. Infeed
and outfeed effects, arc resistance effect, load encroachment and power system disturbances
like power swings have to be considered while calculating the distance protection settings.
Distance protection by using non-pilot scheme involves the stepped schemes and the zone-1
extension schemes. For distance protection, MiCOMho P443 relay is used and settings are
calculated. The results from the coordination study are implemented to the substation protection
relays. After the necessary test and commissioning of protection system, the SKS is successfully
energized.
Organized industrial zones’ distribution networks must be supplied with electricity

continuously. Considering the radial distribution network, a fault on the network affects all the
downstream feeders. Due to this fact, ring distribution network is commonly implemented in
the organized industrial zones. The challenging aspect is the protection coordination of the ring
distribution network. The customer feeders can be protected by overcurrent relays. The
underground cables are protected by differential relays. In addition, auxiliary protections are
implemented by using overcurrent relays for the case the differential protection is not working
properly. The overcurrent protection must be directional for the selective operation as the
current flows in the ring network from two directions. The coordination is done by considering
as if the ring network is radial from two sides. The auxiliary protection can also provide busbar
protection. However, the main busbar protection can be provided by using GOOSE
communication between the customer feeder relays and the ring input output relays. In this
thesis all the necessary protection coordination for the ring distribution networks are discussed
161
by using Gebze organized industrial zone as a case study. The results from this study are
implemented to the industrialized zone and proved working properly.
With increased integration of DGs to the distribution network, the fault current generally
increases. For the non-inverter based DGs the increase is significant which can cause damage
of equipment and mis-operation of protection devices. Normally the fault current variation due
to DG integration affects the determination of switchgear ratings. Considering the solar power
plant understudy, even though the short circuit current level increases with increasing of the
DGs, with the current design, there is no significant problem with respect to withstand capacity
of the materials. This is due to the fact that the materials selected for the project can with stand
a fault current up to 16 kA.
False tripping can occur when inverter based DGs are integrated. If the integration is in large
quantity, the inverter based DG can also result in the wrong operation of protection devices.
Due to the increased DGs integration, the fault current injected from the source to the fault point
is observed to decrease for both weak and strong networks. But the possibility of protection
blinding is more for non-inverter based DGs. Furthermore, increase in short circuit has more
effect in the weak network than in strong networks.
Usually, there is a great variation of the fault current along the network due to DGs integration.
The trend of fault current is not increasing or decreasing in one direction only when the DGs
are integrated. Due to this fact the traditional overcurrent needs modification to be used for the
network protection with availability of DGs. This calls for the new protection philosophy,
which adapts to the fault condition on the network. The protection method based on the adaptive
protection can handle these problems. In the proposed method, the status of CBs are monitored
continuously in real time and if any change happens, the calculation and setting agents are
triggered to initialize relays setting automatically. The proposed method can vary with each
MW variation of DGs. Even though it is adaptive it is based on the currently used protection
functions and IEDs. To speed up the operation of the relay when the faults happens on the
cables or lines between buses, a method of follow me signal is proposed in this study. After the
setting is loaded to the relay, the protection is not fully dependent on the communication, but
the availability of communication can be used as an advantage. By using DPL, the protection
philosophy is verified. The relays, successfully adapted their setting for any change on the DGs
integration. The coordination between the relays is also verified for each DGs state.
162
The following topics can be considered for future works:
1. The DGs integration study can be extended by considering the additional parameters
like for example their effect on stability.
2. The change in the structure of the network is considered in this study to design the
adaptive protection, this can be further extended by further coordinating the algorithm
to be coordinated with the energy management system.
3. The proposed method in this study can be further tested by using Hardware in the Loop
(HIL) system.
4. The proposed protection method can be implemented by using pilot practical projects.
5. The communication is not accounted this research work in detail, this can be extended
by further.
 The proposed method is based on the communication availability. If the communication

fails during the structural change of the network, the adaptive settings cannot be loaded
to the relays.
 The study of DGs integration to the network considered only the effect of 12 MW solar
power plant on the distribution network due to limitation of data and computing
resource.
163
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APPENDIX-A
Cable and Transformer Data Used for Short Circuit Analysis of SKS
Table A.1 Cable Data
Size Length No./ R1 X1 Y1 R0 X0 Y0
(mm2) (m) Phase (mΩ) (mΩ) (mS) (mΩ) (mΩ) (µS)
From 33 kV bus bar 300 50 4 23.25 44.26 0.029 73.26 108.9

to Power
transformer
From 33 kV bus bar 240 272 1 28.49 45.72 0.026 89.74 112.5
to Pota Furnace
From 33 kV bus bar 240 233 1 28.49 45.72 0.026 89.74 112.5
to Arc Furnace
From 33 kV bus bar 240 88 1 28.49 45.72 0.026 89.74 112.5

to 2nd HF and TCR
From 33 kV bus bar 240 93 1 28.49 45.72 45.29 116.1

to 3rd and 4th HF
From 33 kV bus bar 95 13 1 72.09 52.30 114.6 132.8

to Aux.
Transformer
171
Table A.1 (cont’d)
Çolakoğlu 795 3733 1 27.04 99.8 80.6 581.2 0.6
Gebze 795 13094 1 27.04 99.8 80.6 581.4 0.6
Table A.2 Transformer Data
Transformer MVA Prim. kV Sec. kV %Z X/R Type Phase shift
154/33 kV 150 154 33 18.7 65.47 YNd 30
172
APPENDIX-B
Cable and Transformer Data Used for Short Circuit Analysis of Gebze
Industrial Zone
Table B.1 Cable Data
Cable Size Length No./ R X Y
(mm2) (m) Phase (mΩ/10 (mΩ/1000 (mS/10

00 ft) ft) 00 ft)
ADM A - DM1 A 240 286 1 28,49 45,72 0.0263
DM1 A - DM1 B 240 15 1 28,49 45,72 0,0263
ADM A - ADM B 240 15 1 28,49 45,72 0.0263
DM1 B - DM2 A 240 450 1 28,49 45,72 0.0263
DM2 A – DM2 B 240 15 1 28.49 45.72 0,0263
DM2 B – DM4 A 240 1485 1 28.49 45.72 0.0263
DM4 A – DM4 B 240 15 1 28,49 45,72 0.0263
DM5 B – DM4 B 240 350 1 28,49 45,72 0,0263
DM5 A – DM5 B 240 15 1 28,49 45,72 0.0263
173
Table B.1 (cont’d)
DM6 B – DM5 A 240 958 1 28.49 45.72 0.0263
DM6 A – DM6 B 240 15 1 28.49 45.72 0,0263
DM3 B – DM6 A 240 865 1 28,49 45,72 0.0263
DM3 A – DM3 B 240 15 1 28,49 45,72 0.0263
ADM B – DM3 A 240 910 1 28,49 45,72 0,0263
ADM A – ADM B 240 15 1 28.49 45.72 0.0263
TEIAS 33 kV – ADM B 240 3640 1 28.49 45.72 0.0263
TEIAS 33 kV – ADM A 240 3640 1 28.49 45.72 0,0263
Table B.2 Transformer Data
Transformer MVA Prim. Sec. %Z X/R Type Phase

kV kV shift
154/33 Kv 100 154 33 18.7 65.47 Yyn11 30
174
CURRICULUM VITAE
PERSONAL INFORMATION
Name: ABDULFETAH ABDELA SHOBOLE
Date of Birth and Place: 24/11/1986, ARSI
Country of Citizenship/Residence Citizenship Ethiopia/ Residence in Turkey
EDUCATION
 PhD. on Smart Distribution Grid Automation and Protection from Yildiz
Technical University, Istanbul, Turkey (with GPA of 3.94, from 2013 to 2017,
the thesis will be completed sooner).
 Graduated in July 2011, Msc. in Electrical Power Engineering from Addis
Ababa Institute of Technology with 3.75 GPA. The research was on
Investigation of wind farm Interaction with Ethiopian National grid.
 Graduated in 2009, Bsc. in Electrical Engineering from Jimma University with
3.91 GPA. The research was on the Design of Remotely Configurable
Microprocessor Based Greenhouse Controller.
 Diploma in 2000, in English Language from C.T. Language School Adama.
SOFTWARE SKILLS
DigSILENT Power Factory, ETAP, PSAT, PSS/E, IET600, PCM600, ABB

MicroSCAD, ACSELERATOR , CET850, MiCOM S1 Studio, ETAP, DigSilent
Powerfactory, Matlab, Simulink, PSpice, Codecomposer studio, AutoCad, C++, C#,
Java, Ms-office.
175
WORK EXPERIENCE
Period Corporation/Institute Country Summary of activities

performed
2014 -2017 Power System Protection Engineer at Turkey  Akdeniz University,
Dalkıranlar Yapı Taahhüt Sanayi ve MV Distribution
Ticaret A.Ş. Network, Protection

Coordination and
Web Address:
Implementation
http://www.dalkiranlar.com/ Project, This project
References: Mr. Gokhan Zahman Contains 45
Distribution
Demirciler Sitesi 5. Yol No:75/1
Networks
Zeytinburnu / İstanbul / Türkiye
 GEBZE
Phone:00905333806514
industrialized zone
Tel: +90 (212) 546 2141 (Pbx) TEBELOVA site
Fax: +90 (212) 510 1158 project this project

contains 7
Email:
distribution
[email protected] substations which
includes SCADA,
Automation and
Protection Works.
 Siddik Kardeşler
154/33 kV
substation project
 ESAN 154/33 kV
substation project
 16 MW CLK Antalya
solar power project.
2013-2016 IEC 61850 and Protection Engineer Turkey  Closed Ring
in Yildiz Technical University and Distribution Network
176
Boğaziçi Elektrik Dağıtım A.Ş. Automation and
https://www.bedas.com.tr Protection Pilot
Development Project.
References:
This project involves
1. Ass. Prof. Mustafa Baysal
6 distribution
Email: [email protected]
substations.
Phone:+90(212)383 5821
2. Mr Mehmet Gönen
Email: [email protected]
Phone: 00905071880540
2013-2014 Senior Electrical Design Engineer in Turkey  Data , Telephone and
Katilim Muhendislik, Security Systems
http://www.katilimmuhendislik.com/  Building Automation
en and Electricity Works
Reference: Selman Akdeniz
Email:
[email protected]
Phone:00905323751707
2011-2012 Electrical Site Engineer on Adama Ethiopia  Wind Turbines,
Wind Farm Project, Adama, Ethiopia Substation and
As a consultant site Engineer Transmission Line

Works
2011-2012 Lecturer in Adama Science and Adama,  Giving Lecture to 5
Technology Institute Ethiopia th year Electrical

Engineering Student
2009 Ethio Telecom Ethiopia  Telecommunication
177
Adama Telecommunication
switching room in industrial
attachment program
2008 Designer of Digital Security System Ethiopia

for “Abba Jifar” Palace in CBTP
program
PUBLICATION
Published
 “Real Time Balancing Of Supply and Demand in Smart Grid by Using Storage,
Controllable Loads And Smart Generations”, International Istanbul Smart Grid
Congress and Fair Proceeding, Page 201-206, May 8, 2014.
 “Investigation of Wind Farm Interaction with Ethiopian Electric Power
Corporation’s Grid”, SciVerse ScineceDirect, Energy Procedia 14 (2012) 1766 –
1773. It is available on
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1876610211045851
 “Fault Ride-through Capability of Wind Farm (Case Study of Adama Wind Farm
Project, Dynamic Modeling and Simulation) ”, 6th International Conference on
Modeling, Simulation, and Applied Optimization (ICMSAO), 2015 Pages: 1 - 8,
DOI: 10.1109/ICMSAO.2015.7152197 2015, IEEE. It is available on
http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/7152197/
On Publication Process
 Effects of Distributed Generations Integration to the Distribution Networks, Case

Study of Solar Power Plants to be submitted to the International Journal of
Renewable Energy Resources
 A New Protection Philosophy for Smart Distribution Network, to be submitted to
IEEE Journals
 Protection Coordination in Electrical Substation Part-1 Overcurrent and Earth
Fault Protection, Case Study of Siddik Kardeşler Substation (SKS), Istanbul,
Turkey, Submitted to GAZI UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF SCIENCE
 Protection Coordination in Electrical Substation Part-2 Unit Protection
(Differentialand Distance Protection) Case Study of Siddik Kardeşler Substation
(SKS), Istanbul, Turkey. Submitted to GAZI UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF
SCIENCE
 IEC-61850 based Protection Coordination of Industrial Ring Distribution Network
to be Sigma Journal of Engineering and Natural Sciences.
178
 IEC-61850 Protocol Applications for Protection and Automation of Industrial
Distribution Network.
AWARDS
 Very great distinction award from Addis Ababa Institute of Technology on

July 2011 in Electrical Power Engineering program.
 Very great distinction award from Jimma University on 07 May 2009.
 Certificate of Excellence from Department of Electrical Engineering for
Design of Remotely
 Configurable Microprocessor Based Greenhouse Controller JU.
 2008/09 Academic Year Certificate of Appreciation from faculty of
technology as a final year project winner of the faculty.
 Winner of Jimma University’s annual students’ research symposium on 11
June 2009.
LANGUAGE SKILLS
Speak, listen, read and write Amharic, Arabic, English, Oromic and Turkish
Languages.
INTEREST AREAS
 Smart Grid, SCADA, Automation and Protection.

 Renewable Energies and Distributed Generation Integration to the electrical
network.
 Power Generation, Transmission and Distribution Systems.
CONTACT INFORMATION
 Address Mobile: Sultancifliği Mah. 5. Sokak No. 2/4

Sultangazi/Isanbul/Turkey.
 Phone: 00905343992945, Turkey,
 E-mail:[email protected] (preferable) or
[email protected].
179

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GRADUATE SCHOOL OF NATURAL AND APPLIED SCIENCES

A NEW PROTECTION PHILOSOPHY IN SMART DISTRIBUTION

ABDULFETAH ABDELA SHOBOLE

A NEW PROTECTION PHILOSOPHY IN SMART DISTRIBUTION

Approved By the Examining Committee

Prof. Dr. İlhami ÇOLAK, Member

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Uğur S. SELAMOĞULLARI, Member

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Aslan İNAN, Member

Assist. Prof. Dr. Alper ŞIŞMAN, Member

In the name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful.

…and say: O my Lord! Increase me in knowledge.

Abdulfetah Abdela SHOBOLE

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ........................................................................................... x

LIST OF FIGURES ........................................................................................................ xii

LIST OF TABLES ......................................................................................................... xiv

ÖZET ............................................................................................................................ xvii

1.1 Literature Review ................................................................................................... 19

POWER SYSTEM PROTECTION ................................................................................ 27

2.1 Development of Protection Relays ......................................................................... 27

PROTECTION OF THE RING DISTRIBUTION NETWORK .................................... 82

3.1 System Modeling and Short Circuit Analysis ......................................................... 84

IEC-61850 PROTOCOL APPLICATIONS FOR PROTECTION AND AUTOMATION

4.1 Scope and Contents of IEC 61850 ........................................................................ 106

INTEGRATION EFFECTS OF DISTRIBUTED GENERATIONS TO THE

A NEW PROTECTION PHILOSOPHY FOR SMART DISTRIBUTION NETWORK

6.1 Protection Coordination Problems Due to DGs .................................................... 141

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ....................................................... 160

7.1 Conclusions ........................................................................................................... 160

CURRICULUM VITAE ............................................................................................... 175

C Neutral line capacitance

ANM Active Network Management

A NEW PROTECTION PHILOSOPHY IN SMART DISTRIBUTION

Abdulfetah Abdela SHOBOLE

Department of Electrical Engineering

Adviser: Assist. Prof. Dr. Mustafa BAYSAL

Keywords: Circuit breakers, etap, digSILENT programming language, distributed

YILDIZ TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY

AKKILLI DAĞITIM ŞEBEKESİNİN YENİ BİR KORUMA

Abdulfetah Abdela SHOBOLE

Elektrik Mühendisliği Anabilim Dalı

Tez Danışmanı: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Mustafa BAYSAL

Üretim, iletim ve dağıtım sistemlerinde kaliteli ve güvenilir bir işletme sağlanabilmesi

YILDIZ TEKNİK ÜNİVERSİTESİ FEN BİLİMLERİ ENSTİTÜSÜ

Figure 1.1 Structure of Smart Distribution Grid [22]

As shown in Figure 1.1 Smart Distribution Network is expected to contain substations,

POWER SYSTEM PROTECTION

Figure 2.1 Development of protection relays [28]

Table 2.1 IEC 60255 standard characteristics [42]

90°-30° Characteristic (30° RCA)

90°-45° characteristic (45° RCA)

Code Name Description

Used to convert voltage from HV to the level

5T Circuit Breaker with Circuit breaker with auto-reclosing capability

4 Isolator For no load opening and closing, and isolate the

6 Surge Arrester To discharge high voltages caused by lightning

7 Power Transformer To transform the voltage level from 154 kV to

Code Name Description

8c/8b/8c Cable Medium Voltage (MV) XLPE underground

6a Surge Arrestor MV surge arrestor

5a/5b/5c Circuit Breaker MV circuit breaker

3a/3b/3c Current Transformers MV current transformer

14 Voltage Indicator Indicates the availability of voltage on each