Digested Cases in CRIM PRO

DIGESTED CASES ON RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
G.R. No. 123263 December 16, 1996

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY, Branch 32,
and ISAH V. RED
FACTS:
Private respondent, Isah V. Red, was charged with the crime of libel before
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Thereafter, Red filed a motion to quash the
information on the ground that the Regional Trial Court has no jurisdiction over the
offense charged. The Regional Trial Court granted the motion and remanded the case
to the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City.
The prosecution, citing the provision of Article 360 of the Revised Penal
Code filed a manifestation and motion to remand praying that the case be returned to
the Regional Trial Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the crime of libel falls on the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court.
HELD:
Yes, the crime of libel falls under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court.
Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code pertinently provides that:
“The criminal action and civil action for damages in case of written defamation, as
provided for in this chapter, shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the Court
of First Instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first
published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the
commission of the offense…”
Republic Act 7691, placing the exclusive and original jurisdiction of offenses
punishable by not more than six years of imprisonment under the Municipal Trial
Court did superseded Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as there is no manifest
legislative purpose to do so or an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exist
between them.
1
G.R. No. 115115 July 18, 1995

CONRAD AND COMPANY, INC.
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, FITRITE INC., and
VICTORIA BISCUITS CO., INC.
FACTS:
Private respondents, FITRITE Inc. and Victoria Biscuits Co., Inc., are
engaged in the business of manufacturing, selling and distributing biscuits and
cookies bearing the trademark “SUNSHINE” in the Philippines. Petitioner,
CONRAD AND COMPANU, Inc. is engaged in the business of importing, selling
and distributing biscuits and cookies in the Philippines.
Private respondents were granted the trademark “SUNSHINE” to be used on
biscuits and cookies by the Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer
(BPTTT). For quite some time, the trademark “SUNSHINE” has been used by the
private respondents in the concept of an owner on its biscuits and cookies.
Meanwhile, petitioner was designated as the exclusive importer and dealer of
the products of “Sunshine Biscuits, Inc.” for sale in the Philippines.
Private respondents then filed a case before the Regional Trial Court, seeking
for remedies against infringement under Sec. 23 of Republic Act No. 166, as
amended, as well as of the remedies against unfair competition under Sec. 29 of the
same statue.
Petitioner then filed a motion to dismiss the complaint invoking, among
others, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is applicable in the case at bar.
HELD:
No, the doctrine finds no merit in the case at bar.
While an application for the administrative cancellation of a registered
trademark falls under the exclusive cognizance of BPTTT, an action, however, for
infringement or unfair competition, as well as the remedy for injunction and relief for
damages, is explicitly and unquestionably within the competence and jurisdiction of
ordinary courts.
An application with BPTTT for an administrative cancellation of a registered
trade mark cannot per se have the effect of restraining or preventing the courts from
the exercise of their lawfully conferred jurisdiction. A contrary rule would unduly
expand the doctrine of primary jurisdiction which, simply expressed, would merely
behoove regular courts, in controversies involving specialized disputes, to defer to the
findings of resolutions of administrative tribunals on certain technical matters.
2
G.R. No. 169004 September 15, 2010

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and ROLANDO PLAZA
FACTS:
Private respondent, Rolando Plaza, is a member of the Sanguniang
Panlungsod of Toledo City, Cebu with a salary grade 25. He was charged in the
Sandiganbayan with violation of Section 89 of Presidential Decree No. 1445, or the
Auditing Code of the Philippines for his failure to liquidate the cash advances he
received.
Private respondent then questioned the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
over the offense charged. Private respondent contends that he should not fall under
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as he does not belong the salary grade 27 and
that his violation is not among those enumerated by law to be cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan even if the offender is below salary grade 27.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over violations of the
Auditing Code of the Philippines committed by a public official below salary grade
27.
HELD:
Yes, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over violations of the Auditing Code
of the Philippines committed by a public official below salary grade 27.
The jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be determined at the
time of the institution of the action, not at the time of the commission of the offense.
The case having been instituted on March 25, 2004 the provisions of Republic Act
No. 8249 shall govern.
Those that are classified as Grade 26 and below may still fall within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan provided that they hold the positions thus
enumerated by RA No. 8249. Among those enumerated are members if the
Sangunuiang Panlungsod. In connection therewith, Section 4 (b) of the same law
provides that other offenses or felonies committed by public officials and employees
mentioned in subsection (a) in relation to their office also fall under the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan.
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G.R. No. L-14595 May 31, 1960

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
HONORABLE GREGORIO MONTEJO, Judge, Court of First Instance, Zamboanga
City and Basilan City, MAYOR LEROY S. BROWN, DETECTIVE JOAQUIN R.
POLLISCO, PATROLMAN GRACIANO LACERNA aliasDODONG, PATROLMAN
MOHAMAD HASBI, SPECIAL POLICEMAN DIONISIO DINGLASA, SPECIAL
POLICEMAN HADJARATIL, SPECIAL POLICEMAN ALO, and JOHN DOES
FACTS:
A sub-police station was established upon the orders of Mayor Leroy S.
Brown in sitio Tipo-Tipo, district of Lamitan, City of Basilan. Said sub-station was
composed regular and special policemen all armed with pistols and high power guns.
It was alleged that criminal complaints were entertained in the said sub-station and
that defendant Joaquin R. Pollisco acted as investigating officer and exercised
authority to order the apprehension of persons and their detention in the camp, for
days or weeks, without due process of law and without bringing them to the proper
court.
On June 4, 1958, Yokan Awalin Tebag was arrested upon orders of Mayor
Brown without any warrant or complaint filed in court. Tebag was allegedly
maltreated while being taken into the sub-station and was again mauled at the sub-
station, said torture resulted to Tebag’s death.
The private respondents were then charged with the crime of murder before
the Court of First Instance of the cities of Zamboanga and Basilan.
Senator Roseller Lim entered his appearance for the private respondents. The
prosecution is questioning said appearance due to the constitutional prohibition for
senators and members of the House of Representatives to appear as counsel in any
criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the Government is accused of an
offense committed in relation of his office.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the crime charged is committed in relation to the offices of the private
respondents.
HELD:
Yes, a mere perusal of the amended information therein readily elicits an
affirmative answer. It is alleged in said amended information that "Leroy S.
Brown, City Mayor of Basilan City, as such, has organized groups of police patrol
and civilian commandoes consisting of regular policemen and ... special policemen,
appointed and provided by him with pistols and high power guns" and then
"established a camp ... at Tipo-Tipo," which is under his "command, ... supervision
and control," where his codefendants were stationed, entertained criminal complaints
and conducted the corresponding investigations, as well as assumed the authority to
arrest and detain persons without due process of law and without bringing them to the
proper court, and that, in line with this set-up established by said Mayor of Basilan
City as such, and acting upon his orders, his codefendants arrested and maltreated
Awalin Tebag, who died in consequence thereof.
It is apparent from these allegations that, although public office is not an
element of the crime of murder in abstract, as committed by the main respondents
herein, according to the amended information, the offense therein charged is
intimately connected with their respective offices and was perpetrated while they
were in the performance, though improper or irregular, of their official functions.
4
Indeed, they had no personal motive to commit the crime and they would not have
committed it had they not held their aforesaid offices. The co-defendants of
respondent Leroy S. Brown, obeyed his instructions because he was their superior
officer, as Mayor of Basilan City.
5
G.R. Nos. 118013-14 October 11, 1995

vs.
HON. DEMOSTHENES L. MAGALLANES, as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 54, Bacolod City, and P/COL. NICOLAS M. TORRES, P/INSP.
ADONIS C. ABETO, PO MARIO LAMIS Y FERNANDEZ, PO JOSE PAHAYUPAN,
PO VICENTE CANUDAY, JR., JEANETTE YANSON-DUMANCAS, CHARLES
DUMANCAS, DOMINADOR GEROCHE Y MAHUSAY, JAIME GARGALLANO,
ROLANDO R. FERNANDEZ, EDWIN DIVINAGRACIA, TEODY DELGADO,
CESAR PECHA,
and EDGAR HILADO
FACTS:
Two informations for kidnapping for ransom with murder were filed in the
Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City against fourteen persons, five of whom are
members of the Philippine National Police. The two cases was consolidated.
While the trial was on going, the prosecution file a motion for the transmittal
of the case to the Sandiganbayan on the ground that the trial court has no jurisdiction
over the cases because the offense charged were committed in relation to the office of
the accused PNP officers.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the crimes charged falls under the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.
HELD:
No, the case is no longer cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.
Ordinarily, jurisdiction once acquired is not affected by subsequent legislative
enactment placing jurisdiction in another tribunal. It remains with the court until the
case is finally terminated. Hence, the Sandiganbayan or the courts, as the case may
be, cannot be divested of jurisdiction over cases filed before them by reason of R.A.
No. 7975. They retain their jurisdiction until the end of the litigation.
In the instant case, the Sandiganbayan has not yet acquired jurisdiction over
the subject criminal cases, as the informations were filed not before it but before the
Regional Trial Court. Even if we labor under the foregoing assumption that the
informations in the subject cases do charge the respondent PNP officers with offenses
committed in relation to their office so that jurisdiction thereof would fall under the
Sandiganbayan, and assuming further that the informations had already been filed
with the said tribunal but hearing thereon has not begun yet, the Sandiganbayan can
no longer proceed to hear the cases in view of the express provision of Section 7 of
R.A. No. 7975. That section provides that upon the effectivity of the Act, all criminal
cases in which trial has not yet begun in the Sandiganbayan shall be referred to the
proper courts. Hence, cases which were previously cognizable by the Sandiganbayan
under P.D. No. 1606, as amended, but are already under the jurisdiction of the courts
by virtue of the amendment introduced by R.A. No. 7975, shall be referred to the
latter courts if hearing thereon has not yet been commenced in the Sandiganbayan.
It would, therefore, be a futile exercise to transfer the cases to the
Sandiganbayan because the same would anyway be transferred again to the Regional
Trial Court pursuant to Section 7 of the new law in relation to Section 2 thereof.
6
G.R. No. L-64548 July 7, 1986

ROLANDO P. BARTOLOME
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. L-64559 July 7, 1986
ELINO CORONEL Y SANTOS
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS:
Rolando P. Bartolome and Elino Coronel Y Santon were charged with the
crime of Falsification of Official document as defined and penalized under paragraph
4, Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code. It was alleged that the two conspired to
make it appear on the CS Personal Data Sheet that Bartolome has taken and passed
the Career Service Professional Qualifying Examination with a rating of 73.35% and
that he was a 4th year AB student at the Far Eastern University.
The charges were filed in the Sandiganbayan.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the offense charged falls under the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.
HELD:
No, the offense is not cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.
Under Section 4 of P.D. 1606, which created this special court:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction — The Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction over:
(a) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and Republic Act No. 1379; (b) Crime committed by
public officers and employees, including those employed in government-owned or
controlled corporations, embraced in Title VI I of the Revised Penal Code, whether
simple or complexed with other crimes; and (c) Other crimes or offenses committed
by public officers or employees, including those employed in government-owned or
controlled corporations, in relation to their office. (Emphasis supplied).
A careful reading of Republic Act No. 3019 and Republic Act No. 1379 will
reveal that nowhere in either statute is falsification of an official document
mentioned, even tangentially or by implication.
Title VII, Book Two, of the Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes a wide
range of offenses committed by public officers, from knowingly rendering an unjust
judgment under Article 204 to abuses against chastity in Article 245, but falsification
of an official document is not included. This is punished in Article 171 under Title
IV, Book Two, on Crimes against Public Interest.
G.R. No. 85328 July 4, 1990

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
vs.
BIENVENIDO LEOPARTE, alias "EMBEN,"
FACTS:
7
Bienvenido Leoparte was charged and convicted with the complex crime of
forcible abduction with rape by the Regional Trial Court of Lucena. It was alleged in
the information that the accused, Leoparte, pulled the victim, Marinel Idea, while she
was on her way home and traversing the railroad tracks. The accused then dragged
her to the nearby banana plantation where the accused satisfied his carnal desires
against the victim’s will. Thereafter, the accused brought the victim to his sister’s
home where he again had carnal knowledge with the victim.
The following day, the accused brought the victim to his uncle’s home and
again succeeded to have carnal knowledge with the victim against her will. After two
day, the accused the brought the victim to the house of his parents where he again
successfully satisfied his lascivious desires against the victim. All the incidents took
place with the accused purporting that he and the victim had eloped and were
planning to get married.
Issues:
Whether or not the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the case.
Held:
Yes, The Regional Trial Court has lawfully acquired jurisdiction over the
case.
Article 344 was not enacted for the specific purpose of benefiting the
accused. When it is said that the requirement in Article 344 that a complaint of the
offended party or her relatives is jurisdictional, what is meant is that it is the
complaint that starts the prosecutor proceeding. It is not the complaint which confers
jurisdiction on the court to try the case. The court's jurisdiction is vested in it by the
Judiciary Law. Such condition has been imposed out of consideration for the
offended woman and her family who might prefer to suffer the outrage in silence
rather than go through with the scandal of a public trial.
The overriding consideration in determining the issue of whether or not the
condition precedent prescribed in Article 344 has been complied with is the intent of
the aggrieved party to seek judicial redress for the affront committed. In the case at
bar, the active cooperation of the offended party in the prosecution of the case, as
witness, clearly indicates said intent.
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G.R. No. 192565February 28, 2012

UNION BANK OF THE, PHILIPPINES AND DESI TOMAS
vs.
FACTS:
Desi Tomas was charged with perjury for making a false narration in a
Certificate against Forum Shopping. It was alleged that Tomas stated under oath that
the Union Bank of the Philippines has not commenced any other action or proceeding
involving the same issues in another tribunal or agency aside from that which is filed
before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for the collection of sum of money with
prayer of writ of replevin filed against Eddie and Eliza Tamondong and a John Doe.
Tomas filed a motion to quash arguing that the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Makati City does not have jurisdiction over the case as, though it was notarized in
Makati, the Certificate against Forum Shopping was used or submitted before the
Regional Trial Court of Pasay City.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City has jurisdiction
over the case at bar.
HELD:
Yes, the Metropolitan Trial Court has jurisdiction to try and decide the case
at bar.
Tomas’ deliberate and intentional assertion of falsehood was allegedly shown
when she made the false declarations in the Certificate against Forum Shopping
before a notary public in Makati City, despite her knowledge that the material
statements she subscribed and swore to were not true. Thus, Makati City is the proper
venue and MeTC-Makati City is the proper court to try the perjury case against
Tomas, pursuant to Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure as all the essential elements constituting the crime of perjury were
committed within the territorial jurisdiction of Makati City, not Pasay City.
9
G.R. No. 158763 March 31, 2006

JOSE C. MIRANDA, ALBERTO P. DALMACIO, and ROMEO B. OCON
vs.
VIRGILIO M. TULIAO
FACTS:
Two informations for murder were filed against SPO1 Wilfredo Leaño, SPO1
Ferdinand Marzan, SPO1 Ruben B. Agustin, SPO2 Alexander Micu, SPO2 Rodel
Maderal, and SPO4 Emilio Ramirez for the deaths of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer
Tuliao in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Santiago City.
The venue was later transferred to Manila. On 22 April 1999, the RTC of
Manila convicted all of the accused and sentenced them to two counts of reclusion
perpetua except SPO2 Maderal who was yet to be arraigned at that time, being at
large. The case was appealed to this Court on automatic review where we, on 9
October 2001, acquitted the accused therein on the ground of reasonable doubt.
Sometime in September 1999, SPO2 Maderal was arrested. On 27 April
2001, he executed a sworn confession and identified petitioners Jose C. Miranda, PO3
Romeo B. Ocon, and SPO3 Alberto P. Dalmacio, a certain Boyet dela Cruz and
Amado Doe, as the persons responsible for the deaths of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer
Tuliao. Respondent Tuliao filed a criminal complaint for murder against petitioners,
Boyet dela Cruz, and Amado Doe, and submitted the sworn confession of SPO2
Maderal. On 25 June 2001, Acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan issued
warrants of arrest against petitioners and SPO2 Maderal.
On 29 June 2001, petitioners filed an urgent motion to complete preliminary
investigation, to reinvestigate, and to recall and/or quash the warrants of arrest.
In the hearing of the urgent motion on 6 July 2001, Judge Tumaliuan noted
the absence of petitioners and issued a Joint Order denying said urgent motion on the
ground that, since the court did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons, the motion
cannot be properly heard by the court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court has lawfully acquired jurisdiction over the person of
the accused.
HELD:
Yes, in criminal cases, jurisdiction over the person of the accused is deemed
waived by the accused when he files any pleading seeking an affirmative relief,
except in cases when he invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by impugning
such jurisdiction over his person. Therefore, in narrow cases involving special
appearances, an accused can invoke the processes of the court even though there is
neither jurisdiction over the person nor custody of the law. However, if a person
invoking the special jurisdiction of the court applies for bail, he must first submit
himself to the custody of the law.
In cases not involving the so-called special appearance, the general rule
applies, i.e., the accused is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the
court upon seeking affirmative relief. Notwithstanding this, there is no requirement
for him to be in the custody of the law. The following cases best illustrate this point,
where we granted various reliefs to accused who were not in the custody of the law,
but were deemed to have placed their persons under the jurisdiction of the court. Note
that none of these cases involve the application for bail, nor a motion to quash an
information due to lack of jurisdiction over the person, nor a motion to quash a
warrant of arrest.
10
11
G.R. No. 113630 May 5, 1994

DIOSDADO JOSE ALLADO and ROBERTO L. MENDOZA
vs.
HON. ROBERTO C. DIOKNO, Presiding Judge, Br. 62, Regional Trial Court, Makati,
Metro Manila, and PRESIDENTIAL ANTI-CRIME COMMISSION
FACTS:
Petitioners, Diosdado Jose Allado and Roberto L. Mendoza, were both
implicated as the masterminds of the kidnapping and murder of Eugen Alexander
Van Twist.
An information for the said crime was filed against the petitioners primarily
on the strength of a sworn statement by Escolastico Umbal, who admitted that he was
among those who kidnapped and killed the victim upon the orders of the petitioners.
Thereafter, respondent judge, Roberto C. Diokno, ordered the arrest of the petitioners
and no bail was recommended.
Petitioners, contending that their arrests was effected whimsically as there is
no probable cause, questioned their arrests.
ISSUE:
Whether or not probable cause is present to warrant the order of arrest against
the petitioners.
HELD:
No, probable cause do not exist to merit the order of arrest against the
petitioners.
For sure, the credibility of Umbal is badly battered. Certainly, his bare
allegations, even if the State invokes its inherent right to prosecute, are insufficient to
justify sending two lawyers to jail, or anybody for that matter. More importantly, the
PACC operatives who applied for a warrant to search the dwellings of Santiago never
implicated petitioners. In fact they claimed that according to Umbal, it was Santiago,
and not petitioners, who masterminded the whole affair. While there may be bits of
evidence against petitioners' co-accused, i.e., referring to those seized from the
dwellings of Santiago, these do not in the least prove petitioners' complicity in the
crime charged. Based on the evidence thus far submitted there is nothing indeed,
much less is there probable cause, to incriminate petitioners. For them to stand trial
and be deprived in the meantime of their liberty, however brief, the law appropriately
exacts much more to sustain a warrant for their arrest — facts and circumstances
strong enough in themselves to support the belief that they are guilty of a crime that
in fact happened. Quite obviously, this has not been met.
Bonifacio v. RTC of Makati, G.R. No. 184800, May 5, 2010;

Facts:
Petitioners Bonifacio et al were charged with the crime of libel after private respondent
Gimenez, on behalf of Yuchengco family and Malayan Insurance Co., filed a criminal
complaint before the Makati City Prosecutor for libel under Article 355 in relation to Article
353 of the Revised Penal Code .
12
The complaint alleged that petitioners, together with several John Does, publicly and
maliciously with intention of attacking the honesty, virtue, honor and integrity, character and
reputation of Malayan Insurance Co. Inc., and Yuchengco family for exposing them to public
hatred and contempt, and published in the said website http://www.pepcoalition.com a
defamatory article persuading the public to remove their investments and policies from the
said company. This is after the petitioners filed to seek their redress for their pecuniary loss
under the policies they obtained from the company. Makati City Prosecutor, after finding
probable cause to indict the petitioners, filed separate information against them .
Petitioners filed before the respondent RTC of Makati a Motion to Quash on the grounds that
it failed to vest jurisdiction on the Makati RTC; the acts complained of in the Information are
not punishable by law since internet libel is not covered by Article 353 of the RPC.
Petitioners maintained that the Information failed to allege a particular place within the trial
courts jurisdiction where the subject article was printed and first published or that the
offended parties resided in Makati at the time the alleged defamatory material was printed and
first published, and the prosecution erroneously laid the venue of the case in the place where
the offended party accessed the internet-published article.
Issue:
Whether petitioners’ Motion to Quash due to lack of jurisdiction is valid.
Held:
Yes. Venue is jurisdictional in criminal actions such that the place where the crime was
committed determines not only the venue of the action but constitutes an essential element of
jurisdiction. The venue of libel cases where the complainant is a private individual is limited
to only either of two places, namely: 1) where the complainant actually resides at the time of
the commission of the offense; or 2) where the alleged defamatory article was printed and
first published.
The Amended Information in the case opted to lay the venue by stating that the offending
article was first published and accessed by the private complainant in Makati City. In other
words, it considered the phrase to be equivalent to the requisite allegation of printing and
first publication. This is wrong. For the court to hold that the Amended Information
sufficiently vested jurisdiction in the courts of Makati simply because the defamatory article
was accessed therein would open the floodgates to the libel suit being filed in all other
locations where the pepcoalition website is likewise accessed or capable of being accessed.
This goes against the purpose as to why Republic Act No. 4363 was enacted. It lays down
specific rules as to the venue of the criminal action so as to prevent the offended party in
written defamation cases from inconveniencing the accused by means of out-of-town libel
suits, meaning complaints filed in remote municipal courts (
IN FINE, the public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners
motion to quash the Amended Information.
13
de Lima v. Guerrero, G.R. No. 229781, Oct. 10, 2017.

FACTS: The DOJ filed criminal complaints against senator delima after several inquiries
made by the congress regarding the proliferation of drugs inside the bilibid prison. On the
basis of the evidence presented by the DOJ and the complaint affidavits, Judge Guerrrero of
Muntinlupa issued a warrant of arrest against Senator Delima. The senator then filed a motion
to quash the warrant and pending such motion she also filed a petition for certiorari under rule
65 alleging that the issuance of the warrant of arrest was with grave abuse of discretion.
ISSUES:
A. Whether or not petitioner is excused from compliance with the doctrine on hierarchy of
courts considering that the petition should first be filed with the Court of Appeals.
B. Whether or not the pendency of the Motion to Quash the Information before the trial court
renders the instant petition premature.
C. Whether or not petitioner, in filing the present petition, violated the rule against forum
shopping given the pendency of the Motion to Quash the Information before the Regional
Trial Court of Muntinlupa City in Criminal Case No. 17-165 and the Petition
for Certiorari filed before the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. SP No. 149097, assailing the
preliminary investigation conducted by the DOJ Panel.
D. Whether the Regional Trial Court or the Sandiganbayan has the jurisdiction over the
violation of Republic Act No. 9165 averred in the assailed Information.
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E. Whether or not the respondent gravely abused her discretion in finding probable cause to
issue the Warrant of Arrest against petitioner.
F. Whether or not petitioner is entitled to a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Status Quo
Ante Order in the interim until the instant petition is resolved or until the trial court rules on
the Motion to Quash.
HELD:
A. NO. None of the exceptions were sufficiently established in the present petition so as to
convince this court to brush aside the rules on the hierarchy of courts.
Petitioner’s allegation that her case has sparked national and international interest is
obviously not covered by the exceptions to the rules on hierarchy of courts. The notoriety of a
case, without more, is not and will not be a reason for this Court’s decisions. Neither will this
Court be swayed to relax its rules on the bare fact that the petitioner belongs to the minority
party in the present administration. A primary hallmark of an independent judiciary is its
political neutrality. This Court is thus loath to perceive and consider the issues before it
through the warped prisms of political partisanships.
That the petitioner is a senator of the republic does not also merit a special treatment of her
case. The right to equal treatment before the law accorded to every Filipino also forbids the
elevation of petitioner’s cause on account of her position and status in the government.
Further, contrary to her position, the matter presented before the Court is not of first
impression. Petitioner is not the first public official accused of violating RA 9165 nor is she
the first defendant to question the finding of probable cause for her arrest. In fact, stripped of
all political complexions, the controversy involves run-of-the mill matters that could have
been resolved with ease by the lower court had it been given a chance to do so in the first
place.
B. YES. the prematurity of the present petition cannot be over-emphasized considering that
petitioner is actually asking the Court to rule on some of the grounds subject of her Motion to
Quash. The Court, if it rules positively in favor of petitioner regarding the grounds of the
Motion to Quash, will be pre-empting the respondent Judge from doing her duty to resolve
the said motion and even prejudge the case. This is clearly outside of the ambit of orderly and
expeditious rules of procedure. This, without a doubt, causes an inevitable delay in the
proceedings in the trial court, as the latter abstains from resolving the incidents until this
Court rules with finality on the instant petition.
Without such order, the present petition cannot satisfy the requirements set before this Court
can exercise its review powers. Section 5 (2) (C) of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
explicitly requires the existence of “final judgments and orders of lower courts” before the
Court can exercise its power to “review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal
or certiorari” in “all cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue,”
C. YES. The presence of the first requisite is at once apparent. The petitioner is an accused in
the criminal case below, while the respondents in this case, all represented by the Solicitor
General, have substantial identity with the complainant in the criminal case still pending
before the trial court.
As for the second requisite, even a cursory reading of the petition and the Motion to
Quash will reveal that the arguments and the reliefs prayed for are essentially the same. In
both, petitioner advances the RTC’s supposed lack of jurisdiction over the offense, the alleged
multiplicity of offenses included in the Information; the purported lack of the corpus delicti of
the charge, and, basically, the non-existence of probable cause to indict her. And, removed of
all non-essentials, she essentially prays for the same thing in both the present petition and
the Motion to Quash: the nullification of the Information and her restoration to liberty and
freedom. Thus, our ruling in Ient v. Tullet Prebon (Philippines), Inc. does not apply in the
present case as the petition at bar and the motion to quash pending before the court a
quo involve similar if not the same reliefs. What is more, while Justice Caguioa highlights our
pronouncement in Ient excepting an “appeal or special civil action for certiorari” from the
15
rule against the violation of forum shopping, the good justice overlooks that the phrase had
been used with respect to forum shopping committed through successive actions by a “party,
against whom an adverse judgment or order has [already] been rendered in one forum.” The
exception with respect to an “appeal or special civil action for certiorari” does not apply
where the forum shopping is committed by simultaneous actions where no judgment or order
has yet been rendered by either forum. To restate for emphasis, the RTC has yet to rule on the
Motion to Quash. Thus, the present petition and the motion to quash before the RTC
are simultaneous actions that do not exempt petitions for certiorari from the rule against
forum shopping.
D. NO. While it may be argued that some facts may be taken as constitutive of some elements
of Direct Bribery under the Revised Penal Code (RPC), these facts taken together with the
other allegations in the Information portray a much bigger picture, Illegal Drug Trading. The
latter crime, described by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) as “a
global illicit trade involving the cultivation, manufacture, distribution and sale of substances,”
necessarily involves various component crimes, not the least of which is the bribery and
corruption of government officials. An example would be reports of recent vintage regarding
billions of pesos’ worth of illegal drugs allowed to enter Philippine ports without the scrutiny
of Customs officials. Any money and bribery that may have changed hands to allow the
importation of the confiscated drugs are certainly but trivial contributions in the furtherance
of the transnational illegal drug trading — the offense for which the persons involved should
be penalized.
Read as a whole, and not picked apart with each word or phrase construed separately, the
Information against De Lima goes beyond an indictment for Direct Bribery under Article 210
of the RPC. As Justice Martires articulately explained, the averments on solicitation of money
in the Information, which may be taken as constitutive of bribery, form “part of the
description on how illegal drug trading took place at the NBP.” The averments on how
petitioner asked for and received money from the NBP inmates simply complete the links of
conspiracy between her, Ragos, Dayan and the NBP inmates in willfully and unlawfully
trading dangerous drugs through the use of mobile phones and other electronic devices under
Section 5, in relation to Section 3 (jj), Section 26 (b), and Section 28, of RA 9165.
Granting without conceding that the information contains averments which constitute the
elements of Direct Bribery or that more than one offence is charged or as in this case,
possibly bribery and violation of RA 9165, still the prosecution has the authority to amend the
information at any time before arraignment. Since petitioner has not yet been arraigned, then
the information subject of Criminal Case No. 17-165 can still be amended pursuant to Section
14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court which reads:
SECTION 14. Amendment or Substitution. — A complaint or information may be amended,
in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea.
After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court
and when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.
Now the question that irresistibly demands an answer is whether it is the Sandiganbayan or
the RTC that has jurisdiction over the subject matter of Criminal Case No. 17-165, i.e.,
violation of RA 9165.
It is basic that jurisdiction over the subject matter in a criminal case is given only by law in
the manner and form prescribed by law. It is determined by the statute in force at the time of
the commencement of the action. Indeed, Congress has the plenary power to define, prescribe
and apportion the jurisdiction of various courts. It follows then that Congress may also, by
law, provide that a certain class of cases should be exclusively heard and determined by one
court. Such would be a special law that is construed as an exception to the general law on
jurisdiction of courts.
The pertinent special law governing drug-related cases is RA 9165, which updated the rules
provided in RA 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. A plain reading
16
of RA 9165, as of RA 6425, will reveal that jurisdiction over drug-related cases is exclusively
vested with the Regional Trial Court and no other. The designation of the RTC as the court
with the exclusive jurisdiction over drug-related cases is apparent in the following provisions
where it was expressly mentioned and recognized as the only court with the authority to hear
drug-related cases
E. NO. It must be emphasized, however, that in determining the probable cause to issue the
warrant of arrest against the petitioner, respondent judge evaluated the Information and “all
the evidence presented during the preliminary investigation conducted in this case.” The
assailed February 23, 2017 Order is here restated for easy reference and provides, thusly:
After a careful evaluation of the herein Information and all the evidence presented during the
preliminary investigation conducted in this case by the Department of Justice, Manila, the
Court finds sufficient probable cause for the issuance of Warrants of Arrest against all the
accused LEILA M. DE LIMA x x x.
As the prosecutor’s report/resolution precisely finds support from the evidence presented
during the preliminary investigation, this Court cannot consider the respondent judge to have
evaded her duty or refused to perform her obligation to satisfy herself that substantial basis
exists for the petitioner’s arrest. “All the evidence presented during the preliminary
investigation” encompasses a broader category than the “supporting evidence” required to be
evaluated inSoliven. It may perhaps even be stated that respondent judge performed her duty
in a manner that far exceeds what is required of her by the rules when she reviewed all the
evidence, not just the supporting documents.
17
G.R. No. L-4567 May 30, 1983

EMILIANO A. FRANCISCO and HARRY B. BERNARDINO
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
A complaint for intriguing against honor was filed against petitioners,
Francisco and Bernardino on February 6, 1966 before the Office of the Provincial
Fiscal of Rizal. The acts constituting the complaint was allegedly perpetrated against
Dr. Patrocinio Angeles on December 26, 1965.
On May 3, 1966, an information charging the petitioners with the crime of
grave oral defamation was filed before the Court of First Instance of Rizal. The
information was amended upon the order of the court on October 8, 1966 amending
the offense charged to slander.
The Court of First Instance of Rizal convicted the petitioners with the offense
charged, the Court of Appeals modified the conviction finding the petitioners only
guilty of simple slander.
On appeal, the petitioners raised the defense of prescription.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the crime has prescribed.
HELD:
No, the crime has not prescribed.
Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "the period of prescription
shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended
party, the authorities or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the
complaint or information, and shall commence to run again when such proceedings
terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably
stopped for any reason not imputable to him."
Interpreting the foregoing provision, this Court in People vs. Tayco held that
the complaint or information referred to in Article 91 is that which is filed in the
proper court and not the denuncia or accusation lodged by the offended party in the
Fiscal's Office. This is so, according to the court, because under this rule it is so
provided that the period shall commence to run again when the proceedings initiated
by the filing of the complaint or information terminate without the accused being
convicted or acquitted, adding that the proceedings in the Office of the Fiscal cannot
end there in the acquittal or conviction of the accused.
18
G.R. No. 125066 July 8, 1998

ISABELITA REODICA
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
A complaint charging petitioner, Isabelita Reodica, with the crime of reckless
imprudence resulting to damage to property and slight physical injuries was filed
before the Fiscal’s office on October 20, 1987.
On January 13, 1988, an information was filed before the Regional Trial
Court of Makati charging the petitioner for the abovementioned offense. The
Regional Trial Court found the victim guilty as charged, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court.
On appeal, the petitioner raised the defense of prescription.
ISSUE:
Whether or not prescription has set in.
HELD:
We cannot apply Section 9 of the Rule on Summary Procedure, which
provides that in cases covered thereby, such as offenses punishable by imprisonment
not exceeding 6 months, as in the instant case, “the prosecution commences by the
filing of a complaint or information directly with the MeTC, RTC or MCTC without
need of a prior preliminary examination or investigation; provided that in
Metropolitan Manila and Chartered Cities, said cases may be commenced only by
information.” However, this Section cannot be taken to mean that the prescriptive
period is interrupted only by the filing of a complaint or information directly with
said courts.
It must be stressed that prescription in criminal cases is a matter of
substantive law. Pursuant to Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution, this Court,
in the exercise of its rule-making power, is not allowed to diminish, increase or
modify substantive rights. Hence, in case of conflict between the Rule on Summary
Procedure promulgated by this Court and the Revised Penal Code, the latter prevails.
In the instant case, as the offenses involved are covered by the Revised Penal
Code, Article 91 thereof and the rulings in Francisco and Cuaresma apply. Thus, the
prescriptive period for the quasi offenses in question was interrupted by the filing of
the complaint with the fiscal’s office three days after the vehicular mishap and
remained tolled pending the termination of this case. We cannot, therefore, uphold
petitioner’s defense of prescription of the offenses charged in the information in this
case.
19
G.R. No. 152662 June 13, 2012

vs.
MA. THERESA PANGILINAN
FACTS:
Virginia Malolos filed an affidavit-complaint for estafa and violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg.22 against the respondent, Pangilinan on September 16, 1997 with the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City.
On December 5, 1997, a civil case was commenced by Pangilinan against
Malolos for accounting, recovery of commercial documents, enforceability and
effectivity of contract and specific performance before the Regional Trial Court of
Valenzuela City.
Five days thereafter or on December 10, 1997, Pangilinan filed a “Petition to
Suspend Proceedings on the Ground of Prejudicial Question” before the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Quezon City, citing as basis the pendency of the civil action she
filed with the RTC of Valenzuela City. The City Prosecutor approved the petition
upon the recommendation of the assistant City Prosecutor on March 2, 1998.
Malolos appealed the decision of the City Prosecutor to the Department of
Justice. On January 5, 1999, reversed the resolution of the City Prosecutor and
ordered the filing of informations on violations of Batas Pambansa Blg.22. Said cases
were filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City on November 18,
1999.
Pangilinan filed an “Omnibus Motion to Quash the Information and to Defer
the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest” before MeTC, Branch 31, Quezon City. She
alleged that her criminal liability has been extinguished by reason of prescription.

ISSUE:
Whether or not prescription has set in.
HELD:
No, the action has not prescribed.
Act No. 3326 entitled “An Act to Establish Prescription for Violations of
Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall
Begin,” as amended, is the law applicable to BP Blg. 22 cases. Appositely, the law
reads:
SECTION 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in
such acts, prescribe in accordance with the following rules: (a) xxx; (b) after four
years for those punished by imprisonment for more than one month, but less than two
years; (c) xxx.
SECTION 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the
violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery
thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and
punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against
the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for
reasons not constituting jeopardy.
Since BP Blg. 22 is a special law that imposes a penalty of imprisonment of
not less than thirty (30) days but not more than one year or by a fine for its violation,
it therefor prescribes in four (4) years in accordance with the aforecited law. The
20
running of the prescriptive period, however, should be tolled upon the institution of
proceedings against the guilty person.
21
G.R. No. 127845 March 10, 2000

vs.
LODRIGO BAYYA
FACTS:
Respondent, Lodrigo Bayya was charged and convicted with the crime of
incestuous rape as defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code
as amended by Republic Act 7659 before the Regional Trial Court in Ilagan, Isabela.
On Appeal, respondent challenged the penalty of death against him on the
grounds that the information charging of the offense did not made any mention of
Republic Act 7659 and that he was only charged using Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code, hence, the penalty should be that which is provided for in the Revised
Penal Code and not as provided for in Republic Act 7659. As such, in convicting him
under the provisions of Republic Act 7659, a transgression of his right to be informed
of the nature and cause of accusation against him.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a transgression of the respondent’s right to be
informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him.
HELD:
Yes, the respondent may only be convicted of the charges under the
information indicting him and nothing more.
In the case under scrutiny, the information does not allege the minority of the
victim, Rosie S. Bayya, although the same was proven during the trial as borne by the
records. The omission is not merely formal in nature since doctrinally, an accused
cannot be held liable for more than what he is indicted for. It matters not how
conclusive and convincing the evidence of guilt may be, but an accused cannot be
convicted of any offense, not charged in the Complaint or information on which he is
tried or therein necessarily included. He has a right to be informed of the nature of the
offense with which he is charged before he is put on trial. To convict an accused of an
offense higher than that charged in the Complaint or information on which he is tried
would constitute unauthorized denial of that right.
22
G.R. No. 169888 November 11, 2008

RAMON Y. TALAGA, JR., City Mayor, Lucena City
vs.
HON. SANDIGANBAYAN, 4th Division, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
Criminal and administrative charges were filed against petitioner Ramon Y.
Talaga Jr. before the Office of the Ombudsman. It was alleged, that the petitioner, in
his capacity as mayor, has unlawfully granted favors to a third party with respect to
the operation of bingo games in the city, to the damage and prejudice of the
complainants. The administrative complaint was dismissed but the criminal case was
retained by the Ombudsman.
Three criminal information charging the petitioner of violation of Republic
Act No. 3019 was recommended by the Office of the Special Prosecutor. Only one
information was sustained by the Sandiganbayan, the criminal information for giving
unwarranted benefits to Jose Sy Bang by approving an ordinance granting him a local
franchise to operate bingo games in the city. However, said information was reverted
back to the Ombudsman for the conduct of further preliminary investigation.
Thereafter, an information charging the petitioner and the City Councilors for
the aforementioned offense, alleging that the parties conspired to perpetrate the crime.
The City Councilors moved for the motion to be quashed as the information does not
constitute an offense.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there exist a valid information under which the petitioner
stands charged.
HELD:
Yes, the information is valid.
The test in Section 9, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court is whether the crime is
described in intelligible terms with such particularity as to appraise the accused, with
reasonable certainty, of the offense charged. The raison d'etre of the rule is to enable
the accused to suitably prepare his defense.
Based on the foregoing test, the Information sufficiently apprises petitioner of
the charges against him. The Information charged the petitioner of evident bad faith
and manifest partiality when as Mayor of Lucena City, petitioner, in conspiracy with
the City Council, gave unwarranted benefits to Jose Sy Bang. Moreover, it states the
specific act which constituted the giving of unwarranted benefits, namely, granting
unto the said Jose Sy Bang a local franchise to operate a bingo business in Lucena
City in violation of existing laws. These allegations are clear enough for a layman to
understand.
23
G.R. No. 130492 January 31, 2001

vs.
SALVADOR ARROJADO
FACTS:
The accused, Salvador Arrojado, and the victim, Mary Ann Arrojado was
living in the same roof along with the victim’s father. The accused was helping in
taking care of the victim’s father.
One day, the accused went to the house of his cousin, Erlinda Arrojado
Magdaluyo, and reported that the victim has committed suicide. Erlinda along with
his husband and father went to the victim’s house and there they saw the already
lifeless body of the victim.
Upon examination, it was revealed that the victim suffered multiple stab
wounds all over her body, negating the theory of suicide.
On hearing, several witnesses testified on the strained relationship between
the victim and the accused. The accused was found guilty of murder.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength,
though not alleged in the information, may be appreciated in the case.
HELD:
No, an aggravating circumstance to be appreciated must be alleged in the
information.
The murder in this case took place after the effectivity of R.A. No. 7659 on
December 31, 1993 which increased the penalty for murder from reclusion
temporal maximum to death to reclusion perpetua to death. In view of the presence
of the aggravating circumstance of abuse of confidence and in accordance with Art.
63(1) of the Revised Penal Code, the trial court should have imposed the penalty of
death on accused-appellant. However, on December 1, 2000, the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure took effect, requiring that every complaint or information state
not only the qualifying but also the aggravating circumstances. This provision may be
given retroactive effect in the light of the well settled rule that “statutes regulating the
procedure of the court will be construed as applicable to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retroactive in that
sense and to that extent.” The aggravating circumstance of abuse of confidence not
having been alleged in the information, the same therefore could not be appreciated to
raise accused-appellant’s sentence to death.
24
G.R. No. 188106 November 25, 2009

vs.
ANTONIO DALISAY Y DESTRESA
FACTS:
Antonio Dalisay was charged and convicted with the crime of rape
perpetrated against the 16 years old daughter of his live in partner.
It was alleged that even prior to the commission of rape, the accused was
already repeatedly molesting the victim by inserting his fingers in her genitalia.
An information charging the accused of the crime of rape in relation to
Republic Act 7610 was then instituted before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City. The Regional Trial Court convicted the accused for the crime of qualified rape.
The Court of Appeals only found the accused guilty of the crime of simple rape.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the special qualifying circumstance of minority, though not
alleged in the information, may be appreciated in the case at bar.
HELD:
No, the special qualifying circumstance of minority may not be appreciated
as it is not alleged in the information charging the accused of the crime.
While it has been proven that appellant was the common-law spouse of the
parent of the victim and the child was a minor at the time of the incident, the Court
cannot convict appellant of qualified rape because the special qualifying
circumstances of minority and relationship were not sufficiently alleged in the
information. To recall, the information here erroneously alleged that appellant was
the stepfather of the victim. Proven during the trial, however, was that appellant was
not married to the victim’s mother, but was only the common-law spouse of the latter.
Following settled jurisprudence, appellant is liable only of simple rape punishable
by reclusion perpetua.
25
G.R. No. 103102 March 6, 1992

CLAUDIO J. TEEHANKEE, JR.
vs.
HON. JOB B. MADAYAG and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
Petitioner, Tehankee, Jr. was charged with the crime of frustrated murder for
the act of shooting Maureen Navarro Hultman on the head, which would have caused
her death if not for the timely medical intervention.
Trial ensued. After the prosecution had rested its case, petitioner was allowed
to file a motion for leave to file a demurrer to evidence. However, before the said
motion could be filed, Maureen Navarro Hultman died.
The prosecution then filed an omnibus motion for leave of court to file an
amended information. The amended information was filed, however, the petitioner
refused to be arraigned on the said amended information for lack of preliminary
investigation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an amended information involving a substantial amendment,
without preliminary investigation, after the prosecution has rested on the original
information, may legally and validly be admitted.
HELD:
Yes, the amendment is legal and valid.
Amendments are allowed after arraignment and during the trial but only as to
matters of form and provided that no prejudice is caused to the rights of the accused.
An objective appraisal of the amended information for murder filed against herein
petitioner will readily show that the nature of the offense originally charged was not
actually changed. Instead, an additional allegation, that is, the supervening fact of the
death of the victim was merely supplied to aid the trial court in determining the
proper penalty for the crime. Under the circumstances thus obtaining, it is
irremissible that the amended information for murder is, at most, an amendment as to
form which is allowed even during the trial of the case. It consequently follows that
since only a formal amendment was involved and introduced in the second
information, a preliminary investigation is unnecessary and cannot be demanded by
the accused. The filing of the amended information without the requisite preliminary
investigation does not violate petitioner's right to be secured against hasty, malicious
and oppressive prosecutions, and to be protected from an open and public accusation
of a crime, as well as from the trouble, expenses and anxiety of a public trial.
26
G.R. No. 165751 April 12, 2005

DATU GUIMID P. MATALAM
vs.
THE SECOND DIVISION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
An information charging the petitioner of violation of Section 3 € of Republic
Act No. 3019 as amended was filed before the Sandiganbayan. Said violation was for
his alleged refusal to pay the back wages ordered by the Civil Service Commission.
After reinvestigation, an amended information was filed by the public
prosecutor, Matalam, objected to the filing of the amended information and filed a
motion to dismiss alleging that the amended information charges an entirely new
cause of action, that is, the alleged willful, unlawful and illegal dismissal from the
service of the complaining witnesses. Also, the petitioner assails that admitting said
information without a preliminary investigation would amount to a violation of his
right to due process.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the amendment to the information is substantial as to warrant
the conduct of a new preliminary investigation.
HELD:
Yes, the amendment was indeed substantial.
The recital of facts constituting the offense charged was definitely altered. In
the original information, the prohibited act allegedly committed by petitioner was the
illegal and unjustifiable refusal to pay the monetary claims of the private
complainants, while in the amended information, it is the illegal dismissal from the
service of the private complainants. However, it cannot be denied that the alleged
illegal and unjustifiable refusal to pay monetary claims is related to, and arose from,
the alleged illegal dismissal from the service of the private complainants.
If petitioner is not to be given a new preliminary investigation for the
amended charge, his right will definitely be prejudiced because he will be denied his
right to present evidence to show or rebut evidence regarding the element of evident
bad faith and manifest partiality on the alleged dismissal. He will be denied due
process.
A component part of due process in criminal justice, preliminary
investigation is a statutory and substantive right accorded to the accused before trial.
To deny their claim to a preliminary investigation would be to deprive them of the
full measure of their right to due process.
27
G.R. No. 182677 August 3, 2010

JOSE ANTONIO C. LEVISTE
vs.
HON. ELMO M. ALAMEDA, HON. RAUL M. GONZALEZ, HON. EMMANUEL Y.
VELASCO, HEIRS OF THE LATE RAFAEL DE LAS ALAS
FACTS:
Petitioner, Leviste, was originally charged with the crime of homicide for the
death Rafael de las Alas before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.
After re-examination and re-investigation of the records of the case, the
prosecution amended the information to reflect that the petitioner is already charged
with the crime of murder and no longer for homicide.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the amendment of the information is substantial as to warrant
the conduct of a new preliminary investigation.
HELD:
Yes, the amendment was substantial. However, there is no need for a new
preliminary investigation as the conduct of re-investigation is of the same nature.
The test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by the amendment is whether
a defense under the information as it originally stood would be available after the
amendment is made, and whether any evidence defendant might have would be
equally applicable to the information in the one form as in the other. An amendment
to an information which does not change the nature of the crime alleged therein does
not affect the essence of the offense or cause surprise or deprive the accused of an
opportunity to meet the new averment had each been held to be one of form and not
of substance.
Considering that another or a new preliminary investigation is required, the
fact that what was conducted in the present case was a reinvestigation does not
invalidate the substantial amendment of the Information. There is no substantial
distinction between a preliminary investigation and a reinvestigation since both are
conducted in the same manner and for the same objective of determining whether
there exists sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been
committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial.
What is essential is that petitioner was placed on guard to defend himself from the
charge of murder after the claimed circumstances were made known to him as early
as the first motion.
28
G.R. No. 121211 April 30, 2003

vs.
RONETO DEGAMO alias “Roy”
FACTS:
Accused, Degamo, was charged and convicted for the crime for rape before
the Regional Trial Court of Ormoc City. The Trial Court imposed upon the accused
the supreme penalty of death as the Trial Court appreciated the aggravating
circumstance of dwelling and night time.
Also, the penalty of death was imposed due to the qualifying circumstance of
that by reason of the incident of rape, the victim has become insane. However, said
circumstance was only presented on the amended information submitted after the
accused has already been arraigned.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the amendment to include the circumstance “that the victim
has become insane by reason of the incident of rape is substantial.
HELD:
No, the amendment is not substantial.
The test as to whether an amendment is only of form and an accused is not
prejudiced by such amendment is whether or not a defense under the information as it
originally stood would be equally available after the amendment is made, and
whether or not any evidence which the accused might have would be equally
applicable to the information in one form as in the other; if the answer is in the
affirmative, the amendment is one of form and not of substance
Tested against the foregoing guidelines, the subject amendment is clearly not
one of substance as it falls under all of the formal amendments enumerated in
the Teehankee case. The insertion of the phrase that the victim has become insane by
reason or on occasion of the rape in the Information merely raised the penalty that
may be imposed in case of conviction and does not charge another offense different
from that charged in the original Information. Whatever defense appellant may have
raised under the original information for rape committed with a deadly weapon
equally applies to rape committed with a deadly weapon where the victim has become
insane by reason or on occasion of the rape. The amendment did not adversely affect
any substantial right of appellant. Therefore, the trial court correctly allowed the
amendment.
29
G.R. No. 171271 August 31, 2006

vs.
ELBERTO TUBONGBANUA y PAHILANGA
FACTS:
Accused, Tubongbanua, was charged and convicted with the crime of murder
for the death of Atty. Evelyn Sua-Kho by the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City.
The conviction was based on the amended information which included the
aggravating circumstance of dwelling and with insult or in disregard of the respect
due to the offended party on account of her rank, age or sex.
The Court of Appeals did not appreciate the aggravating circumstances of
dwelling and insult to rank, sex and age of the victim because these circumstances
were included as amendments to the information after the presentation by the
prosecution of its evidence.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the amendment constitutes a substantial one so as to
invalidate the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and insult to rank, sex or age of
the victim.
HELD:
No, the amendments are not substantial.
The test as to whether an amendment is only of form and an accused is not
prejudiced by such amendment is whether or not a defense under the information as it
originally stood would be equally available after the amendment is made, and
whether or not any evidence which the accused might have would be equally
applicable to the information in one form as in the other; if the answer is in the
affirmative, the amendment is one of form and not of substance.
Tested against these guidelines, the insertion of the aggravating
circumstances of dwelling and insult or disregard of the respect due to rank, age, or
sex of the victim is clearly a formal, not a substantial, amendment. These
amendments do not have the effect of charging another offense different or distinct
from the charge of murder as contained in the original information. They relate only
to the range of the penalty that the court might impose in the event of conviction. The
amendment did not adversely affect any substantial right of appellant. Besides,
appellant never objected to the presentation of evidence to prove the aggravating
circumstances of dwelling and insult or in disregard of the respect due to the offended
party on account of rank, age or sex. Without any objection by the defense, the defect
is deemed waived
30
G.R. No. 151785 December 10, 2007

SUSAN FRONDA-BAGGAO
vs.
FACTS:
Four separate informations for illegal recruitment were filed against
petitioner, Baggao, before the Regional Trial Court of Bangued.
The prosecution filed a motion to amend the informations praying that the
separate informations for illegal recruitment be amended so that there would only be
one information for illegal recruitment in large scale.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the amendment is valid.
HELD:
Yes, the amendment is valid.
Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:
Section 14. Amendment or substitution. – A complaint or information may be
amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the
accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may
only be made with leave of court and when it can be done without causing prejudice
to the rights of the accused.
However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of the
offense charged in or excludes any accused from the complaint or information, can be
made only upon motion by the prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with
leave of court. The court shall state its reasons in resolving the motion and copies of
its order shall be furnished all parties, especially the offended party.
If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in
charging the proper offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or
information upon the filing of a new one charging the proper offense in accordance
with section 19, Rule 119, provided the accused would not be placed in double
jeopardy. The court may require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the
trial.
Simply stated, before the accused enters his plea, a formal or substantial
amendment of the complaint or information may be made without leave of court.
After the entry of a plea, only a formal amendment may be made but with leave of
court and only if it does not prejudice the rights of the accused. After arraignment, a
substantial amendment is proscribed except if the same is beneficial to the accused.

31
G.R. No. 160451 February 9, 2007

EDUARDO G. RICARZE
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, CALTEX PHILIPPINES,
INC., PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK (PCIBANK)
FACTS:
Two informations for estafa through falsification of commercial document
was filed against petitioner, Ricarze, before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.
Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIBank), unknown to the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, credited the amount being questioned in the criminal
cases of estafa.
On pre-trial, the petitioner questioned the appearance of PCIBank. The
petitioner averred that unless the Informations were amended to change the private
complainant to PCIB, his right as accused would be prejudiced.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the substitution of Caltex by PCIBank as private complainant
is tantamount to substantial amendment.
HELD:
No, there is no substantial amendment.
The test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by the amendment is whether
a defense under the information as it originally stood would be available after the
amendment is made, and whether any evidence defendant might have would be
equally applicable to the information in the one form as in the other. An amendment
to an information which does not change the nature of the crime alleged therein does
not affect the essence of the offense or cause surprise or deprive the accused of an
opportunity to meet the new averment had each been held to be one of form and not
of substance.
In the case at bar, the substitution of Caltex by PCIB as private complaint is
not a substantial amendment. The substitution did not alter the basis of the charge in
both Informations, nor did it result in any prejudice to petitioner. The documentary
evidence in the form of the forged checks remained the same, and all such evidence
was available to petitioner well before the trial. Thus, he cannot claim any surprise by
virtue of the substitution.
32
G.R. No. 80116 June 30, 1989

IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL
vs.
HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXVI; HON. LUIS C. VICTOR, in his capacity as the
City Fiscal of Manila; and ERICH EKKEHARD GEILING
FACTS:
Two complaints for adultery were filed against petitioner, Pilapil, before the
City Fiscal of Manila, for allegedly having an affair with a certain William Chia and
another man named Jesus Chua while her marriage with Geiling was still subsisting.
Pilapil contested said charges stating that Geiling no longer qualify as an
offended spouse having obtained a final divorce decree in Germany before filing the
criminal charges for adultery.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Geiling is an offended spouse with capacity or legal
representation to initiate an action for adultery.
HELD:
The law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and
concubinage the person who can legally file the complaint should be the offended
spouse, and nobody else. The offended spouse assumes a more predominant role
since the right to commence the action, or to refrain therefrom, is a matter exclusively
within his power and option. This policy was adopted out of consideration for the
aggrieved party who might prefer to suffer the outrage in silence rather than go
through the scandal of a public trial.
Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute
the action, it necessarily follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity or
legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action. It
presupposes, therefore, that the marital relationship is still subsisting at the time of the
institution of the criminal action for adultery.
In view of the valid divorce obtained by Geiling in his country, its legal
effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as Geiling is concerned in view
of the nationality principle in civil law on the matter of status of persons. Geiling,
being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the
adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed
suit.
33
G.R. No. 168785 February 5, 2010

HERALD BLACK DACASIN
vs.
SHARON DEL MUNDO DACASIN
FACTS:
Herald, an American, and Sharon, Filipino, were married in Manila on April
of 1994. In June 1999, Sharon was able to obtain a divorce decree from the Circuit
Court of Lake County, Illinois. The Illinois Circuit Court also granted sole custody of
their child to Sharon.
In 2002, both parties instituted a contract agreeing to a joint custody over
their child.
In 2004, Herald filed a case against Sharon alleging that Sharon had
exercised sole custody over their child.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the case.
HELD:
Yes, the Regional Trial Court can take cognizance of the case.
The trial court has jurisdiction to entertain petitioner’s suit but not to enforce
the Agreement which is void.
Subject matter jurisdiction is conferred by law. At the time petitioner filed his
suit in the trial court, statutory law vests on Regional Trial Courts exclusive original
jurisdiction over civil actions incapable of pecuniary estimation. An action for
specific performance, such as petitioner’s suit to enforce the Agreement on joint child
custody, belongs to this species of actions. Thus, jurisdiction-wise, petitioner went to
the right court.
34
G.R. No. L-38308 December 26, 1984

MILAGROS DONIO-TEVES and MANUEL MORENO
vs.
HON. CIPRIANO VAMENTA, JR., as Presiding Judge, Branch III, Court of First
Instance, Negros Oriental, PABLO E. CABAHUG, as City Fiscal of Dumaguete, and
JULIAN L. TEVES
FACTS:
Milagros Donio-Teves and Manuel Moreno are accused of and charged with
adultery. Thecriminal action was initiated by a letter-complaint thumb marked and
sworn to by complainant Julian Teves, the husband of petitioner Milagros Donio-
Teves. During the preliminary investigation, Julian Teves filed a new letter-complaint
attaching his affidavit. Before the scheduled arraignment, Milagros Donio-Teves filed
a Motion to Quash challenging the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance over the
offense charged, the persons of both accused, and the authority of respondent City
Fiscal of Dumaguete to file the information. The motion was denied by the CFI.
During the pendency of the case, complainant Julian Teves died.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the death of the complainant in adultery while the case is
pending a ground to dismiss the case.
HELD:
In adultery and concubinage cases, the death of the offended party is not
a ground for the extinguishment of the criminal liability, whether partial or total, of
the offending spouse. The participation of the offended party is essential not for the
maintenance of the criminal action but solely for the initiation thereof. The moment
the offended party initiates the action, the law will be applied in full force beyond the
control of, and in spite of the complainant, his death notwithstanding.
35
G.R. No. 190847 April 13, 2011

BUREAU OF CUSTOMS
vs.
PETER SHERMAN, MICHAEL WHELAN, TEODOR B. LINGAN, ATTY. OFELIA
B. CAJIGAL and the COURT OF TAX APPEALS
FACTS:
A criminal action for violation of the provisions of the Tariff and Custom
Code of the Philippines, as amended and Republic Act 7916 was filed against private
respondents for alleged non-payment of duties or taxes for the shipment of bet slips
and thermal papers.
The State Prosecutor found probable cause and filed an information against
the private respondents before the Court of Tax Appeals.
The Secretary of Department of Justice reversed the determination of
probable cause and ordered the withdrawal of the information. Hence, the State
Prosecutor withdrew the information.
The Bureau of Customs then filed, in its own, a motion for reconsideration
before the Court of Tax Appeals.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Bureau of Customs can commence the action without the
participation of the State Prosecutor.
HELD:
No, the public prosecutor has power of direction and control over prosecution
of criminal cases.
It is well-settled that prosecution of crimes pertains to the executive
department of the government whose principal power and responsibility is to insure
that laws are faithfully executed. Corollary to this power is the right to prosecute
violators. Thus, all criminal actions commenced by complaint or information are
prosecuted under the direction and control of public prosecutors. In the prosecution of
special laws, however, the exigencies of public service sometimes require the
designation of special prosecutors from different government agencies to assist the
public prosecutor; but this designation does not detract from the public prosecutor
having control and supervision over the case.
36
G.R. No. 145391. August 26, 2002

AVELINO CASUPANAN and ROBERTO CAPITULO
vs.
MARIO LLAVORE LAROYA
FACTS:
The parties in this case were involved in a vehicular accident. As a result,
Casupanan filed a civil case against Laroya for Quasi-delict and Laroya filed a
criminal case against the former for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to
property.
When the civil case was filed, the criminal case was already in its
Preliminary investigation stage. Laroya filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of
forum shopping considering the own going criminal case, which was granted.
Casupanan filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that the civil case is a
separate civil action which can proceed independently from the criminal case.
ISSUE:
Whether or nor an accused in a pending criminal case for reckless
imprudence can validly file, simultaneously and independently, a separate civil action
for quasi-delict against the private complainant in the criminal case?
HELD:
Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, the independent civil action in
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code is not deemed instituted with the
criminal action but may be filed separately by the offended party even without
reservation. The commencement of the criminal action does not suspend the
prosecution of the independent civil action under these articles of the Civil
Code. The suspension in Section 2 of the present Rule 111 refers only to the civil
action arising from the crime, if such civil action is reserved or filed before the
commencement of the criminal action.
The two cases can proceed simultaneously and independently of each other.
Second, the accused, who is presumed innocent, has a right to invoke Article
2177 of the Civil Code, in the same way that the offended party can avail of this
remedy which is independent of the criminal action.
37
G.R. No. 174238 July 7, 2009

ANITA CHENG
vs.
SPOUSES WILLIAM SY AND TESSIE SY
FACTS:
Two cases of estafa was filed by petitioner, Cheng, against the respondents,
Spouses Sy, before the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
Petitioner then filed two more criminal cases for violation of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22 against the respondents based on the same facts contained in the criminal
charge of estafa.
The criminal charge for estafa was dismissed for failure to prove the elements
thereof, however, no pronouncement as to the civil liability was made. The cases for
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 are likewise dismissed, no pronouncement as the
civil liability was also made.
Petitioner then filed a civil action for collection of sum of money with
damages based on the same checks that are the subject of the charges of estafa and
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the dismissal of the charges of estafa and Batas Pambansa
Blg.22 bars the institution of a civil actions arising from the criminal charges.
HELD:
Under the present revised Rules, the criminal action for violation of BP Blg.
22 includes the corresponding civil action to recover the amount of the checks. It
should be stressed, this policy is intended to discourage the separate filing of the civil
action. In fact, the Rules even prohibits the reservation of a separate civil action, i.e.,
one can no longer file a separate civil case after the criminal complaint is filed in
court. The only instance when separate proceedings are allowed is when the civil
action is filed ahead of the criminal case. Even then, the Rules encourages the
consolidation of the civil and criminal cases. Thus, where petitioner’s rights may be
fully adjudicated in the proceedings before the court trying the BP Blg. 22 cases,
resort to a separate action to recover civil liability is clearly unwarranted on account
of res judicata, for failure of petitioner to appeal the civil aspect of the cases. In view
of this special rule governing actions for violation of BP Blg. 22, Article 31 of the
Civil Code is not applicable.
38
G.R. No. 175091 July 13, 2011

P/CHIEF INSPECTOR FERNANDO BILLEDO,
SPO3 RODRIGO DOMINGO, PO3 JORGE LOPEZ, FERDINAND CRUZ,
and MARIANO CRUZ,
vs.
WILHELMINA WAGAN, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Branch
III, Pasay City, ALBERTO MINA, NILO JAY MINA AND FERDINAND CAASI
FACTS:
Private respondents were charged for violating a city ordinance that prohibits
the drinking of liquor in public places.
Thereafter, the private respondents filed a civil case against the petitioners,
criminal complaints were also filed against the petitioners before the City Prosecutor
Office and the Office of the Ombudsman for unlawful arrest and violation of
Republic Act No. 7348.
Both of the criminal actions against the petitioners were dismissed, however,
the civil action proceeded with the trial.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the civil case is cognizable by the Regional Trial Court.
HELD:
Yes, the civil case falls within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court.
The subject civil case does not fall within the purview of Section 4 of R.A.
No. 8249 as the latter part of this provision contemplates only two (2) situations.
First, a criminal action has been instituted before the Sandiganbayan or
the appropriate courts after the requisite preliminary investigation, and the
corresponding civil liability must be simultaneously instituted with it. Second, the
civil case, filed ahead of the criminal case, is still pending upon the filing of the
criminal action, in which case, the civil case should be transferred to the court trying
the criminal case for consolidation and joint determination. Section 4 of R.A. No.
8249 finds no application in this case. No criminal action has been filed before
the Sandiganbayan or any appropriate court. Thus, there is no appropriate court to
which the subject civil case can be transferred or consolidated as mandated by
the said provision .It is also illogical to consider the civil case as abandoned simply
because the criminal cases against petitioners were dismissed at the preliminary stage.
A reading of the latter part of Section 4 of R.A. No. 8294 suggests that the civil case
will only be considered abandoned if there is a pending criminal case and the civil
case was not transferred to the court trying the criminal case for joint determination.
The criminal charges against petitioners might have been dismissed at the preliminary
stage for lack of probable cause, but it does not mean that the civil case instituted
prior to the filing of the criminal complaints is already baseless as the complainants
can prove their cause of action in the civil case by mere preponderance of evidence.
G.R. Nos. 155531-34 July 29, 2005
MARY ANN RODRIGUEZ
vs.
HON. THELMA A. PONFERRADA, in her OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS PRESIDING
JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY BRANCH 104;
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and GLADYS NOCOM
FACTS:
39
Petitioner Rodriguez was charged with estafa and violation of Batas

Pambansa Blg. 22. On hearing of the criminal charge of estafa, the respondent judge
allowed the appearance of a private prosecutor to try the civil aspect of the offense
charged. The petitioner opposed said appearance alleging that the private prosecutor’s
appearance is barred as the civil aspect of the case is already deemed instituted in the
criminal charge of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.
ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondent is allowed to collect civil damages in both
the estafa and Batas Pambansa Blg.22 cases as to warrant the appearance of a private
prosecutor in the case of estafa.
HELD:
No. Settled is the rule that the single act of issuing a bouncing check may
give rise to two distinct criminal offenses: Estafa and violation of BP 22. However,
the recovery of the single civil liability arising from the single act of issuing a
bouncing check in either criminal case bars the recovery of the same civil liability in
the other criminal action. While the law allows two simultaneous civil remedies for
the offended party, it authorizes recovery in only one.
40
G.R. No. 175851 July 04, 2012

EMILIA LIM
vs.
MINDANAO WINES & LIQUOR GALLERIA, A SINGLE PROPRIETORSHIP
BUSINESS OUTFIT OWNED BY EVELYN S. VALDEVIESO
FACTS:
Mindanao Wines and Liquor Galleria (Mindanao Wines) delivered several
cases of liquors to H & E Commercial owned by Emilia Lim who issued four checks
worth P25,000.00 each. Two of these checks bounced for the reasons ‘ACCOUNT
CLOSED’ and ‘DRAWN AGAINSTINSUFFICIENT FUNDS’. Mindanao Wines
demanded from H & E Commercial the payment of their value through two separate
letters but the demands went unheeded prompting Mindanao Wines to file before the
MTCC for violations of BP 22. Emilia Lim was acquitted but was made to pay civil
the two amounts of checks plus interest and cost of filing fees.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the dismissal of the Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 case includes
the dismissal of the civil aspect.
HELD:
No, Acquittal from a crime does not necessarily mean absolution from civil
liability. Even if the Court treats the subject dismissal as one based on insufficiency
of evidence as Emilia wants to put it, the same is still tantamount to a dismissal based
on reasonable doubt. The MTCC dismissed the criminal cases because one essential
element of BP 22 was missing, i.e., the fact of the bank’s dishonor. The evidence was
insufficient to prove said element of the crime as no proof of dishonor of the checks
was presented by the prosecution. This, however, only means that the trial court
cannot convict Emilia of the crime since the prosecution failed to prove her guilt
beyond reasonable doubt, the quantum of evidence required in criminal cases.
Conversely, the lack of such proof of dishonor does not mean that Emilia has
no existing debt with Mindanao Wines, a civil aspect which is proven by another
quantum of evidence, a mere preponderance of evidence." Preponderance of evidence
is defined as the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and
is usually considered to be synonymous with the term ‘greater weight of the
evidence’ or ‘greater weight of the credible evidence’. It is evidence which is more
convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition
thereto."
41
G.R. No. 102007 September 2, 1994

vs.
ROGELIO BAYOTAS y CORDOVA
FACTS:
The accused, Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova, was charged and convicted with
the crime of rape by the Regional Trial Court of Roxas City. Pending appeal, the
accused suffered a cardio respiratory arrest resulting to his demise. The Supreme
Court dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal and required the Solicitor General
to submit his comment with regards to the civil aspect of the case.
The Solicitor General, relying on the case of People vs Sendaydiego, opined
that the civil liability of the accused still exists despite his death, thus, the case should
proceed for the determination of the civil liability.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the civil liability of the accused arising from the offense
charged is extinguished upon the death of the accused pending appeal.
HELD:
Yes. The death of the accused pending appeal extinguishes the civil liability
arising from the offense charged.
In pursuing recovery of civil liability arising from crime, the final
determination of the criminal liability is a condition precedent to the prosecution of
the civil action, such that when the criminal action is extinguished by the demise of
accused-appellant pending appeal thereof, said civil action cannot survive. The claim
for civil liability springs out of and is dependent upon facts which, if true, would
constitute a crime. Such civil liability is an inevitable consequence of the criminal
liability and is to be declared and enforced in the criminal proceeding. This is to be
distinguished from that which is contemplated under Article 30 of the Civil Code
which refers to the institution of a separate civil action that does not draw its life from
a criminal proceeding.
42
G.R. No. L-50691 December 5, 1994

EUSEBIO V. FONACIER, ROGELIO RAMOS, JOSEPH GONZALES and
FRANCISCO VILLANUEVA
vs.
THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN presided by HONORABLE MANUEL PAMARAN,
BERNARDO P. FERNANDEZ and ROMEO ESCAREAL, and the TANODBAYAN
CHIEF SPECIAL PROSECUTOR JUAN A. SISON and PROSECUTORS RODOLFO
AQUINO and MANUEL HERRERA
FACTS:
In April 1979, Fonacier, et. al, being public officers, entered into a fixed and
pre-arranged contract in the name of the Government requiring their participation and
approval with Francisco T. del Moral, a private contractor, for the delivery of Five
Thousand Five Hundred and Fifty (5,550) cubic meters of aggregate subbase. No
delivery was ever made after payment of Ninety Six Thousand Six Hundred and
Three Pesos (P96,603.00) through falsified vouchers supported by falsified, spurious,
irregularly prepared and questionable documents and without the requisite delivery
receipts and tally sheets approved by the accused public officers.
On October 8, 1980, Del Moral died. Counsel for Del Moral filed a motion to
dismiss the petition for review on certiorari on the ground that Del Moral died during
the pendency of the case. The Solicitor General commented "petitioner's appeal
should only be dismissed insofar as his criminal liability is concerned."
ISSUE:
Whether or not the death of the accused extinguishes the criminal and civil
liability of the accused.
HELD:
On 29 January 1981, the Court dismissed the petition only with regard to Del
Moral's criminal liability. The death of Del Moral has extinguished the civil liability
based on ex delicto. In the recent case of People vs. Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova, G.R.
102007, promulgated on 02 September 1994, the Court have ruled, and might now
reiterate, that —
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal
liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice
Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates
his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely
on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore."
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of
accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than
delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation
from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission: a)
Law, b) Contracts, c) Quasi-contracts, d) .Delict, e) Quasi-delicts
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for
recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and
subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended.
This separate civil action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or
the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same
is based as explained above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this
separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the
criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-offended party instituted
43
together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil
liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably
with provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code, which should thereby avoid any
apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription.
44
G.R. No. 172060 September 13, 2010

JOSELITO R. PIMENTEL
vs.
MARIA CHRYSANTINE L. PIMENTEL AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
On 25 October 2004, Maria Pimentel y Lacap (private respondent) filed an
action for frustrated parricide against Joselito Pimentel (petitioner) before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. On 7 February 2005, petitioner received
summons to appear before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City for the pre-trial
and trial of a civil case (Maria Pimentel v. Joselito Pimentel) for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground
of psychological incapacity. On 11 February 2005, petitioner filed an urgent motion
to suspend the proceedings before the RTC Quezon City on the ground of
the existence of a prejudicial question. Petitioner asserted that since the relationship
between the offender and the victim is a key element in parricide, the outcome of the
civil case would have a bearing in the criminal case filed against him before the RTC
Quezon City. The RTC Quezon City held that the pendency of the case before the
RTC Antipolo is not a prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the
criminal case before it. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with application for a
writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order before the Court of
Appeals. However, The Court of Appeals ruled that even if the marriage between
petitioner and respondent would be declared void, it would be immaterial to the
criminal case because prior to the declaration of nullity, the alleged acts constituting
the crime of frustrated parricide had already been committed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the resolution of the action of annulment of marriage is a
prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case of frustrated
parricide.
HELD:
No, there is no prejudicial question in the case at bar.
Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that
elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action
involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent
criminal action and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the
criminal action may proceed. In the case at bar, the civil case for annulment was filed
after the filing of the criminal case for frustrated parricide. As such, the requirement
of Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure was not met since
the civil action was filed subsequent to the filing of the criminal action. The
relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in the crime of
parricide, which punishes any person “who shall kill his father, mother, or child,
whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants or descendants, or his
spouse.” However, the issue in the annulment of marriage is not similar or intimately
related to the issue in the criminal case for parricide. Further, the relationship between
the offender and the victim is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the
accused. The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code is whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations. The issue in parricide is whether the accused killed
the victim. In this case, since petitioner was charged with frustrated parricide, the
issue is whether he performed all the acts of execution which would have killed
45
respondent as a consequence but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason

of causes independent of petitioner’s will. At the time of the commission of the
alleged crime, petitioner and respondent were married. The subsequent dissolution of
their marriage will have no effect on the alleged crime that was committed at the time
of the subsistence of the marriage. In short, even if the marriage between petitioner
and respondent is annulled, petitioner could still be held criminally liable since at the
time of the commission of the alleged crime, he was still married to respondent.
46
G.R. No. 184861 June 30, 2009

DREAMWORK CONSTRUCTION, INC.
vs.
CLEOFE S. JANIOLA and HON. ARTHUR A. FAMINI
FACTS:
Petitioner, Dreamwork, instituted a criminal case for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 against private respondent, Janiola, before the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Las Pinas. Thereafter, the petitioner filed a criminal information for the
said offense before the Metropolitan Trial Court on February 2, 2005.
On September 20, 2006, spouses Janiola instituted a civil complaint for the
rescission of an alleged construction agreement that they entered into with the
petitioner. The checks, subject of the criminal case of violation of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22, were issued in consideration of the construction agreement.
The private respondent then filed a motion to suspend the trial in the criminal
case alleging that the civil case of rescission poses a prejudicial question that needs to
be resolved first before a determination on the criminal case may be had.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a prejudicial question in the case at bar.
HELD:
No, the action for rescission does not pose a prejudicial question on the
criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.
The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil
action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the
subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or
not the criminal action may proceed.
A prejudicial question is understood in law as that which must precede the
criminal action and which requires a decision before a final judgment can be rendered
in the criminal action with which said question is closely connected. The civil action
must be instituted prior to the institution of the criminal action.
47
GR. No. 101236 January 30, 1992

JULIANA P. YAP
vs.
MARTIN PARAS and ALFREDO D. BARCELONA, SR., Judge of the 3rd MTC of
Glan Malapatan, South Cotabato,
FACTS:
Private respondent, Paras, sold his share in the intestate estate of their parents
to his sister, Juliana P. Yap. Nineteen years thereafter, Paras sold the same property to
Santiago Saya-ang.
When Yap learned of the second sale, she filed a complaint for estafa against
Paras and Saya-ang with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of General Santos
City. On the same date, she filed a complaint for the nullification of the said sale
with the Regional Trial Court of General Santos City.
After investigation, the Provincial Prosecutor instituted a criminal complaint
for estafa against Paras with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Glan-Malapatan,
South Cotabato, presided by Judge Alfredo D. Barcelona, Sr.
On April 17, 1991, before arraignment of the accused, the trial judge motu
proprio issued an order dismissing the criminal case on the ground that the criminal
action for estafa is a prejudicial question to a civil action for nullity of an alleged
double sale.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there exist a prejudicial question in the case presented.
HELD:
No, the criminal action for estafa is not and cannot be a prejudicial question
to a civil action for nullity of double sale.
A prejudicial question is defined as that which arises in a case the resolution
of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the congnizance of
which pertains to another tribunal. The prejudicial question must be determinative of
the case before the court but the jurisdiction to try and resolve the question must be
lodged in another court or tribunal. It is a question based on a fact distinct and
separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt
or innocence of the accused.
For a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause
the suspension of the criminal action pending the determination of the civil action, it
must appear not only that the civil case involves the same facts upon which the
criminal prosecution is based, but also that the resolution of the issues raised in said
civil action would be necessarily determinative of the guilt or innocence of the
accused.
It is the issue in the civil action that is prejudicial to the continuation of the
criminal action, not the criminal action that is prejudicial to the civil action.
48
G.R. No. L-53373 June 30, 1987

MARIO FL. CRESPO
vs.
HON. LEODEGARIO L. MOGUL, Presiding Judge, CIRCUIT CRIMINAL COURT
OF LUCENA CITY, 9th Judicial Dist., THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
represented by the SOLICITOR GENERAL, RICARDO BAUTISTA, ET AL.
FACTS:
An information for Estafa was filed by the Fiscal against Crespo in the
Criminal Circuit Court of Lucena. When the case was set for arraignment, Crespo
filed a Motion To Defer Arraingment on the ground that there was a pending Petition
for Review with the Department of Justice. Said Motion was denied by Judge Mogul.
Crespo’s Motion For Reconsideration also having been denied, he filed a TRO with
the CA, which granted the same. Thereafter, the CA granted Crespo’s Writ of
Injucntion and perpetually restrained Judge Mogul from having Crespo arrainged
until the Sec. of Justice finally made his decision and ordered the Fiscal to move for
dismissal of the case. The Fiscal then filed a Motion attaching the Secretary’s
Resolution calling for the dismissal of the case. Judge Mogul denied the Motion and
set Crespo’s arraignment.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court may refuse to grant a Motion to Dismiss filed
by the Fiscal under orders from the Secretary of Justice and still insist on the
arraignment of the accused.
HELD:
Yes, it is within the power of the trial court to refuse to grant a motion to
dismiss filed by the fiscal.
Once an information is filed in court, the court’s prior permission must be
secured if fiscal wants to reinvestigate the case. While it is true that it is through the
conduct of a preliminary investigation that the fiscal determines the existence of a
prima facie case that would warrant the prosecution of a case, the filing of a
complaint or information in Court initiates a criminal action. The preliminary
investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of determining whether a prima
facie case exists warranting the prosecution of the accused is terminated upon the
filing of the information in the proper court. The Court is the best and sole judge on
what to do with the case before it. The determination of the case is within its
exclusive jurisdiction and competence.
49
G.R. No. L-60962 July 11, 1986

vs.
ROLANDO MONTEVERDE y CONE alias "EDUARDO MASCARIAS
FACTS:
Rolando Monteverde along with his co-accused Reynaldo Codera Jr. were
charged and convicted with the crime of robbery with rape and meted out the ultimate
penalty of death.
On appeal, Monteverde raised the following issues; 1) a) the medical
certificate does not show signs of physical injuries and spermatozoa; (2) said medical
certificate and even his co-accused's confession are inadmissible against him, for
being hearsay; (3) recidivism cannot be considered against him because it was not
alleged in the information; and (4) the lower court's proceedings are void because the
amended information does not contain a certification.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused can still assail the lack of preliminary
investigation even after plea and conviction.
HELD:
No, a valid plea on arraignment is tantamount to a waiver of the right of the
accused to preliminary investigation.
While generally, a preliminary investigation is mandatory and a certification
that such investigation was held is required, still this rule does not apply if the issue is
raised only after conviction. Thus, it has been held that after a plea of not guilty to the
information, an accused is deemed to have foregone the right of preliminary
investigation and to have abandoned the right to question any irregularity that
surrounds it.
50
G.R. No. L-14732 January 28, 1961

vs.
JOSEFINO G. SELFAISON, NEMESIO DALISAY, DOMINGO URETA and
BERNARDO BAUTISTA
FACTS:
Appellants Josefino G. Selfaison, Nemesio Dalisay, Domingo Ureta and
Bernardo Bautista — in company with Arsenio Amacio, Reynaldo Bautista, Domingo
Salde and Amrafil Dalisay who were alleged to be still at large were accused in an
amended information of the crime of robbery with rape in the Court of First Instance
of Capiz. After trial, Josefino G. Selfaison was found guilty and sentenced to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the complainants, Angelita Sinag and
Angelina Maghibon, the amounts of P212.50 and P110, respectively, and to pay one-
fourth of the cost. The other three accused namely, Nemesio Dalisay, Domingo Ureta,
and Bernardo Bautista, were found guilty of the crime of rape and sentenced to suffer
an indeterminate penalty of 12 years of prision mayor to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day
of reclusion temporal, plus proportionate costs. From the judgment of conviction, the
four named accused appealed to the Court of Appeals, but in view of the penalty
imposed, that court certified the case to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners were deprived of their right to preliminary
investigation.
HELD:
No, the claim of denial of the right to preliminary investigation is not
supported by any facts.
Nothing appears affirmatively on the record that such preliminary
investigation has not been had. On the other hand, it is presumed that the inferior
court proceeded in accordance with law. (People vs. Silos and Bagano, G.R. No. L-
5158, March 28, 1952.) At any rate, appellants appear to have waived such right,
because immediately after their arrest, they filed bonds for their release and
subsequently proceeded to trial, without previously claiming that they did not have
the benefit of a preliminary investigation.
51
G.R. No. 101837 February 11, 1992

ROLITO GO y TAMBUNTING
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON. BENJAMIN V. PELAYO, Presiding Judge,
Branch 168, Regional Trial Court, NCJR Pasig, M.M., and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
An information was filed charging herein petitioner Rolito Go for murder
before the Regional Trial Court of Metro Manila. Petitioner voluntarily presented
himself together with his two lawyers to the police upon obtaining knowledge of
being hunted by the latter. However, he was immediately detained and denied his
right of a preliminary investigation unless he executes a waiver of the provisions of
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. Thereafter, petitioner posted bail for his
conditional release.
No preliminary investigation before the filing of the information charging Go
for murder was conducted. The prosecutor ratiocinates that Go has already waived his
right to preliminary investigation when he posted bail.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner has waived his right to preliminary investigation.
HELD:
No, the petitioner did not waive his right to preliminary investigation.
The right to preliminary investigation is deemed waived when the accused
fails to invoke it before or at the time of entering a pleas at arraignment. The facts of
the case show that petitioner insisted on his right to preliminary investigation before
his arraignment and he, through his counsel denied answering questions before the
court unless they were afforded the proper preliminary investigation. For the above
reasons, the petition was granted and the ruling of the appellate court was set aside
and nullified. The Supreme Court however, contrary to petitioner’s allegation,
declared that failure to accord the right to preliminary investigation did not impair the
validity of the information charging the latter of the crime of murder.
52
G.R. No. 134744 January 16, 2001

GIAN PAULO VILLAFLOR
vs.
DINDO VIVAR y GOZON
FACTS:
Respondent, Vivar, was initially charged with the crime of slight physical
injuries for the mauling of petitioner Villaflor. Said charge was withdrawn when it
was later discovered that the injuries sustained was more serious than they had
appeared at first. A case of serious physical injuries was then filed against respondent
before the Municipal Trial Court of Muntinlupa City. A case of grave threat was also
filed against the respondent.
Thereafter, a Motion to Quash the information on grave threat was filed by
the respondent contending that crime should be absorbed in the charge of physical
injuries as such threats were made in connection with the same mauling incident. The
motion was denied by the MTC.
Respondent then went to the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City by way
of certiorari. The Regional Trial Court granted the motion to quash because the cases
were filed without the requisite preliminary investigation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the case should be dismissed due to the absence of
preliminary investigation.
HELD:
No, absence of preliminary investigation does not warrant a dismissal of a
criminal action.
Preliminary investigation is "an inquiry or proceeding to determine whether
sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed
and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial." A
component part of due process in criminal justice, preliminary investigation is a
statutory and substantive right accorded to the accused before trial. To deny their
claim to a preliminary investigation would be to deprive them of the full measure of
their right to due process.
However, the absence of a preliminary investigation does not impair the
validity of the information or otherwise render it defective. Neither does it affect the
jurisdiction of the court or constitute a ground for quashing the information. The trial
court, instead of dismissing the information, should hold in abeyance the proceedings
and order the public prosecutor to conduct a preliminary investigation.
53
G.R. No. 130644 March 13, 1998

THE MINOR FRANCISCO JUAN LARRANAGA, Represented in this Suit by his
mother, MARGARITA G. Present: LARRANAGA
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPPINES
FACTS:
Petitioner Larranaga was charged with two counts of kidnapping and serious
illegal detention before the RTC of Cebu City. He was arrested and was detained
without the filing of the necessary Information and warrant of arrest. The petitioner
alleged that he must be released and be subject to a preliminary investigation.
However pending the resolution of the Court for the petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus with writs of preliminary and mandatory injunction filed
by the petitioner, the RTC judge issued a warrant of arrest against the petitioner.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to preliminary investigation.
2) Whether or not the petitioner should be released from detention pending
the investigation.
HELD:
1) Yes. Our ruling is not altered by the fact that petitioner has been
arraigned on October 14, 1997. The rule is that the right to preliminary investigation
is waived when the accused fails to invoke it before or at the time of entering a
plea at arraignment. Petitioner, in this case, has been actively andconsistently
demanding a regular preliminary investigation even before
hewas charged in court. Also, petitioner refused to enter a plea during thearraignment
because there was a pending case in this Court regarding
hisright to avail of a regular preliminary investigation. Clearly, the acts of petitioner a
nd his counsel are inconsistent with a waiver. Preliminaryinvestigation is part of
procedural due process. It cannot be waived unless the waiver appears to be clear and
informed.
2) No. The filing of charges and the issuance of the warrant of arrest against a
person invalidly detained will cure the defect of that detention or at least
deny him the right to be released because of such defect.The originalwarrantless
arrest of the petitioner was doubtless illegal. Nevertheless, the
Regional Trial Court lawfully acquired jurisdiction over the person of thepetitioner by
virtue of the warrant of arrest it issued on August 26, 1993 against him and the other
accused in connection with the rape-slay cases. It was belated, to be sure, but it was
nonetheless legal
G.R. Nos. 138859-60 February 22, 2001

ALVAREZ ARO YUSOP
vs.
The Honorable SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division)
FACTS:
Acting on an Affidavit-Complaint filed by a certain Erlinda Fadri, the Office
of the Ombudsman-Mindanao issued an order dated September 19, 1995,
naming the following as respondents: benjamin Arao, Fredireck Winters, Pelaez
Pantaran, Eduardo Dablo, Efren Sissay and the city jail warden of Pagadian City. The
54
order also required respondents, within ten days from

receipt thereof, to submit their counter-affidavits and other pieces of controverting
evidence.
The Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao issued a Resolution dated Janua
ry 15, 1998 recommending the prosecution of the forenamed respondents
for violation of Article 269 of the Revised Penal Code andSection 3-a in relation to
Section 3-e of Republic Act No. 3019 as amended. Significantly, the name of
Petitioner Alvarez A. Yusop was included as one
of the persons to be prosecuted, although he was not one of the originalrespondents
mentioned in the Order of September 19, 1995.
OmbudsmanAniano A. Desierto approved the recommendation. Accordingly, twoInf
ormations were filed with the Sandiganbayan. They were docketed as Criminal Case
Nos. 24524 (violation of Section 3-a of RA 3019) and 24525(unlawful arrest under
Article 269 of the Revised Penal Code).
On April 16, 1998, an Order of Arrest was issued by the Sandiganbayan in
Criminal Case No. 24524. Petitioner, however, posted a bail bond before the
Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City on May 20 of the same year. On
thesame day, he filed a "Motion to Remand Case to the Ombudsman -Mindanao for
Preliminary Investigation."
In Resolution dated June 8, 1998, the Sandiganbayan denied the Motion
of petitioner for his alleged failure to submit himself to the jurisdiction of the anti-
graft court. On August 8, 1998, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss, grounded again
on the lack of preliminary investigation. In an Order dated September 22, 1998,
the Sandiganbayan resolved not to take action on the Motion, becausepetitioner
had not yet submitted himself to its jurisdiction insofar as Criminal Case No. 24525
was concerned. On the scheduled arraignment on February 15, 1999, petitioner
reiterated his claim that he had not been accorded preliminary investigation. In its two
assailed Orders, the Sandigabayan rejected his claim and proceeded with the
arraignment
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the Sandiganbayan may proceed with the arraignment
without preliminary investigation.
2) Whether or not the filing of a bond constitute a waiver of preliminary
investigation.
HELD:
1) Section 27 of Republic Act 6770 cannot justify the evasion of the
requirement set forth in the Rules of Court for conducting preliminary investigation.
The law does not sanction such interpretation, for it deals merely with the finality of
orders, directives and decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman -- not the
deprivation of the substantive right to a
preliminary investigation. Moreover, petitioner cannot be bound by theOmbudsman's
January 15, 1998 Resolution, which recommended the filing of charges. He was not a
party to the case and was not accorded any right to present evidence on his behalf.
2) In Go v. Court of Appeals, this Court held that "the right to preliminary
investigation is waived when the accused fails to invoke it before or at the time of
entering a plea at arraignment." Conversely, if the accused does invoke it before
arraignment, as the petitioner did in this case, the right is not waived. Neither did the
filing of a bail bond constitute a waiver of petitioner's right to preliminary
investigation.
55
Under Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,"[a]n
application for or admission to bail; shall not bar the accused from challenging the
validity of his arrest or the legality of the warrant issued therefor, or from assailing
the regularity or questioning the absence of a preliminary investigation of the charge
against him, provided that he raises them before entering his plea.
The right to preliminary investigation is substantive, not merely formal or
technical. To deny it to petitioner would deprive him of the full measure of his right
to due process.
56
G.R. No. 109036 July 5, 1995

BARTOLOME F. MERCADO
vs.
The Honorable COURT OF APPEALS, FOURTH DIVISION, The Honorable CESAR
C. PERALEJO, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 98, Quezon City
and the Honorable CITY PROSECUTOR of Quezon City
FACTS:
Petitioner, Mercado, was charged with a violation of Batas Pambansa Blg.22
before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
Petitioner moved to defer his arraignment on the ground that he was not
notified of the preliminary investigation. He claimed that the private complainant
deliberately provided a wrong address in the issuance of the subpoena to him. He was
thus prevented from submitting his counter-affidavit, which if considered, would
have prevented the filing of the criminal case against him.
The City Prosecutor denied the claim of petitioner, stating that the subpoena
was sent to the residence of the petitioner and that the same was returned unserved.
The prosecutor also avers that the presence of the accused was not a requisite to the
validity of the preliminary investigation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is denied of his right to preliminary
investigation.
HELD:
No, Petitioner was not denied of his right to a preliminary investigation. It is
uncontroverted that a subpoena was sent to his given address but it was returned
unserved. Petitioner did not dispute that the address appearing in the official receipt
of his cash bond was his address.
The purpose of a preliminary investigation is for the investigating prosecutor
to determine if a crime has been committed. A review of the evidence is thus
necessary to establish probable cause and if the evidence so warrants, the
investigating prosecutor is duty bound to file the corresponding information (Cruz, Jr.
v. People, 233 SCRA 439 [1994]). It was ruled that preliminary investigations can be
conducted ex-parte if the respondent cannot be subpoenaed or does not appear after
due notice (New Rules on Criminal Procedure, Rule 112, Section 3(d); Cf. Rodriguez
v. Sandiganbayan, 120 SCRA 659 [1983]).
57
G.R. No. 110315 January 16, 1998

RENATO CUDIA
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, The HON.CARLOS D. RUSTIA, in his capacity as
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court Branch LVI, Angeles City
FACTS:
Petitioner, Cudia, was arrested in Mabalacat, Pampanga for the alleged
possession of unlicensed revolver. He was the brought to Angeles City where he was
detained. A preliminary investigation was conducted, consequently, an information
charging the petitioner of illegal possession of fire arms was filed before the Regional
Trial Court of Angeles City.
On pre-trial, the judge called the attention of the parties to the fact that the
crime was committed in Mabalacat and not in Angeles City.
Another information charging the same offense was filed against the
respondent, this time by the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga. Thereafter, the City
Prosecutor of Angeles moved for the dismissal of the earlier case stating that the case
is within the jurisdiction of the Provincial Prosecutor.
The petitioner the filed a motion to quash on the ground of violation to his
right against double jeopardy.
HELD:
Whether or not the contention of the petitioner is with merit.
HELD:
The Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga, not the City Prosecutor, who should
prepare informations for offenses committed within Pampanga but outside Angeles
City. An information must be prepared and presented by the prosecuting attorney or
someone authorized by law. If not, the court does not acquire jurisdiction. Although
failure to file a motion to quash the information is a waiver of all objections to it
insofar as formal objections to pleadings are concerned, questions relating to want of
jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. Moreover, since the
complaint or information was insufficient because it was so defective in form or
substance that conviction upon it could not have been sustained, its dismissal without
the consent of the accused cannot be pleaded as prior jeopardy, and will not be a bar
to a second prosecution
58
G.R. No. 116623 March 23, 1995

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and HONORABLE ALFREDO GUSTILO
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ESAM GADI y ABDULLAH
FACTS:
The private respondent, Esam Gadi, was apprehended at the Manila National
Airport and subsequently detained for possession of marijuana. A criminal case for
violation of the provisions of Dangerous Drug Act was then filed against the private
respondent before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City.
Private respondent, though admitting that it is beyond the fide day period
prescribed by law, filed a motion for reinvestigation alleging that the gravity of the
offense charged against him warranted the motion and that period prescribed by law
to file the motion is not mandatory.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused is entitled to reinvestigation (preliminary
investigation)
HELD:
No, the period to ask for a reinvestigation has already lapsed.
The period for filing a motion for preliminary investigation after an
information has been filed against an accused who was arrested without a warrant has
been characterized as mandatory by the Court. In People vs. Figueroa, the .Supreme
Court applied Section 15, Rule 112 of the old Rules, which is substantially
reproduced in Section 7, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure. The
Court held that Section 15 of old Rule 112 granted the accused the right to ask for
preliminary investigation within a period of five (5) days from the time he learned of
the filing of the information. As the accused in that case did not exercise his
right within the five-day period, his motion for "reinvestigation" was denied.
Clearly, Section 7 of Rule 112 of the present Rules gives the accused the
right to ask for a preliminary investigation; but it does not give him the right to do so
after the lapse of the five-day period. This is in accord with the intent of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure to make preliminary investigation simple and speedy. The
Supreme Court, elaborating on the rationale of the rules on preliminary investigation
59
G.R. No. 182677 August 3, 2010

JOSE ANTONIO C. LEVISTE
vs.
HON. ELMO M. ALAMEDA, HON. RAUL M. GONZALEZ, HON. EMMANUEL Y.
VELASCO, HEIRS OF THE LATE RAFAEL DE LAS ALAS
FACTS:
Petitioner, Leviste, was originally charged with the crime of homicide for the
death Rafael de las Alas before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.
After re-examination and re-investigation of the records of the case, the
prosecution amended the information to reflect that the petitioner is already charged
with the crime of murder and no longer for homicide.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a reinvestigation is availing in the case at bar.
HELD:
Yes, the amendment was substantial. However, there is no need for a new
preliminary investigation as the conduct of re-investigation is of the same nature.
Considering that another or a new preliminary investigation is required, the
fact that what was conducted in the present case was a reinvestigation does not
invalidate the substantial amendment of the Information. There is no substantial
distinction between a preliminary investigation and a reinvestigation since both are
conducted in the same manner and for the same objective of determining whether
there exists sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been
committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial.
What is essential is that petitioner was placed on guard to defend himself from the
charge of murder after the claimed circumstances were made known to him as early
as the first motion.
60
G.R. No. 132422 March 30, 2004

FILADAMS PHARMA, INC.
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and ANTONIO FERIA
FACTS:
A complaint charging the private respondent, Feria, for estafa before the
assistant City Prosecutor of Quezon City was filed by petitioner, Filadams. Said
complaint was dismissed for lack of cause of action. The petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration was likewise dismissed.
The petitioner then appealed the same to the Secretary of Justice. The
Secretary of Justice arrived at the same conclusion and dismissed the appeal. The
petitioner then raised the same issue to the Court of Appeals, but also to no avail.
ISSUES:
1) What is the nature of the conduct of preliminary investigation of the
prosecutor?
2) Are the acts (appeals) resorted to by the petitioner valid?
HELD:
1) The prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not determine the guilt
or innocence of the accused. He does not exercise adjudication nor rule-making
functions. Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and is often the only
means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime and to
enable the fiscal to prepare his complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case
on the merits and has no purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been
committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty
thereof. While the fiscal makes that determination, he cannot be said to be acting as a
quasi-court, for it is the courts, ultimately, that pass judgment on the accused, not the
fiscal.
2) With our ruling in Bautista that the Office of the Prosecutor was not
covered by the appellate process under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, what then was
petitioner's remedy from the resolution of the Assistant Prosecutor dismissing his
complaint? Based on the 1993 Revised Rules on Appeals from Resolutions in
Preliminary Investigations or Reinvestigations — now the 2000 NPSRule on
Appeals — the petitioner could appeal to the Secretary of Justice. In this case, the
petitioner did appeal to the Secretary of Justice but his appeal was dismissed. His
motion for reconsideration was also dismissed. Since there was no more appeal or
other remedy available in the ordinary course of law, the petitioner correctly filed a
petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals on the ground of grave abuse of
discretion.
61
G.R. No. 147932 January 25, 2006

LAILA G. DE OCAMPO
vs.
THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, MAGDALENA B. DACARRA, and
ERLINDA P. ORAYAN
FACTS:
Ronald Dacarra, Magdalena’s nine-year-old son, complained of dizziness
upon arriving home. When asked, Magdalena found out that Laila G. De Ocampo,
Ronald’s teacher, banged his head against that of his classmate. Due to continuous
vomiting, Magdalena brought Ronald to the hospital where he underwent an x-ray.
She was informed that Ronald’s head had a fracture. He died after 5 days from the
incident, which led Magdalena to charge De Ocampo with homicide. During the
inquest proceedings, the Assistant City Prosecutor ruled that there is no concrete
evidence to show proof that the banging of the heads of the two victims could be the
actual and proximate cause of the death of Ronald, further reasoning that the
vehicular accident which happened two years ago may be the cause of Ronald’s head
injury. Subsequently, the case was referred to another Assistant City Prosecutor for
preliminary investigation. De Ocampo invoked the disposition of the inquest
prosecutor which found insufficient evidence to support the charges against her. She
reiterated that the head-banging incident was not the proximate cause of Ronald’s
death but the vehicular accident where he was involved. After the preliminary
investigation, the prosecutor found probable cause against De Ocampo for the offense
charged.
De Ocampo thereafter filed a petition for review with the DOJ where she
contended that the investigating prosecutor erred in concluding that her alleged act of
banging Ronald and Lorendo’s heads was the cause of Ronald’s injury. She also
asserted that she was denied due process during the preliminary investigation when
the prosecutor did not conduct a clarificatory hearing and when said
prosecutor unilaterally obtained a copy of the autopsy report from the PNP Crime
Laboratory. The DOJ Secretary, however, denied the petition for review and held that
Ronald’s injury was the direct and natural result of petitioner’s act of banging Ronald
and Lorendo’s heads. The Secretary also rejected De Ocampo’s claim that she is
innocent as held by the inquest prosecutor because he inquest prosecutor did not
dismiss the case but merely recommended her release for further investigation since
the case was not proper for inquest and the evidence was then insufficient. Her
motion for reconsideration having been denied, De Ocampo filed this present petition
for certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not De Ocampo was denied due process during the preliminary
investigation.
HELD:
Petitioner was not denied due process during the preliminary investigation.
A clarificatory hearing is not indispensable during preliminary investigation. Rather
than being mandatory, a clarificatory hearing is optional on the part of the
investigating officer as evidenced by the use of the term "may" in Section 3(e) of
Rule 112. On the issue of the prosecutor’s obtaining of the autopsy report, the Rules
on preliminary investigation do not forbid the investigating prosecutor from obtaining
62
it. Neither is there a law requiring the investigating prosecutor to notify the parties
before securing a copy of the autopsy report. The autopsy report, which states the
causes of Ronald’s death, can either absolve or condemn the petitioner. Unfortunately
for petitioner, the investigating prosecutor found that the autopsy report bolstered
complainants’ allegations.
Asserting her innocence, petitioner continues to invoke the disposition of the
inquest prosecutor finding insufficient evidence for the charges against her. As
correctly ruled by the DOJ Secretary, the inquest prosecutor did not dismiss the case
but merely recommended it for further investigation since it was not proper for
inquest and the evidence was then insufficient. Moreover, petitioner’s active
participation in the preliminary investigation without questioning the propriety of
such proceedings indicates petitioner’s agreement with the recommendation of the
inquest prosecutor for the further investigation of the case.
The instant petition was denied and the Court affirms the Resolutions of the
Secretary of Justice.
63
G.R. No. 119990 June 21, 2004

REMBERTO C. KARA-AN
vs.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, HON. CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, HON.
ABELARDO L. APORTADERA, JR., HON. RAUL ARNAU
FACTS:
Kara-an wrote to Senator Ernesto Maceda imputing certain criminal acts to
"the clique of six" in the Board of Directors of the Al-Amanah Islamic Investment
Bank of the Philippines. Kara-an claimed that "the clique of six" granted a loan of
P250,000 to Compressed Air Machineries & Equipment Corporation (CAMEC)
without a valid collateral. Kara-an also claimed that the "clique of six" approved the
real estate mortgage on CAMEC’s loan without requiring the cancellation of a prior
subsisting mortgage and without securing the written consent of the first mortgagee in
violation of law. Kara-an thus asserted that the "clique of six" is liable for entering
into a contract which is manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government,
which is punishable under RA 3019.
Senator Maceda endorsed Kara-an’s letter to Ombudsman Conrado M.
Vasquez for appropriate investigation. The Ombudsman dismissed the complaint for
lack of merit on the ground that Kar-an, as officer-in-charge of the Makati Branch of
the Islamic Bank, was the one directly responsible in screening the qualifications of
the various applicants for loan hence Kara-an filed a Motion for Reconsideration or
Reinvestigation. In said motion denied that he was the officer-in-charge of the Islamic
Bank’s Makati Branch responsible for screening loan applications in 1986. His
Motion for Reconsideration having been denied, he filed this petition for review on
certiorari where he contends that the Ombudsman’s failure to conduct the preliminary
investigation is a breach of constitutional, statutory and administrative mandates.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Ombudsman’s failure to conduct the appropriate
investigation is a breach of constitutional, statutory and administrative mandates.
HELD:
No, the Ombudsman does not have to conduct a preliminary investigation
upon receipt of a complaint. The Ombudsman has discretion to determine whether a
preliminary investigation is proper. Should the investigating officer find the
complaint devoid of merit, then he may recommend its outright dismissal. Since the
Ombudsman can dismiss a complaint outright for lack of merit, it necessarily follows
that he can also dismiss the complaint for lack of merit after the respondent’s
comment to the complaint.
The investigation is advisedly called preliminary, as it is yet to be followed
by the trial proper. The occasion is not for the full and exhaustive display of the
parties’ evidence but for the presentation of such evidence only as may engender a
well-founded belief that an offense has been committed and that the accused is
probably guilty of the offense. The Resolution of the Ombudsman denying the
Motion for Reconsideration is affirmed.
64
G.R. No. 129742 September 16, 1998

TERESITA G. FABIAN
vs.
HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, in his capacity as ombudsman; HON. JESUS F.
GUERRERO, in his capacity as Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon; and NESTOR V.
AGUSTIN
FACTS:
Teresita G. Fabian, major stockholder and president of PROMAT
Construction Development Corporation, a company engaged in construction business,
had an affair with Nestor V. Agustin, the incumbent District Engineer of Metro
Manila. During their affair, Agustin gifted PROMAT with public works contracts.
When their relationship soured, Fabian filed an administrative case in the
Ombudsman against Agustin for violation of Section 19 of the Ombudsman Act of
1989 and Section 36 of the Civil Service Decree. Consequently, Graft Investigator
Eduardo R. Benitez issued a resolution finding private respondents guilty of grave
misconduct and ordering his dismissal from the service with forfeiture of all benefits
under the law. Ombudsman Desierto approved the aforesaid resolution with
modifications, by changing the penalty to suspension of one year without pay.
Agustin moved for reconsideration but Desierto inhibited himself when he discovered
that the former's new counsel had been his "classmate and close associate." The case
was transferred to Deputy Ombudsman Jesus F. Guerrero who exonerated private
respondents from the administrative charges.
ISSUE:
Whether or not recourse under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to appeal for the
decision in an administrative proceeding of the Ombudsman is proper.
HELD:
No, under the present Rule 45 appeals may be brought through a petition for
review on certiorari but only from judgments and final orders of the courts. Appeals
from judgments and final orders of quasi-judicial agencies are now required to be
brought to the Court of Appeals on a verified petition for review, under the
requirements and conditions in Rule 43 which was precisely formulated and adopted
to provide for a uniform rule of appellate procedure for quasi-judicial agencies.
Taking all the foregoing circumstances in their true legal roles and effects,
therefore, Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to
this Court from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative
disciplinary cases. It consequently violates the proscription in Section 30, Article VI
of the Constitution against a law which increases the appellate jurisdiction of this
Court.
65
G.R. No. 131445 May 27, 2004

AMADO G. PEREZ (DECEASED) REPRESENTED BY HIS WIDOW GUILLERMA
T. PEREZ, et al.
vs.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, MAYOR IGNACIO R. BUNYE, CARLOS G.
DOMINGUEZ, et al.
FACTS:
Petitioners, members of the Kilusang Bayan ng mga Magtitinda ng Bagong
Pamilihang Bayan ng Muntinlupa, Inc. (KBMBPM), instituted two complaints at the
Office of the Ombudsman against several respondents, one of whom was then Mayor
Ignacio R. Bunye, for violation of RA 3019 (also known as the “Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act”). Bunye and others allegedly destroyed the doors of the
KBMBPM office while serving on petitioners the Take-Over Order of the KBMBPM
management issued by then Agriculture Secretary Carlos G. Dominguez. In
disposing of said complaints, the Office of the Ombudsman issued a
resolution excluding respondent Bunye from the criminal indictment. The petitioners
assailed the exclusion in the Court of Appeals through an original petition
for certiorari and mandamus but the CA dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction in
accordance with Section 27 of RA 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989). The CA
likewise denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.
Petitioners now file this appeal by certiorari under Rule 45, contending that
the Ombudsman acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion when it dismissed the charges against Bunye. Respondents counter that the
preliminary investigation yielded insufficient evidence to charge Bunye of the
offense.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Ombudsman acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction
or with grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed the charges against Bunye.
HELD:
A preliminary investigation is in effect a realistic judicial appraisal of the
merits of the case. Sufficient proof of the guilt of the accused must be adduced so that
when the case is tried, the trial court may not be bound, as a matter of law, to order an
acquittal. Hence, if the Ombudsman, using professional judgment, finds the case
dismissible, the Court shall respect such findings, unless clothed with grave abuse of
discretion. Otherwise, the functions of the courts will be grievously hampered by
innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted
by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before it. In much
the same way, the courts will be swamped with cases if they will have to review the
exercise of discretion on the part of fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time the
latter decide to file an information in court or dismiss a complaint by a private
complainant.
G.R. No. 171188 June 19, 2009

vs.
JESSIE B. CASTILLO and FELICITO R. MEJIA
FACTS:
66
Cesar Sarino is one of the registered owners of a piece of land located in front

of SM Bacoor, Cavite. The property is being subleased to several stallholders.
Felicito R. Mejia, Municipal Building Official of Bacoor, sent to the stallholders
Notices of Violation4 of the National Building Code on the grounds that the structures
they were occupying were erected without building permits and occupied by them
without the necessary certificates of occupancy having been first secured. Because of
stallholders’ repeated failure to comply, a task force from the Municipal Hall closed
the stalls through the installation of galvanized iron fences.
Lessees Aquino and Samoy filed before the Office of the Ombudsman a
complaint against Castillo and Mejia for violation of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act). The Office of the Ombudsman, however, dismissed the case,
for lack of probable cause, ruling that the respondent local officials acted in good
faith in effecting the closure of the stalls. Another complaint was filed by Sarino
against Castillo and Mejia in the Office of the Ombudsman, containing the same
allegations as the previous complaint filed by Aquino and Samoy. The Office of the
Ombudsman now found probable cause hence the Ombudsman, through the Office of
the Special Prosecutor, filed an Information against respondents for violation of
Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019 before the Sandiganbayan which declared that
probable cause exists and thus directed the issuance of the corresponding warrants of
arrest and hold departure orders. Castillo and Mejia then filed a Motion for Judicial
Determination of Probable Cause which was denied by the SB. However, upon
motion for reconsideration, the SB reversed its ruling and dismissed the case, holding
that there is no probable cause that warrants the filing of the present criminal case is a
mere rehash of the previously dismissed criminal case filed by complainant’s lessees
against respondents.
The Office of the Special Prosecutor filed a motion for reconsideration, but it
was denied, hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan erred in overturning the Ombudsman’s
determination of probable cause resulting in the dismissal of the case against
respondents.
HELD:
Yes, corollary to the principle that a judge cannot be compelled to issue a
warrant of arrest if he or she deems that there is no probable cause for doing so, the
judge in turn should not override the public prosecutor’s determination of probable
cause to hold an accused for trial on the ground that the evidence presented to
substantiate the issuance of an arrest warrant was insufficient. It must be stressed that
in our criminal justice system, the public prosecutor exercises a wide latitude of
discretion in determining whether a criminal case should be filed in court, and that
courts must respect the exercise of such discretion when the information filed against
the person charged is valid on its face, and that no manifest error or grave abuse of
discretion can be imputed to the public prosecutor.
Absent a finding that an information is invalid on its face or that the
prosecutor committed manifest error or grave abuse of discretion, a judge’s
determination of probable cause is limited only to the judicial kind or for the purpose
of deciding whether the arrest warrants should be issued against the accused. The
SB’s challenged Resolutions are reversed and the case remanded to the SB.
67
G.R. No. 70748 October 21, 1985

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF
LAURENTE C. ILAGAN, et al.,
vs.
HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, Minister of National Defense, et al.
FACTS:
Attorneys Laurente Ilagan, Antonio Arellano, and Marcos Risonar were
arrested and detained in Camp Catitipan solely on the basis of a Mission Order signed
by General Echavarria, Regional Unified Commander of the Ministry of National
Defense. They filed a petition for Habeas Corpus, on the ground that the arrests were
illegal and violative of the Constitution, contending that arrests may not be made
solely on the basis of Mission Orders. On the other hand, respondents asserted that
the attorneys were arrested on the basis of a Decree issued by the President, that the
detained attorneys played active roles in organizing mass actions of the Communist
Party of the Philippines and the National Democratic Front and that the Writ
of habeas corpus is suspended as to them by virtue of Proclamation No. 2045-A. The
Court resolved to order the temporary release of the detained attorneys on the
recognizance of retired Chief Justice Concepcion and retired Associate Justice J.B.L.
Reyes as their counsel.
Respondents filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of this Court's
Order of Release reiterating that the suspension of the Writ of Habeas Corpus has the
effect of ousting the Court of its jurisdiction to hear the case, further arguing that the
detained attorneys "were arrested for specific acts of rebellion and economic sabotage
as well as for their leadership in the CPP." Respondents also aver that an Information
for Rebellion was already filed against the attorneys in the Davao RTC, hence the
petition for Habeas Corpus is already moot and academic. Petitioners countered by
contending that since the detained attorneys were not given the benefit of preliminary
investigation, they were denied their constitutional right to due process and,
consequently, the Information for Rebellion filed against them is void. Respondents
maintain that a preliminary investigation was unnecessary since the detained
attorneys were lawfully arrested without a warrant.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the absence of a preliminary investigation renders the
Information filed in RTC Davao void.
HELD:
No, although the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure states that no
Information for an offense cognizable by the Regional Trial Court shall be filed
without a preliminary investigation having been first conducted, exceptions to this
rule are provided for in Section 7 of Rule 112. Consequently, the Information filed by
the City Fiscal before the Regional Trial Court of the City of Davao fell within the
exception.
Paragraphs (a) and (b) refer to cases when a suspect is caught in flagrante
delicto or immediately thereafter, while paragraph (c) refers to escaping prisoners. As
to whether the detained attorneys fall under either of the first two instances
enumerated is a question of fact, which will need the presentation of evidence and is
more properly within the province of the trial Court. The question of absence of a
proper preliminary investigation is also better inquired into by the Court below. This
Court has held that the trial Court is called upon "not to dismiss the information but
hold the case in abeyance and conduct its own investigation or require the fiscal to
68
hold a reinvestigation. The petition for Habeas Corpus is dismissed for having
become moot and academic. Petitioners are now detained by virtue of a Warrant of
Arrest issued by the Regional Trial Court of Davao City.
69
GR NOS 117952-53 FEBRUARY 14, 2001

vs.
DANILO DE GUZMAN
FACTS:
The two offenders were brought to the police station for questioning and
detention. The police officers were without warrants of arrest or search warrants at the
time of the arrests and seizure of evidence. As the operation was conducted largely
during nighttime, the police officers were unable to secure the necessary warrants for
fear of leaving the place of surveillance. The two were charged with Unlawful
Possession of Firearms and violation of Dangerous Drugs Act in the RTC. On
arraignment, he pleaded not guilty to both charges but the RTC convicted him on the two
offenses. De Guzman appealed from said decision, hence this case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the arrest done is valid even without conducting a preliminary
investigation beforehand.
HELD:
A close scrutiny of the records reveals that the police officers’ manner of
conducting the accused-appellant’s arrest was not tainted with any constitutional
infirmity. Rule 113, Section 5 (a) of the Rules of Court provides that a peace officer
or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the
person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense. In this jurisdiction, the mere possession of a firearm, ammunition
or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of
any firearm or ammunition is a criminal offense under PD No. 1866.
This is a valid warrantless arrest because despite word from their fellow
officer, SPO1 Cuevas, that he saw accused-appellant sniff “shabu”, they resisted the
first impulse to storm the rented cottage which could have caused them to seriously
disregard constitutional safeguards. Instead, the police officers waited for the needed
opening to validly arrest the accused. To their minds, it would be the arrival of drug
buyers. As the situation would have it, the arrest was necessitated by the presence of
accused-appellant with a gun obviously tucked in his pants. The decision of the RTC
is therefore affirmed.
70
G.R. NO. 104879 MAY 6, 1994

ELIZALDE MALALOAN and MARLON LUAREZ
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ANTONIO J. FINEZA, et al
FACTS:
Petitioners then filed a motion to quash a search warrant issued against him
for alleged violation of Presidential Decree 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms and
Ammunitions), contending that the same was acquired from a court that does not
have territorial jurisdiction over the offense. Quezon City Judge Velasco, however,
upheld the validity of the warrant, opining that the same falls under the category of
Writs and Processes, within the contemplation of paragraph 3(b) of the Interim Rules
and Guidelines, and can be served not only within the territorial jurisdiction of the
issuing court but anywhere in the judicial region of the issuing court (National Capital
Judicial Region). The CA affirmed the decision of the trial court, hence petitioners
filed this present petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the search warrant issued by Judge Fineza of Kalookan RTC
is valid.
HELD:
Yes, the search warrant is valid. It is incorrect to say that only
the court which has jurisdiction over the criminal case can issue the search warrant, as
would be the consequence of petitioners' position that only the branch of the court
with jurisdiction over the place to be searched can issue a warrant to search the same.
It may be conceded, as a matter of policy, that where a criminal case is pending, the
court wherein it was filed, or the assigned branch thereof, has primary jurisdiction to
issue the search warrant; and where no such criminal case has yet been filed, that the
executive judges or their lawful substitutes in the areas and for the offenses
contemplated in Circular No. 19 shall have primary jurisdiction.
It would be an exacting imposition upon the law enforcement authorities or
the prosecutorial agencies to unerringly determine where they should apply for a
search warrant in view of the uncertainties and possibilities as to the ultimate venue
of a case under the foregoing rules. The petition is denied and the decision of the CA
is affirmed.
71
G.R. No. 124346 June 8, 2004

YOLLY TEODOSIO y BLANCAFLOR
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
Chief Inspector Federico Laciste ordered a team from the PNP Regional
Office Intelligence Unit to conduct a buy-bust operation on Teodosio who was
suspected of peddling shabu hence, the team and their informer proceeded to the
Teodosio’s house in Pasay at about midnight. SPO1 Jeffrey Inciong and the informer
entered the open gate of appellant’s compound and walked to his apartment while the
rest of the team observed and waited outside. After the exchange of the money earlier
treated with ultraviolet powder and the shabu, Inciong gave the signal to the other
police officers and they arrested Teodosio. In the RTC, Teodosio insisted that the
warrantless arrest was not valid because the police officers framed him up for
possession of shabu after the search in his apartment produced no illegal drugs and
that it should be invalidated because the police officers failed to obtain a warrant even
though they had several days for such purpose. The RTC and the CA found him
guilty, hence this petition for review of the Court of Appeal’s decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the warrantless arrest conducted was illegal.
HELD:
No, the warrantless arrest was legal. Frame-up, a usual defense of those
accused in drug-related cases, is viewed by the Court with disfavor since it is an
allegation that can be made with ease. For this claim to prosper, the defense must
adduce clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption that the arresting
policemen performed their duties in a regular and proper manner.
On the argument that the officers had four days to secure a warrant but did
not get one, the evidence was that the four-day period was not enough to establish
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant. All that the police authorities knew
about appellant was the information gathered from the informer and their surveillance
of the area. Furthermore, no warrant was needed considering that the mission was
not a search but an entrapment. An arrest made after an entrapment does not require a
warrant inasmuch as it is considered a valid warrantless arrest pursuant to Rule 113,
Section 5(a) of the Rules of Court. Any search resulting from a lawful warrantless
arrest is valid because the accused committed a crime in flagrante delicto, that is, the
person arrested (appellant in this case) committed a crime in the presence of the
arresting officers.
72
G.R Nos. 117145-50 & 117447 March 28, 2000

vs.
LEONIDA MERIS y PADILLA
FACTS:
Napoleon Ramos, Nadal, Conseja and Bombarda were told by Meris that she
knew someone who could help them secure employment in Hongkong in exchange
for P15,000.00 each as their placement fee. When they went to Manila, they stayed in
the house of Julie Micua who assured them of their overseas job, upon their payment
of money. Two months after their downpayment, Ramos became suspicious and later
realized that Meris and Micua are fake recruiters so the six of them went to Manila
and filed criminal complaints for estafa and illegal recruitment against the accused,
which led to her immediate arrest. Meris contended that she was also a victim of
Micua and, more importantly, that the warrantless arrest conducted against her was
illegal. Both the RTC and the CA ruled in favor of petitioners, hence Meris filed this
appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the warrantless arrest made was illegal.
HELD:
No, the warrantless arrest was legal.
Jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired either by arrest or
voluntary appearance in court. The record amply demonstrates that accused-appellant
voluntarily appeared in court at her arraignments, entered a plea of "not guilty" to all
the charges against her, and later actively participated in the trial. Hence,
granting arguendo that accused-appellant’s arrest was defective, such is deemed cured
upon her voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court. It should be stressed
that the question of legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over
the person of the accused. Consequently, if objections based on this ground are
waived, the fact that the arrest was illegal is not sufficient cause for setting aside an
otherwise valid judgment. The technicality cannot render the subsequent proceedings
void and deprive the State of its right to convict the guilty when all the facts on record
point to the culpability of the accused
73
G.R. No. 107741 October 18, 1996

FRANCISCO BERNARTE, et al.,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, et al.
FACTS:
A writ of preliminary injunction ordering the petitioners to desist and refrain
from occupying their portions of the disputed lands pending litigation was issued by
the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga in its capacity as a Special Agrarian Court. The
Court then deputized the Philippine National Police of Lubao and Guagua, Pampanga
to issue the said writ.
After some time, the petitioners were able to garner a writ of preliminary
injunction issued by the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board, and by
virtue of such, the petitioners resumed occupation and cultivation of the disputed
land.
Thereafter, several policemen were dispatched in the area to enforce the
earlier writ of preliminary injunction issued by the Regional Trial Court. The
policemen then arrested the petitioners for their refusal to vacate the area and
subsequently charged them with resistance and/or disobedience to the lawful order of
persons in authority.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the arrest of the petitioners that was effected without a
warrant was valid.
HELD:
Yes, the warrantless arrest was valid. At the time when the arrest was
effected, the RTC has not been declared as without jurisdiction over the Agrarian
case and therefore, the said writ of preliminary injunction it issued is in order.
Following this, since at the time the petitioners were arrested, the PNP team was
enforcing a lawful order of the same RTC and in seriously resisting the same the
appellants intimidated the PNP team committing the alleged crime of Direct Assault
upon an Agent of a Person in Authority, a warrant was not necessary for their arrest.
Moreover, the petition for Habeas Corpus was not the proper remedy. Once
the person detained is duly charged in court, he may no longer question his detention
by a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. His remedy then is the
quashal of the information and/or the warrant of arrest duly issued. The reason for the
issuance of the writ even becomes more unavailing when the person detained files a
bond for his temporary release.
74
G.R. No. L-31665 August 6, 1975

LEONARDO ALMEDA
vs.
HON. ONOFRE A. VILLALUZ
FACTS:
Leonardo Almeda was charged, together with five others, with the crime of
qualified theft of a motor vehicle in the Circuit Criminal Court of Pasig, Rizal,
presided by Judge Onofre Villauz. The amount of the bond recommended for the
provisional release of Almeda was P15,000, and this was approved by the respondent
judge with a direction that it be posted entirely in cash. At the hearing, Almeda asked
the trial court to allow him to post a surety bond in lieu of the cash bond required of
him but such request was denied.
Because of this, Almeda filed the present special civil action for certiorari
with preliminary injunction against respondent Judge Villaluz. Almeda contends that
the judge has no authority to require that the bond be strictly in cash.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the judge may require that the bond to be posted entirely in
cash.
HELD:
No, the judge does not have the authority to require such. The condition that
the accused may have provisional liberty only upon his posting of a cash bond is
abhorrent to the nature of bail and transgresses our law on the matter.
The sole purpose of bail is to insure the attendance of the accused when
required by the court, and there should be no suggestion of penalty on the part of the
accused nor revenue on the part of the government. The allowance of a cash bond in
lieu of sureties is authorized in this jurisdiction only because our rules expressly
provide for it. Were this not the case, the posting of bail by depositing cash with the
court cannot be countenanced because, strictly speaking, the very nature of bail
presupposes the attendance of sureties to whom the body of the prisoner can be
delivered. And even where cash bail is allowed, the option to deposit cash in lieu of a
surety bond primarily belongs to the accused. The trial court may not reject
otherwise acceptable sureties and insist that the accused obtain his provisional liberty
only thru a cash bond.
The order of the judge denying the motion of the petitioner Almeda that he be
allowed to post a surety bond instead of a cash bond is set aside, without prejudice to
increasing the amount of the bail bond and/or the imposition of such conditions as the
respondent judge might consider desirable and proper for the purpose of insuring the
attendance of the petitioner at the trial.
75
A.M. No.MTJ-97-1139 October 16, 1997

ROBERTO ESPIRITU
vs.
JUDGE EDUARDO JOVELLANOS, respondent.
FACTS:
While Roberto Espiritu was with a group of people, Weny Dumlao
approached him and fired at him three times, which resulted to his wounds. On the
basis of this and his companion’s affidavits, SPO II Eduardo R. Yadao filed a
criminal complaint for frustrated murder in MCTC Pangasinan. After conducting a
preliminary examination, Judge Jovellanos ordered the arrest of Dumlao and fixed the
amount of bail for his provisional liberty at P20,000.00, which was later reduced to
P10,000.00, stating that Dumlao’s father had asked for the reduction. Later, the Judge
ordered “any peace officer under whose custody [Dumlao] may be found” to release
the latter in view of the fact that Dumlao had posted bail for P10,000.00. Thereafter,
the Judge also ordered Dumlao to be released due to the fact that Dumlao had filed a
case against Roberto Espiritu and others as a result of the same incident, charging
Espiritu and his companions with a case for attempted murder and illegal possession
of firearm. Espiritu sought a review in the Department of Justice, but his petition was
denied for having been filed late hence he filed the complaint in this present case,
alleging irregularities committed by respondent judge in the granting of bail and the
conduct of the preliminary investigation of his complaint against Dumlao.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the granting of bail while Dumlao was not in the custody of
the court and its reduction proper.
HELD:
Judge Jovellano correctly granted bail to Dumlao because he may be
considered to be under constructive custody at the time when he submitted himself to
the jurisdiction of the court when he personally asked respondent judge to admit him
to bail and reduce its amount. We held that the accused was in the constructive
custody of the law when he moved for admission to bail through his lawyers (1) by
filing the application for bail with the trial court, (2) by furnishing true information
of his actual whereabouts, and (3) by unequivocably recognizing the jurisdiction of
said court.
76
G.R. No. 189122 March 17, 2010

JOSE ANTONIO LEVISTE
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
Jose Antonio Leviste was charged with the murder of Rafael de las Alas but
was convicted by the RTC for homicide and sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of six years and one day of prision mayor as minimum to 12 years and one
day of reclusion temporal as maximum. He appealed his conviction to the Court of
Appeals and, while the appeal was pending, he filed an urgent application for
admission to bail pending appeal, citing his advanced age and health condition, and
claiming the absence of any risk or possibility of flight on his part. However, the CA
denied his petition for bail, ruling that Leviste failed to show that he suffers from an
ailment of such gravity that his continued confinement during trial will permanently
impair his health or put his life in danger and that the court made a preliminary
evaluation of petitioner’s case and made a prima facie determination that there was no
reason substantial enough to overturn the evidence of petitioner’s guilt.
Leviste now questions as grave abuse of discretion the denial of his
application for bail via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. His theory is that,
where the penalty imposed by the trial court is more than six years but not more than
20 years and the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5 are
absent, bail must be granted to an appellant pending appeal.
ISSUE:
In an application for bail pending appeal by an appellant sentenced by the
trial court to a penalty of imprisonment for more than six years, does the discretionary
nature of the grant of bail pending appeal mean that bail should automatically be
granted absent any of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section
5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court?
HELD:
No, Leviste’s stance is contrary to fundamental considerations of procedural
and substantive rules.
Any application for bail pending appeal should be viewed from the
perspective of two stages: (1) the determination of discretion stage, where the
appellate court must determine whether any of the circumstances in the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present; this will establish whether or not the
appellate court will exercise sound discretion or stringent discretion in resolving the
application for bail pending appeal and (2) the exercise of discretion stage where,
assuming the appellant’s case falls within the first scenario allowing the exercise of
sound discretion, the appellate court may consider all relevant circumstances, other
than those mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114, including
the demands of equity and justice; on the basis thereof, it may either allow or
disallow bail.
On the other hand, if the appellant’s case falls within the second scenario, the
appellate court’s stringent discretion requires that the exercise thereof be primarily
focused on the determination of the proof of the presence of any of the circumstances
that are prejudicial to the allowance of bail. This is so because the existence of any of
those circumstances is by itself sufficient to deny or revoke bail. Nonetheless, a
finding that none of the said circumstances is present will not automatically result in
77
the grant of bail. Such finding will simply authorize the court to use the less stringent
sound discretion approach. Given these, the petition is dismissed.
78
G.R. No. 141529 June 6, 2001

FRANCISCO YAP, JR., a.k.a. EDWIN YAP
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
Yap was convicted of estafa by the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City. He
filed a notice of appeal, and moved to be allowed provisional liberty under the cash
bond he had filed earlier in the proceedings but the motion was denied by the trial
court. When the records of the case were transmitted to the Court of Appeals,
petitioner filed with the said court a Motion to Fix Bail, invoking the last paragraph
of Section 5, Rule 114 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court. Asked to comment on this
motion, the Solicitor General opined that petitioner may be allowed to post bail in the
amount of P5,500,000.00 and be required to secure “a certification/guaranty from the
Mayor of the place of his residence that he is a resident of the area and that he will
remain to be so until final judgment is rendered or in case he transfers residence, it
must be with prior notice to the court and private complainant.” Yap however
contended that the P5,500,000 proposed bail was violative of his right against
excessive bail. The CA upheld the recommendation of the Solicitor General and
maintained the conditions and the P5,500,000 bail. His motion for reconsideration
having been denied, he filed this present petition.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the conditions set forth unduly restrict his constitutional
liberty of abode and travel; and
(2) whether or not the P5.5M bail is violative of his right against excessive
bail.
HELD:
(1) No, the right to change abode and travel within the Philippines, being
invoked by petitioner, are not absolute rights. Section 6, Article III of the 1987
Constitution provides exemptions to the rule, such as “…national security, public
safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.” The order of the Court of
Appeals releasing petitioner on bail constitutes such lawful order as contemplated by
the above provision. The condition imposed by the Court of Appeals is simply
consistent with the nature and function of a bail bond, which is to ensure that
petitioner will make himself available at all times whenever the Court requires his
presence.
(2) Yes the amount is too much. Section 9 of Rule 114 provides the factors
to be considered when fixing the amount of bail. Although it cannot be controverted
that the Court of Appeals, despite the possibility of flight still wielded its discretion to
grant petitioner bail, the setting of bail in the amount of P5,500,000.00 is unjustified
as having no legal nor factual basis. Guided by the penalty imposed by the lower
court and the weight of the evidence against petitioner, we believe that the amount of
P200,000.00 is more reasonable.
79
G.R. No. 129670 February 1, 2000

MANOLET O. LAVIDES
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS; HON. ROSALINA L. LUNA PISON, Judge
Presiding over Branch 107, RTC, Quezon City; and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
Manolet Lavides was arrested without a warrant as a result of an entrapment
conducted by the police. It appears that the parents of complainant Lorelie San
Miguel reported to the police that their daughter, then 16years old, had been
contacted by Lavides for an assignation that night at his room at the Metropolitan
Hotel in Diliman, Quezon City. Apparently, this was not the first time the police
received reports of petitioner’s activities. He was charged with violation of RA 7610.
Lavides filed a Motion, contending that the warrantless arrest made was illegal and
that he should be allowed to post bail as a matter of right. Later, nine more
Informations for child abuse were filed against Lavides. No bail was recommended
but he still filed separate applications for bail in the nine cases.
The trial court issued an order resolving the Motion of Lavides, ruling that he
is allowed to post bail, under the conditions that: a) The accused shall not be entitled
to a waiver of appearance during the trial of these cases; b) In the event that he shall
not be able to do so, his bail bonds shall be automatically cancelled and forfeited,
warrants for his arrest shall be immediately issued and the cases shall proceed to
trial in absentia; c) The hold-departure Order of this Court dated April 10, 1997
stands; and d) Approval of the bail bonds shall be made only after the arraignment to
enable this Court to immediately acquire jurisdiction over the accused. He thereafter
filed a motion to quash the Informations against him and to suspend his arraignment.
The court however denied said motion so he was arraigned during which he pleaded
not guilty to the charges against him. The court then ordered him released upon
posting bail bonds in the total amount of P800,000.00, subject to the conditions in the
Order.
He filed a petition for certiorari in the CA, assailing the trial court’s denial of
his motion to quash and the conditions set forth in its order. The CA declared
conditions (a) and (b) invalid but declined to pass upon the validity of condition (d)
on the ground that the issue had become moot and academic since Lavides has
already been arraigned. He then filed this present petition in the SC, contending that
the CA erred in not declaring condition (d) as a void condition and that his
arraignment should be also considered void because it was held pursuant to a invalid
condition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the condition is void and the arraignment is invalid.
HELD:
The condition is void. Bail should be granted before arraignment, otherwise the accused
may be precluded from filing a motion to quash. For if the information is quashed and the
case is dismissed, there would then be no need for the arraignment of the accused. In the second place,
the trial court could ensure the presence of petitioner at the arraignment precisely by granting bail and
ordering his presence at any stage of the proceedings, such as arraignment. To condition the grant of
bail to an accused on his arraignment would be to place him in a position where he has to choose
between (1) filing a motion to quash and thus delay his release on bail because until his motion to
quash can be resolved, his arraignment cannot be held, and (2) foregoing the filing of a motion to quash
so that he can be arraigned at once and thereafter be released on bail. These scenarios certainly
80
undermine the accused’s constitutional right not to be put on trial except upon valid complaint or
information sufficient to charge him with a crime and his right to bail.
81
A.M. NO. RTJ-06-2018 August 3, 2007

Office of the Solicitor General
vs.
Judge Antonio de Castro
FACTS:
Gao Yuan, a national of the People’s Republic of China, and her husband
James Mahshi, a U.S. national, and their two young children were on their way to a
vacation in Canada when Philippine immigration officers arrested Gao Yuan and
prevented her from boarding her flight. Her arrest was by virtue of an order issued by
Bureau of Immigration (BI) Commissioner Alipio Fernandez, Jr., which, in turn, was
a response to a letter from the Consul General of the PROC which alleged
that Gao Yuan was a fugitive from justice and charged with embezzlement by
Chinese police and requested her arrest and deportation to China. Gao Yuan was
detained at the BI Detention Center. Mahshi filed before the RTC the petition for writ
of Habeas Corpus with Application for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and Writ
of Preliminary Injunction. On the same day, Executive Judge Eugenio enjoined the
Commissioner from initiating any deportation proceeding against Gao Yuan.
Thereafter, Judge de Castro promulgated an Order of Release directing Commissioner
Fernandez to immediately discharge the custody of Gao Yuan, she having filed her
cash bond in the amount of P250,000.00.
The RTC then took custody of Gao Yuan and clarified that it was only a
provisional release for the duration of the TRO subject to certain conditions: the
posting of an additional cash bond of P100,000.00; (2) her movements were to be
monitored by the court; (3) the issuance of a warrant of arrest against her should she
try to hide; and (4) the signing by Gao Yuan and her husband of an undertaking that
she will come to court at any given time she is called. Respondent based the
provisional release on humanitarian reasons, considering that Gao Yuan was merely
wanted as a witness in a case in the PROC and she is a nursing mother to a 17-month
old child. Commissioner Fernandez then was compelled to file a Notice of Appeal
upon Gao Yuan’s release from the BI’s custody. The OSG contends that Gao Yuan’s
release on bail is illegal since such falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Bureau of Immigration and not in the regular courts pursuant to Section 37(e) of C.A.
No. 613.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC has the authority to release an alien on bail while the
case is pending.
HELD:
No, the RTC has no authority because the power to grant bail in deportation
proceedings is vested in the BI. When an alien is detained by the BID pursuant to an
order of deportation, RTCs have no power to release said alien on bail even in habeas
corpus proceedings, because there is no law authorizing it.
It should be noted too that Section 37 (9) (e) of the Philippine Immigration
Act of 1940, as amended, provides that “[a]ny alien under arrest in a deportation
proceeding may be released under bond or under such other conditions as may be
imposed by the Commissioner of Immigration.” . The exercise by the Commissioner
of such power is discretionary. So too, the determination of the propriety of allowing
the temporary release on bail of the alien, subject to deportation under the
Immigration Act, as well as the conditions of such release falls within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Commissioner, not the courts of justice. The reason for this is that
82
the courts do not administer immigration laws. The power of the Commissioner to

grant bail in deportation proceedings should be exercised when the alien is still under
investigation, and not after the order of deportation has been issued by the BI.
83
G.R. No. 153675 April 19, 2007

GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION,
represented by the Philippine Department of Justice
vs.
HON. FELIXBERTO T. OLALIA, JR. and JUAN ANTONIO MUÑOZ
FACTS:
On January 30, 1995, the Republic of the Philippines and the then British
Crown Colony of Hong Kong signed an "Agreement for the Surrender of Accused
and Convicted Persons." Said agreement took effect on June 20, 1997. Muñoz was
charged before the Hong Kong Court with three (3) counts of the offense of
"accepting an advantage as agent," in violation of Section 9 (1) (a) of the Prevention
of Bribery Ordinance, Cap. 201 of Hong Kong. He also faces seven (7) counts of the
offense of conspiracy to defraud, penalized by the common law of Hong Kong.
Subsequently, warrants of arrest were issued against him. The DOJ received from the
Hong Kong Department of Justice a request for the provisional arrest of private
respondent so the NBI filed with the
RTC of Manila an application for the provisional arrest of private respondent.
In a petition for extradition filed by Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region against Muñoz, the latter has already filed a petition for bail which was
denied by Judge Bernardo, holding that there is no Philippine law granting bail in
extradition cases and that private respondent is a high "flight risk." In a motion for
reconsideration, his petition for bail was granted by respondent Judge Olalia, thus he
was allowed to post a P750,000.00 bail. Petitioner filed an urgent motion to vacate
the Order allowing Munoz to post bail but it was denied by Judge Olalia, hence the
instant petition where the petitioner alleged that the trial court committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in admitting private
respondent to bail; that there is nothing in the Constitution or statutory law providing
that a potential extraditee has a right to bail, the right being limited solely to criminal
proceedings .For his part, private respondent maintained that the right to bail
guaranteed under the Bill of Rights extends to a prospective extraditee; and that
extradition is a harsh process resulting in a prolonged deprivation of one’s liberty.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an extraditee is allowed to post bail.
HELD:
Yes. While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an
extraditee, however, there is no provision prohibiting him or her from filing a motion
for bail, a right to due process under the Constitution. Records show that private
respondent was arrested on September 23, 1999, and remained incarcerated until
December 20, 2001, when the trial court ordered his admission to bail. In other
words, he had been detained for over two (2) years without having been convicted of
any crime. By any standard, such an extended period of detention is a serious
deprivation of his fundamental right to liberty. In fact, it was this prolonged
deprivation of liberty which prompted the extradition court to grant him bail.
In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented evidence to
show that he is not a flight risk. Consequently, this case should be remanded to the
trial court to determine whether private respondent may be granted bail on the basis
of "clear and convincing evidence.
84
G.R. No. 157977 February 27, 2006

EDUARDO TOLENTINO RODRIGUEZ and IMELDA GENER RODRIGUEZ
vs.
HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
MANILA–BRANCH 17, et al.
FACTS:
The case stemmed from the petition for extradition filed on March 12, 2001
by the US Government through the DOJ against the petitioners. Petitioners applied
for bail which the Regional Trial Court granted. The bail was set for one million
pesos for each. Petitioners then posted cash bonds. The US government moved for
reconsideration of the grant of bail, but the motion was denied by the trial
court. Unsatisfied, the US government filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme
Court. Thereafter, the Court directed the trial court to resolve the matter of bail so in
compliance with the Court’s directive, the RTC, without prior notice and hearing,
cancelled the cash bond of the petitioners and ordered the issuance of a warrant of
arrest. Petitioners filed a very urgent motion for the reconsideration of the
cancellation of their bail which was denied, hence this special civil action for
certiorari and prohibition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a prior notice and hearing is required before the cancellation
of bail in extradition cases cancelled.
HELD:
Yes. However, the issue has become moot and academic insofar as petitioner
Eduardo Rodriguez is concerned as he is now in the USA facing the charges against
him. But co-petitioner Imelda Gener Rodriguez is here and stands on a different
footing. We agree that her bail should be restored.
The policy is that a prospective extraditee is arrested and detained to avoid
his flight from justice. On the extraditee lies the burden of showing that he will not
flee once bail is granted. If after his arrest and if the trial court finds that he is no
flight risk, it grants him bail. The grant of the bail, presupposes that the co-petitioner
has already presented evidence to prove her right to be on bail, that she is no flight
risk, and is entitled to provisional release.
Under these premises, and with the trial court’s knowledge that in this case,
co-petitioner has offered to go on voluntary extradition; that she and her husband had
posted a cash bond of P1 million each; that her husband had already gone on
voluntary extradition and is presently in the USA undergoing trial; that the passport
of co-petitioner is already in the possession of the authorities; that she never
attempted to flee; that there is an existing hold-departure order against her; and that
she is now in her sixties, sickly and under medical treatment, we believe that the
benefits of continued temporary liberty on bail should not be revoked and their grant
of bail should not be cancelled, without the co-petitioner being given notice and
without her being heard why her temporary liberty should not be discontinued.
85
G.R. No. 135012 September 7, 2004

ANITA ESTEBAN
vs.
HON. REYNALDO A. ALHAMBRA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional
Trial Court, Branch 39, San Jose City, and GERARDO ESTEBAN
FACTS:
Gerardo Esteban is the accused in four criminal cases. In each case, his
sister-in-law, Anita Esteban, petitioner herein, posted cash bail of P20,000.00 in
each case for his temporary liberty. However, while out on bail and during the
pendency of the four criminal cases, Gerardo was once again charged with
another crime for which he was arrested and detained. “Fed up with Gerardo’s
actuation,” Esteban refused to post another bail and instead, she filed with the trial
court an application for the cancellation of the cash bonds she posted in the four
criminal cases and alleged that she is “terminating the cash bail by surrendering
the accused who is now in jail as certified to by the City Jail Warden.” The Judge
denied her application, as well as the motion for reconsideration, hence she filed
this petition for certiorari. She contends that by surrendering the accused who is
now in jail, her application for cancellation of bail in the four criminal cases is
allowed under Section 19, now Section 22, Rule 114.
ISSUE:
Whether or not she may avail of the right to cancel bail as provided under
Sec. 22 of Rule 114.
HELD:
No, petitioner’s submission is misplaced. Section 22, Rule 114 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, which provides: Sec. 22. Cancellation of
bail. – Upon application of the bondsmen, with due notice to the prosecutor, the bail
may be cancelled upon surrender of the accused or proof of his death. The bail shall
be deemed automatically cancelled upon acquittal of the accused, dismissal of the
case, or execution of the judgment of conviction. In all instances, the cancellation
shall be without prejudice to any liability on the bail.
The first paragraph of Section 22 contemplates of a situation where, among
others, the surety or bondsman surrenders the accused to the court that ordered the
latter’s arrest. Thereafter, the court, upon application by the surety or bondsman,
cancels the bail bond. We hold that the cash bail cannot be cancelled. Petitioner did
not surrender the accused who was charged in the four criminal cases to the trial
court. The accused was arrested and detained because he was charged in a subsequent
criminal case. A cash bond may be posted either by the accused or by any person in
his behalf. However, as far as the State is concerned, the money deposited is
regarded as the money of the accused. Consequently, it can be applied in payment of
any fine and costs that may be imposed by the court.
86
G.R. No. 131909 February 18, 1999

vs.
HON. ALFREDO CABRAL, Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 30, Camarines Sur and
RODERICK ODIAMAR
FACTS:
Roderick Odiamar was charged with rape upon the complaint of Cecille
Buenafe. In a bid to secure temporary liberty, accused-respondent filed a motion
praying that he be released on bail which Buenafe opposed by presenting real,
documentary and testimonial evidence. The lower court, however, granted the
motion for bail, stating that the evidence against Odiamar was not strong. Believing
that respondent was not entitled to bail as the evidence against him was strong, the
prosecution filed two motions to recall the bail, which was later dismissed by the
court. The dismissal prompted Buenafe to file a petition before the Court of Appeals
with prayer for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. This petition,
like its predecessors, was also denied. Still convinced by the merit of its case,
Buenafe filed the instant petition with the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC is correct in allowing Odiamar to post bail even
though he is charged with the crime of rape.
HELD:
Yes, Judge Cabral erred when he allowed respondent to post bail. In this
case, accused-respondent was being charged with rape qualified by the use of a
deadly weapon punishable by reclusion perpetua to death and, as such, bail is
discretionary and not a matter of right. The test is not whether the evidence
establishes guilt beyond reasonable doubt but rather whether it shows evident guilt or
a great presumption of guilt. The court is ministerially bound to decide which
circumstances and factors are present which would show evident guilt or presumption
of guilt as defined above.
This Court has observed that the lower court’s order failed to mention and
include some significant factors and circumstances which, to the mind of this Court
are strong, clear and convincing. First, it excluded the testimony of Dr. Belmonte
about her psychiatric examination of the victim as well as her findings that the latter
manifested “psychotic signs and symptoms such as unusual fear, sleeplessness,
suicidal thoughts, psychomotor retardation, poverty of thought content as well as
depressive signs and symptom.” The lower court cannot exercise judicial discretion
as to what pieces of evidence should be included in the summary. While conceding
that some prosecution evidence were enumerated, said enumeration was
incomplete. An incomplete enumeration or selective inclusion of pieces of evidence
for the prosecution in the order cannot be considered a summary, for a summary is
necessarily a reasonable recital of any evidence presented by the prosecution. A
“summary” that is incomplete is not a summary at all.
G.R. Nos. 99289-90 January 27, 1993
MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO
vs.
CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, Ombudsman; GUALBERTO J. DE LA LLANA, Special
Prosecutor; SANDIGANBAYAN and REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA
FACTS:
87
An Information was filed against Defensor-Santiago with the Sandiganbayan

for alleged violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Consequently, order
of arrest was issued in said case against her by Presiding Justice Francis E.
Garchitorena of the Sandiganbayan, with bail for the release of the accused fixed at
P15,000.00. . On even date, Santiago filed an "Urgent Ex-parte Motion for
Acceptance of Cash Bail Bond for and in behalf of Dr. Miriam Defensor-
Santiago," which prays that the bail bond she is posting in the amount of P15,000.00
be duly accepted and states that she be considered as having placed herself under the
jurisdiction of the SB for purposes of the required trial and other proceedings," . So
the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution authorizing petitioner to post a cash bond for
her provisional liberty without need for her physical appearance. She then filed with
this Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction,
seeking to enjoin the Sandiganbayan and the Regional Trial Court of Manila from
proceeding with her cases. One year later, the Court rendered a decision dismissing
the petition for certiorari and lifting and setting aside the temporary restraining order
previously issued. Meanwhile, the Sandiganbayan issued a hold departure order
against her by reason of her announcement, which was widely publicized in both
print and broadcast media, that she would be leaving for the US to accept a
fellowship offered by the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard
University. Santiago now filed this instant petition, arguing that the Sandiganbayan
never acquired jurisdiction over her person considering that she has neither been
arrested nor has she voluntarily surrendered, aside from the fact that she has not
validly posted bail since she never personally appeared before said court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court acquired jurisdiction over her when she posted her
bail.
HELD:
Yes. The Court finds and so holds that petitioner is deemed to have
voluntarily submitted herself to the jurisdiction of respondent court upon the filing of
her aforequoted "Urgent Ex-parte Motion for Acceptance of Cash Bail Bond for and
in behalf of Dr. Miriam Defensor-Santiago" wherein she expressly sought leave "that
she be considered as having placed herself under the jurisdiction of (the
Sandiganbayan) for purposes of the required trial and other proceedings," and
categorically prayed "that the bail bond she is posting in the amount of P15,000.00 be
duly accepted" and that by said motion "she be considered as having placed herself
under the custody" of said court. Petitioner cannot now be heard to claim otherwise
for, by her own representations, she is effectively estopped from asserting the
contrary after she had earlier recognized the jurisdiction of the court and caused it to
exercise that jurisdiction over the aforestated pleadings she filed therein.
Petitioner would also like to make capital of the fact that she did not
personally appear before respondent court to file her cash bond, thereby rendering the
same ineffectual. Suffice it to say that in this case, it was petitioner herself, in her
motion for the acceptance of the cash bond, who requested respondent court to
dispense with her personal appearance until she shall have recovered sufficiently
from her vehicular accident. It is distressing that petitioner should now turn around
and fault respondent court for taking a compassionate stand on the matter and
accommodating her own request for acceptance of the cash bond posted in her
absence.
88
G.R. No. 115132 August 9, 1995

IMELDA R. MARCOS
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division) and the PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
Imelda Marcos, former First Lady and widow of former President Ferdinand
E. Marcos, is the defendant in several criminal cases for violations of the Anti Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019) pending before the Sandiganbayan and in
the regular courts. In two of these cases, petitioner was found guilty and was
sentenced imprisonment. After conviction, she filed a "Motion for Leave to Travel
Abroad" to seek diagnostic tests and treatment by practitioners of oriental medicine in
China allegedly because of "a serious and life threatening medical condition" but the
same was denied by the Sandiganbayan. She then filed an "Urgent Ex-Parte Motion
for Permission to Travel Abroad" to undergo diagnosis and treatment in China, which
was now supported by several medical reports that were prepared by her doctor
Roberto Anastacio. Mrs. Marcos contended that she needs to travel to US and Europe
for treatment of several heart diseases because the tests were not available
here. Garchitorena, the presiding justice, contacted Dr. Gregorio B. Patacsil, Officer-
in-Charge of the Philippine Heart Center, to verify if the treatment for Mrs. Marcos’
illness was not really available here but the same was contradicted by Dr. Patacsil.
The Office of the Special Prosecutor therefore opposed the motions, contending that
the absolute necessity to go abroad was not demonstrated by Mrs. Marcos. On the
other hand, the Presidential Commission on Good Government filed a manifestation
interposing no objection to petitioner's motions "primarily on humanitarian grounds
provided that the accused comply with the terms and conditions for travel as may be
imposed" by respondent court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the granting of the motion to travel abroad is a matter of right
of the accused or a matter of discretion by the court.
HELD:
Yes, the granting of such motion is based on the discretion of the court. The
court ruled that petitioner failed to prove the necessity for a trip abroad. It should be
emphasized that considering the fact that she is facing charges before the courts in
several cases, in two of which she was convicted although the decision is still pending
reconsideration, petitioner did not have an absolute right to leave the country and the
burden was on her to prove that because of danger to health if not to her life there was
necessity to seek medical treatment in foreign countries.
89
G.R. No. 138859-60 February 22, 2001

ALVAREZ ARO YUSOP
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division), respondent.
FACTS:
Acting on an Affidavit-Complaint filed by a certain Erlinda Fadri, the Office
of the Ombudsman-Mindanao issued an Order naming Benjamin Arao, Frederick
Winters, Pelaez Pantaran, Eduardo Dablo, Efren Sissay and the city jail warden of
Pagadian City as respondents. The Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao
recommended the prosecution of “the aforenamed respondents” for violation of
Article 269 of the RPC. Significantly, the name of Alvarez A. Yusop, herein
petitioner, was included as one of the persons to be prosecuted, although he was not
one of the original respondents mentioned in the Order of the Ombudsman. An Order
of Arrest was issued by the Sandiganbayan but it was learned later that he has already
posted a bail bond before the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City. Yusop thereafter
filed a “Motion To Remand Case To The Ombudsman - Mindanao For Preliminary
Investigation” but the same was denied by the SB for his alleged failure to submit
himself to the jurisdiction of the anti-graft court and that his filing of bail bond
constitutes a waiver of his right to preliminary investigation. He then filed a Motion
to Dismiss because he was not accorded a preliminary investigation but it was still
denied by the court under the same reason, hence this Petition for Certiorari under
Rule 65.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the filing of a bail bond constitutes waiver of petitioner’s
right to preliminary investigation.
HELD:
No, the filing of a bail bond does not constitute a waiver of petitioner’s
right to preliminary investigation. Under Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure, “[a]n application for or admission to bail shall not bar the
accused from challenging the validity of his arrest or the legality of the warrant issued
therefor, or from assailing the regularity or questioning the absence of a preliminary
investigation of the charge against him, provided that he raises them before entering
his plea. x x x.” We stress that the right to preliminary investigation is substantive,
not merely formal or technical. To deny it to petitioner would deprive him of the full
measure of his right to due process. Hence, preliminary investigation with regard to
him must be conducted.
G.R. No. 70746-47 September 1, 1992

BIENVENIDO O. MARCOS
vs.
HON. FERNANDO S. RUIZ, RTC JUDGE, 7TH JUDICIAL REGION, TAGBILARAN
CITY, AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
90
FACTS:
After conducting the appropriate preliminary investigation, Acting Assistant
City Fiscal Lorenzo A. Lopena of the City of Tagbilaran filedwith the Regional Trial
Court of Bohol two informations against Marcos for violating Batas Pambansa Blg.
22. In the arraignment, Marcos appeared but asked for a resetting on the ground that
his lawyer had just withdrawn and he had to look for another lawyer. The court granted his
request and the arraignment was reset. It turned out, however, that petitioner settled his
obligation with Oculam, the complainant in the criminal case, who executed a
subscribed Affidavit of Desistance in favor of petitioner.
When the cases were called, neither the petitioner nor his counsel appeared so
arraignment was rescheduled. At the next arraignment, he was arraigned ex parte
where he automatically entered a plea of not guilty. The prosecution then presented
its evidence ex-parte and rested its case. After this, the court then rendered a decision
against the petitioner, asserting that his absence means that he will no longer present
evidence. Thereafter, the trial court received an urgent motion for the resetting of the
hearing filed by the petitioner which explained the non-appearance but the same does
not contain a notice of hearing to the Prosecuting Fiscal so it was denied. Petitioner
filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was likewise denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner was denied his rights during the course of the trial.
HELD:
No, petitioner was not denied of his rights during the trial. Considering that
he had been arraigned, petitioner was not required to appear at all the trials. Section 1
(c) of Rule 115 states that while it may be true that he has the right to be present at
every stage of the proceedings, i.e. from the arraignment to the promulgation of
judgment, he can also validly waive his presence to be present after the arraignment.
On the other hand, petitioner was denied his right to be heard when the
respondent Judge capriciously and arbitrarily considered that the case was already
submitted for decision after the prosecution rested its case. The Judge blatantly
disregarded Section 1(c) of Rule 115 when he considered the accused’s non-
appearance during the first day of trial as a waiver of his right for the succeeding trial
dates, when such should be construed to mean that he only waived his right to be
present during that day of trial.
91
G.R. No. 127772 March 22, 2001

ROBERTO P.ALMARIO
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR., PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES AND RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORP.
FACTS:
Petitioner is one of the accused in a case for estafa thru falsification of public
document and another for estafa, with respondent RCBC as the offended party in both
cases. The When the case was already scheduled for trial, the hearings were cancelled
because the Presiding Judge of RTC Makati was elevated to the Supreme Court and
no trial judge was immediately appointed/detailed thereto. The hearing set for June
21, 1995, was postponed for lack of proof of notice to all the accused and their
counsel. The hearing on July 17, 1995, upon request of private prosecutor, and
without objection on the part of petitioner’s counsel, postponed to July 24, 1995.
However, for lack of proof of service of notice upon petitioner’s three co-accused, the
hearing set for July 24, 1995, was likewise cancelled and the cases were reset for trial
on September 8 and 25, 1995. On September 8, 1995, private complainant failed to
appear despite due notice hence, upon motion of petitioner’s counsel, respondent
court moved that the case against Almario be dismissed for failure to prosecute and
considering that accused is entitled to a speedy trial. However, upon motion of the
private prosecutor the RTC set aside the previous Order that dismissed Almario’s
case. He filed for a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied. In the CA,
his appeal was likewise dismissed for lack of merit, hence this appeal by certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner’s rights to speedy trial and against double jeopardy
were violated.
HELD:
The right of the accused to speedy trial and against double jeopardy had not
been violated. It has been held that the right to speedy trial may only be availed of
when the trial was burdened by unreasonable delays but the fact that there was no
unreasonable delay of the proceedings is apparent from the chronology of the
hearings with the reasons for their postponements or transfers. Petitioner could not
refute the appellate court's findings that petitioner's right to speedy trial had not been
violated. As both the trial and appellate courts have taken pains to demonstrate, there
was no unreasonable, vexatious and oppressive delay in the trial. Hence, there was no
violation of petitioner's right to speedy trial as there were no unjustified
postponements which had prolonged the trial for unreasonable lengths of time.
G.R. NOS. 115236-37 JANUARY 16, 2003

vs.
BRYAN FERDINAND DY y LA MADRID and GIOVAN BERNARDINO y GARCIA
FACTS:
Bryan Ferdinand Dy and Giovan Bernardino filed separate motions for
reconsideration of the decision of the Supreme Court which affirmed the judgement
92
of the RTC of Baguio City, Branch 5, finding them guilty of rape and acts of
lasciviousness. In his Motion, Giovani Bernardino alleges that the right to be
arraigned is not among the rights that are susceptible to waiver or estopped, thus the
lack of arraignment cannot be deemed cured by their participation in the trial. He
further contends that because of the absence of arraignment, the courts have not
acquired jurisdiction over them, hence the decision rendered against them was not
valid.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the right to be arraigned may be waived or stopped.
HELD:
Yes. The allegation that there was no valid arraignment is misleading and
betrays a lack of comprehension regarding the procedural requirements of
arraignment in the context of the constitutional right of an accused to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
In one of the Court’s decisions, it was held that the right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation may not be waived. Indeed, the defense may
waive their right to enter a plea and let the court enter a plea of “not guilty” in their
behalf. However, it becomes altogether a different matter if the accused themselves
refuse to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them. The
defense cannot hold hostage the court by their refusal to the reading of the complaint
or information.
93
G.R. No. L-80845 March 14, 1994

vs.
HON. ERNESTO M. MENDOZA, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of
Malaybalay, Bukidnon, Branch 10, and JUAN MAGALOP y SALVACION
FACTS:
The storeroom of the Bukidnon National School of Home Industries
(BNSHI) in Maramag, Bukidnon, was ransacked. The value of the missing articles
was estimated at P15,298.15. The responsibility for the robbery with force upon
things was laid on accused Juan Magalop y Salvacion, Petronilo Fernandez y Cano
and Ricarte Dahilan alias Ricky. At the arraignment, Magalop pleaded "guilty" while
Fernandez pleaded "not guilty." The arraignment of Dahilan was deferred as he was
"not mentally well." Instead of pronouncing judgment on Magalop who already
pleaded guilty, the RTC conducted the trial, which led the prosecution to present its
witnesses and evidence. The defense having opted to waive its right to present
evidence, the case was submitted for decision. In the decision, respondent Judge
acquitted accused Fernandez as well as Magalop who earlier pleaded guilty to the
charge.
Its motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner is now before us
contending that the decision denying reconsideration are "purely capricious and
arbitrary, made for no proper reason at all and rendered without legal authority
whatsoever, thereby amounting to lack of jurisdiction and/or grave abuse of
discretion, and curtailed the power of the state to punish criminals."
ISSUE:
Whether or not Mangalop’s plea of guilt immediately convicts him of the
crime charged.
HELD:
Yes, the essence of a plea of guilty is that the accused admits his guilt freely,
voluntarily and with full knowledge and understanding of the precise nature of the
crime charged in the information as well as the consequences of his plea. It is an
unconditional admission of guilt with respect to the offense charged. It forecloses the
right to defend oneself from said charge and leaves the court with no alternative but
to impose the penalty fixed by law under the circumstances. Thus, under the 1985
New Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, when the accused pleads guilty to a
non-capital offense, the court may receive evidence from the parties to determine the
penalty to be imposed.
This rule is at most directory. It will certainly be a clear abuse of discretion
on the part of the judge to persist in holding the accused bound to his admission of
guilt and sentencing him accordingly when the totality of the evidence points to his
acquittal. There is no rule which provides that simply because the accused pleaded
guilty to the charge that his conviction automatically follows. Additional evidence
independent of the plea may be considered to convince the judge that it was
intelligently made.
94
G.R. Nos. L-30527-28 March 29, 1974

vs.
PANFILO PADERNAL
FACTS:
Panfilo Padernal was charged by the Prosecutor with the crime of homicide.
During the arraignment, Padernal pleaded guilty. The trial ensued for the
determination of the mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense but, after the
testimony of Padernal, it was proved that he may invoke complete self-defense hence
the trial judge ordered that a plea of not guilty be entered by the accused, even though
the arraignment has long been done. The trial on the merits ensued and a decision
acquitting accused Panfilo Padernal of the crime of homicide with which he was
charged “on the ground of reasonable doubt” was reached by the court. On the other
hand, Fiscal Alvero verbally moved for a reconsideration alleging that the accused
has entered a plea of guilty which is “sufficient to sustain conviction of the offense
charged in the Information without the introduction of further evidence, the accused
himself has supplied the necessary proof of his guilt and which closes the right of the
accused to defend himself and leaves the Court with no alternative but to impose the
penalty prescribed by law.” The oral motion for reconsideration was denied, as well
as the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration, hence Fiscal Alvera filed this appeal to
the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not appellant may still be acquitted even though he already plead
guilty during the arraignment.
HELD:
Yes, in People v. Balisacan, L-26376, August 31, 1966, this Court ruled that
where the accused pleads guilty and proceeds, in a hearing to prove mitigating
circumstance of incomplete self-defense, to state facts constituting full and complete
self-defense, the trial judge should declare his plea of guilty thereby withdrawn, order
that a plea of not guilty be entered and proceed to trial on the merits. For failure, in
the Balisacan case, to follow this procedure, We ruled therein that there was
deprivation of day in court against the prosecution. An acquittal on the merits thus
made without the requisite trial providing sufficient opportunity to the prosecution to
present evidence to prove the guilt of the accused, was held improper.
95
G.R. Nos. 163972-77 March 28, 2008

JOSELITO RANIERO J. DAAN
vs.
THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS:
Daan, together with Kuizon, were charged with three counts of malversation
of public fund before the Sandiganbayan. In addition to the charge for malversation,
the accused were also indicted for three counts of falsification of public document by
a public officer or employee.
In the falsification cases, the accused offered to withdraw their plea of “not
guilty” and substitute the same with a plea of “guilty”, provided, the mitigating
circumstances of confession or plea of guilt and voluntary surrender will be
appreciated in their favor. In the alternative, if such proposal is not acceptable, said
accused proposed instead to substitute their plea of “not guilty” to the crime of
falsification of public document by a public officer or employee with a plea of
“guilty”, but to the lesser crime of falsification of a public document by a private
individual. On the other hand, in the malversation cases, the accused offered to
substitute their plea of “not guilty” thereto with a plea of “guilty”, but to the lesser
crime of failure of an accountable officer to render accounts.
The prosecution found as acceptable the plea bargaining proposals of the
accused. The Sandiganbayan, however, denied petitioner’s Motion to Plea Bargain,
despite favorable recommendation by the prosecution, on the ground that petitioner
and the prosecution failed to demonstrate that the proposal would redound to the
benefit of the public.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the plea bargaining offer of the petitioner should be granted.
HELD:
Yes, the plea bargaining offer should be granted.
Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court presents the basic requisites upon
which plea bargaining may be made, i.e., that it should be with the consent of the
offended party and the prosecutor, and that the plea of guilt should be to a lesser
offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged. The rules however use
word may in the second sentence of Section 2, denoting an exercise of discretion
upon the trial court on whether to allow the accused to make such plea. Trial courts
are exhorted to keep in mind that a plea of guilty for a lighter offense than that
actually charged is not supposed to be allowed as a matter of bargaining or
compromise for the convenience of the accused.
Apparently, the Sandiganbayan has proffered valid reasons in rejecting
petitioner's plea offer. However, subsequent events and higher interests of justice and
fair play dictate that petitioner's plea offer should be accepted. The present case calls
for the judicious exercise of this Court's equity jurisdiction -
Equity as the complement of legal jurisdiction seeks to reach and do complete justice
where courts of law, through the inflexibility of their rules and want of power to
adapt their judgments to the special circumstances of cases, are incompetent so to do.
Equity regards the spirit of and not the letter, the intent and not the form, the
substance rather than the circumstance, as it is variously expressed by different courts
and of its power of control and supervision over the proceedings of lower courts, in
order to afford equal justice to petitioner.
96
G.R. No. 196231 September 4, 2012

EMILIO A. GONZALES III
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 196232 September 4, 2012
WENDELL BARRERAS-SULIT
vs.
ATTY. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.,
FACTS:
Deputy Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman charged Major
General Carlos F. Garcia and others with Plunder and Money Laundering before the
Sandiganbayan. Subsequently, the Sandiganbayan denied Major General Garcia's
urgent petition for bail holding that strong prosecution evidence militated against the
grant of bail. However, the government, represented by petitioner, Special Prosecutor
Wendell Barreras-Sulit and her prosecutorial staff sought the Sandiganbayan's
approval of a Plea Bargaining Agreement entered into with the accused which was
agreed upon by the SB. Outraged by this deal, the House of Representatives'
Committee on Justice conducted public hearings on the PLEBARA. At the
conclusion of these public hearings, the Committee on Justice passed and adopted
Committee Resolution No. 3, recommending to the President the dismissal of
Barreras-Sulit from the service and the filing of appropriate charges against her
Deputies and for having committed acts and/or omissions tantamount to culpable
violations of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust. The Office of the President
initiated a case against Barreras-Sulit but she asserts that the propriety of taking and
continuing to take administrative disciplinary proceeding against her must depend on
the final disposition by the Sandiganbayan of the PLEBARA, explaining that if the
Sandiganbayan would uphold the PLEBARA, there would no longer be any cause of
complaint against her; if not, then the situation becomes ripe for the determination of
her failings.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Office of the President may validly conduct the
administrative disciplinary proceedings while the disposition on the PLEBARA is
still pending.
HELS:
Yes, the Office of the President may initiate the proceedings. The incidents
that have taken place subsequent to the submission in court of the PLEBARA shows
that the PLEBARA has been practically approved, and that the only thing which
remains to be done by the Sandiganbayan is to promulgate a judgment imposing the
proper sentence on the accused Major General Garcia based on his new pleas to lesser
offenses.
The approval or disapproval of the PLEBARA by the Sandiganbayan is of no
consequence to an administrative finding of liability against petitioner Barreras-Sulit.
While the court's determination of the propriety of a plea bargain is on the basis of the
existing prosecution evidence on record, the disciplinary authority's determination of
the prosecutor's administrative liability is based on whether the plea bargain is
consistent with the conscientious consideration of the government's best interest and
the diligent and efficient performance by the prosecution of its public duty to
prosecute crimes against the State. Consequently, the disciplining authority's finding
of ineptitude, neglect or willfulness on the part of the prosecution, more particularly
97
petitioner Special Prosecutor Barreras-Sulit, in failing to pursue or build a strong case

for the government or, in this case, entering into an agreement which the government
finds "grossly disadvantageous," could result in administrative liability,
notwithstanding court approval of the plea bargaining agreement entered into.
98
G.R. No. 173588 April 22, 2009

ARIEL M. LOS BAÑOS, on behalf of P/Supt. Victor Arevalo, SPO2 Marcial Olympia,
SPO1 Rocky Mercene and PO1 Raul Adlawan, and in his personal capacity
vs.
JOEL R. PEDRO
FACTS:
The Boac election officer filed a criminal complaint against Pedro for
violating the election gun ban, i.e., for carrying a firearm outside of his residence or
place of business without any authority from the Comelec. Pedro filed a Motion for
Preliminary Investigation, which the RTC granted but the same did not materialize
because Pedro filed with the RTC a Motion to Quash, arguing that the Information
“contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification”
and attached a Comelec Certification which shows that he was “exempted” from the
gun ban. By virtue of this, the RTC quashed the Information and ordered the police
and the prosecutors to return the seized articles to Pedro. Private prosecutor Ariel Los
Baños, representing the checkpoint team, moved to reopen the case, as Pedro’s
Comelec Certification was a falsification, and the prosecution was deprived of due
process when the judge quashed the information without a hearing. Pedro moved for
the reconsideration of the RTC’s order primarily based on Section 8 of Rule 117,
arguing that the dismissal had become permanent. The trial court, for its part, rejected
the position that Section 8, Rule 117 applies, and explained that this provision refers
to situations where both the prosecution and the accused mutually consented to the
dismissal of the case, or where the prosecution or the offended party failed to object
to the dismissal of the case, and not to a situation where the information was quashed
upon motion of the accused and over the objection of the prosecution. The RTC,
thus, set Pedro’s arraignment date. Pedro filed with the CA a
petition for certiorari and prohibition to nullify the RTC’s mandated reopening which
initially denied the petition but granted the same after a Motion for Reconsideration.
Prosecutor Los Banos now filed this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the motion to quash is considered a provisional dismissal,
which became permanent one year from the prosecutor’s receipt of the order.
HELD:
No, an examination of the whole Rule 117 tells us that a dismissal based on a
motion to quash and a provisional dismissal are far different from one another as
concepts, in their features, and legal consequences. While the provision on
provisional dismissal is found within Rule 117 (entitled Motion to Quash), it does not
follow that a motion to quash results in a provisional dismissal to which Section 8,
Rule 117 applies.
The RTC grossly erred in its initial ruling that a quashal of the Information
was in order. Pedro, on the other hand, also misappreciated the true nature, function,
and utility of a motion to quash. As a consequence, a valid Information still stands,
on the basis of which Pedro should now be arraigned and stand trial.
99
G.R. No. 164170 April 16, 2009

MACA-ANGCOS ALAWIYA y ABDUL, ISAGANI ABDUL y SIACOR, and SARAH
LANGCO y ANGLI
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, SECRETARY OF JUSTICE SIMEON A. DATUMANONG,
P/C INSP. MICHAEL ANGELO BERNARDO MARTIN, P/INSP. ALLANJING
ESTRADA MEDINA, PO3 ARNOLD RAMOS ASIS, PO2 PEDRO SANTOS
GUTIERREZ, PO2 IGNACIO DE PAZ, and PO2 ANTONIO SEBASTIAN BERIDA,
JR.
FACTS:
Private respondents were charged with the crime of kidnapping for ransom.
However, the accused moved for the quashal of the Information on the ground that
the officer who filed the Information has no authority do so because it should be the
Office of the Ombudsman who filed the same. The trial court denied the motion to
quash on the ground that under the ruling in People v. Mapalao, an accused who is at
large is not entitled to bail or other relief. The trial court also held that the jurisdiction
and power of the Ombudsman under Section 15(1) of Republic Act No. 6770 (RA
6770), as well as Administrative Order No. 8 of the Office of the Ombudsman, are
not exclusive but shared or concurrent with the regular prosecutors. Thus, the
authority of the Department of Justice to investigate, file the information and
prosecute the case could no longer be questioned. In a Resolution, then Secretary of
Justice Hernando B. Perez reversed the ruling of State Prosecutor Velasco and
ordered the latter to cause the withdrawal or dismissal of the Information for
kidnapping for ransom. The Secretary of Justice ruled that the incident complained of
was a bungled buy-bust operation, not kidnapping for ransom. Petitioners then filed a
Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by then Secretary of Justice Simeon
A. Datumanong. Petitioners thereafter filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals but the same was also denied, hence this petition.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not petitioners must be under the custody of the law prior to
the filing of a motion to quash; and
(2) Whether or not a motion to quash on the ground that it is the Ombudsman
who has jurisdiction over the case.
HELD:
(1) No, there is nothing in the Rules governing a motion to quash which
requires that the accused should be under the custody of the law prior to the filing of a
motion to quash on the ground that the officer filing the information had no authority
to do so. Custody of the law is not required for the adjudication of reliefs other than
an application for bail. However, while the accused are not yet under the custody of
the law, any question on the jurisdiction over the person of the accused is deemed
waived by the accused when he files any pleading seeking an affirmative relief,
except in cases when the accused invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by
impugning such jurisdiction over his person.
(2) No, the accused’s motion to quash, on the ground of lack of authority of
the filing officer, would have never prospered because as discussed earlier, the
Ombudsman’s power to investigate offenses involving public officers or employees is
not exclusive but is concurrent with other similarly authorized agencies of the
government.
100
G.R. No. 152644 February 10, 2006

JOHN ERIC LONEY, STEVEN PAUL REID and PEDRO B. HERNANDEZ
vs.
FACTS:
Petitioners are officers of Marcopper Mining Corp., engaged in mining in the
province of Marinduque.
The Department of Justiced charged petitioners with violation of the Water
Code of the Philippines, the National Pollution Control Decree, Philippine Mining
Act and RPC for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property by reason of
the discharge millions of tons of tailings into the rivers due to their mining operation.
Petitioners moved to quash the information on grounds that these were “duplicitous”
as DOJ charged more than one offense for a single act and that the Informations
contain allegations which constitute legal excuse or justification.
The MTC ruled that as far as the 3 laws are concerned, only the Information
for violation of Philippine Mining Act should be maintained. Thus, the Informations
for violation of Anti-Pollution Law and the Water Code should be dismissed because
the elements constituting the aforesaid violations are absorbed by the same elements
which constitute violation of the Philippine Mining Act. The RTC reversed the said
decision and ruled that there can be no absorption by one offense of the three other
offenses, as the acts penalized by these laws are separate and distinct from each other.
This was affirmed by the CA.
ISSUE:
Whether all the charges filed against petitioners except one should be
quashed for duplicity of charges and only the charge for Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Damage to Property should stand.
HELD:
No, duplicity of charges simply means a single complaint or information
charges more than one offense, as Section 13 of Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure clearly states. Under Section 3(e), Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure, duplicity of offenses in single information is a ground to quash
the Information. The Rules prohibit the filing of such Information to avoid confusing
the accused in preparing his defense. Here, however, the prosecution charged each
petitioner with four offenses, with each Information charging only one offense. Thus,
petitioners erroneously invoke duplicity of charges as a ground to quash the
Informations. On this score alone, the petition deserves outright denial.
101
G.R. Nos. 107964-66 February 1, 1999

THE PEOPLE of the PHILIPPINES represented by the PANEL OF PROSECUTORS,
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
vs.
HON. DAVID G. NITAFAN, Presiding Judge, Branch 52, Regional Trial Court of
Manila, and IMELDA R. MARCOS
FACTS:
Three criminal informations for violation of Section 4 of Central Bank
Circular No. 960 were filed against Imelda Marcos in the RTC of Pasig. The
petitioners asked for the consolidation of the three informations, hence the remaining
one was re-raffled and re-assigned to Branch 52-Manila presided by public
respondent Judge Nitafan. Thereafter, without any action or filing any motion to
quash the informations coming from Marcos, respondent judge issued an order
requiring petitioners to show cause why the case should not be dismissed on the
ground that it violates private respondent’s right against ex post facto law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a judge can motu proprio initiate the dismissal and
subsequently dismissed a criminal information or complaint without any motion to
that effect being filed by the accused based on the alleged violation of the latter’s
right against ex post facto law and double jeopardy.
HELD:
No, it is clear from Section 1 that the right to file a motion to quash belongs
only to the accused. There is nothing in the rules which authorizes the court or judge
to motu proprio initiate a motion to quash if no such motion was filed by the
accused. A motion contemplates an initial action originating from the accused. It is
the latter who is in the best position to know on what ground/s he will based his
objection to the information. Otherwise, if the judge initiates the motion to quash,
then he is not only pre-judging the case of the prosecution but also takes side with the
accused. This would violate the right to a hearing before an independent and
impartial tribunal. Such independence and impartiality cannot be expected from a
magistrate, such as herein respondent judge, who in his show cause orders, orders
dismissing the charges and order denying the motions for reconsideration stated and
even expounded in a lengthy disquisition with citation of authorities, the grounds and
justifications to support his action. Certainly, in compliance with the orders, the
prosecution has no choice but to present arguments contradicting that of respondent
judge. Obviously, however, it cannot be expected from respondent judge to overturn
the reasons he relied upon in his different orders without contradicting himself. To
allow a judge to initiate such motion even under the guise of a show cause order
would result in a situation where a magistrate who is supposed to be neutral, in effect,
acts as counsel for the accused and judge as well. A combination of these two
personalities in one person is violative of due process which is a fundamental right
not only of the accused but also of the prosecution.
102
G.R. No. 164682 September 14, 2011

JOEL GALZOTE
vs.
JONATHAN BRIONES and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
The prosecution filed an Information for robbery in an uninhabited place
against Galzote before the Metropolitan Trial Court. Galzote thereafter moved to
quash the said information by alleging that it was patently irregular and fatally flawed
in form and in substance. He contends that the information did not allege conspiracy
and questions why his alleged co-conspirator had been convicted of the lesser offense
of malicious mischief in another case. The MeTC denied the petitioner’s motion to
quash, as well as his motion for reconsideration. Galzote elevated the case to the RTC
via a petition for certiorari. The petition, however, was denied by the court.
Thereafter, he filed another petition for certiorari before the CA but the case was
likewise dismissed. He now filed this present petition for certiorari in the Supreme
Court.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not petitioner’s motion to quash the information against him
was proper; and
(2) Whether or not certiorari is the right mode of appeal regarding the denial
of petitioner’s motion to quash.
HELD:
(1) No. The ground used by the petitioner in his motion to quash (i.e., that
his co-conspirator had been convicted of an offense lesser than the crime of robbery)
is not among the exclusive grounds enumerated under Section 3, Rule 117 of the
2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure that warrant the quashal of a criminal
information. A facial examination of the criminal information against the petitioner
shows it to be valid and regular on its face considering its conformity with the
guidelines under Section 6, Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
Under the circumstances, the criminal information is sufficient in form
and substance for it states: (a) the name of the petitioner as the accused; (b)
the offense of robbery as the designated offense committed; (c) the manner on how
the offense of robbery was committed and the petitioner’s participation were alleged
with particularity; and (d) the date and the place of the commission of the robbery
were also stated therein. Thus, as the RTC correctly ruled, the petitioner can be
properly tried under the allegations of the information.
(2) No, we find no compelling reason to justify a resort to a petition
for certiorari against the orders of the MeTC as the petitioner failed to show that the
factual circumstances of his case fall under any of the above exceptional
circumstances. The MeTC in fact did not commit any grave abuse of discretion as its
denial of the motion to quash was consistent with the existing rules and applicable
jurisprudence.
103
G.R. No. 172716 November 17, 2010

JASON IVLER y AGUILAR
vs.
HON. MARIA ROWENA MODESTO-SAN PEDRO, Judge of the Metropolitan Trial
Court, Branch 71, Pasig City, and EVANGELINE PONCE
FACTS:
Jason Ivler was charged with the separate offenses of (1) reckless imprudence
resulting in slight physical injuries and (2) reckless imprudence resulting in homicide
and damage to property, before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City. During the
arraignment, Ivler pleaded guilty on the charge of reckless imprudence resulting in
slight physical injuries and was meted out the penalty of public censure. Thereafter,
Ivler, invoking his right against double jeopardy, moved to quash the charge of
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to property filed against him.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the motion to quash on the ground of double jeopardy was
proper.
HELD:
Yes, the motion to quash is proper. The accused’s negative constitutional
right not to be "twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense" protects
him from, among others, post-conviction prosecution for the same offense, with the
prior verdict rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid information.
The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were
prosecuted under the same provision of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, namely,
Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses, hence the motion to quash is
valid.
104
G.R. No. 143591 May 5, 2010

TEODORO C. BORLONGAN, JR., et al.
vs.
MAGDALENO M. PEÑA and HON. MANUEL Q. LIMSIACO, JR., as Judge Designate
of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Bago City
FACTS:
The Government Prosecutor filed four informations charging Borlongan and
others of four counts of the crime of Introducing Falsified Documents. Petitioners
then moved to quash the four (4) Informatiosn filed on the ground, among others, that
"they were denied due process because of the non-observance of the proper procedure
on preliminary investigation prescribed in the Rules of Court. Specifically, they
claimed that they were not afforded the right to submit their counter-affidavit. They
then argued that since no such counter-affidavit and supporting documents were
submitted by the petitioners, the trial judge merely relied on the complaint-affidavit
and attachments of the respondent in issuing the warrants of arrest, also in
contravention of the Rules. Petitioners further prayed that the information be quashed
for lack of probable cause. Lastly, petitioners posited that the criminal case should
have been suspended on the ground that the issue being threshed out in the civil case
is a prejudicial question." The court denied the omnibus motion primarily on the
ground that preliminary investigation was not available in the instant case — which
fell within the jurisdiction of the MTCC so the petitioners resorted to the filing of a
special civil action for Certiorari in the CA but the same was also dismissed, hence
this present petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the motion to quash filed by petitioners was proper.
HELD:
Yes, the motion to quash should have been granted by the trial court. It is
evident that in the affidavit-complaint, specifically in paragraph 1, respondent merely
introduced and identified “the board of the bank, namely, Teodoro Borlongan, Jr.,
Delfin Gonzales, Jr., Benjamin De Leon, P. Siervo Dizon, Eric Lee, Ben Lim, Jr.,
Corazon Bejasa and Arturo Manuel, Sr.” However, in the accusatory portion of the
complaint which is paragraph number 9, Mr. Ben Lim, Jr. was not included among
those charged with the crime of use of falsified documents under Article 172,
paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal Code. The omission indicates that respondent did
not intend to criminally implicate Mr. Ben Lim, Jr., even as he was acknowledged to
be a member of the board.
The City Prosecutor should have cautiously reviewed the complaint to
determine whether there were inconsistencies which ought to have been brought to
the attention of the respondent or, on his own, considered for due evaluation. It is a
big mistake to bring a man to trial for a crime he did not commit.
105
G.R. No. 153176 March 29, 2004

vs.
HON. ZEIDA AURORA B. GARFIN, In her capacity as Presiding Judge of RTC,
Branch 19, of the City of Naga and SERAFIN SABALLEGUE
FACTS:
Saballegue was charged with violation of Section 22(a) in relation to Sections
19(b) and 28(e) of Republic Act No. 8282, otherwise known as the “Social Security
Act,” in an information. Said information contains a certification signed by State
Prosecutor Romulo SJ. Tolentino. Saballegue pleaded not guilty so the case was set
for pre-trial but, three days later, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the
information was filed without the prior written authority or approval of the city
prosecutor as required under Section 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court. The
RTC granted the motion to dismiss or to quash on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
The State Prosecutor thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that
Saballegue has waived his right to file a motion to quash when he pleaded to the
information but said motion was denied by the RTC. Hence this petition
for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65by the People through Regional State
Prosecutor Santiago Turingan and State Prosecutor Romulo SJ. Tolentino.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused waived his right to quash the information when
he pleaded to the information.
HELD:
No. The 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides for lack of
authority of the filing officer as among the grounds for a motion to quash and the
waiver of these grounds. Similar to the 1985 Rules, the Revised Rules enumerate the
exceptions from the waiver, namely: (a) that the facts charged do not constitute an
offense; (b) that the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged;
(c) that the criminal action or liability has been extinguished; and (d) that the accused
has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or the case against
him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. Apparently,
the want of jurisdiction under the Rules refers to jurisdiction over the offense and the
person, and not over the case.
In the absence of a directive from the Secretary of Justice designating State
Prosecutor Tolentino as Special Prosecutor for SSS cases or a prior written approval
of the information by the provincial or city prosecutor, the information was filed by
an officer without authority to file the same. As this infirmity in the information
constitutes a jurisdictional defect that cannot be cured, the respondent judge did not
err in dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction.
106
G.R. No. 139615 May 28, 2004

vs.
AMADEO TIRA and CONNIE TIRA
FACTS:
After surveillance and confirmation that drug activities were being conducted
in the residence of the respondents, the police officials applied for a search warrant.
Armed with the warrant, the policemen went to the residence of Tira and found drug
paraphernalia. After Connie’s arrest, she filed a motion to quash search warrant,
alleging that the police officers who applied for the said warrant did not have any
personal knowledge of the reported illegal activities. The motion to quash, however,
was denied by the RTC hence they were charged for violation of possession of
marijuana and shabu, two offenses, in only one Information. They were both found
guilty, hence this appeal.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not the dismissal of the motion to quash the warrant was
proper; and
(2) Whether or not the information that charged them with two offenses valid.
HELD:
(1) Yes, the dismissal of the motion was proper. As can be gleaned from the
facts, Judge Gayapa issued the search warrant after conducting searching questions,
and in consideration of the affidavit of witness Enrique Milad.
(2) The information is not valid because it charges two separate crimes: (a)
possession of regulated drugs under Section 16, in relation to Section 20, of Rep. Act
No. 6425, as amended, for their possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a
regulated drug; and, (b) violation of Section 8, in relation to Section 20 of the law, for
their possession of marijuana, a prohibited drug. However, although only one
Information was filed against the appellants, nevertheless, they could be tried and
convicted for the crimes alleged therein and proved by the prosecution.
Strictly speaking, the Information is defective because it charges two crimes
and the appellants should have filed a motion to quash the Information under Section
3, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court before their arraignment. They failed to do
so. Hence, under Rule 120, Section 3 of the said rule, the appellants may be
convicted of the crimes charged. The said Rule provides:
SEC. 3. Judgment for two or more offenses. - When two or more offenses
are charged in a single complaint or information but the accused fails to object to it
before trial, the court may convict him of as many offenses as are charged and
proved, and impose on him the penalty for each offense, setting out separately the
findings of fact and law in each offense.
They are therefore found guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the two offenses.
107
G.R. No. 130026 May 31, 2000

vs.
ANTONIO MAGAT y LONDONIO
FACTS:
Two informations were filed against respondent, Magat, charging him with
the crime of incestuous perpetrated against his daughter, Ann Fideli M. Magat At the
arraignment, Magat pleaded guilty but bargained for a lesser penalty for each case.
Complainant's mother, Ofelia Limpoco Magat, and the public prosecutor agreed with
the plea bargain, so he was sentenced to ten years imprisonment for each case. After
three months, however, the cases were revived at the instance of Magat’s daughter
and wife on the ground that the penalty imposed was "too light." As a consequence,
Magat was re-arraigned on both Informations where he entered a plea of not guilty.
Three months thereafter, when the trial started, Magat entered anew a plea of guilty
therefore, he was sentenced to death for each case. Because of the sentence of death,
the SC had this automatic review of the case wherein Magat contends that the re-
arraignment violated his right against double jeopardy because the case has already
been decided and he has already been sentenced to ten years imprisonment for each
case by the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the re-arraignment violates his right against double jeopardy.
HELD:
No. The order of the trial court convicting the accused-appellant on his own
plea of guilt is void ab initio on the ground that accused-appellant's plea is not the
plea bargaining contemplated and allowed by law and the rules of procedure. The
only instance where a plea bargaining is allowed under the Rules is when an accused
pleads guilty to a lesser offense.
It must be emphasized that accused-appellant did not plead to a lesser offense
but pleaded guilty to the rape charges and only bargained for a lesser penalty. In
short, as aptly observed by the Solicitor General, he did not plea bargain but made
conditions on the penalty to be imposed. This is erroneous because by pleading guilty
to the offense charged, accused-appellant should be sentenced to the penalty to which
he pleaded. In effect, the judgment rendered by the trial court which was based on a
void plea bargaining is also void ab initio and cannot be considered to have attained
finality for the simple reason that avoid judgment has no legality from its inception.
Thus, since the judgment of conviction rendered against accused-appellant is void,
double jeopardy will not lie.
108
G.R. No. 108028 July 30, 1996

vs.
CRISTINA M. HERNANDEZ
FACTS:
Respondent, Hernandez, purporting herself as the general manager of
Philippine-Thai, a recruitment and placement company, was charged with the crime
of illegal recruitment committed in large scale. The trial court convicted respondent
as charged.
On appeal, respondent claimed that the prosecution failed to prove one of the
essential elements of the offense charged, that she is not licensed or does not have
authority to engage in the business of placement and recruitment. The prosecution,
however, avers that the said element was already admitted by the respondent during
the pre-trial.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 4 of Rule 118 -- requiring an agreement or admission
made or entered during the pre-trial conference to be reduced in writing and signed
by the accused and his counsel before the same may be used in evidence against the
accused -- equally applies to a stipulation of facts made during trial.
HELD:
No, said rules do not apply on stipulation of facts made during trial.
A stipulation of facts entered into by the prosecution and defense counsel
during trial in open court is automatically reduced into writing and contained in the
official transcript of the proceedings had in court. The conformity of the accused in
the form of his signature affixed thereto is unnecessary in view of the fact that: "x x x
an attorney who is employed to manage a party's conduct of a lawsuit x x x
has prima facie authority to make relevant admissions by pleadings, by oral or
written stipulation, x x x which unless allowed to be withdrawn are conclusive.". In
fact, "judicial admissions are frequently those of counsel or of the attorney of record,
who is, for the purpose of the trial, the agent of his client. When such admissions are
made x x x for the purpose of dispensing with proof of some fact, x x x they bind the
client, whether made during, or even after, the trial."
The foregoing find basis in the general rule that a client is bound by the acts
of his counsel who represents him. For all intents and purposes, the acts of a lawyer
in the defense of a case are the acts of his client. The rule extends even to the
mistakes and negligence committed by the lawyer except only when such mistakes
would result in serious injustice to the client. No cogent reason exists to make such
exception in this case. It is worth noting that Atty. Ulep, appellant's counsel in the
lower court, agreed to the stipulation of facts proposed by the prosecution not out of
mistake nor inadvertence, but obviously because the said stipulation of facts was also
in conformity to defense's theory of the case. It may be recalled that throughout the
entire duration of the trial, appellant staunchly denied ever having engaged in the
recruitment business either in her personal capacity or through Philippine-
Thai. Therefore, it was but logical to admit that the POEA records show that neither
she nor Philippine-Thai was licensed or authorized to recruit workers.
It is true that the rights of an accused during trial are given paramount
importance in our laws on criminal procedure. Among the fundamental rights of the
accused is the right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him. But the
right of confrontation guaranteed and secured to the accused is a personal privilege
109
which may be waived. Thus, in the case of U.S. vs. Anastasio, this Court deemed as a
waiver of the right of confrontation, the admission by the accused that witnesses if
present would testify to certain facts stated in the affidavit of the prosecution.
In the same vein, it may be said that such an admission is a waiver of the
right of an accused to present evidence on his behalf. Although the right to present
evidence is guaranteed by no less than the Constitution itself for the protection of the
accused, this right may be waived expressly or impliedly. This is in consonance with
the doctrine of waiver which recognizes that "x x x everyone has a right to waive, and
agree to waive, the advantage of a law or rule made solely for the benefit and
protection of the individual in his private capacity, if it can be dispensed with and
relinquished without infringing on any public right, and without detriment to the
community at large."
The abovementioned doctrine is squarely applicable to the case at
bar. Appellant was never prevented from presenting evidence contrary to the
stipulation of facts. If appellant believed that the testimony of the Chief Licensing
Officer of the POEA would be beneficial to her case, then it is the defense who
should have presented him. Her continuous failure to do so during trial was a waiver
of her right to present the pertinent evidence to contradict the stipulation of facts and
establish her defense
110
G. R. No. 146854 April 28, 2004

vs.
PASCUAL BALBARONA
FACTS:
Pascual Balbarona was charged of raping Odette M. Balbarona, his daughter
before the Regional Trial Court of Lanao Del Norte, Branch 2. During arraignment,
Balbarona pleaded not guilty to the accusation. The prosecution and defense
subsequently entered into a stipulation of facts4 where it was admitted that the victim,
Odette M. Balbarona, was appellant’s daughter and was fifteen at the time of the
alleged rape; and that appellant was then living with the victim and his two other
daughters. Balbarona was convicted by the RTC and to suffer the supreme penalty of
death because of the presence of the qualifying circumstance of minority of the victim
and the offender is a parent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not stipulation of facts in pre-trial, which was admitted by the
accused, can serve as evidence of minority of the victim.
HELD:
While the above-quoted information alleged the concurrence of the victim’s
minority and her relationship to appellant as his daughter, the jurisprudentially
required evidence to prove such circumstance is utterly lacking. Except for the bare
testimonies of the parties, no birth certificate exists in the records to prove that the
victim was fifteen (15) years old at the time she was raped by appellant. And yet there
was no showing that her birth certificate was lost or destroyed or was unavailable
without the prosecution’s fault. Thus, substitutionary evidence – the victim’s and
appellant’s testimonies – was inadmissible. Much reliance is had on the stipulation of
facts embodied in the trial court’s June 22, 2000 Pre-trial Order whereby appellant
admitted to the victim being his daughter and her being fifteen (15) years old at the
time of the rape incident. This Court in People v. Sitao rejected stipulation of facts as
a specie of evidence to prove the qualifying circumstances of rape: Neither can a
stipulation of the parties with respect to the victim’s age be considered sufficient
proof of minority. Circumstances that qualify a crime and increase its penalty to death
cannot be the subject of stipulation. An accused cannot be condemned to suffer the
extreme penalty of death on the basis of stipulations or his own admissions. This
strict rule is warranted by the seriousness of the penalty of death.
111
G.R. No. 148000 February 27, 2003

vs.
HON. JUDGE PATERNO V. TAC-AN (in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the RTC,
Fourth Judicial Region, Branch 84, Batangas City) and MARIO N. AUSTRIA
FACTS:
On February 22, 2000, an Information was filed by the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Batangas City against Mario N. Austria for falsification of public
official document.
The trial court set the arraignment of the accused and the initial pre-trial on
August 1, 2000. Apparently, only three out of eleven witnesses were notified of said
arraignment and pre-trial. The trial court dismissed the case for failure of said
witnesses to appear before it. The public prosecutor asserted that only three were
subpoenaed by the trial court. He argued further that the dismissal of the case was not
authorized under Republic Act No. 8493. However the Court of Appeals rendered a
decision dismissing the petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the absence of witnesses during the pre-trial will amount to
the dismissal of the case.
HELD:
Under R.A. 8493, the absence during pre-trial of any witness for the
prosecution listed in the Information, whether or not said witness is the offended
party or the complaining witness is not a valid ground for the dismissal of a criminal
case. Although under the law, pre-trial is mandatory in criminal cases, the presence of
the private complainant or the complaining witness is however not required. Even the
presence of the accused is not required unless directed by the trial court. It is enough
that the accused is represented by his counsel.
Indeed, even if none of the witnesses listed in the information for the State
appeared for the pre-trial, the same can and should proceed. After all, the public
prosecutor appeared for the State. The public prosecutor is vested with authority to
consider those matters catalogued in Section 2 of R.A. 8493.
112
G.R. No. 142848 June 30, 2006

EUGENE C. YU
vs.
THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
TAGAYTAY CITY, BRANCH 18, THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ASSISTANT PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR JOSE M.
VELASCO, SEC. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, RODOLFO OCHOA and REYNALDO
DE LOS SANTOS A.K.A. "Engine,"
FACTS:
Atty. Eugene Tan, former President of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) and his driver Eduardo Constantino were abducted by Pedro Lim, Bonifacio
Roxas, Sgt. Edgar Allan Abalon, Mariano Hizon, Eugenio Hizon in Alabang,
Muntinlupa, and brought somewhere in Cavite where they were both shot to death. It
was alleged that it was a military operation against communist rebels. An information
was then filed against the said perpetrators but after investigation, the following
individuals were included namely, Eugene C. Yu, and Patricia Lim-Yu as responsible
for the commission of the offense. And the prosecution filed a “Petition to Discharge
as State Witnesses and Exclude from the Information accused Ochoa and de los
Santos which was granted by the Court but contested by Eugene Yu for lack of
evidence supporting such decision invoking Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure is the one applicable despite the provision of Republic Act No. 6981 in the
case at bar.
HELD:
The discharge of an accused to be a state witness under Republic Act No.
6981 is only one of the modes for a participant in the commission of a crime to be a
state witness. Rule 119, Section 17, of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, is
another mode of discharge. The immunity provided under Republic Act No. 6981 is
granted by the DOJ while the other is granted by the court. On the other hand, in the
discharge of an accused under Republic Act No. 6981, only compliance with the
requirement of Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is
required but not the requirement of Rule 119, Section 17. An amendment of the
information made before plea which excludes some or one of the accused must be
made only upon motion by the prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with
leave of court in compliance with Section 14, Rule 110. And the prosecution of
crimes appertains to the executive department of government whose principal power
and responsibility is to see that our laws are faithfully executed. A necessary
component of this power to execute our laws is the right to prosecute their violators.
The right to prosecute vests the prosecutor with a wide range of discretion – the
discretion of whether, what and whom to charge, the exercise of which depends on a
smorgasbord of factors which are best appreciated by prosecutors. We thus hold that
it is not constitutionally impermissible for Congress to enact R.A. No. 6981 vesting in
the Department of Justice the power to determine who can qualify as a witness in the
program and who shall be granted immunity from prosecution.
113
G.R. No. 140690 June 19, 2001

vs.
HON. NAZAR U. CHAVEZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 18 of the
Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, and SPO1 Reynaldo Lim de la Victoria
FACTS:
An Information charging the offense of Multiple Murder for the killing of
members of the Bucag family in Gingoog City was filed before the Regional Trial
Court of Gingoog City. Venue of the case was moved to Cagayan de Oro City by
virtue of Administrative Order No. 87-2-244. Thus, the case was transferred to the
Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 18, presided by respondent
Judge Nazar U. Chaves. Only Felipe Galarion was tried and convicted. All the other
accused were at large.
Two years later, Felizardo Roxas, was identified as another member of the
group. Amended information was filed on to implead Roxas as a co-accused. He
engaged the services of private respondent Miguel Paderanga as his counsel. Roxas
was given the opportunity to adduce evidence in support of his defense, a preliminary
investigation was conducted. In his counter-affidavit, Roxas implicated Atty.
Paderanga as the mastermind of the killings. Consequently, the amended information
was again amended to include private respondent Paderanga as one of the accused in
Criminal Case No. 86-39.
Trial of the case ensued. At the hearing, the prosecution called Roxas as its
first witness. Paderanga objected to the presentation of Roxas’ testimony on the
ground that the presentation of Roxas’ testimony will violate his right against self-
incrimination. The trial court ruled further that before Roxas can be presented as a
witness for the prosecution, he must first be discharged as a state witness. Otherwise
put, the prosecution cannot present Roxas as a hostile witness. On June 3, 1993 the
trial court issued an order denying the prosecution’s motion for reconsideration but
setting the motion for the discharge of Roxas as state witness for hearing and granted
the private respondent’s motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals dismissed
the prosecution’s petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus for lack of merit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the prosecution may present the testimony of Felizardo Roxas
as hostile witness.
HELD:
This is error. Clearly, the Order dated June 3, 1993 was interlocutory; it did
not finally dispose of the case on its merits. As such, the Order cannot be the proper
subject of appeal. It may, however, be assailed in a special civil action for certiorari.
Under the Rules of Court then governing, the petition for certiorari may be filed
within a reasonable period.
It is true that an accused cannot be made a hostile witness for the prosecution,
for to do so would compel him to be a witness against himself. However, he may
testify against a co-defendant where he has agreed to do so, with full knowledge of
his right and the consequences of his acts. It is not necessary that the court discharges
him first as state witness. There is nothing in the rules that says so. There is a
difference between testifying as state witness and testifying as a co-accused. In the
first, the proposed state witness has to qualify as a witness for the state, after which
he is discharged as an accused and exempted from prosecution. In the second, the
witness remains an accused and can be made liable should he be found guilty of the
114
criminal offense. The trial court must determine with certainty, lest their right against
self-incrimination be violated.
115
G.R. No. 165496 February 12, 2007

HUN HYUNG PARK
vs.
EUNG WON CHOI
FACTS:
Eung Won Choi, was charged for violation of BP 22,otherwise known as the
Bouncing Checks Law, for issuing PNB Check No. 0077133 postdated August28,
1999 in the amount of P1,875,000 which was dishonored for having been drawn
against insufficient funds. He pleaded not guilty.- After the prosecution rested its
case, respondent filed a Motion for Leave of Court to File Demurrer to Evidence to
which he attached his Demurrer, asserting that the prosecution failed to prove that he
received the notice of dishonor, hence, the presumption of the element of knowledge
of insufficiency of funds did not arise.- (2/27/03) The MeTC of Makati, Branch 65
granted the demurrer and dismissed the case. The prosecution’s motion for
reconsideration was denied.- Park appealed the civil aspect of the case to the RTC of
Makati, contending that the dismissal of the criminal case should not include its civil
aspect. The RTC held that while the evidence presented wasinsufficient to prove
Choi’s criminal liability, it did not altogether extinguish his civil liability. It
accordingly granted Park’s appeal and ordered Choi to pay himP1,875,000 with legal
interest.- Upon Choi’s motion for reconsideration, however, the RTC set aside its
decision and ordered the remand of the case to the MeTC “for further proceedings, so
that Choi may adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case.” Park’s motion for
reconsideration of the remand of the case having been denied, he elevated the case to
the CA which dismissed his petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent has a right to present evidence on the civil
aspect of the case in view of his demurrer.
HELD:
Yes. In case of a demurrer to evidence filed with leave of court, the accused
may adduce countervailing evidence if the court denies the demurrer. Such denial
bears no distinction as to the two aspects of the case because there is a disparity of
evidentiary value between the quanta of evidence in such aspects of the case. In other
words, a court may not deny the demurrer as to the criminal aspect and at the same
time grant the demurrer as to the civil aspect, for if the evidence so far presented is
not insufficient to prove the crime beyond reasonable doubt, then the same evidence
is likewise not insufficient to establish civil liability by mere preponderance of
evidence.
On the other hand, if the evidence so far presented is insufficient as proof
beyond reasonable doubt, it does not follow that the same evidence is insufficient to
establish a preponderance of evidence. For if the court grants the demurrer,
proceedings on the civil aspect of the case generally proceed. The only recognized
instance when an acquittal on demurrer carries with it the dismissal of the civil aspect
is when there is a finding that the act or omission from which the civil liability may
arise did not exist. Absent such determination, trial as to the civil aspect of the case
must perforce continue.- In the instant case, the MeTC granted the demurrer and
dismissed the case without any finding that the act or omission from which the civil
liability may arise did not exist. Choi did not assail the RTC order of remand. He
thereby recognized that there is basis for a remand.
116
Park posits that Choi waived his right to present evidence on the civil aspect
of the case (1) when the grant of the demurrer was reversed on appeal, citing Section
1 of Rule 33, and (2) when respondent orally opposed petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration pleading that proceedings with respect to the civil aspect of the case
continue.- Petitioner’s citation of Section 1 of Rule 33 is incorrect. Where a court has
jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the person of the accused, and the crime
was committed within its territorial jurisdiction, the court necessarily
exercises jurisdiction over all issues that the law requires it to resolve. One of the
issues in a criminal case being the civil liability of the accused arising from the crime,
the governing law is the Rules of Criminal Procedure, not the Rules of Civil
Procedure which pertains to a civil action arising from the initiatory pleading that
gives rise to the suit
117
G.R. No. 132081 November 26, 2002

JOEL M. SANVICENTE
vs.
FACTS:
Petitioner was charged with homicide for the killing of Dennis Wong. At his
arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty.
Petitioner begged leave to file a demurrer to evidence, which was granted by
the trial court. Subsequently, petitioner filed a Motion To Dismiss (On Demurrer to
Evidence), based on the following grounds: (1) the lack of positive identification of
the accused is a fatal omission warranting dismissal; (2) prosecution’s evidence are
totally hearsay/incompetent.
The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the case together with the
civil aspect for insufficiency of evidence. The prosecution filed a motion for
reconsideration, which was denied.
The prosecution filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals but to
no avail. Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the prosecution may appeal the trial court’s resolution
granting demurrer to evidence and acquitting him of all the charges against him
without violating the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy.
HELD:
Under Rule 119, Section 23 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as
amended, the trial court may dismiss the action on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence upon a demurrer to evidence filed by the accused with or without leave of
court. In resolving accused’s demurrer to evidence, the court is merely required to
ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment
or support a verdict of guilt.
The grant or denial of a demurrer to evidence is left to the sound discretion of
the trial court and its ruling on the matter shall not be disturbed in the absence of a
grave abuse of discretion. Significantly, once the court grants the demurrer, such
order amounts to an acquittal and any further prosecution of the accused would
violate the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy. This constitutes an
exception to the rule that the dismissal of a criminal case made with the express
consent of the accused or upon his own motion bars a plea of double jeopardy.
118
G.R. No. 72670 September 12, 1986

SATURNINA GALMAN, et. al.
vs.
SANDIGAYNBAYAN, et. al.
FACTS:
A number of members of the Philippine Military were charged for the
assassination of Former Senator Benigno "Ninoy" Aquino, Jr. The fact finding
committee created to determine what really occurred during that faithful day rejected
the military’s version that Aquino was killed by a lone gunman, Galman. The
investigation of the board revealed that only the soldiers in the staircase with Aquino
could have shot him.
Criminal charges were filed before the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan,
allegedy operating under the control of President Marcos acquitted all the accused of
the crime charged.
The private respondents is now questioning the charges against them arising
from the same offense that were already decided by the Sandiganbayan alleging that
the continuance of the proceedings would amount to a violation of their right against
double jeopardy.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a violation of the double jeopardy clause.
HELD:
None, Impartial court is the very essence of due process of law. This criminal
collusion as to the handling and treatment of the cases by public respondents at the
secret Malacañang conference (and revealed only after fifteen months by Justice
Manuel Herrera) completely disqualified respondent Sandiganbayan and voided ab
initio its verdict. The courts would have no reason to exist if they were allowed to be
used as mere tools of injustice, deception and duplicity to subvert and suppress the
truth. More so, in the case at bar where the people and the world are entitled to know
the truth, and the integrity of our judicial system is at stake.
There was no double jeopardy. Courts' Resolution of acquittal was a void
judgment for having been issued without jurisdiction. No double jeopardy attaches,
therefore. A void judgment is, in legal effect, no judgment at all. By it no rights are
divested. It neither binds nor bars anyone. All acts and all claims flowing out of it are
void.
119
G.R. No. 128587 March 16, 2007

vs.
HON. PERFECTO A.S. LAGUIO, JR., in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch 18,
RTC, Manila, and LAWRENCE WANG Y CHEN
FACTS:
Three separate informations filed against Lawrence C. Wang for Violation of
the Dangerous Drugs Act, Violation of the COMELEC Gun Ban, and Illegal
Possession of Firearms. During his arraignment, accused Wang refused to enter a plea
to all the Informations and instead interposed a continuing objection to the
admissibility of the evidence obtained by the police operatives. Thus, the trial court
ordered that a plea of "Not Guilty" be entered for him. Thereafter, joint trial of the
three consolidated cases followed.
On 6 December 1996, the prosecution rested its case and upon motion,
accused Wang was granted 25 days from said date within which to file his intended
Demurrer to Evidence. Then, the prosecution filed a Manifestation to the effect that it
had rested its case only in so far as the charge for Violation of the Dangerous Drugs
Act is concerned, and not as regards the other two cases.
Wang filed his undated Demurrer to Evidence, praying for his acquittal and
the dismissal of the three cases against him for lack of a valid arrest and search
warrants and the inadmissibility of the prosecution’s evidence against him. Herein
respondent judge granted Wang’s Demurrer to Evidence and acquitted him of all
charges for lack of evidence.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a demurrer to evidence is a resolution of the case on the
merits and will amount to an acquittal.
HELD:
An order granting an accused’s demurrer to evidence is a resolution of the
case on the merits, and it amounts to an acquittal. Generally, any further prosecution
of the accused after an acquittal would violate the constitutional proscription on
double jeopardy hence; the finality-of-acquittal rule is stressed. The exception to this
rule is when the prosecution was denied due process of law. Such was not present in
this case.
Petitioner also used the wrong remedy before the Supreme Court; hence this
petition is outrightly dismissible. The Court cannot reverse the assailed dismissal
order of the trial court by appeal without violating private respondent’s right against
double jeopardy.
G.R. No. 169641 September 10, 2009

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
RICHARD O. SARCIA
120
FACTS:
Sometime in 1996 at Barangay Doña Tomasa, Municipality of Guinobatan,
Province of Albay, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, with lewd and unchaste design, and by means of force,
threats and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
sexual intercourse with [AAA], who was then 6 years of age, against her will and
consent, to her damage and prejudice.
At his arraignment on October 25, 2000, accused-appellant, with the
assistance of his counsel, entered a plea of not guilty.8 Thereafter, trial on the merits
ensued. The prosecution presented the oral testimonies of the victim AAA; her minor
cousin; her father; and Dr. Joana Manatlao, the Municipal Health Officer of
Guinobatan, Albay. The defense presented the accused-appellant himself, who
vehemently denied committing the crimes imputed to him and Manuel Casimiro,
Clerk of Court II of the Municipal Trial Court at Guinobatan, Albay. On January 17,
2003, the trial court rendered its Decision finding the accused-appellant guilty of the
crime of rape and imposed the penalty penalty of DEATH, and to pay the victim,
[AAA], the amount of (1) P75,000.00 as civil indemnity; (2) P50,000.00 as moral
damages, and (3) P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the lower court gravely erred in not acquitting the accused
Richard Sarcia.
HELD:
Inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses, which refer only to minor
details and collateral matters, do not affect the veracity and weight of their
testimonies where there is consistency in relating the principal occurrence and the
positive identification of the accused. Slight contradictions in fact even serve to
strengthen the credibility of the witnesses and prove that their testimonies are not
rehearsed. Nor are such inconsistencies, and even improbabilities, unusual, for there
is no person with perfect faculties or senses. The date is not an essential element of
the crime of rape, for the gravamen of the offense is carnal knowledge of a woman.
As such, the time or place of commission in rape cases need not be accurately stated.
121
G.R. No. 186227 July 20, 2011

vs.
ALLEN UDTOJAN MANTALABA
FACTS:
Mantalaba a 17-year old drug pusher was arrested after a buy-bust operation.
He was found guilty of violation of RA9165. It must be noted that RA 9344 took
effect on May 20, 2006, while the RTC promulgated its decision on this case on
September 14, 2005, when said appellant was no longer a minor. The RTC did not
suspend the sentence in accordance with Article 192 of P.D. 603, The Child and
Youth Welfare Code and Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC, the Rule on Juveniles
in Conflict with the Law, the laws that were applicable at the time of the
promulgation of judgment, because the imposable penalty for violation of Section 5
of RA 9165 is life imprisonment to death. It may be argued that the appellant should
have been entitled to a suspension of his sentence under Sections 38 and 68 of RA
9344 which provide for its retroactive application. The CA also did not suspend the
sentence.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Mantalaba is entitled to suspended sentence.
HELD:
Mantalaba, who is now beyond the age of twenty-one (21) years can no
longer avail of the provisions of Sections 38 and 40 of RA 9344 as to his suspension
of sentence, because such is already moot and academic. It is highly noted that this
would not have happened if the CA, when this case was under its jurisdiction,
suspended the sentence of the appellant. The records show that the appellant filed his
notice of appeal at the age of 19 (2005), hence, when RA 9344 became effective in
2006, appellant was 20 years old, and the case having been elevated to the CA, the
latter should have suspended the sentence of the appellant because he was already
entitled to the provisions of Section 38 of the same law, which now allows the
suspension of sentence of minors regardless of the penalty imposed as opposed to the
provisions of Article 192 of P.D. 603
122
G.R. No. 185960 January 25, 2012

MARINO B. ICDANG
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (Second Division) and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
Marino B. Icdang, Regional Director of the Office for Southern Cultural
Communities (OSCC) Region XII in Cotabato City, was charged with the crime of
Malversation of Public Funds and for violating Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.
SB’s Second Division rendered its decision convicting petitioner of
malversation and acquitting him from violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.
Petitioner claims that his right to due process was violated when his counsel
failed to assist him during the promulgation of the judgment. He faults the
Sandiganbayan for proceeding with the promulgation despite the petitioner not then
being assisted by his counsel, and being a layman he is not familiar with court
processes and procedure.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the right of the accused to due process was violated when his
counsel failed to assist him during the promulgation of the judgment.
HELD:
No. The right of the accused to due process was not violated. There is
nothing in the rules that requires the presence of counsel for the promulgation of the
judgment of conviction to be valid. While notice must be served on both accused and
his counsel, the latter’s absence during the promulgation of judgment would not
affect the validity of the promulgation. Indeed, no substantial right of the accused on
the merits was prejudiced by such absence of his counsel when the sentence was
pronounced
Section 6, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended,
provides:
SEC. 6. Promulgation of judgment. -- The judgment is promulgated by
reading it in the presence of the accused and any judge of the court in which it was
rendered. However, if the conviction is for a light offense, the judgment may be
pronounced in the presence of his counsel or representative. When the judge is absent
or outside the province or city, the judgment may be promulgated by the clerk of
court.
123
G.R. No. L-24529 February 17, 1968

EDUARDO JIMENEZ
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and JUDGE PEDRO NAVARRO, Court of First
Instance of Rizal
FACTS:
Eduardo Jimenez, together with others, was charged with homicide in an
information before the Court of First Instance of Rizal. The case was heard and tried
before Judge Eulogio Mencias. The decision prepared and signed by Judge Mencias
was delivered to the clerk of court on January 16, 1965. On the same date the clerk of
court issued and served notice on the petitioner to appear in court on January 21,
1965 for the promulgation of the sentence. In view that January 21 was declared by
the President a special holiday, the promulgation of the decision could not be carried
out on that day. On January 21, 1965, Judge Eulogio Mencias had reached the age of
70 and was retired on that day from the bench. Respondent Judge Pedro Navarro was
immediately designated to take the place of Judge Mencias. The former judge ordered
that the sentence be promulgated on January 29, 1965, but for some reason, it was
postponed to March 1, 1965.
Jimenez filed a motion to set aside decision and promulgation thereof, on the
following grounds: (a) "That the case was heard and tried by the Hon. Eulogio
Mencias and judgment was rendered by him before he retired on January 21, 1965,
having reached the age of 70 years"; and (b) "That said judgment cannot be validly
promulgated since it is no longer the official act of a judge, either de jure or de facto."
ISSUE:
Whether or not judgment may validly be promulgated despite the fact that the
judge who rendered it is no longer the judge at the time of its promulgation.
HELD:
No. The decision of the judge may be promulgated even without his
presence, as long as he is still a judge of that court (Luna v. Rodriguez, 37, Phil. 186;
Garchitorena v. Criscini 37 Phil. 675; Barredo v. Commission on Elections, 45 O.G.
4457; People v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. L-9111-9113, Aug. 28, 1956; People v.
So, G.R. No. L-8732, July 30, 1957).
In the present case, what we have is not merely physical absence of the judge
who penned the decision, but the cessation of termination of his incumbency as such
judge. In the case of People v. Bonifacio So y Ortega, (G.R. No. L-8732) this Court
ruled:
It is well-settled that to be binding a judgment must be duly signed, and
promulgated during the incumbency of the judge who signed it.
In criminal proceedings the Rules are more explicit. They require the
judgment to be promulgated by reading the judgment or sentence in the presence of
the defendant and the judge of the court who has rendered it; and although it is true
that it may be read by the clerk "when the judge is absent or outside the province," it
is implied that it may be read, provided he is still the judge therein.
Here, in the present case, when the notice for the promulgation of the
decision was sent out, the judge who signed the decision was no longer the judge of
the court, and no copy of the judgment of acquittal was delivered to the appellants.
With more reasons, therefore, is there no judgment validly entered in this case.
124
125
A.M. No. MTJ-02-1417 May 27, 2004

PETER BEJARASCO, JR. and ISABELITA BEJARASCO
vs.
JUDGE ALFREDO D. BUENCONSEJO, Municipal Trial Court, Dalaguete, Cebu,
SECUNDINO PIEDAD, Clerk of Court, and LEONISA GONZALES, Court
Stenographer, Municipal Trial Court, Argao, Cebu
FACTS:
The complainants were charged with grave threats and grave oral defamation
before the MTC of Dalaguete, Cebu. According to the complainants, the respondent
judge inhibited himself from the said cases on the ground of delicadeza and that
Executive Judge Epifanio Llanos of the Regional Trial Court of Argao, Cebu, Branch
26, designated Judge Palmacio Calderon of the MTC of Argao, Cebu, to hear and try
the said cases. Judge Calderon conducted continuous and simultaneous trials, and the
cases were submitted for decision on June 29, 1999. Unfortunately, Judge Calderon
died on December 31, 1999 without having rendered judgment on the said cases.
The complainants were surprise to receive a notice from the MTC of Argao
Cebu, that their cases had been set for promulgation on May 15, 2000 by the
respondent judge, who was then designated as presiding judge of the said court.
The complainants’ counsel argued that the respondent judge could not
promulgate the decision since he had earlier inhibited himself from trying the said
cases, and that the judge who actually heard the case had already died. The
respondent judge, however, ignored these arguments and proceeded with the
promulgation of the Decision convicting the complainants.
The complainants filed a petition for certiorari and while it was pending,
investigated the signatures of the late Judge Calderon in his decisions with the PNP
Crime Laboratory. It was found out that the signatures were forged.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the judgment is valid considering the decision promulgated
was penned by another judge.
HELD:
A judgment, to be valid, must have been personally and directly prepared by
the judge, and duly signed by him. Corollary, a decision or resolution of the court
becomes such, for all legal intents and purposes, only from the moment of its
promulgation. Promulgation of judgment, in turn, signifies that on the date it was
made, the judge or judges who signed the decision continued to support it. If at the
time of the promulgation, a judge or member of a collegiate court has already vacated
his office, his vote is automatically withdrawn. In criminal cases, promulgation of
judgment is made by reading it in the presence of the accused and any judge of the
court in which it was rendered. Judgment may be promulgated by the clerk of court
only when the judge is absent or outside the province or city.
It is clear then, that a judge who takes over the sala of another judge who died
during office cannot validly promulgate a decision penned by the latter. In fact,
decisions promulgated after the judge who penned the same had been appointed to
and qualified in another office are null and void. To be binding, a judgment must be
duly signed and promulgated during the incumbency of the judge whose signature
appears thereon. In single courts like the regional trial courts and the municipal trial
courts, a decision may no longer be promulgated after the ponente has vacated his
office.
Granting arguendo that the decision in the criminal cases was indeed signed
126
by the late Judge Calderon, respondent Judge Buenconsejo had no authority to

promulgate the decision. Judge Calderon ceased to be the judge of that court, thus, the
judgment which he signed cannot be promulgated by another judge. Any judgment or
decision is valid and binding only if both [were] penned and promulgated by the
judge during his incumbency.
Considering that the full records of the case were available for perusal,
another judge could pen the decision even if he did not hear the case in its entirety.
However, since Judge Buenconsejo previously inhibited himself from hearing the
criminal cases, he should have referred the matter to his Executive Judge and
assigned another judge to render judgment thereon.
127
G.R. No. 182748 December 13, 2011

ARNEL COLINARES
vs.
FACTS:
RTC rendered judgment finding Arnel guilty of frustrated homicide but since
the maximum probationable imprisonment under the law was only up to six years,
Arnel did not qualify for probation.
Arnel appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), seeking conviction for the
lesser crime of attempted homicide with the consequent reduction of the penalty
imposed on him. The CA entirely affirmed the RTC decision but deleted the award
for lost income in the absence of evidence to support it.
Assuming Arnel committed only the lesser crime of attempted homicide with
its imposable penalty of imprisonment of four months of arresto mayor, as minimum,
to two years and four months of prision correccional, as maximum, he could still
apply for probation upon remand of the case to the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not he may still apply for probation having appealed from the
judgment of the RTC convicting him for frustrated homicide.

HELD:
Ordinarily, Arnel would no longer be entitled to apply for probation, he
having appealed from the judgment of the RTC convicting him for frustrated
homicide.
Probation is a mere privilege granted by the state only to qualified convicted
offenders. Section 4 of the probation law (PD 968) provides: “That no application for
probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal
from the judgment of conviction.” Since Arnel appealed his conviction for frustrated
homicide, he should be deemed permanently disqualified from applying for
probation.
It is true that under the probation law the accused who appeals “from the
judgment of conviction” is disqualified from availing himself of the benefits of
probation. But, as it happens, two judgments of conviction have been meted out to
Arnel: one, a conviction for frustrated homicide by the regional trial court, now set
aside; and, two, a conviction for attempted homicide by the Supreme Court.
At any rate, what is clear is that, had the RTC done what was right and
imposed on Arnel the correct penalty of two years and four months maximum, he
would have had the right to apply for probation. No one could say with certainty that
he would have availed himself of the right had the RTC done right by him. The idea
may not even have crossed his mind precisely since the penalty he got was not
probationable.
G.R. No. L-38581 March 31, 1976

LORENZO JOSE
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
128
Lorenzo Jose was convicted of illegal possession of explosives and seeks a

new trial which was denied to him by the CFI of Pampanga and respondent CA.
Petitioner filed a motion praying that the case be reopened to permit him to
present, pursuant to a reservation he had made in the course of the trial, a permit to
possess the handgrenade in question. Trial Court denied the motion. When elevated to
the CA, the Appellate Court also denied the same.
Petitioner cites certain peculiar circumstances obtaining in the case before the
Supreme Court which may be classified as exceptional enough to warrant a new trial
if only to afford him an opportunity to establish his innocence of the crime charged.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a new trial may grant on the ground of newly discovered
evidence.
HELD:
It is indeed an established rule that for a new trial to be granted on the ground
of newly discovered evidence, it must be shown that (a) the evidence was discovered
after trial; (b) such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial
even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (c) the evidence is material, not
merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching; and (d) it must go to the merits as
ought to produce a different result if admitted.
The Court held that the circumstances presented by petitioner justify a
reopening of petitioner's case to afford him the opportunity of producing exculpating
exculpating evidence. An outright acquittal from this Court which petitioner seeks as
an alternative relief is not As correctly stressed by the Solicitor General, the People is
to be given the chance of examining the documentary sought to be produced, and of
cross-examining the persons who executed the same, as well as the accused himself,
now petitioner, on his explanation for the non-production of the of the evidence
during the trial.
129
G.R. Nos. 96027-28 March 08, 2005

BRIG. GEN. LUTHER A. CUSTODIO HYPERLINK, CAPT. ROMEO M. BAUTISTA,
2nd LT. JESUS D. CASTRO, SGT. CLARO L. LAT, SGT. ARNULFO B. DE MESA,
C1C ROGELIO B. MORENO, C1C MARIO E. LAZAGA, SGT. FILOMENO D.
MIRANDA, SGT. ROLANDO C. DE GUZMAN, SGT. ERNESTO M. MATEO, SGT.
RODOLFO M. DESOLONG, A1C CORDOVA G. ESTELO, MSGT. PABLO S.
MARTINEZ, SGT. RUBEN AQUINO, SGT. ARNULFO ARTATES, A1C
FELIZARDO TARAN
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
Petitioners were members of the military who acted as Senator Aquino’s
security detail upon his arrival in Manila from his three-year sojourn in the United
States. They were charged, together with several other members of the military,
before the Sandiganbayan for the killing of Senator Aquino who was fatally shot as
he was coming down from the aircraft of China Airlines at the Manila International
Airport. Petitioners were also indicted for the killing of Rolando Galman who was
also gunned down at the airport tarmac.
The Sandiganbayan acquitted all the accused which includes the petitioners
in its decision on December 2, 1985, however the proceedings before the
Sandiganbayan were later found by the Supreme Court to be a sham trial thus
nullified said proceedings, as well as the judgment of acquittal, and ordered a re-trial
of the cases.
A re-trial ensued before the Sandiganbayan. In its decision dated September
28, 1990, the Sandiganbayan, while acquitting the other accused, found the
petitioners guilty as principals of the crime of murder of Senator Aquino and Rolando
Galman. The judgment became final after the Supreme Court denied petitioners’
petition for review of the Sandiganbayan decision for failure to show reversible error
in the questioned decision, as well as their subsequent motion for reconsideration.
The petitioners ask the Supreme Court to allow the re-opening of the cases
and the holding of a third trial to determine the circumstances surrounding the death
of Senator Benigno Aquino, Jr. and Rolando Galman invoking the existence of newly
discovered pieces of evidence that were not available during the second trial which
could have altered the judgment of the Sandiganbayan.
ISSUE:
Whether or not new-trial be granted because of newly discovered evidence.
HELD:
Before a new trial may be granted on the ground of newly discovered
evidence, it must be shown (1) that the evidence was discovered after trial; (2) that
such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the
exercise of reasonable diligence; (3) that it is material, not merely cumulative,
corroborative, or impeaching; and (4) the evidence is of such weight that it would
probably change the judgment if admitted. If the alleged newly discovered evidence
could have been very well presented during the trial with the exercise of reasonable
diligence, the same cannot be considered newly discovered.
The threshold question in resolving a motion for new trial based on newly
discovered evidence is whether the proferred evidence is in fact a “newly discovered
evidence which could not have been discovered by due diligence.” The question of
whether evidence is newly discovered has two aspects: a temporal one, i.e., when
was the evidence discovered, and a predictive one, i.e., when should or could it have
130
been discovered. It is to the latter that the requirement of due diligence has
relevance. We have held that in order that a particular piece of evidence may be
properly regarded as newly discovered to justify new trial, what is essential is not so
much the time when the evidence offered first sprang into existence nor the time
when it first came to the knowledge of the party now submitting it; what is essential
is that the offering party had exercised reasonable diligence in seeking to locate such
evidence before or during trial but had nonetheless failed to secure it.
The Rules do not give an exact definition of due diligence, and whether the
movant has exercised due diligence depends upon the particular circumstances of
each case. Nonetheless; it has been observed that the phrase is often equated with
“reasonable promptness to avoid prejudice to the defendant.” In other words, the
concept of due diligence has both a time component and a good faith component.
The movant for a new trial must not only act in a timely fashion in gathering evidence
in support of the motion; he must act reasonably and in good faith as well. Due
diligence contemplates that the defendant acts reasonably and in good faith to obtain
the evidence, in light of the totality of the circumstances and the facts known to him.
Applying the foregoing tests, we find that petitioners’ purported evidence
does not qualify as newly discovered evidence that would justify the re-opening of
the case and the holding of a third trial.
The report of the forensic group may not be considered as newly discovered
evidence as petitioners failed to show that it was impossible for them to secure an
independent forensic study of the physical evidence during the trial of the double
murder case. It appears from their report that the forensic group used the same
physical and testimonial evidence proffered during the trial, but made their own
analysis and interpretation of said evidence.
The report of the forensic group essentially reiterates the theory presented by
the defense during the trial of the double murder case. Clearly, the report is not
newly discovered, but rather recently sought, which is not allowed by the Rules. If at
all, it only serves to discredit the version of the prosecution which had already been
weighed and assessed, and thereafter upheld by the Sandiganbayan.
131
G.R. No. 128986 June 21, 1999

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and CASAN MAQUILING
FACTS:
Iligan City Fiscal Ulysses V. Lagcao charged Respondent Casan Maquiling
with homicide and frustrated homicide. Acting on the petition of the private
complainants, the Department of Justice subsequently directed the upgrading of the
charge of homicide to murder. To both charges, Respondent Maquiling, assisted by
Counsel de Parte Moises Dalisay Jr., entered a plea of not guilty upon his arraignment
on June 5, 1989.
The trial court convicted private respondent of homicide and serious physical
injuries.
In reversing the trial court, the Court of Appeals accepted the claim of self-
defense. The appellate court also noted various “flaws and inconsistencies” in the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, in effect strengthening the version set forth
by the accused. It held, to the mind of the court, the discrepancies as to the manner
the accused killed the deceased are material. Irreconcilable and unexplained
contradictions in the testimonies of prosecution cast doubt on the guilt of the accused
and such contradictory statements will not sustain a judgment of conviction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appeal made by the Solicitor General placed the accused
in double jeopardy and whether or not it is valid if it does.
HELD:
Although the rule states that any party may appeal from a final judgment or
order, the right of the people to appeal is expressly made subject to the proviso that
such an appeal should not place the accused in double jeopardy. Consistently with
this principle, it has been held that the constitutional mandate that no person shall be
twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense prohibits not only a
subsequent prosecution in a new and independent cause but also extends to an appeal
in the same case by the prosecution after jeopardy had attached, thereby in effect
viewing such appeal as presenting a new and separate jeopardy repugnant to the
fundamental law’s provision against double jeopardy.
Ordinarily, the judicial recourse of an aggrieved party is to appeal the trial
court's judgment to the Court of Appeals and thereafter, to the Supreme Court in a
petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. In such cases, this tribunal is
limited to the determination of whether the lower court committed reversible errors
or, in other words, mistakes of judgment. A direct review by the Supreme Court is the
normal recourse of the accused, where the penalty imposed by the trial court is death,
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.
132
G.R. No. 103275 June 15, 1994

vs.
HONORABLE RODOLFO M. BELLAFLOR, Assisting Judge, Branch 28, Regional
Trial Court, Mandaue City, and REUBEN ALBAÑO
FACTS:
Ruben Albano was charged with the crime of arson. Upon arraignment,
private respondent pleaded "not guilty". Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued and the
parties rested their case before Judge Fortun.
Judge Fortun promulgated his decision convicting Albano of the crime of
arson. Albano moved for the reconsideration of the said decision and was granted and
thus acquitted of the crime charged. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but
the same was denied. Private respondent argues that the resolution acquitting him of
the offense charged has become final and executory and a reconsideration thereof
would place him under double jeopardy.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appeal by the petitioner will place the accused in double
jeopardy and thus invalidates the appeal.
HELD:
Generally, protection against double jeopardy is not available where the
dismissal of the case was effected at the instance of the accused. And there are only
two instances where double jeopardy will attach notwithstanding the fact the case was
dismissed with the express consent of the accused. The first is where the ground for
the dismissal is insufficiency of the evidence for the prosecution and the second is
where the criminal proceedings have been unreasonably prolonged in violation of the
accused's right to speedy trial (People v. Quizada, 160 SCRA 516 [1988]). None
exists in the case at bar.
Admittedly, private respondent had moved for the dismissal of the criminal
case filed against him and therefore, the protective mantle of double jeopardy does
not cover him.
Secondly, private respondent cannot successfully seek refuge in the assailed
resolution of respondent judge. For one thing, it was an empty judgment of acquittal
— a bare adjudication that private respondent is not guilty of the offense charged
anchored on the mere supposition that the decision rendered by Judge Fortun was a
nullity. Indeed, respondent judge acquitted private respondent without expressing the
facts and the law on which it is based, as required by Section 14, Article VIII of the
Constitution.
133
G.R. No. 43659 December 21, 1990

vs.
HON. FELICIDAD CARANDANG VILLALON and FEDERICO DE GUZMAN
FACTS:
The case at bar is a special civil action for Certiorari assailing the order
rendered by Judge Villalon, denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the
aforesaid order of dismissal.
Based on the Court' s records, about the antecedent facts which resulted to the
order issued by the respondent judge, complainant Mariano Carrera and his brother,
Severo Carrera, are co-owners of a parcel of land located at Barrio Buenlag,
Binmaley, Pangasinan.
Complainants, allegedly executed a special power of attorney before Notary
Public Jaime B. Arzadon, Jr., naming private respondent Federico de Guzman as his
lawful attorney-in-fact. private respondent mortgaged the parcel of land with the
People's Bank and Trust Company in Dagupan City using the said special power of
attorney, and was able to obtain the amount of P8,500.00 as a loan from the
mortgagee bank. Both the special power of attorney and the mortgage contract were
duly registered in the Registry of Deeds of Pangasinan.
On March 29, 1974, Criminal Case No. D-868 for estafa thru falsification of
a public document was filed against private respondent. A motion to dismiss was
filed and later on granted by the respondent judge.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appeal by the prosecution is barred by reason of double
jeopardy.
HELD:
The bar of double jeopardy is not involved in the present recourse. As
enunciated in People vs. City Court of Manila, etc., et al.:"As a general rule, the
dismissal or termination of the case after arraignment and plea of the defendant to a
valid information shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for
any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which
necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the complaint or information
(Section 9, Rule 113).
However, an appeal by the prosecution from the order of dismissal (of the
criminal case) by the trial court shall not constitute double jeopardy if (1) the
dismissal is made upon motion, or with the express consent, of the defendant, and (2)
the dismissal is not an acquittal or based upon consideration of the evidence or of the
merits of the case; and (3) the question to be passed upon by the appellate court is
purely legal so that should the dismissal be found incorrect, the case would have to be
remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings, to determine the guilt or
innocence of the defendant."
G.R. No. 170979 February 9, 2011

JUDITH YU
vs.
HON. ROSA SAMSON-TATAD, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City,
Branch 105, and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
134
FACTS:
The petitioner, Judith Yu, was charged and convicted with the crime of estafa
by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Fourteen days after her conviction, the
petitioner filed a motion for new trial before the Regional Trial Court, alleging that
she has discovered new and material evidence that will exculpate her from the crime
of estafa. The Regional Trial Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
Thereafter, using the ruling on Neypes vs Court of Appeals, petitioner filed a
notice of appeal with the Regional Trial Court alleging that she had a fresh period of
15 days to perfect her appeal upon receipt of the Regional Trial Court’s denial of her
motion for new trial.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the fresh period rule is applicable in the case at bar.
HELD:
The raison d’être for the "fresh period rule" is to standardize the appeal
period provided in the Rules and do away with the confusion as to when the 15-day
appeal period should be counted. Thus, the 15-day period to appeal is no longer
interrupted by the filing of a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration;
litigants today need not concern themselves with counting the balance of the 15-day
period to appeal since the 15-day period is now counted from receipt of the order
dismissing a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration or any final order or
resolution.
While Neypes involved the period to appeal in civil cases, the Court’s
pronouncement of a "fresh period" to appeal should equally apply to the period for
appeal in criminal cases under Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure.
135
G.R. No. 141524 September 14, 2005

DOMINGO NEYPES, LUZ FAUSTINO, ROGELIO FAUSTINO, LOLITO
VICTORIANO, JACOB OBANIA AND DOMINGO CABACUNGAN
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRSOF BERNARDO DEL MUNDO, namely: FE,
CORAZON, JOSEFA, SALVADOR and CARMEN, all surnamed DEL MUNDO, LAND
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES AND HON. ANTONIO N. ROSALES, Presiding Judge, Branch
43, Regional Trial Court, Roxas, Oriental Mindoro
FACTS:
Neypes et. al. filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles of land
and/or reconveyance and/or reversion with preliminary injunction before the Regional
Trial Court, Oriental Mindoro, against respondents.
In the course of the proceedings the parties filed various motions with the
trial court. The court dismissed the petitioners’ complaint on February 12, 1998 and
petitioners allegedly received a copy thereof on March 3, 1998 and on the 15th day
thereafter, March 18, 1998, filed a motion for reconsideration. On July 1, 1998, the
trial court dismissed the motion for reconsideration and was received by the
petitioners on July 22, 1998. Five days later, on July 27, 1998, petitioners filed a
notice of appeal.
On August 4, 1998, the court a quo denied the notice of appeal, holding that
it was filed eight days late. This was received by petitioners on July 31, 1998.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but this too was denied in an order dated
September 3, 1998.
Petitioners argued that the 15-day period to appeal started to run only on July
22, 1998 since this was the day they received the final order of the trial court denying
their motion for reconsideration. When they filed their notice of appeal on July 27,
1998, only five days had elapsed and they were well within the reglementary period
for appeal. On September 16, 1999, the CA dismissed the petition. It ruled that the
15-day period to appeal should have been reckoned from March 3, 1998 or the day
they received the February 12, 1998 order dismissing their complaint.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners filed their notice of appeal on time.
HELD:
The petitioners filed their notice on time. The appeal is within the 15 day
period from notice of final judgment or final order appealed from within which the
appeal should be filed.
Under Rule 41, Section 3, petitioners had 15 days from notice of judgment or
final order to appeal the decision of the trial court. On the 15 th day of the original
appeal period (March 18, 1998), petitioners did not file a notice of appeal but instead
opted to file a motion for reconsideration. According to the trial court, the MR only
interrupted the running of the 15-day appeal period. It ruled that petitioners, having
filed their MR on the last day of the 15-day reglementary period to appeal, had only
one (1) day left to file the notice of appeal upon receipt of the notice of denial of their
MR. Petitioners, however, argue that they were entitled under the Rules to a fresh
period of 15 days from receipt of the “final order” or the order dismissing their
motion for reconsideration.
136
To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants
fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh
period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial
Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion
for reconsideration.
The Court thus holds that petitioners seasonably filed their notice of appeal
within the fresh period of 15 days, counted from July 22, 1998 (the date of receipt of
notice denying their motion for reconsideration).
137
G.R. No. 141986 July 11, 2002

NEPLUM, INC.
vs.
EVELYN V. ORBESO
FACTS:
The trial court promulgated its judgment acquitting Neplum of the crime of
estafa on October 29, 1999.
On 12 November 1999, the petitioner, through the private prosecutor, received
its copy of the Judgment. On 29 November 1999, petitioner filed a motion for
Reconsideration (Civil Aspect) of the Judgment, considering that 27 November 1999
was a Saturday, petitioner filed its Motion for Reconsideration on 29 November 1999.
On 28 January 2000, a Friday, petitioner received its copy of the 24 January
2000 Order of the Trial Court denying for lack of merit petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration. On 31 January 2000, a Monday, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal
from the Judgment. On the same day, petitioner filed by registered mail its 28 January
2000 Amended Notice of Appeal.
On 17 February 2000, the Trial Court issued its Challenged Order, which
petitioner received through the private prosecutor on 22 February 2000, denying due
course to petitioner’s Notice of Appeal and Amended Notice of Appeal. It accepted
respondent’s arguments that the Judgment from which the appeal was being taken had
become final, because the Notice of Appeal and the Amended Notice of Appeal were
filed beyond the reglementary period. The 15-day period was counted by the trial court
from the promulgation of the Decision sought to be reviewed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the 15-day period to be counted from the promulgation of the
decision to the accused or from the time a copy thereof is served on the offended
party.
HELD:
It is from the time the offended party had actual or constructive knowledge of
the judgment, whether it be during its promulgation or as a consequence of the
service of the notice of the decision.
Section 6, Rule 122 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, which
provides:
“SEC. 6. When appeal to be taken. – An appeal must be taken within fifteen (15) days
from promulgation or notice of the judgment or order appealed from. This period for
perfecting an appeal shall be interrupted from the time a motion for new trial or
reconsideration is filed until notice of the order overruling the motion shall have been
served upon the accused or his counsel.”
The italicized portion of the provision uses the conjunctive “or” in providing
for the reckoning period within which an appeal must be taken. It shall be counted
from the promulgation or the notice of the judgment or order.
It is petitioner’s assertion that “the parties would always need a written
reference or a copy of the judgment x x x to intelligently examine and consider the
judgment from which an appeal will be taken.” Thus, it concludes that the 15-day
period for filing a notice of appeal must be counted from the time the losing party
actually receives a copy of the decision or order. Petitioner ratiocinates that it “could
not be expected to capture or memorize all the material details of the judgment during
the promulgation thereof.” It likewise poses the question: “why require all
proceedings in court to be recorded in writing if the parties thereto would not be
allowed the benefit of utilizing these written [documents]?”
138
We clarify. Had it been the accused who appealed, we could have easily
ruled that the reckoning period for filing an appeal be counted from the promulgation
of the judgment. In People v. Tamani, the Court was confronted with the question of
when to count the period within which the accused must appeal the criminal
conviction. Answered the Court:
“The assumption that the fifteen-day period should be counted from February
25, 1963, when a copy of the decision was allegedly served on appellant’s counsel by
registered mail is not well-taken. The word ‘promulgation’ in section 6 should be
construed as referring to ‘judgment’, while the word ‘notice’ should be construed as
referring to ‘order’.”
The interpretation in that case was very clear. The period for appeal was to
be counted from the date of promulgation of the decision. Text writers are in
agreement with this interpretation.
In an earlier case, this Court explained the same interpretation in this wise:
“It may, therefore, be stated that one who desires to appeal in a criminal case
must file a notice to that effect within fifteen days from the date the decision is
announced or promulgated to the defendant. And this can be done by the court either
by announcing the judgment in open court as was done in this case, or by
promulgating the judgment in the manner set forth in [S]ection 6, Rule 116 of the
Rules of Court.”
Clear as those interpretations may have been, they cannot be applied to the
case at bar, because in those instances it was the accused who appealed, while here
we are confronted with the offended party’s appeal of the civil aspect only. Thus, the
question arises whether the accused-appellant’s period for appeal, as construed in the
cited cases, is the same as that for the private offended party. The Court answer in
the negative.
139
G.R. No. 125306 December 11, 2000

vs.
CAFGU FRANCISCO BALTAR, JR., CAFGU PRIMO VILLANUEVA alias “ESPOK”
and ROLLY BALTAR, CAFGU PRIMO VILLANUEVA alias “ESPOK”,
FACTS:
The trial court determined that the three accused, Baltar, Villanueva and
Baltar, acted in conspiracy in the killing of Mariano Celino, Jr.
From said decision, only Primo Villanueva has appealed. He prays for the
reversal of said judgment,
In this appeal, Primo Villanueva contends that the trial court erred in finding
that he conspired with Rolly Baltar and Francisco Baltar, Jr. when the latter shot and
killed Mariano Celino, Jr.
ISSUE:
Whether or not accused who did not appeal may be benefited by the
judgment of the appellate court.
HELD:
The accused who did not appeal may be benefited by the judgment of the
appellate court insofar as it is favorable and applicable to him.
In view of this conclusion that the crime committed and proved is homicide
only and not murder, the SC discuss its consequences with respect to the criminal
liability of the two other accused, namely Francisco Baltar, Jr. and Rolly Baltar, who
did not interpose an appeal. Previously, the sentence imposed upon the accused who
did not appeal became final, while that of his co-accused who appealed was stayed.
For it had been held that decisions of the appellate court did not in any way affect the
sentence imposed upon the accused who did not appeal, even if the appellants were
subsequently acquitted or their sentences increased or reduced. Not having appealed,
it was previously held that the appellate court did not have jurisdiction over his case.
140
G.R. No. 147524 June 20, 2006

SEGUNDO S. LIM
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. SIMEON P. DUMDUM, JR., Presiding Judge, Regional
Trial Court, Branch 7, Cebu City, THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and CIRSE
"CHOY" TORRALBA
FACTS:
Petitioner Lim and co-accused Boy "BG" Guingguing were convicted of libel
in the RTC. A petition for review was filed by Lim but was denied.
Meanwhile, Guingguing also filed a petition for review. The Court
promulgated a judgment of acquittal in favor of Guingguing.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner should benefit from Guingguing’s acquittal.
HELD:
Court applied to the accused, who appealed from their judgment of
conviction whose conviction became final and executor, the favorable judgment in
favor of their co-accused. The Court notes that the Decision dated September 30,
2005 in G.R. No. 128959 stated, "the verdict of guilt with respect to Lim [herein
petitioner] had already become final and executory." In any event, the Court cannot
see why a different treatment should be given to petitioner, given that the judgment is
favorable to him and considering further that the Court’s finding in its Decision dated
September 30, 2005 specifically stated that "the publication of the subject
advertisement by petitioner and Lim cannot be deemed by this Court to have been
done with actual malice."
The nature of appeal throws open all contents of the case. Insofar as it has
become favorable to those who did not appeal, it shall affect them. But if the
judgment obtained in the appeal is not favorable to those who did not appeal, it shall
not affect them.
141
G.R. Nos. 131799-801 February 23, 2004

vs.
FELICIANO ULIT y TAMPOY
FACTS:
Feliciano Ulit had sexual intercourse with his 10-year old niece in numerous
occasions. During arraignment, he pleaded not guilty so the presentation of evidence
started. After the prosecution rested its case, Ulit changed his plea of not guilty to
guilty and manifested that he would no longer adduce any evidence in his
defense because the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt for
the crimes charged. The RTC found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two
counts of qualified rape and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of death for each
count of rape. Ulit did not appeal from the decision so in view of the trial court’s
imposition of the death penalty, the said cases were brought to this Court on
automatic appeal. Ulit’s sole contention is that the trial court erred in sentencing him
with a death penalty despite his admission of guilt.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an automatic appeal to the SC is limited to the assigned errors
that the accused presented.
HELD:
No. The appeal in a criminal case is a review de novo and the court is not
limited to the assigned errors. An appeal thus opens the whole case for review, and
the appellate tribunal may consider and correct errors though unassigned and even
reverse the decision of the trial court on the grounds other than those the parties
raised as errors.
Given this, even if Ulit only assigned one error, the Court ruled on other
issues regarding the case, such as: the validity of the change of his plea from not
guilty to guilty; the strength of the evidence of the prosecution regarding the alleged
rapes; the sufficiency of evidence adduced by the prosecution; and the guilt of Ulit in
the two crimes of rape.
142
G.R. No. 147703 April 14, 2004

PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC.
vs.
FACTS:
Napoleon Roman y Macadangdang was found guilty and convicted of the

crime of reckless imprudence resulting to triple homicide, multiple physical injuries
and damage to property. Evidently, the judgment against accused had become final
and executory. Accused has jumped bail and remained at large. It is worth to mention
that Section 8, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court authorizes the dismissal of appeal
when appellant jumps bail. Counsel for accused, also admittedly hired and provided
by petitioner filed a notice of appeal which was denied by the trial court and affirmed
by the CA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an employer, who dutifully participated in the defense of its

accused-employee, may appeal the judgment of conviction independently of the
accused.
HELD:
When the accused-employee absconds or jumps bail, the judgment meted out
becomes final and executory. The employer cannot defeat the finality of the
judgment by filing a notice of appeal on its own behalf in the guise of asking for a
review of its subsidiary civil liability. Both the primary civil liability of the accused-
employee and the subsidiary civil liability of the employer are carried in one single
decision that has become final and executory.
Section 1 of Rule 122 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure states thus:
"Any party may appeal from a judgment or final order, unless the accused will be
placed in double jeopardy."
Clearly, both the accused and the prosecution may appeal a criminal case, but
the government may do so only if the accused would not thereby be placed in double
jeopardy. Furthermore, the prosecution cannot appeal on the ground that the accused
should have been given a more severe penalty. On the other hand, the offended
parties may also appeal the judgment with respect to their right to civil liability. If the
accused has the right to appeal the judgment of conviction, the offended parties
should have the same right to appeal as much of the judgment as is prejudicial to
them. As to when a judgment of conviction attains finality is explained in Section 7
of Rule 120 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which we quote:
"A judgment of conviction may, upon motion of the accused, be modified or set aside
before it becomes final or before appeal is perfected. Except where the death penalty
is imposed, a judgment becomes final after the lapse of the period for perfecting an
appeal, or when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or when
the accused has waived in writing his right to appeal, or has applied for probation."
143
In the case before us, the accused-employee has escaped and refused to
surrender to the proper authorities; thus, he is deemed to have abandoned his appeal.
Consequently, the judgment against him has become final and executory.
144
G.R. No. 159116 September 30, 2009

SPS. NESTOR and FELICIDAD DADIZON
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, and SPS. DOMINADOR and ELSA MOCORRO
FACTS:
The Mocorros spouses filed a case in the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
Naval, Biliran against the Dadizons to recover a parcel of land with an area of 78
square meters and to cancel the latter's tax declaration.
Because of a judgment unfavorable to them, the Dadizons filed a notice of
appeal. The Mocorros moved to dismiss the Dadizons' appeal on the ground that the
mode of appeal they had adopted was erroneous. Agreeing with the Mocorros, the CA
dismissed the Dadizons' appeal through its resolution dated February 26, 2003.11 The
CA denied the Dadizons' motion for reconsideration on June 30, 2003.
Hence, the Dadizons have come to the Supreme Court to assail the dismissal
of their appeal and the denial of their motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether the mode appeal of the Dadizon’s was erroneous.
HELD:
The mode of appeal from the decision of the RTC via a notice of appeal
adopted by the Dadizons was undoubtedly wrong. They should have filed a Petition
for Review in accordance with Rule 42, Rules of Court, which was the correct mode
of appeal, considering that the RTC had rendered the decision in question in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.
145
G.R. No. 169519 July 17, 2009

IRENORIO B. BALABA
vs.
FACTS:
Irenorio Balaba was the assistant Municipal Treasurer of Guidulman, Bohol.
The Office of the Special Prosecutor charged Balaba with Malversation of Funds. On
9 December 2002, the trial court found Balaba guilty.
On 14 January 2003, Balaba filed his Notice of Appeal, where he indicated
that he would file his appeal before the Court of Appeals.
In its 15 December 2004 Decision, the Court of Appeals dismissed Balaba’s
appeal. The Court of Appeals declared that it had no jurisdiction to act on the appeal
because the Sandiganbayan has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over the case.
On 27 January 2005, Balaba filed a Motion for Reconsideration and asked
that he be allowed to pursue his appeal before the proper court, the Sandiganbayan.
Balaba claims that it was due to inadvertence that the notice of appeal was filed
before the Court of Appeals instead of the Sandiganbayan. Balaba adds that his
appeal was dismissed on purely technical grounds. Balaba asks the Court to relax the
rules to afford him an opportunity to correct the error and fully ventilate his appeal on
the merits. The Court of Appeals denied Balaba’s motion.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the appeal instead of
certifying the case to the proper court.
HELD:
Upon Balaba’s conviction by the trial court, his remedy should have been an
appeal to the Sandiganbayan. RA 8249 states that the Sandiganbayan shall
exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or orders of
the regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of
their appellate jurisdiction as herein provided.
In Melencion v. Sandiganbayan “An appeal erroneously taken to the Court of
Appeals shall not be transferred to the appropriate court but shall be dismissed
outright.”
In this case, Balaba sought the correction of the error in filing the appeal only
after the expiration of the period to appeal. The trial court promulgated its Decision
on 9 December 2002. Balaba filed his notice of appeal on 14 January 2003. The
Court of Appeals issued the Decision declaring its lack of jurisdiction on 15
December 2004. Balaba tried to correct the error only on 27 January 2005, clearly
beyond the 15-day period to appeal from the decision of the trial court. Therefore,
the Court of Appeals did not commit any error when it dismissed Balaba’s appeal
because of lack of jurisdiction.
G.R. No. 173990 October 27, 2009

EDGARDO V. ESTARIJA
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the SOLICITOR GENERAL, and
EDWARD RANADA
FACTS:
An Information was filed before the RTC of Davao City against Estarija, then
146
Harbor Master of the Philippine Ports Authority, for violating Section 3, paragraph b
of Republic Act No. 3019 and the RTC rendered a decision convicting Estarija of the
crime charged and imposing upon him a straight penalty of seven years. Estarija filed
his notice of appeal before the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the findings of RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the notice of appeal is correctly appealed before the Court of
Appeals.
HELD:
Paragraph 3, Section 4(c) of Republic Act No. 8249 reads: In cases where
none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary Grade ‘27’ or
higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military and PNP officers
mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper
regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal
circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as
provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise
exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or orders of regional
trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of their
appellate jurisdiction as herein provided. It is manifest from the above provision that
the decisions of the Regional Trial Court -- convicting an accused who occupies a
position lower than that with salary grade 27 or those not otherwise covered by the
enumeration of certain public officers in Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1606 as
amended by Republic Act No. 8249 are to be appealed exclusively to the
Sandiganbayan. Time and again, it has been held that the right to appeal is not a
natural right or a part of due process, but merely a statutory privilege and may be
exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law. The
party who seeks to avail himself of the same must comply with the requirements of
the rules, failing in which the right to appeal is lost. In the instant case, instead of
appealing his conviction to the Sandiganbayan, Estarija erroneously filed an appeal
with the Court of Appeals, in utter disregard of paragraph 3, Section 4(c) of Republic
Act No. 8249. This fatal flaw committed by Estarija did not toll the running of the
period for him to perfect his appeal to the Sandiganbayan. Because of Estarija’s
failure to perfect his appeal to the Sandiganbayan within the period granted therefor,
the Decision of the RTC convicting him of violating Section 3(a) of Republic Act No.
3019 has thus become final and executory.
G.R. No. 188630 February 23, 2011
FILOMENA L. VILLANUEVA
vs.
PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES
FACTS:
Petra Martinez filed a civil action for collection of sum of money before the
Regional Trial Court against Armando Villanueva, the husband of the Assistant
Regional Director of the Cooperative Development Authority (CDA) Filomena
Villanueva. The trial court declared Armnado in default and ordered him to pay the
amount of P 1, 107, 210.90 plus fine and interest. Armando filed a petition for
prohibition before the Court of Appeals alleging that he should not be made to pay
said loan as the same had long been fully paid as shown by an official receipt
evidencing his payment. The CA nullified the RTC decision on the ground that the
obligation has been settled.
147
Martinez filed an administrative case with the Office of the Ombudsman

charging petitioner Filomena Villanueva with violation of Sec. 7 (d) in relation to
Sec. 11 of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees (R.A No. 6713). The Ombudsman rendered a decision finding petitioner
guilty of Grave Misconduct and imposed the penalty of dismissal with forfeiture of
benefits and disqualification for re-employment in the government service. The
Ombudsman also denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
The petitioner then filed a petition for review before the Court of Appeals.
The Court found merits in the petition and reversed and set aside the assailed decision
of the Ombudsman. Martinez filed a motion for reconsideration while the
Ombudsman filed an Omnibus Motion to Intervene and for Reconsideration to which
the Court of appeals denied both motions.
Aside from those cases, a criminal case was filed against the petitioner for
violation of Sec. 2 (d) of R.A No. 6713 before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Claveria Cagayan (MCTC). MCTC promulgated its decision convicting petitioner
and imposing penalty of 5 years imprisonment and disqualification to hold office.
Petitioner appealed the MCTC decision to the RTC of Sanchez Mira, Cagayan but the
RTC affirmed the MCTC decision. Petitioner filed a petition for review before the
Court of Appeals.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Manifestation and Motion
contending that the Sandiganbayan had exclusive appellate jurisdiction over the
petition. The petitioner argued that the issue of jurisdiction could not be raised for the
first time before the CA in view of the failure of the Provincial Prosecutor to bring
out the same when she appealed the MCTC Decision to the RTC. She claimed to
have availed of the remedy provided under Rule 122 of the Rules of Court in good
faith. The CA agreed with the OSG and the CA dismissed the petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Office of the Solicitor General has the exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over the petition.
HELD:
In this case, the CA was correct in dismissing the appeal for lack of
jurisdiction. Section 2 of Rule 50 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court provides,
among others, that “an appeal erroneously taken to the Court of Appeals shall not be
transferred to the appropriate court but shall be dismissed outright.” This has been the
consistent holding of the Court.
Records also bear out that the earlier civil case against Armando, the
petitioner’s husband, was also finally resolved in his favor since the obligation had
already been settled. This civil case is also intertwined with the administrative and
criminal cases filed against petitioner. Thus, it appears that the filing of the criminal
case against petitioner was merely an afterthought considering that the civil case
against her husband and the administrative case against her were resolved in the
couple’s favor.
Dismissal of appeals on purely technical grounds is not encouraged. The
rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid and technical sense, for they
have been adopted to help secure, not override, substantial justice. Judicial action
must be guided by the principle that a party-litigant should be given the fullest
opportunity to establish the merits of his complaint or defense rather than for him to
lose life, liberty, honor or property on technicalities. When a rigid application of the
rules tends to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, this Court is
empowered to suspend their operation.
148
With the dismissal of the administrative case against the petitioner, it is in the
interest of substantial justice that the criminal case against her should be reviewed on
the merits by the proper tribunal following the appropriate procedures under the
rules. Our legal culture requires the presentation of proof beyond reasonable doubt
before any person may be convicted of any crime and deprived of his life, liberty or
even property, not merely substantial evidence. It is not enough that the evidence
establishes a strong suspicion or a probability of guilt. The primary consideration is
whether the guilt of an accused has been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
149
G.R. No. 144590 February 7, 2003

vs.
ROMEO F. PARADEZA
FACTS:
On June 7, 2000, the Regional Trial Court of Iba, Zambales, Branch 69, was
found the appellant, Romeo F. Paradeza guilty of rape and sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. The appellant then filed his notice of appeal anchored
on the sole assignment of error that the Court a quo gravely erred in finding the
accused- appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
However, the Public Attorney’s Office, as counsel for appellant, filed a
motion to withdraw his appeal. The Brief for the appellant was filed on June 1, 2001,
and the Brief for the appellee was filed on November 20, 2001. The Office of the
Solicitor General, in its comment seeking stiffer penalties, pointed out that since the
appellee as well as the appellant already filed briefs, under the Rules of Court, the
approval of appellant’s motion to withdraw his appeal is now a matter of discretion
on the part of the Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court could grant the motion to withdraw the appeal filed
by accused-appellant.
HELD:
An appeal is a "resort to a superior (i.e. appellate) court to review the
decision of an inferior (i.e. trial) court or administrative agency." As a statutory
remedy to correct errors which might have been committed by the lower court, the
object of an appeal is simply and solely the protection of the accused. The right to
appeal is a mere statutory privilege and is not a natural right or part of the due
process. Like any other right or privilege, it may be waived.
A person accused and convicted of an offense may withdraw his appeal not
only because he is guilty as charged. It could be due to his prior erroneous perception
of the applicable provision of law, or of the decision itself. He may feel that to seek a
pardon might be the better and faster remedy. Regardless of his reasons, in our view,
he is within his rights to seek the withdrawal of his appeal. This option should not be
closed to herein accused-appellant except for clearly important substantial reasons of
law and policy.
Appellant in withdrawing his appeal has accepted and recognized that the
trial court’s judgment of conviction and his sentence thereunder is conclusive upon
him. His exercise of the option to withdraw appeal before the case is submitted for
this Court’s decision, but fully cognizant of its legal consequences at this stage of the
case, not only saves the Court precious time and resources. It also opens soonest the
path for the reformation of the contrite offender, pursuant to the ideal of a just and
compassionate society envisioned in our fundamental law. Considering the particular
circumstances of this case, this Court is not without justifiable reasons to act
favorably on his motion.
G.R. No. 158802 November 17, 2004
IN RE: THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS FOR REYNALDO DE VILLA (detained at
the New Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa City)
JUNE DE VILLA
150
vs.
THE DIRECTOR, NEW BILIBID PRISONS
FACTS:
Reynaldo De Villa was charged with the crime of rape by his niece Aileen
Mendoza. The trial court found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of qualified rape, and sentenced him to death, to indemnify the victim in the
amount of P50,000.00, to pay the costs of the suit and to support the child, Leahlyn
Mendoza. An automatic review was made, the RTC finding accused-appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape, is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATIONS that he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusión perpetua.
Reynaldo is currently serving his sentence at the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa
City.
Three years after the promulgation of judgment, June De Villa, the son of
Reynaldo was informed during the pendency of the automatic review of petitioner's
case, of which he was unaware that there was a scientific test that could determine
paternity and that DNA testing could resolve the issue of paternity. Hence he sought
the conduct of a blood type test and DNA test but it was denied. Convict filed a
Motion for Partial Reconsideration for the test but was again denied.
June DE villa, was undaunted by these challenges. He then gathered thru
some help, samples from four grandchildren of Reynaldo de Villa and transported
them to the DNA Analysis Laboratory at the National Science Research Institute
(NSRI). The identities of the donors of the samples, save for the sample given by
Reynaldo de Villa, were not made known to the DNA Analysis Laboratory.
After testing, the DNA Laboratory rendered a preliminary report on March
21, 2003, which showed that Reynaldo de Villa could not have sired any of the
children whose samples were tested, due to the absence of a match between the
pertinent genetic markers in petitioner's sample and those of any of the other samples,
including Leahlyn's
ISSUE:
Whether or not the presentation of newly-discovered evidence be allowed
through a petition to grant new trial.
HELD:
A motion for new trial based on newly-discovered evidence may be granted
only if the following requisites are met: (a) that the evidence was discovered after
trial; (b) that said evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial
even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (c) that it is material, not merely
cumulative, corroborative or impeaching; and (d) that the evidence is of such weight
that that, if admitted, it would probably change the judgment. It is essential that the
offering party exercised reasonable diligence in seeking to locate the evidence before
or during trial but nonetheless failed to secure it.
Although the DNA evidence was undoubtedly discovered after the trial, the
court nonetheless find that it does not meet the criteria for "newly-discovered
evidence" that would merit a new trial. Such evidence disproving paternity could
have been discovered and produced at trial with the exercise of reasonable diligence.
Even with all of the compelling and persuasive scientific evidence presented
by petitioner and his counsel, the court is not convinced that Reynaldo de Villa is
entitled to outright acquittal. As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, even if
it is conclusively proven that Reynaldo de Villa is not the father of Leahlyn Mendoza,
his conviction could, in theory, still stand, with Aileen Mendoza's testimony and
151
positive identification as its bases. The Solicitor General reiterates, and correctly so,
that the pregnancy of the victim has never been an element of the crime of rape.
Therefore, the DNA evidence has failed to conclusively prove to this Court that
Reynaldo de Villa should be discharged. Although petitioner claims that conviction
was based solely on a finding of paternity of the child Leahlyn, this is not the case.
Our conviction was based on the clear and convincing testimonial evidence of the
victim, which, given credence by the trial court, was affirmed on appeal.
152
G.R. No. 126170 August 27, 1998

vs.
EMMA MAQUILAN
FACTS:
Accused-appellant Emma Maquilan was found guilty of drug-pushing in
violation of R.A. No. 6425 and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Accused-appellant filed a notice of appeal as a result of which the records of
the case were forwarded to this Court. However, before the Court could act on the
appeal, accused-appellant moved to withdraw her appeal, as she was going to file a
petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus to seek her release from
confinement.
The Solicitor General was ordered by the Supreme Court to comment on said
withdrawal and required accused-appellant’s counsel, Atty. de Guzman to confer with
her and to determine whether in filing the motion was done voluntarily. The Solicitor
General stated he had no objection to the motion.
Atty. de Guzman informed the Court that accused-appellant had been
released from prison by virtue of an order of the Regional Trial Court issued in
a habeas corpus case.
Subsequently, the Court required Judge Laviña of the Regional Trial Court
to show cause why he should not be held in contempt of court for granting the
petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus , considering that the appeal in this
case was still pending.
ISSUE:
May an accused-appellant file for habeas corpus after withdrawal of their
appeal but, without waiting for the resolution of their motion?
HELD:
The release of accused-appellant constitutes unlawful interference with the
proceedings of this Court and is only somewhat mitigated by the fact that the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City appears to have been misled by accused-appellant
as to the status of the decision in Criminal Case No. S-2191. The trial court’s order
granting release on habeas corpus, based as it is on the erroneous assumption that the
decision in the criminal case had become final, is void. The trial court had no
jurisdiction to issue the order in question.
This case is analogous to People v. Bacang. There accused-appellants moved
for the withdrawal of their appeal but, without waiting for the resolution of their
motion, they applied for and were granted pardon by the President and released from
confinement. Quoting People v. Salle,Jr., this Court ruled:
We now declare that the “conviction by final judgment” limitation under
Section 19, Article VII of the present Constitution prohibits the grant of pardon,
whether full or conditional, to an accused during the pendency of his appeal from his
conviction by the trial court. Any application therefor, if one is made, should not be
acted upon or the process toward its grant should not be begun unless the appeal is
withdrawn. Accordingly, the agencies or instrumentalities of the Government
concerned must require proof from the accused that he has not appealed from his
conviction or that he has withdrawn his appeal. Such proof may be in the form of a
certification issued by the trial court or the appellate court, as the case may be. The
acceptance of the pardon shall not operate as an abandonment or waiver of the appeal,
and the release of an accused by virtue of a pardon, commutation of sentence, or
153
parole before the withdrawal of an appeal shall render those responsible therefor
administratively liable. Accordingly, those in custody of the accused must not solely
rely on the pardon as a basis for the release of the accused from confinement.
Accordingly, the Court in that case denied the accused-appellants’ motion to
withdraw their appeal and ordered their rearrest. Those responsible for their release
were cited for contempt.
What was said in Bacang applies mutatis mutandis to this case. The use of
the high prerogative writ as a post-conviction remedy presupposes a final judgment
by virue of which accused is detained for the service of his sentence. As a matter of
fact, however, that is not the case here as accused-appellant’s appeal is still pending.
154
G.R. No. 151876 June 21, 2005

SUSAN GO and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
FERNANDO L. DIMAGIBA
FACTS:
Fernando Dimagiba issued to Susan Go thirteen checks which, when
presented to the drawee bank for encashment or payment on the due dates, were
dishonored for the reason “account closed.” Subqequently, Dimagiba was prosecuted
for 13 counts of violation of BP 22 (An Act Penalizing the Making or Drawing and
Issuance of a Check Without Sufficient Funds or Credit and for Other Purposes,
approved on April 3, 1979). He was found guilty by the MTCC, was sentenced three
months imprisonment, and was ordered to pay the offended party the amount he owed
plus interest. On February 27, 2001, Dimagiba filed a Motion for Reconsideration and
a Motion for the Partial Quashal of the Writ of Execution, praying for the recall of the
Order of Arrest and the modification of the final decision. Citing SC-AC No. 12-
2000, he pointed out that the penalty of fine only, instead of imprisonment also,
should have been imposed on him. The MTCC denied the motion for reconsideration;
Dimagiba was arrested and imprisoned for the service of his sentence. On October 9,
2001, Dimagiba filed with the RTC of Baguio city a petition for writ of habeas corpus
which was granted by the said court after hearing the case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition for writ of habeas corpus is the proper remedy.
HELD:
No. The respondent had previously sought the modification of his sentence in
a Motion for Reconsideration and in a Motion for the Partial Quashal of the Writ of
Execution. The remedy should have been an appeal of the MTCC Order denying
these motions. His petition for writ of habeas corpus was clearly an attempt to reopen
a case that had already become final and executory, an action deplorably amounting
to forum shopping.
155
G.R 80812 September 2, 1992

LUZ TAN
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
A criminal charge for illegal recruitment was filed against petitioner, Tan.
She pleaded “not guilty” during arraignment. The prosecution then presented all its
witnesses. The defense wasn’t able to present its witness despite several schedules of
hearing. Consequently, the trial court declared petitioner to have lost her right to
present evidence and the case was deemed submitted for decision. On May 28, 1986,
the trial court found the petitioner guilty as charged. Petitioner then filed for a Notice
of Appeal with the CA and when she could not file her brief within the 30-day
reglamentary period, she moved and was granted a 90-day extension until August 12,
1987. On August 4, 1987, petitioner filed an Urgent Manifestation and motion
praying that the period for the filing of Appellant’s Brief be suspended, and that she
be given five days (until August 9, 1987) to file a Motion for New Trial. The CA, on
August 18, 1987, denied aforesaid Manifestation but granted the filing of a Motion
for New Trial provided that the decision of the trial court had not yet become final on
account of petitioner’s failure to file her brief. Luz Tan filed a Motion for New Trial
on August 24, 1987 which motion was denied by the court. Then, petitioner filed a
motion for leave to admit Appellant’s Brief. This was denied on October 7, 1987.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals is correct in dismissing the case for an
error in the procedure in the Court of Appeals.
HELD:
The petition is devoid of merit. Petitioner’s filing of the Motion for New
Trial did not suspend the period for filing appellant’s brief which was due to expire
on August 12, 1987. Such assumption is not supported by the Rules of Court or any
other authority. When Tan filed her Motion for New Trial, she did not take any step
to file her brief, but simply waited for the resolution of said motion, such being
subsequently denied. Petitioner was grossly negligent and had no one to blame but
herself in losing her right to appeal since “the right to appeal is a statutory right and
the party who seeks to avail the same must comply with the requirements of the
Rules. Failing to do so, the right to appeal is lost, as in the case at bar.
PERTINENT LAWS ON RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Sec. 32, BP 129, as amended by RA 7691

SC Adm. Circular No. 09-94
Adm. Circular No. 104 – 96
Jurisdiction of Metropolitan/Municipal Trial Courts/Municipal Trial Courts in Cities
156
1. All civil cases, the grant of provisional remedies in proper cases, and all probate
proceedings, where the value of personal property, estate or amount of demand does not
exceed Php 200,000. exclusive of interest, damages, litigation and other expenses (in Metro
Manila, the amount should be Php 400,000.)
2. All cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer (ejectment)
3. All civil cases which involve title to or possession of real property or any interest therein
where the assessed value does not exceed Php 20,000. (in Metro Manila Php 50,000.)
exclusive of interest, damages, litigation and other expenses
4. Civil cases under the rules on summary procedure
5. All offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six years, regardless of the fine or
other imposable accessory or other penalties including the civil liability (in offenses involving
damage to property through criminal negligence, the MTC has exclusive original jurisdiction)
6. Petitions for issuances of original certificates of titles

Jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts
A. Exclusive original jurisdiction

1. All civil cases in which the subject of litigation cannot be estimated in monetary terms
2. All civil cases which involve title to or possession of real property, or interest therein,
where the assessed value of the property exceeds Php 20,000. (in Metro Manila exceeding
Php 50,000.) Exceptions: forcible entry and unlawful detainer of lands and buildings
3. All actions in admiralty and maritime jurisdiction where the demand or claim exceeds Php
100,000 (in Metro Manila, over Php 200,000)
4. All probate matters, both testate and intestate where the gross value of the estate exceeds
Php 100,000 (in Metro Manila, the value must exceed Php 200,000.)
5. All actions involving the marriage contract and marital relations (annulment, legal
separation, support, etc)
6. All cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or quasi-
judicial body
7. All civil actions and special proceedings falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of
a Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court (JDRC) and the Court of Agrarian Relations
8. All other cases in which the demand or the value of personal property, exclusive of interest,
damages, litigation and other costs, exceeds Php 200,000. (in Metro Manila, the value must
exceed Php 400,000.)
9. Intra-corporate disputes (formerly under the SEC); intellectual property cases
157
B. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by the lower courts (MTCs) in
their respective territorial jurisdictions
C. Concurrent jurisdiction with the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals over petitions
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against all lower courts; habeas corpus and quo
warranto
Note: Republic Act 8369, approved on October 28, 1997, established the Family
Court, with jurisdiction over adoption, guardianship, custody of children, support,
acknowledgment, complaints for annulment or nullity of marriage, criminal cases where one
or more of the accused is below 18 years of age, domestic violence against women and
children, etc.
Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals
A. Original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, habeas corpus,

quo warranto and auxiliary writs and processes
B. Exclusive jurisdiction over actions for the annulment of judgments rendered by the

Regional Trial Courts
C. Concurrent jurisdiction with the Supreme Court over petitions for certiorari,

prohibition or mandamus filed against the RTCs, the Civil Service Commission, the Court of
Tax Appeals, the Central Board of Assessment Appeals, commissions and other quasi-judicial
bodies or agencies.
D. Concurrent jurisdiction with the Supreme Court and RTCsover petitions for certiorari,
prohibition or mandamus filed against lower courts and quasi-judicial bodies; petitions for
habeas corpus and quo warranto.
E. Appellate jurisdiction over ordinary appeals from RTCs, except in cases exclusively

appealable to the Supreme Court; petitions for review from the RTCs in all cases appealed to
it from the lower courts; petitions for review from the Civil Service Commission, the Court of
Tax Appeals and the other quasi-judicial bodies or agencies (e.g. National Labor Relations
Commission)
Note: The Sandiganbayan handles cases of government officials and employees with
salary grades 27 and above.
Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
A. Original exclusive jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus

filed against the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan, the Commission on Elections,
Commission on Audit, and the Department of Labor and Employment
B. Concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals over petitions for certiorari,

prohibition and mandamus filed against the Regional Trial Courts, the Civil Service
Commission, the Central Board of Assessment Appeals, the Court of Tax Appeals, Securities
and Exchange Commission, other quasi-judicial bodies
158
C. Concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial
Courts over petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus filed against the lower courts
and certain quasi-judicial bodies; petitions for habeas corpus and quo warranto
D. Concurrent jurisdiction with the RTCs over actions against ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls
E. Appellate jurisdiction over petitions for review on certiorari from the CA, Sandiganbayan
and RTCs on questions of law only; criminal cases in which the penalty imposed by the trial
court is either death or reclusion perpetua (“life imprisonment”) on questions of fact and law.
ACT NO. 3326

AN ACT TO ESTABLISH PERIODS OF PRESCRIPTION FOR VIOLATIONS
PENALIZED BY SPECIAL ACTS AND MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES AND TO
PROVIDE WHEN PRESCRIPTION SHALL BEGIN TO RUN
Section 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts,
prescribe in accordance with the following rules:
(a) after a year for offenses punished only by a fine or by imprisonment for not more
than one month, or both;
(b) after four years for those punished by imprisonment for more than one month, but
less than two years;
(c) after eight years for those punished by imprisonment for two years or more, but
less than six years; and
(d) after twelve years for any other offense punished by imprisonment for six years or
more, except the crime of treason, which shall prescribe after twenty years. Violations
penalized by municipal ordinances shall prescribe after two months.
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the
law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution
of judicial proceeding for its investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty
person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not
constituting jeopardy.
Sec. 3. For the purposes of this Act, special acts shall be acts defining and penalizing
violations of the law not included in the Penal Code.
Sec. 4. This Act shall take effect on its approval.
SEC 6.; SEC 10. A.M No. 06-11-5-SC – RULE ON DNA EVIDENCE
Sec. 6. Post-conviction DNA Testing. – Post-conviction DNA testing may be available,

without need of prior court order, to the prosecution or any person convicted by final and
executory judgment provided that (a) a biological sample exists, (b) such sample is relevant to
the case, and (c) the testing would probably result in the reversal or modification of the
judgment of conviction.
159
Sec. 10. Post-conviction DNA Testing – Remedy if the Results Are Favorable to the
Convict. – The convict or the prosecution may file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the
court of origin if the results of the post-conviction DNA testing are favorable to the convict.
In the case the court, after due hearing finds the petition to be meritorious, if shall reverse or
modify the judgment of conviction and order the release of the convict, unless continued
detention is justified for a lawful cause.
A similar petition may be filed either in the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, or with
any member of said courts, which may conduct a hearing thereon or remand the petition to the
court of origin and issue the appropriate orders.
160

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DIGESTED CASES ON RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

G.R. No. 123263 December 16, 1996

G.R. No. 115115 July 18, 1995

G.R. No. 169004 September 15, 2010

G.R. No. L-14595 May 31, 1960

G.R. Nos. 118013-14 October 11, 1995

G.R. No. L-64548 July 7, 1986

G.R. No. 85328 July 4, 1990

G.R. No. 192565February 28, 2012

G.R. No. 158763 March 31, 2006

G.R. No. 113630 May 5, 1994

Bonifacio v. RTC of Makati, G.R. No. 184800, May 5, 2010;

de Lima v. Guerrero, G.R. No. 229781, Oct. 10, 2017.

G.R. No. L-4567 May 30, 1983

G.R. No. 125066 July 8, 1998

G.R. No. 152662 June 13, 2012

G.R. No. 127845 March 10, 2000

G.R. No. 169888 November 11, 2008

G.R. No. 130492 January 31, 2001

G.R. No. 188106 November 25, 2009

G.R. No. 103102 March 6, 1992

G.R. No. 165751 April 12, 2005

G.R. No. 182677 August 3, 2010

G.R. No. 121211 April 30, 2003

G.R. No. 171271 August 31, 2006

G.R. No. 151785 December 10, 2007

G.R. No. 160451 February 9, 2007

G.R. No. 80116 June 30, 1989

G.R. No. 168785 February 5, 2010

G.R. No. L-38308 December 26, 1984

G.R. No. 190847 April 13, 2011

G.R. No. 145391. August 26, 2002

G.R. No. 174238 July 7, 2009

G.R. No. 175091 July 13, 2011

Petitioner Rodriguez was charged with estafa and violation of Batas

G.R. No. 175851 July 04, 2012

G.R. No. 102007 September 2, 1994

G.R. No. L-50691 December 5, 1994

G.R. No. 172060 September 13, 2010

respondent as a consequence but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason

G.R. No. 184861 June 30, 2009

GR. No. 101236 January 30, 1992

G.R. No. L-53373 June 30, 1987

G.R. No. L-60962 July 11, 1986

G.R. No. L-14732 January 28, 1961

G.R. No. 101837 February 11, 1992

G.R. No. 134744 January 16, 2001

G.R. No. 130644 March 13, 1998

G.R. Nos. 138859-60 February 22, 2001

order also required respondents, within ten days from

G.R. No. 109036 July 5, 1995

G.R. No. 110315 January 16, 1998

G.R. No. 116623 March 23, 1995

G.R. No. 182677 August 3, 2010

G.R. No. 132422 March 30, 2004

G.R. No. 147932 January 25, 2006

G.R. No. 119990 June 21, 2004

G.R. No. 129742 September 16, 1998

G.R. No. 131445 May 27, 2004

G.R. No. 171188 June 19, 2009

Cesar Sarino is one of the registered owners of a piece of land located in front

G.R. No. 70748 October 21, 1985