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Baxter V Scientology: FSO Motion To Compel Arbitration
Baxter V Scientology: FSO Motion To Compel Arbitration
Plaintiffs,
v. Case No.: 8:22-cv-00986-TPB-JSS
DAVID MISCAVIGE; CHURCH OF
SCIENTOLOGY INTERNATIONAL, INC.;
RELIGIOUS TECHNOLOGY CENTER, INC.;
IAS ADMINISTRATIONS, INC.; CHURCH
OF SCIENTOLOGY FLAG SERVICE
ORGANIZATION, INC.; CHURCH OF
SCIENTOLOGY FLAG SHIP SERVICE
ORGANIZATION, INC.,
Defendants.
_______________________________________/
DEFENDANT CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY FLAG SERVICE
ORGANIZATION, INC.’S MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION; OR
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO RULE 12(b)(6)
and through undersigned counsel, respectfully moves this Court to compel arbitration
moves to dismiss all claims against FSO pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
1 “Plaintiffs” refers collectively to Plaintiffs Gawain Baxter (“G. Baxter”), Laura Baxter
(“L. Baxter”), and Valeska Paris (“Paris”). G. Baxter and L. Baxter, together, will be referred to as
the “Baxters.”
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INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs each served for over a decade as members of the Sea Organization
committed their lives to advancing Scientology. Sea Org members form the dedicated
core of the Scientology religion and dedicate themselves to the Sea Org for a billion
years. This term reflects both their dedication to their religion and their awareness of
themselves as immortal spiritual beings who have lived countless lives and who will
live again and again. Although Plaintiffs voluntarily joined and remained with the Sea
Org for over a decade, they now assert that their participation in this religious order
violated the federal slavery and human trafficking statute, the Trafficking Victims
doctrine, and as a required condition of serving as a member of the Sea Org, each
procedures, disputes that might arise between them and FSO. For the sake of brevity,
entered into arbitration agreements with FSSO. And the arguments raised by FSSO as
2
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such agreements. Additionally, the claims brought by Paris are further subject to
with FSO. Accordingly, all of Plaintiffs’ claims against FSO should be arbitrated
The Complaint Does Not and Cannot State a Claim Against FSO. In the event the
Court determines that Plaintiffs’ claims are not subject to arbitration, the Complaint
still cannot proceed as it fails to state a claim against FSO. The claims fail for three
reasons:
First: Plaintiffs allege TVPRA violations going back decades, but no civil
remedy existed under the statute until Congress amended it in 2003. Further, these
amendments were not retroactive. As such, the Court must dismiss all claims involving
dismissed because they all occurred on the Freewinds, which the Complaint admits
never entered US waters. The TVPRA’s civil provisions do not apply to extraterritorial
conduct. Thus, the Court must dismiss all post-2003 violations as well.
Second: To the extent Plaintiffs can bring a civil action under TVPRA, even
assuming Plaintiffs’ allegations are true, there was still no violation of the TVPRA.
Plaintiffs’ trafficking claims under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1589 and 1590 require allegations of
forced labor. However, here, Plaintiffs admit that they were free to leave the Sea Org
at any time, either by going through the “routing out” process or by simply leaving.
They alleged that they might be declared a “suppressive person” by the Church if they
3
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left without going through the “routing out” process, but courts have held such a
consequence does not equate to forced labor. For similar reasons, Plaintiffs’ peonage
claims under § 1581 fail. Indeed, these claims require an allegation that Plaintiffs were
working to earn their freedom to satisfy an existing debt. However, Plaintiffs have not
pled such an arrangement as they could leave at any time and were not paying off
existing debts.
Third: Paris’ claims fail because they are time-barred. The TVPRA provides a
ten-year statute of limitations, but Paris left the Sea Org—and began publicly
complaining about her time in the religious order—more than ten years before she filed
suit as she expressly alleges in the Complaint. Therefore, these same claims that
dismissed.
ARGUMENT
The Court should compel arbitration on all claims against FSO. This issue is
addressed at length in FSSO’s Motion to Compel Arbitration. (See ECF No. 67). 2 In
short, Plaintiffs signed valid arbitration agreements with FSO and FSSO, and those
2
The Declarations of Kenneth Weber (“Weber Decl.”) and Sarah Heller (“Heller Decl.”) filed in support of
FSSO’s Motion to Compel Arbitration are also fully incorporated by reference into this Motion.
4
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any claims Plaintiffs may have with “any [] Scientology church or organization which
language applying to all Scientology churches worldwide. (Weber Decl. Exs. A, B and
K at ¶ 6; see also Exs. E and F at ¶ 6.C; see also Exs. L and M at ¶ 7.A, 2.A). Therefore,
these agreements clearly apply to FSO. See Robinson v. NBC Universal Cable, No. 17-
CV-81324, 2018 WL 8620154, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 23, 2018) (compelling arbitration
under “third-party beneficiary theories” where defendants were not signatories to the
agreement but were clearly intended to benefit from the arbitration provision therein).
As such, and for the reasons explained further in FSSO’s Motion to Compel
Arbitration, which FSO joins and fully incorporates herein, all of Plaintiffs’ claims
should be arbitrated. Additionally, all claims brought by Paris are further subject to
arbitration because she directly entered into at least one agreement with FSO agreeing
Ex. A at p. 3). Therefore, all claims against FSO should be arbitrated as FSO is either
12(b)(6), a court will take “all factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe
them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Doe #1 v. Red Roof Inns, 21 F.4th 714,
723 (11th Cir. 2021) (internal quote omitted). However, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the
5
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suffice.” Id. (quote omitted). “Instead, a plaintiff must allege sufficient facts that,
accepted as true, state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. (quote omitted).
Australia and the Caribbean. Plaintiffs alleged only limited activity—all predating this
century—in the United States. The TVPRA does not apply to this activity.
Congress enacted the TVPRA in 2000, but the statute did not provide for civil
liability until December 2003, when § 1595 was added. Velez v. Sanchez, 693 F.3d 308,
324 (2d Cir. 2012). However, § 1595 is not retroactive. Thus, FSO cannot be found
civilly liable for any alleged violations predating the 2003 amendment. Velez, 693 F.3d
at 324; see also Ditullio v. Boehm, 662 F.3d 1091, 1099 (9th Cir. 2011) (TVPRA “cannot
be applied retroactively to create liability for conduct that occurred before December
19, 2003”).
• G. Baxter alleges TVPRA violations going back at least ten years before he
3Plaintiffs allege that G. Baxter was born in 1982 or late 1981 (Compl. ¶ 7), that he considered leaving
the Sea Org at age 15 (id. ¶ 83), and that he traveled to the Freewinds about “eight months later.” (Id.
¶ 85). Thus, G. Baxter boarded the Freewinds when he was 16, in about 1998.
6
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further violations during the years he was aboard the Freewinds, but prior to
• L. Baxter alleges TVPRA violations going back at least ten years before she
first boarded the Freewinds no later than 2002. 4 (Id. ¶¶ 94-99). She alleges
further violations after she boarded the Freewinds, but before the 2003
• Paris alleges TVPRA violations going back at least fourteen years before she
violations during the years she was aboard the Freewinds, but before the
2003 amendment.
FSO cannot be civilly liable for any of these alleged violations occurring prior to the
2003 amendments to the TVPRA. The Court should thus dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims to
the extent they depend on this pre-2003 conduct. See Ditullio, 662 F.3d at 1102; see also
Doe v. Siddig, 810 F. Supp. 2d 127, 136 (D.D.C. 2011) (dismissing “insofar as those
4
Plaintiffs allege that L. Baxter served aboard the Freewinds twice, that her first stint ended when she
was seventeen, and that her second stint began two years later, when she was nineteen. (Compl. ¶¶
98-99). Plaintiffs also allege that she was aboard the Freewinds during her second stint in 2004. (Id. ¶
101). Thus, the Complaint insinuates that L. Baxter was born no later than 1985 and that she first
boarded the Freewinds no later than 2002.
5
Plaintiffs allege that Paris was born in 1978 (Compl. ¶ 9) and that she boarded the Freewinds when
she was 18 (i.e. in approximately 1996). (Id. ¶ 133).
7
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Even after Congress added civil liability to the TVPRA in 2003, the statute still
did not cover most of FSO’s alleged violations. Instead, the statute could not apply
until Congress amended the statute again, effective December 23, 2008. Plaintiffs,
however, do not allege any TVPRA violations after that date. Although not entirely
clear because of the dearth of relevant dates pled in the Complaint, Plaintiffs appear
to allege improper conduct prior to the 2008 amendment. As such, the remaining
United States. 6 Indeed, Plaintiffs allege these events took place: (a) aboard the
Freewinds, which Plaintiffs boarded in Curacao no later than 2002 and which never
docked at a United States port or entered United States waters (id. ¶¶ 29-30, 85-92, 97-
112, 133-147); (b) in Copenhagen, where L. Baxter lived after her first stint on the
Freewinds (i.e., after 2002) (id. ¶ 98) and (c) in Australia, where Paris lived after she
left the Freewinds. (Id. ¶¶ 148-51). However, the TVPRA had no extraterritorial reach
until Congress amended § 1596 in 2008. Adhikari v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 845 F.3d
184, 201 (5th Cir. 2017). 7 And that amendment is not retroactive. Id. at 206. Thus,
6 Plaintiffs do not allege any domestic conduct that occurred after Congress established a private right
of action in 2003. The only domestic conduct alleged in the Complaint concerns (a) G. Baxter and
Paris’ alleged experiences in the Sea Org at Flag Base in Florida before 2000 (Compl. ¶¶ 78-84, 125-
133) and (b) L. Baxter’s alleged layover in Miami during a flight from England to Curacao to board
the Freewinds before 2002. (Id. ¶ 97). All this conduct predates the 2003 amendment adding civil
liability to the TVPRA, and thus is not actionable. See supra § II.B.1.
7 As noted below (see infra § II.C), Plaintiffs’ extraterritorial claims also fail because the 2008
amendment expanded the extraterritorial jurisdiction only for criminal prosecutions, not civil claims.
See Apple Inc., 2021 WL 5774224, at *15 (D.D.C. Nov. 2, 2021).
8
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Plaintiffs’ pre-December 23, 2008 claims—which appear to be all, if not the vast
Second, in Counts I, III and V, Plaintiffs seek to hold FSO liable for violating
the TVPRA under a beneficiary theory. (Compl. ¶¶ 162, 176, 191). But the statute did
not apply to beneficiary liability until Congress amended § 1595(a) in 2008. Nestle USA,
Inc. v. Doe, 141 S. Ct. 1931, 1939 (2021) (Thomas, J., writing for Gorsuch, J. and
Kavanaugh, J.) (“in 2008, Congress created the present private right of action,
allowing plaintiffs to sue defendants who are involved indirectly with slavery”); see also
H.G. v. Inter-Cont’l Hotels Corp., 489 F. Supp. 3d 697, 710 (E.D. Mich. 2020). As Justice
Thomas explained, when Congress amended the TVPRA in 2008, it “chose not to
write a retroactive statute.” Nestle USA, 141 S. Ct. at 1939; see also H.G., 489 F. Supp.
3d at 710 (beneficiary amendment not retroactive); E.S. v. Best W. Int’l, Inc., 510 F.
Supp. 3d 420, 431 (N.D. Tex. 2021) (same); Elat v. Ngoubene, 993 F. Supp. 2d 497, 522
(D. Md. 2014) (same). Thus, the beneficiary claims in Counts I, III and V are barred.
Third, Counts II, IV and VI allege a conspiracy to violate the TVPRA. (Compl.
¶¶ 169, 183, 198). However, Congress did not add conspiracy liability to the TVPRA
until it amended § 1596 in 2008. Roe v. Howard, 917 F.3d 229, 245 (4th Cir. 2019).
Therefore, this amendment is not retroactive either. See, e.g., Saraswat v. Jayaraman,
799 F. App’x 85, 87 (2d Cir. 2020) (no 2008 amendments to TVPRA are retroactive).
9
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(Compl. ¶¶ 189, 198). But, again, the TVPRA imposed no civil liability for peonage
until 2008, Ditullio, 662 F.3d at 1094 n.1, and this amendment is not retroactive.
Saraswat, 799 F. App’x at 87; Nestle USA, 141 S. Ct. at 1939. Counts V and VI should
be dismissed accordingly.
Because FSO “should not have to defend conduct that was not actionable when
it occurred,” Druding v. Care Alternatives, Inc., 164 F. Supp. 3d 621, 634 (D.N.J. 2016),
the Court should dismiss all of the claims against it for the reasons discussed above.
See Siddig, 810 F. Supp. 2d at 135 (dismissing § 1595 civil claim “insofar as it is
predicated on acts predating December 23, 2008”); E.S., 510 F. Supp. 3d at 432
(collecting cases reaching same conclusion); H.G., 489 F. Supp. 3d at 710. Further,
because Plaintiffs cannot plead around this retroactivity bar, FSO requests that these
C. All Claims Fail Because the TVPRA Does Not Provide a Civil Cause
of Action for Extraterritorial Conduct
Plaintiffs’ claims also fail because the TVPRA does not extend civil liability to
legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within
the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.’” Morrison v. Nat. Australia Bank Ltd.,
561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010) (internal quotation omitted). Plaintiffs can only overcome
this presumption by either (a) showing that “the statute gives a clear, affirmative
indication that it applies extraterritorially” or (b) establishing that “the case involves a
10
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domestic application of the statute.” RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 579 U.S. 325,
337 (2016). In other words, if the statute “does not apply extraterritorially, plaintiffs
must establish that the conduct relevant to the statute’s focus occurred in the United
that Congress did not give a clear and affirmative statement that the TVPRA’s civil
represented a class of child cobalt miners in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Id. at
*1. They sued under the TVPRA against multiple American companies. Id. at *4. In
court stated that it must “presume that a statute applies only domestically” and that a
plaintiff can rebut that presumption only if the statute “gives a clear, affirmative
indication” that it covers foreign conduct. Id. at *14 (citing Nestle USA, 141 S. Ct. at
1936). However, § 1595 of the TVPRA, the provision which creates civil liability, is
over “any offense (or any attempt or conspiracy to commit an offence) under §§ 1581,
8 The Apple plaintiffs did not allege a violation of § 1581, as Plaintiffs do here. However, that section
says nothing about extraterritorial application for civil claims either. 18 U.S.C. § 1581.
11
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1583, 1584, 1589, 1590, or 1591, its omission of § 1595 was not mistaken, but an
intentional decision not to extend extraterritorially the reach of the statute’s civil
component.” Apple, 2021 WL 5774224, at *16; see also Collins v. Yellen, 141 S. Ct. 1761,
1782 (2021) (“when Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute
but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress
before the establishment of a private right of action under the TVPRA in 2003. See supra
§ II.B.1. All of the post-2003 allegedly actionable conduct happened outside of the
United States. (G. Baxter boarded the Freewinds in around 1998 (Compl. ¶¶ 7, 83-85);
L. Baxter first boarded the Freewinds no later than 2002 (id. ¶¶ 97-100); and Paris
boarded the Freewinds in approximately 1996, and then left for Australia (id. ¶¶ 9, 133,
147-151)). Accordingly, this case cannot proceed because Plaintiffs admit that the only
alleged conduct that occurred after the TVPRA created a private right of action
occurred outside of the United States, and there is no private right of action for that
extraterritorial conduct.
Internal Affairs Doctrine. “[T]he well-established rule of international law that the law
of the flag state ordinarily governs the internal affairs of a ship.” McCulloch v. Sociedad
Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 20 (1963). Under this rule, absent “a
12
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clear statement of congressional intent, general statutes may not apply to foreign-flag
vessels insofar as they regulate matters that involve only the internal order and
discipline of the vessel.” Lobo v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc., 704 F.3d 882, 888 (11th Cir.
2013) (quoting Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., 545 U.S. 119, 130 (2005)). This is a
extraterritoriality discussed above. Schultz v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 465 F. Supp.
3d 1232, 1246-47 (S.D. Fla. 2020) (quoting Stevens v. Premier Cruises, Inc., 215 F.3d 1237,
1242 (11th Cir. 2000)). Internal ship affairs include employment disputes between a
Many of the allegations in the Complaint took place on the Freewinds, which
is flagged in Panama. (FSO’s Request for Judicial Notice (“RJN”), Ex. 1; Weber Decl.
¶ 21, Ex. N). For instance, Plaintiffs allege that they were crew members on the
Freewinds, where they “performed labor or services.” (Compl. ¶¶ 86, 161, 190). They
complain that they worked long hours on the Freewinds and that said labor was
“arduous” and “menial[.]” (Id. ¶¶ 86-87, 100-103, 134-135). Further, Plaintiffs allege
that they performed dangerous maintenance on the ship without proper safety
equipment, and that they suffered physical injury as a result. (Id. ¶¶ 88-90, 105, 113,
134-35, 137, 139, 145-46). They also complain that their pay was insufficient and/or
improperly withheld. (Id. ¶¶ 92, 104, 136). Finally, Plaintiffs contend that the discipline
they faced for violating the ship’s rules was improper. (Id. ¶¶ 102, 106, 137, 140, 145).
These are just a few examples of alleged events that occurred aboard the Freewinds;
13
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all of which (and in fact, the entirety of Plaintiffs’ allegations) concerned the “internal
As such, Plaintiffs are not entitled to any relief under the TVPRA absent a “clear
statement of congressional intent” that the statute applies to foreign vessels, like the
Freewinds. The TVPRA provisions at issue in this action do not contain this intent as
none of them discuss their application to any vessel—much less a foreign-flag vessel. 9
undeniably could have done so here. Nevertheless, it chose not to. Consequently, the
Court must presume that this omission was intentional, and that Congress did not
intend to extend TVPRA liability to the shipboard conduct alleged here. Collins, 141
S. Ct. at 1782. For these reasons, the Court should dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims to the
Counts I and II allege that FSO obtained Plaintiffs’ labor through “serious harm
“scheme, plan, or pattern intended to cause Plaintiffs to believe that” they or someone
9 On the other hand, § 1591, the TVPRA provision forbidding sex trafficking of children, expressly
does apply to vessels under some circumstances. Indeed, in 2003, when Congress amended the TVPRA
to add civil liability to the statute, it also expanded § 1591’s reach to include child sex trafficking
conducted “within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States,” a term that
includes certain vessels. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 7(1), (2) and (8). Moreover, other provisions in Chapter
77 of Title 18—the Chapter which includes the TVPRA—extend liability to certain conduct on or
relating to vessels. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1582-1583 and 1585-1588. These provisions had been on the books
for decades when Congress passed (and later amended) the TVPRA, yet Congress explicitly opted not
to add similar language to the sections at issue here.
14
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else “would suffer serious harm or physical restraint.” (Compl. ¶¶ 160-161 (citing 18
U.S.C. § 1589)). But these conclusory allegations do not amount to pleading facts
showing the force or threat of force used to extract labor for three reasons:
actionable under the TVPRA. The primary “threat” alleged in the Complaint is
Plaintiffs’ fear that if they did leave without permission they would be “declared” as
“Suppressive Persons” under Scientology law, or that if they stated that they wanted
to leave with permission they would be subject to the Sea Org’s rigorous “routing out”
process. (Compl. ¶¶ 63-64, 69, 71, 73-76, 83, 142, 147). But neither of these fears or
Scientology Int’l, 687 F.3d 1173, 1180 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Headley”). In Headley, 10 a married
couple brought § 1595 claims against various organizations affiliated with the Church
of Scientology complaining about their treatment while serving in the Sea Org. The
Headleys, just like Plaintiffs here, asserted that the routing out process prevented them
from freely leaving the Sea Org due to its many requirements. (Compl. ¶¶ 73, 147).
10
Headley has been cited approvingly in the Middle District of Florida and the Eleventh Circuit. See
Roman v. Tyco Simplex Grinnell, No. 8:16-CV-3449-T-33AEP, 2017 WL 3394295, at *5 (M.D. Fla.
Aug. 8, 2017), aff'd, 732 F. App’x 813 (11th Cir. 2018).
15
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Headley, 687 F.3d at 1175. The Ninth Circuit held: “The requirement to leave the
ministry only by routing out” is “religiously motivated” and thus protected under the
First Amendment. Id. at 1181. As such, Plaintiffs’ assertions about routing out,
including that it takes too long or involves activities related to their religious vows does
not rise to the level to state a claim under the TVPRA. Further, despite Plaintiffs’
complaints about the routing out process, they admit that each of them went through
the process and successfully left the Sea Org. (Compl. ¶¶ 111-12, 151-52).
Plaintiffs also state that they could have left the Sea Org without going through
the routing out process; however, the consequence for doing so is being declared a
“Suppressive Person.” 11 (Id. ¶¶ 73, 147). The Ninth Circuit stated that the risk of being
declared a “suppressive person” is also not “serious harm” for purposes of the TVPRA.
Headley, 687 F.3d at 1177. “A church may . . . warn that it will stop associating with
members who do not act in accordance with church doctrine. The former is a
Second, the alleged withholding of passports and other travel documents is not
11
Plaintiffs also allege that they “know” that if a Sea Org member left “without permission,” then
“security” will “force the person to return to their base for routing out,” or, if they left the Freewinds,
security will “force them to return to the ship, confine, and place them under constant surveillance.”
(Compl. ¶ 76). However, Plaintiffs do not allege that anyone ever used or threatened “force” to make
them return to the Sea Org or to make them stay on the Freewinds.
16
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Suppressive Person” or “routing out,” the other specific allegation that Plaintiffs rely
on for their theory of force or threat of force is the Freewinds’ practice of holding the
passports of all passengers and staff—a standard practice of passenger ships. 12 (Compl.
¶ 85 (G. Baxter’s passport “confiscated” to “prevent him from escaping and to force
him to provide free labor and services”; ¶ 99 (L. Baxter, same); ¶ 133 (Paris, same); id.
¶¶ 161, 169 (alleging “retention of passports”) as grounds for Counts I and II)). But the
statutory scheme of the TVPRA makes clear that retention of passports is only
actionable when it occurs within the United States. The TVPRA at 18 U.S.C. § 1597
provides that the retention of a passport to obtain labor is a trafficking offense in itself,
apart from trafficking by force or threat of force under 18 U.S.C. § 1589. But retaining
a passport to obtain labor outside of the United States is not even subject to criminal
prosecution under the TVPRA (much less civil liability). This is because 18 U.S.C. § 1596
identifies the sections of the TVPRA that are subject to extraterritorial enforcement
and does not mention § 1597—the passport section—as part of the extraterritorial
enforcement scheme. The alleged retention of the passports, which Plaintiffs mention
a dozen times in the Complaint, cannot support their trafficking allegations as a matter
of law.
On top of that, the allegations about being “forced” to work and remain on the
Freewinds because passports were withheld do not even make sense. While Plaintiffs
complain that they were somehow imprisoned on the Freewinds for ten years, they
12
Weber Decl. ¶¶ 22; id. Ex. O at pp. 16, 18; id. Ex. P at p. 9.
17
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each allege only one instance of requesting their passports—and in that instance they
were, in fact, given their passports. (Compl. ¶¶ 111, 147). It is standard practice for a
passenger ship to hold the passports of its crew members and passengers. (Weber Decl.
¶ 24; id. Ex. O at pp. 16, 18; id. Ex. P at p. 9). The Complaint recites that Plaintiffs
believed that they had to sign certain documents in order to obtain their passports (id.),
but does not actually allege that anyone ever made a threat to them that their passports
Third, the other allegations of “force” or “threat of force” are vague and
obtaining labor are notably evasive on key factual details. Plaintiffs make generic
in certain quarters, but they never do what the TVPRA requires of them—plead
instances where “force” or “threat of force” were used to obtain labor from them.
Plaintiffs never actually say what force applied to them and how. For instance, they
allege that they were “assigned” unpleasant tasks to them—tasks that need to be
more undesirable tasks if they did not comply; and even that they could be “confined”
to rooms if they disobeyed. (Compl. ¶ 107). But being “assigned” to the boiler room
of a ship is not trafficking—it is a job, and one that many people have. Being demoted
to an even less desirable work assignment for poor performance is an everyday event.
18
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Notably, despite the Complaint’s lurid details, Plaintiffs never allege that they
were locked in a cabin for not working and held there against their will, that they were
threatened with violence to get them to work, or that they were beaten to drive them
to work. The Complaint is replete with the word “force”—it appears over 50 times.
But the detail of how the Defendants applied force or threats of force is never spelled
out, except in connection with 1) retention of passports (Compl. ¶¶ 85, 99, 161, 169);
2) “routing out” (id. ¶¶ 73-76); and 3) being “declared” a “Suppressive Person.” (Id. ¶¶
63, 83). None of that conduct is actionable as force or threat of force in this matter.
Because Counts I and II fail to allege actionable conduct, the derivative Counts
III and IV fail as well. “Plaintiffs have failed to adequately allege a violation of § 1589,
their § 1590 claim must fail, too.” Apple, 2021 WL 5774224 at *14.
Next, in Counts V and VI, Plaintiffs allege that FSO violated § 1581, which
U.S.C. § 1581.” (Compl. ¶¶ 189, 197). These counts fail for two reasons.
First, to establish peonage, Plaintiffs must allege that FSO “intentionally held
[each plaintiff] against his or her will and coerced that person to work in order to satisfy
a debt by (1) physical restraint or force, (2) legal coercion, or (3) threats of legal
coercion or physical force.” United States v. Farrell, 563 F.3d 364, 372 (8th Cir. 2009).
19
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Plaintiffs, however, have not alleged that FSO held them against their will.
Conversely, as explained at length supra, Plaintiffs state that they were free to leave the
Sea Org at any time by complying with the routing out process (Compl. ¶ 73), which
is exactly what each Plaintiff did here. (Id. ¶¶ 111-12, 151-52). Moreover, Plaintiffs
even admit that they could have left the Sea Org without routing out, but they might
be declared a “Suppressive Person” for doing so. (Id. ¶¶ 73, 147). However, as noted
supra, such a consequence (or threatened consequence) is not actionable under the
Second, Plaintiffs fail to allege that they were working to satisfy a debt, which is
v. Otero, No. 2:19-CV-244, 2020 WL 5960681, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 8, 2020) (quoting
Pierce v. United States, 146 F.2d 84, 86 (5th Cir. 1944)). “The basal fact [of peonage] is
indebtedness,” Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207, 215 (1905), and thus its defining
characteristic is that the “peon can release himself therefrom . . . by the payment of the
debt.” Treadway, 2020 WL 5960681, at *3 (quote omitted); see also United States v.
Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133, 144 (1914) (a peonage claim requires the court to “determine
whether the [plaintiff] was in reality working for a debt which he owed the
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indebtedness.” Chen v. Cai, 2022 WL 917575, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2022) (quote
peonage must fail. Id. (determining that this failure “is fatal to this claim”); Jenkins v.
Trustees of Sandhills Cmty. Coll., 259 F. Supp. 2d 432, 445 (M.D.N.C. 2003); Dolla v.
Unicast Co., 930 F. Supp. 202, 205 (E.D. Pa. 1996); Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133, 144 (1914).
Plaintiffs allege that FSO held them “against their will and forced them to
perform labor to pay off purported Scientology debts.” (Compl. ¶ 190). But Plaintiffs
fail to allege any facts supporting any debt owed to FSO or that Plaintiffs were working
to pay off that debt while in the Sea Org. G. Baxter and Paris attempt to side-step this
requirement by stating that they would have been responsible for a debt after they left
the Sea Org. (See, e.g., Compl. ¶ 80 (G. Baxter alleging that “he would be responsible
for paying this mounting debt should he ever leave Sea Org”); ¶ 118 (Paris alleging
that “she would be responsible for paying this mounting debt should she ever leave”);
¶ 150 (same)). 13
However, allegations of a potential future debt cannot state a claim for peonage.
Plaintiffs must allege a debt that existed while they were working and that their labor was
to repay that existing debt, so that they can secure their release from labor “by the
13L. Baxter fails to allege any facts about a debt owed by her, even one that would develop after leaving
the Sea Org.
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payment of the debt.” Treadway, 2020 WL 5960681, at *3. Accordingly, for various
reasons, Plaintiffs failed to state a claim of peonage in Counts V and VI and the Court
suit before the later of “10 years after the cause of action arose” or “10 years after the
victim reaches 18 years of age, if the victim was a minor at the time of the alleged
offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 1595(c). Paris was born in about 1978 and thus turned 18 in
about 1996. (Compl. ¶ 9). As such, this suit, filed twenty-six years later, is untimely
under the second prong for minors and the 10-year statute of limitations from when
the cause of action arose applies. The Complaint was filed on April 28, 2022. Thus,
Plaintiffs’ claims are untimely if they accrued before April 28, 2012.
Paris admits that she spoke with “an investigator from the Australian
government’s labor authority” in May 2011 about these same claims after she left the
Sea Org. (Compl. ¶¶ 152-153). 14 Thus, Paris judicially admitted that she left the Sea
Org before May 2011, which establishes that her claims necessarily accrued more than
ten years before she filed her Complaint on April 28, 2022.
Paris may contend that the statute of limitations should be equitably tolled
because she feared retaliation by the Church if she sued or spoke out against the
Church. (See Compl. ¶¶ 152-157). “The doctrine of equitable tolling allows a court to
14
As discussed, infra, Paris made similar complaints to at least four other publications around this
same time as well. (See RJN, Exs. 2-5).
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toll the statute of limitations until such a time that the court determines would have
been fair for the statute of limitations to begin running on the plaintiff’s claims.” Dotson
v. United States, 30 F.4th 1259, 1268 (11th Cir. 2022) (internal quotations and citations
omitted). But, “[e]quitable tolling is inappropriate when a plaintiff did not file an
action promptly or failed to act with due diligence” and it is therefore “an
extraordinary remedy which should be extended only sparingly.” Bost v. Fed. Express
Corp., 372 F.3d 1233, 1242 (11th Cir. 2004) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Thus, Paris must establish that her untimely filing was “because of extraordinary
circumstances that are both beyond [her] control and unavoidable even with diligence.”
original). Paris apparently contends that tolling is warranted here because her alleged
fear of “retaliation” prevented her from timely pursuing her civil remedies. (Compl. ¶¶
152-157). But these conclusory allegations are negated by the documents attached to
FSO’s RJN showing that she had no problem speaking out against the Defendants or
filing administrative actions against them. (RJN Exs. 2-5). Paris’ false allegations of
fear do not warrant judicial blindness to her actual conduct after leaving the Church.
Each year after her departure from the Sea Org in 2009 (see RJN, Ex. 5), Paris
was completely outside of the control of the Defendants. She was free to travel
anywhere in the world. She had the physical freedom to seek legal advice and
assistance. She also had the freedom to speak out against Defendants. Indeed, her
Complaint admits that after leaving the Church, she filed a formal, publicly available
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approximately twelve years before filing her Complaint, Paris made her “first in a
series of postings” to an online website where she alleged substantially similar facts as
she did in the Complaint. (Compare RJN Ex. 5 with Compl. ¶¶ 116, 127, 133, 147-149,
151, 161, 169). Similarly, during an interview with an Australian news outlet, she
claimed that “the Church of Scientology imprisoned her on its cruise ship The
Freewinds.” (RJN, Ex. 3). This article was posted and most recently updated on
November 29, 2011. (Id.). Also on November 29, 2011, Paris sat for an interview with
the Village Voice and made claims analogous to ones made in the Complaint,
including receiving only $50 in pay each week, (compare RJN Ex. 4 with Compl. ¶ 136),
alleging that she had cleaned up asbestos, (compare RJN Ex. 4 with Compl. ¶ 139), and
complaining about papers she claims she was forced to sign upon leaving the
Freewinds. (Compare RJN Ex. 4 with Compl. ¶ 147). Many of these allegations were
published in a New Idea magazine article dated December 19, 2011 as well. (See
Paris’ alleged fear of retaliation did not prevent her from reporting Defendants
for alleged unfair labor practices or complaining to the press and law enforcement
about the exact allegations described in her Complaint. As stated by the court in
another TVPRA case, Abarca v. Little, 54 F. Supp. 3d 1064, 1069–70 (D. Minn. 2014),
“these acts evince a sophistication and courage that undermine [Plaintiff’s] argument
that extraordinary circumstances rendered him incapable of filing suit until six years
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after he severed his relationship with defendants.” As such, the doctrine of equitable
CONCLUSION
Inc., respectfully asks this Court to enter an order compelling arbitration of all claims
brought by Plaintiffs, or in the alternative, dismissing all claims pursuant to Fed. Rule
The undersigned counsel hereby certifies that the undersigned conferred with
Plaintiffs’ counsel, Neil Glazer and Zahra Dean of Kohn Swift & Graf, PC,
and Manuel J. (John) Dominguez of Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC
who does not agree to the relief sought in this motion. Counsel further certifies that
this motion is brought in good faith and not for any improper purpose.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on July 12, 2022, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk
of the Court by using the CM/ECF system, which will send a true and correct copy to
26