Sneak Analysis - Part 1 - Method and Procedure

ECSS-Q-40-04A Part 1
14 October 1997
EUROPEAN COOPERATION
ECSS
FOR SPACE STANDARDIZATION
Space Product
Assurance
Sneak analysis - Part 1: Method and

procedure
ECSS Secretariat
ESA--ESTEC
Requirements & Standards Division
Noordwijk, The Netherlands
ECSS--Q--40--04A Part 1
14 October 1997 ECSS
Published by: ESA Publications Division

ESTEC, P.O. Box 299,
2200AG Noordwijk,
The Netherlands
ISSN: 1028-396X
Price: DFl 35
Printed in the Netherlands
Copyright 1997 E by the European Space Agency for the members of ECSS
2
ECSS 14 October 1997
Foreword
This standard is one of the series of ECSS standards intended to be applied to-
gether for the management, engineering and product assurance in space projects
and applications. ECSS is a cooperative effort of the European Space Agency,
National Space Agencies and European industry associations for the purpose of
developing and maintaining common standards.
The application of Sneak Analysis is required by ECSS--Q--40 “Safety”.
This standard has been prepared by editing the ESA Standard PSS--01--411 Issue
1, reviewed by the ECSS Technical Panel and approved by the ECSS Steering
Board.
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(This page is intentionally left blank)
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Contents list
Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1 Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2 Normative references . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3 Definitions and abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.1 Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.2 Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4 Sneak analysis basic principles and application . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.1 Sneak analysis basic concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

4.2 Sneak analysis basic steps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.3 Input data for sneak analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.4 Sneak analysis application guidance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
5 Sneak analysis procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
5.1 Definition of the analysis scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

5.2 Data gathering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
5.3 Hierarchical design decomposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
5.4 Synthesis of input/output matrix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
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5.5 Sneak path analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
5.6 Design concern analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
5.7 Assessment of sneak circuit consequences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
5.8 Reporting of findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
5.9 Compilation of the final report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
6 Sneak analysis report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
6.1 Content of the report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

6.2 Approval of the report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Annex A (informative) Derivation of path clues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Annex B (normative) Sneak circuit report form . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Annex C (normative) Sneak analysis applied to computer
software . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
C.1 Inputs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
C.2 Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
C.3 Outputs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Annex D (informative) Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
Figures
Figure 1: Outline of sneak analysis procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Figure 2: Illustration of design decomposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Figure 3: Path identification process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Figure 4: Illustration of answering process to “component+path” clues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Figure 5: Illustration of facilitation path search . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Figure 6: Illustration of design concern analysis and answering process to “component”
clues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Tables
Table 1: Aspects to be considered when defining the analysis scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Table 2: Example of input/output matrix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
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Scope
The aim of Sneak Analysis is to identify “sneak circuits”, i.e. unexpected paths for
a flow of mass, energy, data or logical sequence that under certain conditions can
initiate an undesired function or inhibit a desired function. Sneak circuits are not
the result of failure, but are latent conditions, inadvertently designed into the
system.
This standard establishes a procedure for performing sneak analysis and spec-
ifies the required output.
The standard is composed of two parts:
D part 1 (i.e. this document ECSS--Q--40--04 Part 1 “Sneak analysis -- Part 1:
Method and procedure”) that contains the method and procedure for per-
forming sneak analysis;
D part 2 (i.e. the document ECSS--Q--40--04 Part 2 “Sneak analysis -- Part 2:
Clue list”) that contains a basic clue list to be used during sneak analysis.
This standard is applicable when the performance of sneak analysis is required
by ECSS--Q--40 or by the contract between the customer and the supplier.
Alternative sneak analysis procedures proposed by the supplier may be accepted
by the customer provided that equivalence, for the intended application, with the
one presented in this standard is shown by the supplier.
7
8
Normative references
This ECSS Standard incorporates by dated or undated reference, provisions from

other publications. These normative references to the extent specified in the text
are cited at the appropriate places and publications are listed hereafter. For dated
references, subsequent amendments to or revisions of any of these apply to this
ECSS Standard only when incorporated in it by amendment or revision. For un-
dated references the latest edition of the publication referred to applies.
ECSS--P--001 Glossary of terms

ECSS--Q--40--04 Sneak analysis -- Part 2: Clue list
-- Part 2
9
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Definitions and abbreviations
3.1 Definitions
For the purposes of this standard, the definitions given in ECSS--P--001 apply. In
particular, it should be noted that the following terms have a specific definition
for use in ECSS standards.
Configuration Item
Failure
Severity
Software
System
The following terms and definitions are specific to this standard and shall be ap-
plied.
“Clue
A question pointing at a possible way through which design errors associated
with one or more items of a system can lead to system malfunction.”
“Design concern
The result of a misapplication (or omission of application) of a design requirement
or rule to one item of a system.”
“Design Error
A misapplication (or omission of application) of one or more requirements (i.e. the
ones contained in requirement documents or specifications) or design rules (i.e.
the rules that are used by the designers to synthesise a design that meets the de-
sign requirements) during the design process.”
NOTE Sneak circuits and design concerns are manifestations of design
errors
“Facilitation Condition
A combination of states of system components (e.g. interlocks) that enables the
condition mentioned in a clue to be triggered.”
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“Sneak Circuit
An unexpected path for a flow of mass, energy, data or logical sequence that under
certain conditions can initiate an undesired function or inhibit a desired function.
Sneak circuits are not the result of failures, but are latent conditions, inadver-
tently designed into the system.
Sneak circuits include: sneak paths, sneak timings, sneak indications and sneak
labels.”
“Sneak indication
Ambiguous or false display of system operating conditions that can cause the sys-
tem or an operator to take undesired action.”
“Sneak label
Incorrect or imprecise labelling of system functions (e.g. controls, displays) that
can cause an operator to apply incorrect stimuli to the system.”
“Sneak path
An unexpected path along which mass, energy, data or logical sequence flow in
an unintended direction.”
“Sneak timing
Occurrences of events in an unexpected or conflicting sequence, or at an unex-
pected time, or for an unexpected duration. Therefore sneak timings could also
occur if mass, energy, data or logical control flow along intended paths without
respecting the intended dynamic behaviour of the system.”
“Source
An item of a system which contains mass, energy or data.”
“Target
An item of a system the unwanted activation or inhibition of which can trigger
an undesired event.”
3.2 Abbreviations
The following abbreviations are defined and used within this standard.
Abbreviation Meaning
FMECA Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality Analysis
HW Hardware
I/O Matrix Input/Output Matrix
PA Product Assurance
RAMS Reliability, Availability, Maintainability and Safety
SADT Structured Analysis and Design Technique
SART Structured Analysis Real Time
SW Software
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Sneak analysis basic principles and

application
4.1 Sneak analysis basic concepts

The basic sneak analysis concepts were set up following the observation that sys-
tem failures can occur as a result of design errors and in the absence of component
failures.
A common way to identify design errors is to perform detailed “reviews” of the de-
sign. During these reviews, check-lists derived from previous experience are gen-
erally used to supplement the reviewer’s expertise and to structure the review.
However, the results of a given design review are hardly reproducible by a differ-
ent group of reviewers, since the review is a loose (and creative) process rather
than an algorithmic one. To partially compensate for the above deficiencies and
improve the effectiveness, both administrative procedures for the performance of
the various review phases and analytical techniques are used.
Sneak analysis is a generic term used to indicated a group of analytical tech-
niques employed to methodically identify sneak circuits and design concerns in
a system.
Sneak path analysis is a sneak analysis technique that relies on the identification
of paths between “targets” and “sources” and the use of clues.
Design concern analysis is a sneak analysis technique that is based only on the
application of clues.
Clues are subdivided in the following three classes:
D “path clues”, that are used during sneak path analysis and depend only on the
kind of causal relation between sources and targets that is under investiga-
tion.
An example is: Can the target be “off” when the source is “on”? That for electri-
cal systems can also be worded as: Can the current coming from the source be
diverted away from the target? Annex A explains how the path clues can be
derived.
D “component+path” clues, that are dependent on the type of system (electronic,
pneumatic, hydraulic, software), are applied to “system components” during
Sneak Path Analysis. These clues are derived from experience and are related
to those behaviours of a system component that can affect the flow of mass, en-
ergy, data or logical sequence between sources and targets. For switches an
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example is: During change of state of switches, can transitory current paths
exist?
D “component” clues, that are applied to system components during design con-
cern analysis and are also derived from experience. They are dependent on the
type of system. For an integrated circuit an example is: Have the maximum
frequency conditions been taken into account?
4.2 Sneak analysis basic steps

The procedure for performing sneak analysis is specified in clause 5. In the follow-
ing, its basic steps are outlined (for a graphical sketch, see Figure 1) in order to
give an overview of its key aspects.
The aim of the preparatory tasks is to:
D define the analysis scope, i.e. to identify the boundaries and the mission
phases of the part of the system that is subject to sneak analysis. For this pur-
pose use should be made of the results of preliminary RAMS analyses such as
preliminary hazard analysis and functional failure analysis. The depth of the
analysis is also defined during this task;
D gather the data for the subsequent steps of the analysis;
D decompose the design in “blocks” according to the functions of the part of the
system under analysis (if this is not already available as output of other RAMS
or engineering analyses). The output of this task is used for subdividing the
systems in parts that are easily manageable by the analyst and establishing
a clear relation between functions and blocks of the design;
D document, in the “input/output matrix”, the state of the functional inputs and
outputs of the part of the system under analysis during the planned oper-
ational modes (if this is not already available as output of other RAMS or en-
gineering analyses). This matrix is useful to screen out some paths during the
path tracing.
The actual sneak analysis consists of:
-- the sneak path analysis, the aim of which is to identify sneak paths,
sneak timings and sneak indications through: identification of targets;
identification of sources; tracing of paths between sources and targets;
application of “component+path” clues to the components contained in
the path;
-- the design concern analysis, the aim of which is to identify sneak labels
and design concerns through application of “component” clues;
-- the assessment of the consequences of sneak circuits and design con-
cerns up to the highest level of design decomposition that is of interest.
Finally, sneak circuits and design concerns are documented on “sneak circuit re-
ports” together with the recommendations to eliminate them and a “sneak analy-
sis final report” is produced that documents input data, interim results and con-
clusions.
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Preparation
5.1 Definition of analysis scope
5.2 Data gathering
5.3 Hierachical design

decomposition
5.4 Synthesis of I/O matrix
Analysis performance
5.5 Sneak path analysis
-- Path identification
-- Consultation with
-- Application of path Immediate answer
specialists
and path + component Further analyses -- Simulation
clues needed -- Breadboard
-- Testing
5.6 Design concern analysis
-- Application of
component clues Immediate answer
Further analyses
needed
5.7 Assessment of sneak circuit

consequences
Analysis conclusion
5.8 Reporting of findings
5.9 Compilation of the final report
End
Figure 1: Outline of sneak analysis procedure

4.3 Input data for sneak analysis
The following data can be considered as inputs for sneak analysis:
System Level
D System requirements (including external interface requirements)
D System design
D Internal interface definition (including HW/SW interfaces)
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D User manual (including operation procedures)
D Results of preliminary RAMS analyses (e.g. Functional failure analysis, pre-
liminary hazard analysis)
D Results of functional analysis
Lower Level (for Hardware)
D Subsystem requirements
D Subsystem design
D Equipment requirements
D Equipment design (including drawings)
D Component specification (data sheets)
D (6) Results of worst case analysis
D (6) Results of part stress analysis
D (6) Development testing results
Lower Level (for Software)
D User requirements
D Software requirements
D Architectural design
D Detailed design
D (6) Results of software verification and validation activities
According to the scope of the analysis and its depth some of the above data might
not be relevant.
The data marked with “(6)”, when available, might be useful to avoid duplication
with other analyses/activities. However they do not generally contain the raw
input data (e.g. requirements, drawings) for sneak analysis as the other listed
documents do.
Most of the above quoted raw input data are generally contained in the system
(subsystem, equipment) design specification and (for software) in the source code
and detailed design.
For example, some of the inputs useful for sneak analysis that can be found in an
(electrical) equipment design specification are:
D product description;
D top level diagram;
D functional characteristics (e.g. functions of each board);
D limitations (e.g. lifetime);
D external electrical interfaces;
D internal electrical interfaces;
D electrical schematics (including interface circuits);
D technical characteristics (not those required but those really implemented in
the design, e.g. power line protection, grounding);
D parts list.
In the software detailed design the following data are of use for sneak analysis:
D software architecture describing the software decomposition in functions,
their inter-relationships and sequencing;
D for each software item: function, subordinates, dependencies, interfaces, re-
sources, processing, data;
D source code listing.
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4.4 Sneak analysis application guidance

When planning the application of sneak analysis, it is important to take into ac-
count the following factors:
a. expertise required;
b. availability of computerised tools;
c. “delta” analysis due to design changes;
d. the characteristics of the application domain.
4.4.1 Expertise
It is important that the analysis team contain at least one design specialist in the
domain (e.g. electrical, electronics) of the system to be analysed . In any case, a
discussion on the preliminary findings of the sneak analysis is needed between
the analysis team and the designers of the system concerned in order to screen-
out possible false problems raised during the analysis and to synthesise the rec-
ommendations for the design changes needed to eliminate the sneak circuits.
4.4.2 Computerised tools

The availability of computerised tools, for performing one or more sneak analy-
sis--related tasks (e.g. manipulation of drawings, identification of paths, applica-
tion of clues), is useful to reduce the manpower effort needed for the application.
In some cases, to resolve specific issues raised during the analysis (e.g. timing
problems in digital circuits), either reference to analyses performed by the engin-
eering function through the use of computerised simulators or the performance
of some new simulations might be needed. The availability of the input data for
the analysis (e.g. electrical schematics, component libraries) in an “electronic”
format that is compatible with the one used by the available sneak analysis com-
puterised tools allows to reduce the cost and time needed.
4.4.3 Delta analysis

Interim results of the analysis (e.g. hierarchical decomposition of the design,
input/output matrices) should be clearly documented. This can reduce the cost of
a “delta” analysis which could be required following changes in the design.
4.4.4 Application domain

The procedure specified in clause 5 has been worded in such a way that applica-
tion in several domains is possible (provided that the used clue list covers these
domains). For use of the procedure in specific domains, the following should be
taken into account:
D when applying sneak path analysis to digital systems, the use of digital
simulators is recommended in order to be able to tackle the complexity
problems. The simulators should have the capability of identifying logic er-
rors and timing problems. The application should be coordinated with the
engineering function to avoid duplications;
D the application of sneak analysis to purely software systems (i.e. software
without any HW/SW interface) is not recommended when inspections and
static and dynamic analyses are already required;
D apply sneak analysis to hardware/software systems after the compliance
with semantic and syntax rules of the software language has been checked
by the compiler;
D when the system architecture is either very simple or is such complicated
(at a low detailed level) that has to be represented in a simplified way (e.g.
a system constituted by a couple of microprocessors represented as “black
boxes”), then the sneak path analysis is not likely to identify significant
problems. Only the design concern analysis should therefore be performed.
17
Finally, it is noted that sneak analysis is particularly well suited for electrical sys-
tems and electronics system composed by discrete components and relatively few
integrated circuits.
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Sneak analysis procedure
The Sneak Analysis procedure specified in this document is composed of tasks

that can be grouped into three categories:
D preparation;
D analysis;
D reporting and conclusions.
The relationship between the various tasks is shown in Figure 1. The following
pages specify the contents of the various tasks. Each task description, after an
outline of the objective of the task, contains:
D inputs, where the information that is needed for the task is identified;
D contents, where the analytical steps that are required to carry out the task
are specified;
D outputs, where the information that is expected to be produced as output
from the task is identified.
5.1 Definition of the analysis scope

The aim of this task is to identify the items of the system and the mission phases
that are to be analysed.
5.1.1 Inputs
The following inputs should be used:
a. the requirements on Sneak Analysis contained in the contract (if any);
b. the documents containing the design and operation data for the system con-
cerned (e.g. see 4.3);
c. the results of other RAMS analyses such as preliminary hazard analysis and
functional failure analysis;
d. the list of aspects to be considered included in Table 1.
5.1.2 Contents
To identify the items to be analysed, the following steps should be performed.
1. Check whether the Contract contains specific requirements on Sneak
Analysis:
-- if yes, perform step 2 below;
-- if not, perform step 3 below.
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2. Take into account the requirements contained in the contract (e.g. “Sneak
Analysis to be applied to safety critical functions”) and by means of the
data contained in the documents quoted under 5.1.1.b and the results of
the RAMS analyses quoted under 5.1.1.c., define a list of functions and/or
items that are to be analysed. Define also the phases of the mission to be
considered. Go to step 4.
3. By means of the result of RAMS analyses quoted under 5.1.1.c, identify
the list of safety and reliability critical functions. Answer to the questions
contained in Table 1 for each of the the items contained in the safety or
reliability critical functions (in general a “yes’”answer to a question con-
tained in table increases either the likelihood that the item could contain
sneak circuits or the magnitude of the consequences of the manifestation
of a sneak circuit). Synthesise the results obtained through the applica-
tion of the questions contained in Table 1.
4. To define the level of depth of the analysis, take into account the results
of step 2 (or 3) and, according to the available documentation, check
whether the analysis is to be performed at lower levels (e.g. subsystem,
assembly, equipment or component level). This can be done by using at
the relevant level the questions of Table 1.
5.1.3 Outputs
The following information shall be identified:
a. the items that are to be analysed;
b. the mission phases to be considered;
c. the level of depth to be reached.
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Table 1: Aspects to be considered when defining the analysis scope
Safety and Reliability Consequences

D Does the loss or inadvertent activation of the item lead to catastrophic or criti-
cal safety consequences?
D Does the loss or inadvertent activation of the item lead to loss, or considerable
degradation, of the mission?
Design aspects: general

D Is testing under all operating modes impossible and/or not planned?
D Is it impossible or difficult to eliminate or control the consequences of a sneak
circuit manifestation during system operations?
D Is the item involved in command-control or power functions?
D Is the item interfacing with several other items?
D Has the item several modes of operation?
Design aspects: electrical systems

D Is there functional interaction between the primary power sources?
D Is the “0 Volt” scheme complex?
D Is there functional interaction between the secondary power sources?
Programmatic aspects
D Are there several interfaces manufactured by different suppliers?
D Have many modifications occurred since the beginning of the programme?
D Are many modifications expected?
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5.2 Data gathering
The aim of this task is to collect the input data necessary for the performance of
a Sneak Analysis.
5.2.1 Inputs
a. list of items under analysis (see task “definition of analysis scope”);
b. level of depth of the analysis (see task “definition of analysis scope”);
c. the documents (e.g. see 4.3) containing the design and operations data for the
above quoted items;
d. the clue list (see 2.1).
5.2.2 Contents
The following sub-tasks should be performed.
5.2.2.1 Screening of available documentation

Identify the parts of the documents quoted under 5.2.1.c that are relevant to the
items under analysis at the required level of depth.
5.2.2.2 Homogeneity control

Check, from a configuration management point of view, the homogeneity of the
documents that have been gathered under 5.2.2.1.
5.2.2.3 Familiarisation with the documentation

Become familiar with the documentation screened under 5.2.2.1.
During this process, there might be the need to ask the authors of the documents
for clarification.
If not familiar with some key design or technology issues addressed in the docu-
mentation, perform a bibliographic research and/or consult “experts” on these is-
sues.
5.2.2.4 Tailoring of the clue list

Taking into account the scope of the application, the list of items under analysis
and the level of depth:
D supplement the clues contained in 5.2.1.d with other clues derived from the
knowledge available at the Supplier; and/or
D tailor the list of clues contained in 5.2.1.d by discarding the ones that one not
relevant for the application in order to improve the efficiency of the analysis.
5.2.2.5 Documentation of the findings

Document the outcome of the previous sub-tasks. In particular, make sure that:
D the points related to lack of documentation homogeneity or the requests for
clarification are discussed with the product assurance and engineering per-
sonnel;
D the interfaces (between items or between elements of an item) are unambigu-
ously described as pertains to labelling, kind of causality flow (e.g. current,
logical control) crossing the interface, specified characteristics of the flow (e.g.
current value, rise/fall time), characteristics of the flow that are to be con-
sidered during Sneak Analysis (if they are only a subset of the specified char-
acteristics), timing constraints.
Give particular attention to the interfaces between hardware and software items.
Identify real time issues, software asynchronous behaviour and constraints on
control flow sequence.
22
If necessary aggregate information spread in several different documents (e.g. for

a multi-board electronic equipment, if the data and control interfaces between be-
tween different boards are spread over several documents and drawings it might
be useful to establish a synthetic sketch showing the above interfaces).
5.2.3 Outputs
The following information shall be identified:
a. the parts of the documentation that are relevant for the analysis;
b. the points where a lack of homogeneity has been identified;
c. the requests for additional information or clarification;
d. the definition of the interfaces of the items that are to be analysed;
e. the clue list to be used for the application.
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5.3 Hierarchical design decomposition
The aim of this task is to produce a decomposition into “blocks” of the design of
the items that are subject to Sneak Analysis. For each block the (sub)functions
performed and the inputs and outputs are documented. This hierarchical decom-
position is of use during the following tasks of the analysis because:
D it allows the systems to be subdivided into blocks that are easily manageable
(both in terms of size and understandability) by the analysts;
D it establishes a clear cross-reference between the required functions and the
actual design;
D it supports the assessment of the consequences of the sneak circuits (see sub-
clause 5.7).
5.3.1 Inputs
a. the list of items that are included in the scope of the analysis (see task “defini-
tion of the analysis scope”);
b. the depth of the analysis (see task “definition of the analysis scope”);
c. the documentation relevant to the items under analysis (see task “data
gathering”);
d. the items’ interfaces (see task “data gathering”).
5.3.2 Contents
If a hierarchical decomposition compatible with the one described in this clause
is already available as a result of other Product Assurance or engineering acti-
vities (e.g. in the form of SADT, SART, Data flow diagrams), this task should not
be performed.
Otherwise the following sub-tasks should be performed on the items within the
scope of the analysis.
5.3.2.1 Design decomposition

Take an item and, by looking at the documentation, identify its functions. Identify
precisely the kind (e.g. data, electric current) and the origin of its inputs and out-
puts. Identify the part of the item that is associated mainly with a single item
function. Define this part as a “design block”. Repeat the previous step for all the
items’ functions. Once this has been done, identify the interfaces (e.g. in terms
of data, electric current) between the various blocks. To avoid confusion, use the
names of the interfaces mentioned in the documentation also in the blocks. Depict
the above decomposition in graphical format. If necessary, go to the next level of
decomposition and apply the above procedure to each block.
Repeat the above steps until the level that is above the lowest one that is of in-
terest for Sneak Analysis is reached (e.g. if the analysis is to performed at compo-
nent level for an electronic system, the decomposition is to arrive at board level).
During the stepwise decomposition, the results of the functional analysis (if per-
formed during earlier phases of the programme) can be used to drive the identifi-
cation of the boundaries of the blocks.
Figures 2A and 2B provide an example of the above decomposition for an electri-
cal system F. This system receives control signals E1, E2, E3, power signals W1
and W2, has return current connections through signals M1, M2, M3 and gener-
ates output signals S1, S2, S3 (see Figure 2A). An initial decomposition could lead,
for example, to a diagram such as that shown in Figure 2B, where 3 blocks, each
associated to a function have been identified.
24
Figure 2A
Legend: In “Snm”, “n” is the block number and “m” is the signal number
Figure 2B
Figure 2: Illustration of design decomposition
25
5.3.2.2 Documentation of the design decomposition
Document the following information for each block:
D system concerned;
D description of the block;
D block diagram (e.g. see Figure 2B for block F);
D functions performed by the block;
D design characteristic of the block;
D interfaces with other blocks.
5.3.3 Outputs
Through performance of this task , a hierarchical decomposition into blocks of the
items to be analysed shall be derived.
26
5.4 Synthesis of input/output matrix

The “input/output matrix” documents the elementary events (i.e. in this context
the changes in the items’ inputs) that trigger changes in the items’ outputs under
consideration.
5.4.1 Inputs
b. the level of depth of the analysis (see task “definition of the analysis scope”);
c. the mission phases that are to be considered for the various items (see task
“definition of the analysis scope”);
d. the documentation relevant for the items under a. (see task “data gather-
ing”);
e. the design blocks associated with the items under consideration (see task “hi-
erarchical design decomposition”).
5.4.2 Contents
If the input/output matrix and the operational sequence representation are al-
ready available as a result of product assurance or engineering activities in a for-
mat that is compatible with the one described in the following, this task should
not be performed.
Otherwise the following sub-tasks should be performed.
5.4.2.1 Documentation of operational modes

Identify (by using inputs 5.4.1.c and 5.4.1.d) all the planned operational modes
for the item during the mission phases to be analysed.
If simultaneous changes of operational modes for several items are planned, pin-
point them for further consideration in the next tasks (they are possible sources
of sneak timings).
5.4.2.2 Identification of elementary switching events

Identify (by using inputs 5.4.1.d and 5.4.1.e) the elementary events that trigger
the item outputs. These elementary events are for example:
D (for hardware) on/off commands, power source selection, configuration com-
mands;
D (for software) reconfiguration, memory and/or register initialisation.
5.4.2.3 Input/output matrix at the highest level of design

decomposition
Construct the input/output matrix as follows:
D enter in each row head a planned operational mode;
D enter in each column head the name of an item input or output;
D enter in the various matrix entries the state of each input or output for the
various operational modes.
An example of the format of the matrix (for the item depicted in Figure 2A) is pro-
vided in Table 2.
27
Table 2: Example of input/output matrix
Input/Output On/Off Reset Start +5VD +40VD Reset Stand-by Heater

Matrix E1 E2 E1 C C lamp lamp S3
W1 W2 S1 S2
Off state 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Reset mode 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0
Wait mode 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
Heater 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0
transition
Heater mode 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1
Safe mode 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0
5.4.2.4 Input/output matrix at lower levels of design

decomposition
In some cases, it can be useful to build an input/output matrix for some of the
lower level blocks (the matrix at these low level of design decomposition is also
called “switching matrix” at it documents the state of the “switches” contained in
the design). The selection of these blocks is to be done on a case-by-case basis.
The criteria to be taken into account are:
D the complexity of the block architecture;
D the impact of a change in the block outputs on the output of the item.
The switching matrix can be built in a way similar to the one presented in the
previous sub-tasks. The operational modes are the same as the ones identified
there.
Exercise discipline when identifying switching matrices at low level of design de-
composition in order to avoid a combinatorial explosion of the number of entries
in these matrices.
5.4.2.5 Operational sequence representation

Using the outcome of subtasks 5.4.2.1 and 5.4.2.2, and the input 5.4.1.d, the se-
quence of operational modes for each item under analysis shall be identified and
documented (e.g. in the form of timelines).
5.4.3 Outputs
Through performance of this task (or retrieval of outputs from other product as-
surance or engineering tasks) the following information shall be derived:
a. input/output matrix at the first level of design decomposition;
b. identification of instances of simultaneous switching;
c. input/output matrices for some of the lower level blocks (and list of relevant
blocks).
d. operational sequence representation for the items under analysis.
28
5.5 Sneak path analysis

The aim of this task is to identify sneak circuits, mainly sneak paths, sneak tim-
ings and sneak indications.
5.5.1 Inputs
b. the design decomposition of the above items (see task “hierarchical design de-
composition”);
c. the input/output matrix (see task “synthesis of input/output matrix”);
d. the results of the top-level RAMS analyses (e.g. preliminary hazard analysis,
functional failure analysis);
e. the documentation relevant for the items under analysis (see task “data
gathering”);
f. the instance of simultaneous switching of different items (see task “synthesis
of input/output matrix”);
g. the operational sequence representation (see task “synthesis of input/output
matrix”).
5.5.2 Contents
5.5.2.1 Identification of the targets

Within the items that are to be analysed, “targets” for the sneak path analysis
shall be identified.
This can be done, for each planned operational mode, by identifying the safety or
reliability critical outputs that are either required or to be inhibited.
In carrying this step the inputs 5.5.1.b and 5.5.1.d are used.
5.5.2.2 Identification of the sources

The resources (e.g. electrical current) and the associated “sources” (e.g. batteries)
that are to be studied in connection with the targets shall be identified.
The dependence (if any) of the sources on the operational modes is to be noted.
5.5.2.3 Identification of the intended and undesired causal

relationships (“path clues”) between sources and
targets
a. For each operational mode, the intended causal relations between the states
of the sources and the states of the targets should be identified. Use the data
contained in inputs 5.5.1.b and 5.5.1.c for this purpose.
b. Then the unintended causal relations (i.e. by definition all the relations in
the source/target space that are different from the intended ones) should be
identified.
c. Finally, the undesired causal relations (i.e. the subset of the unintended ones
that lead to the loss or the inadvertent activation of the targets) shall be
identified.
It is noted that these “undesired causal relations” are the “path clues” (see
also 4.1 and Annex A) that are relevant for the sources and targets under
examination.
29
5.5.2.4 Identification of the resource paths
a. The paths that link the sources to the targets through the system structure
(e.g. electrical drawings) should be identified for each operational mode. The
analyst can thus follow the flow of the resource on the path.
b. For those parts of the items that have a complex structure, the task may be
simplified in some cases by replacing the actual structure by the relevant
block (see task “hierarchical design decomposition”).
c. The paths should be identified through the following steps (see Figure 3 for
an illustration of the process):
1. choose a target;
2. select an undesired relation (“path clue”) between a target and one or
more sources (e.g. target is “off” when sources are “on”);
3. choose a source;
4. select an operational mode;
5. trace all the paths between the target and the source that are compatible
with:
* the input/output matrix;
* the characteristics of the components between the source and the
target (e.g. in electrical systems a diode allows current to flow in only
one direction);
* the undesired relation under consideration (e.g. for targets asso-
ciated with required functions, the paths that can disconnect the
target from the source[s] will be searched. For targets associated
with undesired functions, any path that can connect any of the
sources to the target will be searched);
6. repeat step 5 until there are no more operational modes.
30
Identification of the targets
Identification of the sources
Identification of the intended and undesired causal relationships between

sources and targets
Identification of the “resource” paths
1. choose a target
2. select an undesired relation between a

target and one or more sources
3. choose a source
4. select an operational mode
5. trace all the compatible paths that can

be found between the target and the
source
6. repeat until no more

operational modes
7. repeat until no more new

sources
8. repeat until all undesired

relations have been dealt
with
9. repeat until all targets

have been dealt with
End
Figure 3: Path identification process
31
7. select a new source and repeat steps 4 to 6 until all sources have been dealt
with. At this stage:
(a) if the identified paths do not provide a route for the actual occurrence
of the undesired relation, go to the next undesired relation (step 8);
(b) if the paths allow the undesired relation to occur then a potential
sneak circuit has been found. The designers shall be consulted to
check whether the problem is a real one. If this is the case, the sneak
circuit consequences shall be assessed (see task “assessment of sneak
circuit consequences”);
(c) if it cannot be decided whether there is a sneak circuit or not, per-
form the sub-task “Detailed path analysis” (see 5.5.2.5 below). Addi-
tionally if there are items on the paths that are controlled by soft-
ware, perform the “hardware/software path analysis” (see 5.5.2.6
below).
8. repeat steps 2 to 7 until all undesired relations have been dealt with;
9. repeat steps 1 to 8 until all targets have been dealt with.
For manual identification of path, it is useful to have a number of copies of the
drawings/diagrams/flow charts on which the various paths can be marked. The
availability of a computer program is obviously beneficial for performing the path
identification.
5.5.2.5 Detailed path analysis

1. Identify the components on the path under analysis that need to be stu-
died in more detail. For these components the following steps should be
repeated (see Figure 4 for an illustration of this process):
2. Pick-up a “component+path” clue;
3. Try and provide a direct answer by:
* checking the switching matrix; or
* inspecting the drawings, flow-charts or block diagrams containing
the path; or
* consulting the documentation gathered in the task “data gathering”;
or
* identifying “facilitation conditions”, i.e. combinations of states of sys-
tem components (e.g. interlocks) that enable the condition men-
tioned in the clue to be triggered. This identification can be done by
tracing “facilitation paths” from the “facilitation” components back-
wards to the components that control them (see Figure 5 for an il-
lustration of this concept); or
* performing a simple quantitative analysis (bounding calculation).
4. If there is still no answer to the clue, carry out one or more of the following
actions:
* consult experts;
* perform detailed quantitative analysis;
* use testing on breadboard or prototype models.
5. If the clue under examination does not lead to a sneak circuit, go to the
next clue;
6. If a potential sneak circuit is detected through performance of steps 1 to
5, the designers shall be consulted to check whether the problem is a real
one). If this is the case, the sneak circuit consequences shall be assessed
(see task “assessment of sneak circuit consequences”).
32
Clue application
NOT COMPLEX complexity of the COMPLEX

upraised problem?
IMMEDIATE PROCESSING OF NECESSITY OF A MORE

THE CLUE DETAILED ANALYSIS
- switching matrix
- inspection of the drawings, ... - consultation of experts
- consultation of the documentation - detailed quantitative analysis
- identification of “facilitation - breadboard or prototype testing
conditions”
- simple quantitative analysis
has a sneak circuit

been found?
YES
NO
Assessment of sneak circuit

consequences
repeat until all

“component+path” clues
have been dealt with
END
Figure 4: Illustration of answering process to “component+path” clues
33
TARGET
“facilitation” component
SOURCE
ITEM THAT CONTROLS

THE “FACILITATION”
COMPONENT
all the links that are part of the system
a “resource” path identified between the source and the target
a “facilitation” path from the “facilitation” component

backward to the item that controls it
Figure 5: Illustration of facilitation path search
5.5.2.6 Hardware/software path analysis

1. For items along the path that are controlled by software, an analysis of
the software shall be performed to identify whether the software can lead
to the following events:
* to inadvertent or untimely activation or inhibition of the item;
* to improper command sequence to the item(s) or improper input data
to the item(s).
2. The procedure specified in Annex C should be used to carry out the above
analysis.
34
3. It shall be assessed whether the events found during step 1 of 5.5.2.5,

when considered with the path under analysis can lead to a sneak circuit
(i.e. an undesired causal relation between source and target).
4. If a potential sneak circuit is detected through performance of steps 1 to
3, the designers shall be consulted to check whether the problem is a real
one). If this is the case, the sneak circuit consequences shall be assessed
(see task “assessment of sneak circuit consequences”).
5.5.2.7 Sneak timing

Through the above process, those sneak circuits (i.e. sneak paths, sneak timings,
sneak indications) that are a manifestation of undesired causal relations can be
identified.
For those clues pointing out to timing problems (e.g. races, timing discrepancies
between interfacing hardware and software items), a timing analysis should be
performed. Use shall be made of inputs 5.5.1.f and 5.5.1.g.
This analysis, especially for digital items, will require in most cases the availabil-
ity of relatively sophisticated simulation tools. Only in the simpler cases, the man-
ual use of timeline diagrams is sufficient.
5.5.3 Outputs
The following information shall be derived:
a. list of targets;
b. list of sources;
c. intended relations between sources and targets;
d. undesired relations (path clues) between sources and targets;
e. sneak circuits.
5.6 Design concern analysis

The aim of this task is to identify design concerns and sneak labels.
5.6.1 Inputs
a. the list of “atomic items”, i.e. the ones at the lower hierarchical level of design
decomposition that is of interest (see task “definition of analysis scope”);
b. the documentation relevant for the items under a. (see task “data gather-
ing”);
c. the list of operational modes (see task “definition of analysis scope”);
d. the hierarchical design decomposition (see associated task).
5.6.2 Contents
The following steps 1 to 4 should be performed for all atomic items:
1. Select an operational mode.
2. Apply the “component” clues that match the characteristic of the item and
are relevant during the selected operational mode. For each clue, try and
provide an answer according to the process shown in Figure 6.
3. Treat drawing errors spotted during the application of the component
clues as design concerns (or sneak labels if they are related to labelling
of man-machine interfaces). Flag missing information instances to engin-
eering.
35
SELECT AN ITEM
Select an operational mode
Apply the “component” clues

(that match the characteristic of the item
and are relevant during the selected opera-
tional mode)
NOT COM- complexity of the COMPLEX

PLEX upraised problem?
IMMEDIATE PROCESSING OF NECESSITY OF A MORE

THE CLUE DETAILED ANALYSIS
- inspection of the block description

containing the item (see task - consultation of experts
“hierarchical design - detailed quantitative analysis
decomposition”) - breadboard or prototype testing
- consultation of the documentation
- simple quantitative analysis
has a designconcern
been found?
YES
NO
Assessment of design concern

consequences
repeat until all “component”

clues have been dealt with
repeat until until there are

no more operational
modes
repeat until there are no

more items
END
Figure 6: Illustration of design concern analysis and answering process to

“component” clues
36
4. Repeat steps 2 to 3 until there are no more operational modes

5. For all the candidate design concerns and sneak labels detected, consult
the designers to check whether the problem is a real one. If this is the case,
their consequences shall be assessed (see task “assessment of sneak cir-
cuit consequences”).
5.6.3 Outputs
The following outputs shall be produced:
a. design concerns;
b. missing information instances;.
c. sneak labels.
5.7 Assessment of sneak circuit consequences

The aim of this task is to assess the consequences of a sneak circuit or design con-
cern up to the higher level of design decomposition that is of interest.
5.7.1 Inputs
a. the list of items subjected to the sneak analysis (see task “definition of the
analysis scope”);
b. the list of operational modes (see task “definition of the analysis scope”);
c. the design blocks (see task “hierarchical design decomposition”);
d. the list of sneak circuits (see tasks “sneak path analysis” and “design concern
analysis”);
e. the list of design concerns (see task “design concern analysis”).
5.7.2 Contents
For each sneak circuit or design concern identified during the previous tasks the
following steps shall be performed.
1. Retrieve the operational mode(s) under which the sneak circuit or design
concern was identified.
2. Assess the consequences of the sneak circuit or design concern on the next
higher hierarchical level of design decomposition. In doing so, take into
account:
* the operational mode;
* the characteristic of the design as described in the relevant blocks
(see task “hierarchical design decomposition”).
3. Repeat step 2 for the next higher decomposition level until the highest
level under consideration is reached. Document the consequence on
safety and/or reliability associated with the sneak circuit or design con-
cern under consideration.
4. Repeat steps 1 to 3 until there are no more sneak circuits or design con-
cerns.
NOTE In performing step 2 use can be made of the results of other
RAMS analyses (e.g. FMECA). It is also beneficial at this stage
to integrate the results of sneak analysis with the ones obtained
by other analyses (e.g. FMECA, hazard analysis) that are per-
formed in parallel. This will ensure consistency of the recom-
mendations for the elimination of the sneak circuits or design
concerns with the ones issued by the other RAMS analyses.
37
5.7.3 Outputs
The consequences on safety and/or reliability of each sneak circuit and design
concern shall be documented.
5.8 Reporting of findings

The aim of this task is to report about the identified sneak circuits and design con-
cerns, and the recommendations for their elimination.
5.8.1 Inputs
a. the sneak circuits and associated consequences (see task “assessment of
sneak circuit consequences”);
b. the design concerns and associated consequences (see task “assessment of
sneak circuit consequences”);
c. the documentation identified during the task “data gathering”;
d. the list of items subject to sneak analysis (see task “definition of analysis
scope”);
e. the mission phases to be considered (see task “definition of analysis scope”);
f. the design blocks (see task “hierarchical design decomposition”).
5.8.2 Contents
5.8.2.1 Sneak circuit reports

For each sneak circuit or design concern, a “sneak circuit report” containing the
entries (up to the “problem identification” one) included in the form contained in
Annex B shall be prepared. Use information 5.8.1.c to 5.8.1.f for this purpose.
5.8.2.2 Grouping of sneak circuit reports

The reports related to the same items (e.g. subsystems, assemblies, equipments,
components) shall be gathered and it shall be checked whether a correlation can
be established between the problems mentioned in different reports.
This approach makes it possible, in some cases, to identify new problems that are
due to the synergic effect of several sneak circuits.
In these cases, new sneak circuit reports shall be raised.
5.8.2.3 Issue of recommendations

a. In collaboration with engineering, the options for elimination of the identi-
fied sneak circuits and design concerns shall be studied and the sneak circuit
reports shall be completed by adding the appropriate recommendation(s) for
elimination.
b. Eventually, for each identified recommendation, evidence of its implementa-
tion and verification shall be obtained and documented in the sneak circuit
report.
c. Concurrence of the supplier’s product assurance manager and the project
manager on both the recommendations and their implementation and verifi-
cation shall be obtained.
5.8.3 Outputs
The sneak circuit reports containing the information required in Annex B shall
be issued.
38
5.9 Compilation of the final report

The sneak analysis report is intended:
D to list all the documents that have been used and/or issued during the previous
tasks;
D to describe all the problems that have been identified during the analysis;
D to describe the recommendations that have been issued to solve these prob-
lems.
5.9.1 Inputs
The inputs that should be used for this task are all the outputs from the previous
tasks.
5.9.2 Contents
5.9.2.1 Compilation
The supplier shall compile the sneak analysis report, including as a minimum the
information listed in clause 6.
5.9.2.2 Issue of the report

It may be acceptable to issue the sneak analysis report before all the recommenda-
tions issued by the analysis have been implemented and verified.
In these cases the supplier shall explain to the customer how the recommenda-
tions that are not yet implemented and verified will be followed-up.
5.9.3 Outputs
The sneak analysis report shall be issued.
39
40
Sneak analysis report
6.1 Content of the report

The supplier shall produce a sneak analysis report containing:
D document number, issue, revision and date of reference and applicable docu-
ments (including reference to the sources of clue list);
D an introduction recalling and justifying the analysis scope (items to be ana-
lysed, operational modes to be considered, depth of analysis);
D identification of the parts (section, paragraph, page) of the documents
(number, issue, revision, date) that were considered relevant as input informa-
tion for the analysis;
D summary of the requests for clarification issued, their answers and status;
D the results of the hierarchical decomposition of the design (or reference to the
document containing it);
D the input/output matrices (or reference to the document containing them);
D the list of targets, list of sources, intended relations between sources and
targets, undesired relations between sources and targets considered during
the analysis;
D the list of cases where lack of data was found in the input data;
D the sneak circuit reports, their associated recommendations and status;
D other problems that although not classifiable as sneak circuits or design con-
cerns could lead to an undesirable impact on system safety and/or reliability
and have not been identified by other RAMS analyses;
D the new clues synthesised during the analysis (if any);
D conclusion (with a summary table of sneak circuits and design concerns and
their status) outlining the major problems found.
6.2 Approval of the report

The sneak analysis report shall be signed by the analyst(s) and shall be approved
by the supplier’s product assurance manager and project manager.
41
42
Annex A (informative)
Derivation of path clues
The following illustrates how the path clues can be derived.

If a static relation between sources and targets is considered and their states can
be modelled as binary variables, then all the path clues can be derived from the
following two (generic) clues:
a. Can an undesired causal flow switch-on the targets?
b. Can an undesired causal flow switch-off the targets?
If the relation is time-dependent (i.e. the targets have to be “on” or “off” only
during a certain time interval) then the following generic clues have to be
added to the previous ones:
c. Can an intended causal flow switch-on the target at the wrong time?
d. Can an intended causal flow switch-off the target at the wrong time?
To identify the (specific) path clues for a given number of binary targets and
sources the following steps have to be followed:
1. build the state table for the set identified by the targets and the sources;
2. identify all the unwanted set states in which at least one of the targets is
“on”. To these states apply the generic clue “a” (and “c” if the relation is
time dependent) to derive the specific clues;
3. identify all the unwanted set states in which at least one of the targets is
“off”. To these states apply the generic clue “b” (and “d” if the relation is
time dependent) to derive the specific clues.
For example, if the intended relation between a target T and two sources S1 and
S2 is an “AND” and all the other relations are undesired, then clue a) generates
the three following specific clues:
S Can T be on when S1 is ON and S2 is OFF?
SCan T be on when is S1 is OFF and S2 is ON?
SCan T be on when both S1 and S2 are OFF? and clue b) now gives the follow-
ing specific clue:
S Can T be off when both S1 and S2 are on?
A similar approach can be followed to derive the path clues when targets and
sources are not binary, but can assume only a finite number to states.
43
The above approach for the identification of path clues is a viable one if the total
number of binary sources (N) and targets (M) considered is reasonably small.
Otherwise the coverage of all the possible path clues (2**[N+M]) becomes un-
wieldy (if not impossible) for complex systems. In this last case, the analyst should
limit the number of relevant path clues by:
S checking whether some targets are related only to a subset of sources; and
S using path clues that are related only to the most critical targets (according
to the results of preliminary hazard analysis and functional failure analy-
sis).
44
Annex B (normative)
Sneak circuit report form
45
SNEAK CIRCUIT REPORT

Reference: PROJECT:
Issue: FUNCTION:
Revision: Subsystem:
Date: Equipment:
Page: Phase:
HAZARD CONSEQUENCE SEVERITY
RELIABILITY FAILURE EFFECT SEVERITY CATEGORY
CONFIGURATION ITEM REFERENCE:
DESCRIPTION OF FUNCTION/ITEM:
PROBLEM TITLE:
PROBLEM TYPE:
SNEAK SNEAK SNEAK SNEAK DESIGN
PATH TIMING INDICATION LABEL CONCERN
PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION (including CAUSES and ESTIMATED EFFECTS):
ANALYST
prepared by
Name, date & signature

RECOMMENDATIONS:
IMPLEMENTATION AND VERIFICATION OF RECOMMENDATOINS:
ANALYST APPROVAL
prepared by PA Manager Project Manager
Name, date & signature Name, date & signature Name, date & signature
46
Annex C (normative)
Sneak analysis applied to computer software
The aim of this task is to identify “facilitation conditions” related to the software
which can lead to the unwanted activation or deactivation of equipment.
C.1 Inputs
b. the design decomposition of the above items (see task “hierarchical design de-
composition”);
c. the relevant input/output matrices (see task “synthesis of input/output ma-
trix);
d. the results of the “top level” RAMS analysis (e.g. preliminary hazards analy-
sis, functional failure analysis);
e. the documentation relevant for the items under analysis (see task “data
gathering”).
f. the targets, sources, the undesired relations (and the corresponding paths)
between target and sources, that were identified at HW/SW level (see task
“sneak path analysis).
C.2 Contents
C.2.1 Preparation
a. By reviewing the results (see C.1.f) of sneak path analysis at HW/SW level,
the hardware items that are controlled by software shall be identified;
b. using the documentation (see C.1.e) on the HW/SW interfaces and on the soft-
ware, the control commands and data issued by the software to the hardware
items shall be identified;
c. the inputs to the software under analysis coming from the other hardware
or software items shall also be identified.
47
C.2.2 Sneak path analysis in computer software
The following procedure for sneak path analysis in computer software should be
followed:
1. choose as “intermediate targets” for the analysis in the software the com-
mands and data outputs identified by performing sub--task C.2.1;
2. pick--up one intermediate target in the scope of the analysis;
3. trace a (facilitation) path in the software flow chart or data flow diagram
backwards from the intermediate target to the software inputs (e.g. input
registers, data initialisation instructions, operator commands, program
start). Record the “logical condition” necessary for the path to be followed
(e.g. if a path traverses the statement “IF x>0 THEN ...”, the logical condi-
tion for the “YES” branch is “x>0”);
4. check the path as it is built up by comparing it with the input/output ma-
trix. If there is no operating mode which allows the path to be activated,
abandon the path. Also abandon the path if the logical condition for the
path simplifies to “FALSE”;
5. continue the path trace as far as the software inputs;
6. apply software “component+path” clues to the software instructions (e.g.
conditionals, loops, function calls, assignments) along the path;
7. assess whether the software can lead to the unwanted or untimely activa-
tion (or deactivation) of the intermediate target.
8. repeat steps 3 to 7 for the various paths through the software under
analysis. It is noted that the number of paths to be analysed is limited for
software where the two following requirements apply (as it generally the
case nowadays):
* the software shall be composed of modules;
* each software shall have low cyclomatic complexity (e.g. less 10).
If for the software under analysis the two above quoted requirements are
not applicable, then appropriate heuristic criteria might need to be de-
fined, in coordination with the software engineering and product assur-
ance functions, to keep under control the number of paths to be analysed.
9. repeat steps 3 to 8 for all intermediate targets;
10. by reviewing the results of the above steps check that the software com-
mands are provided according to the required sequence and the software
output data is within the allowed ranges.
C.3 Outputs
The following outputs shall be derived:
a. list of intermediate targets;
b. facilitation conditions in the software that lead to unwanted or untimely ac-
tivation (or deactivation) of the intermediate targets;
c. list of cases where improper sequence of commands or improper output data
is produced by the software.
48
Annex D (informative)
Bibliography
A list of papers, available in the public literature, that contain either useful in-
formation about aspects of the sneak analysis procedure or examples of applica-
tion of the procedure is included in this Annex. A short comment has been added
after certain papers to explain the objective of the paper (if this is not clear from
the title).
a. Taylor, J.R., Sneak analysis course notes, ITSA 90--11--1, October 1991.
Section 3, 4, 5 of this report contain guidance and examples anout the application of
the the sneak path analysis (see section 5.5 of this standard). The report is available
through the ESA/ESTEC/QP division.
b. Proceedings of the sneak analysis workshop, ESA/ESTEC WPP--033, Noord-
wijk, June 1992.
The results of several applications of sneak analysis in Europe are summarized in
these proceedings. They could be of use mainly with respect to the tasks described
in sections 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, 5.6, 5.7, 5.8 of this standard. These proceedings are available
through the ESA/ESTEC Technical documentation center.
c. Sneak circuit analysis. A means to verify design integrity, USA Departement
of the Navy, NAVSO P--3634, August 1987
This report provides an overview about sneak analysis benefits and applicability, an
outline of results of previous applications of sneak analysis in the USA and guidance
on its implementation. It is noted that the sneak analysis procedure is different from
the one contained in this standard. This report could be of use with respect to the tasks
described in sections 5.1, 5.2, 5.4 and 5.6 of this standard.
d. Dore, B., Lessons learned from pilot applications of sneak analysis in space
projects, ESA SP--337, pp. 359--363, Noordwijk, May 1996.
e. Dore, B. & Norstrom, J.G., Pilot application of sneak analysis on computer
controlled satellite equipment, Proceedings of Probabilistic Safety Asses-
sment and Management Conference, pp. 1590--1596, Springer, London, 1996
This paper could be of use with respect to the task described in Annex C of this stan-
dard.
f. De Mateo, G., Application of sneak analysis to hydraulic systems, ESA/
ESTEC EWP--1801, Noodwijk, October 1994.
This report contains the results of an application of Sneak path analysis to hydraulic
(e.g. propulsion) systems. It could be of use with respect to the tasks described in sec-
49
tions 5.4 and 5.5 of this standard. This report is available through the ESA/ESTEC
Technical documentation center.
50
ECSS Document Improvement Proposal

1. Document I.D. 2. Document Date 3. Document Title
ECSS--Q--40--04A Part 1 14 October 1997 Sneak analysis -- Part 1:
Method and procedure
4. Recommended Improvement (identify clauses, subclauses and include modified text
and/or graphic, attach pages as necessary)
5. Reason for Recommendation
6. Originator of recommendation
Name: Organization:
Address: Phone: 7. Date of Submission:
Fax:
E--Mail:
8. Send to ECSS Secretariat

Name: Address: Phone: +31--71--565--3952
W. Kriedte Keplerlaan 1 Fax: +31--71--565--6839
ESA--TOS/QR 2200AG Noordwijk E--Mail: [email protected]
Netherlands
Note: The originator of the submission should complete items 4, 5, 6 and 7.
This form is available as a Word and Wordperfect--Template on internet under
http://www.estec.esa.nl/ecss/improve/
51
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ECSS-Q-40-04A Part 1

Sneak analysis - Part 1: Method and

Published by: ESA Publications Division

(This page is intentionally left blank)

3 Definitions and abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

4 Sneak analysis basic principles and application . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

4.1 Sneak analysis basic concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

5 Sneak analysis procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

5.1 Definition of the analysis scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

6 Sneak analysis report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

6.1 Content of the report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

Annex A (informative) Derivation of path clues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

Annex B (normative) Sneak circuit report form . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

Annex C (normative) Sneak analysis applied to computer

Annex D (informative) Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

Figure 1: Outline of sneak analysis procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Table 1: Aspects to be considered when defining the analysis scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

(This page is intentionally left blank)

This ECSS Standard incorporates by dated or undated reference, provisions from

ECSS--P--001 Glossary of terms

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Definitions and abbreviations

Sneak analysis basic principles and

4.1 Sneak analysis basic concepts

4.2 Sneak analysis basic steps

5.1 Definition of analysis scope

5.2 Data gathering

5.3 Hierachical design

5.4 Synthesis of I/O matrix

5.5 Sneak path analysis

5.7 Assessment of sneak circuit

5.8 Reporting of findings

5.9 Compilation of the final report

Figure 1: Outline of sneak analysis procedure

4.4 Sneak analysis application guidance

4.4.2 Computerised tools

4.4.3 Delta analysis

4.4.4 Application domain

Sneak analysis procedure

The Sneak Analysis procedure specified in this document is composed of tasks

5.1 Definition of the analysis scope

Table 1: Aspects to be considered when defining the analysis scope

Safety and Reliability Consequences

Design aspects: general

Design aspects: electrical systems

5.2.2.1 Screening of available documentation

5.2.2.2 Homogeneity control

5.2.2.3 Familiarisation with the documentation

5.2.2.4 Tailoring of the clue list

5.2.2.5 Documentation of the findings

If necessary aggregate information spread in several different documents (e.g. for

5.3.2.1 Design decomposition

Figure 2: Illustration of design decomposition

5.4 Synthesis of input/output matrix

5.4.2.1 Documentation of operational modes

5.4.2.2 Identification of elementary switching events

5.4.2.3 Input/output matrix at the highest level of design

Input/Output On/Off Reset Start +5VD +40VD Reset Stand-by Heater

5.4.2.4 Input/output matrix at lower levels of design

5.4.2.5 Operational sequence representation

5.5 Sneak path analysis

5.5.2.1 Identification of the targets

5.5.2.2 Identification of the sources

5.5.2.3 Identification of the intended and undesired causal