Constitutional Law II – Police Power

CASE DIGESTS

Jacobson vs. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905)

FACTS:

In 1902, during a smallpox outbreak centered in Massachusetts, minister Henning Jacobson emphatically
refused to comply with the town's order that all its adult citizens be vaccinated. Jacobson claimed while
he was a child, a vaccine had made him seriously ill.

Jacobson refused vaccination saying that "he and his son had had bad reactions to earlier vaccinations"
as children and that Jacobson himself "had been caused great and extreme suffering for a long period by
a disease produced by vaccination". Jacobson believed that his family may have some sort of hereditary
condition that made the smallpox vaccine particularly dangerous.

Over the next three years until his case reached the Supreme Court of the United States, Jacobson argued
that subjecting him to a fine or imprisonment for neglecting or refusing vaccination was an invasion of his
liberty, the law was "unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive", and that one should not be subjected to
the law if he or she objects to vaccination, no matter the reason.

He was ordered to pay a $5 fine, but refused to pay it, claiming that compulsory inoculation violated both
the state and federal constitutions. The courts rejected this argument.

ISSUE:

WON the scope of the state’s police power include the authority to enact reasonable regulations in order
to protect public health and safety.

HELD:

Yes. In order to protect public health and safety, the scope of the state’s police power includes the
authority to enact reasonable regulations to do so. The Constitution secures liberty for every person
within its jurisdiction, but does not give an absolute right for each person to be free from restraint at all
times and in all circumstances. Every person is required to be subject to various restraints for the common
good. The efforts by Cambridge to stamp out smallpox are substantially related to the protection of public
health and safety. There has been nothing to clearly justify the Court holding the statute to be
unconstitutional.

The police power of a state must be held to embrace, at least, such reasonable regulations established
directly by legislative enactment that will protect the public health and the public safety. The mode or
manner is within the discretion of the state, subject only to the condition that no rule prescribed by a
state, nor any regulation adopted by a local governmental agency acting under the sanction of state
legislation, shall contravene the Constitution of the United States. A local enactment or regulation must
always yield in case of conflict with the exercise by the general government of any power it possesses
under the Constitution, or with any right which that instrument gives or secures.
 Phil. Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI) vs. Hon. Drilon, June 30, 1988

FACTS:

Phil association of Service Exporters, Inc., is engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers,
male and female of overseas employment. It challenges the constitutional validity of Dept. Order No. 1
(1998) of DOLE entitled “Guidelines Governing the Temporary Suspension of Deployment of Filipino
Domestic and Household Workers.”

It claims that such order is a discrimination against males and females. The Order does not apply to all
Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills, and that it is in violation of
the right to travel, it also being an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power.

Further, PASEI invokes Sec 3 of Art 13 of the Constitution, providing for worker participation in policy and
decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law. Thereafter the
Solicitor General on behalf of DOLE submitting to the validity of the challenged guidelines involving the
police power of the State and informed the court that the respondent have lifted the deployment ban in
some states where there exists bilateral agreement with the Philippines and existing mechanism providing
for sufficient safeguards to ensure the welfare and protection of the Filipino workers.

ISSUE:

Whether or not D.O. No. 1 of DOLE is constitutional as it is an exercise of police power.

RULING:

Police power has been defined as the "state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal
liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare." As defined, it consists of: (1) an imposition
of restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in order to foster the common good. It is not capable of an exact
definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its all-comprehensive embrace.

“The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the contested measure should be nullified. There
is no question that Department Order No. 1 applies only to "female contract workers," but it does not
thereby make an undue discrimination between the sexes. It is well-settled that "equality before the law"
under the Constitution does not import a perfect Identity of rights among all men and women. It admits
of classifications, provided that (1) such classifications rest on substantial distinctions; (2) they are
germane to the purposes of the law; (3) they are not confined to existing conditions; and (4) they apply
equally to all members of the same class.

The Court is satisfied that the classification made - the preference for female workers — rests on
substantial distinctions.
Miners Association of the Philippines, Inc. vs. Hon. Factoran, January 16, 1995

FACTS:

Former President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order Nos 211 and 279 in the exercise of her legislative
powers. EO No. 211 prescribes the interim procedures in the processing and approval of applications for
the exploration, development and utilization of minerals pursuant to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution. EO No. 279 authorizes the DENR Secretary to negotiate and conclude joint-venture, co-
production, or production- sharing agreements for the exploration, development, and utilization of
mineral resources.

The issuance and the impeding implementation by the DENR of Administrative Order Nos. 57 which
declares that all existing mining leases or agreements which were granted after the effectivity of the 1987
Constitution shall be converted into production-sharing agreements within one (1) year from the
effectivity of these guidelines.” and Administrative Order No. 82 which provides that a failure to submit
Letter of Intent and Mineral Production-Sharing Agreement within 2 years from the effectivity of the
Department Administrative Order No. 57 shall cause the abandonment of the mining, quarry, and sand
and gravel claims, after their respective effectivity dates compelled the Miners Association of the
Philippines, Inc., an organization composed of mining prospectors and claim owners and claim holders, to
file the instant petition assailing their validity and constitutionality before this Court.

ISSUE:

Are the two Department Administrative Orders valid?

HELD:

Yes. Petitioner's insistence on the application of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, as the
governing law on the acceptance and approval of declarations of location and all other kinds of
applications for the exploration, development, and utilization of mineral resources pursuant to Executive
Order No. 211, is erroneous.

Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, pertains to the old system of exploration, development and
utilization of natural resources through "license, concession or lease" which, however, has been
disallowed by Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. By virtue of the said constitutional mandate
and its implementing law, Executive Order No. 279 which superseded Executive Order No. 211, the
provisions dealing on "license, concession or lease" of mineral resources under Presidential Decree No.
463, as amended, and other existing mining laws are deemed repealed and, therefore, ceased to operate
as the governing law.

In other words, in all other areas of administration and management of mineral lands, the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, and other existing mining laws, still govern. Section 7 of
Executive Order No. 279 provides, thus:

Sec. 7. All provisions of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, other existing mining laws, and their
implementing rules and regulations, or parts thereof, which are not inconsistent with the provisions of this
Executive Order, shall continue in force and effect.
Well-settled is the rule, however, that regardless of the reservation clause, mining leases or agreements
granted by the State, such as those granted pursuant to Executive Order No. 211 referred to this petition,
are subject to alterations through a reasonable exercise of the police power of the State.
Accordingly, the State, in the exercise of its police power in this regard, may not be precluded by the
constitutional restriction on non-impairment of contract from altering, modifying and amending the
mining leases or agreements granted under Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, pursuant to
Executive Order No. 211.

Police Power, being co-extensive with the necessities of the case and the demands of public interest;
extends to all the vital public needs. The passage of Executive Order No. 279 which superseded Executive
Order No. 211 provided legal basis for the DENR Secretary to carry into effect the mandate of Article XII,
Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution.

The petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Gancayno vs. City Government of Quezon City, October 11, 2011

FACTS:

Retired Justice Emilio A. Gancayco bought a parcel of land located in EDSA, Quezon City. A few years later,
the Quezon City Council issued Ordinance No. 2904, entitled "An Ordinance Requiring the Construction of
Arcades, for Commercial Buildings to be Constructed in Zones Designated as Business Zones in the Zoning
Plan of Quezon City, and Providing Penalties in Violation Thereof.

It required the relevant property owner to construct an arcade along EDSA. An arcade is defined as any
portion of a building above the first-floor projecting over the sidewalk beyond the first storey wall used
as protection for pedestrians against rain or sun. It bears emphasis that at the time Ordinance No. 2904
was passed by the city council, there was yet no building code passed by the national legislature. Thus,
the regulation of the construction of buildings was left to the discretion of local government units.

Under this particular ordinance, the city council required that the arcade is to be created by constructing
the wall of the ground floor facing the sidewalk a few meters away from the property line. Thus, the
building owner is not allowed to construct his wall up to the edge of the property line, thereby creating a
space or shelter under the first floor. In effect, property owners relinquish the use of the space for use as
an arcade for pedestrians, instead of using it for their own purposes.

The ordinance covered the property of Justice Gancayco. Subsequently, Justice Gancayco sought the
exemption of a two-storey building being constructed on his property from the application of Ordinance
No. 2904 that he be exempted from constructing an arcade on his property. The City Council acted
favorably on Justice Gancayco’s request "subject to the condition that upon notice by the City Engineer,
the owner shall, within reasonable time, demolish the enclosure of said arcade at his own expense when
public interest so demands. "

The MMDA then sent a notice of demolition to Justice Gancayco alleging that a portion of his building
violated the National Building Code of the Philippines in relation to Ordinance No. 2904. He did not comply
with the notice. The MMDA then proceeded to demolish the party wall of the ground floorstructure. The
City Government of Quezon City claimed that the ordinance was a valid exercise of police power,
regulating the use of property in a business zone.

Justice Gancayco filed a Petition with prayer for a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction. The RTC ruled that the ordinance was unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals reversed the RTCs
decision and ruled that the ordinance was a valid exercise of the right of the local government unit to
promote the general welfare of its constituents pursuant to its police powers.

ISSUE:

Whether Ordinance No. 2094 is a valid exercise of police power.

HELD:

Yes, it is a valid delegation of Police Power. Police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. It has
been defined as the power vested by the Constitution in the legislature to make, ordain, and establish all
manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, either with penalties or without,
not repugnant to the Constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the
commonwealth, and for the subjects of the same.

The power is plenary and its scope is vast and pervasive, reaching and justifying measures for public
health, public safety, public morals, and the general welfare. In the exercise of police power, property
rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to fulfill the objectives of the
government. For this reason, when the conditions so demand as determined by the legislature, property
rights must bow to the primacy of police power because property rights, though sheltered by due process,
must yield to general welfare.

Police power as an attribute to promote the common good would be diluted considerably if on the mere
plea of petitioners that they will suffer loss of earnings and capital, the questioned provision is invalidated.
Moreover, in the absence of evidence demonstrating the alleged confiscatory effect of the provision in
question, there is no basis for its nullification in view of the presumption of validity which every law has
in its favor.

It is clear that the primary objectives of the city council of Quezon City when it issued the questioned
ordinance ordering the construction of arcades were the health and safety of the city and its inhabitants;
the promotion of their prosperity; and the improvement of their morals, peace, good order, comfort, and
the convenience. At the time that the ordinance was passed, there was no national building code enforced
to guide the city council; thus, there was no law of national application that prohibited the city council
from regulating the construction of buildings, arcades and sidewalks in their jurisdiction.

MMDA vs. Viron Transportation Co., Inc., August 15, 2007

FACTS:

On February 10, 2003 President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued Executive Order 179 "Providing for the
Establishment of Greater Manila Mass Transport System" which tasked the Metropolitan Manila
Development Authority or MMDA to undertake measures to ease traffic congestion in Metro Manila.
Thereupon, the MMDA recommended a plan to eliminate the bus terminals along major thoroughfares
through the provision of mass transport terminal facilities that would integrate existing transport varied
modes. The Metro Manila Council, the governing board and policy - making body of the MMDA, issued a
Resolution expressing support to the Project citing the need to remove the bus terminals located along
major thoroughfares in Metro Manila.

On February 24, 2003 the Viron Transport Co. Inc. filed a petition for declaratory relief before the RTC of
Manila, asking the Court to "construe the scope, extent, and limitation of the power of MMDA to regulate
traffic under R.A. No. 7924" or An Act Creating the MMDA. Defining its Powers and Functions, Providing
Funds Therefore and for Other Purposes. Viron also asked for a Ruling on whether the planned closure of
terminals contravenes the Public Service Act and related Laws.

Later, the Mencorp Transportion System Inc. filed a similar petition, asking the Court to declare the E.O.
unconstitutional and illegal over possessory rights with prayer for the issuance of temporary restraining
order and or writ of preliminary injunction to restrain closure proposal.

The Mencorp petition was incorporated with the Viron petition and raffled to RTC Manila of June 19, 2003.
The prayer for TRO and or Preliminary Injunction was denied. On January 24, 2005 the trial court sustained
the constitutionality and legality of the EO pursuant to RA 7924, ruling that 1. "the E.O. was a valid exercise
of the police power of the state as it satisfied the Two Tests" of Public Welfare and Lawful Means.

On September 8, 2005 the trial court reversed its decision ruling saying that (1) the EO was "an
unreasonable exercise of police power", (2) "that the authority of the MMDA under section (5) (e) of RA
7924 does not include the power to order the closure of existing bus terminals", and (3) "that the E.O is
incosistent with the provisions of Public Service Act".

Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied by a Resolution dated November 23, 2005. Hence the
Petition which faults the trial court.

ISSUE:

WON E.O. 179 issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on February 10, 2003 is unconstitutional as
it constitutes unreasonable exercise of police power.

HELD:

I. E.O. 179 IS ULTRA VIRES

Executive Order 179 has NO BASIS OF LAWS, or ULTRA VIRES.

By designating the MMDA as the implementing agency of the Project, the President clearly overstepped
the limits of the authority conferred by law, rendering E.O. 179 ULTRA VIRES.

Under the provision of E.O. No. 125 as amended, it is the DOTC and not the MMDA which is authorized to
establish and implement (the) project. Thus, the President must exercise the authority through the
instrumentality of the DOTC which is the PRIMARY implementing and administrative entity in the
promotion, development, and regulation of the networks of transportation and the one so authorizes to
establish and implement (the) project.

The authority of the President to order the implementation of the Project may not be sustained. It is
ULTRA VIRES there being NO LEGAL BASIS therefor.

II. NO AUTHORITY FROM RA.7924

Executive Order 179 is without legal basis from RA 7924, a law which declared the Metropolitan Manila
area as a "special development and administrative region" and placed the administration of "metro-wide"
basic services affecting the region under the MMDA.

Unlike the Legislative Bodies of the Local Government Units, there is NO PROVISION in R.A. 7924 that
empowers the MMDA or its Council to enact (anything) for the general welfare of the inhabitants of Metro
Manila. All its functions are ADMINISTRATIVE in nature, summed-up by its Charter itself specifically
Section 2. It follows that the MMDA cannot validly order the elimination of (any transport) terminal (in
Metro Manila).

III. E.O. 179 COMES SHORT OF VALID POLICE POWER

Even assuming arguendo that Police Power was delegated to the MMDA, its exercise of such power does
not satisfy the Two Sets of Police Power Measure, (1) the interest of the public welfare, and (2) the means
employed. Stated differently, the police power legislation must be firmly grounded on PUBLIC INTEREST
and WELFARE and a reasonable relation between the purpose and the means.

Thus, while it is beyond cavil that the motivating force behind the issuance of the E.O. is the interest of
the public in general, the questions are, are the means employed appropriate and reasonably necessary
for the accomplishment of the purpose -- are they not duly oppressive?

In Lucena Grand Central Terminal v. JAC Liner Inc. two Ordinances were passed by the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Lucena declaring that no other terminal shall be situated, constructed, maintained or
established inside or within the City of Lucena and declared as inoperable all temporary terminals therein.
The Ordinances were challenged for being unconstitutional on the ground that the measures constituted
an invalid exercise of police power, an undue taking of private property, and a violation of the
constitutional prohibition against monopolies.

Citing De la Cruz v. Paras, and Lupangco v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that the assailed Ordinances
were characterized by overbreadth as they went beyond what was reasonably necessary to solve the
traffic problem in the City while they make compulsory use of the Lucena Grand Terminal for fees, rentals,
and charges thus unduly oppressive.

The true rule of Constitutional Law is to effect an equilibrium between authority and liberty so the rights
are exercised within the framework of the law and the laws are enacted with due deference to rights.

IV. CONTRARY TO PUBLIC SERVICE ACT

An Order for the closure of respondents' terminal is not in line with the provisions of the Public Service
Act. Paragraph (a) Section 13 of Chapter II of the Public Service Act vested the Public Service Commission
with the "jurisdiction, supervision, and control over all public services and their franchises, equipment,
and other properties".
It is therefore the DOTC which has the power to establish and administer a transportation project like the
Project subject of the case at bar.

The Public Service Act is now section 5 of Executive Order No. 202 creating the Land Transportation
Franchising and Regulatory Board of LTFRB, and the Public Service Commission now the LTFRB.

Hon. Fernando vs. St. Scholastica’s College, March 12, 2013

FACTS:

Respondent SSC’s property is enclosed by a tall concrete perimeter fence. Marikina City enacted an
ordinance which provides that walls and fences shall not be built within a five-meter allowance between
the front monument line and the building line of an establishment.

The City Government of Marikina sent a letter to the respondents ordering them to demolish, replace,
and move back the fence. As a response, the respondents filed a petition for prohibition with an
application for a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order before the Regional Trial
Court of Marikina. The RTC granted the petition and the CA affirmed. Hence, this certiorari.

ISSSUE:

WON Marikina Ordinance No. 192, imposing a five-meter setback, is a valid exercise of police power.

HELD:

No. “Police power is the plenary power vested in the legislature to make statutes and ordinances to
promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people.”

Two tests have been used by the Court – the rational relationship test and the strict scrutiny test.

Under the rational relationship test, an ordinance must pass the following requisites: (1) the interests of
the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require its exercise; and (2) the
means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals.

Here, it was ascertained that the real intent of the setback requirement was to make the parking space
free for use by the public and not for the exclusive use of respondents. This would be tantamount to a
taking of private property for public use without just compensation. As for the objectives of prevention of
concealment of unlawful acts and “un-neighborliness” due to the walls and fences, the parking area is not
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of these goals.

The Court, thus, finds Section 5 of the Ordinance to be unreasonable and oppressive. Hence, the exercise
of police power is not valid.
 Planters Products, Inc. vs. FERTIPHIL Corporation, March 14, 2008

FACTS:

President Ferdinand Marcos, exercising his legislative powers, issued Letter of Instruction No. 1465 which
provided, among others, for the imposition of a capital recovery component (CRC) on the domestic sale
of all grades of fertilizers which resulted in having Fertiphil paying P10/bag sold to the Fertilizer and
Perticide Authority (FPA).

FPA remits its collection to Far East Bank and Trust Company who applies to the payment of corporate
debts of Planters Products Inc. (PPI).

After the EDSA Revolution, FPA voluntarily stopped the imposition of the P10 levy. Upon return of
democracy, Fertiphil demanded a refund but PPI refused. Fertiphil filed a complaint for collection and
damages against FPA and PPI with the RTC on the ground that LOI No. 1465 is unjust, unreasonable
oppressive, invalid and unlawful resulting to denial of due process of law.

FPA answered that it is a valid exercise of the police power of the state in ensuring the stability of the
fertilizing industry in the country and that Fertiphil did NOT sustain damages since the burden imposed
fell on the ultimate consumers.

RTC and CA favored Fertiphil holding that it is an exercise of the power of taxation and is as such because
it is NOT for public purpose as PPI is a private corporation.

ISSUES:

1. WON Fertiphil has locus standi

HELD:

1. Yes. In private suits, locus standi requires a litigant to be a "real party in interest" or party who stands
to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit. In public suits, there is the right of the ordinary
citizen to petition the courts to be freed from unlawful government intrusion and illegal official action
subject to the direct injury test or where there must be personal and substantial interest in the case such
that he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result. Being a mere procedural technicality, it has
also been held that locus standi may be waived in the public interest such as cases of transcendental
importance or with far-reaching implications whether private or public suit, Fertiphil has locus standi.

As a seller, Fertophil bore the ultimate burden of paying the levy which made its products more expensive
and harm its business. It is also of paramount public importance since it involves the constitutionality of a
tax law and use of taxes for public purpose.

2. Yes, LOI 1465 is an invalid exercise of the power of taxation.

Police power and the power of taxation are inherent powers of the state but they are distinct and have
different tests for validity.
Police power is the power of the state to enact the legislation that may interfere with personal liberty on
property in order to promote general welfare. While, the power of taxation is the power to levy taxes as
to be used for public purpose.

The main purpose of police power is the regulation of a behavior or conduct, while taxation is revenue
generation.

The lawful subjects and lawful means tests are used to determine the validity of a law enacted under the
police power. The power of taxation, on the other hand, is circumscribed by inherent and constitutional
limitations.

In this case, it is for purpose of revenue. But it is a robbery for the State to tax the citizen and use the
funds generation for a private purpose. Public purpose does NOT only pertain to those purpose which
are traditionally viewed as essentially governmental function such as building roads and delivery of basic
services, but also includes those purposes designed to promote social justice. Thus, public money may
now be used for the relocation of illegal settlers, low-cost housing and urban or agrarian reform.

Lessons Applicable: Between private and public suits, it is easier to file a public suit, Apply real party in
interest test for private suit and direct injury test for public suit, validity test varies depending on which
inherent power

City of Manila vs. Hon. Laguio, Jr., April 12, 2005

FACTS:

Private respondent Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC) is a corporation engaged in the
business of operating hotels, motels, hostels and lodging houses. It built and opened Victoria Court in
Malate which was licensed as a motel although duly accredited with the DOT as a hotel.

On 28 June 1993, MTDC filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order with the lower court impleading as defendants, herein
petitioners City of Manila, Hon. Alfredo S. Lim (Lim), Hon. Joselito L. Atienza, and the members of the City
Council of Manila (City Council). MTDC prayed that the Ordinance, insofar as it includes motels and inns
as among its prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and unconstitutional.

Enacted by the City Council and approved by petitioner City Mayor, the said Ordinance is entitled–

AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF BUSINESSES PROVIDING CERTAIN

Judge Laguio rendered the assailed Decision (in favour of respondent).

On 11 January 1995, petitioners filed the present Petition, alleging that the following errors were
committed by the lower court in its ruling:
(1) It erred in concluding that the subject ordinance is ultra vires, or otherwise, unfair, unreasonable and
oppressive exercise of police power;
(2) It erred in holding that the questioned Ordinance contravenes P.D. 499 which allows operators of all
kinds of commercial establishments, except those specified therein; and
(3) It erred in declaring the Ordinance void and unconstitutional.

ISSUE:

WON the ordinance is unconstitutional.

HELD:

Yes. the ordinance is unconstitutional. The Court affirms that the lower court did not err in declaring the
Ordinance ultra vires and therefore null and void.

The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has held that for an ordinance
to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and
must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following
substantive requirements:

(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;

The Ordinance was passed by the City Council in the exercise of its police power, an enactment of the City
Council acting as agent of Congress. This delegated police power is found in Section 16 of the LGC, known
as the general welfare clause.

The inquiry in this Petition is concerned with the validity of the exercise of such delegated power.

A. The Ordinance contravenes the Constitution

The enactment of the Ordinance was an invalid exercise of delegated power as it is unconstitutional and
repugnant to general laws.

The police power granted to LGUs must always be exercised with utmost observance of the rights of the
people to due process and equal protection of the law. Due process requires the intrinsic validity of the
law in interfering with the rights of the person to his life, liberty and property.

Requisites for the valid exercise of Police Power are not met.

To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for the enactment of the Ordinance,
and to free it from the imputation of constitutional infirmity, not only must it appear that the interests of
the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with private
rights, but the means adopted must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and
not unduly oppressive upon individuals. It must be evident that no other alternative for the
accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. A reasonable relation must exist
between the purposes of the police measure and the means employed for its accomplishment, for even
under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property
will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.

Lacking a concurrence of these two requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary
intrusion into private rights and a violation of the due process clause.

The object of the Ordinance was, accordingly, the promotion and protection of the social and moral
values of the community. Granting for the sake of argument that the objectives of the Ordinance are
within the scope of the City Council’s police powers, the means employed for the accomplishment thereof
were unreasonable and unduly oppressive.

The worthy aim of fostering public morals and the eradication of the community’s social ills can be
achieved through means less restrictive of private rights; it can be attained by reasonable restrictions
rather than by an absolute prohibition. The closing down and transfer of businesses or their conversion
into businesses “allowed” under the Ordinance have no reasonable relation to the accomplishment of its
purposes. Otherwise stated, the prohibition of the enumerated establishments will not per se protect and
promote the social and moral welfare of the community; it will not in itself eradicate the alluded social ills
of prostitution, adultery, fornication nor will it arrest the spread of sexual disease in Manila.

The enumerated establishments are lawful pursuits which are not per se offensive to the moral welfare
of the community. While a motel may be used as a venue for immoral sexual activity, it cannot for that
reason alone be punished. It cannot be classified as a house of ill-repute or as a nuisance per se on a mere
likelihood or a naked assumption.

If the City of Manila so desires to put an end to prostitution, fornication and other social ills, it can instead
impose reasonable regulations such as daily inspections of the establishments for any violation of the
conditions of their licenses or permits; it may exercise its authority to suspend or revoke their licenses for
these violations; and it may even impose increased license fees. In other words, there are other means to
reasonably accomplish the desired end.

It is readily apparent that the means employed by the Ordinance for the achievement of its purposes, the
governmental interference itself, infringes on the constitutional guarantees of a person’s fundamental
right to liberty and property.

Modality employed is unlawful taking

It is an ordinance which permanently restricts the use of property that it cannot be used for any
reasonable purpose goes beyond regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the property without
just compensation. It is intrusive and violative of the private property rights of individuals.

There are two different types of taking that can be identified. A “possessory” taking occurs when the
government confiscates or physically occupies property. A “regulatory” taking occurs when the
government’s regulation leaves no reasonable economically viable use of the property.
What is crucial in judicial consideration of regulatory takings is that government regulation is a taking if it
leaves no reasonable economically viable use of property in a manner that interferes with reasonable
expectations for use. When the owner of real property has been called upon to sacrifice all economically
beneficial uses in the name of the common good, that is, to leave his property economically idle, he has
suffered a taking.

The Ordinance gives the owners and operators of the “prohibited” establishments three (3) months from
its approval within which to “wind up business operations or to transfer to any place outside of the Ermita-
Malate area or convert said businesses to other kinds of business allowable within the area.” The directive
to “wind up business operations” amounts to a closure of the establishment, a permanent deprivation of
property, and is practically confiscatory. Unless the owner converts his establishment to accommodate
an “allowed” business, the structure which housed the previous business will be left empty and gathering
dust. It is apparent that the Ordinance leaves no reasonable economically viable use of property in a
manner that interferes with reasonable expectations for use.

The second and third options to transfer to any place outside of the Ermita-Malate area or to convert into
allowed businesses are confiscatory as well. The penalty of permanent closure in cases of subsequent
violations found in Section 4 of the Ordinance is also equivalent to a “taking” of private property.

Petitioners cannot take refuge in classifying the measure as a zoning ordinance. A zoning ordinance,
although a valid exercise of police power, which limits a “wholesome” property to a use which cannot
reasonably be made of it constitutes the taking of such property without just compensation. Private
property which is not noxious nor intended for noxious purposes may not, by zoning, be destroyed
without compensation. Such principle finds no support in the principles of justice as we know them. The
police powers of local government units which have always received broad and liberal interpretation
cannot be stretched to cover this particular taking.

Further, The Ordinance confers upon the mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to close down
establishments. Ordinances such as this, which make possible abuses in its execution, depending upon no
conditions or qualifications whatsoever other than the unregulated arbitrary will of the city authorities as
the touchstone by which its validity is to be tested, are unreasonable and invalid. The Ordinance should
have established a rule by which its impartial enforcement could be secured. Similarly, the Ordinance does
not specify the standards to ascertain which establishments “tend to disturb the community,” “annoy the
inhabitants,” and “adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the community.”

The cited case supports the nullification of the Ordinance for lack of comprehensible standards to guide
the law enforcers in carrying out its provisions.

Petitioners cannot therefore order the closure of the enumerated establishments without infringing the
due process clause. These lawful establishments may be regulated, but not prevented from carrying on
their business.

B. The Ordinance violates Equal Protection Clause

In the Court’s view, there are no substantial distinctions between motels, inns, pension houses, hotels,
lodging houses or other similar establishments. By definition, all are commercial establishments providing
lodging and usually meals and other services for the public. No reason exists for prohibiting motels and
inns but not pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments. The classification in
the instant case is invalid as similar subjects are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and
obligations imposed. It is arbitrary as it does not rest on substantial distinctions bearing a just and fair
relation to the purpose of the Ordinance.

The Court likewise cannot see the logic for prohibiting the business and operation of motels in the Ermita-
Malate area but not outside of this area. A noxious establishment does not become any less noxious if
located outside the area.

The standard “where women are used as tools for entertainment” is also discriminatory as prostitution
one of the hinted ills the Ordinance aims to banish is not a profession exclusive to women. Both men and
women have an equal propensity to engage in prostitution. Thus, the discrimination is invalid.

C. The Ordinance is repugnant to general laws; it is ultra vires

The Ordinance is in contravention of the Code (Sec 458) as the latter merely empowers local government
units to regulate, and not prohibit, the establishments enumerated in Section 1 thereof.

With respect to cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses, and
other similar establishments, the only power of the City Council to legislate relative thereto is to regulate
them to promote the general welfare. The Code still withholds from cities the power to suppress and
prohibit altogether the establishment, operation and maintenance of such establishments.

It is well to point out that petitioners also cannot seek cover under the general welfare clause authorizing
the abatement of nuisances without judicial proceedings. That tenet applies to a nuisance per se, or one
which affects the immediate safety of persons and property and may be summarily abated under the
undefined law of necessity. It cannot be said that motels are injurious to the rights of property, health or
comfort of the community. It is a legitimate business. If it be a nuisance per accidens it may be so proven
in a hearing conducted for that purpose. A motel is not per se a nuisance warranting its summary
abatement without judicial intervention.

Not only does the Ordinance contravene the Code, it likewise runs counter to the provisions of P.D. 499.
As correctly argued by MTDC, the statute had already converted the residential Ermita-Malate area into
a commercial area. The decree allowed the establishment and operation of all kinds of commercial
establishments except warehouse or open storage depot, dump or yard, motor repair shop, gasoline
service station, light industry with any machinery or funeral establishment. The rule is that for an
ordinance to be valid and to have force and effect, it must not only be within the powers of the council to
enact but the same must not be in conflict with or repugnant to the general law.

Conclusion

All considered, the Ordinance invades fundamental personal and property rights and impairs personal
privileges. It is constitutionally infirm. The Ordinance contravenes statutes; it is discriminatory and
unreasonable in its operation; it is not sufficiently detailed and explicit that abuses may attend the
enforcement of its sanctions. And not to be forgotten, the City Council under the Code had no power to
enact the Ordinance and is therefore ultra vires, null and void.

Petition Denied.
 Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc. vs. JAC Liner Inc., February 23, 2005

FACTS:

The City of Lucena enacted an ordinance which provides, inter alia, that: (a) all buses, mini-buses and out-
of-town passenger jeepneys shall be prohibited from entering the city and are hereby directed to proceed
to the common terminal, for picking-up and/or dropping of their passengers; and (b) all temporary
terminals in the City of Lucena are hereby declared inoperable starting from the effectivity of this
ordinance. It also provides that all jeepneys, mini-buses, and buses shall use the grand central terminal of
the city.

JAC Liner, Inc. assailed the city ordinance as unconstitutional on the ground that, inter alia, the same
constituted an invalid exercise of police power, an undue taking of private property, and a violation of the
constitutional prohibition against monopolies.

ISSUE:

WON the ordinance satisfies the requisites of valid exercise of police power, i.e. (that is) lawful subject
and lawful means.

HELD:

No. the ordinance does not satisfy the requisites of valid exercise of police power.

The local government may be considered as having properly exercised its police power only if the
following requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require the interference of the State, and (2) the means employed are reasonably
necessary for the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals. Otherwise stated, there must be a concurrence of a lawful subject and lawful method.

The questioned ordinances having been enacted with the objective of relieving traffic congestion in the
City of Lucena, involve public interest warranting the interference of the State. The first requisite for the
proper exercise of police power is thus present. This leaves for determination the issue of whether the
means employed by the Lucena Sangguniang Panlungsod to attain its professed objective were reasonably
necessary and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.

The ordinances assailed herein are characterized by overbreadth. They go beyond what is reasonably
necessary to solve the traffic problem. Additionally, since the compulsory use of the terminal operated by
petitioner would subject the users thereof to fees, rentals and charges, such measure is unduly
oppressive, as correctly found by the appellate court. What should have been done was to determine
exactly where the problem lies and then to stop it right there.

The true role of Constitutional Law is to effect an equilibrium between authority and liberty so that rights
are exercised within the framework of the law and the laws are enacted with due deference to rights. It
is its reasonableness, not its effectiveness, which bears upon its constitutionality. If the constitutionality
of a law were measured by its effectiveness, then even tyrannical laws may be justified whenever they
happen to be effective.
 DECS vs. San Diego, December 21, 1989

FACTS:

The private respondent is a graduate of the University of the East with a degree of Bachelor of Science in
Zoology. The petitioner claims that he took the NMAT three times and flunked it as many times.

When he applied to take it again, the petitioner rejected his application on the basis of the NMAT Rule
which provides that a student shall be allowed only three (3) chances to take the test. After three
successive failures, a student shall not be allowed to take the NMAT for the fourth time. He then went to
the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, to compel his admission to the test. After hearing,
the respondent judge rendered a decision on July 4, 1989, declaring the challenged order invalid and
granting the petition. The Regional Trial Court held that the petitioner had been deprived of his right to
pursue a medical education through an arbitrary exercise of the police power.

ISSUE:

WON the respondent has been deprived of his right to quality education.

HELD:

Police power is validly exercised if (a) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of
a particular class, require the interference of the State, and (b) the means employed are reasonably
necessary to the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals.

In other words, the proper exercise of the police power requires the concurrence of a lawful subject and
a lawful method.

The subject of the challenged regulation is certainly within the ambit of the police power. It is the right
and indeed the responsibility of the State to ensure that the medical profession is not infiltrated by
incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrust their lives and health.

The method employed by the challenged regulation is not irrelevant to the purpose of the law nor is it
arbitrary or oppressive. The three-flunk rule is intended to insulate the medical schools and ultimately the
medical profession from the intrusion of those not qualified to be doctors.

While every per son is entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he does not have a constitutional right to be a
doctor. This is true of any other calling in which the public interest is involved; and the closer the link, the
longer the bridge to one's ambition. The State has the responsibility to harness its human resources and
to see to it that they are not dissipated or, no less worse, not used at all. These resources must be applied
in a manner that will best promote the common good while also giving the individual a sense of
satisfaction.

A person cannot insist on being a physician if he will be a menace to his patients. The Court feels that it is
not enough to simply invoke the right to quality education as a guarantee of the Constitution: one must
show that he is entitled to it because of his preparation and promise. The private respondent has failed
the NMAT five times. While his persistence is noteworthy, to say the least, it is certainly misplaced, like a
hopeless love.

RULING:

NMAT is a measure intended to limit the admission to medical schools to those who have initially proved
their competence and preparation for a medical education. The regulation of practice of medicine is a
reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of the public. This regulation includes the power
to regulate admission to the ranks of those authorized to practice medicine. NMAT is a means of achieving
the country’s objective of “upgrading the selection of applicants into medical schools” and of “improving
the quality of medical education in the country” It is the responsibility of the State to insure that the
medical profession is not infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrust their lives
and health.

The right to quality education is not absolute. The Constitution provides that every citizen has the right to
choose a profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and academic
requirement.

The equal protection requires equality among equals. There would be unequal protection if some
applicants who have passed the tests are admitted and others who have also qualified are denied
entrance.

Ynot vs. IAC, March 20, 1987

FACTS:

Petitioner in this case transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo on January 13, 1984,
when they were confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo for the violation of
E.O. No. 626-A which prohibits the slaughter of carabaos except under certain conditions.

Petitioner sued for recovery, and the trial Court of Iloilo issued a writ of replevin upon his filing of a
supersedeas bond of twelve thousand pesos (P 12, 000.00). After considering the merits of the case, the
court sustained the confiscation of the said carabaos and, since they could no longer be produced, ordered
the confiscation of the bond. The court also declined to rule on the constitutionality of the E.O, as raised
by the petitioner, for lack of authority and also for its presumed validity.

ISSUE:

WON the said Executive Order is unconstitutional.

RULING:

Yes, E.O. No. 626-A is unconstitutional. Although police power was invoked by the government in this case
for the reason that the present condition demand that the carabaos and the buffaloes be conserved for
the benefit of the small farmers who rely on them for energy needs, it does not however, comply with the
second requisite for a valid exercise of the said power which is, "that there be a lawful method."
The reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the
questioned measure is missing.

The challenged measure is an invalid exercise of police power because the method employed to conserve
the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. To
justify the State in the imposition of its authority in behalf of the public, it must be:

1) The interest of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such
interference;
2) that the means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not
unduly oppressive upon individuals.

Gerochi vs. DOE, July 17, 2007

FACTS:

On June 8, 2001, Congress enacted RA 9136 or the Electric Power Industry Act of 2001.

Petitioners Romeo P. Gerochi and company assail the validity of Section 34 of the EPIRA Law for being an
undue delegation of the power of taxation. Section 34 provides for the imposition of a “Universal Charge”
to all electricity end users after a period of (1) one year after the effectivity of the EPIRA Law.

The universal charge to be collected would serve as payment for government debts, missionary
electrification, equalization of taxes and royalties applied to renewable energy and imported energy,
environmental charge and for a charge to account for all forms of cross subsidies for a period not
exceeding three years. The universal charge shall be collected by the Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC)
on a monthly basis from all end users and will then be managed by the PSALM Corp. through the creation
of a special trust fund.

ISSUE:

WON there is an undue delegation of the power to tax on the part of the ERC.

HELD:

No, the universal charge as provided for in section 34 is not a tax but an exaction of the regulatory power
(police power) of the state. The universal charge under section 34 is incidental to the regulatory duties of
the ERC, hence the provision assailed is not for generation of revenue and therefore it cannot be
considered as tax, but an execution of the states police power thru regulation.

Moreover, the amount collected is not made certain by the ERC, but by the legislative parameters
provided for in the law (RA 9136) itself, it therefore cannot be understood as a rule solely coming from
the ERC. The ERC in this case is only a specialized administrative agency which is tasked of executing a
subordinate legislation issued by congress; which before execution must pass both the completeness test
and the sufficiency of standard test.
The court in appreciating Section 34 of RA 9136 in its entirety finds the said law and the assailed portions
free from any constitutional defect and thus deemed complete and sufficient in form.

Commonwealth vs. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush) 53 (1851)

Parties
The defendant, Alger, was a Boston resident who owned property along the Boston harbor; the Plaintiff is
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.

Relevant statutes
There are two statutes involved in this case.

Colony Ordinance of 1647 which stated that owners of waterfront property also owned the adjoining land
above the low water mark and within 100 rods of the land, with power to erect wharves and other buildings
thereon; subject to the reasonable use of other individuals and of the public's ability to navigate.
Construction was also subject to the restraints and limitations as the legislature may see fit to impose for
the preservation and protection of public and private rights. 61 Mass. 53 (1851).

Massachusetts legislature enacted a subsequent statute pursuant to the Colony Ordinance of 1647 which
established lines in the Boston harbor limiting how far out wharves may extend. The statutes stated that
if a wharf extended beyond an established line, then it will be considered a public nuisance. In establishing
these lines, the legislature overruled the Colony Ordinance of 1647 which allowed owners of Harbor-front
land to build a wharf extending 100 rods into the harbor.

Story (FACTS):

In this case, Alger (Defendant) built a wharf in the Boston Harbor that extended beyond a line established
by the Massachusetts legislature. Alger's wharf was otherwise within the geographical limits of the colony
ordinance of 1647 and it did not impede or obstruct the public's navigation.

ISSUE:

The issue in Commonwealth v. Alger is "What are the just powers of the legislature to limit, control, or
regulate the exercises and enjoyment of a property owner's rights." 61 Mass. 53, 65 (1851). In short, when,
if ever can a regulation be a taking?

HELD:

The Massachusetts Supreme Court held the Massachusetts Legislature's statutes creating the lines was
constitutional law, and the legislature had the authority to make that statute; the statute establishing the
line was binding on Alger and he violated the line. Id. at 102.

Sources of regulatory power

Justice Shaw held it is settled principle that, "every holder of property...holds it under the implied liability
that his use of it may be so regulated, that it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having
an equal right to the enjoyment of their property, not injurious to the rights of the community." Id. at 84.
Police power today is, "generally, but vaguely understood in American jurisprudence to refer to state
regulatory power," but really encompasses more. 58 U. Miami L. Rev. 471, 473(2004). In an attempt to
define police power, Shaw stated, "the government's power to enact such regulations for the good and
welfare of the community as it sees fit, subject to the limitations that the regulation be both reasonable
and constitutional." Id. at 479-80. Shaw goes on to explain that, "It is much easier to perceive and realize
the existence and sources of this power, then to mark its boundaries, or prescribe limits to its exercise."
61 Mass 53, 85(1851).

Eminent domain vs. police power

Most notably, the court also attempts to differentiate between eminent domain and police power. In
what is often referred to as the most important paragraph of the opinion, the court explains that police
power, "is very different from the right of eminent domain, the right of a government to take and
appropriate private property to public use, whenever the public exigency requires it; which can be done
only on condition of providing a reasonable compensation therefore; the power we allude to is rather the
police power, the power vested in the legislature by the constitution, to make, ordain, and establish all
manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinance, either with penalties or without, not
repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth,
and of the subjects of the same."

It is often hard to distinguish between police power and eminent domain. Professor Benjamin Barros
states, "Shaw's attempt to make a principled distinction between eminent domain and the police power
was understandable. In the 19th century, it was widely accepted that just compensation was required
only for physical takings, and regulatory restraints on property were generally considered to be outside
of the scope of the Takings clause. Categorizing the law that prohibited Alger from building his wharf as a
regulation allowed Shaw to deny Alger's claim for compensation. By using the new term 'police power,'
Shaw tried to explain this rule in terms of two distinct government powers, each serving a different
purpose." 58 U. Miami L. Rev. 471, 480-81(2004). Shaw provides obvious uses of police power, such as
prohibiting the use of warehouses for the storage of gunpowder when the warehouses are located near
homes or highways, placing restraints on the height of wooden buildings in crowded areas and requiring
them to be covered with incombustible material, and prohibiting buildings from being used as hospitals
for contagious diseases or carrying on of noxious or offensive trades. 61 Mass. 53, 85-86(1851).

Justice Shaw reasoned the Massachusetts statute was, "not an appropriation of the property to a public
use, but the restraint of an injurious private use by the owner, and is therefore not within the principle of
property taken under the right of eminent domain." Id. at 86. Shaw also thought the court's holding in
this case would promote certainty, "Things done may or may not be wrong in themselves, or necessarily
injurious and punishable as such at common law; but laws are passed declaring them offenses, and making
them punishable, because they tend to injurious consequences; but more especially for the sake of having
a definite, known and authoritative rule which all can understand and obey." 58 U. Miami L. Rev. 471, 481
(2004). Shaw gave an example of the certainty outcome he expected to obtain with this holding: "The
trademan needs to know, before incurring expenses, how near he may build his works without violating
the law or committing a nuisance; builders of houses to know, to what distance they must keep from the
obnoxious works already erected, in order to be sure of the protection of the law for their habitations;
this requisite certainty and precision can only be obtained by a positive enactment...enforcing the rule
thus fixed, by penalties." 61 Mass. 53, 96-97 (1851). Applying this reasoning to the facts in Alger, Professor
Barros concluded that, "the law challenged in Alger thus legitimately established a point beyond which
wharves could not be built, and Alger's wharf was subject to such regulation even though it was not
intrinsically harmful." 58 U. Miami L. Rev. 471, 482 (2004).

Compensation

Justice Shaw states that even though these prohibitions and restraints resulting from the Massachusetts
statute may diminish the profits of the owner, the owners are not entitled to compensation because they
are exercises of police power. (61 Mass. 53, 86). Justice Shaw's statement regarding compensation was
generally accepted doctrine at the time, namely that the obligation to compensate was limited to
exercises of eminent domain. 58 U. Miami L. Rev 471, 480(2004). However, passage of time "would show
this rule to be flawed." Id. at 481.

Manila Memorial Park, Inc. vs. Secretary of Social Welfare and Development, December 03, 2013

TOPIC: Bill of Rights; Eminent Domain v. Police Power

FACTS:

RA 7432 was passed into law (amended by RA 9257), granting senior citizens 20% discount on certain
establishments.

To implement the tax provisions of RA 9257, the Secretary of Finance and the DSWD issued its own Rules
and Regulations.

Hence, this petition.

Petitioners are not questioning the 20% discount granted to senior citizens but are only assailing the
constitutionality of the tax deduction scheme prescribed under RA 9257 and the implementing rules and
regulations issued by the DSWD and the DOF.

Petitioners posit that the tax deduction scheme contravenes Article III, Section 9 of the Constitution, which
provides that: "private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation."

Respondents maintain that the tax deduction scheme is a legitimate exercise of the State’s police power.

ISSUE:

Whether the legally mandated 20% senior citizen discount is an exercise of police power or eminent
domain.

RULING:

The 20% senior citizen discount is an exercise of police power.

It may not always be easy to determine whether a challenged governmental act is an exercise of police
power or eminent domain. The judicious approach, therefore, is to look at the nature and effects of the
challenged governmental act and decide on the basis thereof.
The 20% discount is intended to improve the welfare of senior citizens who, at their age, are less likely to
be gainfully employed, more prone to illnesses and other disabilities, and, thus, in need of subsidy in
purchasing basic commodities. It serves to honor senior citizens who presumably spent their lives on
contributing to the development and progress of the nation.

In turn, the subject regulation affects the pricing, and, hence, the profitability of a private establishment.

The subject regulation may be said to be similar to, but with substantial distinctions from, price control or
rate of return-on-investment control laws which are traditionally regarded as police power measures.

The subject regulation differs from that of eminent domain because (1) the discount does not prevent the
establishments from adjusting the level of prices of their goods and services, and (2) the discount does
not apply to all customers of a given establishment but only to the class of senior citizens.

Nonetheless, to the degree material to the resolution of this case, the 20% discount may be properly
viewed as belonging to the category of price regulatory measures which affect the profitability of
establishments subjected to it. On its face, therefore, the subject regulation is a police power measure.